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THE  
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MODERN HISTORY

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## PREFACE

THE Ninth Volume of this work naturally takes its title from the name of the man whose actions form the principal part of its theme. No other period in Modern History—or other historical period, it may be said, except those of Alexander the Great, of Julius Cæsar, and of Charlemagne—was so completely dominated by a single personality. The ages of Charles the Fifth and of Louis the Fourteenth may in some respects be compared with that of Napoleon; but in neither was the personal influence of the sovereign so overpowering; in neither was the supremacy of the State or group of States under his immediate control so extensive or so decided. Moreover, the ascendancy of Charles the Fifth was mainly due to the agglomeration of vast and wealthy territories in the hand of a monarch to whom they passed by hereditary descent; while that of Louis the Fourteenth was rather the work of predecessors and subordinates than his own. Napoleon, on the contrary, was not only the architect of his own fortunes, but the prime creator of that enormous power with which he crowned Europe. If, again, the personalities of Alexander, Julius, and Charlemagne dominated their epochs as did that of Napoleon, the areas over which they bore sway were not comparable with that directly or indirectly affected by Napoleon's power. Never before had the whole of Europe, from the Ural to the Atlantic, from Archangel to Cape Matapan, been knit together in one vast partnership of strife or subjugation; never before had the fortunes of all the nations of the West depended upon the fate of one man. Nor was Europe alone concerned in the success or failure of his far-reaching ambitions: vast regions of Asia, Africa, and America were drawn into the conflict in which they gave rise. If it has been reserved for statesmen of our own time to speak with truth of *Weltpolitik*; if, in the latter days of the nineteenth century, the whole world for the first time felt the

mental action and reaction of all-embracing political forces, the opening years of that century witnessed a marked advance towards such a consummation; and that advance was, in the main, the work of Napoleon.

The period covered by this volume is but little longer than that covered by its immediate predecessor. No event in Modern History can be said to possess greater significance than the French Revolution; but the consequences of that event beyond the borders of France would have been comparatively slight, had not the forces which it engendered been gathered up in one hand, and launched under the direction of a single will against the antiquated politics of Europe. This is not the place to discuss the effects of an impact whose force, however developed or distorted, is not yet exhausted; we need only remark that, if many of the ideas which have been most potent in nineteenth-century Europe first sprang into practical life in revolutionary France, it is principally to Napoleon that they owe their diffusion. The historical events narrated in this volume possess, through this fact and through the dominance of an overwhelming personality, a cohesion, a unity, which no preceding period of Modern History can claim. They unfold themselves with dramatic continuity, as a great tragedy played out upon the stage of the world, exhibiting the rise and development, the triumph, and the fall of a personage whose actions and fortunes, from first to last, dominate the plot.

The estimates of Napoleon's character, and the valuations of his work, have varied, and will always vary, as widely as do the temper and opinions of his judges. It will not be expected that a work of this nature should add to the number of these judgments; our task is rather to lay before our readers an impartial survey of the facts on which any fair conclusion must rest. That Napoleon, during the greater part of his life, was hostile to this country will not, after the lapse of nearly a century, blind Englishmen to his greatness; and friendship has happily taken the place of our prolonged and often bitter rivalry with the country over which he ruled. Nor should it be forgotten that the struggle with Napoleon, besides sowing the seeds of national revival and political reformation throughout Europe, had another result of happy augury for the future. If Great Britain bore the leading part in that struggle; if, in the words of Pitt, having saved herself by her exertions, she saved Europe by her example, it is

equally true that final victory could never have been gained by the efforts, however persistent, of a single State. It was to Europe in arms that the conqueror of Europe succumbed; and victory in war was immediately followed by a combined effort to ensure the continuance of peace. The Congress of Vienna was the first occasion on which all the Powers of Europe met to settle international affairs by peaceful deliberation. The political unity which marks the epoch reached its climax in that assembly; and, however disquieted was the success of that first experiment, it has borne remarkable fruit. The peace of Europe has frequently been broken since 1815; the European Concert has often failed; but pacific statesmen have striven throughout the last century to follow the example set at Vienna, as the best means of avoiding war. This is not the least of the benefits that may be traced to the hand of Napoleon.

To all our contributors, especially to those foreign writers of distinction whose aid we have been fortunate enough to obtain, we express our hearty thanks. To them and to our readers we owe an apology for the delay in the appearance of this volume; but we need not enumerate the unexpected difficulties to which that delay has been due. We desire to express our gratitude to the Right-Hon. Sir A. C. Lyell, B.C.S., and to Sir Charles Lyell, B.C.S.L., for assistance kindly rendered in regard to Indian words and some facts of Indian history. The system adopted in the spelling and accentuation of Indian names is based on that of Sir William Hunter, but modified in the case of certain forms on which use and convention seem to have conferred a prescriptive right. We are also grateful to Dr Charles Schmidt for a valuable note on the contents of the National Archives in Paris; and to Professor Faidat for most kindly revising the entries of the French books in the copious bibliography.

The next volume to be published (Vol. IV) is far advanced, and will, it is hoped, appear in the course of the next few months.

A. W. W.  
G. W. P.  
S. L.

Cambridge,

April, 1890.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

## CHAPTER I.

## THE CONSULATE, 1799-1804. ✓

By GEORGE FARRER, Doctor in Letters, Professor of Modern History in the University of Kansas.

	PAGES
Politics and policy of the Consuls . . . . .	1
Finance. The Consuls . . . . .	2
The Constitution. Views of Sieyès . . . . .	3
Discussions. Intervention of Bonaparte . . . . .	4
<u>The Constitution of the year VIII.</u> . . . . .	5
The Assembly and the executive . . . . .	6
The Consuls. Arrangements for the Palace . . . . .	7
Composition of the Assembly . . . . .	8
The Council of State . . . . .	9
The great officers of State . . . . .	20
General Board. <u>Politics of the year VIII.</u> . . . . .	21
Local government. The Prefects . . . . .	22
Bonaparte's attitude. <u>Evolution of the west</u> . . . . .	23
Royalists and republicans . . . . .	24
Jacobins. Emigrés. Italian campaign . . . . .	25
Chouanerie suppressed. Republican Opposition . . . . .	26
Royalist plots. <u>Sketch of Bonaparte's life</u> . . . . .	27
Treaty of Lunéville. Assassination project . . . . .	28
Amnesty. Capital for life . . . . .	29
The Legion of Honour . . . . .	30
Military conspiracy. " <u>Liber plot</u> " . . . . .	31
Politics and Constitution of the year IX . . . . .	32
The Assembly. The electorate . . . . .	33
The Imperial Court. French society . . . . .	34
Provincial society. Finance. Public debt . . . . .	35
Public Receipts and Expenditure . . . . .	36
Taxes. The budget. The Bank of France . . . . .	37
Respect of the war with England . . . . .	38
Colomb's conspiracy . . . . .	39
Discovery of Colomb's plot . . . . .	40
Arrest and execution of the Duc d'Angoulême . . . . .	41
Establishment of the Empire. <u>Politics of 1804</u> . . . . .	42
Results of the Consulate . . . . .	43



## CHAPTER II.

### THE ARMED NEUTRALITY, 1780-1800.

SECT. I. By the Rev. T. A. Walker, M.A., LL.D., Fellow  
and Tutor of Peterhouse, Cambridge.

SECT. II. By H. W. Wilson, B.A., Trinity College, Oxford.

	PAGE
Early life and education of Paul I . . . . .	56
Accession of Paul I. Changes at Court . . . . .	57
Early policy of Paul . . . . .	58
Russia and Sweden . . . . .	57
Swedish policy of Gustavus III . . . . .	59
Paul I and the Knights of St John . . . . .	60
Russia and France . . . . .	60
Russia, Austria, and England . . . . .	61
Origin of the First Armed Neutrality . . . . .	62
The First Armed Neutrality . . . . .	63
Failure of the First Armed Neutrality . . . . .	64
Sweden, Denmark, and Great Britain . . . . .	65
Origin of the Second Armed Neutrality . . . . .	66
The Second Armed Neutrality . . . . .	67
Paul I and Bonaparte . . . . .	68
Tyranny of Paul I . . . . .	69
Death of Paul I. End of the Armed Armed Neutrality . . . . .	70
Russian plan of operations in the Baltic . . . . .	71
Battle of Copenhagen . . . . .	72
The Channel and the Mediterranean . . . . .	73
Bonaparte's two retreats . . . . .	74



## CHAPTER III.

### THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE, 1795-1802.

By ARTHUR GUILLON, *Licencié en lettres*, Professor of History at  
the École polytechnique Supérieure of Zurich.

Changes in nature of the war with Europe . . . . .	85
Characterisation of the war . . . . .	86
Peace of Bonaparte . . . . .	87
The war in Germany and Italy . . . . .	88
Napoleon's invasion of Italy . . . . .	89
The passage of the St Bernard . . . . .	90
Bonaparte in Lombardy . . . . .	91
The battle of Marengo . . . . .	92
Results of the battle . . . . .	93
Morot's marches in Germany . . . . .	94
Armistice and negotiation . . . . .	95

Negotiations broken off . . . . .	44
The battle of Hohenlinden . . . . .	47
French successes in Italy . . . . .	48
The Peace of Lunéville . . . . .	49
Napoleon's plans against Great Britain . . . . .	50
Influences for and against peace . . . . .	51
Spain, Portugal, and Egypt . . . . .	52
Sanctification of Great Britain and Russia . . . . .	53
Position and aims of Napoleon . . . . .	54
Signature of preliminary of peace . . . . .	55
Discontents at Austria . . . . .	56
The Peace of Amiens . . . . .	57
French treaties with Prussia and Russia . . . . .	58
Impressions of the Peace . . . . .	59
Provisional nature of the Peace . . . . .	60

## ✓ CHAPTER IV.

### FRANCE AND HER TRIBUTARIES, 1800-2.

By Professor GILLMAN.

Julien closes Great France . . . . .	61
Napoleon's Italian policy . . . . .	62
Finland and the new Republic . . . . .	63
Organization of the Cisalpine Republic . . . . .	64
Napoleon becomes President . . . . .	65
Government of the Cisalpine Republic . . . . .	66
Count Melzi as Vice-President. Venice and Tuscany . . . . .	67
Rome, Naples, and northern Italy. Holland . . . . .	68
Changes in the Austrian Republic . . . . .	69
Disappointments of the French . . . . .	70
Effects of the Revolution in Germany . . . . .	71
The left bank of the Rhine. Socialisation in Germany . . . . .	72
Intervention of Napoleon and the Turc . . . . .	73
The Imperial Peace of 1800 . . . . .	74
Influence of the Revolution in Switzerland . . . . .	75
Policy of the Directory in Switzerland . . . . .	76
Parties and camps that in Switzerland . . . . .	77
The Confederation of Malineson . . . . .	78
The Confederation endorsed . . . . .	79
Old war. Napoleon's intervention . . . . .	80
British protest. Increasing friction . . . . .	81
Negotiations between Great Britain and France . . . . .	82
Napoleon's threats. British demands . . . . .	83
Expire with Great Britain. The Act of Mediation . . . . .	84
Restoration of peace in Switzerland . . . . .	85
Results of the Act of Mediation . . . . .	86

## CHAPTER V.

## FRANCE UNDER THE EMPIRE, 1804-14.

By Professor FARNWELL.

	PAGES
Napoleon's family. His marriage . . . . .	187
The Constitution of the year XII . . . . .	189
The <i>Assemblée</i> . The Council of State . . . . .	193
The Imperial hierarchy. The Grand <i>Équipages</i> . . . . .	198
The <i>Ministère</i> . The <i>Grand Sec</i> . . . . .	211
The new nobility . . . . .	212
The Imperial household . . . . .	213
The army. Conscription . . . . .	214
Mobilisation of the conscription . . . . .	215
The National Guard. Finance . . . . .	219
Economic crisis of 1805. The Bank. Taxes . . . . .	227
Income from direct. The Budget . . . . .	230
National Debt. The <i>Financé</i> . Public credit . . . . .	233
Imperial police. Ministers. The Capital . . . . .	237
Economic policy of Napoleon . . . . .	241
Customs. The Continental System . . . . .	243
Imports and smuggling . . . . .	245
Foreign trade. Growth of industry . . . . .	246
French manufactures . . . . .	247
Wealth and poverty. Public instruction . . . . .	249
The Imperial University established . . . . .	257
Organisation of the University . . . . .	258
The Institute. The <i>Grands</i> . . . . .	259
Theatre and newspapers . . . . .	260
Literature. <i>Chateaubriand</i> . . . . .	261
<i>Madame de Staël</i> . Criticism and philosophy . . . . .	262
Science and art . . . . .	263
Architects. The "Empire style" . . . . .	266
Printing and music . . . . .	269
Tranquillity and prosperity of France . . . . .	270
Danville's plot. Anxiety about Spain . . . . .	277
Schemes of Talleyrand and Fouché . . . . .	280
The divorce of Josephine . . . . .	280
Marriage with Marie-Louise. Fouché dismissed . . . . .	285
Wholesale changes (1809-12) . . . . .	291
Growth of absolutism. Birth of the King of Rome . . . . .	293
Decay of industry. Malin's plot . . . . .	295
Failure of Malin's plot. Its meaning . . . . .	296
Council of Regency. The <i>Assemblée</i> . . . . .	298
The Imperial session. Malin's report . . . . .	298
Napoleon reorganises the Legislative Body . . . . .	297



## CHAPTER VI.

## THE CODES.

By H. A. L. FARRIS, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford.

	PAGE
Influence of the Revolution on the law of property . . . . .	140
Its influence on the law of persons . . . . .	142
The legal reaction . . . . .	143
Bonaparte in Council . . . . .	144
Bonaparte as legislator . . . . .	145
The Civil Code and the Tribunal . . . . .	146
Family law . . . . .	146
Paternal control . . . . .	146
The position of women. Divorce . . . . .	147
Divorce. Views of Bonaparte . . . . .	147
Civil rights. French citizenship . . . . .	148
Contracts. Interest. Mortgages . . . . .	149
The law of inheritance . . . . .	150
Estimates of the Civil Code . . . . .	151
Value of the Civil Code . . . . .	152
Introduction of the Civil Code to Bonaparte . . . . .	152
History of civil procedure . . . . .	154
The Grand Ordinance and the Revolution . . . . .	155
The Constitution on Civil Procedure . . . . .	155
Legal innovations . . . . .	157
Conservation of the Code of Civil Procedure . . . . .	158
History of criminal procedure . . . . .	159
Revolutionary changes . . . . .	179
The reaction. The Criminal Code . . . . .	171
The Jury question . . . . .	172
The Jury endangered. Peace in the discussion . . . . .	173
The final compromise . . . . .	174
Estimates of the Code of Criminal Procedure . . . . .	174
The Penal Code . . . . .	175
Origin of the Commercial Code . . . . .	177
The Bankruptcy Law. Defects of the Commercial Code . . . . .	178
Estimates of the Codes as a whole . . . . .	179

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE CONCORDATS.

By L. G. WILKMAN-LANE, M.A., Lecturer in History at New College, Oxford.

Position of the Papacy in 1800 . . . . .	180
Bonaparte's attitude to Pius VII . . . . .	181
Negotiations with Spina in Paris . . . . .	182
Concili sent to Rome. Bonaparte's terms . . . . .	183

	PAGE
Concord in Paris. The Concordat signed . . . . .	181
Character of the Concordat . . . . .	181
The Constitutional Church. The "Pacte Éternel" . . . . .	182
The Concordat nullified. The Organic Articles . . . . .	183
The new Bishops. Triumph of Bonaparte . . . . .	186
Further demands of Bonaparte . . . . .	187
The Italian Concordat. The press. The Orders . . . . .	188
Liturgy and ecclesiastical. Funds sent to Rome . . . . .	191
Coronation of Napoleon . . . . .	192
Quarrel about Jerome Bonaparte. Occupation of Moscow . . . . .	193
Napoleon's demands. Refusal of Civit Vecchie . . . . .	194
Rejection of Napoleon's terms . . . . .	195
Papal States annexed. Captivity of the Pope . . . . .	196
Ecumenical Councils. Congregation of Paris . . . . .	197
The Black Cardinals. The National Council . . . . .	198
The Council dissolved. Rejection of the Pope . . . . .	199
The Pope in France. Council of Fontainebleau . . . . .	200
Release of the Pope. The Church in Germany . . . . .	201
The German States and the Church . . . . .	202
Dallwitz's scheme. The French Protestants . . . . .	203
Lutherans, Huguenots, and Jews . . . . .	204
Grand Synagogue. Negation of Jewish worship . . . . .	205
Political scheme of Napoleon's Church policy . . . . .	206
The Pope as a historical figure . . . . .	207

## CHAPTER VIII.

## THE COMMAND OF THE SEA, 1804-21.

By H. W. WATSON, B.A., Trinity College, Oxford.

Preparations for renewal of war . . . . .	209
Outbreak of war. The French navy . . . . .	210
The navy and the strategic position of Great Britain . . . . .	211
Blockade of the French ports . . . . .	211
First plan for the invasion of England . . . . .	212
Changes in the plan of invasion . . . . .	213
The Boulogne flotilla . . . . .	214
Further development of the invasion plan . . . . .	215
French inactivity. Nelson at Toulon . . . . .	216
Blockade of Toulon. Anglo-Spanish relations . . . . .	217
War with Spain. Napoleon's plans changed . . . . .	218
British and Allied forces. Villeneuve at Toulon . . . . .	219
Nelson in pursuit of Villeneuve . . . . .	220
Ministry in the West Indies . . . . .	221
Napoleon's instructions to Villeneuve . . . . .	222
Villeneuve in the West Indies . . . . .	223
British measures. Nelson sails for the West Indies . . . . .	224
Nelson follows Villeneuve back to Europe . . . . .	225
Collier's action off Cape Finisterre . . . . .	226
Movement of Villeneuve and Aland . . . . .	227
Napoleon orders Villeneuve to fight . . . . .	228

Nelson's plan of battle . . . . .	110
The approach of the fleets . . . . .	119
The battle of Trafalgar . . . . .	121
Tactics of Nelson and Villeneuve . . . . .	122
Death of Nelson. Results of the battle . . . . .	123
Subsequent French losses . . . . .	124
British expeditions to Turkey and Egypt . . . . .	125
The second Copenhagen expedition . . . . .	126
Operations in the Mediterranean. Napoleon's plans . . . . .	127
Effect of the Spanish rising. Attacks upon Bonaparte . . . . .	129
Walcheren expedition. Mediterranean operations . . . . .	130
Colonial captures. The Continental Blockade . . . . .	140
The Continental System and British trade . . . . .	141
Insurance wars. French and British losses . . . . .	142
End of the war. Services of the army . . . . .	143

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE THIRD COALITION. I. 1804-8.

By Colonel E. M. Lister, late Royal Engineers.

Results of the war with Great Britain . . . . .	154
Napoleon's overtures to George III . . . . .	155
Negotiations between Russia and Great Britain . . . . .	156
The Kingdom of Italy. The Emperor Francis . . . . .	157
Vassilation of Austria. Archduke Charles . . . . .	158
Austro-Russian Treaty. Attitude of Prussia . . . . .	159
France and Sweden. The Allied plan of campaign . . . . .	159
Napoleon and Austria. Hanover offered to Prussia . . . . .	161
War with Austria. The Grand Army . . . . .	162
Barbaric John France. The march on the Danube . . . . .	163
The capitulation of Ulm . . . . .	164
Question of Prussian neutrality . . . . .	164
Convention between France and the Allies . . . . .	165
Napoleon at Vienna. Archduke Charles in Italy . . . . .	167
The war in Italy. Napoleon's dangerous position . . . . .	168
Russian operations. Russian advance . . . . .	169
French position at Antwerp. Plans of the Allies . . . . .	170
Battle of Austerlitz. Armistice . . . . .	171
Treaty of Pressburg. Alliance of France and Prussia . . . . .	172
Talavera of the Allies in Italy and north Germany . . . . .	173
French occupy Hanover. Death of Pitt . . . . .	174

## CHAPTER X.

### THE THIRD COALITION. II. 1806-7.

By Colonel Lister.

Napoleon in Paris . . . . .	176
The Franco-Prussian alliance. Attitude of Russia . . . . .	176
Policy of Napoleon in Italy and Holland . . . . .	177

The Confederation of the Rhine . . . . .	168
End of the Holy Roman Empire. Napoleon's new Orders . . . . .	169
Overtures from Great Britain. Battle of Maida . . . . .	170
Peace negotiations. Death of Fox . . . . .	171
Murder at Palermo. Negotiations in Vienna . . . . .	172
Outbreak of war with France . . . . .	173
The Prussian army. Napoleon's plans . . . . .	174
The French recruitment . . . . .	175
Battle of Jena . . . . .	176
Battle of Auerstedt. The Prussian retreat . . . . .	177
Annexation of Prussia and other territories . . . . .	178
Germany reorganised. Berlin and Vienna occupied . . . . .	179
The Prussian army annihilated . . . . .	180
Berlin and Turkey. Napoleon at Berlin . . . . .	181
French negotiations with France, England, and Russia . . . . .	182
The Berlin Decree. Poland and Austria . . . . .	183
Napoleon's advance. The Russian retreat . . . . .	184
Napoleon at Warsaw. The winter campaign . . . . .	185
Battle of Eylau . . . . .	186
French negotiations. Convention of Bartheneville . . . . .	187
A campaign proposed. Napoleon's difficulties . . . . .	188
Action of Great Britain. Fall of Canning . . . . .	189
Russian advance. Battle of Friedland . . . . .	190
Armistice. Alexander's change of mind . . . . .	191
Treaty of Tilsit. Limits of France . . . . .	192
Alliance between France and Russia . . . . .	193

## CHAPTER XI.

## THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT, 1807-8.

By J. HOLLAND ROSE, *Litt.D.*, late Scholar of Christ's College, Cambridge.

Methods and aims of Napoleon . . . . .	204
Napoleon at Dresden. British expedition to Stockholm . . . . .	205
The position and policy of Denmark . . . . .	206
Napoleon's designs revealed to the British Government . . . . .	207
Treaty and policy of Canning . . . . .	208
Retreat of the British fleet, and its results . . . . .	209
Swedish withdrawal. Danish alliance with France . . . . .	210
The invasion of Portugal . . . . .	211
Napoleon's policy. Convention with Spain . . . . .	212
French invasion of Portugal . . . . .	213
Flight of the Portuguese royal family . . . . .	214
Break between Great Britain and Russia . . . . .	215
Russia, Turkey, and France . . . . .	216
The subjugation of France . . . . .	217
Napoleon and the Eastern Question . . . . .	218
Victories of England. Anti-French Convention . . . . .	219
Napoleon's Eastern advance . . . . .	220

	PAGE
Napoleon prepares for an Eastern expedition . . . . .	211
Negotiations between France and Russia . . . . .	212
Russian invasion of Poland. Trouble in Spain . . . . .	217
Conquest and constitution of Poland . . . . .	218
Effect of the Spanish rising on Napoleon's plans . . . . .	219
Alarm in Austria. The League embodied . . . . .	225
Russia and Austria. Napoleon's demands on Prussia . . . . .	227
Napoleon's general position improved . . . . .	228
Congress of Erfurt. The Eastern Question . . . . .	229
Napoleon, Alexander and Austria . . . . .	230
Overtures to Great Britain. Results of the Congress . . . . .	233
Gustavus IV of Sweden. Loss of Finland . . . . .	235
Revolution in Sweden. Abdication of Gustavus . . . . .	238
Bernadotte Prince Royal of Sweden . . . . .	241
Oppression of Prussia. Fichte's Address . . . . .	251
Effects of Fichte's appeal. Prussian education . . . . .	255
Foundation of the University of Berlin . . . . .	257
The University of Berlin. The Napoleonic . . . . .	258
Early life of Stein. His rise to power . . . . .	259
Political, economic and social reforms . . . . .	260
Land reforms. Influence of the King . . . . .	262
Military reforms. Rise of Scharnhorst . . . . .	263
The inviolable army. Local self-government . . . . .	265
The new municipalities . . . . .	266
Expulsion of Stein. German literature . . . . .	269
Queen Louise of Prussia. Kingdom of Westphalia . . . . .	269
James in Westphalia. Grand Duke of Warsaw . . . . .	269
Government of the Grand Duke of Warsaw . . . . .	269
Convent between Poland and Germany . . . . .	269
Results of Napoleon's supremacy . . . . .	269

## CHAPTER XII.

## THE WAR OF 1806.

By AUGUST KERN, Major-General (retired) in the German Army.

✓ Rejoicings of popular reaction against Napoleon . . . . .	272
Austrian preparations. Napoleon's threats . . . . .	272
Austrian motives for war . . . . .	282
Austria without allies. Her resolve on war . . . . .	284
The army and the resources of France . . . . .	285
The Austrian army . . . . .	288
Austrian plan. Distribution of French forces . . . . .	297
Operating movements. Movements of the Austrians . . . . .	299
The "Barricade campaign." Abensberg and Eckmühl . . . . .	299
Repulse of the Austrians. Napoleon at Vienna . . . . .	300
✓ The battle of Aspern . . . . .	301
Repulse of Napoleon. Effect of the battle . . . . .	303
✓ The battle of Wagram . . . . .	312
The campaign in Poland . . . . .	324
The campaign in Italy, Hungary, and Tyrol . . . . .	324

<i>Resistance of Tyrol. The rising suppressed</i> . . . . .	358
<i>Attempts of Schill and the Duke of Brunswick</i> . . . . .	357
<i>The Walcheren expedition</i> . . . . .	355
<i>British disaster at Walcheren. Peace negotiations</i> . . . . .	350
<i>The Peace of Schiedam</i> . . . . .	350

## CHAPTER XIII.

## THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, 1806-12.

By J. HERALD ROSE, LL.D.

<i>Origin and importance of the Berlin Decree</i> . . . . .	361
<i>Influence of the Manifesto and Resonance</i> . . . . .	360
<i>The commercial war against Great Britain</i> . . . . .	360
<i>Napoleon's measures against British trade</i> . . . . .	361
<i>Action of Great Britain. The Berlin Decree</i> . . . . .	365
<i>The 'Warmer Decree.' British Orders in Council</i> . . . . .	360
<i>The Milan Decree</i> . . . . .	367
<i>Apparent probability of Napoleon's success</i> . . . . .	368
<i>Dependency in Great Britain</i> . . . . .	368
<i>Napoleon resolves to attack Holland</i> . . . . .	370
<i>Annexation of Holland. Effects in Great Britain</i> . . . . .	371
<i>Continuation of British foreign trade</i> . . . . .	372
<i>Traffic in Tyrol. Seizure of British ships</i> . . . . .	372
<i>Continuation Decrees. Fresh countermeasures</i> . . . . .	374
<i>The system of trade-warfare</i> . . . . .	375
<i>Causes of French commercial prosperity</i> . . . . .	378
<i>Domestic, foreign. Conditions of Napoleon's success</i> . . . . .	377
<i>Conditions of Prussia and northern Germany</i> . . . . .	379
<i>Sweden and Russia. Downfall of Continental System</i> . . . . .	379
<i>Napoleon's excessive confidence</i> . . . . .	380
<i>Italy under British influence. The Constitution</i> . . . . .	381
<i>Policy of the Queen of Naples</i> . . . . .	382
<i>Parliamentary difficulties. Bonaparte and the Queen</i> . . . . .	383
<i>Reform of the Constitution. Death of the Queen</i> . . . . .	384
<i>Turkey and the Eastern Powers</i> . . . . .	385
<i>The government of Salis III</i> . . . . .	386
<i>Spain's military reforms. Death of Berri</i> . . . . .	387
<i>Murder of Salis. Accession of Maximilian II</i> . . . . .	388
<i>Treaty of Bucharest. No change in Turkey</i> . . . . .	389

## CHAPTER XIV.

## THE FRENCH DEPENDENCIES, AND SWITZERLAND, 1806-12.

The French Dependencies. By H. A. L. FISKE, M.A.

Switzerland. By Professor GUYLARD.

<i>Napoleon's view on government</i> . . . . .	390
<i>Reforms of French administrative measures</i> . . . . .	391
<i>Defects of the Napoleonic system</i> . . . . .	392

<i>Napoleon and his servants. The Italian Republic</i>	242
<i>Expansion of the Italian Kingdom</i>	252
<i>Napoleon's policy for the Italian Kingdom</i>	262
<i>Improvements under the Venetian Empire</i>	269
<i>French Italy. Piedmont</i>	287
<i>Piedmont, Parma, Etruria, etc.</i>	298
<i>Annexation of Etruria</i>	318
<i>Tuscany under French control. The Papal States</i>	400
<i>Annexation of the Papal States</i>	411
<i>Work of the Roman Curia. The Bishop of Rome</i>	492
<i>State of Naples. Accession of Joseph Bonaparte</i>	495
<i>Naples under the government of Joseph</i>	496
<i>Joseph's problems and instructions</i>	498
<i>Religion in the Neapolitan Kingdom under Joseph</i>	499
<i>Music in Naples. French influence in Germany</i>	507
<i>French Germany. The Rhinein departments</i>	608
<i>Humane departments. Grand Duchy of Berg</i>	609
<i>Berg under direct and indirect</i>	620
<i>The kingdom of Westphalia</i>	623
<i>Westphalia under Jerome Bonaparte</i>	623
<i>Mintmaster of Westphalia. Frankfurt</i>	623
<i>The Grand Duchy of Frankfurt under Dalmat</i>	614
<i>The Belgian departments</i>	615
<i>Religion and conscription in Belgium. Holland</i>	616
<i>Holland under French rule</i>	617
<i>The Rhinein provinces</i>	618
<i>Marmont's work in Egypt. The Colonies</i>	618
<i>French colonial policy. Towards L'Overseas</i>	620
<i>San Domingo under General L'Ouveraine</i>	621
<i>French government in San Domingo</i>	622
<i>Switzerland under the Act of Mediation</i>	623
<i>Napoleon's dealings with Switzerland</i>	624
<i>Peace of separation. The Continental System</i>	625
<i>Government of the Isles Det. Public works</i>	626
<i>Education, philosophy, and literature</i>	627

## CHAPTER XV.

## THE PENINSULAR WAR, 1808-18

By C. W. Oman, M.A., F.R.S., Chichele Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford.

<i>Napoleon's drive on to Spain</i>	428
<i>Quarrels in the Spanish royal family</i>	429
<i>French invasion of Spain</i>	430
<i>The revolution of Aranjuez</i>	431
<i>Intercession of Napoleon</i>	432
<i>Abolition of Feudalism. The San Juan</i>	433

	page
Outbreak of the Spanish Insurrection . . . . .	424
The military problem . . . . .	426
Napoleon's movement. Masséu fails at Valencia . . . . .	428
Dupont's march on Seville . . . . .	432
The capitulation of Baylen and its results . . . . .	436
First stage of Napoleon's descent in Portugal . . . . .	439
Wellington's landing. Battle of Vimeiro . . . . .	443
The Convention of Cintra. French reinforcements . . . . .	444
The Central Junta. Its mistaken strategy . . . . .	445
Morre in Spain. Napoleon's victories . . . . .	449
Napoleon at Madrid. Morre's plans . . . . .	449
Morre's advance and retreat . . . . .	445
Battle of Corunna. Death of Morre . . . . .	446
Results of Morre's campaign . . . . .	447
Fall of Saragossa. Other Spanish defeats . . . . .	448
Wellington's return. French invasion of Portugal . . . . .	449
Rush and Victor. Battle of Medellín . . . . .	450
Wellington drives Morre out of Portugal . . . . .	451
Wellington's advance. Battle of Talavera . . . . .	452
Morre's advance. Wellington's retreat . . . . .	453
Battle of Almonacid. Siege of Orense . . . . .	454
Battles of Alcañices and Oporto . . . . .	455
Conquest of Andalusia . . . . .	456
Manuel assumes the command. Siege of Cadix . . . . .	457
Manuel's proposals . . . . .	458
Manuel invades Portugal. Lines of Torres Vedras . . . . .	459
Evacuation of Portugal. Wellington's retreat . . . . .	460
Battle of Bussaco. Capture of Coimbra . . . . .	461
Manuel at Torres Vedras and Bussaco . . . . .	462
Manuel's retreat. Results of the campaign . . . . .	463
The Centre at Cadix. Battle of Bussaco . . . . .	464
Galician reinforcements at Oporto . . . . .	465
Battle of Fozes d'Arenas. Fall of Almeida . . . . .	466
Battle of Albuera. Morre retreats . . . . .	467
Wellington falls at Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	468
Galician Spanish resistance. Its results . . . . .	469
Battle of Albuera. Fall of Valencia . . . . .	470
Wellington takes Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz . . . . .	471
Wellington advances against Manuel . . . . .	472
Battle of Salamanca. Wellington at Madrid . . . . .	473
French concentration. Wellington falls at Bussaco . . . . .	474
Wellington retreats. Results of the campaign . . . . .	475
Improvement in Anglo-Spanish prospects . . . . .	476
Wellington's advance. Joseph's retreat . . . . .	477
Battle of Utiel. Joseph leaves Spain . . . . .	478
The war in eastern Spain . . . . .	479
Battle of the Pyrenees. Wellington returns France . . . . .	480
Battle of the Nive and of Orthez . . . . .	481
Battle of Toulouse. Results of the war . . . . .	482



## CHAPTER XVI

## RUSSIA UNDER ALEXANDER I. AND THE INVASION OF 1812.

By ELMER STANFORD, Professor of Universal History  
in the Imperial University of Odessa.

	PAGE
Alexander's accession. His first counsellors . . . . .	422
Character of Alexander I. Michael Speransky . . . . .	424
Russian foreign policy. The war with Turkey . . . . .	425
The Polish Question. Friction with Napoleon . . . . .	426
Preparations for war. Fall of <u>Speransky</u> . . . . .	427
Strength and composition of the Grand Army . . . . .	428
French defections. The Russian force . . . . .	429
Russian plan of campaign. Crossing of the Niemen . . . . .	429
Napoleon at Vilna. The Russian retreat . . . . .	430
Russian concentration at Smolensk . . . . .	432
Capture of Smolensk. Russian retreat continued . . . . .	432
Kutuzov takes the command . . . . .	434
Battle of Borodino . . . . .	436
Occupation of Moscow. Burning of the city . . . . .	437
Napoleon at Moscow. Revolution of Alexander . . . . .	437
Moscow evacuated. Condition of the French army . . . . .	438
Napoleon's choice of route. Approach of winter . . . . .	439
The retreat to Smolensk. French losses . . . . .	440
/ Kutuzov's pursuit. Cross situation of the French . . . . .	441
Preparations for crossing the Beresina . . . . .	442
The crossing of the Beresina . . . . .	443
Napoleon goes to Paris. Destruction of his army . . . . .	444
French and Russian losses. <u>Significance of the defeat</u> . . . . .	445

## CHAPTER XVII

## THE WAR OF LIBERATION, 1812-3.

By JOHN VON PRINCE HARTMANN, Ph.D., Archivist, formerly  
Professor of History in the University of Basel.

/ Effect of the retreat from Moscow . . . . .	506
International conditions after the retreat . . . . .	507
/ Position of Napoleon. The French army . . . . .	508
The Russian army. Condition and efforts of Prussia . . . . .	509
King Frederick William. Accession of Prussia . . . . .	510
Position of the armies. Opening of the campaign . . . . .	511
French retirement. The King leaves Berlin . . . . .	512
Treaty of Kalisz. Miraculous escape of York . . . . .	513
Engens falls back to the Elbe . . . . .	514
Defeat of Moravitz. Engens falls to retake Berlin . . . . .	515

	Page
Opportunities lost by the Allies. Napoleon's plans . . . . .	215
The French advance. Battle of Quatre-Braires . . . . .	217
The Allies retire upon Bastogne . . . . .	218
Battle of Barvenne . . . . .	219
Indecisive fighting. Armistice of Plawitz . . . . .	220
Condition of the combatants. Attitude of Austria . . . . .	221
Austria joins the alliance. Allied losses and plans . . . . .	222
Napoleon's plans. Schwarzenberg's advance . . . . .	223
Campaign in Silesia. Battle of the Kottbusch . . . . .	224
Silesia freed. Bismarck and the army of the north . . . . .	224
Battle of Gross-Beross. Napoleon at Dresden . . . . .	225
Battle of Dresden. Retreat of the Allies . . . . .	227
The Russians at Pleskau. Battle of Kulm . . . . .	228
Napoleon's intention. Battle of Dennewitz . . . . .	229
Hamburg isolated. Napoleon retreats to Dresden . . . . .	230
Blücher crosses the Elbe . . . . .	231
Napoleon concentrates on Leipzig . . . . .	232
Advance of Schwarzenberg's advance . . . . .	233
Preliminary engagements. Dispositions of forces . . . . .	234
Battle of Leipzig: first day. Allied advance checked . . . . .	235
French counter-attack fails. Indecisive results . . . . .	236
Blücher at Mörsdorf. A day's pause . . . . .	237
Battle of Leipzig: third day. The allied attack . . . . .	238
The French driven to upon Leipzig . . . . .	239
Battle of Leipzig: fourth day. French retreat . . . . .	240
Retreat of Napoleon's forces . . . . .	241
Views of the Allies. Negotiations at Frankfurt . . . . .	242
Distribution of the Allies. Napoleon's difficulties . . . . .	243
Intention of France. Blücher's advance . . . . .	244
Napoleon attacks Blücher. Battle of La Rothière . . . . .	245
Napoleon's advance. Conference at Châtillon . . . . .	246
Napoleon breaks up the army of Silesia . . . . .	247
Causes of the defeat of Blücher. He recovers himself . . . . .	248
Schwarzenberg's retreat. Blücher acts independently . . . . .	249
Treaty of Chaumont. Schwarzenberg advances . . . . .	250
Blücher reinforced. Battle of Laus . . . . .	251
The Conference closed. Napoleon's resources . . . . .	252
The march on Paris. Fighting outside the city . . . . .	253
Napoleon at Fontenoy. Surrender of Paris . . . . .	254

## CHAPTER XVIII. ✓

### THE FIRST RESTORATION, 1814-2.

By H. A. L. FRYER, M.A.

Entry of the Allies into Paris . . . . .	255
Alexander I and Talleyrand . . . . .	256
Napoleon at Fontenoy . . . . .	257
Napoleon's abdication. Question of the Regency . . . . .	258
Treaty of Fontenoy. The Restoration . . . . .	259

	PAGE
<i>Syllabuses of the Senate. Return of Ministers</i> . . . . .	209
<i>The Provisional Government. Louis XVIII</i> . . . . .	211
<i>The return of Louis XVIII.</i> . . . . .	212
<i>The Charter</i> . . . . .	213
<i>The Treaty of Peace</i> . . . . .	214
<i>Popular feeling. The Ministry</i> . . . . .	215
<i>The Princess. Financial difficulties</i> . . . . .	217
<i>Financial Policy. The Army</i> . . . . .	217
<i>The Legion of Honour. Military Discontent</i> . . . . .	218
<i>The Church. Royalists and Constitutionalists</i> . . . . .	219
<i>Discussions on the Charter. Proposals to Emigrate</i> . . . . .	219
<i>Unpopularity of the Government</i> . . . . .	221
<i>Resumption of public opinion. Plots</i> . . . . .	222
<i>Peasants and Talleyrand. Napoleon leaves Elba</i> . . . . .	223
<i>The return of Napoleon</i> . . . . .	223
<i>Flight of Louis XVIII. Fall of the monarchy</i> . . . . .	225

## CHAPTER XIX.

## THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA, 1814-18.

by A. W. WARR, LL.D., F.R.S., Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge.

<i>The First Peace of Paris</i> . . . . .	275
<i>Treaty of Chaumont, and its effects</i> . . . . .	277
<i>Expectations of the Congress</i> . . . . .	279
<i>Previous separate campaigns. Convention of Saltsch</i> . . . . .	279
<i>Opening of the Congress. The Emperor Francis</i> . . . . .	280
<i>The Tsar and the King of Prussia</i> . . . . .	281
<i>Minor Kings and Princes</i> . . . . .	282
<i>Katzenbach. Wagram. Paris.</i> . . . . .	283
<i>Talleyrand. Talleyrand. Conference</i> . . . . .	284
<i>Wellington. Hardenberg. Wilhelm von Humboldt</i> . . . . .	285
<i>Baron. Steinbock. General. Metternich</i> . . . . .	286
<i>Dispossession of the smaller German States</i> . . . . .	287
<i>Other interests. Convention of the Four Powers</i> . . . . .	288
<i>Prussia admitted. Conclusion of the Eight</i> . . . . .	289
<i>Territorial changes: France</i> . . . . .	290
<i>Territorial changes: Great Britain. Austria. Russia</i> . . . . .	291
<i>Territorial changes: Prussia</i> . . . . .	292
<i>The Polish-Russian difficulty</i> . . . . .	293
<i>War supported by France</i> . . . . .	294
<i>Failure of British mediation</i> . . . . .	295
<i>Increased tension. Alexander against Metternich</i> . . . . .	296
<i>Termination of war. Defensive Triple Alliance</i> . . . . .	297
<i>The Powers resume their seats. Compromise</i> . . . . .	298
<i>Part of Germany annexed by Prussia. Gains</i> . . . . .	299
<i>The Polish question</i> . . . . .	300
<i>The Polish question settled</i> . . . . .	301
<i>Tunaw. Parma, etc. Louis</i> . . . . .	302

<i>Naples, etc. The Legation</i> . . . . .	602
<i>The Two Sicilies. Murat. Malta</i> . . . . .	604
<i>Spain and Portugal. Olinda. The Netherlands</i> . . . . .	608
<i>The new Netherlands State. Braziliers</i> . . . . .	608
<i>Denmark and Sweden. The Germanic Constitution</i> . . . . .	607
<i>First indefinite suspension</i> . . . . .	608
<i>Early drafts of a Constitution</i> . . . . .	609
<i>The Twelve Articles. Obstruction</i> . . . . .	610
<i>The oblongs of the German Committee suspended</i> . . . . .	611
<i>Impracticable schemes. Wenzburg's draft</i> . . . . .	612
<i>Deliberations resumed. The National Committee</i> . . . . .	613
<i>Declaration as to the abolition of the slave-trade</i> . . . . .	614
<i>Rivers. Providence. Results to February, 1813</i> . . . . .	615

## CHAPTER XX.

## THE HUNDRED DAYS, 1815.

By Professor OLIVER.

<i>Reconstruction of the Ministry</i> . . . . .	618
<i>Napoleon restored to power</i> . . . . .	620
<i>Peace negotiations. Napoleon's army</i> . . . . .	618
<i>Military measures of Napoleon</i> . . . . .	620
<i>The Constitution and the Champ de Mars</i> . . . . .	622
<i>Morot's campaign and defeat</i> . . . . .	621
<i>The allied forces. Wellington's army</i> . . . . .	623
<i>Morot's army. Napoleon's plans</i> . . . . .	623
<i>Napoleon's military arrangements</i> . . . . .	624
<i>First collision with the Prussians</i> . . . . .	625
<i>Wellington's position. His early concentration</i> . . . . .	626
<i>Wellington and Morot. Battle of Alagar</i> . . . . .	627
<i>Prussian retirement to Wavre</i> . . . . .	628
<i>Battle of Quatre-Bras</i> . . . . .	629
<i>The Prussian retreat. Grouchy in pursuit</i> . . . . .	630
<i>Wellington returns to Mont St Jean</i> . . . . .	631
<i>The British position</i> . . . . .	632
<i>Napoleon's battle-array</i> . . . . .	633
<i>Napoleon's confidence. D'Erlon's advance</i> . . . . .	634
<i>D'Erlon repulsed. Approach of the Prussians</i> . . . . .	635
<i>The deadly charge</i> . . . . .	636
<i>Stagnation of Erlon's advance</i> . . . . .	637
<i>May's attack. La Haye Sainte taken</i> . . . . .	638
<i>Repulse of the Imperial Guard</i> . . . . .	639
<i>Rest of the French army</i> . . . . .	640
<i>Responsibility of Grouchy</i> . . . . .	641
<i>Grouchy's retreat. Napoleon at Paris</i> . . . . .	642
<i>Second abdication of Napoleon</i> . . . . .	643
<i>Napoleon's flight. Advances of the Allies</i> . . . . .	644
<i>The Second Restoration</i> . . . . .	645

## CHAPTER XXI.

## THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA, 1814-1815.

By Dr A. W. WARR.

	PAGE
Effect of Napoleon's return . . . . .	546
New Treaty of Alliance. Rapid settlements . . . . .	547
Naples and Murat. The Germanic Confederation . . . . .	548
Final conference on the Federal Act . . . . .	549
The Federal Act accepted . . . . .	550
Adoption of the Federal and the Final Act . . . . .	551
Provisions of the Final Act. Its primary and . . . . .	552
Treatment of France . . . . .	553
Great Britain and the Final Act. . . . .	554
The Netherlands. Poland . . . . .	555
Poland. Saxony . . . . .	556
Prussia gains. Hanover . . . . .	557
Saxony. Baden-Darmstadt. Frankfurt . . . . .	558
The Germanic Confederation . . . . .	559
Austria gains . . . . .	560
Italy. Unsettled claims . . . . .	561
River navigation. The slave-trade . . . . .	562
Papal protest. Italian neutrality . . . . .	563
Negotiations for peace with France. New frontier . . . . .	564
The Holy Alliance . . . . .	565
The Second Peace of Paris . . . . .	566
General results of the Congress of Vienna . . . . .	567
Shortcomings of the results of the Congress . . . . .	568
Questions passed by or left over . . . . .	569
Representative institutions . . . . .	570
Actual achievements of the Congress . . . . .	571

## CHAPTER XXII.

## GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, 1793-1801.

By G. F. GOSCH, M.A., M.P., late Scholar of Trinity  
College, Cambridge.

Change in the policy of Pitt . . . . .	572
Effect of the French Revolution in England . . . . .	573
Expensive measures. Coalition with Portugal . . . . .	574
Marriage of the Prince of Wales. Treaty 1801 . . . . .	575
Financial measures. Withdrawal of the Whigs . . . . .	576
War loans and taxes. Foul law . . . . .	577
Catholic Emancipation. Pitt resigns . . . . .	578
The King's Speech. Addington Prime Minister . . . . .	579
Pitt's relations with Addington . . . . .	580
The Peace. Proposals for Pitt's return . . . . .	581
Ministerial changes. Renewal of the war . . . . .	582

	PAGE
Pitt returns to power. The new Ministry . . . . .	327
Fall of Melville. Pitt's last speech . . . . .	331
Death of Pitt. Fox Prime Minister . . . . .	333
Death of Fox. Grenville resigns . . . . .	335
Weakness of the Whigs. The great Reviews . . . . .	337
Northam and Colclough. The Portland Ministry . . . . .	338
Portland resigns. Pittman. Sir Francis Baring . . . . .	339
The Regency. Perceval's death. Liverpool Premier . . . . .	339
Poor relief. Enclosures. Factory Act . . . . .	340
General distress. Luddites. Education. Debtors . . . . .	342
Ireland. Religious divisions . . . . .	343
Wolfe Tone and Curran. The Irish Catholics . . . . .	344
Catholic Relief Bill. Growing disaffection . . . . .	345
Irish legislation. Secret societies . . . . .	346
Parliamentary reform. Fitzwilliam Viceroy . . . . .	347
Fitzwilliam's proceedings. The Catholic Question . . . . .	348
Recoil of Fitzwilliam. Its causes and effect . . . . .	350
Orange Societies. Emancipation Act . . . . .	352
Curran's opinion. Radicalism and oppression . . . . .	353
Conventicle. French feelings. Death of Tone . . . . .	353
Project of Union. Advanced views . . . . .	355
Methods of persuasion. Last Irish Parliament . . . . .	356
The Act of Union. Arguments for and against . . . . .	357
Results of the Union. Bonaire's rebellion . . . . .	358
Pittman and death of Robert. Daniel O'Connell . . . . .	359
German and Royal. Economic conditions . . . . .	360

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1783-1802.

India and Ceylon. By the Rev. W. H. HUTTON, M.A., Fellow  
and Tutor of St John's College, Oxford.

The Colonies. By H. E. SUTTON, M.A., Bell Professor of  
Colonial History in the University of Oxford.

The work of Warren Hastings . . . . .	370
Indian conditions. Appointment of Cornwallis . . . . .	372
Legal and other reforms of Cornwallis . . . . .	373
The Permanent Settlement of Bengal . . . . .	375
The Permanent Settlement carried out . . . . .	376
Relations with Dutch and Netherlands . . . . .	376
War with Tipu. Affairs of the Carnatic . . . . .	378
Trial of Warren Hastings . . . . .	378
Act of 1784 renewed. Conditions under Shah . . . . .	377
Railway to China. Rise of Russia . . . . .	379
Consolidation of Russian power . . . . .	379
Death of Russia. Confusion in Russian affairs . . . . .	380
Government of China. Lord Macartney's embassy . . . . .	381
Indian conditions. Alliance with the Mahratta . . . . .	382
Debris and death of Tipu. Settlement of Mysore . . . . .	383
Settlement of the Carnatic, Coorg, and Tanjore . . . . .	384

Treaty with Ouda. The Maritime confederacy . . . . .	702
The Maritime War. Defeat of Shelburne . . . . .	706
War with Holland. Defeat of Mifflin . . . . .	707
Reforms in justice, civil service, and finance . . . . .	720
Question of free trade. Wellesley retires . . . . .	722
Negotiations with Holland and Benkt Singh . . . . .	726
Lord Minto in office. Ministry at Yorktown . . . . .	731
Mission to Afghanistan and Persia. Gurkha War . . . . .	733
Removal of the Chartist. Ceylon . . . . .	735
Expedition to Egypt. Summary of the period . . . . .	734
The colonies and the Great War . . . . .	735
The founding of New South Wales . . . . .	736
Captain Phillip. Early struggles of the colony . . . . .	737
Reforms of King. Bendish's expedition . . . . .	738
Elph and Macquarie. Progress of the colony . . . . .	739
Settlements in Australia. State of Canada . . . . .	740
French population of Canada. First Governors . . . . .	741
Government of Quebec. State of the law . . . . .	742
The Quebec Act. The United Empire Loyalists . . . . .	743
The Constitutional Act . . . . .	744
Character of the Canadian Legislatures . . . . .	745
Crty and Parvnt. Introduction of government . . . . .	746
Canadian development. General despotism . . . . .	747
Exploration of the Fur West. The West Indian Islands captured. Occupation of Cape Colony . . . . .	748
British occupation. Government in West Indies . . . . .	749
St. Louis. The slave-trade. Malta . . . . .	750
War with Napoleon. Reoccupation of the Cape . . . . .	752
St. Louis. Government of the Cape . . . . .	753
Bourbon and Mauritius. Battle in Java . . . . .	754
Treaty of Paris. Colonial results of the war . . . . .	755

## CHAPTER XXIV.

## ST HELENA.

By H. A. L. FISKE, M.A.

The abolition of Napoleon . . . . .	756
Napoleon removed to St. Helena . . . . .	757
Political importance of the captivity . . . . .	758
The sources of life . . . . .	759
Precautions against escape. Sir Hudson Lowe . . . . .	760
Private. Napoleon's autobiography . . . . .	761
Qualities of Napoleon's writings and conversation . . . . .	762
Napoleon's opinions . . . . .	763
Napoleon's policy in Spain, Italy, and Germany . . . . .	764
In Turkey, Egypt, and the West Indies . . . . .	765
Napoleon's designs and lofty aims . . . . .	766
The French nobility . . . . .	767
The Imperial system . . . . .	768
Death of Napoleon . . . . .	769
Napoleon's significance in history . . . . .	770
His legacy to France . . . . .	771

# LIST OF BIBLIOGRAPHIES.

CHAP.	PAGES
General Bibliography . . . . .	713-56
Manuscript Sources for the History of the Consulate and the Empire . . . . .	757-8
I, V. France under the Consulate and the Empire . . . . .	759-59
II. Sect. I.—The Public Powers . . . . .	759-800
Sect. II.—Naval Operations . . . . .	800
III, IV. The pacification of Europe. France and her tributaries . . . . .	801-7
VI. The Codes . . . . .	808-9
VII. The Concordats . . . . .	815-5
VIII. The Command of the Sea . . . . .	816-25
IX, X. The Third Coalition . . . . .	824-6
XI. Tilsit and Erfurt . . . . .	827-28
XII. The War of 1809 . . . . .	833-5
XIII. The Continental System . . . . .	836-43
XIV. The Dependencies . . . . .	843-50
XV. Peninsular War . . . . .	851-8
XVI. The Invasion of Russia . . . . .	854-7
XVII. The War of Liberation, 1813-4 . . . . .	859-67
XVIII. The First Restoration . . . . .	868
XIX, XXI. The Congress of Vienna . . . . .	869-75
XX. The Hundred Days . . . . .	876-7
XXII. Great Britain and Ireland, 1793-1815 . . . . .	878-88
XXIII. The British Empire . . . . .	888-91
XXIV. St Helena . . . . .	892-3
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF LEADING EVENTS . . . . .	894-9
Index . . . . .	901-96



## CHAPTER I

### THE CONSULATE, 1799-1804

THE law of 19 Brumaire served as a Constitution from November 11 to December 25, 1799. The "Consuls of the French Republic," Sieyès, Roger Dumas, and Bonaparte, formed an "executive Consular Commission invested with the full powers of the Directory." They governed collectively; all three enjoyed equal power, Bonaparte ranking no higher than his colleagues; and they were to assume the presidency in turn and in alphabetical order. Thus the Provisional Consulate was nothing else, to employ Aubert's expression, than a "Directory reduced to three members." The Consuls reorganized the Ministry: they retained Cambacérès as Minister of Justice, and Fouché as Minister of Police; they appointed Gaudin to the Ministry of Finance, Barthès to that of War, and Talleyrand to that of Foreign Affairs. Maret acted as Secretary to the Consulate. It devolved on the two intermediate Commissions, those of the Council of Five Hundred and the Council of the Ancients, to embody in laws "the resolutions laid before them definitely and obligatorily by the executive Consular Commission for dealing with all urgent matters of police, legislation, and finance." These bodies met in the former meeting-places of the two assemblies and held regular sittings, to which the public were not admitted. Such was the organization of the provisional consular government.

The Consuls aimed chiefly at avoiding disturbances; and, as they were most careful not to offend anyone, and at the same time to remain independent, their policy was the appearance of Moderation. By their proclamation of November 12, in which the Consuls swore "to be faithful to the Republic, one and indivisible, founded on equality, liberty, and the representative system," they reassured the republicans. On the other hand they procured (November 12) the repeal of the revolutionary Law of Hostages (of 24 Brumaire, year VII, or July 12, 1799) which threatened the relatives of émigrés, absconded soldiers, and persons notoriously opposed to the Revolution. Moreover, the coup d'état having been organized with a view to threatening the plans of the

Jacobins, some sixty officers, conspicuous for their advanced views, were condemned on November 17, some to transportation to French Guiana, and some to detention in the Charolais *hôtels* under the observation of the police. In the end, however, no one was punished; for the sentence of transportation was converted for detention on November 23, and the sentence of detention was annulled on December 25. In order to "enlighten citizens in all parts of the Republic as to the causes and the true object of the transactions of 18 and 19 Brumaire," the Council sent delegates into the departments, one for each of the 64 military districts. These delegates displaced such officials as were hostile or unsympathizing, but otherwise exercised no executive authority. Finally, on the day of their last sitting (December 24), the Commissioners passed a law empowering the Government to authorize the return to France of "every proscribed person who had been condemned by some to deportation without trial and by a simple act of the Legislature."

But it was not enough to keep public opinion quiet; the Government was confronted by want of funds. It is said that, when Gaudin took over the Ministry of Finance, not more than 187,000 francs (190,000) in cash remained in the treasury. Gaudin, however, had worked in the Finance Department since his sixteenth year (he was born in 1766); and his skill, experience, honesty, industry, and adaptability secured him the possession of his portfolio until 1814. He contrived in the first place to provide for immediate necessities. In conjunction with Bonaparte he obtained (November 24) an advance from the Paris bankers, and supplemented it by an extraordinary lottery; at the same time he reorganized with a central board the administration of the direct taxes, which then formed the principal resource of the State. The law of November 24 created in each department an office for the collection of the direct taxes, under the control of the Ministry of Finance. The administration thus created speedily wiped out the immense arrears left by the local officials of the Revolution in regard to the drawing-up of tax-rolls. The current price of government annuities (then counted at 3 3/4) marks the improvement effected. It had fallen to 7 francs in 1793; but the price rose steadily after Brumaire, and reached 44 francs in 1800.

In the west the work of pacification had begun before 18 Brumaire, and proceeded, at first, independently of the political changes which had occurred in Paris. The Chouans had again taken up arms in 1799. The royalist forces were divided into six principal bodies: *Sauvages* and *Antichamps* were in Lower Poitou and the Vendée; Châtillon and *l'Académie* commanded in Angers against Nantes; Beaumont in Maine kept watch on Le Mans; La Fervelaye lay to Upper Brittany round Fougères; in the Morbihan, Georges Cadoudal lay near Vannes; while in Normandy Frotti and Brédart had carried on the campaign without any great success, though without disaster. With a view to uniting the royalists, the Directory had given the command of the "Army of

England" (as the forces operating in the western departments were still called) to General d'Hédouville. The choice was an excellent one. D'Hédouville had been the friend and the chief assistant of Hache during the first pacification of the west, and had a thorough knowledge of the men and conditions to be dealt with, and the best way of dealing with them. He fixed his head-quarters at Angers on November 3, 1793, and, instead of fighting, opened negotiations. Hostilities were suspended; and the existing armistice was confirmed by a proclamation of d'Hédouville on November 24. The royalist chiefs, satisfied as to the pacific intentions of the General, met for consultation at Poitiers on December 2. The things which were received of the general course of the war were far from encouraging; and Monsieur (the Comte d'Artois, brother of the King), whose presence was expected, did not appear. The meeting therefore almost unanimously declared for peace. The armistice was regulated and extended to January 21, 1800; a plan for a general pacification was submitted to d'Hédouville on December 28; and d'Andigné was deputed to discuss its terms with the authorities in Paris.

It was now necessary to determine the form of government. The law of 18 Brumaire had not abolished the Directorial Constitution. The Legislative Body usually stood adjourned to February 28, 1800, and was legally bound to "resemble at Paris on that date in the buildings allotted to it." It is true that the two intermediate legislative assemblies were "charged with the task of formulating the necessary organic changes in the Constitution"; and in this matter the initiative rested with them. The Executive Councils Commission might "lay before them its views on the matter"; but there was no question of "a definite and obligatory proposal." Thus the men of Brumaire themselves admitted that the Legislative Body, immediately on its reassembling, should, of its own authority, carry through the revision of the Directorial Constitution: this was the very end for which it had been purged. But things fell out otherwise; and the most important work of the Provisional Committee was the framing of a new Constitution.

Each of the intermediate Commissions appointed a "section" to examine proposals relating to the Constitution; and the sections encountered Sieyès. Nothing could be more natural, since from the beginning of the Revolution Sieyès had enjoyed the reputation of a philosopher and a political thinker. Many of his plans had lived; he was, even more than Bonaparte, the leader of the men of Brumaire, who had appointed him to the Provisional Committee. Both his past and his present marked him out as the man to be consulted.

So early as November 11 he had begun to discuss his opinions on the subject of a Constitution, his constant being Bodley de la Moutrie, a member of the constitutional section of the intermediate Commissions of the Five Hundred. Sieyès began with apothorisms: "Good democracy is an absurdity." It was necessary therefore to organize it. From this

followed a trifold principle. "No one should hold office except with the sanction of the government; and no one should be associated in office by those he has to govern." In other words: "Confidence should come from below, authority from above." Little by little, in fragmentary fashion, Sieyès gave shape to his ideas. The nation was to prepare lists of Notables, out of whom the members of the Assembly and the officials of the State should be chosen. At the head of the official hierarchy, a Grand Elector, enjoying an annual grant of 5,000,000 francs, was to personally preside. The Grand Elector was to appoint the two chiefs of the executive, the Council for Home Affairs and the Council for Foreign Affairs; and they in their turn were to appoint their respective agents. The legislative authority was to be entrusted to two bodies, the Tribunate, whose business it was to discuss laws, and the Legislative Body, which voted on them. Behind both these assemblies was the Senate, a body conservative in character, choosing its own members, and generally supervising the work of the state machinery. The Senate was to appoint the Tribunes, the members of the Legislative Body, and the Grand Elector; if he or any other person seemed likely to become a danger to the Constitution, the Senate was to efface him by absorption, that is to say, by appointing him a senator.

Bonaparte, de la Motte, Randon, and Talleyrand had arranged interviews between Bonaparte and Sieyès, but the two Councils could not agree. Bonaparte thereupon took to receiving each evening in his rooms at the Luxembourg his two colleagues, the constitutional sections (December 2), and subsequently the members of the Intermediate Commission. These meetings were in no sense official. There was general discussion, Sieyès propounded his ideas, Bonaparte extended them. "The Grand Elector," said he, "will be a shadow, the colourless shadow, of a *roi fainéant*"; and he went on, in a familiar tone, "How can you imagine that a man of any talent or activity would consent to settle down, like a pig fattening on so many millions?" This provoked a retort. Randon pictured a "First Consul" overriding the other two. The destiny of France was handled about in easy repartee.

After a few days, Deacon, who belonged to the section of the Five Hundred, was requested to draw up, in a series of articles, a *séance* which would serve as the basis of a formal discussion. Then the work began again. Bonaparte alternately opposed and approved the respective plans of Sieyès and Deacon, selecting from each what was most in accordance with his own views. His influence grew; he began to speak with authority. On the evening of December 16 the discussion of the details relating to the legislative and the executive authorities had been completed; there remained the detailed study of the organization of the judiciary and the departments, and finally the submission of the whole to the regular deliberations of the two Commissions. But Bonaparte chafed at the delay; it almost made him ill, and he determined to put

an and to it. On the evening of December 18 the final meeting was held in his apartments. He suggested to the members of the commission that they should affix their signatures to the articles as drawn up; and they consented. It was a drawing-room *coup d'état*. Bonaparte, Cambacérès, and Lebrun were named Censors; Sieyès and Roger Dumas were placed at the head of the list of future senators. The Constitution was complete (22 *Primaire*, year VIII; December 18, 1799).

The 35 articles of which the Constitution was composed fell under three principal heads: the electoral system, the Assemblies, and the executive. The electoral system was simply that devised by Sieyès under the name of *Listes de sénateurs*. Universal suffrage formed its basis. In each "communal district" the electors chose a tenth of their number, this tenth forming the "communal list"; those named on the "communal list" chose in each department a tenth of their own number, who formed the "departmental list"; those again named on the "departmental list" chose a tenth part of their number, who formed the "national list." From these three lists respectively were selected the public officials of the districts (*arrondissements*) and the departments, and those destined for the service of the State. As a matter of fact, the lists were not completed till the year IX (September, 1801); and in the interval the composition of the various Assemblies and of the official hierarchy had been settled in its activity, so that the lists were only useful for the purpose of filling up vacancies. Under this system popular suffrage was rendered completely ineffective.

The Assemblies were four in number: the Conservative Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, and the Council of State. The Senate chose the Legislators, the Tribunes, and the Censors from the "national list"; it confirmed or annulled as unconstitutional the measures referred to it by the Tribunate or the Government. The senators were appointed for life, and were irremovable; each received an annual salary of 40,000 francs. They were sixty in number, to begin with; and two were to be added yearly during ten years, when the maximum number of eighty would be reached. The first two senators nominated (Sieyès and Roger Dumas), in conjunction with the Second and Third Censors (Cambacérès and Lebrun), were to appoint a majority of the Senate; after which the Senate was to add to its own numbers by cooptation from lists of three candidates, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, and the First Consul presenting one apiece.

The Government alone could initiate legislation. Treaties, whether of peace, alliance, or commerce, were to be proposed, discussed, passed, and proclaimed in the same manner as legislative enactments. The Budget, in the shape of a yearly financial law, went through the same process. Proposals for legislation and ordinances regulating the public administration were drawn up by the Council of State; but the organisation of the Council of State was left indefinite in the Constitution.

The Tribunal was to discuss projects of law; it could pass or reject them, but it could not amend them; it could state its opinion on laws passed, or to be passed, but the Government was not obliged to take it into account. The Tribunal numbered one hundred; each Tribune received a yearly salary of 15,000 francs. The Legislative Body "made the law"; it heard the three Tribunes and the three Councillors of State, who appeared before it as delegates of their respective bodies, and then gave a secret vote without previous discussion. The Legislature numbered 300, and each of them received 10,000 francs. Both Tribunes and Legislature were nominated by the Senate from the national list; and a fifth part of their body was to be renewed every year.

To sum up, the power of the legislature was very slight, not only because it was divided between two Chambers, neither of which possessed initiative, while both were bound in by the Council of State and the Conservative Senate, but still more because neither legislative body had any popular foundation. The Senate created itself; the Tribunal and the Legislative Body were merely creations of the Senate. On the other hand, the executive power was strongly organized; and all real authority was concentrated in one man.

The executive was entrusted to three Councils appointed by the Senate for ten years, and always reeligible. For the first time the Councils were mentioned by name in the Constitution. The First Council, Bonaparte, was alone to promulgate laws, and to appoint and dismiss at pleasure all functionaries, whether civil or military; even in regard to other acts of the Government the Second and Third Councils possessed merely "a consultative voice." The First Council received 500,000 francs a year; the Second and Third Councils received 185,000 francs each; either of these might, if occasion arose, temporarily supply the place of the First Council; but in point of fact the First Council alone possessed authority. It is true that no measure of the Government could become effective unless it were signed by a minister, and that the minister, being responsible, might be prosecuted by order of the Legislative Body on a charge laid by the Tribunal. The Councils, however, were irresponsible; and no servant of the Government, other than the minister, could be prosecuted with respect to transactions relating to his office except on the decision of the Council of State. The irresponsibility of the Councils and the quasi-responsibility of the various functionaries nullified ministerial responsibility both from above and from below. The checks imposed by the Constitution on the First Council were purely illusory.

That the Constitution was drawn up in great haste is plain from the irregular order of the concluding clauses and from certain remarkable omissions. The communal district (arrondissement) is not defined; the organization of the judiciary is barely outlined; and the organization of the departments is not indicated at all. A clause framed with dangerous vagueness places "local administration" under the control of the ministers.

No machinery is provided for filling vacancies in the Legislative Body and the Tribunates. True, the Constitution guaranteed the rights of those persons who had acquired national property, and confirmed existing legislation against the *émigrés*; but, contrary to the custom of the Revolution, it made no declaration of principles, and it was silent as to liberty of the press, liberty of meeting, liberty of association, and liberty of conscience. By its omissions no less than by its positive statements the Constitution looked towards an undivided despotism.

The last clause of that document stated that the Constitution should forthwith be offered for acceptance by the French people. The law of December 14, supplemented by the Consular decree of December 18, regulated the arrangements for the plébiscite. The voting was not secret. The poll in each commune was to continue for three days from the date ad-vised of the necessary instrument at the chief town of the canton. In consequence of this provision, the taking of the plébiscite lasted, in the departments, till nearly the end of January.

The period of waiting seemed long to politicians in the capital. Only five men were actually in office: three, namely, who had been mentioned by name in the Constitution—the three former provisional Councils and the two new Councils. Bonaparte had shown great judgment in his choice of the two latter. Cambacérès was a native of the South; cautious and subtle, he had been a member of the Convention, and was rightly regarded as an able lawyer. He justified the confidence which Bonaparte placed in him, and proved himself a skillful, cool-headed, and sound adviser. If he did nothing to prevent Bonaparte from becoming a despot, if he even aided him to become one, he succeeded in sometimes tempering the inevitabilities and harshness of his master, at any rate in matters of detail. Lefèvre was thirty years older than Bonaparte; he was a Norman, philopatric and cunning, and was believed to be still at heart a royalist. It was possible for this very reason that Bonaparte chose him, in the hope that his example would win over the wavering; for Lefèvre was by no means a well-known man, and had played no prominent part during the Revolution. His name was the first on the list of the Intermediate Commissions of the Council of Ancients, and he was said to possess literary talent and some knowledge of finances; but he never showed any disposition to take the lead.

Thus, while a few of the men of Bourbois had made their fortunes, the rest were still kept waiting. Once again Bonaparte resolved to force the pace; and he was the more inclined to this, since the inspection received as to the result of the plébiscite was encouraging. A law passed by the Intermediate Commissions on December 23 provided that the new Constitution should come into force two days later (8 Nivôse, year VIII), in other words, on Christmas Day. Bonaparte intentionally chose the date of a great Christian festival for the inauguration of his government.

Sieyès and Roger Dumas, in conjunction with Condorcet and Lacroix, had already drafted the list of the first senators: they settled it definitely on the evening of December 24. The Senate filled up its own number on the following day, and proceeded forthwith to nominate the members of the Tribunal and the Legislative Body. Bonaparte interfered little in these appointments, which were made chiefly under the influence of Sieyès and in a collectively liberal spirit. The Senate was recruited for distinguished men, and included several men of science and philosophers who had served the Revolution as members of public bodies or by their works, and several former ministers and members of the various revolutionary assemblies. Similarly, 65 former members of the Council of Five Hundred and of the Assemblies were included in the Tribunal, and 228 in the Legislative Body. As was fitting, orators and men of letters, speakers and writers, were appointed to the Tribunal; less well-known deputies, with some miscellaneous celebrities, composed the Legislative Body. The appointments were made with a view to the task which the Constitution assigned to each body. The Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunal were fairly representative of the surviving politicians of the Revolution. By this time, however, the men of the Revolution no longer formed the only party in France: they were confronted by the group including Bonaparte—the Councilors of State and the heads of the bureaucracy.

The ordinance of 3 Nivôse, year VIII (December 26, 1799), defined the powers and the composition of the Council of State, as in which the Constitution had been silent. Two days before (December 24) the councillors had been appointed by the First Consul, and they had been installed on the day when the Constitution was inaugurated (December 25). Their maximum number was forty, which was raised to fifty by the *Senatus Consultum* of 18 Thermidor, year X (August 4, 1800): but in point of fact it never exceeded forty-five. It included former revolutionaries of every section, generals, admirals, lawyers, administrators who had held office before the Revolution, former nobles and former nobles—all men of high attainments, energy, and ability.

They were divided into five sections—those of finance, civil and criminal legislation, war, administration, and home affairs—with a president at the head of each. Lacroix acted as General Secretary. Questions were first discussed in "sections," afterwards in a general meeting under the presidency of the First Consul. Each councillor received a yearly salary of 25,000 francs. The ministers, who at the outset could only attend the Council for the purpose of consultation, had, after 1800, the right to vote in the Council according to their rank, and took part in its deliberations. Certain high functionaries, such as Frechot, Prefect of the Seine, and Dufour, Prefect of Police, enjoyed the same rights.

The activity of the Council of State, which at the outset was considerable, went on increasing from year to year. The number of



subjects discussed in general meetings rose from 911 in 1800 to 2,832 in 1804. In short, the control exercised by the Council was all-embracing. To be more precise, the subjects coming under the purview of the Council may be classified under six principal heads: the drafting of codes, laws, and Consular decrees; the drawing-up of ordinances relating to the public administration; the interpretation of statutes by means of opinions given on points stated by the Government; the settlement of administrative disputes; the consideration of demands for the prosecution of functionaries other than ministers, for acts done in their official capacity; and finally an appellate jurisdiction as a "Court of Review" (*appel comme d'office*) in pursuance of the *articles organiques* of 14-Germinal, year X (April 8, 1802). In short, the Council of State was at once an administrative body comprising the heads of all the great departments, a quasi-legislative body, and a judicial body with special powers. It filled the place of a tribunal, a Chamber, and a council of ministers, and was responsible to the First Consul alone.

The Council on its sessions met daily. At certain times Bonaparte summoned general meetings at the Tuileries almost every evening. On these occasions Bonaparte was, as it were, *ex facie*. When the discussion turned on questions which related neither to the personal aims of the First Consul nor to his secret schemes for a dictatorship, everyone spoke his mind freely. Bonaparte himself set the example; and his "opinions in council" are amongst the most striking testimonies of his astonishing genius for organization.

Simultaneously with the installation of the Council of State, Bonaparte was occupied with the reconstruction of the ministry. Cambacérès, who had become Second Consul, was replaced by Abrial as Minister of Justice; while Lucien Bonaparte became Minister of the Interior. Of those who had held office before 18 Brumaire, Fouché alone retained his place, as Minister of Police. Important ministerial changes followed shortly after. The chemist Berthollet succeeded Lucien Bonaparte (January 31, 1801); Decrès became Minister of the Navy (October 3, 1801); Bachelin-Moréas became the first Minister of the Public Treasury (September 22, 1801), and Dajoux the first Minister of Military Affairs (*administration de la guerre*) March 21, 1802. Finally, Régnier replaced Abrial with the title of "Chief Judge and Minister of Justice" (September 14, 1802). The list of portfolios and of their holders under the Consulate was now complete. There were in all ten ministerial departments: foreign affairs, war, military affairs, navy and colonies, finance, the treasury, justice, home affairs, police, and the office of Secretary of State.

The fear that his ministers might grow too important was ever present in Bonaparte's mind. He never summoned them to deliberate in common, but communicated his orders to them or worked with one of them apart from the rest. We have seen that originally the ministers

had merely a consultative voice in the Council of State, and that, under the Constitution, they alone of all functionaries were responsible for their acts. These precautions were, however, insufficient to satisfy Bonaparte. Owing to the nature of their duties, five of the ministers might have gradually assumed a dominant position, viz. the Ministers of War, Finance, the Interior, and Police, and the Secretary of State. It is unnecessary to dwell on the importance that might have attached to the Ministers of War and Finance in the France of that period. The Minister of the Interior wielded a very wide authority; matters relating to public order, local administration, public works, education, relief of the poor, religion, agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, fell within his province. Still less definite and more formidable were the powers of the Minister of Police. Ubiquitous and irresponsible, his eye was everywhere; if a plot were to be denounced, he denounced it; if, as sometimes happened, one were to be invented, he invented it. Finally, every document emanating from the First Consul and all reports addressed to the First Consul passed through the hands of the Secretary of State. He moved about with Bonaparte, received directly from him his curt commands, put these into official language, and countersigned them. His office reared him above the rest; but Bonaparte would not bear of a *prime minister*, and took his measures accordingly.

In the first place, he was most careful in his choice of men. Berthier, an admirable minister and in the field an excellent Chief of the Staff, was helpless without a leader. "If you leave him to himself," said Bonaparte, "he is not capable of commanding a battalion." Maret was, as some one said, "a civilian Berthier"; and he only used his influence to secure the most lucrative places for his relations and friends. Gaudin's subservience we have already had occasion to notice. Two men alone eluded their master's domination—the mysterious Fouché, and, in another department, Talleyrand.

In the second place, Bonaparte lessened the importance of the principal ministries by dividing their functions between two bodies, a measure analogous to that which weakened the legislative authority by distributing it amongst several bodies. It was not only with a view to improving the administration, but also for a political purpose, that, by the side of the Ministry of Finance, a Ministry of the Public Treasury was created: the first to deal with income—"action without action"; the second with expenditure—"action without foresight"—a plan which resulted in incessant disputes between the two departments. In like manner, by the side of the Ministry of War was placed the Ministry of Military Affairs; beside the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of the General Police (created on January 8, 1796); beside the Ministry of General Police, the Prefecture of Police in Paris (March 8 and July 1, 1800). The last-named magistrats controlled the police of Paris and of the department of the Seine, and at the

same time, in conjunction with the Prefect of the Seine, took an active part in the municipal administration. He was subordinate to the Minister of General Police, but only in his capacity as a police official; and his semi-independence, the importance of his district, and the personal rivalry between Debats and Fouché, rendered the Prefecture a counterpoise to the Ministry of Police.

Finally Bonaparte established, within the principal ministries themselves and with the view of still further diminishing their importance, independent bodies, temporary or permanent according to their functions, which, under the name of General Boards (*Conseils Généraux*), were almost always situated in Councils of State. The system of General Boards was one of the original features of the Napoleonic system. It often contributed to the rapid transaction of business; from a political point of view, it in a manner legalized the assumption of executive power by the Council of State to the detriment of ministerial authority.

While the appointments to the various political and governmental offices were thus being completed, the work of the *péribacite* was proceeding but slowly. In a proclamation issued in view of this event (December 15), Bonaparte had formulated in remarkable language the principles of the new Constitution. "The authorities which the Constitution creates are strong and stable, competent in all respects to guarantee the rights of the citizens and the interests of the State. Citizens! the Revolution has remained faithful to the principles from which it springs. It is now at an end." Bonaparte moreover, when he became First Consul, took care to mark his accession to power by a series of measures calculated to prove, in a striking fashion, that a new era of harmony and peace had dawned for France. On December 25, 1799, he despatched a letter to the King of England advocating peace; and, by an application of the law of December 24, he authorized the return to France of forty proscribed persons belonging to the Mountain party or to the Mountains. On December 27 the Council of State, promulgating for the first time a formal "opinion," declared that the Constitution had revealed by implication the enactments which excluded the *ci-devant* nobility and relations of *émigrés* from public office. On December 28 a circular decree substituted for the oath hitherto imposed on functionaries and ministers of religion a simple declaration of ability to the Constitution. New Year's Day, 1800, was, with revived respect for the Christian calendar, fixed for the opening of the legislative session. The *péribacite* closed with a general vote of reconciliation, of wariness, and of peace. The result was proclaimed on February 12: the Constitution was adopted by 3,211,207 votes against 1,822.

Local administration had still to be organized. The law of 28 Floridian, year VIII (February 17, 1800), was the last of the series of great organic enactments which marked the beginning of the Consulate

and supplied what was lacking in the Constitution. It forms the basis of the French administrative system to the present day.

As we remember, the Constitution omitted to define the communal *arrondissements*. It was a question whether the national municipalities of the Directory should be retained under this name. The law in question decided the matter by grouping the 6000 or 7000 *cantons* of the Republic in 364 communal *arrondissements*. At one end of the scale, the system of division into departments was preserved; at the other, there remained the 36,000 to 40,000 *communes* (villes, towns, and villages) of former days. Had these communes been grouped together in national municipalities, the spirit of local self-government might have been developed; divided amongst 40,000 petty units it could not fail to die out. This was precisely the end in view: the administration was destined to pass altogether from the inhabitants themselves to the central authority. When introducing the law of 28 Floride before the Legislative Body, Bonaparte pointed out three distinct activities which it was intended to direct: (1) the administration properly so-called; (2) official decisions on points relating to taxation, involving the distribution of assessments as between groups and individuals; (3) the decision of litigated points in dispute in all departments of administration. According to him, "To administer is the business of one man, to judge is the business of several."

The duty, then, of administration was "confided to a single magistrate in each administrative division," viz. to the prefect in the department, to the sub-prefect in the district (*arrondissement*), and to the mayor and his assistants in the commune. The assessment of the direct taxes was to be adjusted as between the districts by the council of that department, and as between the communes by the council of the district. The General Councils and the District Councils could initiate proposals; they voted the additions to the direct taxation necessary to meet the special needs of their respective areas; and they supervised the expenditure of these funds by the local officials. In the cities, towns, and villages, Municipal Councils were to assist the mayor and his assistants in "settling the domestic affairs of the community," in audit and criticism the municipal accounts, to consider questions relating to the administration of the property and status of the commune, leases, streets, and additional taxes. The mayor and his assistants kept the public registers and supervised the local police, in conjunction with commissioners of police in towns of more than 5000 inhabitants, and with commissioners general of police in towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants. Finally, the power of deciding matters in litigation throughout the department was entrusted to the council of the prefecture, the prefect acting as president and having a casting vote.

All the appointments to posts in the administration and in the judiciary were made by the First Consul or by the prefect from the

**Lists of Notability.** All autonomy disappeared. Popular election was a thing of the past. The "administration and the administered were brought together"—such was the phrase; but the administration was, in fact, nothing else than the central power, which pressed heavily on the local government. Municipal constitution was now more thorough and more burdensome than before 1789.

The first prefects were appointed on March 31; and Bonaparte, in his manner, was, *chance well*. The first generation of his administrative officials consisted, as a rule, of men of a superior type. Bonaparte did not trouble himself to enquire to which party a man had belonged or what was his origin; he appointed former members of revolutionary assemblies, men who had filled posts during the Revolution or even under the monarchy, generals, and (later) members of the nobility; all he required was industry, experience, and obedience. Under the energetic impulse of a picked body of functionaries the local administration worked with an apparent smoothness which hid its defects, with a rapidity often excessive, but with admirable regularity throughout.

On February 12, 1800, two days after the promulgation of the law which completed the equipment of his government, Bonaparte established himself at the Tuileries, the former palace of the Kings of France. On that day Bonaparte took visible possession of power. His political methods were now very different from those he had adopted during the Provisional Committee. His object was the maintenance of order rather than pacification; and the distinction is important. According to circumstances, he employed in turn repression and indulgence.

In his dealings with the *Chouans* in the west, Bonaparte had just shown that he was quite ready to employ repression. His patience had been tried by d'Hédouville's attempts at negotiation; and when (December 22) d'Andigné, accompanied by Hyde de Neuville, one of the leading royalist agents in Paris, came to discuss with Bonaparte the question of peace, the interview ended in acute disagreement. On the following day (December 23) an edict and circular proclamation announced that all *Chouans* who failed to surrender within ten days would be treated as rebels, but it granted an amnesty to those who laid down their arms. Subsequently, on January 8, 1800, at the expiration of the days of grace, still severer measures were decided on. The Army of England became the Army of the West; General Bugey was to replace d'Hédouville, and was to quarter his army of 60,000 men in the disaffected districts, and subject the inhabitants to all the miseries of war. On January 18 the Constitution was suspended for three months in the departments of the west; and Rome received power to make regulations, even to the extent of inflicting the death penalty. Bonaparte's strong methods took the place of the mild and sagacious treatment of d'Hédouville; and the intention of the Government was to strike

hard and quickly, so as to make an end of the matter before beginning the campaign of 1800 against the Coalition.

D'Aliberville had not despaired of the success of his policy, and was continuing his negotiations; while the Abbot Bernier, the parish priest of St Land d'Angers, was secretly urging the mass of power upon the royalist leaders. The amnesty was to expire on January 31. D'Antichamp and Beaumot submitted on the 24th; Châtillon and the royalists of Angers on the 28th. The process of disarmament began forthwith, and D'Aliberville conducted it with his habitual prudence and moderation. He had disinterestedly accepted the post of Chief of the Staff to his success, and he remained at Angers while Bruce marched into Brittany in order to commence operations. Bruce's task was an easy one. La Pérelaye surrendered without a blow (January 26); and, after some fighting, Beaumot (January 28) and Georges Cadoudal (February 14) submitted in their turn. Organized *Chouanerie* was at an end.

Normandy was within the military authority of General LeFebvre in Paris, where Generals Gardane and Chambarlhac, at the head of 10,000 men, were despatched against Frotté (January 22). The latter became aware that the struggle was hopeless, and restrained his adherents from any military movement after February 4. He sent representatives to Alençon to treat with Guillel, the general in command there, who was soon after joined by Chambarlhac. On February 1, Bonaparte declared that Frotté "should surrender at discretion, and that he might count on the generosity of the Government, which was anxious to forget the past and to unite all Frenchmen." It is not known whether the order and the promise of the First Consul were transmitted to Frotté, or, if they were, in what circumstances; what is certain is, that he surrendered without reserves at Alençon. There he was arrested with some of his officers and sent forthwith to Paris (February 15). On the way he was met at Vernon by an order from LeFebvre that he should be tried by court-martial; sentence was pronounced on the 17th; and on the 18th Frotté and his companions were executed.

Several of the royalist leaders came to Paris, some of their number hoping to find in Bonaparte the long-expected restorer of monarchy. Beaumot became the intimate of Fouché, with whom he had natural affinities. Cadoudal obtained an interview with the First Consul (March 2). He was prepared, after a certain delay, and on condition that he should be paid for it, to give his support to the Government. Moreover, while the European war lasted, there was always a possibility that a disaster to the French arms might retrieve the royalist cause. The agents at Paris were already planning fresh schemes, when Fouché got wind of the matter and seized their papers, which were laid before the Council of State (May 2). Those members of the party who thought they were compromised sought safety in flight; Cadoudal and Hyde de Neuville escaped to England.

The First Consul dealt with republican opponents as he had dealt

with the *Closerie*—by repression. Immediately upon its assembly, the Tribunate took upon itself to play the part assigned to it by the Constitution. On January 2 Duvivier, and on January 3 Benjamin Constant, made open allusion to the autocratic tendencies of Bonaparte. A newspaper was followed. Bonaparte, much annoyed, at first took part in it, and attacked his adversaries through the inspired press; then suddenly he cut the matter short. There were 79 political newspapers in circulation at that time in Paris; an edict of January 17, 1800, suppressed 60 and forbade the publication of any fresh ones. But more was to follow. On April 5, 1800, Fouché was informed that the Council intended to suppress three of the existing journals "unless the proprietors could show their editors to be men of such character and patriotic principles as to be proof against corruption." One paper only succeeded in furnishing the necessary guarantee; the other two disappeared. In the following month yet another newspaper was suppressed for misbehaviour, so that not more than 11 political journals were left, in addition to the *Mémoires*, which had become the official organ. A press bureau was in operation at the Ministry of the General Police; and by an order of the First Consul, dated April 5, 1800, a theatrical censorship was established at the Ministry of the Interior.

On the other hand, Bonaparte treated with indulgence those who had taken the losing side in the Revolution. The measures passed on November 13, and on December 24, 25, and 27, 1799, restored some peace of mind to the two or three hundred thousand Frenchmen—*émigrés* nobles or relations of *émigrés*—who, under the revolutionary laws, had suffered a species of proscription while still remaining in France; and a few of the proscribed were allowed to return from abroad. But there still remained outside France about 144,000 *émigrés*, against whom the Constitution maintained in its full force the severity of the Revolution. There could as yet be no question of recalling these exiles; but the law of March 3, 1800, fixed December 30, 1799, as the date for closing the list of *émigrés*.

The second Italian campaign interrupted Bonaparte's domestic activity. He set out to join the army on May 4, 1800; Cambacérès took his place during his absence. The victory of Marengo (June 14) was important, not merely from a military point of view, but because it was, in the words of Hyde de Neuville, "the consecration of Napoleon's personal authority." It added to his glory and popularity, and, while not ending his ambition, brought it into greater prominence. A pamphlet written by someone in his confidence, probably Fontanes, already compared Napoleon, not to the "vilein" Cromwell, or to the "usurper" Monk, but to Caesar. Bonaparte made haste to return to Paris, and was there at the beginning of July. He feared that, during his absence, both royalists and republicans would resort themselves, and he wished to make an end of party strife.

Louis XVIII himself had long cherished the hope that Bonaparte would restore the monarchy; and he went so far as to write to him on February 20, 1800. Bonaparte waited till after Marengo, and then sent a plain answer: "Your return is not a thing to be wished for; it could only be made over 100,000 corpses" (September 7). Cadoudal had returned from London to Brittany (June 8); but Chouanerie had degenerated into a form of brigandage similar to that which disturbed the South and certain districts of Central France. A law of February 7, 1801, empowered the Government to establish in the departments, wherever it thought necessary, special tribunals, half civil, half military: these courts were subject to no appeal, and were empowered to inflict every degree of punishment, including capital, in cases of brigandage, insurrection, seditious assemblages, and attacks on the persons of nationalized property. These exceptional courts were of much use in the suppression of brigands and Chouans. Cadoudal returned to England at the close of 1801; the last shot was fired on January 5, 1802. The Army of the West was disbanded on May 21; and the maintenance of order was handed over to the governments. In Paris the republicans had renounced all thought of action; and their agency confined itself to correspondence and the collection of intelligence. The party seemed to have suffered final defeat.

The republicans were relatively numerous in the Senate, in the Tribunats, and in the Legislative Body; but they had no leaders, no organization, and no genuine support in the country. "They accepted," said Fourier, "the Constitution of the year VIII, as safeguarding the greatest extent of liberty which it was possible to enjoy after the evils and the excesses of the Revolution." They said, however, that the Republic was doomed. Bonaparte called them *illuminés*, and they in turn called him an *illuminé*. The advanced republicans—"Jacobins," "enthousiasts," "anarchists," "exclusives, and others"—looked back with regret on the democratic institutions of the Revolution; they were few in number, but were reported to be reckless. Bonaparte held them up as a warning to the constitutional republicans. "Do you want me to hand you over to the Jacobins?" he asked. They protested loudly against the idea of any understanding with those "enthousiasts." Less even than the royalists did the republicans seem to be in a position to offer any serious resistance to Bonaparte.

In keeping watch on both parties alike, the police played an important part, and soon developed into one of the fundamental supports of Bonaparte's government. Fourier and his agents, Dubois and the Prefecture of Police, were not sufficient. The chief staff of the Paris garrison, the governments and the agents of the Home Office in the departments, the Post Office officials who opened letters, the innumerable spies and informers in Bonaparte's pay, all became part of his police. His informers denounced each other and the public. By Bonaparte's orders



everyone was kept under observation except himself; spying and denunciation were universal. This system contributed not a little to lower the tone of public life and of individual character. Constitutional opposition became impossible; *Chouanerie* had been stamped out; conspiracy offered the only means of contending with Bonaparte. "They conspire in the street; they conspire in the saloon," said the ex-deputy Artois; and the remark (adds Dumas) is characteristic of the time. The police were prepared, on occasion, to organize plots in order to gain credit by denouncing them, and by supplying the Government with opportunities for employing harsh measures with a greater appearance of justice. There can be no doubt that the pretended conspiracy of the Jacobins, Dumasville, Artois, Topino-Lebrun, and Camille, who were arrested on October 10, 1800, on the charge of plotting the assassination of the First Consul at the Opera, had been organized by agents of the police. Nevertheless, which was made of it, the parliamentary bodies formally congratulated the First Consul on his happy escape; and the Jacobins were forthwith put on their trial.

On the other hand the royalists conspired, and conspired seriously. On June 19 Cécoudal wrote that the "indispensable blow" was about to be struck at Paris. Of the five or six *Chouans* dispatched to Paris, two only—Lamotte and Saint-Beaufort—perished in the attempt. They were joined by Jean Carbon, who happened to be in the capital. They hid themselves so skillfully that the police lost sight of them, but on December 24 they made their presence felt. On the evening of that day, when Bonaparte was on his way from the Tuilleries to the Opera, the conspirators exploded an infernal machine. Many were killed and injured, but Bonaparte himself escaped unhurt.

There was violent indignation. Bonaparte himself, the police who had been taken unawares, the best instructed royalists then at Paris (Bourmont and Hyde de Neuville), vied with each other in accusing the Jacobins. Fouché drew up a list of suspects (January 1, 1801); and the Government framed a decree condemning them to deportation. The Council of State gave its opinion that this decree was in the nature of a formal "order of the State Police," and that "it was unnecessary to embody it in statutory form." The Senate was then called upon to rule, by a Senate Commission, that this "Order of the Government" was a "measure tending to preserve the Constitution" (January 8). There was some show of resistance; but they met it by alleging that the welfare of the country was at stake; and the constitutional republicans in the Senate shrank from making common cause with the Jacobins. It was thus, by means of more than doubtful legality, that the first Senate Commission was forced through. A hundred and thirty anarchists, Jacobins, and "Septembrists" were, by a precautionary act of government, condemned to deportation. They were forthwith dispatched to Nantes, but not more than fifty were deported to the colonies; the

rest were allowed to remain under the supervision of the police. The persons implicated in the pretended Opera conspiracy were sent to the galleys (January 22). The Jacobin party, so far as it can be called a party at all, was disposed of; and the constitutional republicans, who had supported the Council in their policy of terror, were reduced to compulsory silence. The police in the end discovered the true authors of the explosion in the Rue St Nicolas. Linossier succeeded in escaping to America, where he became a Catholic priest; Saint-Nicolas and Carbon were taken, condemned (April 6), and executed forthwith (April 31).

Bonaparte's popularity was increased through the general horror excited by the attempt on his life. It was increased still more by the glory derived from the conclusion of the Treaty of Lunéville (February 9, 1801). The main lines of his policy now became clear, his aim was to reconcile the old France with the new, those who had suffered by the Revolution with the Government which had sprung from it. The first steps taken in this direction were the negotiations relating to the Concordat, to be discussed in a later chapter. The treaty with the Pope was signed on July 18, 1801; and the ratifications were exchanged on December 19. A statutory enactment was, however, necessary to render the arrangement binding; and in spite of every effort the measure seemed likely to encounter strenuous opposition in the Tribunats and the Legislative Body. The time had come for the partial renewal of those two bodies; and the method of renewal was not defined by the Constitution, except that twenty Tribunes and sixty Legislators were to retire. Instead of determining the selection by lot, the Senate decided, on January 18, 1802, that it would name by vote the 20 Tribunes and the 60 Legislators who were to continue in office. This was a mere contrivance, designed to facilitate the exclusion of some under pretence of retaining others. The result was that no leader of the Opposition remained a member of the Tribunats. The bodies, thus purged, were convened in extraordinary session; and the Concordat, together with the *Article Organique*, became the law of 18 Germinal, year X. (April 8, 1802). Meanwhile the Peace of Amiens (March 25) had still further enhanced the prestige of the First Consul. A Te Deum was sung at Notre Dame on Easter Day, April 18, 1802, and was attended by the Consular court, in all the pomp of the hyponomachy. This act appeared to sanction what had occurred, and to reconcile France with the Church.

In order also to reconcile the new France with the old, the Senate Consulated of April 26, 1802, granted an amnesty in respect of the crime of emigration to all persons "who may be guilty thereof." The exceptions were not numerous. The decree of October 20, 1800, had authorised the first general amnesties in favour of the plebeian *émigrés*, with their wives and children. The individual amnesties of the old-nobility nobility had been largely added to by means of the tolerance of the Government and the weakness of the police. The Senators

Constitution of April 18 got an end to bargains in detail; it specified the various classes of *déportés* who were not to profit by the amnesty—persistent leaders of risings against the Republic, persons who had taken office abroad, and a few others; but the total number of those exempted was not to exceed a thousand. The *déportés* were required to return before 1 Vendémiaire, year XI (September 28, 1802), and to swear fidelity to the Constitution. Having fulfilled these requirements, they were at once to resume possession of so much of their property as had not been alienated; but they were declared incapable of retaining, under any pretext, estates which had been nationalized or sold. The rights of those who had purchased such property were thus again implicitly guaranteed by the imperial decree.

Bonaparte such as those deserved their reward; and Bonaparte had already made up his mind that this reward should take the shape of the Consulate for Life; but this he was not to obtain without further manipulation of the Constitution. On May 6, 1802, a message from the Council announced the Treaty of Amiens to the Tribunate and the Legislative Body. It was received with enthusiasm in both bodies; and the Tribunate unanimously adopted a resolution, proposed by Clabot de l'Allier, that there should be given to General Bonaparte, First Consul of the Republic, "a signal pledge of the gratitude of the nation." This resolution was communicated to the Senate. So far the proceedings were quite regular; but the question then arose what the pledge should be. The equibrians expected that it would be merely titular; but Bonaparte's supporters, secretly incited by Cambacérès, proposed the Consulate for Life. The Senate adopted a middle course, and resolved by a Senate Commission (May 8) to re-elect Bonaparte for the ten years immediately following the ten years for which he had originally been appointed.

Bonaparte expected more than this; but, yielding to the advice of Cambacérès, he concealed his dissatisfaction. He described the Senate, adding: "You deem that I owe a fresh sacrifice to the nation; I am ready to perform it, if the commands of the people confirm what your vote allows" (May 10). It was then that he referred the question from the Senate to the people. But he did more than this. The Council of State, when consulted (May 10) on the wording of the question to be put to the nation, formulated it thus: "Is Napoleon Bonaparte to be made Consul for Life?" For the first time the venerable Christian name accompanied the surname Bonaparte, and it took its place in history by an illegal act; for there was nothing to justify the Council of State in thus framing the question to be solved by a new plebiscite. A *Circular* edict published the same day (May 10) arranged for the taking of the ballot. The Assembly yielded, Carnot being the only Tribune who opposed the Consulate for Life.

It was not enough for Bonaparte to receive rewards; he desired also

to be in a position to bestow them. The Constitution had decided that soldiers should receive a recompense from the State, in the shape (it would appear) of grants from the national property. But the Council deses of December 23, 1799, gave general application to a custom instituted by Bonaparte in the series which he commanded, of presenting "arms of honour" to soldiers who had distinguished themselves. The law of May 12, 1804, created a "Legion of Honour," with the view of rewarding merit and services both military and civil.

A "Grand Council," presided over by the First Consul as Chief of the Legion, was to appoint the legionnaires. These were divided into 15 "cohorts," each composed of 7 Grand Officers, 20 Commanders, 50 officers, and 800 legionnaires: each Grand Officer received 2000 francs a year, each Commander 1000 francs, each officer 1000, and each legionary 250 francs. At the head-quarters of each "cohort" there was to be a hospital for the reception of sick, injured, and needy legionnaires, the expense of which was to be defrayed out of the State *domain*. Soldiers who had received "arms of honour" became legionnaires as a matter of course. The details of the organization were to be the subject of future regulations. In 1805 the mark of Grand Eagle was created, and made superior to that of Grand Officer. The number of members largely exceeded the figure originally fixed. In 1805 Napoleon had already made 14,000 appointments. The number of legionnaires averaged during his reign 80,000, of whom 1500 were civilians.

In expounding the motives of the law, Boudier remarked that the creation of the Legion of Honour "resembled the issue of a new coinage; but that, unlike money issued from the Treasury, this new coinage, drawn from the mint of French honour, was unvarying in value and inexhaustible in amount." Bonaparte held that man's actions are guided, not by a sense of duty, but by a desire for honour, if not for honours; and this belief has ever since exerted a detrimental influence on the French people. The republicans strenuously opposed the measure; it passed the Council of State by only 14 votes to 10, the Tribunal by 36 to 28, and the Legislative Body by 106 to 100. The Legion of Honour attained great prestige, and became a valuable aid to government; but, at the same time, it was so repugnant to public opinion that Bonaparte did not venture to hold formal distributions of the first decorations till after the establishment of the Empire.

It now became more and more evident that Bonaparte aimed at personal rule. After the proscription of the Jacobins and the rest of the royalists, the opposition consisted of the republican party alone; they were very weak, but the peace brought them substantial reinforcements. The army was still deeply imbued with republicanism and free thought; and Napoleon was aware of this. He had therefore got rid of the regiments most attached to the spirit of the Revolution, by sending them to San Domingo. They had embarked on December 31, 1801, shortly

after the signature of the preliminaries of the peace with England. On the conclusion of peace, the generals, now released from service, flocked to Paris; and even those who had supported Bonaparte on 18 Brumaire were now—whether owing to a spirit of republicanism, or to jealousy of the First Consul, it is difficult to say—in opposition. Angerme, Bruna, Delmas, Gervais St-Cyr, Jourdan, Lannes, Lecombe, Oudinot, Maréchal, Riquet, Soult, Marmont, Bernadotte, Moreau—all, especially the three last, were hostile to Bonaparte.

The details are obscure, but it seems probable that the most serious danger which threatened Bonaparte in his progress to supreme power was to be found in this quarter. From April to June, 1800, the generals met frequently to discuss in secret councils their grievances against "Satan" Bonaparte. What was still more serious, the military opposition was joined by the civilians; by Sieyès and the republican senators, by Madame de Staël and her following, and by the *idéologues* who met at Antoinette in the house of Cabanis.

Bernadotte, rather than Moreau, appears to have been the pivot of the military conspiracy. But on principle, as he said, and also, no doubt, to protect himself in case of failure, Bernadotte was disposed to act by legal means only, after obtaining a vote of the Senate. Various plans of government were proposed, one being the division of France into military districts which should be assigned to various generals, the district of Paris being given to Bonaparte. Bonaparte suspected what was in the wind, and hastened to disavow militarism. "Never will military government take root in France," he declared at the Council of State on May 4, 1800, "unless the nation has first been brutalized by fifty years of ignorance. The army is the nation." The police thereupon set to work. They first attempted to repeat the coup which had succeeded so well against the Jacobins; they trumped up a conspiracy of assassination, and two officers, Dumas and Fournier, were smothered on the charge of conspiring the death of the First Consul (May 7). The actual conspirators were to be sought elsewhere. On May 20 General Simon, Bernadotte's Chief of the Staff, began secretly to dispatch from Rennes into every corner of France pamphlets violently attacking Bonaparte. "Soldiers!" such was their language, "you have no longer a country; the Republic has ceased to exist. A tyrant has seized upon power; and that tyrant is Bonaparte."

Deloë, the Prefect of Police, was the first to draw Bonaparte's attention to this "libal plot." Fouché started the theory of a royalist conspiracy; but before long General Simon, with some other officers, was arrested at Rennes (June 22). Bonaparte wisely hushed the matter up; nothing became known; Simon was dismissed without trial, and Bernadotte was sent to take the waters at Plombières. Fouché was appointed a senator (September 14, 1800); and the General Police Office was again attached to the Department of Justice (September 18, 1800). One by

one, the opposition generals were sent away from Paris on distant embassies. Madame de Staël, who had returned to Coppet in May, 1802, was forbidden to re-enter Paris; and when, in the following year, she ventured into France, she was actually expelled (October 18, 1803). The steps taken to suppress the plot were as obscure as the plot itself; but for Bonaparte there was still a lion in the path—Hannan.

While Barrasotti's conspiracy had thus come to nothing, the *plébiscite* sanctioned every position taken by Bonaparte. The result of the count, which was made public on August 2, 1802, was 3,355,535 "aye" against 8,374 "noe." It would seem that, speaking generally, the *plébiscite* had obtained; and it will be noticed that the number of those who voted "no" had sensibly increased. Nevertheless, this *plébiscite* marks, without doubt, the political abdication of the French nation in favour of Bonaparte and the system of Cæsarism.

Now that Bonaparte was master of the situation, he drew up, of his own authority, a fresh Constitution, which he first laid before his two colleagues and certain confidential friends. He then sent it to the Council of State, which approved it forthwith, and later on the same day to the Senate (August 4, 1802). As if by accident, "the approaches, the court, and the ante-chambers of the Luxembourg were filled with grandees." The Senate accepted the measure, voting on it without discussion; and it was henceforth known as the "*Organic Statutes Constitution of the Constitution, of 15 Thermidor, year X.*"

Under it the Councils were appointed for life, the Second and Third Councils being appointed by the Senate on the presentation of the First. The First Council had the right to nominate his successor; if his candidate were rejected by the Senate, the right of nomination reverted to the two other Councils. The First Council retained all the power given him by the Constitution of the year VIII; and, in addition, he was to enjoy the sole right of ratifying treaties of peace and alliance, which were no longer looked upon as matters for legislation. On these subjects, he had only to confer with his Privy Council, whose members he nominated before each sitting. A Privy Council was to draft the *Senatus Consults*.

The Councils were to preside in the Senate, which, at the time, consisted of 66 members. The number was raised to 120; and the appointment of senators was henceforth left to the First Council, who had the right of presentation in case of a vacancy created by the Constitution of the year VIII, and of absolute appointment to the vacancies created since that date. In this fashion Bonaparte disposed of 54 seats and could easily obtain a majority. The Senate was to settle by *organic Statutes* any point not provided for by the Constitution; it could dissolve the Legislative Body and the Tribunate, and if necessary suspend the Constitution. Its powers were enlarged in proportion as it became more subordinate to the First Council, and it was henceforward his *veritable* instrument. The creation of *senatorships* (January 4, 1803) completed

its subjugation. In each of the districts into which the country was divided for the purpose of legal appeals, a senator whom Bonaparte visited in turn received a life-grant from the national lands, yielding an income about equivalent to a senatorial salary. The only conditions imposed on the grantee were a three months' residence in the locality during each year, and the furnishing of a report on the state of public opinion in the district.

The Lists of Notability were replaced by a fresh system. The national assemblies, composed of all citizens domiciled in the canton, were to be summoned by the Government, and their presidents were to be appointed by the First Consul. They were to nominate, under certain conditions, the candidates for the municipal councils, and also, from among the 500 most highly taxed citizens of the department, the members of the electoral colleges of the districts, and of the electoral college of the department. The latter were chosen for life, and their presidents were appointed by the First Consul. Two candidates for each vacancy in the district and departmental councils, also for each vacancy in the Tribunats, the Legislative Body, and the Senate, were to be nominated by the duly qualified colleges, whether district or departmental, respectively. In fact, in spite of the democratic air of the national assemblies, the scheme created a system of nomination of those particularly qualified, combined with a power of actual appointment reserved to the First Consul. The Tribunats was to be reduced to fifty members from the beginning of the year XIII (1804-5). The organic *Senatus Consultum* of 28 Frimaire, year XII (December 26, 1803), placed the appointment of the President of the Legislative Body in the hands of the First Consul.

It is not without reason that the *Senatus Consultum* of 16 Thermidor, year X, is generally known as the Constitution of the year X. The Constitution of the year VIII was still in existence, but it was so changed as to be hardly recognisable. The First Consul had become an autocrat: and no constitutional limit to his authority remained.

Apart from the establishment of the Consulate for Life, so fraught with evil for the future, the year 1803 might be reckoned one of the most splendid in the history of France. The restoration of peace, the victories won, the conquests achieved, the memories of revolutionary enthusiasm, the personal fame of Bonaparte, the return of order and the revival of trade—all combined to make existence brilliant and enjoyable.

A new Court had by degrees been formed at the Tuilleries. A Governor of the Palace (*Durée*), four Prefects of the Palace, and four ladies (of whom Madame de Beauharnais was one) in waiting on Madame Bonaparte, had been appointed by Bonaparte. Josephine, who was accustomed to the ways of good society, and Bonaparte, who was anxious to limit as much as possible the number of persons attending their receptions; and royal usages and etiquette superseded by degrees at the consular Court.

Bonaparte was wearied of all this grandeur, and gladly resumed a simpler life during the days which he passed in the company of his intimates at St Cloud or at Malmaison, the estate acquired by Josephine in 1798.

In Paris, the salons, those centres of conversation in the days before the Revolution, were once more formed. The *Salonques* met at Antoinette at the house of Colburn. Madame de Stael had a circle composed of Camille Jordan, de Gérando, Benjamin Constant, Fourier, and others. Two intimate friends of Madame de Stael, the melancholy and pathetic Madame de Bernis and the lovely Madame Récamier, the wife of a rich Paris banker, also held their salons. In the aristocratic *Palaisburg* St Germain a few royalist houses already half opened their doors. The politeness of old France resumed itself, and elegance in dress again prevailed. Whenever a new office was created, a radiant description was given of the uniform of the new officials; Paris fashions again ruled; the practice of *toilette* resumed; a lady was no longer addressed as "*Citoyenne*" but as "*Madame*"; and "*Citoyen*" was not heard after 1804.

The criminal Court and the refined society of the salons had thrust into the background the wretched rickshaws—the *black-johns*, *l'assommoir*, *hucksters*, speculators in national property, army contractors, gilded officers, gamblers and adventurers, who had been in the ascendant under the Directory, and whose misconduct had discredited the system which allowed them the foremost place. The dissipated classes lived as they had done during the Directory, much out of doors. They frequented the *cafés* on the boulevards, and filled the well-known restaurants of the *Palais Royal*; thence they betook themselves to the public gardens, to dancing saloons, to gaming-houses, or to the theatres. Paris was very gay during the winter of 1800-1. Never before had so many foreigners been seen. Miss Helen Williams entertained at her tea-table, at one and the same time, Carnot, a Neapolitan bishop, Kowalewski, and Fox. Twenty-two accounts are extant of journeys to Paris or other parts of France undertaken by Englishmen between 1801 and 1808; and in September, 1802, there were said to be 16,000 English tourists in Paris.

In the departments, to be sure, the aspect of things was less brilliant. During 1801 certain *Councillors of State* had been sent on a tour of inspection through the military divisions; and their reports, published by Bonaparte, show how much still remained to be done. The evil plight of the commercial classes, the destruction of property, the dissipated state of bridges, ports, canals, public buildings, and roads, the continued insecurity, the prevalence of brigandage, the poverty of hospitals and public charities, the almost complete interruption of public works during long years, often lent to the districts a spectacle of ruin and distress. It was, however, an appearance only. In the country districts, the 1,800,000 purchasers of national domains had had their titles guaranteed by the Constitution; and Bonaparte was careful to ally their name whenever an opportunity occurred. The populace of



the towns were far from sharing the republican regrets of the middle classes; they were enthusiastic for Bonaparte, for his military glory, and for the blessings of peace. Work was plentiful and wages were high: and the two industrial exhibitions, which Chaptal, the Minister of the Interior, had organized in Paris in 1801 and 1804, gave brilliant proof of the progress that had been achieved. One more fact will help us to understand the amazing rapidity with which the Consular administration reorganized the public services, and the deep-seated optimism of which successive generations gave so signal a proof. In 1788, according to Lefebvre, France contained not more than 36,000,000 inhabitants. The census of the year IX. showed 37,847,600 or, including the newly-acquired territories, 38,111,562. This implies, even during the Revolution, a remarkable increase of the population.

We shall consider, in a later chapter, the reforms and undertakings which, begun under the Consulate, were continued under the Empire. We propose to deal in the same way with agriculture, manufactures, trade, literature, science and art, and to confine ourselves for the present to the finances. The first thing necessary was to clear off existing obligations. The market was still loaded with paper of all sorts, negotiation vouchers, assignments, warrants for arrears of interest, subsequent bills of former loans, &c. There were securities of more than sixty descriptions; all were more or less depreciated; their total amount it is impossible to estimate. In order to relieve the money market and restore healthy conditions, Gaudin took steps to buy up these various securities: that is, he called them in, and, on their being returned to the Treasury, gave in exchange for them bonds of an amount proportionate to their nominal value. The operation was carried through rapidly and on the strictest lines, sometimes so strictly that it had almost the appearance of partial repudiation. What was done, however, was justified by the needs of the moment and by the clamorous jobbery which had prevailed under the Directory. Steps were also taken to consolidate various portions of the Public Debt outstanding. This operation was not complete at the close of the Consulate, and was continued under the Empire.

The combined result of all these operations was an increase in the Public Debt. In the year XII (1804-5) it showed a total of about 48,000,000 francs in perpetual securities (without counting life annuities), being an increase of 9,000,000 francs on the amount existing after the last budget of the Directory. But, if the Public Debt was thus increased, it was done for the purpose of discharging existing obligations. Bonaparte issued no securities to cover loans: in this respect, he adhered to older systems of finance. He found the necessary resources in the extraordinary receipts; these were of two sorts, external and internal. The extraordinary external receipts consisted of the war contributions, *arables*, and payments of every sort made by conquered countries or by foreign

*Powers.* An estimate of their total value, even approximate, is unfortunately impossible. They reached by far their highest point under the Consulate in the year XII (1803-4), when they amounted to 120,000,000 francs, of which 50,000,000 francs represent what was paid by the United States for Louisiana. The extraordinary internal receipts were the result, in the first place, of the special measures adopted at the beginning of the Provisional Consulate. In the second place, the sale of the national domains, wisely conducted, provided yearly an appreciable sum. According to *Steuars*, the Consulate received in all nearly 800,000,000 francs from the extraordinary internal receipts.

The ordinary receipts under the Revolution consisted almost entirely of direct taxes; and we have seen with what care Gaudin, as soon as he was appointed, proceeded to reorganise them. The finance law of February 25, 1804, provided that "all collectors of direct taxes should be appointed by the First Consul," and that there should be, "as far as possible, one collector in each city, town, and village." The administrative hierarchy was therewith complete and fully controlled under the State. By its wise management the taxes were got in with far greater facility and produced better results.

Under the Revolution the indirect taxes had been reduced to a minimum. Besides the customs and the postal revenue, there only remained the registration and stamp duties, with certain miscellaneous taxes on public conveyances, articles of gold and silver, playing-cards, and tobacco. Contrary to Gaudin's advice, Bonaparte refused for a long time to impose any new indirect taxation, not because he condemned it in principle, but because he called to mind the dangerous unpopularity of the  *aides* and *gabelles* of the ancien régime. Eventually he consented; but he proceeded at first with the greatest caution. Even under the Directory, *town dues* (*octrois*) were again levied in Paris and certain other cities, in respect of articles intended for local consumption; and the law of February 24, 1800, made the levying of *town dues* obligatory "in towns where the public hospitals had not revenues sufficient for their wants." Thus the new indirect taxation was at first devoted to local purposes. Subsequently, Bonaparte decided to avail himself of it for State purposes also; and a law of February 25, 1804, imposed a tax on liquors, and provided for concentrating the management of all indirect taxes, old and new, in the hands of a single General Board, the combined Octroi and Excise Office (*droits réunis*).

The two first budgets of the Consulate (years VIII and IX, 1799-1801) were still loaded with arrears which were in process of liquidation. But the typical budget, and the one which exemplifies best the happy results of Bonaparte's financial policy, was that of the year X (1801-02). According to the estimated figures, the payments (761,461,818 francs) and the receipts (761,466,409 francs) practically balanced each other. According to the figures given by *Nicolas*, 45 per cent. of the receipts

were derived from direct taxation, 22 per cent. from the *foncier* and *real* donations (including the amount produced by sales), 27 per cent. from indirect taxation, 8 per cent. from various sources and extraordinary receipts. Of the payments, the charges in connection with the finances and the public debt absorbed 47 per cent., the army and navy 43 per cent., and the expenses of administration 8 per cent. An exact balance was secured by strictly adjusting expenses to receipts; and the taxes were collected easily because they were relatively very light. In 1789, according to Talon, of every 100 francs of net income, the peasant paid 14 francs to his *seigneur*, 14 to the Church, 43 to the King, and kept only 19 for himself. After 1800 he paid nothing to the *seigneur* or to the Church; he paid 81 francs in all to the State, the department, and the commune; and he kept 19 francs for himself. "These figures," as Talon remarks, "are all-important." Further, on August 11, 1800, the State was able to announce that the government annuities would be paid punctually and in cash as they fell due. This promise was strictly kept.

From a financial point of view, as well as in other respects, the year 1800-1 marked the zenith of success. After the year XI, the expenses entailed by the renewal of war and the reappearance of extraordinary sources of income lowered the character of the budget. On the other hand, Bonaparte was perpetually tampering with the legitimate control of the Assembly. On no single occasion were his financial proposals presented in a strictly legal and candid fashion. The consequence was that, in spite of the results achieved, complete confidence was never felt. The average price of the 5 per cent. annuities did not exceed 60 francs. This was, to use Boissac's forcible expression, "a masked affront offered daily to Bonaparte by an irreconcilable Boissac."

It was a sounder policy which prompted the creation of the Bank of France. There were several houses at Paris which carried on a discount business, collected *débits*, received deposits, opened current accounts, and issued notes payable to bearer and at sight. The oldest of these was the Bank of Current Accounts (*Caisse des comptes courants*), founded June 23, 1794, with a capital of 2,000,000 francs. Its condition was very prosperous; and Bonaparte decided that, under a fresh name, it should extend its field of operations. On January 18, 1800, a general meeting of the shareholders voted the dissolution of the company; and on the same day an ordinance decreed the establishment of the Bank of France. Its capital amounted to 80,000,000 francs.

The operations of the Bank of France resembled those of the Bank of Current Accounts; and its managers and directors, known as *regents* and *censors*, were elected by the shareholders. What distinguished the Bank of France from the company which it replaced was its intimate relation with the Government. The First Consul, the members of his family, and the high officers of state took shares in it. It was over the counter of the Bank that during several years the holders of

government machine received their armors. The Bank was successively entrusted with other financial duties; for instance, with the custody of the funds subscribed to the national lotteries. The law of April 14, 1803, increased the capital of the Bank to 45,000,000 francs, and granted it for fifteen years the exclusive privilege of issuing bank-notes. The other banks which enjoyed a right of issue either went into liquidation or were bought up by the Bank of France.

Napoleon meanwhile pursued his ambitious designs. Through the medium of Prussia he proposed to Louis XVIII, who was then at Warsaw, that he should renounce his right to the Crown in return for an indemnity. Louis declined the offer, and in a decisive reply, published on March 3, 1803, he reaffirmed all his rights. A crushing victory was required to reduce him to impotence. Napoleon's famous outbreak against the English ambassador, Lord Whitworth, at the diplomatic reception on March 13, 1803, was intended to be at once a reply to the declaration of Louis XVIII and to the reluctance of the British Government to carry out the terms of the Peace of Amiens. War with Great Britain broke out afresh in May, 1803. Public opinion was not in favor of war; but, of all the members of the *Second Coalition*, England was the most detested in France. Napoleon's popularity was not affected. With much parade he organized the camp at Boulogne for an invasion of England. Some historians have doubted whether invasion was his real design; but in any case all his available troops remained till 1805 concentrated at Boulogne and in the neighborhood, practicing the same manoeuvres and inspired by a common enthusiasm. The camp at Boulogne was a crucible in which the various divisions of the republican forces were fused together, and from which emerged, homogeneous and trained to his hand, the "Grand Army" of the Emperor.

Like Napoleon, the royalists hailed with joy the resumption of hostilities. They persuaded themselves, and their correspondents at Paris stated, that "no one believed in the permanence of the new regime." The eulies in London were much excited. They hoped that the British Government would once more lend them its support; and, as a captive of fact, the proceedings of certain British agents—of Drake at Munich, and of Spencer Smith at Stuttgart—were of a nature to encourage the conspirators. In February, 1803, a certain M<sup>lle</sup> de la Trache arrived in London with the information that the Jacobins and republicans still formed a powerful party, which was ready to associate itself with the royalists in overthrowing the tyrant. The idea was attractive. A plan of operations was devised: it embraced an insurrection at Paris, risings in the west and south, assistance to be sent by England, and the landing in France of the Comte d'Artois or some other member of the royal House. Success seemed to be assured.

Now M<sup>lle</sup> de la Trache was probably a secret agent of Fouché.

The former Minister of the General Police had obtained a subvention from Bonaparte; and his personal agents acted independently of the official police, who were now attached to the Ministry of Justice. Fouché, with consummate skill, took advantage of the situation thus created. The conspiracy of 1803-4 was in part his work. His ambition was to become a minister some day; and he saw the advantages which Bonaparte might reap by the discovery of a fresh plot.

On August 21, 1803, Cadoudal left London with a few trusted friends, of whom one, by name Quétel, seems also to have been a police agent in England. Cadoudal crossed the Channel on a cutter from the British fleet commanded by Captain Wright, landed at night at Bréville, near Dieppe, and proceeded to Paris. He was furnished by the British Government with drafts for a million francs to enable him to organize the insurrection in the capital. Meanwhile General Lajolais, an old friend of Pichegru, had seen General Moreau at Paris, and had talked to him of Pichegru; and, as Moreau seemed to preserve the friendliest recollection of him, Lajolais thought himself justified in assuming that Moreau was inclined to follow Pichegru's example and make common cause with the royalists. On January 24, 1804, Pichegru, Lajolais, Rivière, and the Polignacs landed, and secretly entered Paris.

It only remained for the royalists to come to an understanding with Moreau, the leader of the republican party, with a view to common action. Lajolais arranged an interview between Pichegru and Moreau on January 24; and an appointment was made for 7 a.m. on January 25 in the Boulevard de la Madeleine. Moreau proceeded thither with Lajolais; but Pichegru also brought a companion whom Lajolais introduced: it was Cadoudal. Moreau at once withdrew. During the following days (February 2 and 3) Pichegru called on Moreau; but his visits were vain; Moreau had never been willing, and was at this moment less willing than ever, to associate himself with the royalists.

The official police were at a loss. They had arrested some conspirators, of whom Quétel was one; but the whole affair remained a puzzle. They suspected a plot of some sort, but they were ignorant of its nature; and Bonaparte treated them with their ignorance. At the end of January, however, when the conspiracy was ripe, and Moreau appeared to be sufficiently compromised, Bonaparte and Fouché resolved to act. Orders were given to place on their trial certain of the royalists who had been arrested by the police. Quétel was one of these; and he made haste to confess (January 25) all he knew,—the nature of the conspiracy, the presence of Georges Cadoudal at Paris, and the expected arrival of a prince. There was great excitement. On February 1 a General Board of Public Safety was opened at the Ministry of Justice; at the head of it was Bérar, a friend of Fouché. Action was delayed for a few days in the hope of obtaining fresh evidence against Moreau. When it became clear that he would not move, he was arrested (February 14).

A general uproar suddenly succeeded the mysterious silence of the previous weeks, and the public excitement reached its height when the police discovered and arrested Pichegru (February 28), Georges Cadoudal (March 5), and soon afterwards most of the other conspirators.

The whole performance had been arranged with the greatest skill; but what rendered the conspiracy of 1804 a model of police parvenuism, was the fact that a real conspiracy existed, and that Fouquier himself did not know everything. The conspirators were expecting a prince. The question was, which prince, and where was he? Savary, chief of the *gendarmes d'élite*, betook himself to Brive to keep an eye on Monsieur, the Comte d'Artois. But it was not Monsieur's way to run any sides; he remained where he was. Enquiries were hastily made as to the residence of the other princes; and on May 8 there came from Strasbourg some astonishing information.

The Duc d'Angoulême, son of the Duc de Bourbon, and grandson of the Prince de Condé, was living at Ettlingen, less than two leagues from the Rhine. He came now and then secretly into Strasbourg. With him was supposed to be Dumas and an English agent, Colonel Smith, who had just come from London and was clearly in correspondence with Desaix. The expected prince could be no other than the Duc d'Angoulême. On March 10 Bonaparte summoned his colleagues, the two Consuls, with Talleyrand, Fouché, and Régnier, to a privy council, at which it was decided to arrest the Duke, in spite of the fact that Ettlingen was in the territory of Baden. Generals Ordener, Canclauxert, and Frizon were sent at the head of a small force; and during the night of March 14 they arrested the Duke at Ettlingen. He was at once sent on to Paris. Monceville, the papist agent at Ettlingen, and the reports of the officer commanding the expedition, had reached Bonaparte. Everything pointed to a mistake. The Duke was not conspiring; he was living quietly at Ettlingen. With him was, not Dumas, but the old Margie de Thionvry, whose name, disguised by German pronunciation, had confused the blunder; Schmidt (not Smith), came from Freiburg, not from London; the Duke had never been at Strasbourg; and, if it was true that he had wished to take service in England against France, and that he was in receipt of a pension from the British Cabinet, there was in all this nothing that was not natural in the case of an heir of royal blood.

Bonaparte, however, paid no attention to these facts. Was he under the influence of one of those fits of rage, genuine or simulated, to which he was subject? Was his object to make a terrible example, to avenge himself in the person of the Duke on the prince who had not arrived to take command of the "armées"? Was it to prove to the republican party that the blood which was about to flow would render reconciliation between himself and the Bourbons impossible; or was it to blind to himself, by making them his accomplices, those of his followers whom he

expected of sympathy with the fallen dynasty? At all events, Bonaparte was resolved that the Duke should die.

On the morning of March 30, a meeting of the petty council decided to announce immediately a military commission of seven members, to be named by Murat, as Governor of Paris. At 11 o'clock Murat made his nominations, appointing as president General Hulin, who commanded the Circular Guard. At half-past five the Duke arrived at the castle of Vincennes, where two hours before his grave had been dug. At nine in the evening the members of the commission met at the castle. A detachment of troops commanded by Savary was also present. At 11 o'clock the Duke was subjected to a preliminary examination in his room. At 1 a.m. on the 31st he appeared before his judges, Savary standing immediately behind Hulin. The examination was short, and revealed nothing. At half-past two the Duc d'Angoulême was shot.

By midday on the 31st the news-hops were shouting the news in the streets of Paris. An immense sensation was created, and Bonaparte strove to profit by it at once with a view to carrying out his grand design. On March 22 he asked Régier to send in a report on the intrigues of Drake; and on March 25 he laid this report before the Senate. The result, however, did not answer the expectations of the First Consul. Not till four days later did the Senate draw up an address, in which, while reprehending the recent plots, they urged that, with a view to punishing similar attempts, a "High Court or National Jury" should be established, in order to safeguard the existing system of government. They further brought the First Consul "to complete his work, by rendering it, like his glory, immortal."

The wish thus expressed was exceedingly vague; and the most determined supporters of Bonaparte dared not as yet pronounce the word "hereditary." A series of intrigues, of which very little is known, occupied the following weeks. On the surface a great movement of opinion, partly genuine, partly manufactured by the Government, swayed the country in favour of Bonaparte, by whose death the English and the conspirators had meant to compass the destruction of France. The columns of the *Mémoires* were filled with addresses breathing devotion and enthusiasm. The Opposition was easily overcome. When Bonaparte at last, on April 25, replied to the address of the Senate, he put the question in plain terms: "You have resolved that it is necessary that the supreme magistracy should be hereditary. . . . I now ask you to explain fully what is passing in your minds."

Already, on April 25, Cuvier, a member of the Tribunal, had brought forward a resolution that Bonaparte "should be declared Emperor," and "that the Imperial dignity should be declared hereditary in his family." The debate began on April 26. Carnot alone spoke and voted against the proposal. The decision of the Tribunal, given on May 3, was communicated on May 4 to the Senate, which replied to the message of

April 25 as follows: "Glory, gratitude, devotion, reason, the interests of the State, all unite to proclaim Napoleon hereditary Emperor."

For some days Bonaparte was engaged in drawing up, with the aid of his privy council, a new constitutional instrument, which was approved by the Council of State on May 18, and laid before the Senate three days later. After a short debate, the Senate passed the measure, which thus became the "Organic Statute Constituent of 68 Floral, year XII" (May 18, 1804). By Clause 1, the "government of the Republic is entrusted to an Emperor, who takes the title of Emperor of the French." By Clause 2, "Napoleon Bonaparte, now First Consul of the Republic, is Keeper of the French." By Clause 3, "the Imperial dignity is declared hereditary." So soon as the vote had been given, the Senate went in a body to St. Cloud; and there Cambacérès, Second Consul and President of the Senate, hailed Napoleon by the title of "Imperial Majesty."

A Irish *publique*, ordered by a decree of May 12, was to give its sanction to the Imperial Constitution. Meanwhile the trial of the conspirators went on. There is no doubt that many of them were put to the torture in prison. Pichegru died there on April 16; whether he was murdered, after being tortured to no purpose, or committed suicide, we cannot say. During the trial Moreau retained his quiet self-possession; and his replies were repeatedly applauded. Cadoudal showed courage and firmness. The judges were at first, by seven votes to five, in favour of acquitting Moreau; but Savary and Jéze, who watched the proceedings from an adjoining room, induced them to reconsider their decision. In the end, the court sentenced Cadoudal and nineteen of his companions to death; Moreau, Jules de Polignac, and three others, were condemned to two years' imprisonment; the rest were acquitted or sent before another tribunal. Bonaparte eventually agreed to pardon Moreau. Yielding to Josephine's entreaties, he consented, for imprisonment, the death sentence passed on eight of the accused, viz. Lajolais, Rivière, Armand de Polignac, and the other members of the nobility who were implicated with Cadoudal. The conspirators of lesser birth were executed, with their leader, on June 24; and on the following day Moreau sailed for America. The result of the *publique* was not published till November 25, when the corrected figures gave 3,278,262 "yes" against 1,808 "noes." "We have done more than we hoped to do," Cadoudal had said in prison; "we meant to give France a King, and we have given her an Emperor."

Such was in fact the final outcome of the Consulate. From 18 Brumaire onwards Bonaparte had toiled without ceasing at the reorganization of France, but always with a view to his own interest. Hence the double aspect of the whole history of the Consulate. On the one hand, there is Bonaparte's continuous ascent to supreme power. Profiting as much by the general feeling of weakness as by the popular enthusiasm which he aroused, he forced his way, by a series of small *coups d'état*, by slight breaches of the Constitution, by misstatements, by the greed and the



force which he excited, and by the ever-increasing personal influence which he exerted on those around him. His policy was at once very simple and highly diversified. He persisted in holding himself aloof from party: he belonged "neither to the Red Heels nor to the Red Caps," to quote the picturesque phrase of a contemporary writer; he was "neither royalist, nor republican"; he meant that there should be but one party in France—his own. But in the rapid development of his policy he showed marvellous versatility. During the Provisional Consulate he maintained a waiting attitude. Afterwards, down to Marngo, his aim was to bring about pacification, either by repression or by milder methods. Between Marngo and the Peace he maintained order and laboured systematically to reconcile the old France and the new. After the Peace and the Consulate for Life there was a halt in his triumphal progress, which gave him time to prepare for the Empire.

On the other hand, it was Bonaparte who directed the reorganization of France; and never perhaps in history was a work so formidable accomplished so quickly. Order and regularity were established in every branch of the administration. The greater part of the institutions founded during the Consulate have survived to the present day; and it is no exaggeration to state that it was Bonaparte who created contemporary France. For this very reason, however, the Consular system weighed heavily on France during the nineteenth century. Devoid by one man for his own ends, concentrating everything at Paris, leaving to the nation at large neither liberty nor initiative, and affecting a democratic guise the better to crush democracy itself, it deranged the political balance of the country and for a long time paralyzed the national spirit. From the civil and economic point of view, Bonaparte confirmed the work of the Revolution: all Frenchmen retained their equality before the law; and those who had become owners of national property were secured in their possessions. But, from the political point of view, Bonaparte revived the arbitrary traditions of the old monarchy: and after his institutions were more realisms of the past. The Council of State and the King's Council, prefects and sub-prefects, sub-prefects and sub-delegates, the Prefect of Police and the Lieutenant-General of Police, the *droits républicains* and the *chefs*, are but brothers and sisters, the children of one father—who is no other than absolutism. And the consequence is that, although starting from the Consulate, the history of France during the nineteenth century has been, in many respects, nothing but a long and tedious reaction against the system created by Bonaparte.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE ARMED NEUTRALITY.

BOOK I.—THE BALANCE OF POWER (1790-1800).

On November 17, 1791, Catherine II died. Paul Petrovitch was proclaimed as Tsar of the Russian. During the long and uneventful reign of his mother, Paul had been slightly excluded from all government affairs. A man of forty-two at the time of Catherine's death, he had been kept for years in a condition of tutelage. While prisoner, archbishop, and foreign ambassador were crowding to the toilet-chamber of a Potemkin or a Platen Zuboff, the Tsar in the throne was devoid of all political influence. His very children were reared from his control on their birth, and educated without reference to his wishes. Exposed at the Winter Palace or at Tsarskoe Selo to the humiliation of the presence of the successive favorites of Catherine and covertly gazed at in the circle surrounding the Empress, Paul avoided the Court. Living during the summer at his country-house, Pavlovsk, during the autumn at another country place, Gatchina, he amused himself after the fashion of his father. Just as Peter III had had his Holstein guard drilled after the pattern of Frederick the Great, so Paul, indignant by Catherine with the title of Grand Admiral and with permission to retain in service some battalions of marines, had set up a small army which he clothed and drilled on the Prussian model.

It would have been a powerful or singularly sweet nature which should have endured unscathed the position of the Grand Duke Paul. Paul's nature was not of the equable, forgiving type. It was marked by many of the worst peculiarities of the murdered Peter III and of Peter the Great. He was morose, stiff, narrow-minded, and given to sudden fits of wild, unreasoning passion. He was capricious, erratic, unstable, varying from point to point with each changing mood and influence. Not perhaps naturally cruel, and capable at times of thought and deeds of generous chivalry, he was a bitter and vindictive enemy. Evil spirits there had been, ready to suggest to Paul that the sceptre swung by his mother was rightly his own; but the Grand Duke had been possessed of sufficient wisdom to refrain from any overt attempt against Catherine's rule. The police had, nevertheless, not been without

its effect. Mother and son were divided; and, in the later years of Catherine, the estrangement became ever more acute. It was universally believed at St. Petersburg that, at the time of her sudden demise, she was on the point of promulgating an edict anointing her grandson Alexander as her successor, to the exclusion of Paul.

Thus an explanation is found for the first internal legislative act of Paul's reign, and for the trend of his earliest proceedings. Immediately after his coronation, an Imperial edict declared the order of succession to the Russian throne to be that of primogeniture from male to male in the direct line. A deep-seated hostility against the conditions and conceptions of his mother contributed the first key to his initial policy. "Never was there any change of scene at a theatre so sudden and so complete as the change of affairs at the accession of Paul I. In less than a day costumes, manners, occupations, all were changed." So writes the future minister of Alexander, the great Pole, Adam George Czartoryski. The army of Gatchina made its ceremonious entry into St. Petersburg; its rank and file were distributed among the existing Imperial Guards, in which corps its efforts received high promotion. The aristocratic gentlemen, who had made merry with the Gatchina force, found themselves suddenly under its heel. The military profession became a real thing. Favored courtiers who had attended drill once a year, and old officers who had never smelt powder, while yet laughing that Russian troops could march anywhere, were called out for daily military parades under a martinet discipline. The dress and accoutrements of the Prussian army superseded the old Russian equipments. (1797)

The Court was revolutionized. Platon Zuboff was permitted to walk to his Lithuanian estates; his brother Nicholas was actually promoted; but the dramatic incident of the crowning of the coffin of Peter III at the Alexander Nevski Convent, and its consequences to the Winter Palace to us by that of Catherine, when Prince Bariatinski and Alexis Orloff were compelled to watch by its side, and to walk behind to till such Imperial corpses were laid in the same vault, struck the note of the new reign. Count Rastvoroff, alone amongst the trusted ministers of Catherine, was singled out for continued confidence; and Rastvoroff was believed to have earned the title of Prince and the immense gift which the Emperor showed upon him, by handing over to Paul on his accession a document that the dower which Catherine had proposed, on her next birthday, to declare his exclusion from the throne. Rastvoroff was entrusted with the conduct of foreign affairs. Rastvoroff, who had been crazy enough to select from the Grand Duke his former days the privilege of wearing the Gatchina uniform, became Minister of War. Arakcheeff, a poor artillery captain of 37 years of age, who had earned Paul's gratitude by organizing his tiny Gatchina battery, took charge of the police as Commandant of the capital. Fidelity with Gatchina and fidelity to Peter III were the first passports to distinction.

Now was it the Court only that felt the change. Russia in general speedily realised the worst that had been prophesied of Paul. That he should attempt to introduce order into Russian finances, and that corrupt officialdom, alike in St Petersburg and in the provinces, should learn to tremble at his name, was only too desirable; but in other directions his domestic changes were less satisfactory. Paul was a born despot, and had the old Russian sense of his own dignity. Not only was a stifled court ceremonial introduced and enforced with a rigour which made each day's attendance a dangerous ordeal for the trembling courtiers, but in the streets of the capital the signs of the humblest subservience were exacted by the new Tsar. Princess and ladies were compelled to descend from their vehicles into the snow to salute the passing Imperial carriage. At the coronation at Moscow, the Poles saw their King relegated to a side gallery; and, when the unhappy Stanislas, II and married by the inordinate length of the ceremonial, contrived to sit down, a messenger sent directly by Paul compelled him to stand during the remainder of the service. The atmosphere of dignified yet easy and kindly familiarity, which had surrounded Catherine, was exchanged for a reign of terror.

In his early dealings with foreign Powers, Paul's proceedings were not unmarked by wisdom. He recalled the Russian forces from Persia and Georgia. He released Potocki and other distinguished Polish gentlemen. He invited Stanislas to St Petersburg and received him with royal honours. He even went so far as to express to Kosciuszko his personal disapproval of the partition of Poland. He instructed Osterman to announce by circular to foreign Courts a policy of peace. Russia, and Russia alone, he said, had been engaged since 1756 in wars. The nation was exhausted; he could not refuse to his subjects the rights for which they sighed. He would remain faithful to Russia's alliances, and oppose by all possible means the purposes of the great French Republic; but he could not in the first days of his reign send his armies beyond his borders. Kutskoff, despatched to Berlin, was instructed to declare that the new Emperor sought neither compensation nor aggrandisement; he was even permitted to inform Caland, ambassador at the Prussian Court, that the Tsar did not consider himself at war with France, that he was disposed to live on friendly terms with her, that he would engage his arms to hasten to conclude the war, and would offer Russian mediation for the purpose. The Baltic policy of Catherine was continued. The close relations of friendship with neutral Denmark, which had been rebuilt by Catherine, were naturally continued. General Grigori Osterlin was sent to Stockholm to announce the accession of Paul; and advantage was taken of the occasion to reopen the negotiations for the match between the Swedish King and the Grand Duchess Alexandra. In these proceedings, the Tsarina Maria and Elizabeth's favourite, Melchior de Meusebach, who continued to exercise a constantly restraining influence on the mind of Paul, lent their aid.

Paul was as good as his word. The Russian squadron, which had been co-operating with the British in the North Sea and the Channel, was recalled. The design of despatching a Russian army of 60,000 men to the Rhine, which Catherine had been nursing, was dropped. The oppressive system of recruiting which she had enforced was given up. But there was no slackening of vigilance against the progress of French republican principles. Hostility to the French Revolution was, indeed, a religion with Paul; it has been rightly recognised as the dominant principle of his reign. When, in his later days, he bent towards Bonaparte, it was because he recognised in him the most powerful foe of Jacobinism. Russian subjects were recalled forthwith by Paul from western travel. A strict censorship, directed against revolutionary principles, was imposed upon the theatre and the press. Freemen entering Russia were required to present passports attested by a Russian Prince. In certain directions Paul's violence against Russian menaces under the new regime was more and even sank to the level of squandry. Freemasonry, *volontaria*, and high collars were denounced as symbols of liberalism. The unhappy wearer of a round hat was chased by the police in the streets of the capital and castigated at the nearest grand-house. Even the ambassador Whitworth found it necessary to change his headgear.

It was impossible that a ruler with Paul's want of mental balance should succeed in avoiding for any long period uniform coercion, international or domestic. His first diplomatic failure was with Sweden.

Gustavus III and Catherine II had made peace at Wuch in August, 1793. Gustavus, in his eagerness to engage in active opposition against revolutionary France, had shown a desire to compose his differences with his ancient foe. The outcome was the defensive Treaty of Drottningholm, October 19, 1793. Gustavus required money for his proposed campaign. He had irretrievably lost the subsidies formerly contributed from Versailles to impoverished Sweden; he obtained by the treaty the financial aid of Russia. In the course of the negotiation, Gustavus formulated the suggestion of a marriage between his heir and the Grand Duchess Alexandra, the daughter of Paul and the favourite grand-daughter of Catherine. The dowry of a Russian Grand Duchess was a matter of serious consideration for Sweden.

The assassination of Gustavus (March, 1792) shook the Swedish monarchy, whose power had recently been on the increase, and put an end to the anti-French projects of Sweden. The Regent, Charles of Sudermania, took a different line from his predecessor in international politics. Baron Benzelstierna, who was recalled to Court as the Regent's confidential adviser, was a fanatical Lutheran priest, who, having been in Paris during the revolutionary ferment, had, seemingly without much warrant, earned the reputation of a Jacobin. Returning to Stockholm, he played with France and intrigued with the Porte against Russia. Catherine II was speedily made aware of Sweden's return to her old

parties; but Count Stenckberg, the Russian Minister at Stockholm, was instructed to keep on foot the negotiations for the proposed marriage. Stenckberg remonstrated somewhat strongly against the dealings of the Regent with Constantinople, and his recall was demanded (May, 1766); while Catharine on her side stopped the Swedish subsidy. Though the marriage treaty continued to be awaited, various circumstances combined to widen the breach between Catharine and the Swedish Government. Baron Arnfeldt, a personal enemy of Rasteholm and a Russian sympathiser, headed a plot against the Regent. The conspiracy was discovered. Arnfeldt escaped, and ultimately took refuge in the dominions of Catharine, who haughtily refused his extradition. The Regent retaliated by publicly announcing in Stockholm a match between Gustavus Adolphus and a Princess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. The French party was again in the ascendant in the Swedish capital.

Catharine II excited herself to stave off this diplomatic defeat. It was at length announced that Gustavus IV Adolphus would, in company with his uncle, visit St Petersburg. The Regent and Rasteholm undoubtedly displayed seeming eagerness for the Russian marriage. The visit was duly paid. The preliminaries were apparently arranged to mutual satisfaction; the day of the formal betrothal was fixed, and the company actually assembled for the ceremony. But the bridegroom came not. He had refused to sign the document dictated by Catharine and presented to him at the last moment, whereby the future Russian Queen of Sweden was to be permitted the free exercise of the Orthodox faith. The Regent and Rasteholm had only too easily gauged the character of the young Swedish King. Reputed a prodigy of learning, he was gentle, narrow-minded, irredeemably obstinate, and a fanatic in religion. Moreover he was as little ready as was his father to stomach the attitude of superiority which was assumed by Catharine towards despising Sweden. The marriage negotiations were abruptly broken off. The excitement caused by this incident was the immediate cause of the apostrophic satire which expired off Catharine.

That Paul should have suffered the prospectors to be returned affords strong testimony of his desire to be on good terms with his Swedish neighbour. Golovkin, despatched to Stockholm in the first instance to announce the accession of the new Tsar, exerted himself to resume the marriage treaty. He met with an absolute rebuff. The position of neither party had in fact changed in the least since the autocrats of October—November, 1756. Gustavus Adolphus endeavoured to atone for his treatment of Golovkin by a civil communication to Paul; but the Tsar's patience was at an end. Golovkin was recalled; the Swedish agent, Klingensporre, was ordered to leave St Petersburg; and the match was finally at an end (March, 1767). Gustavus IV Adolphus married Frederica Dorothea of Baden (October 23, 1767), whilst the Grand Duchess Alexandra found a husband in Austria.

The attitude of Paul towards France did not remain long unchanged. His initial bias was against the republican government. On their side, the Directory displayed no consistent attitude for cultivating the friendship of the energetic and capricious Tsar. The magnificent career of Bonaparte in Italy, closing with the Peace of Campo Formio (October 17, 1797), made them less careful of Russian receptibility. The possession by the French of the Ionian Islands conflicted with Russian schemes of future Mediterranean aggrandisement. On the other hand, Austria was little content either with the peace or with the action of the French negotiators at Rastatt; whilst England, whose peace negotiations at Lille (June—September, 1797) had failed, was willing enough to acquire a powerful, active ally. Already on February 21, 1797, the signature of a treaty of commerce marked the progress made at St Petersburg by British diplomacy. Whitworth endeavoured duffly to involve Paul in German politics as guarantee of the Peace of Tilsit; the Tsar took the bait; and the refusal of the French to admit his representative, Razumovski, to the deliberations at Rastatt was a severe blow to the Imperial cause-propos.

In January, 1797, Paul embarked upon that patronage of the Knights of St John which lent a singular colour to his whole remaining career. Years later, Alexander I affected to have discovered in this proceeding on the part of his father a vast design to knit together all the nobility of Europe in an alliance of loyalty and honour against the invasion of those squalling ideas which were attacking and undermining all ranks of society. Paul was, in a word, an eighteenth century Crusader. While not sharing Catherine's pseudo-liberalism, Paul had all her willingness to share in European politics, a willingness which, in her case, had produced the mutilation of Tilsit and the First Armed Neutrality. At one period in her career, Catherine, in pursuance of her anti-Turkish designs, had endeavoured to establish useful relations with Malta; and her heir had been reared to enthusiasm for the Knights of St John by the perusal of Vertot's history.

Shortly after Paul's accession, the Baili of the Order, Count Giulio Litta, appeared at St Petersburg with a petition for the reestablishment of a Grand Priory of the Knights which had formerly been founded without much success in Valais. On January 15, 1797, Paul entered into a convention with Litta; he reestablished the Order in his dominions, and endowed it with large revenues. Cardinal Litta, Papal Nuncio in St Petersburg, worked hard in hand with his brother in pursuance of a Latin Church intrigue.

The Grand Master, the Prince de Rohan, and the *Grand Maître* were alike looking to find their account in St Petersburg. Rohan nominated Count Litta as ambassador of the Knights to the Russian Court, offered Paul the title of Protector of the Order, and sent him La Valletta's cross. Paul accepted the offer with enthusiasm (November—

December, 1797). Already in February, 1797, Bonaparte had captured at Ancona dispatches of Paul which revealed a design on the part of the Tsar to seize Malta. When the news arrived of the surrender of Malta to the French in June, 1798, the Russian Knights met, declared the deposition of the treacherous successor of Ekman, the Habsburgs Baron Hovgosh, and threw themselves upon the grace of Paul. By an act signed on September 10, 1798, Paul proclaimed his determination to take the Order under his auspicious direction, promising not only to maintain its privileges but to reestablish it in its ancient splendour.

On October 27, 1798, the Knights passed their cause by electing Paul to the Grand Mastership. The little, ungainly Tsar of Orthodox Moscow assumed the insignia of the headship of the great medieval Latin Crusading Order, created a second Grand Priory for Russia, inaugurated a pompous ceremonial of initiation, and decorated his favorites with knightly uniforms and crosses. Any diplomacy would be unfortunate which should come athwart such a course. The Master of Bavaria having declined to recognise the new Grand Master, his representative at St. Petersburg was forthwith arrested and conducted to the frontier by Cossacks. Meantime the French Directors had been adding further fuel to the fire of Paul's resentment. They authorised the exiled Dombrowski to collect Polish legions in Italy. Nikita Petrovitch Pash, the Russian representative at Berlin, intercepted (January, 1798) a French despatch wherein there was talk of the revival of an independent Poland. Paul, on his part, had furnished cause of offence to France. He had taken into his pay (December, 1797) Condé's corps of émigrés, which had been discharged from the Austrian establishment after the signature of the Peace of Campo Formido, and had established Louis XVIII in the palace of the old Duke of Courland at Mittau with a pension of 800,000 roubles (February, 1798). On the part of Paul, there were mere acts of chivalry; but for the French they were reprehensible acts of hostility. A Russian squadron joined the fleet under Lord Duncan in July. When word reached St. Petersburg that a French expedition was fitting out at Toulon, Paul, suspecting that he might be the object of attack, caused the Russian Black Sea coast to be put in a state of defence. Negotiations were opened with Vienna for a new coalition against France.

A palace revolution at St. Petersburg quickened the course of events. Kutaisoff, Paul's Turkish valet, had obtained over his master's refusal an influence well-nigh magical. Without troubling himself to enquire upon the uncertain tide of political affairs, Kutaisoff was open to traffic with candidates for place. Mademoiselle Nelidoff, in an evil hour, induced Paul to dismiss Bartopshin, the abject of the new ministers, from the charge of the War Department, and to substitute in his room her own nephew. Bartopshin, banished to Moscow, found means to ally himself with Kutaisoff, who looked askance at the rival influence of Mademoiselle



Saldorf. A deft suggestion that the world regarded Paul as its favourite leading-strings excited the ire of the Tsar. The introduction to Court of a young beauty, Mademoiselle Lopokhin, did the rest. The star of the Empress and her courtiers paled. Rostopchin came back to St. Petersburg to take charge of foreign affairs. It was Rostopchin who was the soul of the Russian alliance with Pitt.

The campaigns of the Second Coalition and the sources of the estrangement of Paul from Austria have been described in a previous volume. When Saldorf led back the remains of his gallant army into Austria in the autumn of 1799, all Russia accused the Austrians of treachery. To Paul's anger at political betrayal was added the fury of personal resentment. His favourite daughter, the Grand Duchess Alexandra, had, after the failure of the Swedish match, married the Archduke Joseph, Prince Palatine of Hungary. The jealousy of the Empress drove the beautiful Russian from the Austrian Court. When Paul heard of this, his rage was boundless. For a time British diplomacy prevented a violent explosion; but, long before the insult offered to the Russian flag on the capitulation of Ancona (November 29, 1799) had become known in St. Petersburg, Cobenzl, challenged by Paul to answer, "without if or but," whether Austria would restore the Pope and the King of Sardinia to their dominions and sovereignty, had failed to give a satisfactory reply and been forbidden the Court; and the troops of Saldorf had begun their homeward march through Bohemia and Moravia. The sole result for Russia of the campaign of 1799 was the conquest of the Ionian Islands in alliance with the Turks. Paul longed to sweep himself upon Austria. He was still willing to act against France, but it must be with other allies. He proposed a new coalition forced of the northern Powers, to the exclusion of Austria. But for such a league neither Prussia nor England was prepared.

Meanwhile causes of difference between England herself and Russia were not wanting. The combined Anglo-Russian expedition in Holland was a total failure. The Russians had suffered heavily; and the Duke of York capitulated at Alkmaar (October 18). On October 5, 1799, Bonaparte landed at Fofus. On November 2 (18 Brumaire, year VIII) the Directory was overthrown; and on the next day the Consulate was established. The eagle eye of Bonaparte took in at a glance the political situation. His first thought was to induce Prussia from her attitude of neutrality; his next to drive off Paul from the Coalition. The first approaches to Paul were made through Hamburg; but negotiations were centred in Berlin, whither Paul had sent Erdmann as agent to restore friendly relations with Frederick William. In Malta, then close pressed by a British squadron, Bonaparte recognised the inevitable apple of discord between England and Russia. He offered, should the garrison be compelled by famine to evacuate the place, to hand over the island to the Tsar as Grand Master of the Knights of St. John. No suggestion

could have been better fitted for its purpose. The victory of Marengo (June 14, 1800) had fixed the admision of Paul upon Bonaparte. Shortly afterwards the wily First Consul halted yet another book. The British Government had declined to receive in exchange for French prisoners Russian who had been captured in Holland and elsewhere. Bonaparte offered to restore without ransom the Russian prisoners, some 6000 in number, as a particular mark of his esteem for the brave Russian troops, and of his desire to please the Tsar. He made known his recognition of the interest taken by Paul in Austria, Naples, and Rome. Paul was reassured alike through his divinity and his inordinate pride. General Springporten was dispatched (October 16) to Paris to open, under cover of receiving the Russian prisoners, direct negotiations with the First Consul. He was received by Bonaparte on December 20.

Meanwhile, on September 5, 1800, Malta capitulated; but the British Government showed no disposition to surrender the island to the Tsar. Paul's anger found vent in the *Second Armed Neutrality*.

For the initial conception of this league it is necessary to go back twenty years. In 1780 Great Britain was at war with her revolted American colonies, with France, and with Spain. The commerce of neutral Powers must always suffer more or less at the hands of powerful naval belligerents. Such belligerents had always claimed the right to capture at sea, not only the public property of a hostile State, but the private property of hostile vessels found on the high seas under a hostile flag. They had assumed, in the exercise of the right of blockade, authority to cut off all approach by sea to certain ports and coast-lines; and they had seized, as contraband, goods of certain kinds when carried on the high seas to a hostile destination, even when under a neutral flag. Until the close of the first half of the eighteenth century, they had claimed and exercised, without general protest, the power to capture on the high seas hostile property, though laden on board neutral merchant-men. Finally, in order to secure their rights in these and other particulars, they had exercised a right of visit and search over all merchantmen encountered on the high seas.

The interests of belligerent and neutral in respect of these practices were obviously divergent. It was to the interest of the belligerent to spread the net wide; it was to the interest of the trader to secure the utmost freedom of traffic. So early as the seventeenth century the Dutch, as great seafarers, made it a point of diplomacy to secure by special treaties with various Powers the recognition of the principle "free ships, free goods," i. e. that the neutral flag exempts from seizure ordinary belligerent property laden thereunder. Frederick the Great had endeavored, with indifferent success, to erect the principle into an universal rule. In a spirit dictated by less purely selfish considerations, various treaties had been contracted for the definition of contraband, and for the determination of the rights and duties of the neutral merchant in general. The

ships of the Baltic coast mainly in articles which were of direct belligerent utility—timber, tar, hemp, cordage, and provisions. The leading exports of Russia included wax, leather, iron, hemp, sail-cloth, pitch and tar; Sweden and Germany traded in similar products; and Denmark exported provisions. It was natural that these Powers should feel with particular severity the restrictions imposed alike by Great Britain and by her opponents in the naval contest arising out of the American struggle for independence. The practice of Great Britain was based upon the medieval *Comestote del Mare* and the precedents of several centuries: the practice of France and Spain, embodied in various royal instructions and in particular in a French ordinance of 1683, was even more severe.

Out of these circumstances the jealousy of two rivals for Catherine II's favour created the First Armed Neutrality. Sir James Harris was seeking to draw Catherine more closely into a British alliance; and Potemkin was apparently supporting him. They sought to make capital of some Spanish misbehaviour of Russian commerce in the Mediterranean. Nikita Ipanovitch Panin, whose star was paling before that of Potemkin, replied with a scheme which, while it offered to Catherine the proud position of the protectress of the north, struck hard, under cover of rules of general application, at the naval power of Great Britain. On February 28, 1780, a circular declaration was forwarded to foreign Courts, wherein Catherine announced certain principles "founded on the primitive law of peoples," which she proposed in future to defend by calling out, if necessary, her maritime forces. These principles were, in brief: (1) that neutral vessels may navigate freely from port to port, and on the coasts of nations at war; (2) that belligerent merchandise, with the exception of contraband, is protected by the neutral flag; (3) that the character of a blockaded port belongs only to that before which there is a force of vessels, anchored and sufficiently near to make the attempt to enter manifestly dangerous; (4) that the nature of contraband is strictly defined. Each of these principles pointed to a possible real abuse of belligerent power. They were designed to reflect upon, and could in fact be turned against, certain features of the British maritime practice which, however, admitted of serious defence; namely, the legal principle known as "the Rule of 1756," the doctrine of Occasional Contraband, and the contention that a notice sent by a government to neutral Powers that a blockading squadron is on any coast constitutes a sufficient warning of the existence of a blockade. Gustavus III of Sweden, personally piqued against George III, and ready to revive his waning popularity with his Swedish subjects by bestowing the champion of greater neutral trading freedom, quickly ranged himself with Catherine. Denmark was yet more prompt; Bernstorff, in a state-paper of May, 1780, declared the Baltic closed to the armed vessels of belligerent Powers. By a series of conventions

signed at Copenhagen and St. Petersburg, a league was established between the three Powers for the common support of the cause. Thus the First Armed Neutrality came into being (1780). France and Spain hailed Catherine's programme with more enthusiasm than regard for consistency. Holland, Prussia, Austria, Portugal, and the Two Sicilies, in the course of these years, successively acceded to the league. Great Britain acquitted herself with commendable skill. She replied in studied terms of courtesy to the communication of the Northern Powers; she anticipated the accession of the States General to the Armed Neutrality by a declaration of war; and the Dutch, receiving no warning from Catherine, were severely punished.

The First Armed Neutrality, as an onslaught upon British naval power, was a failure. The long-standing commercial tie which bound the two countries was too close to admit of Catherine's withdrawing herself with England in pursuit of what for her was little more than a crusade of empty glory. The efforts of Gustavus III. to bring about the meeting of an international congress, by which the principles of the Neutral League should be embodied as a maritime code, were fruitless. When the revolutionary war broke out, the Powers of the Armed Neutrality, as they became involved in the struggle, threw their principles to the winds. Catherine herself united with England in the endeavour to prevent other "Powers not implicated in this war from giving, on this occasion of common concern to every civilized State, any protection whatever, directly or indirectly, in consequence of their neutrality, to the commerce or property of the French on the sea or in the ports of France" (Convention of March 18, 1793). Spain, Prussia, and Portugal entered into similar undertakings. A Russian fleet cruising in the Baltic and the North Sea arrested all neutral vessels bound for French ports, and compelled them either to return or make for a neutral harbour. Ground between the upper millstone of the allied Powers and the gather of French retaliatory measures, the neutral States suffered severely: and in March, 1794, Denmark and Sweden were constrained to form an alliance for the common defence of their trade.

But the lesson of the First Armed Neutrality had not been entirely lost. Further treaties adopting its principles had been made between 1781 and 1788; and, down to and throughout the dark days of the revolutionary struggle, one Power remained true to its allegiance. Denmark, under the guidance of Andreas Peter, Count Bernstorff, an honest, painstaking patriot, remained consistently neutral, and a bold and firm supporter of the claim of neutral nations. A new item was now added to the programme of the neutral States. In 1781 an old dispute was revived between England and the Scandinavian Powers. Queen Christina, the daughter of the great Gustavus, had in 1688 advanced the pretension that the declaration of a neutral accompanying officer as to the character of the cargoes of the vessels under his convey-

should invalidate the right of search; and the Dutch had occasionally ventured to advocate this innovation. By Great Britain, as by other strong naval Powers, the contention was always repelled. When, in 1780, the suggestion was again brought forward by Gustavus III., Catherine declared that the principle contended for was implied in her programme; and she included it in her treaties.

In 1788 the convoys of the Danes and Swedes were largely increased, in consequence of renewed activity on the part of the French Directory; and this particular question rapidly assumed importance. In January, 1788, a large company of Swedish merchantmen bound for the Mediterranean, under the convoy of a Swedish frigate, was stopped in the Channel by a British squadron under Commodore Lysterfield; and, on offering a show of feeble opposition to search, the merchantmen were brought in for adjudication. In June, 1789, in the case of the *Maria*, one of the captured vessels, Sir William Scott, the famous admiralty judge, after the production of the Swedish official instructions which expressly prohibited submission to search, pronounced sentence of condemnation on the broad general ground of resistance to the exercise of "an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation." With Denmark the question was debated in a yet more striking fashion. In December, 1788, the commander of a Danish convoying frigate fired upon British boats which were endeavouring to search vessels under his charge off Cöpenhagen. Murry, the British chargé d'affaires at Cöpenhagen, demanded an explanation. Count Bernstorff, far from disavowing the proceedings of the officer, defended his conduct and called upon the British Government for reparation. This affair was still under discussion, when in July, 1800, in similar circumstances, the *Fregate*, a Danish frigate, was captured with the six vessels under her convoy, after a smart action with a British squadron in the English Channel. The Danish Government demanded the immediate restitution of the vessels and prompt satisfaction for what they deemed a signal insult to the honour of their flag. The reply of Great Britain was the immediate despatch of Lord Whitworth to Cöpenhagen, while a British fleet under Admiral Elton entered the Sound. A lively and presumptuous interchange of state papers ensued. Neither party would shake its pretensions, but at length mild counsels prevailed, and on August 23, 1800, a convention was arrived at whereby Great Britain restored the *Fregate* and the other captured ships, and on her side Denmark agreed to suspend for the present the grant of convoy.

Denmark, as was natural, had communicated early with Russia. Paul's indignation against Great Britain was already rising fast. Earlier in the year he had dreamed of a Northern League against France: he now fell back upon his mother's diplomacy and limbered his bolt at his late ally. On August 27, 1800, he issued a declaration wherein, after referring to the *Fregate* incident, he invited the monarchs of Europe,

Denmark, and Sweden to unite with him in the re-establishment of the principles of the *Armed Neutrality* in their full force, and announced his determination to place his subjects and those of his allies "out of the reach of a similar infraction of the right respected by every people." When news arrived that a British squadron had passed the Sound, Paul ordered the sequestration of all British property found within his dominions (August 186). The signature of the Anglo-Danish convention temporarily discomfited his plans; then Malta fell, and Paul was thoroughly aroused. On November 7, 1800, the *Cour Gazette* of St. Petersburg announced the imposition of an embargo on British vessels in Russian ports, to be maintained until such time as the island of Malta should be surrendered to the Order of St. John. The crews of two British vessels having successfully resisted the execution of this decree and made their escape from the port of Narva, the Tsar ordered the burning of a third vessel which had remained in the harbour. Many British seamen were marched as prisoners into the interior of Russia, and were exposed to terrible hardships.

Orise Fersen contributed to inflame the fury of Paul to the point of madness. On September 4, a British squadron cut out two Spanish frigates from the port of Barcelona. The Spaniards declared that in this action use had been made of a neutral Swedish galleet, and preferred a wholly unjustifiable demand that the captured ships should be restored by Sweden. Fersen supported the Spaniards in their claim. On November 13, the Prussian Government took possession of Copenhagen, on the pretext that a British cruiser, driven with its Prussian prize into that neutral port by stress of weather, had thereby violated the neutrality of northern Germany, of which neutrality Frederick William openly claimed for himself the rôle of protector. The Tsar's brain was whirling. With one hand he drew together his Baltic neighbours; the other he held out to Bonaparte.

Constantin IV. Adolphus, who on attaining his majority had reneged the Hænschel Armistice, hurried in person to St. Petersburg, where he arrived on November 22. Within a few days' time (December 16-18, 1800) a series of treaties knit together Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia in the *Second Armed Neutrality*. Rostopchin was the Russian negotiator. The articles agreed on were, in effect, as follows:

(1) Every neutral vessel may navigate freely from port to port and on the coasts of nations at war.

(2) Goods belonging to subjects of the belligerent Powers, with the exception of contraband, are free as neutral vessels.

(3) In order to determine what constitutes a blockaded port, this denomination shall be given only to one where there exists, owing to the blockade being maintained by vessels anchored and sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering; and no vessel navigating towards a blockaded port shall be regarded as having contravened the present

conviction, unless she shall, after having been warned by the commander of the blockading squadron, attempt to enter by force or stratagem.

(4) Neutral vessels can be arrested only for just cause and in view of evident facts; they shall be adjudicated upon without delay; the procedure followed shall be uniform, prompt and legal; and on each session, over and above the compensation accorded to those who have suffered loss without having been in fault, there shall be granted complete satisfaction for the losses done to the neutral flag.

(5) The declaration of the officers, commanding the vessel or vessels of the Royal or Imperial Marine, accompanying the convey of one or more merchant vessels, that his convey has not on board any contraband merchandise, shall suffice to prevent any visit on board his vessel or any vessel of his convey.

These principles of 1800 differed from those proclaimed in 1793 in (1) the addition of the article touching convey; (2) the greater stringency with respect to what constitutes a valid blockade; (3) the provision as to the necessity for formal apology to the neutral flag.

Bonaparte was eagerly watching the course of events in the north. On December 7, 1806, he instructed Talleyrand to announce to neutral and allied Powers "that the French Government, having principally at heart to oppose the invasion of the sea and to concert with neutral Powers in causing their flags to be respected, and appreciating the truly patriotic zeal of the Emperor of Russia for the common cause of all Continental Powers, will not treat for peace with England until, those sacred principles having been recognized, the Russian, Danish, Swedish, American, and Prussian flags shall be respected on the sea as the allies of these Powers are on land, and until England shall have acknowledged that the sea belongs to all nations." On January 23, 1804, on hearing of the British embargo on Russian vessels, the First Consul forbade forthwith any capture of Russian ships, declared that he regarded the Republic as already at peace with the Tsar, and attributed only to the great distance which separated the two countries the delay in the formal signature of a treaty.

On January 18, Paul despatched Kolyshoff to Paris to treat definitely for peace. Great was Bonaparte's excitement when he heard of this: "Peace with the Emperor is nothing in comparison with an alliance which will overcome England and preserve to us Egypt." Paul wrote to Bonaparte (January 21) suggesting a French diversion on the coasts of England, a proposition to which the First Consul readily agreed. He requested Bonaparte (February 16) to concert with Spain to obtain the accession of Portugal and of the United States to the maritime prohibitions of the north. He proposed a vast scheme for the invasion of India. A Russian army under Knorring was to march from Orenburg by way of Bokham and Khiva; a French army under Masséna was to pass down the Danube to Taganrog, thence by the Don and the Volga to

Asiatickian, whence, combined with a Russian force, it was to proceed by way of Hazet and Candahar. The difficulties of the long journey through wild and hostile lands, difficulties which Bonaparte clearly recognised, sunk into insignificance in the eyes of the excited Tur. The recent powerful annexation (January, 1800) of the territories of the Georgian princes, George the son of Heraclius, seemed to pave the way for this eastern campaign. The Hottentots of the *Don* Comanchi actually set out on the march.

Bonaparte, on his side, was looking forward to and actively fostering the establishment of a system which aimed at the commercial extinction of Great Britain from the Continent. The British Government, informed of what was passing, demanded an explanation from Denmark. Count Bernstorff frankly admitted that the negotiations in which the Northern Powers were engaged had for their object the reversing of the engagements of 1793, but maintained that the claims of Denmark were absolutely defensive, peaceful, and incapable of giving any offence, and that her accession to the Northern Alliance was in no way incompatible with the convention of August 25, 1800. The mortal poison of the peace-loving Christian VII was failing, but the Prince Royal supported himself in a determined stand. The British Government was not prepared to accept the Danish contentions, however courteously urged. On January 14, 1801, an embargo was placed on all Russian, Danish, and Swedish vessels in British ports; and a British fleet under Parker and Nelson was fitted out for the Baltic. The threatened Powers prepared energetically for resistance. Denmark had not hitherto ratified unconditionally the convention of December 18: she now gave in her formal adhesion (February 27, 1801). On March 22, 1801, an embargo was placed on British vessels in Danish ports; and on the same day Danish forces entered Hamburgh and declared the Elbe closed to the English. A few days later Danish troops took possession of Lübeck. On March 13 Gustavus IV Adolphus tightened his relations with St. Petersburg by a new treaty of commerce, in which Paul suffered himself to depart from the arrogant position of superiority which Sweden had found so obnoxious in Catherine. The vacillating Government of Prussia at length abandoned its neutral attitude; Prussian troops occupied Hainaut and Bremen; the Weser and the Elbe were shut to British trade. The vote was the voice of the Northern League; but the hands were the hands of Bonaparte. "Every one," he wrote in his message to the Senate, February 18, 1801, "must surely be subject to the exclusive sovereignty of England? She arms against Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, because Russia, Sweden, and Denmark have assumed, by treaties of guarantee, their sovereignty and the independence of their flag. The Powers of the North, unjustly attacked, may rightly count on France. The French Government will arrange with them on injury common to all nations, without losing sight of the fact that it fights only for peace and the welfare of the world."



The vengeance of England fell, not on the arch-investigator, Werder, or Gordon, but on the Danes. On March 30 Pukler and Nelson forced the passage of the Sound, the task being materially facilitated by the rejection of the Swedish, and on April 8 was fought the battle of Copenhagen. But one arch-investigator had already met his doom.

For months past the madness of Paul had been becoming more and more apparent. His wild fits of ungovernable and threatening rage wrought havoc around him. Imperial in moments of generosity, he was terrible in his anger. There was no restraint in his drives. Un deserved degradation followed with stunning discursive promotion equally awarded. Men of all ranks were persecuted on the shadow of suspicion. Officers of the guard were killed and maimed or confined in warehouses for the most trivial offences. Ministers were exiled to their estates for a chance word. Scores of unfortunate were despatched to Siberia. One by one, Paul drove from him his most faithful servants. Kardinoff, returning from his glorious efforts in Italy, was hotly reprimanded upon a formal postulate, and sunk under the blow. Bontopkin was again called. The infernal Andakioff was disgraced. In the provinces Paul was not unpopular. He was known to spare chances for ameliorating the lot of the serfs; and the country landowner, who was not brought into contact with his secondary mistreatment, was by no means dissatisfied with a monarch who was the terror of officialdom. The military looked with no disfavor upon the tyrant who maltreated their enemies. But in the Court, in official circles, and in the capital in general the atmosphere of suspense became unbearable. The universal fear found vent in a conspiracy.

It was not the conspiracy of a populace demanding liberty, or of politicians desiring to form new constitutions. The merchants were indeed suffering in consequence of the cutting off of British trade, but that alone would have been of small avail to raise a Russian revolt. It was the combination of men within the Imperial circle who troubled each moment for their property and lives. Count Nikita Petrovitch Puzin, formerly Minister at Berlin and now a member of the Council for Foreign Affairs, led the way. He enlisted Count Fahlen, who, in addition to other high appointments, held the post of Commandant of the capital, which gave him control over the police. Fahlen, a man of iron nerve, the trusted agent of Paul, became the protector and central figure of the plot. A skilled intrigue brought about the recall of the two Zerkoffs, Platon and Nicholas. General Bennigsen and other great officers were brought in. But without the sanction of the Grand Duke Alexander the conspirators dared not proceed. Alexander was approached. The danger of the situation was pointed out to him. It was proposed to him that Paul should be deposed. Alexander stipulated that no badly ill should befall his father. He forgot that in a land like Russia there can be but a step for a deposed sovereign between a prison and a grave. Still, Alexander hesitated to give the signal even for deposition. The crisis came when

It transpired through Fahlen that the Tsar was meditating the imprisonment of the Empress and her sons, and the adoption as his successor of the young Prince Eugene of Württemberg. At any moment the blow might be struck by the Tsar: at any moment Arnoldeff might be recalled, when Fahlen's ability to protect the plotters would be at an end. At two o'clock in the morning of March 23, 1801, after supper and drinking freely, two parties of officers, led by Fahlen, Bennigsen, and the Zakhoff, entered the Mikhailovskii Palace: Paul I was brutally strangled; and Nicholas Zakhoff reported to the horrified Alexander his accession to the throne.

The second Armed Neutrality had received its death-blow. The spirit of the North was not crushed by the battle of Copenhagen; Sweden maintained a bold front; and Bonaparte filled the air with indignation, encouraging cries. But no gleams of Miltonic dreams blinded the eyes of Alexander. He made known forthwith his willingness to negotiate with England. Durno, despatched to St. Petersburg on April 25, had soon to report that France had nothing to hope or to fear from Alexander. Under a maritime convention negotiated by Lord St. Helena with Paris, and signed on June 12, 1804, amicable relations were restored between Russia and Great Britain. The latter accepted verbally certain of the principles of the Armed Neutrality; namely, that neutral vessels might navigate freely to the ports and on the coasts of nations at war; that such vessels should only be stopped for just cause and in respect of evident fact; that they should be adjudicated upon without delay; and that the procedure followed should always be uniform, prompt and legal. She agreed that the right to visit merchantmen under neutral cover should not be exercised by a privateer. But she obtained the recognition of the general right of her belligerent vessels of war to visit and search neutral convoys, of her belligerent right to capture hostile property under the neutral flag on the high seas, and of the validity of a blockade maintained by cruising ships. The convention was drafted in terms which were calculated to satisfy the ardent prayers of Alexander; but the substantial fruits of victory in the maritime discussion were practically left to the hands of England. Already an end had been put to the war of hostile embargoes between Great Britain and the Baltic Powers; and Alexander had notified the withdrawal of the Danish forces from Hamburg (May 22). The retirement of the Prussians from Hanover and Bremen was delayed some time longer; the Swedes and the Danes for some months stood out for better terms; but on October 23, 1800, Copenhagen unwillingly adopted the convention of St. Petersburg; and on March 30, 1802, Gustavus IV. Adolphus reluctantly handed in his abdication.

## SECT. II.—NAVAL OPERATIONS (1802-3).

When Napoleon set sail for Egypt in 1798, the Directory's plan of invading England was abandoned. But one of the first consequences of the resumed French measures on the Continent in 1802 was that the First Consul revived the project; and in 1803 he decided to construct a flotilla of gunboats and small craft on the coast of the Channel. So little, however, was actually done that he probably only intended to use this flotilla as a means of obtaining a satisfactory peace by playing upon British fears. It was not till the summer of 1801 that the flotilla began to take serious shape. Meanwhile the attention of the British navy was attracted to another quarter, viz. to the Baltic. The Armed Neutrality of the Northern Powers, described above, threatened not only the commercial but the political interests of Great Britain. As these Powers possessed forty-one sail of the line in addition for service, the British Government at once determined to strike a vigorous blow against them, so as to render their assistance in the war with France.

A fleet of eighteen sail of the line and a number of smaller craft was hastily assembled at Yarmouth, under the orders of Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson, now a Vice-Admiral, as second in command. Undoubtedly the Admiralty looked askance at Nelson, after his supposed disobedience to Keith in the Mediterranean in 1798. But this appointment of a superior officer who lacked decision and energy was a grave mistake, and came near causing a failure. Owing to Parker's delays, the expedition was slow in starting; Nelson was not admitted to his chief's confidence; and, when the Sound was reached, Parker preferred to negotiate, instead of striking, and did not listen to Nelson's suggestions and bold advice to aim the intended blow at Russia, disregarding Denmark. Compelled to act as his superior decided, Nelson was finally attracted with an attack on Copenhagen, where the Danes had collected a formidable flotilla to cooperate with the fixed defences. Their forts and ships together mounted some 760 guns.

Nelson's plan was to pass to the south of Copenhagen before a north wind, sailing through the Outer Deep, which joins the King's Channel a little to the south of Copenhagen. The King's Channel runs under the forts of the city; and he intended to move northwards up it, as soon as the wind shifted to the south. The British ships would then have their retreat secured in the event of the attack miscarrying. Nelson was personally charged with the conduct of the action, which involved great hazard both from the Danish guns and from the shallow water. He sailed for ten sail of the line and was given twelve, while

Parker remained in reserve with eight ships, including six of light draught—a very injudicious disposition, were the first principle in war is to employ all possible force at the point of contact. For this, however, the commander-in-chief must be held responsible; he had shown so much timidity and hesitation that Nelson probably feared to alarm him by asking for every serviceable ship. It is also true that Nelson underestimated the strength of the Danish defence.

On April 1, 1801, Nelson's division sailed northward before a north wind to the point where the channels join below the city, and there anchored, waiting for the wind to shift. On the 2d the change came; and about 9 a.m. the division weighed and stood up the King's Channel to attack the Danes. There were many misadventures: one ship could not weather the shoal which parted the two channels; two others ran aground through error of the pilots. But, with the rest, Nelson anchored in line parallel to the Danes, making no attempt to concentrate as a part of their force, and fought a fierce and protracted battle, in which the greater capacity to take and give hand loads carried the day. To Parker's eye, matters seemed to be going so badly that in the night of the battle he made signal No. 30, "Discontinue the action"; and the signal was reluctantly acted upon by Captain Haze with the smaller craft. Nelson, however, was equal to the emergency. He turned his blind eye to his telescope when the signal was reported to him; and gave orders that it should not be repeated by his ships, and that his own battle-signal, No. 16, "Engage more closely," should be kept flying. His independence was triumphantly justified. The other ships in the line did not flash or obey the order to withdraw; and Parker's signal had no influence on the engagement. If executed, it must have resulted in a British defeat and in the loss of the ships which were aground. At no point in his career did Nelson give evidence of greater judgment and tenacity.

The crisis passed with the signal; the Danish fire began to slacken; and flames showed in several of the Danish ships. Unwilling to destroy the disabled vessels of the enemy's fleet, tired as they were with wounded, anxious to avoid inflicting further injury upon a nation which he would have spared had his own policy been adopted, and, it may also be, feeling some concern for the safety of his injured or grounded vessels, he proposed to the Danes that firing should cease and that he should take possession of the prizes, threatening that if the action continued he would blow them into the air, ships and crews. A truce was arranged; Nelson took possession of the Danish fleet; and after some days of negotiating, his mingled boldness, tact, and firmness brought the Danes to consent, on April 3, to a suspension of hostilities.

The news of Parker's dilatory proceedings and of his signal reached the Admiralty at home, and led to his suspension. Nelson thereupon directed the movements of the fleet. There is no documentary

foundation for the story that the signal of recall was merely perfunctory, and had been arranged for beforehand. On the contrary, the evidence of journals and logs is decidedly against such a view; and Graves, the junior admiral under Nelson, thought that, if the signal had been obeyed, the fleet would have been destroyed. His judgment as to the brilliancy of Nelson's conduct will be endorsed by posterity. "Considering," he said "the disadvantages of navigation, the approach to the enemy, their vast number of guns and mortars on both land and sea, I do not think there was ever a bolder attack." The British loss was 943 killed and severely wounded; the French lost between 1000 and 1800.

There was no further fighting in the Baltic, as the death of the Tsar Paul was followed by a change in Russian policy. Nelson returned to England, and, much against his own wishes, was placed in charge of the flotilla watching the French in the Channel. It was a service in which his life was unnecessarily risked, while his talents for grand strategy found in it no scope. Nor was his presence really required, for it does not appear that the Admiralty took the French preparations at all seriously. On August 12, 1801, anxious to force a decisive action, he delivered a desperate attack on the French coast at Boulogne, but was repulsed with heavy loss. In October an armistice was concluded between the two Powers, and fighting ceased.

In the Mediterranean, great efforts were made by the French to send reinforcements to Egypt and to prevent Lord Keith, the British commander-in-chief on the station, from disembarking an expeditionary force there. Rear-Admiral Ganteaume, with seven battleships of the fleet which Brueis had brought to Toulon in the previous year, put to sea in January, 1801, evading the British fleet, passed the Straits of Gibraltar without misadventure, and might have stood away for Egypt, to land his 5000 troops under General Bonaparte. But his fleet appears to have failed him. He cleared for Toulon, fully believing that powerful British forces were pursuing him, and that Keith was in front of him. He also alleged as an excuse the many mishaps that occurred on board his ships. Jerome Bonaparte, who was on board the flagship, has given a vivid picture of the alarms of the Admiral and the panic which seized him at the mere report that twelve sail had been sighted in the night. He was ordered once more to put to sea and carry out his mission, making an attempt on Porto Ferrajo on the way. The attempt failed; but in June he came within 800 miles of Alexandria, and only retired when he found that the British were there in some force. He failed to land his men on the coast of Tripoli, as he had intended, since British vessels were sighted just as the disembarkation was about to begin; and in July he returned to Toulon, having captured a British fleet of battleship on the way westward.

In June Rear-Admiral Lincoln was ordered to sail from Toulon with three ships of the line and proceed to Cadix, there to take under his

command six Spanish ships of the line, which had been given to France by the Spanish Government and manned with French crews. Learning, however, that the British Admiral Samaras was off Cadix with six ships of the line, Lincoln got into Algeiras and anchored there. As soon as Samaras knew of the arrival of the French, on July 5, he sailed for Algeiras, and on July 6 stood into Algeiras Bay and attacked Lincoln, who was anchored close inshore, under the protection of powerful batteries and supported by a large number of Spanish gunboats. The failure of the wind hurmped the attack; and a British ship of the line, the *Marshall*, ran aground and was captured by the French. Samaras sustained a distinct repulse, though he inflicted a heavier loss in men upon the French than he himself suffered. He took the battered remainder of his fleet to Gibraltar, and there refitted his ships with the utmost energy; while Lincoln appealed to the French Rear-Admiral Dumanoir in Policy and the Spaniards at Cadix, to come at once to his help before the British should again attack him.

On July 3, a Franco-Spanish squadron of six sail, under Vice-Admiral Moron, joined Lincoln at Algeiras; and on the 11th the allies sailed for Cadix, leaving behind the prize taken from the British. The allied admiral was together in a fligate; no signals for the two fleets had been hoisted. Samaras, with his five serviceable ships, followed them at once, and began a running action with them in the late hours of the night. A Spanish three-decker was the first ship brought to action: she speedily caught fire, and dropped astern, when she fell in with two of her comrades, which opened fire on her, mistaking her for a British vessel. As the final result of this tragic error, two great Spanish three-deckers destroyed one another, both being burnt with the greater part of their crews. A third vessel surrendered to the British after a short engagement at close quarters. The rest of the allied fleet reached Cadix after sustaining the British attack, and on this ground claimed a victory. It was a strange claim, for the allies lost three ships and 6000 killed, wounded, and prisoners to a far inferior force, while inflicting on the British but insignificant loss. But, though Lincoln's fleet had not obtained any success of importance, it fought better than any French fleet in this first period of the war, and is deserved every credit for the action at Algeiras, which illustrated anew the risk of attacking even an inferior enemy when covered by forts and gunboats.

## CHAPTER III

## THE PACIFICATION OF EUROPE (1793-1804).

Scarcely before the *coup d'état* of Brumaire, the President of the Directory, when celebrating the *fête* of the Death of August, had declared that monarchy would never again raise its head in France, and that the last had been seen of those self-styled delegates of Heaven, who held Frenchmen in subjection and looked upon the law of the land merely as the instrument of their own good pleasure. The right which men were never to see again, they saw almost immediately. France desired rest and peace, and she called Bonaparte to her aid, a man who was by nature incapable of giving her either. War was essential to the political ends which Bonaparte was pursuing; for he held, as did the Directory, that the fortunes of the Republic depended on the continuous extension of its rule. The Republic, however, was henceforth to be merged in the personality of Bonaparte; and the elevation of war into a system of government was a policy which he made his own. The object in view was no longer, as it had been under the Convention, to restore to France her "natural" limits, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, but the making of fresh conquests beyond her borders. On the morning of Brumaire Napoleon proclaimed the fact to his soldiers. "Our task," he said, "is not to defend our own frontiers but to invade the territory of our foes." Moreover, in spite of his pacific assurance at the commencement of the Consulate and of his protests that the Revolution which he had assumed was purely civil, it was on the army that he relied for the accomplishment of "those great things" which since 1793 his David and extraordinary imagination had kept in view. At the end of 1799 the French treasury had run dry: Bonaparte proclaimed that it should be replenished with funds taken from hostile States, from their towns, their convents, and their citizens. The army was starving. Bonaparte promised his soldiers a speedy end to their troubles: "Victory," he told them, "will give you bread."

The majority of Frenchmen did not share these views. Wary with its long struggle, and feeling that its independence was safely guarded by the Rhine and the Alps, the nation longed for peace. Out of respect

for its sides, pacific overtures were made to Great Britain and Austria. Writing to George III on December 26, 1798, the First Consul declared that no one was more desirous than he was of helping to bring about a general peace, and that he would use every means to attain that end. Bonaparte, however, inspired no confidence in the minds of the British ministers, who looked upon him merely as a soldier of fortune, a vulgar Jacobin. They also received France to be more exhausted than she really was, and calculated that, by continuing the war for a few months, the Coalition would secure better terms. Consequently they declined Bonaparte's offer, and informed him that the only basis of peace would be the withdrawal of France within her former frontiers and the reestablishment of the monarchy as a pledge of the permanence of peace.

In Austria, Bonaparte's proposals, which suggested the Treaty of Campo Formio as the basis of an understanding, were equally unsuccessful. Francis II, after the warnings gained by his armies in Italy, declined to entertain any convention based on that treaty, and declared moreover that without the concurrence of his allies he could not conclude any convention at all. Hostilities therefore continued; and Bonaparte, who had taken every step with ostentatious display, so that all Vienna might see how anxious he was for peace, got what he really wanted—war; while at the same time he succeeded in throwing the whole responsibility on his adversaries.

France opened the campaign of 1799 under conditions more favorable than in 1798. The Coalition had finally lost the aid of Paul I, who, annoyed by the policy of Turgot, by the conduct of the war in Italy by the Court of Vienna, and by the checks inflicted on the allied forces in Holland, had renounced his allies of branch of faith, and had definitely broken with them. Prussia clung more closely than ever to her policy of neutrality, which left her free at any time to turn against France if fortune favored the Coalition. For the moment, however, she seemed rather to lean towards the side of Bonaparte, who had been skilful enough to suggest to Frederick William III a recognition of the Rhine frontier in a sense favorable to Prussia. In Germany, the rulers of Bavaria and Württemberg and the Elector of Mainz had indeed promised subsidies to Austria, who hoped by these means to recruit herself for losses suffered during the retreat of the Russian soldiery. But in Austria everything was going from bad to worse; the financial position was deplorable. From the military point of view, it was unfortunate that Turgot's real in the task of preparation produced such inadequate results; he was hampered by the traditional lethargy, slowness, and want of method in the Austrian administration. Moreover, the newly appointed generals were inferior to their predecessors; Artchake Charles, sick of the struggle and broken in health, had retired in December from active service; and his place at the head of the army in Germany had been filled by Kray, a good soldier but a second-rate commander. As



for the army in Italy, General Melas, enfeebled by age, slow of mind, and over-cautious in action, had taken the place of the brilliant and impetuous Suvoroff.

It was only in the matter of numbers and position that the Austrians had an advantage over the French. General Kray, with an army 150,000 strong, occupied in the neighbourhood of Donauwörth a wooded and hilly district, almost resembling a vast entrenched camp, backed on one side by a river and a lake, and on the other by mountains and dense forests, from which he could sweep down at pleasure on the frontiers of Alsace or Switzerland. The Austrians had at last recognised the strategic importance of the latter country, and they proposed occupying it. On the other side of the Rhine, confronting Kray, Moreau was at the head of 110,000 men distributed in *schicks* between Strasbourg and Constance. They were veteran soldiers; and their commander, cautious, precise, and skilled, was the best general of the Republic. In Italy Melas had under his orders rather more than 100,000 men, of whom 50,000 were required to garrison the fortresses of Upper Italy; but, after sending certain detachments into Tuscany, he still had 70,000 men left for operations in the field. The French army of Italy, under the orders of Masséna, was but the shadow of the fine force that Bonaparte had had. Decimated and disorganised, it did not number more than 50,000 men; and it needed all its general's energy to give it any cohesion.

To remedy his inferiority in numbers, Bonaparte had busied himself since January with the creation of a fresh army. The final pacification of the Vendée released troops sufficient to form the nucleus of the new force; and in March, with the arrival of contingents from Paris and the south, the army itself was nearly complete: it numbered from 40,000 to 50,000 men. Bonaparte, whose first idea was to make the banks of the Rhine the chief theatre of war, was on the point of sending these soldiers *schicks*, when Moreau's reluctance to serve under him necessitated a change of plan. He now decided to lead his new army into Italy, where he himself could take the command. Early in April he ordered Moreau to begin hostilities on the Rhine, while he himself with his army was to march to the help of Masséna. Bonaparte's idea was that Moreau should boldly cross the Rhine at Schaffhausen with his whole force, and fall upon Kray in his stronghold at Donauwörth. Moreau however was too cautious to compromise his whole army by a single movement, since, in the event of defeat, it would have been doomed to certain destruction. In spite therefore of Bonaparte's wishes, Moreau crossed the Rhine at several points simultaneously; but he manoeuvred in such a way as to lead Kray to believe that the whole French army would pass the stream between Basel and Strasbourg, so as to penetrate into the Black Forest by the Hohenfels, as he had done in 1795. Kray fell into the trap, abandoned his position at Donauwörth, and marched with part of his force towards the head of the Rhine, in the

hope of bringing Marmonte to a stand before he reached the Black Forest. Marmonte meanwhile turned suddenly up stream on the right bank, marched rapidly towards Donauwörth, and rejoined the rest of his force which had crossed the river between Biele and Schaffhausen. King, seeing his mistake, though somewhat late in the day, hurried back to protect his magazines at Stockach and cover the line of the Danube. Various engagements took place: on May 3 at Egen and Stockach, on May 5 at Mouskirch, and on May 10 at Küssenach. Everywhere the Austrians were forced back. It was all King strove to gain Vorarlberg and so keep touch with the army in Italy: he was flung back towards the north with 68,000 men, and driven to seek shelter under the walls of Ulm. That town, defended by a chain of forts perched on the hills, formed in fact an entrenched camp: and there the army, weary tired by these opening conflicts, had time to recruit its strength and recover its morale. Meanwhile Marmonte, whose orders were to thrust back King as far as possible towards the north without risking a battle, occupied the district which lies between the Iller, the Danube, and the Lech.

The campaign in Italy opened less favourably for the French. Marmonte, who occupied with 25,000 men a line thirty-five leagues in length in the neighbourhood of Genoa, had been ordered by Bonaparte to withdraw his forces from the passes of the Alps, where the winter snows formed an adequate defence, and to concentrate round that city. While preparing to carry out his instructions he was suddenly attacked by the Austrians, who, after they had occupied the heights which commanded Genoa, cut his army in two: the left wing under Suchet was driven back to the banks of the Var; and Marmonte with the remainder—the divisions of Skobeleff and Minio—was compelled to retreat into the town. Against the second of these fragments Melas dispatched General Ott, with orders to keep the French closely shut up in Genoa; General Elberich, who was sent against Suchet, flattered himself that, after defeating that general, he would be able to force his way into France, when it was believed by the Austrians that a popular movement would overturn the rule of the Republic.

Suchet, however, defended himself with much energy on the Var, and frustrated the designs of Elberich. Marmonte, on his side, by vigorous and repeated sorties, harassed the Austrians so constantly that for several weeks they made no visible progress. Still the position at Genoa became more critical from day to day. It was impossible to revictual the town through the pass, which was closed by the British fleet under Lord Keith; and the inhabitants suffered terribly from hunger, being driven after a time to support life on a substitute for bread made of cones and starch. It was to be feared moreover that the famished population, with the British and Austrian flags floating before their eyes, might rise at any time; Genoa must be relieved, and that without delay. An officer succeeded in passing through the hostile lines and

informed Bonaparte in Paris of the desperate plight of the town: Bonaparte answered that the army of reserve was ready, that he himself would cross the Alps immediately, and that in a few days Italy would be conquered and Genoa relieved. It was now April 30; Genoa had been besieged for fifteen days, and it was destined to hold out till June 4.

The army of reserve, four divisions strong, was slowly marching towards Lombarney and Geneva, where large quantities of stores had been collected. Bonaparte, however, no longer thought of carrying help to Mantua; his plan was to reconquer by a short and brilliant campaign all those districts of Italy which the Austrians had taken from the French. This plan, revealed only at the last moment, would, he calculated, strike his adversaries dumb, proclaim his genius to all Europe, and secure a notable triumph for the arms of the Republic. The task which he set himself was to burst like a thunderbolt upon the plains of Lombardy, to occupy that province by a series of rapid movements, and so threaten Milan, who in order to check the advance of the French army would be forced to raise the siege of Genoa. Now Bonaparte could only enter Lombardy through some pass of the Swiss Alps—the St Gothard, the Simplon, or the Great St Bernard—each of which at that season presented great difficulties. The St Gothard was rejected as being too distant and so inadequately protected against an Austrian attack. The Simplon was rejected also, as, in order to reach it, it was necessary to ascend the whole valley of the Rhone; and this enormously complicated the question of transport, already difficult enough in that mountainous country. The Great St Bernard had this disadvantage that, after leaving Bourg St Pierre, the path became narrow and dangerous. Bonaparte, however, did not hesitate to choose the last-named pass; and he declared to Berthier, who was in command, that it must be crossed at any price, "even if it cost half the force." The troops marched forthwith from Lombarney and Geneva into the Valais. Bonaparte himself arrived; and on May 15 the crossing of the pass began.

Bonaparte, who had traced the plan of campaign and who superintended its execution, was not in command of the new army. It is true that in March a Consular decree had invested him with the command; but the Council, thinking it imprudent to infringe the spirit of the constitution, which provided that the first magistracy of the Republic should be a civil magistracy, had revoked the decision and had appointed Berthier instead. Bonaparte, however, had no idea of being thrust into the background. He was before all things a soldier; he had won all his glory on the battlefield; and it was no part of his scheme to allow himself to be eclipsed. On the other hand, as he was not commander-in-chief, he escaped responsibility for any failure that might occur. Berthier superintended the organisation of the army. Bonaparte did not appear till it was ready to cross the Alps.

The passage of the Great St Bernard, which took place between

May 15 and May 20, was completely successful. An army of 55,000 foot and 5000 horse had to cross the pass—no easy matter. Lannes, the hero of Lodi, commanded the advance-guard: his task was to open the road and effect a junction in the valley of Aosta with the division of General Chabran, which crossed by the Little St Bernard. When the road had been cleared, the advance of the rest of the army was less laborious; and the only remaining difficulty was the transport of the artillery. As the guns on their carriages could not climb the narrow track, it was necessary to dismount them at Bourg St Pierre and to convey the various parts on carts or on mule-back. With a view to this, all available transport in the Rhone valley had been requisitioned; but, in spite of the liberal prices offered, the country people, hating the French, had taken refuge in the mountains, where they hid their mules. In the end the guns had to be transported by the soldiers: planks were hewn out, the guns were placed within them, and each gun was dragged over by a hundred men working in relays. At St Remy, on the Italian slope, an artillery workshop put the gun-carriages together again and reloaded the guns upon them. Bonaparte crossed the St Bernard with the rear-guard, not on a fiery war-horse, as David's picture portrays him, but on a humble mule led by a peasant from Bourg St Pierre. Was this passage, after all, as wonderful as contemporaries would have us believe and as certain historians still affirm it to be? It was no doubt a brilliant military exploit; but material difficulties alone had to be overcome. Other generals before and after Bonaparte—Lansac on the St Gotthard and Macdonald on the Splügen—accomplished marches more full of peril; but, as they lacked both Bonaparte's eye for theatrical effect and his insuperable talent for self-advertisement, their achievements passed almost unnoticed.

The Austrians, who never dreamt that any considerable force could descend into Italy by the high passes of the Great and the Little St Bernard, had sent only some weak detachments to guard these approaches. Lannes, who during his march had met with but little opposition, occupied Aosta almost without striking a blow, and effected his junction with Chabran. At Châtillon he met with a more considerable Austro-Sardinian force, commanded by Briosi. He defeated it, and then marched against the fortress of Bard. That little fort, built on a precipitous rock which completely closed the *valle*, was the only serious obstacle met with by the French. A mountain-track existed, by which the fort could be turned; but it was not practicable for artillery, and the army had so little time to spare that a regular slope was out of the question. Marmont, who commanded the artillery, had recourse to a stratagem; he wrapped the guns and their carriages in ropes of hay and straw, and during the hours of darkness caused stable-litter to be spread along the road. Taking advantage of a stormy night, he marched his guns past under the cover of the fort. The garrison were indeed

showered, and their fire killed a few French soldiers; but by the morning the obstacle had been turned. From that point the French troops marched down the valley with great rapidity.

The Austrians had meanwhile divined Bonaparte's plan. They suspected that Moreau's sudden attack in the south of Germany had been delivered with the object of making an invasion of Italy. Melas received forthwith from Vienna an order to march with all haste on Turin. For the defence of that city there were available in the north of Piedmont not more than 10,000 men; they were commanded by General Haddick, who occupied a series of very strong positions behind the Orselle and on the heights of Romano. On May 26 Lannes attacked Haddick and compelled him to withdraw behind the Orso. The Austrian general hastened to warn Melas that, if he did not return with all speed, Piedmont would be overrun by the French. Melas thereupon decided to quit Genoa, leaving 20,000 men under Ott before the city, and 20,000 men under Elsnitz to watch Suchet beyond the Var. Convinced that the object of the French was to cross the Po, conquer Piedmont, and march to the help of Masséna, Melas judged that with his own army and that of Haddick he could succeed in stopping their advance. When, however, Melas drew near to Turin the French were no longer in Piedmont. They had collected a number of boats and porters and made a feat of crossing the river at Chiasso; they then turned sharply to the east, crossed the Sesia and the Ticino, and after an engagement with General Vukassowitch, who was charged with the defence of the latter river, invaded the Milanese. On June 3 Bonaparte made his triumphal entry into Milan.

Once master of Lombardy, Bonaparte had at his command all the forces available for his campaign in Italy. In addition to the army of reserve, 18,000 men detached from Moreau's force had just arrived by the St Gothard under General Monnier; and they, with Turreau's division, which had marched into Piedmont by the Great Cenis, made up the total number of French troops in Italy to 70,000 men. To oppose to these troops, fresh and shakled with success, Melas could bring but a weary and disheartened soldiery. Surprised by the unexpected turn of events and the rapidity of Bonaparte's movements, the Austrian general stood for a moment paralysed and bewildered, but finally decided to recall his forces from Genoa; he ordered them to concentrate on Alessandria and marched thither himself. He hoped in a few days to collect 60,000 men to shatter the audacity of Bonaparte by a well-timed defeat.

These hopes were far from being realised. To begin with, it proved impossible to effect the concentration on Alessandria so quickly as had been expected. Elsnitz, in his retirement from the Var, was involved in repeated combats with Suchet, who harassed his retreat; when he arrived, it was with diminished forces. Ott, on the very day when the order reached him to raise the siege of Genoa, received the capitulation of

Monfca, and was compelled to leave a garrison in the city. He then, in pursuance of further orders, marched to the east of Alessandria in order to reconnoitre the line of the Po; he was there beaten by the advance-guard of the French army, and, after losing heavily, was forced to fall back on Alessandria. Thus, from every point of view, the position of the Austrians seemed unsatisfactory.

Bonaparte, meanwhile, had occupied Lombardy as far as the Oglio, driven the Austrians from all the cities, and seized Cremona with its important stores of provisions, arms, and war material. His advance-guard, consisting of Lannes' and Murat's corps and a division of Victor's, crossed over to the right bank of the Po, took Piacenza, and occupied the numerous villages to the west of that town, with the defence of the Stradella. It was there that on June 8 the combat of Montebello took place. Ott, who attempted to force the passage, was compelled, after a desperate struggle, to retreat on Alessandria. Bonaparte, learning at this moment, through some intercepted despatches, that the Austrians had not yet effected their concentration, crossed the Po with the rest of his troops, and resolved to attack them without delay.

To the east of Alessandria stretches a plain separated from the town by the river Bernida; it is covered with cornfields and vineyards, and contains a few villages and hamlets, Castell-Corico, San Giuliano, and Marengo. It was here that the French awaited the Austrians. As three days passed without their arrival, Bonaparte concluded that they were retreating either to the north or the south. The intelligence which came from the north making it clear that no movement of troops was taking place in that direction, the First Consul was convinced that Melas had moved south with a view to regaining Genoa. He immediately despatched 6000 men under Domb, who had just arrived from Egypt, in the direction of Novi. In the plain of the Bernida he left only the corps of Lannes and Victor, 14,000 strong, supported by Murat's cavalry. He himself fixed his head-quarters considerably to the east, on the banks of a little river, the Scrivia; and he had with him a reserve force consisting of Monnier's division, numbering 3500 men, two regiments of cavalry, and the Consular Guard, 1800 strong.

At the moment when Bonaparte was thus dividing his forces, the Austrians resolved on attacking. On the morning of June 14 they crossed the Bernida at three points simultaneously: Ott with the cavalry of Elsnitz to the north; Melas with the divisions of Haddick, Kaim, Morpau, and Lobkowitz in the centre; O'Reilly to the south. The corps of Lannes and Victor, which occupied the villages of Castell-Corico and Marengo, offered a vigorous resistance during six hours to the Austrian attacks; but, inferior as they were in numbers as well as in artillery and cavalry, they were eventually compelled to retreat and abandon their positions to the enemy. In vain Bonaparte hurried up from the Scrivia to their relief with Monnier's division and the Consular

ground. The French were unable to regain the ground they had lost, and by three in the afternoon the Austrians were masters of the battlefield. Melas, who felt the weight of his years and had been slightly wounded, considering that his presence on the field was no longer necessary, returned to Alexandria and despatched a courier to Vienna to announce his victory.

The announcement was premature. Hardly had Melas quitted the plain of the *Borovida*, when a second battle began. Desaix, with his 8000 men, after searching in vain for Melas in the direction of Novi, returned in all haste towards Alexandria; and, hearing the sound of the distant cannonade, he concluded that the Austrians had not withdrawn and that they were giving battle to the French. When he arrived on the plain of the *Borovida* a hurried council of war was held. The French generals acknowledged their defect. "A battle has been lost," said Desaix, "but another battle can be won." He offered to make the attempt on condition that he was "vigorously supported by artillery." Marescot's guns were moved up, and the whole line resumed the offensive. The French, encouraged by the arrival of fresh troops, fought with spirit. The Austrians, who had not expected an attack and, looking upon the victory as won, had partly lost formation, stood for a moment bewildered. They made an attempt at resistance, but were driven in on all sides; a panic seized them, and they fled precipitately. At nightfall the field of battle remained in the hands of the French; and the whole Austrian army, in great confusion, sought shelter under the walls of Alexandria. The Austrians lost more than 9000 men killed and wounded; the French 7000.

Among the killed was Desaix, the hero of the day, who fell at the head of his troops, while cheering them on to the attack; his body was found where the dead lay thickest. When he saw it, Bonaparte exclaimed: "A glorious day's work if only I could have embraced Desaix upon the battlefield. I should have made him minister of war, and a prince too, had it been in my power." Bonaparte was right: it was Desaix who saved him on that day. The victory of Marescot confirmed the power of the First Consul; had he been beaten there, his brother Lucien remarked, the prescription of the Bonaparte family would have certainly followed. The military results of the victory were immediately apparent. The Austrians were too demoralised and too weak to hazard another battle; and Melas sent an officer to the French head-quarters to request an armistice. Bonaparte agreed, on the following conditions. The French troops were to occupy Lombardy as far as the *Mincio*; and the Austrian garrisons in *Tuscany* and *Ancona* were to retire beyond that river until the proposals of peace submitted to the Emperor had led to some definite result. A special messenger, Count *Saint-Julien*, started immediately for Vienna, bearing with him the convention and a letter from Bonaparte to Francis II., in which he said: "If your Majesty desires peace, it is easy to have it. Let both parties carry out the Treaty of Campo Formida."

Bonaparte had the more reason for believing that Francis would consent to make peace, since the Austrian army in Germany had just suffered a series of reverses. Kray, who had been forced to retreat beneath the walls of Ulm, made repeated attempts to drive off Morano, who, advancing cautiously but steadily, was all the while closing in upon him. On May 28 the French general had occupied Augsburg and established himself in the district between the Danube, the Ilar, and the Lech. Kray attacked him on June 3, but without success. Morano thereupon crossed the Danube near Mindheim and cut off the enemy's retreat. Kray attempted in vain to drive Morano back to the right bank of the river. The Austrian attacks were repulsed, and Kray was compelled to abandon his entrenchments. On June 22, as the result of another French victory gained at Hochstadt, Kray was compelled to retreat towards the north.

Morano had conducted the second part of the German campaign with the greatest skill; and Kray, when he heard of the defeat of Neres, considering further resistance impossible, proposed an armistice to the French general. Morano refused, but refrained from further pursuit, as the enemy had now plunged into a woody and difficult country. With part of his force Morano laid siege to Ulm and Ingolstadt; with the remainder he marched into Bavaria, occupied Munich, seized the passes into Yornberg and Switzerland, and so placed himself in communication with the French armies which were operating on the frontiers of Tyrol and of the Grisons. Once master of the line of the Inn, Morano, cautious as ever, preferred not to venture farther to the east; and, receiving a second proposal for an armistice from Kray, he agreed to sign a convention at Passdorf on July 15. This convention provided that hostilities should be indefinitely suspended in Germany, and that the French should occupy Bavaria west of the Inn, as far as Munich in one direction and Ratisbon in the other.

In spite of its reverses in Germany and Italy, the Imperial Government, contrary to Bonaparte's expectations, seemed very little disposed to sign a treaty of peace. It refused to consider the situation as desperate, and looked upon Mantova and Hochstadt as setbacks that might easily be repaired; in any case it declined to discuss proposals based on the Treaty of Campo Formio. Francis II had a short time before concluded a treaty with Great Britain, by which, in consideration of a subsidy of £2,500,000, he bound himself not to sign a peace with France before February 1, 1801. What was he now to do? He could not answer Bonaparte's proposals with an absolute refusal, for that involved an immediate assumption of hostilities under conditions distinctly unfavorable to Austria; he therefore used all his efforts to amuse Bonaparte by the prospect of an understanding, hoping thus to gain the time necessary to receive the English subsidy and to reinforce his army. It was with this object that he consented to discuss Bonaparte's



proposals; and to that end he despatched two representatives—Count Saint-Julien and Count Nesselrode—on a mission to Paris.

The instructions given to these envoys gave them no authority to treat; they were merely authorised to sound Bonaparte as to the proposals he was prepared to make. Saint-Julien, however, who was vain and incapable, was aided by the First Consul and Talleyrand into believing that he was clothed with plenary powers. They pictured to him the immense service which he would render to the two nations by securing them the blessings of peace, and they induced him to sign the draft of a document which was nothing else in its main lines but the Treaty of Campo Formido. Saint-Julien, whose self-conceit was flattered, affixed his signature, saying: "I sign provisionally, pending ratification by my government. Without such ratification any convention is null and void." Bonaparte and Talleyrand smiled; and the trick was played.

At Vienna the anger of the Government was extreme. The Austrian Court had meant to entice Bonaparte, but it was Bonaparte who had deceived them. The imprudent envoy was badly deceived and, with his colleague, shot up in a furrow. Thugot, in his anxiety to reassure the English, disclosed to them the duplicity of the French and pointed out his military preparations with anxiety. This, however, was mere pretence. Austria was in no condition to recommence the struggle; her army was completely disorganised. The confusion which reigned in the higher commands at the beginning of 1800 had gone on increasing. Her best generals had been replaced by officers still more incompetent. A headstrong youth, Archduke John, succeeded Kray. The Archduke himself was nothing more than the nominal viceroy of General Lauer, who himself was a mere mouthpiece of the Government; for, under the old-fashioned system still in vogue at the Austrian Court, military operations were conducted from Vienna. With the army in Italy things went no better; as a result of his defeat at Marengo, Melas was deprived of his command, which was given to a man still more inefficient and incapable, General de Bellegarde.

At the moment when Austria was preparing to renew the contest, Francis II. himself went to the camp on the Inn to study the military situation on the spot. He found such a state of disorganisation that, on his return to Vienna, he applied to Bonaparte for a prolongation of the armistice; and to this Bonaparte agreed, on condition that the Austrians should surrender Philippsberg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt. A change of opinion in favour of peace was now perceptible at Vienna. Thugot, who belonged to the war party, was replaced by Cobenzl, who had negotiated the Treaty of Campo Formido: and the negotiations between Vienna and Paris, which had been broken off, were resumed. The chief wish of the Austrians all through was to gain time; but they believed also that Bonaparte was ardently desirous of peace, and they hoped to obtain from him terms such as Great Britain would be able to accept.

Naparte, however, was not a man to be played with; he was willing to trust on the basis of Campo Formio and on no other. He consented indeed to negotiate; even the meeting place, Lunzville, was agreed upon by his brother Joseph as representing France and Colnau as representing Austria. Before, however, Colnau reached Lunzville, Bonaparte, who wished to find out what the real intentions of Austria were, invited him to Paris. Once there, Bonaparte had no difficulty in finding out what he wanted. When Colnau had been driven to make a definite statement of his views, Bonaparte saw that the object of Austria was to secure a lull-phase of retreat, and that she meant to sign no treaty without the concurrence of England. Bonaparte at once understood that nothing but a signal victory would bring Austria to terms, and he took measures accordingly.

From the moment of his return to Paris after the campaign of Marengo, Bonaparte had been continuously engaged in military preparations. A fresh army of reserves had been formed at Dijon and was ready, in case of war, to march into Italy by the Spilgen. The Dutch had been ordered to furnish a corps of 8000 men, who under Angereau were to reinforce Moreau in Germany. After the interview between Bonaparte and Colnau in Paris, these preparations were pushed on with the greatest energy; and notice was given to Austria that the armistice would terminate on November 2.

The Austrian Government, which was not ready, made a supreme effort to preserve peace. The two emperors were at Lunzville, where they were engaged in formulating the arguments which bore upon the question whether an English plenipotentiary should be admitted to their conference or not, and whether the Emperor should sign as prince of his hereditary States or as the head of the Holy Roman Empire. Suddenly it was proposed from Vienna that the treaty of peace should be signed without waiting for the concurrence of England, on condition that the transaction should be kept secret until February 1, 1806, on which date the arrangement between Austria and England would come to an end; and that, to save appearances, a British plenipotentiary should be admitted to the negotiations at Lunzville. Bonaparte agreed to a secret treaty of peace, but insisted that it should be concluded within forty-eight hours, and declined altogether to admit a British representative to the deliberations. Austria could not accept this last condition, and nothing was left but a fresh resort to arms.

At the end of November, 1805, hostilities were renewed both in Germany and in Italy. In Germany, Moreau held the line of the Inar with 100,000 men. The Austrian army commanded by Archduke John numbered only 80,000; but this inferiority was balanced by the great strength of the position which it held on the right bank of the Inar, protected on the north by wooded and swampy plains and on the south by steep heights very difficult of access. Moreau, confident that

the Archduke would remain on the defensive, decided to attack him, and marched towards the Inn in order to clear the approaches to the river and force back the Austrian outposts to the other side. At the moment, however, that he put his force into motion, his left was suddenly attacked by Archduke John, who, contrary to all expectation, had quitted his commanding position. Fired by the exploits of Bismarck, the Archduke formed the ambitious project of outflanking the French, cutting off their retreat, and attacking them before they were able to concentrate. The success of this plan, however, depended upon its being executed with skill and rapidity. It was executed with neither. Through the plains to the north, low-lying and seldom with rain, the progress of the army was exceedingly slow, so much so that when the Archduke reached the opposite bank of the river he had already begun to lose heart. After holding a council of war, he decided to abandon his plan and to attack the French forthwith. Marmen's left wing under Grœner was at Aupfing near Nikißdorf, isolated from the rest of the army. These troops gave way before the Austrian attack, but, thanks to a division sent to their assistance, they made their retreat in good order.

Elated by this petty success, the Archduke imagined that he could dispose without difficulty of the rest of the French army. Thus threatened, Marmen concentrated his troops in the middle of the plateau, which is clothed by the great forest of Hohenberg. In an open space in the very middle of the forest stands the village of Hohensinden; and there Marmen halted on ground which was well adapted to defence and gave little opportunity for the manoeuvres of the splendid Austrian cavalry. The Austrian generals pointed out the rashness of marching through country so thickly wooded, but the Archduke would not listen. On December 2, a dull, snowy day, his army plunged into the forest, came by the main highway and wore by other roads. Meanwhile, Marmen, having General Grœner's force strongly posted in the open space, moved the divisions of Bismarck and Deussen back through the forest with orders to attack the Austrians in the rear. The operation was perfectly successful. The rear of the Archduke's army came into collision with the troops massed at Hohensinden, while its rear-guard was attacked by the rest of the French force. Caught between two fires, the Austrian regiments swept back on themselves; the ranks were broken; the soldiers fled right and left into the forest, climbing steep banks and falling into bogs. Very soon the high road was nothing but a confused mass of dead and wounded, loose horses, wrecked carts, abandoned guns and ammunition-waggons. The rest of the troops, who during the afternoon converged on the open space by other roads, met the same fate; and by half-past three the Austrian army was completely routed, with the loss of 22,000 men killed, wounded, and prisoners, besides a large number of guns and an immense baggage train. In a bulletin admirably simple in its terms, Marmen conveyed to Paris the news

of the battle of Hohenlinden, a victory more brilliant and more complete than that of Marengo.

In spite of the wintry weather, which rendered the roads in this mountainous district exceedingly difficult, Massénæ continued his advance. He compelled successfully the lines of the Inn, the Isar, the Salzach, the Traun, and the Enns, and defeated the enemy in a series of combats, capturing men and guns. On December 23 he was within 55 miles of Vienna, and his generals were already rejoicing at the prospect of entering the Austrian capital in triumph. But Massénæ, who was anxious, as he said, to secure peace without defiling the Austrians to extremities, agreed with the Archduke Charles, who had succeeded his unlucky brother, to sign an armistice at Steyr on December 23. It was stipulated that those towns in Bavaria and Tyrol which still resisted should be handed over to the French; and that Austria, in spite of her existing engagements, should sign a treaty without the concurrence of England.

The campaign in Italy brought no less glory to the French arms. Brune, who had succeeded Massénæ as commander-in-chief of the army in Italy, had 80,000 men under his orders. Bellegarde commanded a force about equal in number; but he had the advantage of being protected by the famous fortresses of the Quadrilateral, Peschiera, Legnano, Mantua, and Verona. Bonaparte had forbidden Brune to attack the Austrian position till he had been reinforced by Macdonald, who was in the Grisons with 12,000 men. Macdonald, in order to reach the Valbellinæ, and thence Tyrol, was compelled, like as it was, to cross the Spilgen. He accomplished that dangerous feat successfully, in spite of ice and avalanches, and reached the Lake of Isèo, from which point he could join Brune without difficulty. Brune was now able to move; between the 23th and 28th of November he drove the Austrians from their positions on the Mincio, and two days later he forced the passage of that river at Fomolo and at Masoventura. He then pushed back the enemy towards the Adige, crossed to the left bank at Boasengo on December 8, and occupied Verona. Next, after effecting his junction with Macdonald, who marched up from Trent, he thrust back Bellegarde beyond the Tagliamento. The Austrian general, finding it impossible to keep the field, proposed an armistice, which Brune accepted readily and signed at Treviso on January 16, 1801. By the terms of this convention the French were to occupy the line of the Adige with Verona, Peschiera, and Legnano.

The French were no less successful in other parts of Italy. In Tuscany General Miollis defeated a small Neapolitan force, which had come to the help of the Austrians; and Murat, after forcing his way into the kingdom of Naples, compelled Ferdinand IV to sign a convention at Foligno. This convention was subsequently turned into a formal treaty of peace, the Treaty of Florence, signed in March, 1801. By it Ferdinand undertook to close his ports to the English, to hand

over Tanaro to the French, and to maintain there a French garrison of 15,000 men till a general peace should be concluded. Thus, in a few months, Italy was once again brought under French control.

The result of the French victories was to facilitate the conclusion of peace; but Bonaparte was more exacting at the beginning of 1801 than he had been in the autumn of the preceding year. He was no longer satisfied with the line of the Minus as the frontier of the Cisalpine Republic; he insisted on the frontier of the Adige with the cession of his fortress of Mantua. The improved external relations of France placed Bonaparte in a position to increase his demands. Paul I. felt of admiration for the victor of Marengo, had made advances; and Bonaparte, profiting by this friendly attitude, asked to him the island of Malta, at the moment when it was about to fall into the hands of the English. The Tsar, who attached a serious value to his position as Grand Master of the Knights of Malta, called upon the British Government to surrender the island, and, on receiving a refusal, laid an embargo on three hundred English ships. More than this, he had, as we related in the previous chapter, challenged the maritime supremacy of England by renouncing the famous League of Neutral with Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia. All this had undoubtedly been of great assistance to Bonaparte, and had made him less than ever disposed to yield to Austria. At Lunéville, Colonel had offered the Oglio, the Chiese, and the Minus, as after the other, as the frontier of the Cisalpine Republic. Bonaparte, as is reasonable, he would sign no treaty that did not give him the frontier of the Adige. At last Austria gave way; and on February 9, 1801, signed at Lunéville the treaty which he described as "terrible."

This treaty was for France a great diplomatic success. The concessions for which she had fought so long were ceded to her by the Emperor, who signed as head of the Holy Roman Empire; France acquired, in addition to the German districts on the left bank of the Rhine, Belgium and Luxembourg. In Germany she gained the right to share in determining the indemnities to be granted to the dispossessed princes; and the principle of secularization which she imposed was to be of great assistance to her policy. In Italy she had secured advantages not less substantial: she occupied Piedmont; the Cisalpine Republic and Liguria were under her protection; Tuscany, which had been converted into the kingdom of Etruria, was governed by the young heir of Parma, who had married a Spanish Infanta and was completely under the thumb of Bonaparte; Rome lay at his mercy; the King of Naples, who owed his crown solely to the intervention of the Tsar, was compelled to maintain a French garrison at Taranto.

Nothing could be more flattering to the national vanity of the French than a treaty such as this, which established the complete failure of the Second Coalition. The republics, which the Coalition was formed to crush, maintained their existence under the protection of France.

Paul I, who had chivalrously embarked on a crusade to restore the Bourbons to the throne, had ended by leagueing himself with the usurper and helping to consolidate his influence. There was, indeed, a shadow on the picture—Great Britain; but she was isolated for the moment, and Napoleon cherished the hope of forcing her to make peace.

In the spring of 1800 Napoleon believed the moment had come when, with the aid of the neutrals, he would be able to humiliate England. He flattered himself that he could contend successfully with the British fleet, divided, as it necessarily was, between the Baltic, the French coast, and the Mediterranean. The idea of a descent upon Ireland or the English coast was never absent from his mind. "With three days of east wind," he remarked, "I could repeat the exploit of William the Conqueror." At the same time he was pursuing the idea, which he had established in 1798, of attacking Great Britain through Egypt and India; and he made preparations for the necessary supplies to be forwarded to the forces in Egypt. He had already planned to send Masséna to join the Russians by way of the Danube, the Black Sea, and Astrakhan. Each day's march had already been arranged; proclamations to the inhabitants had been drawn up; nothing had been forgotten, not even the halibut-stuff and the sermons. But when Napoleon's preparations had reached this point, two pieces of intelligence were almost simultaneously received which ruined the whole scheme. These were the battle of Copenhagen and the assassination of the Tsar.

This latter event, in particular, affected Napoleon deeply. On hearing of it, he uttered cries of rage and declared that he was in it for the hand of *pygmalion*. "The English failed to strike me on the third of Niémen," he said, "...but they have not failed to strike me at St Petersburg." The *Moniteur* published the news in these terms: "Paul I died on the night of March 24: the British squadron passed the Sound on the 21st. History will teach us the connection which may exist between the two events." In spite of all this rebuke, Napoleon was serious. The death of Paul had practically dissolved the League of Neutrals; and the blockade of the English coast which Napoleon had dreamed of was no longer possible. He had even to abandon the hope of driving the English from the Mediterranean. At the same time there were, after the Peace of Lunéville, important matters in France which demanded Napoleon's attention—the *Constitution*, the Civil Code, the reform of the finances, the organisation of public instruction—while abroad, the political systems of Italy, Holland, and Switzerland, needed reorganisation in accordance with his ideas. For every reason, a truce with England was necessary; and Napoleon turned his thoughts in that direction.

In Great Britain also there was a general inclination towards peace. Although they had won great successes at sea in the East and West Indies, had taken Copenhagen and landed in Egypt, the English recognised the fact that, in spite of all this cost of the tail and money which

they had expended, Bonaparte was still the strongest power on the Continent. Should they continue the struggle or should they abandon it, husband their strength, restore their finances, and wait for better times? Both views were represented in Great Britain, but it was the peace party which was gaining in numbers, including, as it did, the whole business world. The country was passing through a crisis: from the agricultural phase it was passing into the industrial. The steam-engine, which had increased tenfold the manufacturing capacity of the population as well as the producing capacity of the soils, had spread over the country a multitude of factories and workshops. The manufacturing industry, which had already attained importance in 1801, demanded new outlets. To the markets of the colonies and America, it was indispensable to add those of Europe, for the west port closed during the war. It was hoped that, with peace, British goods would find their way to the Continent; merchants, manufacturers, and bankers became in consequence ardent partisans of peace.

This movement, which became general after the Peace of Lunéville, was one of the causes which led to the retirement of Pitt on February 4, 1801, and the formation of a ministry under Addington. From this moment a better feeling began to prevail between England and France; and the Foreign Minister, Lord Hawkesbury, intimated to Otto, who had been sent by the French to London to arrange an exchange of prisoners, that the British Government was disposed, should France be favourably inclined, to resume negotiations.

Bonaparte, as we have seen, also desired peace; but, in order to have it on the most advantageous terms, he prepared to himself, as a preliminary step, to complete the isolation of his rival. To that end, in spite of the Treaty of Lunéville, he prepared for intervention on the Continent by occupying positions favourable both for attack and defence, and surrounding the Republic with what may be described as a more complete system of relieving forts. Foreseeing possible complications with Great Britain, Bonaparte made it his primary object to confront the English with accomplished facts. The first step in that direction was the annexation of Piedmont. Hitherto the widow of Paul I. the self-constituted champion of the King of Sardinia, had formed the chief obstacle to this step. The Tsar once out of the way, Bonaparte's hands were free. On the day when he heard of Paul's death he decided on annexation, taking care to articulate the document, so that the connection between the two events should not be apparent. Anxious also not to alarm Europe, he announced to the various Courts that the organisation of the country was his sole object. In his secret instructions to General Jourdan, who commanded the corps of occupation in Piedmont, he held very different language. "This organisation," he said, "is merely a first step towards annexation." At the same time he informed the agents of the King of Sardinia, who had taken refuge at





understanding with Great Britain, for on this point Bonaparte would not yield. Alexander I, who, since the death of his father, had shown himself desirous of an understanding with England, had declared that the occupation of Egypt by the French, and their evident determination to remain there, created an insuperable source of difficulties and disputes. A more friendly feeling was now growing up between the Russian and British Governments. Alexander had raised the embargo on British ships and renounced the Grand Mastership of Malta; while the English, on their side, had restrained the further activity of Nelson in the Baltic. In short, by the end of the spring, everything was ready for a definite understanding; and this was arrived at by the signature on June 17, 1801, of the Treaty of St Petersburg, which formally defined the rights of the neutral Baltic Powers.

Nothing could affect Bonaparte more than this drawing together of Russia and Great Britain; it meant the ruin of his eastern policy and the indefinite postponement of his plans. Thereafterward, in everything that he did, he would have to reckon with St Petersburg; and, what was still worse, he saw in the young Tsar a possible rival in European politics. Alexander had wide ambitions; he could not forgive the Russian upstart, who filled the political stage and imposed his will on the sovereigns of Europe. The Tsar longed to replace the supremacy of France by the supremacy of Russia, and to play the part of arbitrator in European disputes. In Italy he posed as the champion of the Kings of Sardinia and Naples, claiming for the former a territorial indemnity in the peninsula, and for the latter the preservation of his crown. In Germany he was about to intervene in favour of the deposed Emperor, "with a view to establishing," as he said, "such a balance of power as would afford mutual guarantee and preserve the peace of Europe."

At this moment France appeared to be completely isolated. Even Prussia seemed inclined to secure some advantage from the new political situation. Her King, it is true, did not go so far as to abandon the neutral policy which had answered his purpose so well. In 1801 he was no more ready to give up his political system than he had been in 1793, when the Second Coalition held out to him the prospect of filling up the gap in his dominions, and of adding thereto certain territories on the left bank of the Rhine, or than he was in 1800, after Marengo, when Bonaparte offered him Hanover as the price of his alliance. It was in vain that Lucchese, French ambassador in Paris, pointed out to Frederick William that Bonaparte, through his policy in Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, had brought about a European coalition against himself, and was even losing his popularity in France; the King would not listen. Nevertheless, aided by the Tsar, he made an almost attempt to secure for himself a wide stretch of German territory by way of compensation for his trifling losses on the left bank of the Rhine. At the same time, in order to reassure Austria, he was at pains to prove

that such an addition to his territory would be chiefly to the detriment of France. "The establishment of several great Powers in Germany," said his minister Haugwitz, "is the only possible barrier which we can oppose to the supremacy and the revolutionary mal of France."

Confronted by so many rival ambitions; face to face with Russia, whose aim it was to keep him at a distance and to challenge his supremacy over Germany and Italy; with Prussia, who offered nothing but a precarious neutrality for which she expected to be handsomely paid; with Austria, whose only object was to evade and whittle away the Treaty of Lunéville—Bonaparte saw that there was but one thing to be done, viz. to make terms with England. The necessity of this step was brought home to him by the inevitable difficulties of the work which he had undertaken in the countries owing allegiance to France. It was true that these countries owed some tribute to France; but the system of contributions and conscriptions which she had forced upon them proved more onerous than the burdens which they had borne under their former rulers, and they were far from being attached to the Republic. Bonaparte saw clearly that, if he wished to bind their peoples to him, it was necessary to bestow upon them just and regular government. To organise the French Republic, to organise also the governments of Italy, Holland, Germany, and Switzerland, in other words, to secure the supremacy of the First Consul in France itself and the supremacy of France outside her own borders, was a task which could not be deferred. He resigned himself, therefore, to a truce with England, which he knew to be precarious, but which he hoped would hold long enough to enable him to complete the work of political organisation.

Negotiations had gone on without a break between London and Paris; but it was rather the scope of the understanding than the understanding itself which had been under discussion. The British Government had, in the first instance, proposed the principle of *no partition*, as the basis of the future arrangement; that is to say, the simple retention by both parties of their respective conquests. This the French Government rejected, under the pretext that it would work to the prejudice of their allies, Holland and Spain, who had lost several of their colonies. They had failed also to agree on what was implied by the *status quo bellum*, as each party strove to interpret those words in the sense most favorable to itself. Eventually a basis of agreement was found in "reciprocal compensation." France formally recognised the greater part of the conquests which England had made; Great Britain did the same with respect to the conquests of France; while Malta and Egypt were restored to their former owners, the Knights and the Sultan respectively.

The discussion on this question of compensation lasted throughout the summer. The British Government could not consent to an official recognition of the recent establishment of the Republic, but it knew

will enough that to raise this question would render agreement impossible; it therefore evaded the difficulty by ignoring its existence and by forestalling discussion to those points which were indispensable. The French Government, on the other hand, refused to consent to the retention by Great Britain of all the colonies which she had taken from the allies of France, and required the restitution of the Cape to Holland and of Trinidad to Spain. On the question of Trinidad especially Bonaparte was at first intransigent, since its possession would secure to his son "a dangerous foothold on the vast continent of South America." When, however, the Spaniards had played him false in the matter of Portugal, Bonaparte was less anxious to protect their interests. On September 19 he had reluctantly signed at Madrid a treaty with Portugal, which was nothing more than a confirmation of the Treaty of Badajoz; and, at Talleyrand's suggestion, he decided to leave Trinidad in the hands of England. This concession expedited the negotiations in London and quieted the doubts of the British Cabinet; and on October 1, 1861, the preliminaries of peace were signed in London.

By these preliminaries Great Britain undertook to restore to France and her allies, Spain and Holland, all her maritime conquests except Ceylon and Trinidad, which became hers permanently. She restored the Cape, Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo, and Surinam to the Dutch; Martinique and Guadeloupe to the French; Minorca to the Spaniards; and Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, under the guarantee of one of the great Powers. She abandoned Porto Ferro, which, with the rest of the island of Elba, became French property in 1860. In return for this the French were to evacuate Naples. The armies of both nations were withdrawn from Egypt, which was restored to Turkey. The integrity of Portugal was guaranteed; and the independence of the Ionian Islands was recognized. The question of the Newfoundland fisheries was deferred.

The news that preliminaries had been signed in London caused great joy in France. It announced the general peace so long desired, which was to give lasting tranquillity to the Continent, remove the necessity for European coalitions, and furnish the nation with fresh opportunities for the development of its industry and commerce. In Paris the news spread rapidly, and the city was spontaneously illuminated. In London the rejoicings were not less intense. The people, delivered from the nightmare of invasion, and believing that death, high prices, and all the other ills which war produces, were at an end, perceived also that profitable markets would now be opened to their foreign trade, gave themselves up to transports of joy. The public conveyances which started from London bore enormous placards announcing "Peace with France." When Lauriston, Bonaparte's *adje-champ*, arrived from Paris with the ratification of the preliminaries, the crowd, in its excitement, took the horses from his carriage and dragged him in triumph, amid loud cheers for Bonaparte.

In England this joy was short-lived. No sooner were the terms of the convention made known than the liveliest discontent was manifested. Politicians could not believe that no stipulations had been made in respect of Holland, the Rhine, Switzerland, or Italy, and that, of all her conquests, England had retained only Ceylon and Trinidad. Business men, on their side, were deeply disappointed that the stipulations embodied no treaty of commerce, and that, instead of the wide facilities which they expected, the Continent remained closed, as in the past, with a system of prohibitive tariffs more ruinous than war. The opinion of the mercantile world became before long the opinion of the whole nation. "It is nothing but a frail and deceptive truce," said Lord Fitzwilliam in a speech in Parliament. The Government bravely shared this view, and hoped, before signing a definite peace, to obtain more favourable conditions and so render the treaty acceptable to the nation.

The town of Amiens was the place chosen for the discussion of the articles of the treaty. The British envoy was Lord Cornwallis, who had commanded in America and in the East, and had governed India and Ireland. The French envoy was Joseph Bonaparte, who was already called "Grand Signatory of the Consulate," from having signed the treaty of Maastricht with America and that of Lunéville with Austria. Joseph, who liked to pose as a liberal and as an opponent, on many points, of the policy of his brother, professed great sympathy with England, and was ready to make genuine efforts to bring about a definite reconciliation between the two countries. Personally he was inclined to make concessions with a view to removing causes of disagreement in the future: but the First Consul ordered Talleyrand to draw up instructions which confined Joseph's power of negotiation within very definite limits. Joseph, accordingly, was compelled to decline all discussion which related to the King of Sardinia, to Holland and the Stadholder, or to the affairs of Switzerland, Germany, and Italy. "All these subjects," said Napoleon, "are completely outside our deliberations with England." With all useful questions thus eliminated, the treaty of peace became nothing more than a simple acceptance of the preliminaries. The British Government had to agree to these conditions: for Bonaparte declared that, rather than yield on this essential point, he would recommence hostilities. The questions of India, Malta, and Egypt were settled in accordance with the terms of the preliminaries.

There remained what the English people had most at heart, the question of commercial treaties. Bonaparte, who had inherited from the Committee of Public Safety and from the Directory their spirit of legislation, had also inherited from them their economic methods. The Decree-law of 10 Brumaire, year V, which was the counterpart in an aggravated form of the Terrorist law of 19 Vendémiaire, year III, was rigidly enforced; it placed British merchants on the same footing as French émigrés, declared their merchandise to be enemy's goods,

and forbade its importation or sale throughout the territory of the French Republic. In vain did the British strive to obtain more equitable conditions; Bonaparte fully refused and declared that he preferred to renew hostilities. "Rather immediate war," said he, "than literary arrangements." The British Government was compelled to submit, and only obtained some unimportant concessions in matters of detail. The negotiations, however, dragged on for nearly six months. Many protocols of a dilatory nature were drawn up; there was much discussion and much going and coming between Amiens, London, and Paris. Bonaparte grew impatient, and frequently threatened to resort to war. It was his wish that the treaty should be signed on March 10, the day on which the Concordat was to be promulgated in France. It was not, however, till March 25, 1802, that the signatures were exchanged.

The Treaty of Amiens was also signed by Amiens and Schimmelpenninck, the representatives of Spain and Holland, who, as a matter of fact, had merely to ratify what Bonaparte had decided. It contained the following provisions. Peace was proclaimed between the French Republic, the King of Spain, and the Batavian Republic on the one part, and the King of Great Britain and Ireland on the other. Great Britain retained Capten and Trinidad, and restored the other colonies taken from France and her allies. The integrity of Turkey was guaranteed; the Prince of Orange was to receive an indemnity; Malta was to be restored to the Order, to remain neutral and independent under the guarantee of the Great Powers, and to receive a Neapolitan garrison for a year, and if necessary for a longer period. Great Britain was to evacuate the island within three months of the ratification of the treaty, while France was to evacuate Tarente and the States of the Church; Great Britain was to surrender the points which she occupied on the Adriatic and the Mediterranean in the month following the ratification, and her colonial conquests within six months of that date.

This treaty was far more advantageous to France than to England, where it was regarded with very mixed feelings. It was in vain that Addington declared, "This is no ordinary peace, but a genuine reconciliation between the two first nations of the world": the country did not believe him. The leaders of commerce, when they saw that the prohibitions imposed in the heat of a violent struggle were in no way relaxed, looked upon the arrangement as a *faux* bargain. The lower orders, to whom it did not bring the cheap food on which they had counted, were still more dissatisfied. The great landowners, who had hoped for relief from fiscal burdens, and the middle class, which called for the abolition of the income-tax, openly expressed their dislike for a treaty which did not fulfil their wishes. But what perhaps more irritated the nation as a whole, was the discovery that the Government had taken no measures to check the insatiable ambition of Bonaparte. This feeling of discontent made itself heard when the treaty was discussed in Parliament.

In the House of Lords, Lord Granville declared the peace to be both "unstable and dishonourable," and asserted that the country, instead of being secure, "stood in greater danger than ever." Lord Carnarvon, stigmatising the peace as disgraceful, remarked that it "even contrived to remove all security for those rights which still remained unsecured." In the House of Commons, where the criticisms were equally bitter, Addington expressed his regret at being made a party to the aggrandisement of France, but he added: "I am well persuaded that, whatever may happen, it is the wisest course for us to husband our resources at present that we may the better be prepared, if that should be our lot, to exert ourselves with energy and effect.....I think therefore that we should take care not to exhaust our resources when there is nothing to be gained by it." The treaty was ratified accordingly.

In France, on the contrary, the joy caused by the announcement of the Peace of Amiens was without alloy. Mistress as she was of Holland, Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, Switzerland, and Italy, never at any period of her history had France appeared to be more powerful. However, the fact that the peace affected almost the whole Continent was a reason for believing that it would prove durable; for, simultaneously with the signature of the preliminaries of London, treaties had been signed with other countries, Prussia, Bavaria, Turkey, and Russia.

On May 23, 1802, France concluded a treaty with Prussia, by which the latter secured the possession of the bishoprics of Paderborn and Hildesheim, part of Münster, Bielefeld, Erfurt, etc., and several abbeys, in compensation for the territories surrendered to France on the left bank of the Rhine. In return, Prussia formally recognised the changes effected by France in Italy. The Stadtholder received from France a share of German territory consisting of the bishopric of Fulda and certain abbeys; and he on his side recognised the existence of the Batavian Republic. By a treaty dated May 24, France obtained from Bavaria the surrender of all territory possessed by the latter on the left bank of the Rhine; in consideration of this, she undertook to use her influence in the negotiations which were shortly to take place with reference to the affairs of Germany, to obtain for Bavaria adequate and consequently distant compensation. The treaty of October 9 with Turkey provided for the restitution of Egypt to the Porte, for the re-establishment of former relations with France, and for the strict enforcement of all previous treaties of commerce and navigation.

The treaty of October 11 with Russia was still more important. France undertook to settle in conjunction with Russia the question of indemnifying the German princes, and also the Italian question, so far as the latter had not been disposed of by the treaties concluded with the Pope, Austria, and Naples. The most thorny question was that of Poland. During the negotiations in London, Sanaparte, emboldened by the silence of the British Government, had completed the details

incorporation of that country, which he had positively delayed. He now made up his mind not to surrender it to the King of Sardinia. The Tsar, in spite of his championship of that sovereign, was compelled to rest satisfied with a clause by which France and Russia mutually promised "to concern themselves in friendly concert with the interests of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, and to treat them with all the consideration compatible with the actual state of things."

It needed no prescience to foresee, even so early as 1802, that this universal peace, which was the admission of contemporaries, could not, from its very nature, be anything more than a truce. Austria had suffered the Treaty of Lunéville to be wrong from her; and it was clear that she would seize the first opportunity to tear it up. In the instructions which Colburn had set down for his own guidance at the moment of starting for Lunéville, he wrote, "In case it should be impossible to obtain better conditions from France, we must consider, in conjunction with the English Government, which course would best further the common cause—whether to expose Austria to the dangers of continuing the war, or to come to her by a separate peace the steps necessary to enable her to recover her strength and so remain a servicable ally of England." Austria had not lost the hope, or at any rate the desire, to deprive France of her supremacy in Europe, and to force her back within her ancient limits or even beyond them. Acknowledging that for the moment she was beaten, she compromised but did not capitulate.

Great Britain, for analogous reasons, could only look upon the Peace of Amiens as a truce. Bonaparte showed plainly that his intention was to rob her of her ascendancy in the Mediterranean and to dispute her supremacy at sea. England would have ceased to be England had she agreed to such conditions. A nation belonging ever with strength and vitality, with her traditions, her passions, and her pride, with her hands, her mines, her manufactures, her superfluous population, her fleets, her trade, her vast capital and her inexhaustible credit, would have deemed her own destruction had she given up the contest. It suited her to discontinue it for a time, to secure her acquisitions and gather fresh strength; but she knew that a resumption of the conflict was inevitable.

But what, above everything else, rendered the peace precarious and short-lived was the personal ambition of Bonaparte. Reflecting his past life at St Helena, Napoleon said: "I was terribly persuaded that both the future of France and my own was settled at Amiens. . . . It was my intention to devote myself entirely to the administration of France; and I believe that I should have worked wonders. I should have made the moral conquest of Europe, as I conquered it, or very nearly conquered it, by force of arms." Bonaparte's language in 1802 was very different. "France," he said, "must be first among States, or she must disappear. I will keep the peace as long as my neighbours keep it; but the advantage will be mine if they force me to take up arms again before they grow

party. Between old monarchies and a young republic the spirit of hostility must always exist. In the existing situation every treaty of peace means to me no more than a brief armistice; and I believe that, while I fill my present office, my destiny is to be fighting almost continually."

No sooner was the Treaty of Amiens signed than Bonaparte began to make ready for the struggle which he foresaw and foretold. In domestic affairs he displayed an all-consuming activity: roads, canals, improvements in the ports, were all undertaken at once. He paid a visit to Normandy, admired its cloth-factories, its looms, its workshops, and resolved to extend throughout France the industries to which that province owes its wealth. He fitted out extensive colonial expeditions for the Antilles, Louisiana, Mauritius, Madagascar, and India. All the dockyards were filled with scaffolding, in the midst of which rose the hulls of vessels. Bonaparte's great ambition was to have a fleet equal to that of England. "It will take us at least ten years," he said to Admiral Duroc; "after that time, with the help of Spain and Holland, we may perhaps hope to challenge the power of Great Britain with some chance of success." To this end, and in order to profit by a period of aggressive peace which was to insure the hegemony of France on the Continent, he began by passing into his service those maritime Powers which were already dependent on the Republic. Already controlling Holland and Italy, he was determined to be master of Spain and Portugal; and, pending the annexation of those countries, he sent his own generals in the guise of ambassadors, who were to disguise the governments, keep watch on their doings, frustrate intrigues, and take care that the ports were rigidly closed to the English. Foreseeing, moreover, that in the event of a maritime war the struggle would extend to the Continent, he took measures to strengthen his position on the French frontier; and this entailed interference with the politics of Italy, Holland, Germany, and Switzerland.



## CHAPTER IV.

## FRANCE AND HER TRIBUTARIES (1801-5).

In 1798 it had been the aim of the Coalition to destroy those revolutionary creations of the Directory—the Ligurian, Cisalpine, Batavian, and Helvetic Republics. The result of the campaign of 1800 was to affirm their existence and their independence. More than this, under the terms of the Treaty of Lunéville, Bonaparte intervened in Germany on the question of the indemnities to be paid to the dispossessed Princes of the left bank of the Rhine; and he proposed, by enforcing his own doctrine of “secularisation,” to bring about the aggrandisement of certain lay Princes and so create allies in the heart of Germany. It was only under the rule of Bonaparte that the political effects of the Revolution acquired any degree of durability in the tributary States. He had himself lost no time, after the events of Brumaire, in making important modifications in the constitutions of the Cisalpine Republic, Holland, and Switzerland. After the Peace of Amiens he was able to undertake the reorganisation of these countries.

At the outbreak of the revolutionary wars, the educated classes in Italy had welcomed the French as deliverers, in the hope of obtaining from them what as yet the Italians lacked—liberty and a federalism. The French Revolution, while it adhered to the old reforms which had been so ardently longed for by the majority of the people, had laid down, as a first principle, the independence of nations, and had aimed at giving them their freedom and at uniting them in appropriate groups by the ties of patriotism. It was this feature of the great movement of political emancipation in France which struck enlightened Italians, and caused all inhabitants of the peninsula to hail that movement with enthusiasm. This enthusiasm did not, however, survive the fall of the Republic. The Italians believed that it was the sole object of the French to free them and to ensure their liberty. The French, indeed, were willing to free the Italians and to share with them the gains of the Revolution; but the protection thus given was primarily intended to attack them in the Republic. The war, too, was costly; and by whom should the cost be defrayed if not by those who benefited by it? Before long, however, the necessities of the conqueror brought with them the

desire of gain; and, by degrees, the wars of Revolution were turned into wars of conquest. The Convention had treated the nations which submitted to it with a certain degree of generosity; the Directory, in its dealings with them, displayed only greed and cruelty. Generals and administrators rivaled each other in the art of making war at a profit. Bonaparte, during his first Italian campaign, showed a special aptitude in this direction. Not only did he levy enormous contributions upon the towns, sequester the estates and goods of the clergy, and quarter his soldiers upon the inhabitants, but he sent to Paris "everything which could be carried off and which might be useful." Moreover his officers, agents, and commissioners, not content with enforcing requisitions on behalf of the army or the Directory, pillaged so shamelessly on their own account that Bonaparte was occasionally compelled to intervene.

During the second Italian campaign the people were subjected to the same exactions; and ridings took place everywhere after the arrival of the French. Bonaparte, however, flattered himself that he would be able to win over the Italians by his speeches and promises of good government. One of the chief mistakes of the Directory had been the persecution of religion. The First Consul, on the other hand, as soon as he entered Italy, declared himself its defender. In all his proclamations this advice was repeated: "Let your priests say mass; power lies with the people; if they wish for religion, respect their wishes." This respect for religion went a long way towards smoothing down Italian opposition. An entirely new section of adherents was gained over—the middle classes and the people. To reconcile the Liberals with the new régime, Bonaparte boasted the benefits of the Revolution, civil equality and the suppression of abuses and privileges. He led the patriots to believe that, by means of the institutions which were to be given to Italy, he was preparing the way for national unity, which had already been brought about in France by the creation of a unity of principles and of legislation, of thought and sentiment—the ties which were fain to bind together all human communities. He thus led all parties to cherish the illusion that the new polity, half national republic, half protestantism, would eventually lead them to the full possession of their independence.

It was certainly no part of Bonaparte's scheme to promote Italian unity. At Campo Formio, in spite of the wishes of the Directory, who had planned the creation of a strong republic in North Italy, he himself had been the foremost to mutilate that great scheme by the surrender of Venice, and, later, by the annexation of Piedmont. To enable him to become master of Italy, it was necessary that the country should be split up. In his private conversations with Fouché he declared that the Italian people, corrupted by centuries of bondage, was unfitted for liberty and independence. To Italians he held out the splendid prospect of a united Italy; but he was well aware that the bulk of the

gation, keenly interested in local and municipal matters and at heart indifferent to forms of government, would sooner or later be gained to France by the dispensing of equal justice and by a wise and careful administration. It was with these views that he organised Piedmont, Liguria, and the Chaïmpine Republic.

The future of Piedmont had been provisionally settled by a decree of April 26, 1801, which made of it a French military province. By a decree of September 21, 1802, the administration was made civil instead of military; and the country was divided into six departments. This incorporation with France had been long foreseen; and the people accepted it willingly. Forced, after the Austro-Russian invasion, to submit to the excesses of a reaction which had not even restored their original family; invaded once more by the French, whom they had hailed as liberators; and governed subsequently by commissioners who were hampered by incessant financial difficulties, the Piedmontese desired nothing so much as peace, even at the expense of their nominal independence. During a year and a half they had become accustomed to the French administration, and had found it to be just and useful of the general good; the change made by Bonaparte did not affect them; it was merely a substitution of the permanent for the provisional. For the rest, they were by no means badly off under French rule. Agriculture, which had suffered much from the war, was generally resumed; manufactures and commerce prospered; the people, who could now pursue their tillage in peace, became reconciled to a régime which, if it did not give them liberty, at any rate ensured them security and a certain degree of comfort.

While Bonaparte was incorporating Piedmont with the French Republic, the government of the *Ligurian Republic* underwent important changes at his hands. The existing constitution of the latter country was a copy of the French constitution of the year III: it provided for government by a Directory with two elective Chambers. This constitution Bonaparte abolished; and, in concert with Saliceti, the French representative at Genoa, he created a new form of government, composed of a Senate and a Doge, who was to be his nominee. The change was made without opposition; and the new authorities took office on June 23, 1802. From that time forward, the Republic of Genoa was a docile instrument in Bonaparte's hands, and continued to lend him useful support in his struggle with Great Britain until its incorporation with the French Empire in 1805.

In the *Chaïmpine* Bonaparte had no difficulty in reestablishing his authority; for Austrian ill-will had caused the French to be remembered with regret. Not less intent than the French had been on absorbing the riches of the country, the Austrians had made themselves especially odious by the same vengeance which they wreaked on those who had borne office under the Republic. Farming men had

not been wanting in Austria to warn the Government against these excesses, but their warnings were in vain. Patriots had been publicly flogged, and many had been thrown into prison. All the high functionaries of the Cisalpine Republic had been compelled to expiate their crime by forced labour on the government works at Cortico. The gains of the Revolution had been nullified by a stroke of the pen; and the former régime, aggravated by the abuses peculiar to Austrian rule, had been reestablished.

In its beginnings, however, French rule proved harsh enough. Before it obtained a regular polity, the Cisalpine had to submit to a Provisional Government which literally sucked the country dry. Bonaparte had indeed promised to reorganise the Republic in accordance with the principles which had triumphed in France in 1793—"religion, morality, and good order." A year, however, was to pass before the promise was fulfilled; and during that time the Cisalpine was governed, first by a French agent, General Petiet, a former war minister of the Directory; then by a commission of nine, which was replaced subsequently to a triumvirate composed of three Milanese advocates, Bonasusina, Visconti, and Ruggi. In addition to this executive, there was a Legislative Assembly or *Consiglio*, the members of which, limited in number, had been selected by Bonaparte. This Assembly was powerless; and the country lay at the mercy of the Triumvirate, two of whom, Bonasusina and Ruggi, governed with the sole object of enriching themselves at the expense of the State. The condition of the Cisalpine was for some time pitiable: compelled, according to the principle laid down by Bonaparte, to support the army of occupation, the Republic had under this head to make a monthly payment of 100,000 francs into the French Treasury. To this heavy charge were added innumerable and never-ending requisitions in kind. The country districts had been ravaged; and a succession of bad harvests added to the general misery.

It was high time for Bonaparte to intervene, if he were not to lose the fruits of his conquest. After the signature of the Treaty of Lunenburg, he announced to the inhabitants of the Cisalpine that he was about to organise their Republic on a permanent basis. Bonaparte had no intention of leaving to the Lombards the task of framing their own constitution. It was at Paris that the Constitution of the Cisalpine was drawn up, on the model of the French Consular Constitution. In September, 1801, when the draft was ready, Bonaparte summoned four of the most considerable citizens of the Republic, Marzucchi, Micali, Aldini, and Berbelloni, submitted the result of his labours to them, and asked for their criticism. But, subject to some slight modifications made at their suggestion, the Constitution remained essentially such as he himself had evolved it. The complete instrument was referred in secret to the *Consiglio* at Milan, which adopted it without amendment.

As the foundation of the whole system, Bonaparte created a body of *electors*, divided into three colleges, the proprietors (*propriétaires*), the learned classes (*lettrés*), the trading classes (*commerçants*). These electors, 300 in number, appointed various bodies: a Commission of Censorship (*Censure*) of 42 members, whose duty it was to safeguard the constitution, and which resembled the French Senate; a Council of 8 members, whose business it was to draw up new laws, and who corresponded to the French Council of State; a Legislative Council of 10 members, whose task, like that of the French Tribunate, was to discuss proposed legislation; and lastly a Legislative Body of 75 members, constituted, like the French prototype, to discuss, whose only function was to consider such laws as were passed. But the powers of these various bodies were still further curtailed to the advantage of the executive. The executive authority was concentrated entirely in the hands of a President and a Vice-President, the powers of the latter being even more shadowy than were those of a Second Consul. These two magistrates were appointed for ten years.

In organizing the *Gaulish Republic* after this fashion, Bonaparte set before himself a double object. He strove, on the one hand, to set up a stable government which might reassure threatened interests and satisfy to a certain extent the national aspirations; on the other hand, to establish French rule in the north of Italy on a durable footing. Bonaparte attained the first end by the grant of a Constitution, and the second by reserving to himself the nomination of all the functionaries of the Republic. As usual, he was astute enough to make it appear that, in so doing, he was only carrying out the wishes of the people. Prompted by his agents, certain of the citizens came to Paris to beg him to choose their officials and so render a service to their country. Bonaparte replied that it was not possible for him to perform the task needed; and he proposed to do so in concert with the most influential members of the Republic. It was arranged that this new Commission, the members of which had been chosen by Bonaparte, should meet at Lyons, in order, as he said, that its deliberations might be free from local influences. Four hundred and fifty-four deputies, all favourable to France, went to Lyons at the beginning of 1802, and in concert with Bonaparte distributed the offices of the Republic. When they came to the choice of the chief magistrate—the President—a committee appointed for the purpose nominated Count Muhl, the most prominent person in Lombardy and a man who appeared to stand high in Bonaparte's favour. Bonaparte, however, strongly disapproved of their choice. What was his reason for doing so the Lombards failed to understand, until Talleyrand enlightened them by enquiring why they did not nominate Bonaparte himself. The Italians took the hint at once, and lost no time in offering to Bonaparte the first place in their Republic. Bonaparte received the proposal as a matter of course. He told the Lombards that he accepted,

"because he had found no one amongst them who had sufficient claims on popular esteem...and who had rendered services to his country sufficiently important to make him worthy of the chief magistracy."

Not to have a President of their own nationality was a real disappointment to the Lombards; but Bonaparte, by way of consolation, announced at the first sitting of the Commission, January 23, 1802, that from that time forward the name "Italian" should be substituted for that of "Cisalpine." These words were received with unanimous applause. Did they not proclaim to the whole of Italy that the Republic might be welcomed as the first step towards national unity, towards that Italia unita, magna, et una, which their poet Alfieri had foretold? Malin was at the same time appointed Vice-President, with the task of governing in Bonaparte's absence.

This first experiment of an Italian Republic was, at least at the outset, fairly successful. Malin, a man of a gentle and conciliatory disposition, who belonged to an old Lombard family, and carried great weight in the country, succeeded by his personal influence in smoothing down to a great extent the opposition of the privileged classes—the nobility and the clergy. The clergy in particular, already reassured by Bonaparte, were completely won over. The well-to-do classes, who had hitherto suffered severely from the depredations of French agents and the incessant requisitions imposed by the army, were harassed no longer. The support of the corps of occupation was arranged for on a definite basis, so that the burden could not be increased by arbitrary demands.

From the political point of view also, the situation seemed at first to promise fairly. Malin, it is true, did not share Bonaparte's ideas; he was a Liberal, and would have preferred a Constitution on the English model; but he administered with strict impartiality the Constitution which had been given to his country. He received valuable assistance in his task from the officials whom Bonaparte had chosen, particularly from Pisoni, the famous minister, a very able man. In less than a year all the chief departments of state were organised; and the machine of government was put into working condition. Order was reestablished in the finances; a national army was created; and military schools for the instruction of officers were opened at Pavia and Modena. Public instruction, which under the Austrians had fallen into neglect, made a fresh start; and the universities of Bologna and Pavia were reopened.

But these auspicious beginnings led no further. Malin did not receive that support from the people which might have given durability to his work. The nation, whose moral and national unity he strove to bring about, was strongly particularist at heart. The local spirit of the towns rebelled against the decisions of the central authority. The States to the south of the Po were impatient of the supremacy of Milan, and, in the words of the Vice-President, were "constantly hankering after secession." Of devotion to the common cause there was none; each

man thought only of himself. At the same time there was perpetual friction with the French. No one spoke well of the administration. "Why," it was asked, "do we need an army of occupation? Are we not ourselves capable of keeping order in our own country?" Strange to say, no better order was established, discontent increased. "The feeling of animosity against the French," wrote Melzi, "is universal."

To make head against so many difficulties a man of energy was needed, a man capable of combining all parties by the force of his own will. Melzi was not of this stamp; he lacked the highest qualities of a statesman. As a great noble, moreover, Melzi could not but feel an instinctive aversion to the Jacobin leaders, men who sprang from the middle or lower classes, and many of whom still sat on the various councils. Now these Jacobins were the representatives of French ideas; and, if they were no favourites of Bonaparte, he knew how to make use of them. On all occasions they found a ready listener in Murat, who commended the army of occupation; and he omitted no opportunity of keeping the First Consul informed of what was happening in Lombardy. Naturally the tendency of these reports was to give the impression at Paris that Melzi was an enemy of France.

An event happened which for the moment almost lost credibility to these accusations. A captain in the Italian army, Geronzi, published under a pseudonym a collection of accounts in which he sang the former glories of Italy, and contrasted them with her present humiliation, terming "the fatherland prostrate beneath the heel of the stranger." In Bonaparte's eyes such a book was treasonable; and he expressed surprise that Melzi should have allowed it to be published. So harsh, indeed, was his reprimand, that the Vice-President of the Italian Republic, disheartened already by the ill success of his policy, sent in his resignation. Bonaparte declined to accept it. He was already, in his own mind, tracing the future of Lombardy. On the point of being proclaimed Emperor of the French, he dreamt of reviving in his own favour the kingdom of Italy; until that dream could be realised, it was necessary that Melzi should retain his office. The latter was compelled to sacrifice his own wishes and remain as Vice-President till Bonaparte came to Milan to assume the iron crown of Lombardy (May, 1806).

Compared with the north, which prospered in spite of French domination, the condition of the rest of Italy was deplorable in the extreme. The remaining States, unlike the Cisalpine and Piedmont, had not only lost their political independence, but were ill-governed and ill-administered into the bargain. In spite of the wealth of the soil, agriculture was at its lowest ebb. Industry and commerce were stifled under an antiquated system of laws. The commercial decline of Venice, which had begun in the middle of the eighteenth century, was hastened under the Austrian rule. Turin, which had been turned into the kingdom of Sardinia, for the benefit of the Duke of Parma, the son-in-law of the King of Spain,

was in a pitiable state: the King, feeble in mind and body, and affected by epilepsy, was entirely dominated by his wife, the bigoted Marie-Louise, who in her turn was dominated by the priesthood; the last vestiges of liberty had been abolished, and the privileges of the clergy augmented to a corresponding extent. At Rome the situation was no better. Pius VII, a man adorned with great virtues in private life, possessed no aptitude for government; and his States, administered as they had been in the Middle Ages, were reputed the most wretched in Italy. At Naples, Ferdinand IV was equally useless in promoting the prosperity of his kingdom; the policy on which he was wholly bent was one of feigning blind submission to Bonaparte, while he secretly intrigued against him with the Governments of Vienna, London, and St. Petersburg.

Compared with these peoples, so miserably governed, northern Italy seemed fortunate. Her citizens, if they did not enjoy liberty, possessed at all events equality and equitable laws. If Bonaparte did not give the country its independence, he developed its wealth by undertaking great works of public utility. He made roads, cut canals, improved the ports, and transformed the cities. Consequently, among the Venetians, the Romans, and the Neapolitans there was many who would have welcomed French rule or annexation to the Italian Republic. Bonaparte, too, did not fail to encourage the belief that what he had effected in Piedmont and Lombardy had been effected in the interest of the Italians. In his official speeches he declared that the state of semi-subjection in which he held their country was only a stage on the road to absolute freedom, and that the day would come when he would restore to Italy the control of her own destinies. This illusion of the Italians was not to last long. In 1804 the Empire was established in France; and this involved for Italy the complete subjection of the country.

If the Dutch did not show the enthusiasm of the Italians for the doctrines of the French Revolution, these doctrines had, nevertheless, made their way into Holland even before the arrival of the armies of the Republic. The fragments of the old republican party, whose chief men had taken refuge in France after the revolution effected by the Stadtholder William V in 1795, still existed in the country. In imitation of what had been done in Paris, these republicans founded clubs in most of the towns; after the French conquest, many of them became leaders in the new polity and the first office-bearers in the Batavian Republic. The first republican government was remarkable for its wisdom and moderation, but it was incapable of grappling with its political and financial difficulties. The ancient particularist tendencies of the Dutch showed themselves in each province and even in each town; and the military requisitions, which were often crushing, caused general discontent. An attempt at centralisation made in 1798, in the shape of a National Convention, whose members chose the executive, succeeded in



latter; and after two years the plan was abandoned. For some time (1797-8) all political life in Holland was possessed by a *mal de corps d'état*. Government by a Directory, modelled on that of France, at last seemed to the country three years of comparative repose.

The Dutch Directory consisted of an executive body of five members. The legislative authority was shared between two Chambers: a Grand Council, which was representative in character, and a Council of Ancients. This system worked fairly well, and at any other time would probably have secured the well-being of the country. At the head of the Republic were active men of moderate views, capable of rotating to Holland her financial prosperity, which had been compromised by a series of revolutions. Progress, however, in that direction was once more blocked by the war of 1799; and on the narrow of Bonaparte's victories the Republic sank under the weight of its debt. Angerous, who commanded the army of occupation, drained the previous day by his incessant requisitions; and, as a last resource, the legislature was compelled to vote for the year 1800 a forced loan of 8 per cent. on capital values. Under these conditions the Government was quickly discredited.

This state of things afforded Bonaparte abundant excuse for interference in Holland. Ever since the revolution of Brumaire, his wish had been to change the system of government; and Maccarelli, the representative of France at the Hague, had written, "Batavia will accept whatever Constitution you give her." In 1801 Bonaparte considered that the moment for intervention had come; and he drew up a Constitution which strengthened the executive, while it diminished the authority of the legislature to a corresponding extent. He created a Council of twelve members (Statecouncil), with a Secretary-General and four Secretaries of State. The legislative power rested with a single Chamber of 88 members, chosen, in the first instance, by the Government, and afterwards to be renewed, one-third at a time, by the electors. This Chamber could only vote by a simple "aye" or "no" on the bills placed before them.

Bonaparte resolved to submit this Constitution to the two Chambers for ratification, convinced that they would accept it eagerly. He was mistaken: the Chambers declined to give it their sanction, and they were supported in their refusal by two of the Directors. Bonaparte did not hesitate. On Sept. 20, 1801, Angerous proclaimed the dissolution of the two Chambers; and, as the people made no sign, the Minister was able to say that "the operation had been accomplished without the smallest disturbance." Bonaparte declared that he would appeal to the nation; and he did in fact, a few days later, submit his Constitution to the suffrages of the Dutch. Of 444,419 electors, 58,259 voted against the Constitution, and 18,771 for it; the rest abstained. This abstention was treated by Bonaparte as acquiescence; and on October 8, 1801, he declared that the Constitution had been accepted. In order to reconcile

the Batavians to the new arrangement, he agreed to reduce, from 35,000 to 10,000 men, the number of soldiers which Holland was to support till the conclusion of peace with England. But, as a set-off to this reduction, he exacted a contribution of 45,000,000 florins.

This intervention of France in Holland took place only a few days before the signature of the Preliminaries of London, and could not fail to be displeasing to the British Government. Was it a prelude to the annexation of the country, in spite of the engagements which Bonaparte had entered into at Lunéville? To an enquiry made on this subject by the British Cabinet the First Consul replied "that every State had a right to organise itself as it thought fit, that Holland was free, and that, like the other Powers, she had her representation at Paris." This reply could not decide the British Government. They did not, however, press the point, probably hoping that Bonaparte, tied down as he was by the Treaty of Lunéville, and by Article 2 of the Convention of the Hague, which bound him, on the conclusion of peace with England, to evacuate Holland, would refrain from further intervention.

In Holland the *coup d'État* of September 18, 1801, was received, not with the enthusiasm described by Bonaparte in his despatches to Paris, but with resigned indifference. The next that could be said was, that those of the nation who longed for repose saw in it some hope of a period of tranquillity. This hope became almost a certainty after the signature of the Treaty of Amiens. Freedom of navigation encouraged the Dutch to look forward to a renewal of their trade and to the end of the evils which had accumulated during nine years of war. At the same time, the struggle which had hitherto raged between the Orangists and the Patriots was terminated by the action of the Prince of Orange, who, on behalf of himself and his heirs, renounced all claims to the Stadtholdership, and accepted in exchange the grant of the unendowed German bishopric of Paderborn, and the abbey of Convey and Weingarten. All this seemed to promise a brighter future.

These hopes, however, were doomed to disappointment. The Government, composed of men of undoubted honesty but lacking in ability and courage, was incapable of securing the repose and prosperity of the country. The gravest question which it had to deal with was the question of finance. There was a deficit of 50,000,000 florins; and the Council adopted most unpopular measures to make it good. They imposed, for example, a tax of 4 per cent. on property and of 10 per cent. on income for eight years. They showed, moreover, intolerance towards Jews and Catholics, who, as under the former régime, were excluded from political life; and this policy irritated the Liberals. Other measures alienated the sympathies of the army; and a conspiracy, stirred up by Generals Dandolo and Dumasseau, very nearly succeeded. It was only due to the interference of Bonaparte, who managed to reduce the military to order, that a fresh *coup d'État* did not take place.

The rupture of the Treaty of Amiens finally ruined the hopes of the Dutch. On June 15, 1803, Bonaparte imposed on them, in addition to the maintenance of the French army of occupation, the duty of providing 15,000 men, of fitting out five men-of-war and five frigates, and of building transports and boats sufficient for the accommodation of more than 50,000 men. This was too much for a country whose finances were exhausted. The Government, driven into a corner, attempted to evade its engagements, and to delay the outbreak of hostilities with Great Britain. Bonaparte, who got wind of these measures, proposed in 1803 to bind Holland more closely to France by placing, as he said, "a war of character" at the head of affairs—he had already Schismalgemeinschaft in his eye—but the mass of business on his hands forced him to defer the execution of this plan.

In Germany the effects of the French Revolution were not less important than in Italy. The people had become familiar with the ideas of liberty, fraternity, and equality through the teaching of their philosophers and poets, who at the end of the eighteenth century were essentially humanitarians and cosmopolites. But these ideas would have had little chance of taking practical effect, had not the blow dealt by the revolutionary armies, and still more by those of Napoleon, shattered the political fabric which had so long kept Germany divided and strangled all efforts at reform. Even after the reorganization of 1803 had reset the map of Old Germany and given the States their more modern shape, the process of reform would never have been completed had not the Holy Roman Empire been dissolved, and had not, above all, the Napoleonic wars, by exciting the patriotism of the Germans, aroused in them an ardent spirit of nationality. Indirectly, then, the French Revolution and the events that followed produced great results in Germany. But its immediate effects hardly made themselves felt in that country except on the left bank of the Rhine. There the conditions of life bore a strong resemblance to those existing in France. Landed estates had been broken up; and the peasant proprietors enjoyed sufficient civil liberty to give them a taste for more. The feudal system had been so much relaxed as to suggest the idea of casting it off altogether. If we add to this the absence of historical traditions, we can understand the ease with which French ideas were assimilated in the newly-conquered districts.

The Jacobins of the Rhinische provinces, released the French, who freed them from ecclesiastical and feudal burdens and gave them civil equality. The people were by no means strongly imbued with the sentiment of German patriotism. The young patriot, Götter, a native of Coblenz, accepted animation with the words: "The Rhine was created by nature to serve as the boundary of France." It is true that, at the outset of the French conquest, the people had much to put

up with, and that the regulations imposed upon them caused great discontent; but from 1797 onward they had a regular and definite government. The German districts on the left bank, divided into four departments under a French Commissioner who resided at Mainz, were attached to the great Republic and enjoyed the advantages of the union. Bonaparte merely confirmed this arrangement, which lasted till 1804. During the whole of this period the left bank of the Rhine, defended by the line of fortresses which Napoleon had carefully constructed along the course of the river, enjoyed absolute peace. The district was indeed traversed by the Imperial armies, but remained untouched by war. The development of agriculture followed rapidly on civil freedom. The sale of the national domains at low prices created a multitude of peasant proprietors; and the various industries, freed from oppressive restrictions, grew rapidly and found important outlets in France. Napoleon encouraged the growth of the towns by the promotion of public works. In the rural districts roads were constructed; fruit trees were planted, and new breeds of horses, horned cattle, and merino sheep introduced. Liberty, it is true, existed no more on the banks of the Rhine than it did in France, and the press and all books sent from Germany were subject to a strict censorship; but, as the administration was fair and honest, the people were not dissatisfied with their lot. Till 1814 they remained attached to France.

The occupation of the left bank of the Rhine by the French brought about an important revolution in Germany. The Treaty of Lunéville provided that the dispossessed princes should be indemnified, and that the policy of "secularization" should be put into force. When the Emperor Francis II. sanctioned this arrangement to the Diet at Ratisbon, that body was roused from its torpor and began to display an unwearied activity. On March 6, 1801, the three Colleges met to consider the Imperial communication. The King-Elector of Brandenburg proposed the ratification of the treaty, subject to certain reservations for the future, and to the condition that the Estates of the Empire should take part in the rearrangement of territory which must follow as a necessary consequence. This proposal was adopted by a majority.

Though not too well pleased to see the number of beneficiaries increased by the addition of the Stadtholder and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the temporal Princes were, on the whole, gratified with the prospect of secularization. They called to mind the vast confiscations of church property which had followed on the Reformation, and which the Treaties of Augsburg and Westphalia had confirmed. The fortunes of Prussia, Saxony, and Electoral Hesse dated from that time; and the rulers of Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria looked forward to obtaining, by the aid of Bonaparte, similar aggrandizement. On the other hand, the Princes of the Church would not listen to the proposals for secularization, and protested loudly against them, avowing that, if their

claims were disregarded, the Empire and the Catholic religion would alike perish.

Between two extremes—the party which adopted the policy of wholesale secularisation and that which repudiated it altogether—a third party sprang up, the party of limited secularisation, headed by Austria and Saxony. These three views were debated at great length; and, as no one was prepared to make concessions, discussion only served to intensify the divergence. Not only had the principle of reduction to be decided, but also the question of the amount of the indemnities themselves. The rivalry was bitter; Austria and Prussia were particularly jealous of each other. At one time it seemed that these two Powers had come to an understanding with the object of settling all matters between themselves in a friendly way. They fell out, however, over the desamortisation of Cologne and the Bishopric of Münster; and the discussions in the Diet grew more and more violent. Eventually, Bonaparte, in concert with the Tsar Alexander, resolved to intervene.

Bonaparte had long been waiting for this opportunity to meddle in the affairs of Germany. Master of the left bank of the Rhine, he called to mind the advice of Turenne, "If you would defend the left bank of the Rhine, cross to the right." Accordingly, while deferring the project of creating, after Mazaria's idea, a League of the Rhine, he aimed at establishing on the right bank friendly Powers who would mount guard for him. The Tsar, on his side, invoking the Treaty of Teschen (1779), declared that no rearrangement of German territory could take place without his participation. Bonaparte, who was not sorry to associate a great Power with the transformation which he contemplated in Germany, gave a cordial welcome to the Russian overtures. Their acceptance left him still master of the situation; and it was he, in the last resort, who determined the apportionment of property in Germany.

The German Princes knew well enough that the division of the spoil depended finally upon Bonaparte, and they forthwith hastened to Paris. In 1803 the capital of France presented a curious spectacle. An auction might have been going on for the sale of German lands, with Bonaparte as auctioneer. He bought all the Princes who received benefits by special and separate treaties, which placed them at his discretion. The Tsar, whose vanity he had flattered by giving him the credit of a successful mediation, and by satisfying him on all points in which the interests of France and Russia were identical, gave his approbation to the scheme, which was laid before the Diet on February 22, 1803. The question before the deputies involved readjustments of territory as important as to recast the whole map of Germany from one end to the other; the majority however approved the scheme; and the Emperor, Francis II, having no alternative, ratified their decision. The only objections which he put forward were in relation to the balance of votes in the Diet. The Protestants in that body, hitherto a minority of 46 to 67, became, by

votes of the new arrangement, a majority of 67 to 44. This change entailed the defeat of the Austrian and the triumph of the Prussian party. In spite of this opposition, the new Imperial Constitution came into force in 1806; and it was destined to last, in essentials, until the complete destruction of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.

By this decision of the Diet (*Reichsgesamtsversammlung*) the sixth part of Germany, with a population of four millions, was redistributed amongst certain secular States, which gained more strongly by consolidation than the Empire had lost by dismemberment. Austria, which ceded the *Vorarlberg* and *Graz* to the Duke of Modena, received the bishoprics of Brixen and Trent. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, an ally of Austria, obtained the archbishopric of Salzburg, with the surrounding territory. Bavaria was very favourably treated. She received an area of 11,000 square kilometres with 384,000 inhabitants in exchange for the 12,800 square kilometres with 700,000 inhabitants which she surrendered on the left bank of the Rhine, and was rendered far more compact by the addition of these new territories. Württemberg got nine free cities and a number of abbeys. Baden, which had lost nothing but a few petty lordships, received the bishopric of Constance, the towns of Heidelberg and Mannheim, ten abbeys, seven free cities, and gained 337,000 additional inhabitants. The new Elector of Hesse-Cassel was liberally indemnified at the expense of the territory of Mainz. Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, and other of the minor lay Princes each received a substantial increase of territory. But, of all the States, it was again Prussia that came off best. In the place of the 2750 square kilometres and the 125,000 subjects which she lost, she acquired 18,800 square kilometres and 500,000 inhabitants in Westphalia, the very heart of Germany; she was thus placed in a position to renew her designs on the hegemony of the north.

The effect of all these changes was to add materially to the concentration of Germany. The petty Princes, especially the Princes of the Church, were nearly all dispossessed. Of these latter, numerous as they had formerly been, only three remained, viz. *Salzburg*, Elector of Mainz, who through Bonaparte's influence was translated to the see of *Bavaria*, now raised to an archbishopric, the holder of the see being made *ex officio* President of the Diet; the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order; and the Grand Master of the Order of the Knights of St John. The number of the electors was raised from 7 to 10; and that increase was favourable to the Protestants, 6 being Protestant and 4 Catholic. The free cities were reduced in number from 50 to 8, namely Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, Frankfurt, Augsburg, and Nürnberg. The upshot of it all was that the Germany of the Middle Ages, with its ecclesiastical States, its orders of knight hood, and the preponderance of the *Edelherren*, vanished, never to return. The independent nobility (*Richthaus*) disappeared, to the advantage of the Princes; and the

most powerful among the latter were the chief givers. Another stage on the road towards a united Germany was accomplished; and, for this reason, the Imperial Recess of 1803 was in its way a revolution as radical as was the French Revolution of 1789.

In Switzerland, the effects of the French Revolution resembled those in Germany: the ancient federation of 13 cantons with its subject and allied provinces, together with the extraordinary inequalities which existed between the country districts and the towns, disappeared once for all. In its place was created the *Helvetic Republic*, one and indivisible, which, by abolishing ecclesiastical and feudal burdens and the monopolies that clogged manufactures and commerce, and by establishing civil equality and liberty of conscience, laid the foundation of the democratic Switzerland of the nineteenth century. This work, it must be admitted, was accomplished less by the will of the citizens than by the conquering armies of the Revolution. The ideas of 1789 had indeed penetrated into Switzerland, where they found a ready response. The peasants, who were in subjection to the oligarchy of the towns, and the populations of the subject provinces—Valais, Argovia, Thurgau, St. Gallen, Ticino—who bore with impatience the yoke of their rulers, sympathized with the French revolutionaries. At Paris a Helvetic Club was founded in 1790, with the object of propagating revolutionary ideas in Switzerland: it flooded the towns and country districts with tracts and pamphlets preaching war against the oligarchy. Some stirrings took place in certain parts of Switzerland, at Solothurn and in Valais, where, at the instigation of Frédéric-César de La Harpe and a host of patriots, trees of liberty were planted and tricolour flags displayed, to the strains of "Ça ira." But these movements were promptly put down. The existing Governments in Switzerland were strongly reactionary; and even in the small democratic cantons of Old Switzerland, Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden, which had furnished many officers to France, Jacobinism was held in abhorrence. Consequently, in no part of Europe were French émigrés more numerous, relatively speaking, than in Switzerland; and they were generally welcomed.

This hospitality accorded to the refugees prejudiced the French revolutionary Government against Switzerland, and supplied it with an excuse for intervention. The strategical importance of the country had not escaped the Directory, which, after the *coup d'état* of Bructière, 1797, had prepared a scheme of invasion. Returning from his first Italian campaign, Bonaparte passed through Switzerland on his way to the Congress of Rastatt, and satisfied himself that France, if she intervened in that country, would receive the support of certain sections of the population. The resolution of the Directory was taken forthwith: French agents, under the guise of travellers, overran the country, inciting the inhabitants to rebellion and promising the aid of France. Not long

afterwards, French troops arrived in the *Montane Jura* (then the bishopric of Basel) and in *Vaud*; and a few months later (March, 1798) the whole of Switzerland was under the rule of French generals, who announced themselves as liberators and promised to respect persons and property.

This pretended respect for persons and property was a cruel irony. Of the countries invaded by the revolutionary armies, none was worse treated than Switzerland. "The Directory," said Carnot, "has looked for the country where it could find the greatest number of free men to sacrifice, and has thrown itself upon Switzerland." Merciless contributions were levied on all the cantons and towns. The rich treasure lying at Bern found its way to Paris. Armies were pillaged, old houses carried off. The Confederation was impotent and could not interfere. As yet the cantons had not learned to make common cause. Each was freight for itself; and Bern opposed a heroic resistance to the foreign invaders. In the end, however, the country was subdued.

General Brune drew up a Constitution, under which the country was divided into three republics—the *Rhodanique* or *Latin* Switzerland, the *Tellane* or *Old* Switzerland, and the *Helvétique* or *German* Switzerland. This scheme, the work of a man who knew nothing of Swiss affairs, turned out impracticable, and at the end of seven days it was abandoned.

A new Constitution drawn up by Peter Ochs of Basel, one of the chiefs of the Swiss revolutionary party, was next established. It was copied from the French Constitution of the year III., and divided Switzerland into 35 cantons administered by prefects. The central legislative authority was divided between two bodies, the Senate and the Grand Council. The executive authority was in the hands of a Directory of five members chosen by the legislative bodies. A supreme tribunal was also created. This Constitution, however, was never accepted by the Swiss people as a whole. The mountain cantons, in particular, opposed it so strenuously that it was necessary, in order to enforce submission, to call in the French troops; and these unhappy districts were also deluged with blood.

The new Government, supported as it was by French arms, might have been accepted by the country had it not proved altogether inefficient. Its ideas were ambitious; it aimed at establishing a system of civil law, at organising public instruction, which was very backward in most of the cantons, at developing agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and art; but, having no funds at its disposal, it could effect nothing. The country, beneath the onctions of the French troops, had been taxed to the uttermost; and yet it was called upon every year to submit to fresh sacrifices of men and money. Aristocrats and democrats, who had been overruled by the French bayonets, began to grow restless when the Coalition defeated the French in Germany and Italy in 1799. But after Maudslowi's victories at Zurich, which confirmed once more the French protectorate in Switzerland, that country gave up the struggle.



For some years the revolutionary Government of the Helvetic Republic had much difficulty in maintaining its authority; and, attacked as it was by the aristocrats of the towns and the democrats of the old cantons, its members perceived that a *coup d'état* was the only means of establishing their power. They proposed to accomplish at Bern in the beginning of 1800 what Bonaparte had recently accomplished at Paris in Brumaire. The Federalists, on the other hand, believing that they could count upon Bonaparte (who had confided to one of them, the Baron Jenner, his sympathies with the federal form of government), began an active agitation in certain of the cantons.

Bonaparte was not indifferent to what was passing in Switzerland; and, as in the case of Holland, he was on the watch for an opportunity to intervene. He gave the preference to neither of the two extreme parties which divided the country, but inclined rather to an intermediate group which recognised at once the advantages of the new régime and of certain institutions belonging to the past which it considered indispensable. This party, known in Switzerland as the *Republicans*, stood midway between the patriots or Jacobins on the one side and the reactionaries or Federalists on the other. It was moderate in its claims and unimpeachable in its objects. But the party was weak in numbers; its members were men of distinction who had been trained in the school of the Republic, and they formed, so to speak, a staff of officers without an army. Bonaparte nevertheless approached them; and on January 8, 1800, a *coup d'état* was effected at Bern which placed these men in power.

This *coup d'état* was chiefly aimed at the Jacobin members of the Directory, La Harpe, Secretan, and Oberlin, who since the beginning of December, 1799, had been secretly preparing a *coup d'état* of their own. The two Directors who belonged to the Moderate party, Dolder and Savary, proposed in the Directory that it should dissolve itself. On the refusal of the majority to do this, the Moderates placed the matter before the two Councils, which were hostile to the Jacobin Directors. The two Councils dissolved the Directory, and entrusted the executive power to Dolder and Savary. Soon afterwards, instead of nominating fresh Directors, the Councils appointed an Executive Committee of seven members, moderate and experienced men, who were to act as a Provisional Government till another Constitution could be proclaimed.

This *coup d'état* was speedily followed by another. Bonaparte could not tolerate the existence in Switzerland of two Assemblies, each with a Jacobin majority. He therefore encouraged the Executive Committee to substitute for the two Councils a Legislative Body composed of 48 members, of whom 34 were to be chosen from the Councils by the Executive Committee, while the remaining 14 were to be re-elected by the SS. The Legislative Body thus constituted was in its turn to appoint the executive in the shape of a Council of seven members. The Grand Council, on this proposal being submitted to it, disowned it; the hand

of Bonaparte and voted it unanimously. The Senate, after a show of resistance, also acquiesced (August 8, 1800).

The Republican party formed the majority in the new Government, both in the executive and in the legislative departments; and they thought themselves strong enough to establish a Constitution framed in accordance with their own ideas, that is to say, at once unitarist and Hered. It was, however, as part of Bonaparte's plan to favour the creation of a centralised Switzerland which would be less under his control than a Federation. The new Government submitted a scheme based on the French Consular Constitution. To this Bonaparte replied by a counter-project, the Constitution of Malacania; and this he imposed upon the country in defiance of the Treaty of Lunville, which had recognised Switzerland as an independent State.

The Constitution of Malacania (May, 1801) divided Switzerland into 17 cantons, to each of which was given autonomy in various matters, particularly in those relating to finance and public instruction. Each canton was placed under the authority of a prefect; and the administration was in each case adapted to local needs. The central authority consisted of a Diet of 77 members and a Senate of 32 members; and from the latter was chosen the First Magistrate of the country, who bore the title of Chief Landammann of Switzerland. The Landammann presided over a Council of Five, who formed the executive authority.

This Constitution, in spite of its imperfections, was the best that the country could hope for at the time. Taking into account recent events, it met the requirements of justice and history better than the unitarist Constitution which had preceded it; it may even be said that in certain respects it was superior to the Act of Mediation which followed it (1803). Had it been loyally applied, it would have restored peace to Switzerland and spared her many misfortunes; but, as things turned out, it found favour nowhere. The Republicans complained that it did not centralise sufficiently; the urban aristocrats could not forget the fact that it transformed the prefects which had formerly been held in subjection into autonomous entities. The democrats of the smaller cantons declared roundly that they would never accept a Constitution imposed by a stranger. All parties therefore agreed in demanding its modification; and the Republicans, who formed the majority in the Diet, appointed a committee to reconstruct Bonaparte's work. Nothing was better calculated to irritate the First Consul than this piece of audacity; and his annoyance was aggravated when the Diet declared that "the absolute integrity of Helvetic territory was a fundamental article of the Constitution." This declaration was an answer to the proposal attributed to Bonaparte, of detaching Valais from the rest of Switzerland, so as to ensure the control of the passes into Italy.

The reply of the first First Consul was not long delayed. On October 28, 1801, a third coup d'Etat at Bern swept away the Govern-

ment of the Moderates. The stroke was secretly planned at Bern by Bonaparte's agent Fournier, in collusion with the Bernese aristocrats. These latter, finding that Bonaparte was annoyed with the Republicans, made common cause with the Federalists of the small cantons in order to upset the Government. They succeeded, thanks to the support of French troops under General Moutchisky. The Diet was declared to be dissolved; the Constitution of Malmaison was reestablished; and for the office of *Landammann* of Switzerland the choice fell on Alphon Rodding, an ardent Federalist of Schwyz, who had organised the resistance of the smaller cantons to France in 1798. Meanwhile, Valais was occupied by the troops of General Thurren.

When he heard what had happened at Bern, Bonaparte signed the *Protest* indignation. Moutchisky was disavowed and recalled; but Fournier, who had pulled the strings, retained his post. In point of fact, the First Consul was very well satisfied with this fresh revolution, which increased the confusion in Switzerland. He received the new *Landammann* at Paris, and, according to his own expression, talked to him "as the First Magistrate of the Gauls might have done at the time when Helvetia formed part of Gaul." The Federalists demanded three things—the withdrawal of the French troops, the restitution to the cantons of their subject lands, and the retention of Valais as part of Switzerland. Bonaparte was unable to give a satisfactory reply on any of these points, but he left Rodding in the belief that he was favourably disposed towards the Federal party. Rodding returned to Switzerland full of hope, but subsequently, when he found that Bonaparte had put him off with fair words, he turned to the other European Powers and sent agents on secret missions to Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, to beg these Governments to maintain the independence and the neutrality of Switzerland.

Bonaparte, on hearing of this proceeding, was deeply incensed, withdrew his support from the Federalists, and, shifting his position in the manner familiar to him, made a show of sympathy with the Republicans. The latter, believing that the moment had come for a fresh coup d'état, took advantage of the absence of many of the Federalists from Bern during the Easter recess, declared the Senate indefinitely adjourned (April 17, 1802) and summoned an assembly of notables from all the cantons to agree on the changes to be made in the Constitution of Malmaison. Bonaparte allowed them to proceed, forecasting that their action would but add to the existing confusion, and so furnish him in the eyes of Europe with the necessary pretext for facile intervention. The convention was therefore drawn up: it was a compromise between the Malmaison scheme and the Constitution designed by Ochs. On being submitted to the nation for approval, it was rejected by 58,000 votes against 73,000; but the Republicans, following the example of Bonaparte, declared that the 107,000 objections should count in its favour.

This new Constitution, imposed by force, gave rise to incessant troubles. In Vaud the peasants, incited by the refusal of taxes and tithes, rose in revolt, plundered the archives of castles and towns, and burnt their contents. To quell the rising, the aid of French troops was required. This was the very moment chosen by Bonaparte, with Madiavillaz's assistance, to withdraw his soldiers from Swiss territory. Bonaparte had not miscalculated; hardly had the last French soldier quitted Swiss soil than risings took place in all directions. Instigated by Alays Badin, the smaller cantons, with some of the others—Zürich being one—formed themselves into a Federal State. Before long, this federation, which included the portions of the old régime, grew so strong that the Helvetic Government was powerless to compel its dissolution by force of arms. General Andrematt, who commanded the government troops, after an unsuccessful attack on Zürich, was compelled to retire. The Federalists, under experienced leaders, made themselves masters of Bern, and expelled the Government. They then defeated their rivals at Morat, October 4, 1803, and marched on Lausanne in order to overthrow the Government, which had taken refuge there. At this point Bonaparte intervened. General Rapp, one of his side-deputies, brought the following message to the Swiss: "As you cannot agree amongst yourselves I have decided to step in as mediator."

While he appeared merely to offer mediation, Bonaparte in reality imposed it by force. At the very moment when Rapp presented himself before the Helvetic Government, General Ney was ordered to march into Switzerland with 24,000 men and "crush all opposition." His terse proclamation in which he stated that it was "at the request of the nation, and particularly on the demand of the Senate and the smaller cantons, that the First Consul intervened as mediator." It was true; but, at the moment when the French invaded the territory of Switzerland, the Federalist Government despatched a protest to London, Vienna, and Berlin. The Emperor Francis II. vouchsafed no reply, though the action of Bonaparte was in direct violation of the Treaty of Lunéville. The King of Prussia, Frederick William III, also kept silence. The British Government alone protested against the aggression, although infinitely less interested in Swiss affairs than were the continental Powers. On October 10, 1803, Lord Hawkesbury despatched a note to the French Government, reminding them that the principle of the neutrality of Switzerland was closely bound up with the questions of peace and the balance of power in Europe; that the Treaty of Lunéville, signed only a year before, had solemnly recognised and guaranteed that principle; and that, in spite of all that was happening in Switzerland, he was unwilling to believe that it could be intended to reduce a free people to slavery.

In answer to this note, moderate in form but firm in tone, the First Consul, on October 23, caused Talleyrand to forward a declaration to

Otto, French minister in London, which stated that, "if the British ministry made any public statement from which it might be inferred that the First Consul had refrained from doing any particular thing because he had been prevented, he would do it forthwith." When Talleyrand despatched this note, the relations between England and France were already much strained. In Great Britain, public opinion was growing exasperated because the Government had failed to obtain a treaty of commerce from France. Bonaparte evaded their demands, and put off the proposal for a definite agreement by vague promises. As nothing came of this, the English began to lose patience. Bonaparte had his own grievances against the British Government. He resented the hospitality offered to refugees who were his enemies, and to the French Princes who conspired against him. He complained also of the attacks directed against him in the English press.

But, more than anything else, it was Bonaparte's policy in Europe which exasperated the relations of the two peoples. He was well aware of this; and his vigorous abuse of the English newspapers was due to the fact that they persisted in exposing and condemning his unworthy treatment of the weaker States, the hypocrisy of his high-headed proceedings glossed over by the falsehoods of the *Motivier*, and the acts of violence of which he had been guilty towards Portugal, Spain, Holland, and Switzerland. Bonaparte sought to justify his long proscribed aggressions on the Continent by the refusal of the British Government to satisfy his demands, which he sought to represent as measures of precaution taken in view of a possible attack on the part of Great Britain. Thus, in August, 1802, after Lord Hawkesbury had formally refused to reply to Bonaparte's menacing communications on the subject of the *Angria*, the exiled French Princes, and the measures to be taken against the English press, the First Consul had retaliated by the definite occupation of Piedmont and the Isle of Elba, by a refusal to evacuate Flushing and Utrecht, and, a little later, by sending his forces under General Ney to occupy Switzerland.

All these acts, following on Bonaparte's usurpations in Italy, and on the steps which he had taken to secure for himself the Presidency of the Cisalpine Republic, amply justified the apprehensions of British statesmen, who saw no limits to his aggressive career. They, too, sought protection against Bonaparte's growing ambition; and it was with this object that they persistently demanded a return to the conditions which existed at the time of the Peace of Amiens. To this Bonaparte retorted: "At the time of the Peace of Amiens we had 80,000 men in Piedmont and 40,000 in the Cisalpine Republic; it follows that, if the English desire the state of things which existed at that date, they cannot complain of the state of things which exists to-day....As for Switzerland, we cannot do without her." Switzerland was clearly the weak point in Bonaparte's argument; the silence of the Treaty of Amiens on this

subject could not be urged in his favour, for his intervention as mediator was subsequent to the declaration of peace.

Bonaparte was well aware that the British Government was deeply interested in the questions of Switzerland and Holland, and that those questions would in the end have the pivot of the discussion. At the time of his intervention in Switzerland, Otis wrote to Talleyrand: "The general opinion is that the evacuation of Malta will depend on the result of the negotiations relating to Switzerland." Bonaparte declined in any circumstances to allow England to connect the two questions. "As to Switzerland," he wrote to Talleyrand, "we cannot permit England to meddle there, for, if she did so, it would be only to spread disorder; she would make it a second Jersey from which to encourage agitation against France"; and he added, "I require, first and foremost, a frontier to near France's Coast. I require (in Switzerland) a firm government, friendly to France; this is my first aim, and, if I cannot secure it, I shall know what to do in the interests of France."

Such was the position in October, 1802, when Bonaparte intervened in Switzerland. With so much suspicion on the one side and so much menace on the other, a rupture between the two Powers seemed only a question of days. Nevertheless both nations were so deeply interested in the preservation of peace, and each was so deeply convinced that the other desired peace and was prepared to make concessions to secure it, that a few weeks later regular diplomatic relations were resumed, Count Androsky being sent as ambassador to London, and Lord Whitworth to Paris.

In order to arrive at a mutual understanding, it was arranged to avoid all burning questions; but this was a difficult matter. At the opening of Parliament at the end of November, 1802, King George, while expressing his desire for the preservation of peace and the maintenance of good relations with all the Powers, added that England could not cease to emphasise the interest which she took "in certain States." The States referred to were evidently Switzerland and Holland. Sheridan, speaking in Parliament, exposed in plain language Bonaparte's policy of conquest. "Look at the map of Europe," he exclaimed, "and you will see nothing but France." Great Britain was consequently compelled to take certain measures of precaution; and, in spite of the public assurances of the King, the ministry asked for and obtained, with a view to the protection of Ireland, an addition of 65,000 men to the army and of 25,000 men to the navy.

Bonaparte had no belief in the warlike intentions of England; and, as the reports which he received from London spoke of the people as heartily desirous of peace, he imagined that the British Cabinet would yield to threats. Not a day passed but he abused the British Government. When in January, 1803, he received the Swiss Delegation at Paris, he declared to them that, if the Cabinet of St. James made representations

on the subject of Switzerland, he would sweep their country outright. A few days later, in a sitting of the Legislative Body, he announced that he was about to equip an army of 100,000 men against England, which he spoke of as "isolated and powerless." Finally, on January 26, there appeared in the *Moniteur*, with his approbation, the report of Colonel Sebastiani, who had been sent on a special mission to Egypt. This report described the army of occupation as an ill-armed and undisciplined rabble, worn out by debauchery, and went on to say that 6000 French soldiers would suffice for the reconquest of Egypt. It was by utterances of this sort that Bonaparte believed that he could force England to yield to his demands. The very opposite took place. Sebastiani's report, added to the provocations already received, decided the British Government to declare that their troops would not be withdrawn from Malta until the conditions of March 1800 had been reestablished.

Bonaparte's anger knew no bounds. On February 18, 1801, in the course of a violent scene with Lord Whitworth, he declaimed against British perfidy. When the British ambassador referred to the aggressive nature of Bonaparte's policy in Europe, the First Consul answered, " Piedmont, Switzerland, Holland, are mere trifles "; and he went on to use language so coarse that Lord Whitworth wrote to his Government, that " he talked more like a captain of dragons than the head of one of the greatest States in Europe." On March 3 the King replied to this fresh provocation by asking Parliament for supplies. On the 10th the militia was embodied, and an addition of 10,000 men to the army was voted. This gave Bonaparte the opportunity of making another scene with Lord Whitworth—the historic scene of March 13, when, in the presence of all the other ambassadors assembled at the Tuileries, Bonaparte addressed him with threatening words. " It is you who are determined to make war against us; you want to drive me to it. You will be the first to draw the sword; I shall be the last to sheathe it. Woe to those who show no respect for treaties ! "

In spite of all this submontaine, Bonaparte in his heart wished to maintain peace. He was informed by Duroc from Berlin and by Colbert from St. Petersburg that neither the King of Prussia nor the Czar approved his policy. The situation, however, had become so staked by reason of this very conduct that peace was no longer possible; or rather war could only have been avoided by his agreeing to the fresh conditions laid down by Great Britain. These were—(1) that she should retain Malta for ten years; (2) that Lampedusa should be ceded to her in perpetuity; (3) that the French troops should evacuate Holland and Switzerland. These terms Bonaparte could not bring himself to accept. Negotiations between London and Paris did indeed continue for a few weeks longer. Among the men who surrounded Bonaparte there was a peace party, whose leaders were Talleyrand, Cambacérès, and Joseph Bonaparte; and they made every effort to avert a rupture. The British Government,

on its side, made what concessions it could, even undertaking by a secret article to evacuate Malta, when the French should have withdrawn from Holland. But Bonaparte would not come to terms: and on May 12, 1802, Lord Whitworth left Paris.

Bonaparte had foreseen that the war could not be confined to France and England, but would involve the rest of the Continent. This, indeed, was his reason for occupying Piedmont, for occupying Lombardy and Holland, and for recasting the map of Germany. His latest information in Switzerland gave him the control of the most important strategic position in central Europe.

Among Bonaparte's works of constructive policy none has been more generally admired than the Act of Mediation. It has been termed a masterpiece, and such it may have been; but it was a masterpiece of Machiavellian policy. Bonaparte did not consult the Swiss when he gave them a Constitution. In conformity with the promise which he had made them in October, 1802, he summoned to Paris in the beginning of 1803, as a consultative assembly, the members of the Senate and all the citizens who had during the last three years filled the higher posts in the central administration. Some sixty deputies obeyed the summons, the greater part of whom belonged to the party of progress and unity. Bonaparte, however, was no more disposed in 1803 than he had been in 1800 to show special favour to any one party. Accordingly, at the first sitting, he asked for the appointment of a commission of ten members, five Federalists and five Unitarists, who, together with four French delegates, should study the question of the Constitution.

The scheme of the First Consul was a skilful compromise between new ideas and the traditions of Old Switzerland. The Unitarists did not obtain the centralised authority which they demanded, while the aristocrats of the towns were compelled to renounce their privileges, and to include the former subject districts in the new Federal Constitution on an equal footing with the other cantons. The commissioners, in conjunction with the French delegates, were required to draw up memoranda containing their observations on the scheme. A preliminary draft was then prepared, which was read and discussed on January 23, 1803, at a meeting of the commission, presided over by Bonaparte. He listened to all the objections which were urged, and consented to modify certain points of detail; but in its essence the scheme was left precisely as he had conceived it. On February 12, 1803, the ten commissioners added their signatures in the name of the Swiss nation, which had not been consulted and upon which this constitution had been thrust.

The Act of Mediation replaced the Helvetic Republic, one and indivisible, by a Swiss Confederation of thirteen cantons, each enjoying sovereign powers and equal rights. The Confederation was identical with the Swiss Federation of to-day, except that it did not include Valais, Geneva, Neuchâtel, or the former bishopric of Basel, i.e. the Bernese



*Jura.* Politically, the cantons were divided into three groups, the rural cantons, the urban cantons, and the former subject districts. The rural cantons comprised the rural and mountain districts of central Switzerland as well as the Gersau; they recovered their ancient democratic organization with their *Landsgemeinden*, or popular assemblies, which voted on the bills proposed by their Grand Councils; the executive authority was placed in the hands of a small Council, presided over by a supreme magistrate, or *Landammann*. The urban cantons received a political organization aristocratic in character: the supreme magistrate (*mayor* or *burgomaster*) governed with the aid of a Senate, a Council, and a Representative Body, elected on a limited suffrage, which contained deputies from the country districts. As for the districts formerly subject, now recognized as independent cantons, they also had Petty and Grand Councils; but, as in their case the electoral qualifications were lower, their Governments were more democratic in character.

All the cantons were bound to conform to the terms of the federal compact, and were forbidden to conclude alliances either amongst themselves, or with a foreign Power. The local militia could, in case of necessity, be formed into a Federal contingent of 15,000 men; and it was decided that every canton should contribute to the common expenses, which were estimated at 500,000 francs per annum. Six of the cantons, viz. Bern, Fribourg, Lucerne, Zurich, Solothurn, and Basel, became in successive years the seat of the central authority. This "diocesan" canton was known as the *Forest*; and its first magistrate became *Landammann* of Switzerland. The powers of the *Landammann* were restricted; he had the general management of foreign affairs, opened and presided over the Diet, and was responsible for the maintenance of internal order. He was authorized to exercise the cantonal authority in the event of disorders taking place, or of urgent operations being necessary in connexion with roads or rivers. He received a salary paid by his canton, which fixed its amount and also paid the salaries of his aide-de-camp, of the Chancellor of the Confederation, and of a clerk, the only three functionaries who held permanent office in the Government.

In addition to the *Landammann*, the central power consisted of the Federal Diet, which met every year during a month in the summer at the *Forest*. Each canton sent a single deputy to the Diet, making 19 in all; but there were 22 votes, as every canton containing more than 100,000 inhabitants possessed two votes. The Diet dealt with treaties, raised the troops necessary to provide the Federal contingent, appointed the commander-in-chief, and settled disputes between the cantons when arbitration had failed. It had no other powers. The State possessed no standing army, hardly any revenue, and no diplomatic agents, and, in obedience to the will of Bonaparte, was compelled to accept the position of absolute neutrality.

It cannot be denied that Bonaparte showed marvellous penetration in dealing with the conditions existing in Switzerland. The Swiss were so sharply divided in political matters that a general agreement was impossible; and neither of the two great parties was willing to make concessions. By the compromise involved in the Act of Mediation, which aimed at holding the balance equal between the two sections, Bonaparte restored peace to the country. Between the passionate aspirations of the Republicans and the purely federal tendencies of those who wished to revive in Switzerland, emancipated as she had been by the Revolution, the skeleton frame of the old régime, Bonaparte chose the form of Constitution best fitted to the circumstances. But it is open to question whether, when engaged in his task of construction, Bonaparte took the interests of the Swiss sufficiently into account. Their true interest would have demanded a better grouping of the various districts, greater centralisation, an army capable of enforcing respect for their neutrality, and a common treasury which would have enabled them to carry out urgent public works. A strong and compact Switzerland, however, was not what Bonaparte wanted; it was to his interest that she should be helpless without the aid of France, and strictly under her guardianship. By the Act of Mediation he obtained what he wanted: from 1803 to 1814 Switzerland ceased to have a distinct political existence; she became a mere satellite of France.

From the domestic point of view, the Act of Mediation was beneficial. After many years of bitter strife Switzerland had at last time to breathe and work. The Act did not please everyone, for the country was neither free nor independent; but the bulk of the nation, united with civil equality, and with the final suppression of the abuses of the old régime and of the gross injustice of the old relations between the cantons and subject districts, acclaimed with joy the work of Bonaparte. Above all, the inhabitants of the smaller cantons were overjoyed to return to their ancient form of government; and they drank to the health of the great mediator "who had relieved them from the intolerable yoke of Unionism." They sent addresses of congratulation to Bonaparte, to which he graciously replied with the words, "The title of restorer of the liberty which you received from Tell is more dear to me than the most brilliant of my victories." In later days the nation was to change its tone; but in 1803 it was in full enjoyment of its newly recovered tranquillity and peace.

## CHAPTER V.

## FRANCE UNDER THE EMPIRE.

THE organic Senate Consultum of 28 Floréal, year XII (May 18, 1804), generally known as the Constitution of the year XII, ordained that "the Imperial Succession should thenceforth be vested in the direct issue of Napoleon Bonaparte, natural and legitimate, descending always in the male line, by order of primogeniture, to the perpetual exclusion of females and heirs claiming through female descent." In default of male heirs, Napoleon was empowered to adopt his brother's children or grandchildren; in default of either legitimate or adoptive male heirs, the succession was to pass, first, to his eldest brother, Joseph, and his descendants; then to his younger brother, Louis, and his descendants. The Emperor had two other brothers, Lucien and Jerome. But, in spite of Napoleon's opposition, Lucien had recently married beneath him; and the breach between the two brothers lasted until the end of the Empire. Jerome went into the army, and, on his return home from the *Aixelles* by way of the United States, had married Miss Ellen Patterson (1803) without his brother's consent. To obtain his restoration to honor (March 8, 1805) and secure his rights in the Imperial succession (September 24, 1805), he was forced to abandon his wife and the son she had borne him; and, for the time being, he was shut out from the Imperial family.

On March 1, 1797, just before his departure for Italy, Napoleon had entered into a civil marriage with Josephine Tascher de la Pagerie. Born at Martinique on June 23, 1763, she was, at the time of her marriage to Napoleon, the widow of General de Tascherault. By her first marriage she had two children, Eugene and Hortense, the latter of whom married Louis Bonaparte in 1803; her second marriage was without issue. When Pope Pius VII came to France in 1804 for the consecration of the nation he refused his blessing to a couple who had only been through a civil marriage. Consequently, on the night of Dec. 1, in the utmost secrecy, the religious marriage was performed by Cardinal Fesch, in the presence of only two witnesses, Talleyrand and Berthier. On the following day (Dec. 2) the consecration of the nation was celebrated at Notre Dame with great pomp. The occasion was remarkable rather for splendour

thus for popular enthusiasm. The Emperor crowned himself, afterwards placing the crown on the Empress's head.

The distance travelled since 18 Brumaire was great indeed! But, as a matter of fact, the Constitution of the year XII added nothing to Napoleon's power: the Consulate for Life had already given him everything. Even the Republic was not nominally suppressed. "The government of the Republic," so runs the first clause, "is vested in an Emperor, who will assume the title of Emperor of the French." This was of course a contradiction in terms. Napoleon met the difficulty by gradually and patiently suppressing the word "Republic" wherever it cropped up. "The first representative of the nation," he wrote in the *Mémoires* of December 15, 1806, "is the Emperor; for all authority is derived from God and the nation... If there existed in our Constitution a body representative of the nation, that body would be supreme; no other institution could compare with it: its will would be all-potent. But to put the nation itself before the Emperor would be at once chimerical and criminal." All authority, therefore, was vested in the Emperor, since, by the will of God, he was the sole representative of the Sovereign People.

"In the order determined by our Constitution," continued Napoleon, "the Senate comes next to the Emperor in representative authority." The Constitution of the year XII rendered the Senate still more subservient than it had been in 1802. Senators were nominated by the Emperor, and were no longer limited in number. The French Princes and the Grand Electors were members of the Senate *ex officio*. The president was appointed by the Emperor and drawn from the senatorial ranks. The Senate was thus, more than ever before, dependent upon Napoleon. On the other hand, from this time forward, it appointed two permanent bodies, known as "Senatorial Commissions," charged respectively with the maintenance of "individual liberty" and the "liberty of the press." Bills passed by the Legislative Body were sent before the Senate, which, "by expressing the opinion that it saw no occasion for promulgating the measure in question," could exercise a certain right of veto. Such were the new rights conferred upon the Senate; and, as senators were appointed for life, they seemed to be favourably situated for the full exercise of their powers.

The Commission for the protection of individual liberty displayed, it is true, certain hamperings after activity. But it could do nothing of any real importance in the face of arbitrary arrests and imprisonments for reasons of State; and, in his decree of March 3, 1810, regarding state prisons, the Emperor did not shrink from reviving and regularising, in some degree, the old system of *bastille* and *lettres de cachet*. The Commission charged with protecting the liberty of the press was not intended to concern itself with newspapers or periodicals; and the powers conferred by the decree of February 3, 1810, upon the "General Board for the control of Printing and Publishing" deprived the Commission of

almost all power of intervention. The right of veto could be exercised only with the Emperor's consent. In a word, the rights conferred upon the Senate remained a dead letter. So it came about that the senators gradually ceased to discuss anything, even the drafting of *Senatus Consulta*; and, when the Government sent them a bill to pass, the terms of which were already decided, it became their practice in the most important cases to express their gratitude for the consideration which had been vouchsafed to them; and that in terms of grovelling servility.

By the Constitution of the year XII the Tribunalate was divided into three sections, dealing respectively with legislation, home affairs, and finance. These sections deliberated separately, either by themselves or with the corresponding sections of the Council of State. The Tribunalate thus became nothing but a useless duplication of the Council of State. The Legislative Body was recruited more and more from among officials and ex-officials; and, in accordance with the Constitution of the year VIII, its voice was never heard. By the *Senatus Consultum* of August 19, 1807, three commissions, of seven members each, were established within the Legislative Body itself, whose business was to discuss legislative proposals, and to defend or oppose them before the whole body in full session. These commissions were intended to take the place of the sections of the Tribunalate. The Tribunal, as their powers successively expired, were, some of them, provisionally regarded as belonging to the Legislative Body; the rest reserved for the most part public appointments, chiefly at the *Cour des Comptes*, established on September 18, 1807. So vanished the Tribunalate. Only two Chambers remained; the Senate and the Legislative Body. But even the imaginary power enjoyed by them loaned too large to the despotic eye of the Emperor; and he almost entirely abandoned the practice of making "*lans*." He governed by means of *Senatus Consulta*, which he sent straight to the Senate for ratification, or by decrees drawn up for him by the Council of State.

By the Constitution of the year XII the French Princes and Grand Dignitaries reserved seats in the Council of State. Their sittings were presided over either by the Emperor in person, or by a Grand Dignitary, usually either the Arch-Chancellor or the Arch-Treasurer, who acted as his deputy. The importance of the Council of State was no less under the Empire than under the Consulate. The number of questions discussed in full session rose from 8,794 in 1804 to 8,883 in 1811. The honorary title of "Councillor of State" was conferred in certain cases.

The second generation of Napoleon's officials (i.e. from about 1807 onwards, and especially from 1810-11) was by no means equal to the first. The new officials were sometimes very young men, endowed with a certain pride and self-confidence which gave them the air of experience. They were drawn more and more from old aristocratic families or the upper bourgeoisie, who had suffered under the Revolution and hated it accordingly. Though selected with less care than before,

owing to the severity of men and the ever-increasing extent of territory to be administered by a master who mistook obedience for devotion, and fondly imagined that in bestowing his favour he could also create merit, these men undoubtedly showed themselves capable of much hard work; but they fell far short of the distinguished body which, under the Consulate, had reflected so much credit on Napoleon.

The great work of administrative creation was now complete. Fouché, at a reversal for his services in establishing the Empire, again received the Ministry of Police (July 18, 1806). Two new ministries were created: that of Public Worship (July 18, 1806), and that of Trade and Manufactures (June 22, 1811). The honorary title of Minister of State was sometimes granted to high officials, ministers, diplomats, and presidents of sections in the Council of State.

While the legislative machine was being simplified out of existence and the administrative system suffered no marked change, a new and complicated hierarchy, with numerous grades, was being elaborated. It was the only constitutional innovation which owed its origin to the Empire, and it did not survive its author.

The reader will have noticed the appearance, in the ranks of the bureaucracy, of certain honorary titles, such as Counsellor of State and Minister of State. The Legion of Honour had also created certain honorary distinctions. The decree of 18 Messidor, year XII (July 18, 1804), which, for want of something better, is still occasionally invoked in France, laid down an order of precedence for dignitaries and officials, administrative, legal, ecclesiastical, and military, in the conduct of public ceremonies. There was a hierarchy even for localities; and the mayors of 56 towns mentioned in the decree of June 22, 1804, were singled out for the enjoyment of certain special privileges. The list of honours cities was subsequently enlarged, as fresh territories were added to the Empire.

Besides all this, the Constitution of the year XII created two new honorary hierarchies. After the French Princes, that is, "the members of the Imperial Family in the order of heredity," it instituted, by a quiet combination of the great offices of the Holy Roman Empire with those of the old French monarchy, six Grand Imperial Dignities, viz. the Grand Elector (Joseph Bonaparte), the Arch-Chancellor of the Empire (Cambacérès), the Arch-Chancellor of State (Eugène de Beauharnais), the Arch-Treasurer (Lebrun), the Constable (Louis Bonaparte), and the Grand Admiral (Mout). Subsequently, by the decree of August 9, 1807, Talleyrand was appointed Vice-Grand Elector, and Berthier Vice-Constable; and the Senate Consultum of February 2, 1808, raised to the rank of a Grand Dignity the Governor-Generalship of the Departments beyond the Alps, a post held by Berghese, husband of Pauline Bonaparte.

After the Grand Dignitaries came the military Grand Officers of the Empire. By the terms of the Constitution of the year XII, these

now to consist, first, of Marshals of the Empire, chosen from amongst the most distinguished generals. They were not to exceed sixteen in number, exclusive of the generals having seats in the Senate, upon whom also the title of Marshal of the Empire might be bestowed. Napoleon shortly afterwards selected four military marshals, and fourteen other generals for this honour. Eight others were subsequently added. After the Marshals came the Inspectors and the Colonel-Generals, who originally numbered eight. Lastly, the great civil functionaries of the Empire, viz. the Grand Almoner (Fesch), the Grand Marshal of the Palace (Duroc), the Grand Chamberlain (Talleyrand), the Grand Master of the Horse (Caulaincourt), the Grand Huntsman (Berthier), and the Grand Master of the Ceremonies (Stieglitz), performed the various court duties connected with the Imperial household, followed by a long train of subordinates—prefects of the palace, chamberlains, squires, aides-de-camp, pages, and others.

Nor was this all. By a series of decrees, dated March 30, 1806, which the Senate was obliged to register on the following day, Napoleon created yet another hierarchy. Joseph Bonaparte was proclaimed King of Naples and Sicily; the principality of Genoa was given to Pauline Bonaparte in full ownership and sovereignty; the duchies of Cleves and Berg were bestowed upon Murat, the principality of Neuchâtel upon Berthier. Besides these, the Emperor reserved to himself in Italy, certain ducal "grand-fiefs"—title-bearing domains and territorial revenues—the hereditary ownership of which he bestowed upon and where he thought fit. These were the three duchies, of Parma (granted to Cambronne), Modena (to Lohr), and Massa (to Regnier); and, among the erstwhile Venetian States, now incorporated in the kingdom of Italy, the twelve duchies—of Istria, granted to Sordani; Friuli, to Bessières; Friaul, to Duroc; Cadore, to Champagny; Belluno, to Victor; Cossiga, to Masséna; Treviso, to Mortier; Udine, to Clarke; Bassano, to Murat; Verona, to Caulaincourt; Padoa, to Arrighi; and Rovigo, to Suvarov. In the kingdom of Naples, the principality of Benevento (with the title of Prince and Duke) and of Ponte-Corvo was granted to Talleyrand and Bernadotte respectively; while the duchy of Reggio was given to Caulaincourt, that of Tuscany to MacDonald, of Gales to Gaudin, and of Otranto to Fouché. Suchet was made Duke of Alghero, in Spain.

A new nobility was in the making, but it was at first located outside France. Napoleon had his own plan, which he patiently pursued. A *Senatus Consultum*, dated August 18, 1806, authorised Fouché to cede Genoa to the kingdom of Italy, and to buy, with the proceeds of this transaction, estates within the territory of the French Empire. The other ducal grand-fiefs might eventually be exchanged in the same way. The privileges attaching to noble houses were to be transferred to the estates thus acquired by exchange; and this right was to go with "the grant of any further duchies or other titles which the Emperor

might create in future." A further step was taken when, during the Polish campaign of 1807, Napoleon ordered Lefebvre to lay siege to Danzig. It was with set purpose that he selected the Marshal-Senator for this command. Lefebvre was an old campaigner, quite incapable of conducting a difficult operation, but he was a veteran of the Republican armies, very brave, very popular, and above all very plebeian. When the place capitulated, Lefebvre was made Duke of Danzig: the grant accompanying the new title was to be composed of lands situated within the territories of the Empire.

A precedent had thus been created, to which the decree of March 1, 1808, gave the fullest application. The Grand Dignitaries were to bear the title of Prince, and their eldest sons that of Duke; Ministers, senators, life-members of the Council of State, presidents of the Legislative Body, and archbishops, that of Count; presidents of the electoral colleges, the first presidents and procurators-general of the courts of justice, bishops, and masters of lesser orders, that of Baron; members of the Legion of Honour, that of Knight (Chevalier). These titles were to be hereditary, provided they were endowed with property bringing in an annual income of not less than 500,000 fr. in the case of Princes; 50,000 fr. in that of Counts; 15,000 fr. in that of Barons; and 5,000 fr. in that of Knights. The Emperor reserved to himself the right to bestow, on the same terms, suitable titles upon generals, prefects, and each other of his subjects as should attain distinction through services rendered to the State. The old French nobility, however, was not restored. Cambacérès read to the Senate the decree which so profoundly modified the social order created by the Revolution; the Senate, in an address carried at the sitting of March 18, "offered to His Imperial and Royal Majesty its humble and respectful thanks for his kindness in communicating to them through the medium of His Serene Highness the Prince Arch-Chancellor of the Empire the regulations dealing with the creation of the Imperial titles."

The hierarchical system was now complete. Napoleon created three princely titles after the campaign of 1809. That of Wagner was conferred on Berthier, Prince of Neuchâtel; of Essling on Masséna, already Duc de Rivoli; and of Eckmühl on Davoust, already Duc d'Angoulême. After the Russian campaign, a fourth, viz. that of Moscow, was bestowed upon Ney, already Duc d'Elchingen. Besides these, Napoleon created 31 Dukes, 306 Counts, 1499 Barons, and about 1800 Knights. There were only two Marshals of the Empire, namely, Bessier and Jourdan, who were not enabled. Napoleon showed himself extremely generous in the matter of grants designed to help in the formation of the necessary endowments and to maintain the splendour of the new titles. Berthier, for instance, had over 1,200,000 fr. a year in grants; Davoust over 700,000 fr.; Masséna over 600,000. To these figures must be added the large salaries attached to the offices held by



the greatness, also the amount of the private fortunes they had succeeded in amassing, by illicit means, in the discharge of their official duties.

Napoleon took care not to see what went on. He held that a monarchy required the support of a noble class, and believed that by making the fortunes of those who served him he would bind them to himself. "We have been guided," he declared to the Senate, in remonstrating to it the decrees of March 30, 1803, "by the great desire to consolidate the social order and our own throne, on which that order is based." He imagined that, by multiplying the number of social grades between him and his subjects, he was enhancing the sacredness of his Imperial majesty and exciting a spirit of emulation in those who were ranged in successive stages beneath him. "For," said he, "in ambition is to be found the chief motive-force of humanity, and a man puts forth his best powers in proportion to his hopes of advancement."

The formation of a new society, depending entirely on himself, was, in the field of liberal politics, Napoleon's great idea. It was also his great failure. The old-time nobility filled the posts about the new Court. Napoleon had the proud satisfaction of numbering among those attached to his new Court, or in the service of members of his family, the greatest names of pre-revolutionary France.

The Emperor's household was conducted with the most perfect method, under the personal eye of the master: it was a model of order, luxury, and economy combined. On the other hand, Josephine's expenditures were prodigal. According to Masson, she spent, between 1804 and 1808, 4,687,088 francs on dress alone; and several times Napoleon was forced to pay her debts. The dress worn by the courtiers was sumptuous: men and women alike appeared covered with gold and jewels. The concerts, the theatres, and the receptions were magnificent.

Following their pride, the old-time nobility accepted the titles Napoleon gave them, but they heartily remembered those older titles they had no longer the right to bear. Nothing could obliterate from their minds the feeling that they were in the employ of a parvenu; and they felt nothing but contempt for the new nobility. As for the latter, their devotion to the Empire diminished in proportion to the favours they received; for, the more he loaded them with honours and wealth, the less they had to expect. Thus the society which the Emperor had created round him was largely composed of secret royalists or of secret opponents: it was imperialist only in name. Moreover—and this was a point of view of greater importance—Napoleon was isolated from the nation by his Court, whose etiquette, growing stricter every year, gradually excluded all who were not in regular attendance. The Constitution had been narrowed to one man; and that man had ceased to be national. The popularity of Napoleon Bonaparte, which had waxed steadily under the Consulate, slowly waned under the Empire.

"I can use up 85,000 men a month," said Napoleon one day. It was from the notion that there were none. If our calculations are accurate, in order to maintain the army at its full effective strength, the nation was called upon to provide 50,000 men in 1800, 60,000 in 1801, 60,000 in 1802, and 60,000 in 1803, or 210,000 in all under the Consulate. It provided 60,000 men in 1804, 40,000 in 1805, 80,000 in 1806, 80,000 in 1807, 80,000 in 1808, 75,000 in 1809, 100,000 in 1810, 100,000 in 1811, 90,000 in 1812, and 1,100,000 in 1813, or 2,000,000 in all under the Empire. The total amounts to 2,510,000 men during the reign of Napoleon. If the figures of his armies are to be complete, we must add to them the soldiers raised by the levy en masse of 1814: volunteers and time-expired men who had rejoined the colours at high pay; young men who evaded conscription on leaving the military schools; foreign regiments in the service of France, composed of Swiss, Irish, and volunteers of various nationalities; deserters; prisoners of war enrolled either with or against their will; and lastly, the contingents contributed by subject or allied foreign Powers. But we are here concerned only with the share taken by the French departments in the recruiting of Napoleon's armies.

There were three regular methods of procedure: (1) the first levy (*appel*) of the "*classes de la conscription*," numbering 1,847,000 men; (2) the supplementary levy (*appel*) of the same classes, for such men as had not yet served, amounting to 746,000 men; (3) the levy of the National Guard, 579,000 men. To these should be added the "exceptional levies," amounting to 50,000 men, which included the young men on the naval lists (*conscription maritime*), and the "growth of horses" equipped and mounted at their own expense, of whom each department had to provide a certain number, and who gained their commissions after a year's service. These totals amount to 2,812,000 men (see above).

The Conscription was regulated by the law of 1793, which underwent no serious modification. The system of drawing by lot was used to weed out those conscripts of any particular class who would not be called upon to serve. Substitution was legalized. The payment for a substitute varied from 1000 to 6000 francs, according to the district and the year. Thus the escape from military service was open only to those possessed of some means. On an average we may reckon one substitute in every ten conscripts called. Exempted persons had to pay a military tax. Young men married immediately before the summons were exempt. It naturally followed that the number of marriages increased in proportion to the greater frequency of the calls to arms. In 1812 there were 265,000 marriages in France; in 1813, 222,000; in 1814, 265,000; and in 1815, 129,000. Similarly, the number of marriages, bankruptcies, and deserters rose in proportion to the number of the levies. At certain moments the number of conscripts in hiding was considerable, especially in the west, north, and centre, and in the newly annexed provinces.

Some had recourse to self-mutilation; others begged the authorities to include them in the lists of exemption or to falsify their civil status. It often happened that the conscripts who joined were delicate or idly youths, unfit for service, whom the officers were obliged to reject, while the sound conscripts stayed at home in hiding. The police hunted them down, or quartered them in the prisons of the refractory; while flying columns roamed the country in search of the insubordinate. Almost always the people were in league with the recalcitrants. In spite of the amnesties declared in 1803, 1804, and 1805, the shirkers and the insubordinate went on increasing in number. Thus the number of the levies estimated on paper must be taken rather as representing the effort aimed at the country than the actual result obtained. Between the two there was always a large discrepancy.

By a natural consequence, in proportion as the actual return from conscription fell off, Napoleon was forced to raise the nominal number required. In 1800 he only summoned 55,000 conscripts to the colours; but the number rose to 60,000 per annum during the years 1801-3, 80,000 during 1804-6, 110,000 for 1812, 120,000 for 1813; and 125,000 for 1814, 130,000 for 1814, and 160,000 for 1815—a total of 1,467,000 (see above). Moreover, it frequently happened that the Emperor kept the conscripts enrolled beyond the statutory five years, or he summoned the yearly classes before their term. For example, the 1806 class was summoned on September 21, 1805, the 1808 class on April 7, 1807, that of 1809 on January 21, 1808, that of 1810 on September 10, 1809, that of 1811 on September 1, 1810, that of 1812 on January 11, 1812, and that of 1813 on October 9, 1813.

When the conscription, even with its heightened demands, failed to provide enough men, Napoleon recalled the earlier classes to the colours; and then those who by good luck in the drawings had not been included in the lists, those who had found substitutes, and even those who were exempt—had all alike to go or find substitutes. It was in accordance with this plan, that, in 1805, he summoned ahead the classes from 1804 back to 1800, in 1806 those from 1805 to 1800, in 1808, those from 1810 to 1804, in 1812 first those from 1812 to 1808, then those from 1814 to 1812, and finally all the classes from 1814 to 1808. In this way all the classes were actually called upon to serve several times over.

Moreover, the use Napoleon made of the National Guard was in reality only a veiled disguise. By the Act of 1793 the National Guard had not been suppressed; but Napoleon viewed it with distrust. He remembered the important part it had played in the revolutionary movements; and indeed there was no room in a despotic system for a citizen militia. In Paris the Government organized a Municipal Guard (October 4, 1802), composed of picked veterans, and maintained at the cost of the city. In reality it was a reserve force in the service of the State; and the cost of its maintenance was extracted in spite of

protests on the part of both the Municipal Council and the Prefect of the Seine, who was acting as Mayor of Paris. As for the National Guard, it existed on paper; and the Government could at any time place it on an active footing in case of need. Fouché, in fact, did so in 1803. Subsequently Napoleon reorganised it by the Senate Council of March 14, 1812. It was to consist of all male citizens of sound health, divided into three levies (*levées*). To the first levy belonged all those men, aged from 20 to 25, who did not belong to the regular army; to the second those between 26 and 40; and to the third all those between 41 and 60. The National Guard was liable to serve only in the home defence of the Empire, in the maintenance of public security, and on the frontier and the coast. In the event of the country being invaded (an eventuality which was not long in presenting itself) its "cohorts" and its "legions" would have been an invaluable resource, and as it were a last refuge for French patriotism. But, in 1812, Napoleon destroyed the original character of the National Guard by enrolling all its best men as regular troops in the first levy for service in Germany. Henceforth the National Guard was as hateful in the eyes of the people as conscription itself; and when, at the end of 1813 and in 1814, the Emperor, as a last resource, called up all the classes and ordered a *levée en masse*, the country did not respond.

But it was not enough to recruit soldiers; it was necessary to provide for the cost of their maintenance. The history of France under the First Empire would seem, viewed superficially, to show a more satisfactory record than that of army recruiting. And yet, when Napoleon fell, but one cry went up from the whole of France: "*Down with conscription and the *drôle de loi*!*"

The extent of the crisis was distinguished by what was, relatively, a serious financial crisis. In 1804 there was formed under the name of "The Company of United Merchants" (*Négociants Unis*), an association of *financiers de service*, purveyors and speculators, the leading spirit among whom was a man named Gervais. The Company engaged in certain speculations in connexion with the Spanish colonies, the success of which depended on being able to avoid the British cruisers. It also undertook to advance money to the French Treasury, and to supply the army with provisions. Now, in France, ready money was very scarce; and the Government failed to pay for the supplies furnished to the army. The Company thus found itself exposed to a heavy risk. In this emergency, with the consent of Berthier-Marchais, the embarrassed Company appealed to the Bank of France, which agreed to make advances by means of an issue of bank-notes. The notes decreased in value by 10 per cent. and more; and the situation became extremely grave. By a natural consequence the business in commercial bill-discounting was paralysed; and the crisis extended itself to trade. There were several startling failures. The interests of the Treasury, of the

Bank, and of the Company—that is to say public, semi-public, and private interests—were disastrously entangled and jointly endangered. The news of the victory of *Austerlitz* (December 3, 1805) did something to restore confidence. On Napoleon's return to Paris, *Barbè-Mathois* was dismissed and replaced by *Deffès*, who drew up an account of the loans made to the United Merchants. The total amounted to 141,000,000 francs. The Company was forced to hand over all it possessed; and, thanks to the cash brought in from *Austria*, the Bank was put in a position to resume payment. But the Emperor was determined to prevent the recurrence of such crises in future.

"*The Bank*," he declared, "belongs not only to the shareholders but also to the State, since it was to the State that it owed its privilege of issuing notes." And he added, "It is my desire to see the Bank under the control of the State, but not too much so." The law of April 22, 1806, consequently enacted that the Bank should be under the direction of a Governor (*Cofet*, Councillor of State) and two Vice-Governors, appointed by the State, and adopted other provisions to ensure state control. In these affairs the Emperor himself did not scruple to interfere. For instance he fixed the rate of discount at 5 per cent. in 1806, and at 4 per cent. in 1807. In return for this, the Bank's privilege was extended for twenty-five years beyond the fifteen originally conceded, i.e. to 1843; its capital was raised from 40,000 to 80,000 shares of 1000 francs each; and the decree of May 15, 1806, empowered it to open branches in the provinces, under the name of *Comptoirs d'Escompte de la Banque de France*. Three branches were opened under the Empire, at Lyons, Rouen, and Lille. Thus, after 1806, in the words of *Croix* the younger, the Bank became "a state institution in the form of a limited liability company."

The close control of the Treasury was ensured by the establishment of the *Cour des Comptes*, created by the law of September 14, 1807, to take the place of a commission with similar duties (the *Commission nationale de comptabilité*), which under the Constitution of the year VIII was composed of seven titular members only. The new Court was far larger. It had a President-in-Chief (*Barbè-Mathois*), three Presidents, eighteen councillors entitled *des comptes*, sixty or seventy officers (*officiers*), and an Imperial Attorney-General. The *Cour des Comptes* took rank immediately after the Court of Cassation, and was charged with the "auditing" (judgment) of all the national accounts. It was the last financial creation that owed its origin to Napoleon.

Direct taxation underwent no essential modification. On the other hand, indirect taxes were considerably increased. The duties on liquors were remodelled and enhanced by a series of measures dealing with their manufacture, circulation, and consumption; salt was taxed (1800-4) in spite of the unpopularity of the gabelle; tobacco was made a government monopoly (1810). The administration of the

*debits cridis* was duty and taxation, and because hateful in the eyes of the people. In 1818 Napoleon took upon himself to increase both direct and indirect taxes by means of a simple decree.

But what constituted the essential characteristic of Imperial finance was the abnormal growth in the receipts from abroad. Of these, two kinds must be clearly distinguished: (1) the immediate contributions of war (such as war-indemnities paid by the vanquished at the conclusion of the war, ransoms, captures, and ransoms made in the course of the war); (2) such property, real or other, as the Emperor reserved to himself by right of conquest in countries either conquered or otherwise acquired. The exact amount of the actual war contributions is impossible to estimate. All the accumulated wealth was formed into a special fund variously named *trésor de guerre*, *trésor de l'armée*, *cahier des contributions*, and finally *donnée extraordinaire*. The fund was actually established after the Austrian campaign in 1805; but it was not till much later that it received an official organisation by the Senate Commission of January 30, 1809. Its disposition was in the hands of the Emperor alone; he gave his orders to Delacroix as intendant *général* of the *donnée extraordinaire*, just as, through his intendant Duroc, he disposed of his Civil List of 25,000,000 francs and of the property which formed the *dotation de la couronne*. The formation of a War Reserve-Fund; the maintenance of the army in the field (the expenses of its preparation came out of the ordinary Budget); rewards, gifts and favours, uniforms and pensions paid to the soldiery, the war nobility and the official class; a portion of the expenses incurred in connection with the Public Works; all the expenses incidental to the repairs, up-keep, and decoration of the Imperial palaces, an occasional contribution to the normal receipts in order to balance the Budget; subsidies and loans to declining industries—such were the principal uses to which the extraordinary receipts derived from abroad were put during the Empire. There was, thus, a secret Budget, drawn up independently of that which was published, but indispensable to it.

It follows that the Budget figures, as passed by the Legislative Body, were in reality fictitious; and the requisite equilibrium was no longer obtained, as in the days of the Consulate, by an approximate balance between income and expenditure. In 1811 the Budget showed an income amounting to 1,895,674,848 francs, and an expenditure of 1,802,000,240 francs; there was therefore a small surplus. According to the figures furnished by Nodding, we may apportion the receipts for 1801 as follows: 30 per cent. from direct taxation; 6 per cent. from forests and lands; 60 per cent. from indirect taxation; and 38 per cent. from direct taxation and the "extraordinary receipts." The expenditure may be thus apportioned: 48 per cent. for the finances and interest on the public funds; 53 per cent. for the army; and 9 per cent. for the expenses of administration. Deficits only made their appearance along with

disaster in the field. In 1815 there was a deficit of 50,000,000 francs; in 1818 one of 175,000,000 francs.

But, if the interest on the National Debt rose in 1814 to 65,000,000 francs per annum, in the shape of Perpetual Annuities, it was principally in order to complete the liquidation of the services which had accrued prior to the Consulate. Never under the Empire or under the Consulate was interest paid to loans properly reckoned. "That method," declared Napoleon in the interesting preamble to the *act of December 22, 1810*, establishing the tobacco monopoly, "is both immoral and disastrous. It inevitably undermines the edifice of state, and expends one generation to the ruin of the next."

In other respects the Empire carried on those traditions of order and method which it had inherited from the Consulate. The price of stock had risen from 60 to 70 francs by the year 1805, and afterwards remained stationary at about 80. The maximum price of 20-45 was reached on August 27, 1807, and the minimum of 45 on March 22, 1814. Even this low figure compares favourably with those which prevailed shortly before and after 18 Brumaire. Thus, if facts were neglected which did not appear on the surface, the financial position appeared highly satisfactory. Not only were the means to carry on the ordinary affairs of government always forthcoming, but supplies were found, in spite of almost constant war, to provide for the expenditure and the public works initiated under the Consulate, though these appeared, by their very nature, suited rather to a time of peace.

Under the Empire, public works were vigorously pushed on. Between 1804 and 1815 more than a milliard was spent; and the programme of works under construction in 1815 involved a further expenditure of 500 millions, without counting the expenses incurred under the Consulate. The repairs of the roads had become a matter of urgency. A distinction was drawn between local and departmental roads (kept up at the expense of the local authorities) and imperial high-roads (kept up by the State). The admirable system of high-roads, dating from early monarchial times, underwent a complete renovation and was carried beyond the boundaries of Old France. The Decree of November 28, 1811, enumerated 228 imperial high-roads, the most important of which, 50 in number, radiated from Paris as their centre to the most distant extremities of the Empire and indeed of Europe. The *Mont-Cenis road*, completed in 1805, brought Paris into touch with Turin; that of the *Empire*, completed in 1807, connected Paris with Milan, Rome, and Naples. Numerous bridges were also built. The network of canals and waterways rendered available for navigation was hardly even continued in pre-revolutionary France. The works undertaken during the Consulate and partially completed at the close of the Empire were planned on a scale so vast and, at the same time, with few exceptions, on such practical lines, that they constitute to-day by far the most important

portion of the internal navigation of France. The Spanish prisoners of war, organized in "working companies," provided manual labour at such to no expense. Frepp, the Director of the School of Bridges and Highways, who, either on the spot or from a distance, was the guiding spirit in all these undertakings, was an engineer of the first rank. Marshes were drained, dykes strengthened, sand-dunes hindered from spreading along the coast. The principal sea-ports, both naval and commercial, and particularly the ports of Cherbourg and Antwerp, were enlarged and fortified. On the other hand, only a few inland places were fortified, and these only beyond the boundaries of Old France—as unlikely did a foreign invasion seem to be.

The imperial palaces in the environs of Paris (Saint-Cloud, Fontainebleau, Compiègne, Versailles, Trianon, and Rambouillet) and those situated in the more remote departments, were restored and enlarged. In Paris the completion of the Louvre and the clearing of the Tuileries formed part of a general scheme which aimed at making the French capital the metropolis of Europe. The most famous works of art, the fruits of victory, poured in to enrich the *Musée Napoléon* at the Louvre. The Vatican archives, those of Sicily, and those of the Holy Roman Empire, came from Rome, Spain, and Vienna to be mingled with the imperial archives, as though the present aspired to emulate the past. The capital grew rapidly. Numbering 600,000 inhabitants towards the close of the eighteenth century, it only registered 547,336 at the census of 1801; but by the end of the Empire its population had reached 750,000. Napoleon had expended more than 100,000,000 francs upon Paris, and 150,000,000 francs upon the chief towns of the departments. In the west, two towns, viz. *Napoliën-Vendée* (La Roche-sur-Yon), and *Napoliënville* (Pontivy) were, so to speak, created by him, in order to keep a closer watch upon that royalist district.

The Emperor threw himself into public works with the greater keenness in that he had a genuine desire to cancel off his military glory with the arts of peace, and because he considered it his duty as head of the State to contribute actively towards the material well-being of the country. When he rose to power, he knew little or nothing of economics. But by dint of discussion in the Council of State, of talk with Mollien, and of observation, he taught himself a great deal. In 1801 he had taken up a definite attitude. "That great and ordered system," he exclaimed to Mollien, "which governs the whole world, must also govern each part of it. Government plays the part of the sun in the social system, whose various bodies should revolve round this central luminary, each keeping strictly to its own orbit. Government should therefore so rule the destinies of each society that all should vie with one another in seeking to preserve the harmony of the whole."

These ideas gave birth to legislation of a new type. Under both the Consulate and the Empire, the State often intervened in the sphere of



economies, and returned to their pristine vigorous institutions which the Revolution had suppressed. A marked return towards the guild-system of the old régime was visible in the creation of commercial exchanges with brokers and jobbers appointed by the Government (1801), in the reconstruction of the Chambers of Commerce (1803), in the formation of Advisory Boards in connexion with manufactures, factories, arts and crafts (1804), in the useful institution of *conseils de prud'hommes* (1806), and in the regulation of certain liberal professions.

Even while proclaiming the principle of the liberty of labour, the Revolution had made certain reservations in connexion with the food-supply. To Napoleon this question was one of primary importance. "He desired," he said, "popular insurrections due to economic causes, though he was not afraid of political risings." Thinking to provide a remedy for economic crises in the exercise of state control, he kept a watchful eye on all that concerned the food-supply, especially in Paris. A copious series of laws, Consular decisions, Imperial decrees, and regulations issued by the Prefect of Police, revived in some measure the minute supervision exercised by the police in former times over the markets, the public granaries, and all the trades connected with the supply of food and drink; so much so that in Paris, at the close of the Empire, almost all these trades had again become veritable corporations. The same process was beginning in the larger provincial towns.

On the other hand, Napoleon was opposed to the restoration of the guild-system in other professions. While upholding in principle the liberty of labour, he instituted a system of strict supervision which placed the workman under the control of the police and in a position of inferiority towards his employer. It was with this end in view that the law of April 19, 1803, obliged the workman to provide himself with a form supplied by the local police, on which were inscribed his successive engagements. Without this form or without a passport, a workman was treated as a vagabond; and an employer might engage him. In Paris the Prefect of Police, and in certain provincial towns the local police, were to be found descending to the most trifling details in the regulation of labour. The law of April 12, 1803, also recognised a systematised copyright in trademarks or designs.

"While preserving," said Napoleon, "those useful innovations which it was the object of the Revolution to introduce, I tried to restore any institutions of value which it mistakenly destroyed"—a general principle which was applied in a new fashion to weights and measures and the coinage. The Bill of December 10, 1793, upheld the decimal-metric system: but its general adoption was long delayed by the Order of November 4, 1800, and the Decree of February 12, 1812, which authorised the simultaneous use of both the old and the new measures. Similarly, with regard to the currency, the law of March 28, 1803, ordained as the unit a weight of five grammes of silver, 80 per cent.

being of pure metal, under the name of "franc." Gold was reckoned 154 times the value of silver. These regulations sufficed to secure (1) the France of that day a sound and stable monetary system; and (2) Revolutionary reforms were maintained and developed. But the Senate Consensus of 4th Fructidor, year XI (September 8, 1803) reintroduced the Gregorian Calendar, which was to come into operation from 11 Nivôse year XIV (January 1, 1805).

It was, however, Napoleon's general policy which, more even than his legislation, affected the material development of the country. The view which regarded state intervention as all-powerful in economic matters, the protectionist leanings of the French producers, on whose side the Emperor ranged himself, above all, the incidents of the struggle with Great Britain, brought about a commercial situation almost unique dated in history, the consequences of which not only reacted upon French agriculture and French trade, but on the trade of Europe and the general commerce of the world. It does not fall within the scope of this chapter to enter into a full explanation of Napoleon's commercial system. We must content ourselves with outlining that portion of it which concerns the internal conditions of *hygiene France*.

In the course of every year from 1802 to 1807, a law relating to the Customs was passed by command of Napoleon. Of these laws, the two most important were those of 1803 and 1806, which contained Customs Tariffs. The protectionist character of the Tariff for 1803 was one of the causes which led to the rupture of the Peace of Amiens. The Tariff of 1806 was drawn up in the same spirit, but it was fuller, a crack so that it served as a basis for all the Customs Tariffs in France during the greater part of the nineteenth century. France thus became frankly protectionist.

The various Decrees which established what is generally known as the *Continental System*, together with the Orders in Council by which the British Government retaliated on Napoleon, will be described at length in a later chapter, and therefore need not be discussed here. For some account of the *economic effects of this system*, it is requisite to have a description of France under the Empire. During the middle period of the Empire, the Continental System occupied a position of paramount importance; and it is not without reason that some have seen in it the pivot of Napoleon's policy: for, if it were to be made effective, it was essential that, as he no longer had a navy, he should have the whole of Europe either under his sway or in his alliance. But owing to the force of circumstances, Great Britain was economically indispensable to Europe. Thanks to the lead which she had gained in matters industrial, she alone was in a position to provide certain manufactured goods, and more especially cotton fabrics. Owing to her maritime supremacy, she alone could import colonial raw-stuff into Europe. British goods and colonial produce became therefore the

centre of an active system of smuggling, has widespread in France, it is true, than in the countries newly incorporated with the Empire, such as Germany, Italy, and Spain. The smugglers brought in the prohibited merchandise at a premium representing approximately half its real value. Napoleon compromised. He granted temporary licenses, giving certain French shippers the right to bring in prohibited goods or articles of British origin on payment of a duty of 40 per cent. The law of January 18, 1806, regularized the license system; but duties, excises, cotton materials, and luxury remained absolutely prohibited. Napoleon hoped by this means to direct the illicit trade to his own advantage, and to become, so to speak, his own smuggler.

With regard to food-stuff and cotton, he had vainly tried to import them overland from the Levant, by a system of transport across the Balkan Peninsula. But he was not living in the Middle Ages; and it was not in his power, omnipotent as he was, to revive the overland trade-routes which the progress of maritime navigation had superseded. Napoleon, therefore, compromised once more. The *Tribuna Decree* enhanced the existing duties on colonial produce. Here again the custommen took the place of the smuggler.

Having thus regulated to his own advantage the importation of merchandise and food-stuff which found their way into the Empire in spite of him, Napoleon, by a Decree issued October 16, 1806, established certain *Tribunaux administratifs de douane* (Custom Tribunals) to try cases of first instance; above which the *Cour principale de douane*, presided over by Grand Provosts, pronounced final judgments in cases of appeal. All the smuggling cases were referred to these special tribunals. The penalties for fraudulent declaration and smuggling were very severe. Such smuggled goods as came within the category of prohibited merchandise were to be confiscated and burnt, or included in the list of dutiable articles to be sold for the benefit of the State. Drawings were particularly frequent outside the old boundaries of France, where smuggling most abounded. In France itself the Decree of October 18, 1806, was received with enthusiasm because it maintained protection for French industries against British competition, and opened up to French trade those countries which had hitherto provided for their needs by means of smuggled British goods.

There was, therefore, two stages in the Continental System. In 1806 the exclusion of British trade was absolute, but tempered in practice by smuggling; in 1810 the prohibition was to a certain extent tempered by the Government, which, per contra, attempted to put down smuggling altogether. In both cases the Europeans, and especially the French, markets were so far as possible sealed to the products of British invention and to colonial produce. That the injury to trade and the sufferings of the consumer were acute, especially beyond the old boundaries of France, it is scarcely necessary to say. In 1800 the

Foreign trade of France reached an approximate total of 808,000,000 francs (imports 583,000,000, exports 225,000,000); in 1802, thanks to the peace, it touched 780,000,000 (imports 445,000,000, and exports 335,000,000); and it reached its maximum height in 1806 with 925,000,000 (imports 677,000,000, exports 248,000,000), but thenceforward it steadily diminished, falling in 1815 to 582,000,000 (imports 350,000,000, exports 232,000,000). Obviously these figures are only of secondary significance, owing to the extent of the illicit trade. The fact also ought to be taken into account, that neither the imports nor exports of gold and silver are included in the above figures. Between 1789 and 1804 France imported cash to the value of 255,000,000 francs, and only exported 25,000,000. Generally speaking, however, the evolution of the "curve" remained fairly characteristic. Finally, it is to be observed that the balance of trade showed an excess of imports in 1800 and an excess of exports in 1814. The two lines intersected one another immediately after the establishment of the Continental System.

Various circumstances, wholly unconnected with the Continental System, contributed powerfully to advance French industry. At the time of the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, the "industrial revolution," which had so radically transformed the conditions of production in England, was beginning to be felt in France. The application of machinery to manufactures, which had begun before the establishment of the Continental System, continued to develop under the new régime, simultaneously hindered and fostered by it—hindered because all relations with the original home of mechanical invention had been broken off, fostered because France had now to produce herself the goods she could no longer buy from Great Britain. On the other hand, there now came into being for the first time a happy and fruitful alliance between the manufacturers and the men of science. "The Society for the Encouragement of National Industries" grouped together, under the presidency of Chaptal, all those who were interested in mechanics, chemistry, and economics, in agriculture and commerce; and by its propaganda, its experiments, its loans, and its prizes contributed largely to the scientific progress of industry. In fact, it created in France the "applied sciences." Napoleon himself was active in the same direction. Technical schools, prizes, loans and subventions, industrial exhibitions, government institutions designed to help on industrial development—all played their part in bringing about the progress achieved.

Agriculture profited by the introduction of improved systems of crop rotation, both Friesian and English. The spread of these was, to be sure, slow enough; but still a beginning had been made. The Continental System, by prohibiting the importation of foreign dyes, gave a great impetus to the culture of dye-producing plants, such as madder, woad, and saffron. Clobery was grown as a substitute for coffee. To take the place of sugar, various preparations were tried.

The consumer was just getting used to a kind of trade extracted from the grape, when, after many experiments, French manufacturers, reviving a process discovered in Prussia in the preceding century, succeeded in manufacturing sugar out of beetroots (1800-10). The Government fostered the new industry, which in 1812 was in full course of development: but the abandonment of the Continental System two years later dealt it a blow from which it took long to recover.

Fine and cheap were cultivated, and worked up by home industry. Napoleon offered in 1809 a prize of a million francs to the inventor of the best spinning machine. A good machine was made by Philippe de Girard; but the prize was not awarded to him. His invention was taken up in Great Britain, whence it afterwards returned to France. The manufacture of woollen goods was greatly improved. The old and famous silk industry of Lyons had suffered greatly through the Revolution. Napoleon did all in his power to revive the fashion for Lyons silks. Jacquard invented the loom bearing his name, which executed by purely mechanical means even the most intricate designs in the richest materials. The progress of the cotton industry in France under Napoleon is astonishing, when one thinks of the difficulty of obtaining the raw material from America, of bringing the Louisiana cotton overland, of the inadequacy of the supply from Naples and Sicily, and of the failure of the attempt to cultivate it in Corsica or the valley of the Rhone. Nevertheless Oberkampf and Richard, with his partner Lenoir, succeeded in establishing important cotton-spinning factories with the machinery of the English spinning-jennies.

The important law of April 21, 1804, laid down once for all the principles which were to govern mining operations in France. As a matter of fact, neither mining operations nor metallurgical industries made much progress. On the other hand, industrial chemistry made great advances. The Decree issued on October 13, 1809, on "Factories and workshops which emit noisily or offensive smells," laid the foundation of the system of state regulation still in force in France. Already it could enumerate—as subject to authorisation or to inspection—nearly seventy different chemical industries. Philippe Lebon invented the system of gas-lighting. Nicholas Leblanc, having invented a process for manufacturing soda, published his method from patriotic motives, and committed suicide, a ruined man. Lebon's invention remained practically unknown; that of Leblanc, while it relieved France from the necessity of importing foreign natural soda, gave it in exchange a superior product at a tenth of the price.

It is difficult to form a general opinion on the development of wealth in France under the Consulate and the Empire. We shall see later that Napoleon's downfall was preceded by an economic crisis of peculiar gravity, the causes of which, it is true, were partly of political origin. But it seems clear that, while luxury prevailed at the Court and among

the new nobility, as also material well-being and comfort were spreading among the general population and the peasantry. In the case of the latter the evidence is almost unanimous; but the improvement in their condition was less the work of Napoleon than of the Revolution itself. With regard to artisans, the frequent calls to arms made manual labour scarce and therefore dearer. Nevertheless, certain local disturbances varied increasing men of the difficulties which industry on the grand scale and the growth of machinery were bound to meet.

Never perhaps was France more systematically armed against poverty. The old charitable institutions of the Church had disappeared during the Revolution; and the reorganisation of asylums, hospitals, refuges, outdoor relief centres, floating hospitals, *maisons de pitié*, etc., devolved upon the municipalities. In Paris, Prévost, who as Prefect of the Seine performed the duties of mayor (for political reasons, the capital had, as regards municipal government, been placed in a category of its own), took an active part in the business of charity, as did the prefects and mayors in the departments. The communal and municipal revenues (including Paris) amounted in 1812 to 152,000,000 francs, more than half of which (31 per cent.) was contributed by the octroi-duties, which were specially assigned to meet the requirements of charitable institutions. The income derived from municipal property (i.e. 18 per cent.) was partially devoted to the same purpose. The Government strove to suppress vagrancy. In the list of public works executed by order of the State in the departments the construction of vagrant wards and prisons figured at the head.

Public instruction, like public charity, was in the hands of the Church under the old regime; but now the State claimed to be the Church's heir. The law of 11 Floral, year X (May 1, 1802), divided both instruction and schools into four classes as follows—(1) Primary Schools, supported by the local authorities, communal and municipal acting under the control of the prefects and sub-prefects; (2) Secondary Schools, providing instruction in French, Latin, and elementary sciences, and supported by the communes or by private enterprise, but subject to government authorisation and prefectorial inspection; (3) *Lycees*, providing a thorough education in literature and science, of which there was to be at least one in each Appellate Court district. The *lycees* were state institutions: inspectors, governors, and teachers were appointed and paid by the State. (4) *Hautes Écoles*, contributing, according to the law, "the final stage in public instruction." They were divided into (a) *écoles publiques supérieures*, devoted to "the full and thorough study, as well as to the advancement of the useful arts and sciences"; and (b) *écoles d'application des sciences pures*, designed to provide the State with enlightened public servants. The Act contemplated a general re-organising of the Higher Schools. As a matter of fact, the Government

contracted itself with completing and organizing, in Paris and the departments, the schools of law, medicine, and design, with maintaining the institutions which the Revolution had protected, created, or restored in Paris; and, lastly, with the establishment of a few new schools, such as a special military school for officers at Saint-Cyr, schools of pharmacy, and technical schools. In fact the law was responsible for only one wholly new creation, viz. the *lycées*. In those it undertook to found 6000 exhibitions (*bourses*), 2000 of which were to be reserved for the sons of military men and government officials, and 4000 for the best pupils in the secondary schools. Nevertheless, in 1806, there were only 89 *lycées* in existence, as compared with 370 secondary schools kept up at the expense of the communes, and 377 founded by private persons.

With these results Napoleon was by no means satisfied. "The essential thing," he wrote on February 18, 1808, "is a teaching body" organized on hierarchical lines, "like that of the Jesuits of old." This body should have a definite aim, for there can be no stability in political conditions without a teaching body actuated by fixed principles. "Unless men are taught from childhood, as they should be, to be republicans or monarchists, Catholics or infidels, and so forth, the State will never make a nation: it will rest upon shifting and insecure foundations, and will be for ever exposed to disturbance and change." An enquiry was ordered. Fourcroy, Councillor of State and Director-General of Public Instruction at the Ministry of the Interior, drew up a scheme which he was obliged to remodel more than twenty times; the Emperor was never satisfied with it. On May 18, 1808, the Legislative Body approved practically the principle of the desired reform. "There shall be established, under the name of the Imperial University, a body exclusively charged with the work of teaching and public instruction throughout the Empire." In bringing in the Bill, Fourcroy explained that it aimed, in a sense, at a reconstruction, only on a vaster scale and embracing the whole Empire, of the ancient University of Paris.

Eventually the Decree of March 17, 1808, gave a working constitution to the Imperial University. Henceforth no one might open a school nor teach in public without being a member of the Imperial University, and a graduate of one of its Faculties. These Faculties were five in number, viz. theology, law, medicine, science, literature. After the Faculties came the *lycées*; then the colleges or secondary schools maintained by the municipalities; next those kept by private persons; then the private boarding-schools; and, lastly, the primary schools. The degrees attached to the Faculties were those of Bachelor, Licentiate, and Doctor. No one could be promoted to a higher post unless he had previously held three below it. All the schools of the Imperial University were to take as the basis of their teaching the principles of the Catholic religion, loyalty to the Emperor, and obedience to the statutes of the teaching body. These statutes laid down a special

system of discipline, and a series of regulations which, in the case of certain posts, went so far as to impose the common life and celibacy. The recruiting-ground for the teaching-staff was provided in the Normal School, organised in Paris in 1809, by the restoration of the Normal School founded by the Convention in 1793.

The University was divided into as many Academies as there were Appeal Court areas. At the head of each Academy was a Rector, assisted by a conseil académique and by academic inspectors. A Grand Master, in Paris, appointed and dismissed by the Emperor, governed the Imperial University. He appointed and promoted its officers, maintained discipline, superintended the curriculum, and presided over the University Council. The University had its own budget. An abundant crop of regulations subsequently grew up. In this connection the Decree of November 15, 1811, is highly characteristic: it shows clearly that Napoleon was anxious to reduce more and more the competition of those private schools with the government institutions, if not, indeed, to suppress them altogether. And yet, at the final collapse of the Empire, there existed within the old boundaries of France only 56 lycées with 9000 pupils, and 888 colleges with 25,000 pupils, as against 1855 voluntary institutes and boarding-schools with nearly 40,000 pupils.

The Imperial University had, therefore, as desirable less than half the pupils actually acquiring a secondary education. Moreover, it will be observed that it was incomplete both at the top and at the bottom. The Faculties of Law and Medicine had, it is true, 6900 students in 1814; but all the *Écoles Spéciales* included in the design of the Act of 1808 were to be found outside the University organisation. Primary education was left to private initiative, to the communes, or to the *Fribre der écoles chrétiennes*, who were authorised and encouraged by the Grand Master, according to the decree of 1805.

These shortcomings did not prevent the University from being the sole Imperial creation which has survived to our own day, though it has become almost unrecognisable both in its organisation and in its guiding spirit. In Napoleon's conception, it was to be a self-governing corporation, but a state institution. The pupils and the masters were subjected to a discipline derived partly from a monastic, partly from a military model. As in the hierarchical society created in all its details by the Emperor, academic energies were to be stimulated by the spirit of emulation and the desire of promotion. Confined practically as it was to the sphere of secondary and higher education, the Imperial University appealed only to the sons of the upper and middle classes. It was in no sense democratic. Lastly, it aimed at the preservation of the social and monarchical system; and, so long as the Church could not produce schools of its own to compete with it, it frankly claimed, although renounced from lay sources, to take the Church's place. Its first Grand Master, Fontanes, was one of the leaders of what we may call the clerical party



under the Empire; and its first Chancellor, appointed by the Decree of March 17, 1800, was "Monsieur Vilbert, Bishop of Cambray."

Above the *École Spéciale* and the *Faculties* came the Institute, established in 1795. By its publications, its reports, its correspondence with learned and foreign societies, the higher standard it set for study and research, and above all to the authority it derived from the inclusion of the most illustrious names in branches of learning, the Institute was intended to be the permanent, living, and active representative of literature, science, and art. It comprised three "classes," physical sciences and mathematics, moral and political sciences, literature and the fine arts. The second class was disliked by Bonaparte, for it contained all the most notorious ideologues. By the consular order of January 23, 1800, it was suppressed; and its members were distributed among the other branches, which were henceforward to be four in number, resembling in their attributes the Academies of former times. The class of physical and mathematical sciences carried on the old Academy of Sciences; that of French language and literature, the French Academy; that of ancient history and literature, the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres; that of Fine Arts, the old Academies of painting, sculpture, and architecture.

It would seem to have been Napoleon's wish that the Institute should take an active part in the work of government. "The Institute cannot refuse what is asked of it," he wrote in a famous note, dated April 19, 1807; "it is bound by the terms of its constitution to respond to any demands made upon it by the Ministry of the Interior." Nevertheless, the active participation of the Institute was actually confined to the editing of general reports on the progress of literature, science, and art, and to the distribution of prizes.

Thus, then, the labours of the intellect, the work of education and criticism, and the formal recognition of these results, were entrusted to organized bodies acting by order of the Government. It followed inevitably that all expression of opinion uttered outside these organized bodies was subject to rigorous scrutiny. The two Censorships established on April 3, 1800, at the Ministry of the Interior for theatres, and at the Ministry of Police for the press, discharged their duties uninterruptedly; and police supervision was naturally extended to all printed publications. This however was not enough; and to Napoleon's eye a fresh series of regulations appeared necessary. He began with the theatres. The imperial note of February 23, 1806, and the Decrees of June 8, 1806, April 23, July 23, and November 1, 1807, established a truly extraordinary system. In Paris there was to be only eight theatres, viz. four "Grand Theatres" (the Opéra, the Théâtre Français, the Opéra Comique, and the Odéon), and four "Secondary Theatres." Every theatre was to have a special character of its own, defined by the Minister of the Interior. All plays had to be supervised by the police before production.

In the departments, five towns were to be entitled to two permanent theatrical companies each, fourteen other towns to one company each. The Empire was divided into twenty-five theatrical areas, twelve of which were to be allowed two strolling companies each, and thirteen one company each. The companies and their repertoires were placed under the supervision of the police and the Ministry of the Interior, the prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors.

But the Decree of February 5, 1810, which organised the general censorship of printing and publishing, was stricter still. The number of printers was limited: in Paris it was not to exceed sixty. Printers had to take out licenses and to swear an oath; and candidates for licenses might not take the oath "until they had given proof of their capacity, moral character, and attachment to their country and their sovereigns." Bookellers also were to be licensed and sworn, but their number was not restricted. Before being printed, every work had to be submitted to the General Censorship, and, in case of appeal, to the Minister of the Interior; but, even after permission given, the general police and the prefects could suspend publication. The severity shown by the General Censorship and the police in dealing with intellectual activity was almost incredible.

Down to 1810, newspapers had remained subject to the régime established under the Consulate, but the supervision of the police tended always towards greater rigour. Censors and official editors were forced upon the principal journals. After 1810 the control of the press became still more severe. Outside Paris the number of newspapers was reduced to one for each department; and this was placed under the control of the prefect by the Decree of August 3, 1810. After October, 1811, there were only four newspapers left in Paris—the *Moniteur*, the official organ; the *Journal des Débats*, now called *Journal de l'Empire*; the *Journal de Paris*, which dealt chiefly in gossip; and the old *Gazette de France*, which gave special prominence to religious news. Going one step further still, the Decree of February 18, 1811, appropriated the *Journal de l'Empire*, without giving any compensation to the brothers Bertin, its proprietors. Finally, the Decree of September 17, 1811, confiscated all the other Paris newspapers. From that moment the Press may be said to have ceased to exist. Political news was only published at rare intervals and only with the Government's consent; and each word was often false.

Is it astonishing if a régime such as that we have just described hampered the free expression of ideas? It was no mere coincidence that Chateaubriand and Madame de Staël, the two most distinguished writers of the Napoleonic era, belonged to the Opposition.

In 1801 Chateaubriand, a former *émigré*, had published *Atala*, an episode detached from *Le Génie du Christianisme*, which first saw the light in 1802, about the time of the promulgation of the Concordat; his demonstration of the poetic beauty and civilising power of the

Catholic religion therefore appeared at the right psychological moment. Chateaubriand then entered the diplomatic service, but resigned after the murder of the Duc d'Angoulême. He now published *Basil*, another fragment of *Le Génie*; and, having formed the project of writing *Les Martyrs*, a kind of romantic prose epic depicting the antagonism between the Christian and pagan worlds, he set out for the Holy Land. This was in 1805. Returning to Paris in 1807, he published, in 1809, *Les Martyrs*, and in 1811 his travelling impressions under the title of *Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem*. His diatribe for Napoleon had become inevitable; but, though he took little pains to disguise it, he was not subjected to any persecution, for, being in no sense a man of action, he was politically harmless. Moreover, his pride kept him aloof from affairs. But, just because all he wrote reflected his own personal views, and because he had a marvellous gift for reproducing, with the precision of a painter and the sensibility of an artist, his impressions of nature and of history, he succeeded, at least to a large extent, in stamping his mode of thought and feeling upon his contemporaries. The effect of his work did not reach its height until the next generation; but during the Napoleonic era he stood for reaction against what he called the narrow scepticism of the eighteenth century. He rediscovered, so to speak—possibly, indeed, in a manner exceeding more of literature than of genuine religious belief—the living God of the Christian, and substituted Him for the Supreme Being of the philosophers and for the obsolete apologetics of the men of letters. He shook himself free from the crotchets and forms of the classicism. History was to him only the past returned to life; and this past he made others see as he himself saw landscape, colour, sunlight. Lastly, whatever he did was stamped in his personality, his aloofness, his disinterestedness. French Romanticism springs from Chateaubriand.

Madame de Staël was also a romanticist. Resigned from Paris under the Consulate, she made her home at Coppet, whence she travelled in Germany, Italy, even in France. She had published her treatise, *De la Littérature considérée dans ses rapports avec les Constitutions Politiques* in 1800, and two novels, *Delphine* in 1802, and *Gertrude* in 1807. In 1810, having finished her book on Germany, she ventured to return to France, and settled near Hain, where immediately her friends flocked round her, as of old at Coppet. Solitude was distasteful to her; she needed conversation and the stir of life. It was for this reason that Napoleon dealt more severely with her than with Chateaubriand. The Grand Censorship was on the point of authorizing the publication of *De l'Allemagne*, when the police, at the Emperor's instigation, interposed its veto (1809). Madame de Staël was forced to return to Coppet, where she was kept under strict surveillance; and Madame Récamier was banished from Paris (1811) for having gone to see her friend. In 1812 Madame de Staël escaped, travelling through various countries to England, where she published *De l'Allemagne* in 1813.

What a strange spectacle was the struggle between the all-powerful Emperor and this woman! To the whole of Europe Madame de Staël personified opposition to the despot. In France, since all political activity had become impossible, she played another part. Supremely intelligent drawing her intellectual nourishment from the talk of the most distinguished men of her day, a Parisian by choice, a traveller by necessity Madame de Staël developed into a French-speaking cosmopolitan. Perceiving that the classical rules which tradition had forced upon literary expression in France were not absolute, and that each people, each generation, has its own individuality, she distinguished between the mental attitude of the Latin and that of the Teuton, she revealed Germany to France, and made the Romantics of the North (she was the first to use the word in its modern sense) acceptable to the classic taste of the Latin north. Like the philosophers of the eighteenth century, she believed in the boundless progress of humanity; and in her march of European literature was an harmonious concert, to which each people contributed its peculiar note. She broke down barriers, she opened out horizons. She sowed the seeds of new ideas, and she believed in their force. She could not conceive of politics divorced from morals, or of morals divorced from religion. She was at once a *liberal* and a believer. In the noblest sense of the word she was an idealogue.

But, for the present, literature still dragged on in the rut of these honoured formulas. Its revolution only came after the fall of Napoleon. Most of the poets of the time are forgotten to-day. Some signs there were, perhaps, which spoke of a revival of lyric poetry, in the work of Chénier, Millevoye, and even Fontanes; but Dactyl, who (after Voltaire) made Shakespeare known in France, and *the official* Lebrun "the French Pindar," had almost ceased to write. *The Journal* was suspended. The birth of the King of Rome inspired *Madame de Staël* to write for the occasion, which brought in 88,480 francs in *subsidy* to authors.

Professional literary criticism, whether it drew *the first line* the Voltairean tradition, was abandoned in the controversy of the past; Giampetro devoted himself to the study of Italian literature; Sismondi, a friend of Madame de Staël, to the history of the Italian Republics; Bert, though Bentham scolded the praises of Charlemagne and his Palatine, of Henri Quatre and other monuments of the past, there does not exist a single national historical work of that time worthy of mention.

As for philosophy, the sensualistic school of the eighteenth century which claimed to explain everything by sensation, was represented by idealogue like Volney, Gerdil, Saint-Lambert, Laromiguière, Paul de Gisors, by Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy, whose *idéologie*, or Science of Ideas, appeared in 1801. The idealogue were free-thinkers in religion and liberals in politics. "A band of libertines," Napoleon called them, "who sigh from the bottom of their souls for liberty of the press and of speech, and believe in the omnipotence of public opinion."

A new doctrine, reactionary both in politics and religion, was formulated by de Bonald and Joseph de Maistre. A poetic tendency showed itself in the works of Saint-Martin, Ballanche, and Aesch. The psychological analysis of Maine de Biran and the spiritualism of Bayle-Collard introduced a philosophy which found a warm welcome at the University, and was long to remain the official doctrine. Lastly, Saint-Simon and Fourier, whose first publications, be it said, attracted no attention whatever, maintained certain ideas upon social organization which placed them among the pioneers of socialism.

The movement of ideas under Napoleon was, therefore, both interesting and varied; and we can often discern the beginnings of things for which the future was to be the richer. The scientific movement brilliantly maintained the progress of the eighteenth century. In mathematics, both pure and applied, astronomy, algebra, geometry, topography, physics, the generation which comprised men like Lalande (born in 1732), Lagrange, Méchain, Monge, Carnot, Delambre, Laplace, Laplace, and Carnot, together with that of Lacroix, Biot, Mélin, Poisson, Poisson, and Arago (born in 1786), could boast a brilliant constellation of stars of the first magnitude. The chemists, from Gayton de Morveau (born in 1767), Berthollet, Fourcroy, Chaptal, Davout the younger, Vauquelin, Berzelius-Lagrange, Thénard, Gay-Lussac, down to Chevreul (who was born in 1786, and died in 1826), combined laboratory experiments and scientific research with practical application of their results.

Natural science too advanced with rapid strides, thanks to the work of Cuvier in the field of comparative anatomy and paleontology, of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Latrobe in zoology, of Lamarck, who was the first to formulate the doctrine of evolution (1809), of Haly in meteorology, of Jussieu and the two Genevans, Candolle and Saussure, in botany. Among the physicians, Richat, whose anatomical treatise was epoch-making, and who died prematurely in 1808 at the age of 31, alone gained scientific distinction. The rest were little more than practitioners.

Turning to the *Finis Arts*, we find two theories dividing their holden into opposite camps. Quatremère de Quincy, whose *Essay on the Ideal* appeared in 1804, maintained a doctrine of ideal æsthetics. According to him, there exists an ideal beauty, absolute, eternal, and final. The beauty the ancients had succeeded in expressing; it was the duty of the moderns to rediscover it. The artist was bound to study things as they are, but only in the spirit of idealism, or in the light of an æsthetic law to which he must subordinate his own individual tastes and temperament. The naturalistic or liberal school led by its leader Étienne David, whose *Disquisition on the Art of Engraving* appeared in 1803. It aimed at reconciling the realisation of classic "beauty" with personal inspiration, with truth of expression and sincerity of observation. The public became interested in the controversy, but it

was not converted to the "ideal." The Government also possessed immense influence in this respect. Napoleon was indifferent to art in all its forms; but he thought it advisable to encourage it, in order to add splendour to his reign. The official art professions of Decorative, Director-General of Galleries and Museums, coincided with those of the Fine Art class of the Institute and of the *Académie des Beaux-arts*.

Thus it came about that out of the conflict of doctrines, the tastes of the public, and the influence of the Government, there was born an artistic style sufficiently original and definite to give to the reign of Napoleon that distinction which it lacked in literature. Like the Imperial regime itself, it was stiff and formal, solemn and sumptuous, declaratory, pompous and—fading! It only required a little romantic imagination or a little realistic truth to sweep it into oblivion. Nevertheless it had a beauty of its own, and it left its stamp on everything—as an official discourse by Fontaine as well as on the shape of a red-tail, on an overture by Méhul as well as on a picture by David. Theoretically it belonged to the "ideal" school, modified in practice by the "liberal" doctrine. In so far as it followed antique models, it may be said to be "ideal"; in so far as circumstances forced it to adapt those models to modern needs, it was "liberal"; and it displayed original beauty in proportion as this adaptation was complete.

For this reason the sculpture of the period does not count. Houdon (born in 1761) and Roland (born in 1760) belong to another generation. The architecture of the time exaggerated more and more the tendency of the preceding period to reproduce the monuments of antiquity; its best work was in the restoration and completion of existing monuments. It was in no sense original. It built a Greek temple and called it the Exchange; it copied Trajan's column to glorify the Grand Army; nothing could have been easier. Nevertheless there was a keen sense of decorative effect and a grandiose, harmonious *ensemble*, especially in the work of Napoleon's favourite architects, Percier and Fontaine. It was the same thing with the decorative arts. Furniture was stiff, uncomfortable, and pompous to the point of absurdity. But it is not in its place in the mean houses of the middle class. To judge it aright, we must picture it in its proper sphere, in the Imperial palace, surrounded by all the accessories which Fontaine and his fellow-workers were able to group in such imposing fashion. We must examine up before the eye of imagination the Court *fête* and the stately ceremonial. We must observe the uniforms and official costumes of the men, and the dress of the women, so original in its combination of modern elegance with classic design. In all this there is an artistic note, the note of the "Empire style," which belongs to the Empire alone, and is marvelously attuned to the Roman features of Napoleon.

In painting, Louis David (1748-1828) stood high above his contemporaries by right of genius, knowledge, and personal influence. His

was one of the protagonists of the Neoclassic school; but, whether he willed it or not, in his hands the orthodox doctrine subsided from its attitude of uncompromising rigidity. The aged Vien, born in 1718, to whom belonged the glory of having been David's master; Vincent, worthy but frigid; Regnaud, through whose currently classical work there still shined occasionally something of eighteenth century charm; and Lathière—all these were temperate idealists. Gros and Flaxmann, who lived till 1808 and 1809 respectively, were only the survivors of a bygone age: the day of that charming, delicate, dainty, but superficial eighteenth century art was over.

The generation of painters which followed belonged entirely to the classical school. The work of Ingres (born 1780) was attractive and brilliant. Girodet was a classicist and at the same time a man of genuine imagination—two elements which he never fully succeeded in reconciling. Gérard specialized in portraiture, as did Madame Vigée-Lebrun and Robert Lefèvre. Gérard, Regnaud's pupil, Girodet's master, and a confirmed "Davidian" to boot, was perhaps the most typical painter of the classical school. Gros (born in 1771) was the Emperor's favourite artist. He was a colorist, a realist, full of animation and a sense of the dramatic: full too of a sense of life and effort, even if occasionally somewhat theatrically exposed. Among the younger men, Ingres (born in 1780) and Horace Vernet (born in 1789) were already at the height of their powers, if not of their reputation. Lastly, in the Salons of 1804 and 1808, a quite young painter, Gérard's by name (born in 1799), exhibited epoch-making pictures: all romantic art is in them—thrilling, passionate, already triumphant. Thus in painting, as in literature, the First Empire saw the dawn of Romanticism, but with this difference, that in literature the classical school was definitely overthrown and sterile even before the Revolution, while in art its most glorious period is that of Napoleon.

It is interesting to find music developing vigorously side by side with painting. Napoleon's tastes lay rather in the direction of Italian music. He favoured men like Spontini, Cherubini, Salvi, Paisiello, and Delle-Maria. But the French school was brilliant; and the works of Cécile, Berlioz, Lasserre, and particularly of Méhul, with the comic operas of Delagrée, Gaveaux, Nicolo (whose real name was Boieldieu), and Bériollet, illustrated the best qualities of French music.

To complete the picture of France under the First Empire nothing now remains but to group together in their chronological order the principal events in her internal history. In this respect the only noteworthy incident of the first years of Napoleon's reign was the financial and economic crisis, to which, as we have seen, Napoleon speedily put an end on his return to France after the victory of Austerlitz. From January to September, 1805, the Emperor resided either in Paris or at one of the suburban palaces: and it was during this time that he

planned the two most important institutions of the new régime—the new nobility and the University. Then he set off to conduct the campaign in Prussia and Poland. He was absent from September, 1806, until July, 1807. He continued to govern the country from afar; and, in his correspondence, letters dealing with home affairs alternated with military orders and matters relating to the conduct and organization of the campaign. The Berlin Decree put the finishing touch to the new régime so far as internal affairs were concerned. The nobility, the University, the Continental System, and the Church transformed into the household of the State—these were the four basic columns on which the fabric of the Empire rested.

In spite of the master's absence, France was tranquil. We have only to note a few royalist movements of no real importance. At Bordeaux and in the west a royalist band was formed, with the aid of subsidies from Great Britain; La Rochejacquelein was its principal leader. But the police made short work of this disturbance. One obscure accomplice was shot (September 18, 1806); and La Rochejacquelein, in order to save his property from confiscation, went over to the Empire. In Brittany, Guilleminet the Clermont, a former companion of Georges Cadoudal, was taken prisoner and shot (January 4, 1808); La Hève Saint-Hilaire suffered the same fate on October 7, 1808. In Normandy d'Aché and Le Chevalier endeavored to effect a rising; and the poor old Marquise de Combray even went so far as to prepare a bedroom for His Majesty in her château at Tournebise. But the conspiracy ended in an act of highway robbery; the law had no difficulty in dealing with royalists reduced to robbing a stage-coach.

The material condition of the country was one of prosperity. On Napoleon's return, after Jena, Eylau, and Tilsit, he was welcomed with genuine enthusiasm. Everybody, perhaps even Napoleon himself, believed that the war which was just over was to be the last. The national *fièvre* on the occasion of the Emperor's birthday (August 15) was celebrated in 1805 with unbounded splendor. Speaking in the name of the Legislative Body, Fontanes, in the address which he presented to Napoleon, exclaimed "for less the conqueror than the peace-maker of Europe." Practical as ever, the Emperor took advantage of his renewed popularity to suppress the Tribunats. He made, besides, several changes in the personnel of his government. Talleyrand was appointed Vice-Guard of the Seal, Berthier Vice-Constable; Champagny became Foreign Minister, and Clarke Minister for War. Götter replaced Champagny at the Ministry of the Interior; and Bignon de Préaumont succeeded the deceased Portalis as Minister of Public Worship. These selections were not all the happiest imaginable; Clarke could not compare with Berthier. Talleyrand was not exactly dispossessed; but his elevating to the title of a Grand Magistral, specially created for him, removed him to a certain extent from close contact with affairs, and his insupportable volatility as



longer tempered his master's rough diplomacy. The promotions of 1807 usher in a second generation of Napoleon's servants.

Soon after his return from a short journey in Italy (December, 1807), the Emperor put the finishing touches to the two institutions which were to consolidate his work—the nobility and the University (March, 1808). Then he set out for Bordeaux and Bayonne. We know the business he had in view; we know too the disastrous consequences which his intervention in Spain held in store for him. He was away from April to August, 1808. His absence was marked in Paris by a characteristic episode. An old Jacobin, Ewe Demolillo, had gathered round him a band of republicans, including General Claude-François de Malet, an officer who had been cashiered for his republican opinions. The conspirators, flattering themselves that they had the support of the ill-fated group in the Senate, drew up a Senate Constitution proclaiming the dethronement of Napoleon, reestablishing the Republic, and calling the people together in their electoral colleges. A provisional government, in which La Fayette, Moreau, Malet, and other republicans were to take part, was to preserve order, make peace with foreign Powers, and emancipate the conquered countries. A proclamation to the army was drafted. What was the precise extent of the plot? It is impossible to say. Malet seems to have belonged to a secret society known as the *philosophes*, who carried on republican traditions. Fouché was a free-mason. Did the conspirators really think they could count on his support? One thing is certain: it was Deloche, not Fouché, who discovered the plot (June 8, 1808). Deloche arrested the conspirators and informed the Emperor of the affair; this time he had real hopes of ousting his rival at the Ministry of Police. But Fouché, more fortunate than in 1804, succeeded in persuading Napoleon that the plot was of no importance; the prisoners were not tried, and the affair was hushed up.

The Emperor returned to Paris through the departments of the west, but started again immediately, only allowing himself time to celebrate the 18th of August, and to order a brief levy of troops, now for the first time calling up two classes in advance. Already the consequences of the Spanish policy were plainly visible. In close succession the tidings of the capitulation of Baylen and the connection of Castro burst on the French people. Could it be possible that victory no longer attended the eagles of France? "Public opinion," wrote Malet, one of Napoleon's secret agents, "is sick with anxiety"; and he added these significant words: "If one were asked to describe the moral condition of France, one would have to say that the only dupes left are those who still base their calculations on popular credulity." Shortly afterwards Napoleon hurried to the Congress of Erfurt (September 22) where he seemed to be in very truth the master of Europe. On his return to Paris he opened the session of the Legislative Body (October 22). One phrase in the address presented by Fouché in answer to the speech from

the throne destined to be remembered. "Already you are on the point of leaving France once more—France which during so many years has seen you for so few days. You are sitting out; a vague fear, born of loss and tempered by hope, troubles all our hearts." Beneath the cautious dissimulation of the President of the Legislative Body the general sentiment was plainly visible. On October 29 Napoleon left Paris for Spain. Never had his life been marked by such feverish activity. The year 1806 was to be the turning point of the Empire.

To all those, not blinded by servile devotion, who had the true interests of France at heart and some power of divining the future, two facts made themselves more and more apparent: Napoleon's policy was becoming extremely dangerous; and no provision had been made for the contingency that the one man on whom everything depended might disappear from the scene. Talleyrand and Fouché had the courage to look the matter in the face. Their notions could hardly be disinterested. In their thought of the morrow their first instinct was hesitation to retain the high positions to which Napoleon had raised them; but, if they kept their private fortunes in view in case anything should happen to Napoleon, they thought at the same time of the fortunes of France. There was no love lost between the two men; but they met and talked things over. They agreed to ignore Joseph's, Louis, and Jerome, who were neither capable nor popular, and come to an understanding, it seems, to prefer Maret to Bernadotte. The Emperor got wind of these confabulations, and his anger knew no bounds. He returned at full speed, his campaign scarcely over. On January 28 he attacked Talleyrand in public with unprecedented violence. Though removed from the position of Grand Chamberlain, Talleyrand continued to go to Court; but he never forgiven, and if a secret, he was henceforth an implacable enemy. As for Fouché, whether out of prudence or contempt, Napoleon spared him yet once more.

Before four months were over, the Emperor set off again for the front; no one in France knew why. By an administrative order, drawn up at the moment of his departure (April 13, 1806), Napoleon had, as usual, appointed Cambacérès as his deputy. Ministers were to correspond with the Emperor direct, but to meet once a week under the presidency of the Arch-Chancellor. It so happened that Crétet, Minister of the Interior, fell ill soon afterwards; Napoleon put Fouché in his place (June 22). There it came about that the two most important ministerial offices were united under the same chief; and for the first time in the history of the reign there was a chief, if not a Prime Minister.

The royalists had not yet lost all hope. Louis XVIII., at this time a refugee in England, never ceased to look for the active support of the British Government. But royalist emissaries in France continued to be seized and shot; the Jersey agency, which had been at work since 1793, disappeared. Fouché's energy and skill had enabled him to suppress,

was for all, the royalist subterfuge; and this was the chief reason why Napoleon had continued to trust him. Fouché made the most of the situation. The long-expected English landing actually took place, but at Walcheren (July 22, 1806), not in Belgium. Flushing was invested (August 6), Antwerp threatened. While the other ministers hesitated, Fouché ordered a levy of the National Guard in the north-eastern departments and in Paris, and afterwards in the south, on the pretext that another English landing was possible at Marseilles; he also issued orders for the reinforcement of the National Guard in Paris.

These measures were obviously out of all proportion to defensive needs. Let but an accident happen to Napoleon, and Fouché was master of France. As a matter of fact, on October 18, the youth Staps attempted to assassinate Napoleon at Schönbrunn. When the alarm was given, Napoleon, who at the outset had supported Fouché (he had made him Duke of Ottranto on August 18), intervened in his turn. He disbanded the National Guard, and sent Montellier to the Interior (October 1), but he did not disgrace Fouché. He preferred to hide his eyes.

On October 30, 1806, Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau. When, some hours later, the Empress Josephine rejoined her husband, she found the door of communication between her room and that of the Emperor walled up. Napoleon had decided upon a divorce. For a long time he had been possessed by the idea, for upon him, too, lay like a dead weight the terrible question of the future. What did it profit to have founded an hereditary Empire if he could not secure the succession? If we are to trust Masson, Napoleon had for a long time believed himself incapable of having issue. At first he seems to have intended to settle the question of the succession by means of adoption. It was with this idea that on January 28, 1804, he adopted Prince Eugene, who henceforth called himself Eugene-Napoleon, as his successor on the throne of Italy. At that time, the heir-presumptive to the throne of France was, to all appearance, Napoleon-Charles, the son of Louis Bonaparte and Hortense. But Napoleon-Charles died on June 3, 1805, when scarcely five years old. Now, on December 15, 1806, one of Napoleon's mistresses gave birth to a son, Léon, whose imperial origin it was impossible to doubt. Napoleon therefore gave up the idea of adoption in favour of the natural succession from father to son. But from that moment divorce became a necessity. Fouché, who guessed what was in his master's mind, had been spreading abroad the rumour of an approaching divorce since July, 1807, and even had the assurance to speak of it to Josephine herself. Napoleon allowed him, but the idea had been launched; and now the hour had struck for its execution.

The days that followed were a veritable torture for the unhappy Josephine. Up to the very end she had to play the part of Empress; and just at that precise moment there were great festivities about in

honour of the Peace of Vienna. Napoleon suffered also. He was full of tenderness and pity for Josephine; he was moved by the memories of long years spent in common. A heartrending scene took place between husband and wife on November 30, 1809; but Napoleon did not reverse his decision. He dispensed with the formalities laid down by the Civil Code and went to work in a different fashion. On December 16, 1809, after a family council held the evening before, the Senate passed a Senate Consultum annulling the civil divorce; and the religious separation was pronounced shortly afterwards by authority of the Metropolitan (January 24, 1800). Josephine retired to Malmaison. Her beauty, her winning charms, her wit, her gentleness, her tact and goodness of heart, had long ago obliterated the memory of her old frivolity of character and conduct. She had not proved herself unworthy of her amazing destiny. She was moreover greatly popular; and Napoleon's popularity, already somewhat diminished, suffered through this event.

The marriage with Marie-Louise, which had been stated in January, 1810, and settled in February, took place at Vienna, by proxy, on March 11. The civil ceremony was repeated at Saint-Cloud on April 1; the religious, on the 19th, in the chapel of the Tuilleries. Napoleon was happy and hopeful, and passed his time in a whirl of festivities. He never doubted that he would have a son. So early as February 17, 1810, a Senate Consultum proclaimed the incorporation of the Roman States with the French Empire and announced that "the Prince Imperial was to bear the title and honours of the King of Rome."

On June 3, 1810, Napoleon proceeded to perform an act of execution. "I know," he wrote to Fouché, "all the many services you have rendered me.....nevertheless it is impossible for me, without loss of self-respect, to leave you in possession of your portfolio." By means of his agent, Fagan, formerly an English prisoner of war, and of Gervais the speculator, Fouché had kept up surreptitiously the intercourse with the British Cabinet which had possibly already begun at the time of the Waltham affair. Napoleon did not know all this, and therefore still preserved a certain regard for Fouché's amplexibility. He was to be punished for his overbearing attitude in 1809. The letter of June 3 was couched in moderate language; and Fouché obtained by way of compensation the Governorship of Rome and the title of Minister of State (June 4). But, when a subsequent enquiry revealed the Minister's performances in detail, the Emperor flew into a violent rage. Fouché fled, taking refuge first in Italy, and even contemplating a further flight to America; later, on his return to France, he received orders to retire to Aix in his own senatorial district (August 27), where he sought and found oblivion. His diagnosis was absolute. After Talleyrand, Josephine, after Josephine, Fouché. Of these three captures the last was undoubtedly the most serious. Madelin, Fouché's latest biographer, has constituted himself his apologist; and the view he holds is by no means wholly

suggested. Fouche was, in regard to internal politics, by far the most important personage in the reign of Napoleon; and, if his fidelity, in spite of all his services, never rang quite true, the reasons may have been that he was never wholly subservient. It must be admitted that no one could have combined with more astonishing discretion to throw an air of moderation over the work of his formidable office. He never abused his discretionary powers, and he placed under obligations even of all groups. It is not the least of the paradoxes of that time, so rich in contrasts, that the downfall of the former terrorist and atheist caused genuine regrets even in the reactionary and clerical ranks of the *Embourg Saint-Germain*.

Fouche's successor was General Savary, that man of passive obedience of whom report has it that Napoleon said, "I like him: he would kill his own father if I bade him." The story is not authentic, but its circulation throws a terrible light on Savary's character. Nonetheless, clearly, Napoleon intended everyone to bow to his will in all things. Dabain, who had so long hoped for Fouche's place, met, some after, with the same fate as his rival. Napoleon replaced him (October 16) by Pasquier, formerly *Councillor in the Parliament of Paris*, afterwards a member of the Council of State—an appointment no less characteristic than that of Savary. Pasquier came of an old royalist family. The young officials who were now entering the public service often came of the same stock. Full of pride at being the husband of an aristocrat, Napoleon was glad to recruit his staff from the old nobility, and he never troubled himself as to whether these aristocratic royalists were sincere converts or not. The tone of the whole became reactionary, anti-revolutionary, clerical. When, finally, the aged General Fournard had succeeded the young *Portails* in the General Councilship (January 11, 1813), when, in a last administrative shuffle, Napoleon had sent the duc de Mout to the Foreign Office, while Dava took his place as Secretary of State, and Champagny fell from the exalted post of Foreign Minister into that vacated by Dava, the evolution was complete. It may be summed up in two phrases, *obedience even more absolute than in the past to the Imperial authority; reaction, both aristocratic and monarchial*.

This transformation was the more noteworthy in that it coincided with a vigorous renewal of the Emperor's organizing and administrative activity. It was high time: the Empire had become enormous in extent. In 1806 the occupation of Genoa had enlarged it from 686,000 square kilometres and 168 departments, to 840,000 square kilometres and 170 departments; that of Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany (1808) to 688,000 square kilometres and 115 departments; that of Holland, north-western Germany, the Papal States, and Valais (1810) to 780,000 square kilometres and 120 departments. The population was estimated by Moutonnet at 44,700,000 in 1812, of which total 26,700,000 were ascribed to old France.

It will be noted that not a single Imperial institution dates from the year 1806. This is not owing to chance. There were two periods in

Napoleon's internal policy, separated from one another by a veritable gulf. From 1806 to 1808 he devoted himself to welding together and strengthening the Imperial system; after 1808 he reorganised the method of government, but he added nothing to the existing Constitution. If we consider the establishment of the *lesces* system (January 18, 1810), of the *domains extraordinaires* (January 30), of the *back-ownership* (February 5), of state prisons (March 3), and all the later measures, are we not now thrown all up in the one word Absolutism? The State was omnipotent: its interests overrode all private interests, all civil rights, just as long ago it had suppressed all political rights. For the first time since the establishment of the Empire, Napoleon had some leisure. From 1809 to 1811 he resided in Paris, or in one or other of his suburban palaces, Saint-Cloud, Fontainebleau, Compiègne, or Trianon. But he was no longer as active as he had been. He began to get on his feet, and to develop a liking for good food: he dined constantly. His pride became overbearing; and, absorbed in himself, he no longer saw men or things as they were. Yet he allowed no one to do anything but himself.

The birth of the King of Rome, on March 20, 1811, raised the mental intoxication of Napoleon to a climax. The dream of his life was realised. Since November 20, 1810, a *Maison des Enfants de France* had been in existence, its title copied textually from the ceremonial of the old French monarchy. The *five* in honour of his birth were confined to the exclusive Court circle, and had no connexion with the public festivities arranged for the people of Paris. There was no trace of popular enthusiasm; no one used for either Marie-Louise or the King of Rome. To make his isolation complete, Napoleon, after his divorce, quarrelled with every member of his family in turn, even with the uxorious Eliza, who was not allowed to come to Paris for the christening. But this state of things was by no means disastrous to the Emperor of Austria's son-in-law, the father of the King of Rome.

In reality, the position was growing more and more disquieting. To speak only of France proper, the population was suffering sorely from the effects of the Continental System and the continued war. Commercial activity was falling off. Industry was entering upon a critical phase; and the manufacture of articles of luxury, in Paris and Lyons, was the first branch to feel the strain. The harvest of 1821 was bad. Napoleon came to the rescue in his characteristic fashion. A new Ministry of Manufactures and Trade was created in June, 1811, though it had no head until January, 1812, when Gille de Beury was appointed to the post. A Food Commission was secretly organised, with a view to securing an adequate food-supply for Paris (August 20, 1811). Loans were made to manufacturers, amounting to 18,000,000 francs in 1812, scarcely half of which had been repaid at the close of the Empire. The Food Commission purchased corn with a view to restricting the public granaries. Wheat rose from 78 francs (a price already above the average) to 80 francs the

sack (equal to about 2 bushels). Frightened by the rise, the Commission resold, surreptitiously, at 75 francs. On this looking out, belief in an imminent famine became general, and prices rose still further, until they reached 140 francs per sack in 1811. The Decrees of March 16, May 4 and 8, 1811, aimed at remedying this state of things, by limiting the use of grain in the distilleries, by keeping a watch over circulation and sale, and finally by fixing the maximum price at 80 francs per hectolitre, i.e. about 95 francs per sack. Napoleon was thus obliged to revert to the old device of a maximum fixed by law. The year 1811 was a year of scarcity. In Paris more than 50,000 workmen (goldsmiths, makers, goldsmiths, etc.) were out of employment. Nor were the other industrial centres much better off.

The economic crisis had already become acute when Napoleon set forth on the invasion of Russia (May 9, 1812). News of the expedition was so meagre as it was false, a circumstance of which Malet determined to take advantage. After being in prison for 18 months he had obtained leave to move to the "house" kept by Dr Delabranche, at the farther end of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. There he had made acquaintance with several other political prisoners, to whom the same privilege of living under the doctor's surveillance had been granted. Almost all of them were royalists or clericals; among them were the two Polignacs, who had conspired with Cadoudal, and the Abbé Lafon, who had been arrested for papalistic intrigues. A new plot was formed with the aid of certain young men who visited the prisoners while under the doctor's roof.

Malet remodelled the documents which had been framed in 1808—the Edictious Senatus Consultum, the list of the provisional government (to which he added the names of Montmorency, Fouché and others), and the appeal to the army. He no longer proposed to proclaim the Republic, but to grant permission to all *émigrés* to return to France, and to send a deputation to the Pope begging him to pardon the errors to which he had been subjected, and to pass through Paris on his way back to Rome—was this for the purpose of restoring Louis XVIII? The scheme of 1808 had, in fact, undergone so many changes that it became a question whether Malet had not turned royalist. The truth was that, for the time being, royalists and republicans had agreed to combine their efforts so far as the summoning of the Electoral Assembly, which, Napoleon once overthrown, were to decide authoritatively, either for the reestablishment of the Republic or the restoration of Louis XVIII. Malet laid his plans with extreme care. He drew up beforehand a number of forged summonses, to which he succeeded in giving an appearance of perfect authenticity. He even arranged for a detachment to be sent to Saint-Cloud for the protection of Marie-Louise. Why then did he not succeed? Was success more improbable than the very existence of the plot?

When all was ready, Malet escaped under cover of night from

Duboussé's home, went to a friend's house to put on his uniform once more, and then without any other companions sent two youths, presented himself at one of the barracks occupied by the National Guard (October 23, 1815). He opened the old Commandant Soulier, informed him that Napoleon had died before Moscow, and ordered him to hand over his men. Soulier obeyed. Malet took command of the troop and marched straight to La Harpe in order to set at liberty two generals imprisoned there, viz. La Harpe, an ex-chief of staff under Masséna, and Gaidal, whose intimacy with both the royalists and the English in the north had aroused suspicion. Malet revived his fairy-tale for their benefit: and they, too, obeyed in their turn. La Harpe and Gaidal went to the Ministry of Police, arrested Savary and put him under lock and key: after which La Harpe went to the Prefecture of Police to secure the person of Pasquier, while Gaidal raised Clarke at the War Office. At the Hôtel de Ville Pasquier was busy getting ready a hall for the reception of the provisional government. All seemed to be going perfectly when Malet himself spoiled the game. He had chosen as his own task the arrest of Hulin, commander of the Paris garrison. Hulin resisted: Malet laid him low with a pistol-shot. A tumult ensued. Two officers, suspecting the imposture, threw themselves upon Malet, recognized and denounced him. At 11 a.m. all was over. The punishment of the conspirators was vindictive. Twelve unfortunate accomplices, or rather dupes, were shot with Malet (October 29), among them Soulier, La Harpe, and Gaidal. It was not without some show of reason that, at the court-martial, when asked by Dujour, the president, who were his accomplices, Malet proudly replied, "You, yourself, Sir, and all France—if I had succeeded!"

This curious episode was not without its bearing upon Napoleon's decision sorely to desert the Grand Army in its disorderly retreat from Russia, and to return to Paris, where he arrived on the evening of December 18. His reply to the address of the conservative Senate (December 20), showed that he had grasped the true meaning of the Malet conspiracy. So long as the story of Napoleon's death was believed, Malet had no difficulty in making himself obeyed; and no one had dared for one single instant that, if Napoleon were dead, the King of Rome would, as a matter of course, succeed. One moment had sufficed to reveal the vanity of all the precautions taken by the Emperor to place his system on an enduring basis. Without him the whole structure would collapse. "Our fathers," he said to the Senate, "had for their rallying cry, 'The King is dead. Long live the King!' In those words the principal advantages of monarchy are summed up." But the real truth was that the people had no love for either Marie-Louise or the King of Rome. They were ignored; and it was this fact which lent to the Malet affair so grave a significance.

Still possessed by his dynastic ideas, Napoleon attempted to remedy



old state of things. He showed no severity towards anyone. The utmost he did was to replace Fouché by Chabrol. Instead of keeping Marie-Louise hidden behind a hedge of Court etiquette, he went abroad in her company, seizing every opportunity during the winter of 1802-3 of showing her to the Parisians, who could not fail to be charmed by her grace and simplicity. He conceived the idea of having his son crowned by the Pope in anticipation. By a *Senatus Consultum*, dated February 3, 1803, he established an Imperial Regency. In letters-patent in the event of the Emperor's enforced absence from home, by prescriptive right in the event of his premature death, the Empress-mother was to combine the care of her son during his minority with the Regency of the Empire, assisted by a Council of Regency composed of the Princes of the Blood, the Grand Dignitaries of the Empire, and other members appointed by the Empress either by letters-patent or in his will. Thus vanished the *ordre de service* in use since the Consulate, which, in the Emperor's absence, delegated the presidency to Cambacérès. The letters-patent of March 30, 1803, actually conferred the Regency upon Marie-Louise, with Cambacérès as her secret adviser.

Napoleon was absent from April 14 to November 9, 1803. France shattered, less from grief over her defeats, than from moral and physical exhaustion, after so many years of oppression. Nevertheless, a still further effort was expected of her: It was felt that only some performance quite out of the common could rouse public opinion. The session of the Legislative Body, due in 1802, was not held till February and March, 1803, and it was as completely insignificant as its predecessors. By way of contrast, Napoleon determined to give great magnificence to the session of 1803. By the *Senatus Consultum* of November 15, 1803, he announced that the Senate and Council of State would take part collectively in the Imperial conference of the Legislative Body. The idea of the three bodies meeting together, in a sort of national convention, in token to the words of its sovereign, was not without a certain grandeur; and it was legitimate to hope that the spectacle would make a profound impression not only upon France but upon Europe.

It is true that, by the same *Senatus Consultum*, the Emperor arrogated to himself the right to choose the President of the Legislative Body, thus withdrawing from the deputies their right of presentation. Regnier was selected for the presidency, though he was not a deputy but a Grand Judge. Thence resulted a general change in the Ministry—the last of the reign. Malo succeeded Regnier at the Ministry of Justice; Maret went back to the Secretaryship of State; Dumas replaced Lacaze (himself the successor of Dejean) at the Ministry of Marine Affairs; and Caulaincourt was installed at the Foreign Office. It was sort of ministerial shuffle, similar to those of 1800 and 1801. Ministry stability, which was the rule under the Consulate and during the years of the Empire, had now become the exception.

The Imperial session took place on December 18, 1813. "Everything has turned against us," the Emperor confessed. "No obstacle will be offered by me to the restoration of peace. . . . It is with regret that I ask fresh sacrifices at the hands of my generous people." By way of still more closely uniting Emperor and nation, Napoleon announced that all the original documents, now lying at the Foreign Office, relative to the recent negotiations with the Powers, would be laid before the Senate. The Decree of December 18 ordered the Senate and the Legislative Body to elect from their own ranks two commissions of five members each, to examine, with the aid of the two Presidents, the documents furnished by the Government.

In the Senate everything passed off as Napoleon hoped. The report of the Commission was approved at the sitting of December 21; and the Senate required in a body to the Emperor to express its gratitude and devotion. But in the Legislative Body matters turned out differently. The Councillors, who were all northerners, naturally professed by the charges offered them to express their views. When Bignon accused one of them of making an unconstitutional remark, the deputy retorted: "I am sensible of nothing more unconstitutional than you are yourself—*you who, in contempt of the law, come here to guide over the people's representatives without even possessing the right to sit amongst them.*" Here was novel language indeed! But it was even less surprising than Lainé's report. In this document the Emperor was invited, in very respectful terms, to declare that he would continue the war only "in order to preserve the independence of the French people and the integrity of French territory." If, however, the Coalition persisted in maintaining the offensive, France would not be found wanting. "Nevertheless," he continued, "this is not enough in itself to revive the national spirit"; and His Majesty is "implored to see to the constant and effectual execution of those laws by which liberty, personal security, and the rights of private property are assured to every Frenchman, and to the nation at large the undisturbed exercise of its political rights." Lainé's report, put to the vote on the 28th, was carried by 860 votes to 81. The division is all the more interesting from the fact that, at that time at any rate, there was no trace of opposition to the dynasty in the Legislative Body, and because the actual terms of the report had been drawn up with the assistance of the Government. The deputies, in fact, still remained loyal subjects of the Empire; they had merely put into words the passionate longing of the whole Empire for liberty and peace.

Nevertheless the report threw Napoleon into a violent passion. "In spite of the demands of moderation, urged by Cambacérès, he disapproved the publication of Lainé's report; on December 31 he returned the Legislative Body; and at the official new year's reception on January 1, 1814, he welcomed the deputies present with a cold and harsh. "You might have done me so much good, and yet

you have only done me harm! Do you represent the people? I am its representation. Four times have I been summoned by the nation: four times have I received the votes of five millions of citizens. I have a right to speak, and you have none. You are merely delegates of the departments...Your report is drawn up with an intention, a perfidy of intention which you do not yourselves realise. The loss of two battles in Champagne would have done less harm. ...Do you think by such complaints to raise the prestige of the throne? After all, what is the throne? Nothing but four pieces of gilded wood, covered with a scrap of velvet! The true throne rests on the nation's will, and you cannot separate me from the nation without doing it harm, for the nation has greater need of me than I have of the nation...With the enemy at your very doors, you ask for institutions! As if we had no institutions already! Perhaps you want to copy the Constituent Assembly and start a revolution! You would find no resemblance whatever between me and the Sun King. I should abdicate at once, for I would infinitely rather take my place among the Sovereign People than remain a royal slave!...Go back to your departments." One can feel the anger that vibrated through this passionate eloquence. In truth Napoleon was a great orator, just as, judged by the evidence of certain of his letters and by his despatches, he was a great writer. His imagination was full of romanticism; and his literary style went straight to the point without the meaningless embellishments of the classical school. But on this particular occasion his speech was even more impetuous than eloquent. The deputies went back to their departments, but in quite as angry a mood as that evoked by the Emperor. The speech of January 1, 1814, marked, in fact, the rupture between Napoleon and the French middle-class.

Before returning to the front, Napoleon planned, even more carefully than the year before, the line of action to be followed in his absence. Twenty-two Senators or Councillors of State were sent, in the capacity of extraordinary commissioners, to the military districts which had not yet been invaded by the enemy, to hasten on the conscription and the organisation of the National Guard (December 25, 1813). In Paris the National Guard was mobilised (January 4, 1814). The regency was again vested in Marie-Louise, assisted by Cambronne and King Joseph. On January 25, 1814, Napoleon left Paris; and henceforth the history of his reign is merely the record of war and invasion.

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE CODES.

THE codification of French law, if it was probably the most *desirable*, was certainly not the most surprising manifestation of Napoleon's energy. It was the fulfilment of an aspiration, as old at least as the fifteenth century, and partially realised by the edicts of kings and the treatises of jurists—an aspiration for the legal unity of France, for "one weight, one measure, one law." To this ideal the Revolution imparted a fresh and powerful impulse. The birth of the new nation, the triumph of the new civic enthusiasm, the victory of philosophic reason, seemed to demand a code of uniform laws suitable to an enlightened people. At the same time, all those social obstacles which had hitherto stood in the path of legal unity were swept away—provincialism and feudalism, caste and corporation, the wealth and influence of the Church, the power and prestige of the Crown. The whole law of property and of persons was remodelled by the Revolutionary Assembly under the stress of a democratic theory as coherent as it was imperious.

The land was liberated from feudal dues and tithes; and its freedom was secured by the prohibition of all perpetual and irrevocable rents. The corporate property of the Church and of the rural communities passed almost entirely into the hands of the State, and was thrown placed into the market. Again, as the land was freed to guard against tyranny, so it was divided to promote equality. The Roman law of succession, which was favourable to testamentary freedom and therefore to inequality, was set aside; and the egalitarian tendencies of the *Customs* were developed and sharpened. Wills were almost entirely forbidden; the distinction between moveables, acquisitions, and patrimonial property was abolished; and the inheritance, considered as a uniform mass of property, was to be divided equally among the heirs. Still further to promote territorial equality, representation was declared to be infinite in the direct line; donations were to be returned to the donor; natural children were recognised, and gifts to the rich prohibited. Thus, while the law fortified the proprietor during his lifetime, it weakened his influence after death.

Equally sweeping were the changes which came over the law of persons. Under the monarchy, sex and nationality, social status and professional calling, had created legal inequalities between French subjects. In virtue of the *droit d'aubaine*, a foreigner could not inherit a legacy or execute a will, or transmit his property save to children born in France. The division of persons into three orders—clergy, nobility, and *third état*—carried with it fiscal and political inequalities and also some differences of civil status. The dead was dead to civil life; and in the mountains of the Jura there lingered a last remnant of serfdom. In several Customs, the rule of inheritance differed according as the person concerned was noble or roturier. Religion, which gave privileges to the Catholics, brought penalties to the Protestant and the Jew. The civil disabilities of women were many. Not all these tributes, manifold, and unreasonable distinctions were swept away by the Revolutionary Assembly. The *droit d'aubaine* was suppressed; the division between the three orders was effaced; and monks were restored to civil life. Religious toleration took the place of the intolerant privilege of the Catholic religion. The clergy were permitted to marry; and marriage itself, being declared a civil contract, passed into the domain of state control. Divorce and adoption were introduced to the world of the Catholic world; and the care of the registers of births, marriages, and deaths was transferred from the Church to lay officials. A secular State based upon a large private property, a civil law emancipated from religious influences, a system of land tenure devised to secure the possession of equality, a law of persons, which proclaimed that all men had equal rights—such were the main results of a period of legislation experimental in history for its volume, its violence, its idealism, its splendid achievements, and its deplorable mistakes.

An atmosphere of great legislative fertility, of high passions and quick changes, is unfavourable to codification: and the draft codes of the Convention and the Directory received so little attention from the pre-occupied Assemblies to which they were successively submitted, that the revolution of Brumaire found France still waiting for that body of simple and clear laws which had been promised in the Constitution of 1791. Yet no one could doubt but that a code would eventually be enacted, even if three successive drafts had been assigned to limbo. Every Assembly had regarded the task as a solemn charge upon its conscience; and every sensible man felt—as one more than Cambacérès, the chief draftsman of the Convention—that in the Revolutionary legislation there was much to revise, to coordinate, and to secure. At the first calm moment the task could be completed. Indeed, immediately after the revolution of Brumaire, a committee was appointed to consider the reform of the Code and to report to the Legislative Commission.

There is perhaps no single document more significant of the temper of France upon the morning of Brumaire than the speech made by

Jacquemont in submitting his draft to the Commission. The reporter fully acknowledged that the work of his committee had been hasty and imperfect, but urged in extenuation that it was necessary to put an end to the scandal of the Revolutionary divorce laws, to restore to parental power its lawful authority, and to widen the liberty of testamentary bequest. So instantaneous was the reaction from Revolutionary excesses to the old and pertinacious tradition of French jurisprudence! The draft of Jacquemont was in itself of no consequence. Compared to the brief and unsettled interlude between the fall of the Councils and the establishment of the Consulate, and far inferior in elaboration and technique to the earlier work of Cambacérès, it was not even discussed for five minutes. The Legislative Commission was confronted with larger and more pressing problems; but it is well to remember that, before their task had been completed, and while the fragments of the Consular Constitution were still under discussion, the spirit which was destined to inform the *Code Napoléon* had spoken and revealed itself. The laws of France, as they had been left by the Revolutionary Assemblies, were to be coordinated and reduced to system; but philosophical idealism was to be corrected by juristic tradition, and the political enthusiasm of the passing hour utterly effaced. Law was to be the expression of settled national character, not of every passionate and casual mood.

### The Civil Code.

The desired moment of calm came after the battle of Marengo had secured the frontier of France, established the prestige of the Consulate, opened the avenue to an honourable peace, and liberated the energies of Bonaparte for the civil organisation of the State. On August 18, 1800, a committee of four lawyers, Tronchet, Portalis, Bigot de Préameneu, and Malville, was appointed to draw up a project of a Civil Code, with instructions to bring the work to a conclusion in the following November. Every committee has a head and a tail. Though Malville was a capable lawyer and afterwards distinguished as the first of a long line of commentators on the Code, and though Bigot's scholarship and pliancy were destined to be proved in more fields than one, the driving power in this committee lay with Tronchet and Portalis. Of these two men, Tronchet, the reasonable president of the *Orde de Cassation*, stood for passive learning, sound judgment, and conservative caution; while Portalis, if less eminent in knowledge than "the Narbonne of the aristocracy," was specially distinguished in the art of legal and philosophical exposition. "He would have been," said Napoleon, "the most eloquent censor in the Council if he had known when to stop"; but, more for its fluency, the chastened eloquence of the great Provençal jurist had little in common with the exaggerated rhetoric of the Clubs. Portalis was a thinker, a Catholic, and a conservative. A true parliamentarian,

in the French sense of the term, he had opposed legal unification in 1789 on the ground that a code would be the precursor of despotism; and ten years later, when the Directory was tottering to its fall, he expressed to a friend his earnest desire that a Liberator might be found to free France from the toils of Revolutionary legislation. It was certain that he viewed divorce with aversion, and that his will would be cast into the scale of moderate reaction towards the past. While Portalis and Maleville represented the legal traditions of the land of written law, Tranchet and Bigot had been trained in the *Parlement* and the Customs of Paris; and the Civil Code, which was the result of their labours, exhibits many traces of compromise between southern Teutonicism and the Latin inheritance of the south.

The draft of the Civil Code was completed in four months and printed on January 1, 1801. It was then, by order of Bonaparte, sent to the law-courts, which were invited to submit their criticisms and observations in the course of the next three months. In the light of this commentary the draft Code was then examined and revised by the legislative section of the Council of State, composed of Rodière, Berlier, Ekmery, Portalis, Réal, and Tribaudin; and, when this process was completed, it was submitted title by title to the whole body of the Council. It was at this stage that the provisions of the Code first came under the notice of Bonaparte.

Eye-witnesses have described the vivid and animated drama which was enacted whenever Bonaparte came down to preside over the Council-chamber in the Tuilleries. A click of arms, a roll of the drum under the arcades, and then, as the door opens, and the other rolls, and the councillors rise in salutation, the master steps briskly up to his green table on the dais, seats to Cambacérès on his right, to Lebrun on his left, signs to his Council to be seated, and with his "*allons, Messieurs, commençons*," sets the debate afloat. Under the Consulate, these discussions were free, vivacious, and unembarrassed; and, when the First Consul presided in person—and he presided over thirty-five of the eighty-seven sittings devoted to the Civil Code—they were generally prolonged till a late hour in the evening. His too was the most quickening spirit in debate. With little legal learning, save what he had gathered from sketches of reading or from the talk of Tranchet and Portalis, and devoid of the scholarly temper of the professional draftsmen, he possessed so luxuriant an intellectual nature, so lively a power of concrete vision, so keen an instinct for the large issues of politics, that his contributions to the discussion were a series of splendid surprises, occasionally appropriate and decisive, constantly involved in the glowing chaos of a dream, but always stamped with the mark of genius and glowing with the impulse of a fresh and impetuous temperament. Landry has indeed urged that the official report of the proceedings drawn up by Locré, the clerk of the Council, has imparted a correctness

to Bonaparte's language which did not belong to it, and has afforded the necessities which would have betrayed the novice in legislation. This is true. Bonaparte often talked at random, and some of his warmest admirers in the Council complained that he fatigued the attention of his audience by the confused abundance and the unexpected turns of his thought. On the other hand, it is equally true to say that the grave and dully language of the official reporter has robbed the First Consul of all his peculiar force and most of his originality.

"He spoke," says Thibauteau, "without embellishment and without pretension. He was never inferior to any member of the Council; he often equalled the ablest of them by the ease with which he seized the point of a question, by the justice of his ideas and the force of his reasoning; he often surpassed them by the turn of his phrases and the originality of his expression." At one moment he would embark upon the most adventurous of intellectual cruises; at the next he would propound some *prima legal* definition. Here would be a flash of anger; here a string of anecdotes; here a friendly passage of badinage punctuated by scoff-taking; here a flight of gaudy rhetoric. But the prevailing impression left on the reader of these debates is the union in the mind of the chief debater of hard-headed common sense with imaginative vision. He thinks, not in legal rules but in concrete cases, keeping always in sight the gain and loss to the whole State, the political advantages and disadvantages to France. "You act as law-makers," he cried once, "not as statesmen. It is by speaking to the soul that men are decided." He was in fact the master of genius, learning as he went along, throwing off opinions as sparrows fly from the awl, shaking himself free from the views of yesterday if they embarrassed him or were plainly overpowered, but always capable of making a contribution to the discussion by his clear power of seeing principles as they would work themselves out in the life of the individual or the State. "I first thought," he avowed, "that it would be possible to reduce laws to simple geometrical demonstrations, so that whoever could read and tie two ideas together would be capable of pronouncing on them; but I almost immediately convinced myself that this was an absurd idea"; and in one of the last sittings of the Council he pronounced what legal opinion has felt to be the true criticism on the Code itself. "I often perceived that over-simplicity in legislation was the enemy of precision. It is impossible to make laws extremely simple without cutting the knot oftener than you untie it, and without leaving much to uncertainty and arbitrariness." Yet Bonaparte's appreciation of the complexity of the task was only equalled by his impatience to dispatch it without delay.

As each Title of the Code passed the Council, it was submitted successively to the Tribunal and the Legislative. The spirit of these two assemblies was in the early days of the Consulate tolerably independent; and the debates of the Tribunal were often distinguished by



discrepancy and savings. As the Tribunats had been provided with copies of the first draft, they had ample leisure to mature their objections; and it was expected that they would assail the Code for its lack of originality, its distance to tradition, and its departure from some of the Revolutionary innovations. To disarm criticism of this kind, Portalis pointed out that the *Provisional Code* had respected historic forms and even local customs; that moderation was a quality essential to the legislator; and that the temporary laws of the Revolution were like piles floating in a stormy sea. Nevertheless, the Tribunats proceeded to level a volley of well-aimed criticism against the first two "Titles," or laws, which were presented to them. It was objected against the First—which dealt with the publication, the effects, and the application of laws in general—that its scope was too wide; that its character, consisting largely of moral and legal maxims, was inappropriate; and that the arrangement of the clauses was incoherent. These objections were so strongly felt that the law was thrown out by a majority of sixty-five to thirteen in the Tribunats, and by a hundred and fifty-two to a hundred and thirty-nine in the Legislative. The Second Title, on the enjoyment and loss of civil rights, shared the same fate; and the Council was obliged to withdraw both laws. The First Council was deeply chagrined. "When I see a man like *Simon*," he said, "doubting if persons born in the colonies are Frenchmen, I ask myself whether my head has turned"; and, announcing that the time had not yet come when one could "import into these great discussions the calm and unity of intention which they demand," he decreed (April 1, 1801) a revision of procedure. An end was put to open debate in the full House. The Titles of the Code were transferred to be submitted to the legislative section of the Tribunats, which was invited to tender its comments to the section of the Council responsible for that portion of the draft. In case of non-agreement, a conference was held under the presidency of Cambacérès; and, when the clauses had been there settled, they were referred back to the whole body of the Council, discussed anew, and then in their final shape expounded to the elect legislature by three selected Councillors. Under the new arrangement the work proceeded swiftly; and on March 31, 1804, the Civil Code in its entirety passed into law.

It has been often said that the spirit displayed by the Tribunats in these legal debates was capricious and unsteady, and that it was well for France that the abolitionists were silenced. This view is extensible. The speeches of *Andrieux* and *Simon*, who took the lead in opposition, are serious and weighty; and nearly all the criticisms of the Tribunats were well-founded. One speaker protested against the draft *Code de Commerce*, another against civil death, a third against confiscation. All three have the verdict of posterity on their side. When *Simon*, the brother-in-law of Portalis, urged that there was no pressing hurry, and that every effort should be made to bring the Code to perfection, he was only talking

common were. But Bonaparte was impatient of delay; and, through no fault of its own, the action of the Tribunats was bound to wear the aspect of obstruction. By no except clause of the Constitution, that body was debarred from proposing amendments to the laws which were submitted to it. If, then, the Tribunats were to give practical effect to their criticism of an article, they were forced to throw out the whole Title of which that article formed perhaps only an inconsiderable part. The alternative was one which no self-respecting public man could accept; and, refusing to accept it, the Tribunats were deprived of the power of publicly debating the Civil Code.

The First Book of the Civil Code treats of "Persons," the Second of "Goods and the various kinds of Property," the Third of "The various modes in which Property is acquired."

The French Revolution was fairly charged with having disturbed the foundations of family life. In order to stimulate the subdivision of property, it had, by its encouragement of adoption and its recognition of natural children, introduced new members into the family, while, with the same clear intention, it had restricted the testamentary powers of the father, equalised the sexes in marriage, and facilitated divorce. In the strong reaction which had set in against these ideas Bonaparte fully participated. He held that the legislator, far from encouraging the indefinite subdivision of property, should aim at securing a nation of moderate fortunes. He was a keen advocate of the subjection of women. "He thought that it was the function of law to chasten loose morals, to exhibit the solemnity and sanctity of marriage, to strengthen the authority of the father, and to maintain the cohesion of the family group." All these views—and they were by no means the exclusive property of Bonaparte—are reflected in the provisions of the Code. "If adoption was retained, the institution was accompanied by so many precautions that it could no longer be regarded as a deterrent to matrimony or a menace to family life. The adopter must be childless and over fifty years of age; and the adopted is not to sever the tie which binds him to his natural family. Nor can adoption take place so long as the adopted is a minor. Again, a clear line of separation was traced between the lawful and the natural child. "Natural children are not heirs. The law only awards them a claim upon the goods of their deceased father and mother when they have been legally recognised." Even so their share is reduced to a third, a half, or three-fourths of what it would have been had they been born in wedlock; a third if the father and mother have left lawful descendants; a half, if they have only left ascendants, brothers or sisters; and three-fourths where there are neither descendants nor ascendants, to share the inheritance. In vain Cambacérès pleaded that in certain cases the parent should be compelled to recognise the child. "Society," replied Bonaparte, "has no interest in the recognition of bastards"; and he set his face against facilitating

investigations into questions of paternity. Such is one essentiality, *la recherche de la paternité* is forbidden in the Civil Code.

In one of those large moral precepts, which are placidly sown about the Code, it is laid down that the "child at every age owes honour and respect to his father and mother." The power of the father was restored, and the disposition of the State repeated in the structure of the family. While the mother has no voice in the control of her children, the father is absolute. He can imprison his child, if under sixteen years of age, for a period not exceeding one month; if between sixteen and twenty-one, for a period not exceeding six months. In neither case is any writing or judicial formality required. The president of the Court of the arrondissement is bound to grant the order for detention. The father is not even required to state his motives. It is merely demanded of him that he shall sign an undertaking to pay all the expenses, and to furnish a suitable support to the prisoner. There is no more significant tribute to the continuity of French jurisprudence than this curious revival of the *lettre de cachet*, which, in the later half, at any rate, of the eighteenth century, were almost exclusively used to protect family honour by enabling a parent to incarcerate his troublesome offspring, without any diagnostic process of washing dirty family linen in open court. In the south of France, no doubt, where the Roman law had always been a living force, the paternal power was the cornerstone of society; but all over the country, partly owing to the pride of the aristocracy, partly owing to a delicate sensitiveness which is a feature of the national temperament, and partly owing to the general dislike of the royal tribunals as intrusive meddling, the strongest prejudice existed against dragging family affairs into court. Indeed it is a singular fact that many of the editors of 1789, while denouncing the *lettre de cachet*, express a hope that some less objectionable provision may be made for maintaining domestic discipline. To this aspiration the Code responds.

Nor are these the only stains in the edifice of domestic monarchy. A marriage may not be contracted without consent of the parents by a son who has not reached his twenty-sixth year, or by a daughter who has not reached her twenty-first. The parents have the usufruct of their children's property until they have entered upon their sixteenth year. They have the right to choose a guardian without the intervention of the relations or of a magistrate; and, if the father may not disinherit his son, he is given a larger power of dividing his property by will. "Even in the most absolute governments," said Bonaparte, "despotism stops short at the threshold of the home. It reigns upon the head of the household; and, as the head of the family is absolutely at the disposition of the Government, so is the family absolutely at the disposition of its head."

In accordance with these principles, the civil status of women was carefully depressed. A woman cannot be accepted as a witness to the

acts of the Civil State, nor can she act as guardian or form part of the family council unless she is the mother or one of the ascendants. As a wife she is subject to her husband, and has no voice in the administration of their common property. She cannot give, sell, or mortgage; she cannot acquire by sale or gift without the husband's written consent. Only if she is carrying on a separate trade can she make a contract without her husband's authority. The woman of the Civil Code is regarded as a feeble, defenceless, mindless being; and her lapses from virtue are punished more severely than those of a man. "A husband," said Napoleon, "ought to have the right to say to his wife: you shall not go out, you shall not go to the play, you shall not see such and such a person." When a Councillor asked whether wife obedience had been prescribed in the old laws of France, the First Consul turned upon him sharply. "What a question!" he cried. "Do you not know that the angel told Eve to obey her husband? . . . Modesty has written this article in all languages. *A fortiori* should it be written in French in our Code."

A law of September, 1798, had abolished judicial separation and admitted divorce, not only by mutual consent, but also for incompatibility of temper upon the allegation of one of the parties. That a contract should be abolished at the will of one of the parties was to itself an anomaly; and in this instance it was clearly subversive not only of religious traditions but of the most elementary principles of social order. Some of the law-courts, when consulted upon the first draft of the Code, declared against divorce altogether, and asserted that, as a matter of fact, no recourse had been made to it in the previous. With the single exception of the Tribunal of Paris, every Court in France rejected divorce for incompatibility; and the Tribunal of Paris stipulated that incompatibility should be proved in court. It was a question upon which Bonaparte himself was profoundly interested. On the one hand, with his strong views as to the subjection of the weaker sex and the value of family cohesion, he was averse from any provision which might encourage the levity or augment the liberty of women; and so powerful was this feeling in him that he subsequently prohibited divorce for members of the imperial family. On the other hand, he recognised that divorce might serve his own ends, and that within certain prescribed bounds it was necessary to society. As he said at St Helena, "to make marriage indissoluble is to provide meat, and to put the village cord above the law." The Council too was substantially agreed upon the necessity of admitting the principle of divorce, though it was willing to yield to Catholic susceptibilities so far as to reserve judicial separation (omitted in the first draft) as an alternative. Nor was there any doubt that, while divorce for grave specific causes should be admitted, divorce for incompatibility at the demand of one of the parties should be eliminated from the Code. The main contest raged over divorce by mutual consent; and, but for the strong advocacy of the First Consul,

this would not have been received into the Code. Bonaparte's contention was that divorce for specific causes would not be sufficient. The offences contemplated were not only difficult to prove, but, in the attempt to prove them, the wronged and the wrong-doer were alike dragged into publicity. "Few men are so lost to shame as to proclaim the turpitude of their wives. It would be shameful and against the honour of the nation to reveal what passes in some households."

Practical and political considerations therefore concurred in suggesting that this form of dissolving the marriage union should be supplemented by an alternative expedient which should be at once more private, more honourable, and more popular. Bonaparte was willing to concede that unions should not be dissolved after they had endured ten years; he was willing to prevent the same person from divorcing twice, he urged that the law should forbid divorced persons from remarrying within five years. But, hedged round by these safeguards, divorce by mutual consent for incompatibility of temper was in his view essential to marital happiness. Girls married young; and, though he had succeeded in raising the age from thirteen to fifteen, he had not raised it as high as he wished. In most cases, a young girl fresh from school or convent could not know whether her husband would prove congenial; in most cases a marriage was an affair of convenience. It was well that, when mistakes had been made, they should be capable of being corrected without noise or scandal. Accordingly he proposed that the affair should be brought before a family council presided over by a magistrate; that the relations on both sides should be ascertained, and that with their consent the Court should pronounce the divorce without examination. "I do nothing against the married persons," he said, "since I require mutual consent. I do nothing against marriage, thus I demand the abolition of the relations." Judicial separation was in his view a bad expedient, for it involved publicity and favoured immoral conduct. At St Helena he added, with penetration, that it was "a *maigre formule* which could only be applied to the upper classes." All things thus conspired to recommend the adoption of some provision for divorce by mutual consent. After long debate the First Council prevailed; and, surrounded with a large number of restrictions, divorce by mutual consent passed into law.

No less jealous was the attitude of the Council towards divorce for "specified motives." The possible causes were reduced from seven to three—adultery, cruelty, and the conviction of one of the parties for a grave criminal offence; and the investigation into the facts was transferred from the family council to the law-court. It is a curious fact in human nature that the experiment of entrusting these delicate enquiries to the family council broke down, not so much by reason of the incompetence of its members as because of their sheer indifference to an issue in which their sentiments should have been most closely involved.

The sentiment of equality, which had shaped the family law of the Revolution, had also moulded its conception of civil rights. The Constituent Assembly, in a fit of cosmopolitan generosity, had unconditionally abolished the *droit d'aubaine*, and the *droit de détraction*, a tax per cent. on certain duty levied by the Treasury upon the property of foreigners. But the clouds of war had obscured the clear sky of philanthropy; and the draft Code proposed a return to the earlier system of reciprocity, which secured to the alien in France just such treatment as was accorded to the Frenchman in the alien's country. Though sharply attacked in the Tribunats, this clause passed into the Code. In favour of the change it was argued that the generous policy of the Constituent Assembly had failed to induce other countries to relax their alien laws, and that, by retaining something to give away in return for concessions, France could secure better terms for her emigrants. Actuated by the same spirit of traditional nationalism, the framers of the draft Code had proposed to accord civil rights to each person only as were born in France and were the children of French parents. This proposition seemed "too narrow" for too narrow. On political and on military grounds, he held that the privileges and duties of French citizenship should be as widely diffused as possible. He insisted that civil rights should be granted to the children of an alien father if they were born in France, and to the children of a French father born abroad. So too he urged that the child born abroad of a French father who had renounced his nationality should always be able to recover his French citizenship. "As for me," he said long afterwards when recalling his share in this debate, "I desired that a Frenchman by origin should find himself a Frenchman again even if his family had been for ten generations abroad. If he should appear on the farther bank of the Rhine, saying, 'I wish to be a Frenchman,' I desired that the barrier should fall before him and that he should return triumphant to the bosom of the common mother." It is also due to the First Consul that special dispositions were inserted in the Code to facilitate the registration of births, marriages, and deaths occurring in the French army while it was serving beyond the frontier. *On est le Français, si on le France.*

The fundamental principles of the Revolutionary law of property were too clearly based on sound economic principles to be shaken by the hazy notions of the *Constituante*. Nobody dreamed of restoring feudalism or the *droit laïc* of the great corporations. A proposal to revive the *rente foncière*, a contract resembling the Roman *emphyteusis* by which a proprietor may let out waste land at a perpetual and irredeemable charge, was indeed discussed, but only to be rejected. The First Consul saw no advantage in it, and Portalis urged that, however useful it might have been in days when there was much waste to be reclaimed, such a contract would now create "insupportable embarrassment." But, while the law of tenure underwent no sensible modification, the law which

regulated the transfer of property was modified in several important particulars. A sale of immovable property could be rescinded *pour cause de lésion*, if the seller had been defrauded of more than seven-tenths of the price; and that, too, even if he had expressly reserved his right to take action for the rescission of the contract. Such a provision implies that there is a just price, the result of common opinion; and that, if property is sold for less than it is worth, the State should step in to protect the ignorant seller. The doctrine had been repudiated by the *Commission*, which had excluded the action for rescission in 1793; but it was lately championed by the First Consul, whose hatred of the Stock Exchange and of army contractors led him to welcome any expedient for repudiating a contract.

With a similar aim of defeating the machinations of financiers, it was intimated in the Code that the rate of interest would be fixed by law. "Interest," so runs the text, "is legal or contractual. Legal interest is fixed by law. Contractual interest may exceed legal interest whenever the law does not prohibit." It was urged in defence of the principle of regulation that, ever since the Convention had declared money to be merchandise, it had been loaned out at various rates. Nevertheless, it was not until September, 1807, that the rate was actually fixed—by a law which, as Napoleon remarked to Mollien, did not belong "to the system of your idiosyncrasy."

Two questions arose with regard to loans and mortgages. Should the law require them to be publicly registered? Should the law require them to be specially attached to a particular piece of immovable property? The Convention, which desired to facilitate land transfer to the furthest extent possible, decided on 11 Brumaire, year VII (Nov. 1, 1798) both for the principle of publicity and for that of speciality. But these rules seemed too violent a departure from previous custom. It is true that in the Law Countries mortgages had long been publicly inscribed and specially allocated; but in France the accumulation of an embarrassed aristocracy had retained so obvious a method of facilitating credit. Of thirty Courts of Appeal consulted upon the point, only nine were in favour of maintaining the Law of Brumaire. The legislative section of the Council was divided, and two plans were submitted. It was alleged that the Law of Brumaire violated family secrets, destroyed credit, and injured the circulation of wealth; that inscription was costly and ineffectual; that the principle of speciality was inconsistent with the rights of property, because the debtor was bound to fulfil his engagements upon all his property and not upon some special part of it. But the most valid practical objection to the law, as it stood, was the injury which might be inflicted upon wives and minors who had not taken the step of inscribing their legal claims upon the property of their respective husbands or tutors. The division of opinion pointed to a compromise; and, while the publicity and speciality of loans and mortgages

were recognized, a particular exception was made in favour of women and widows who had omitted the formality of registration.

Content as was the debate upon mortgages, so revealing unexpected depths of timid conservatism, it was far less important than the discussion provoked by the *law of inheritance*. The theory of the French Revolution had been that the State, having bestowed testamentary rights upon the individual, could abridge or expand them at will; and that in the interests of social equality it was necessary to abridge them. Consequently entails (*substitutions*) were forbidden: the divisible portion was limited to a tenth; and equality of division was prescribed. The Code exhibits a sensible but cautious modification of this extreme position. The divisible portion was augmented, rising to a half if the testator had but one child, and never falling below a fourth. The father may bequeath all or any of this portion to one of his natural heirs, or give it to a relative in trust for children who may be yet unborn. Entails, owing to the vigorous advocacy of Bonaparte, are permitted to one degree. The arguments used in debate were both economic and moral. On economic grounds, urged Malesville, it was undesirable that property should be excessively divided, especially in the poorer departments where acre and movable wealth were scarce. On moral grounds, urged Portalis, it was well that the father should be placed in a position in which he "could punish and recompense his children, redress inequalities between them, and satisfy obligations of gratitude towards strangers." While Bonaparte was fully in accord with the spirit of these contentions, he proposed, as an alternative plan for giving effect to them, that the divisible portion should be graduated according to the amount of the heritable property rather than according to the number of the children, in such a way that, the wealthier the testator, the less should be the ratio which the divisible portion should bear to the *res* total of his property. This suggestion, however, was overruled, as entailing expensive and inequitable remedies, and the First Consul acquiesced in his defeat. The concession could be afforded; for, though the Code favours the subdivision of property, it is far more tolerant to inequality than was the Convention, whose doctrine still roused some vigorous opponents in the Council of State.

Napoleon once said at St Helena that his glory consisted, not in having won forty battles, but in the Civil Code and in the deliberations of his Council of State. Judged by external tests, the labours of the Civil Code have indeed been brilliant, and its influence has been wide. Yet it has been subjected to much severe criticism. Savigny, the founder of the historical school of European jurists, and Austin, the chief exponent of the analytical school in England, attacked it with vigour and knowledge. The Civil Code, said Savigny, was drafted at an unfortunate epoch, at a time of uncertainty and conflict, when the ideas of the Revolution were fast passing away and the ideas of the Empire were scarcely growing; and this uncertainty is reflected in its



provisions. To take one instance—the system of entails, rejected in 1803, was restored in 1806, and included in the Code in 1807. The Council of State had no part in the technical discussion of the Code, which was left to the four draftsmen, who were ignorant of Roman law. The judicial literature of France, consisting almost entirely of Pothier, from whose treatise three-fourths of the Code were extracted, was extirpated; and the selection of subjects was not determined by experience and practical knowledge, but by the Institutes of Justinian. The Code was incomplete; it had to be supplemented by external authority, and, far from being an organic product, was but a mechanical mixture of the results of the Revolution and the old rigour of Roman law and the customs. Austin, too, condemned the haste and ignorance of the draftsmen, the absence of definitions of technical terms and of any provision for amendment. The Council of State, he pointed out, often devoted great attention to points of no importance, while neglecting many vital questions of arrangement and expression. The Code must not be regarded as a body of law forming a substantive whole, but as an index to an immense body of jurisprudence existing outside itself.

The Civil Code has also been criticised, upon economic grounds, as too favourable to the subdivision of property. From this cause some have deduced the lack of commercial enterprise, the fearfulness for safe investments, and the stationary census returns which they regard as characteristic of France. Thus Le Play contended that, before the reign of Louis XIV, the French peasantry made use of their testamentary freedom to keep their properties together; and that these habits resulted in an admirable social organisation and great agrarian prosperity. By legend, however, the old traditions of work and economy declined; and it was found more difficult to make pecuniary endowments for the younger children. The habit of territorial subdivision acquired strength; and it was intensified by the legislation of the Revolution and the Consulate. It may be sufficient here to point out that the economic criticism is more properly directed against the Revolutionary law of succession than against the Civil Code, which travelled as far back on the road to testamentary freedom as public opinion would then allow.

The criticisms of the jurists are no doubt largely true; but some of them would be equally applicable to any code framed at any time. The most elaborate system of legal casuistry is poor beside the inexhaustible power of life to produce new combinations; and no code can be more than a legal alphabet. It is doubtful whether the Civil Code has reduced the bulk of French case-law, or materially lightened the labours of French judges. On the other hand, it has diffused the knowledge of law, and made it comparatively easy for the ordinary Frenchman to become acquainted with the leading principles which govern the law of his own country. Again, its simplicity and elegance of form have made it a convenient article of exportation; and these qualities have perhaps

helped to secure for it a wider acceptance outside the frontiers of France than upon its intrinsic merits it deserves. In France, the Code has perhaps commanded an excessive deference and stood in the way of useful legislative changes. There the glamour which attaches to it is due not only to the circumstances of its production, to the fact that it is at once the summary and the consecration of the French Revolution, as well as the legal formulae of the most dazzling period of French national history, but also and more especially to the circumstance that it is the shining symbol of that unity of law which was first made possible by the meeting of the States General in 1789. So long as law was unified, it did not so much matter whether the text was scrupulous or clumsy, whether the principles were collected in a code or left to be inferred from legislative acts, customs, and judicial decisions. The Civil Code was a hasty piece of work; and the First Council imported a strong gust of passion and of politics into the laboratory of legal science. Civil death—a repugnant, unjust, and immoral fiction—confiscation, and the position of women, are bad blot upon the page. Could anything be more monstrous than that a widow should not be allowed to succeed to her husband, until all his relations, even his natural children, have taken their share? There is also much disproportion and omission. There are instances of a subject being discussed in the Council, then forgotten and allowed to lapse. The law of contract is taken almost bodily from Domat and Pothier. But, when all deductions have been made for haste, negligence, and political prejudices, it remains a great achievement. It was a single code for the whole of France, substantially based upon the tried historic instincts of the race, while preserving the most valuable social conquests of the Revolution. It is vain to say that the moment was unfavourable. Ideally favourable it certainly was not, but it was the one moment which had never occurred before and would never occur again. A few years earlier, the Code would have been steeped in Revolutionary extravagance; a few years later, it would have borne the sad imprint of despotism. Fortunately for France, the Code was composed at the only time since the Revolution when the government of the country had been both glorious and even-handed. And to the strictures of the chair it is at least some reply, that the Code has proved adequate to the needs and congenial to the temper of France.

The share taken by Bousquet himself in the construction of this historic movement has been variously estimated according to the political propensities of historians. Lambry believed that, if the First Council advocated divorce and adoption, this was because he was thinking of his own possible requirements; and that his interference with the legal discussions of the Council, being dictated in the main either by strictly political or by strictly private considerations, was a positive disservice to French law. Such a view is a great exaggeration. It is perfectly true that the quidnuncs of Paris were speculating upon a possible divorce of

Josephine so early as July, 1808; and perhaps Bonaparte even then regarded the divorce as a conceivable and admissible contingency. But his attitude upon the question is quite explicable without reference to any dishonourable hypothesis; and the safeguards with which he proposed to surround adoption clearly show that in that matter at least he was not thinking of his own case. Again, it would be a wild paradox to assert that the Code gained nothing by Bonaparte's shaming intrusions. That he had little interest in the technical side of law; that he had none of that patient and trained sagacity which slowly works out the heart of an intricate subject; that he was often grossly irrelevant; that he took no part whatever in the composition of the Second Book of the Code and only an intermittent part in the composition of the Third; that he was mainly interested in the larger social and political aspects of every legal problem which came before his notice—all this may be admitted. Nor can any fair apologist deny that Bonaparte was directly responsible for some of the worst features of the Code; that he admitted without a word of censure other features which were hardly less objectionable; and that, if he had always had his way, some provisions would have been inserted which every sound lawyer and statesman would have deplored. He was solely responsible for the admission of concubinage; he was largely responsible for the gross inequality of treatment meted out to the two sexes. If his will had prevailed, all subjects would have been declared civilly dead, and their marriages regarded as null and void by the law.

All this notwithstanding, the Civil Code owes much to Bonaparte. Without his driving power it would certainly not have come into existence as soon, and it might not have come into existence at all. To his glowing imagination and fertile intelligence are due several small changes of a humanitarian character and some technical improvements. "Would you allow a father to drive a daughter of fifteen from his home or to thrust out his heir into slavery? A well-to-do father always owes maintenance to his children," he cited; and this eloquent protest against the doctrine that slavery was not due to minors was embodied in the Code. In another passage he argued that the deaf and dumb should be permitted to marry. "He has known through his father and mother the marriage union. He can declare his will to live like them. Why then aggravate his misfortune?" And here again the argument went home. He suggested several improvements in the law of abortion; he framed the definition of "domicile" which has found its way into the Code; he advocated, in the interests of the race, that the age at which marriage could be legally contracted should be more advanced than that sanctioned by the old French law. But, over and above these specific contributions, the prevailing intelligence of Bonaparte gave scope and dignity to the work. Professional lawyers may easily lose sight of the wider implications of their professional studies; though perhaps this was not the greatest danger in a Council where men like Buzot and Trévillat championed

at every turn the large political faith of the Revolution. Yet it was a danger; and to Bonaparte's promise we may ascribe the fact that the civil law of France was codified, not only with more scrupulousity than other portions of French law, but also with a triller sense of the general interests of the State. What those interests were, Bonaparte knew. They were civil equality, healthy family life, secure inheritance to property, religious toleration, a government ruled above the hoth of faction. This is the policy which he stamped upon the Civil Code.

## C

*The Code of Civil Procedure.*

By turn feudal and ecclesiastical, royal and democratic, civil procedure in France has earned, in its successive phases, the bad opinion of lawyers. The venality of judges, the needless delays, and the enormous forms of the law have been denounced or satirized by a long succession of writers, from Theodulf of Orleans to Babolae, Montaigne, Molière, and Saint-Pierre. In its feudal stage, procedure was public and oral; its growth was characterized by extreme rigidity and formalism, and also by the barbarous method of the combat. But, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Church began to extend her influence over the whole realm of legal forms, softening the rigors of the old Germanic codes, introducing written proofs and secret inquiry, and appealing to reason rather than to force. In the thirteenth century, the usage of secret inquiry, diffused specially through the medium of the Inquisition, found its way into the "*Ordonnance*" and the official registers of the Parliament of Paris; and the influence of St Louis, who in 1260 suppressed judicial combat in the royal domain, was exerted to promote this tendency.

The triumph of the Canon Law invested the civil procedure of France with a higher degree of unity than existed in the department of Civil Law. The Customists, at any rate in their later stages, generally contained no rules relating to forms; and, although each Parliament had its own "*style of procedure*," there was a large measure of uniformity through France, always excepting those provinces which had lately been conquered. When, therefore, in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, the Kings of France undertook the task of correcting the vices which had crept into the administration of justice, they were able with comparatively little trouble to secure general acceptance for their edicts. Several important partial reforms were effected in the sixteenth century, as for instance by the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterets in 1563, which prescribed the use of the French language in legal documents, simplified procedure in cases of default, and restricted the number of dilatory exceptions; and by the Ordinance of Orleans (1561), which introduced into lay Courts the canonical distinction between ordinary and summary affairs. But all these edicts were rolled together in the Grand Ordinance of 1607, which aimed at establishing a uniform

"style" in all the Courts of the Kingdom, public, feudal, and ecclesiastical. Supplemented by local usages, this elaborate code—for code it was—ruled France till the Revolution. It abolished some abuses; but, since its object was rather to codify existing rules than to introduce reforms, it was often subjected to sharp criticism. The sixteenth century was filled with complaints of the delays, the costs, and the technicalities of justice; but, unfortunately for legal progress, the aversion from Frenchmen characteristic of the age was unaccompanied by an accurate knowledge of facts. With the exception of d'Aguesseau's two Ordinances of 1757 and 1758, no definite modifications were proposed. The works of Lamoignon and Berriat, who had commented upon the Ordinance of 1658 in the reign of Louis XIV, were reprinted; and the reform of French judicial procedure failed to attract a single word of high quality. Indeed, it is well to note that the eminent Polkier, whose letters had so large an influence on the Civil Code, left only one unimportant treatise upon the subject of civil procedure, and that composed only in extreme old age. Thus, when the Revolution broke out, the lawyers, whose gaze was restricted within the four corners of seventeenth century formalism, were confronted with a public that wished all formalism at the bottom of the sea. The public said in effect, "Let justice be speedy, unpretentious, governed by natural laws, divested of technicalities, affording large facilities for arbitration"; and what the fashionable theory proclaimed the Revolutionary Assemblies enacted. The Constituent Assembly promised a code, organized the procedure to be followed before the newly created *Juges de paix*, and curtailed some judicial expenses. In the Constitution of 1795 it was decreed that public arbitration were to decide upon verbal pleadings without formality or expense; and this principle was translated into practice by a law passed in October of that year, which supposed attorneys, and enjoined that procedure should be simple and inexpensive, "founded upon a verbal defense or on a simple memoir read to the Court by one of the judges."

The attempt to infuse simplicity and sentiment into transactions which are necessarily complicated and dry is unlikely to command success. Trifling as that justice was never so costly as during the temporary eclipse of the legal profession, when every litigant was making large and irregular payments for underhand and unauthorized advice. Nor was this the only reason in the list of visible intentions which suffered shipwreck. While theory proclaimed the *Juge de paix* as "arbitrator," "father," and "angel of conciliation," practice too often exhibited him as a weak, violent, and ignorant politician. The mediatory procedure, from which Voltaire had hoped so much, failed for a reason which a man of letters could not have been expected to foresee. If it was a means of averting litigation in isolated country districts, it broke down in the smothering atmosphere of the towns; and, as early as 1800, it was clear that the belief in technical legal intelligence and settled

personality had experienced a revival. The attorney was reestablished by law; the old procedure was restored pending the preparation of a new code; and men of weight held consultation to be a thing of proved facility and a spacious source of delay and expense.

While the Council of State was elaborating the Civil Code, a Commission was at work upon civil procedure. Nominating on March 24, 1803, this Commission was composed of Truffaut, President of the Court of Appeal of Paris; Try, substitute of the Commissioner of the Republic in the same Court; Berthoulet, President of the Court of First Instance of the Seine; Séguier, government Commissioner in the same Court; and Pigon, formerly a practitioner in the Court of the Châtelet and a recognized expert upon procedure. The work of the Commission was published in 1804, submitted to the Courts of Appeal and the *Cour de Cassation* for their observations, amended by the Commission, examined by the legislative section of the Council of State, and then, after a discussion in full Council, communicated privately to a section of the Tribunal, and finally voted on in the Legislative Body (April 14-23, 1805). In the case of the Civil Code, for the most interesting stage in the proceedings had been the debate in full Council; but this cannot be predicated of the Code of Civil Procedure. Most of the Councillors were unversed in scientific individuality; and the Commission, composed as it was of practicing judges and lawyers with little sense of philosophical or literary spirit, presented their work in a somewhat abstract and forbidding shape. Once only, on February 22, 1805, was Napoleon present; and his personal influence was restricted to obtaining the insertion of two clauses which modified the law relating to the inscription of mortgages in the interests of the Treasury. So languid, indeed, was the interest of the Council, that a code containing no less than 1018 articles was despatched in twenty-three sittings (April 23, 1805, to March 29, 1806).

The Commission decided to exclude from its preview all questions affecting judicial competence. It did not attempt to settle the procedure of the commercial Courts, for this would properly belong to the framers of the Commercial Code; nor that of the *Cour de Cassation*, which still substantially follows, in civil cases, the regulation issued by the *Council des Parties* in 1793. It was also determined to leave the settlement of a tariff of judicial costs to subsequent regulation, rather than to include it in the Code. Nevertheless, the task of Truffaut and his colleagues was sufficiently arduous. They had to bring the civil procedure of the ordinary Courts into harmony with the Civil Code, to simplify and amend the ancient forms, and to review the Revolutionary legislation as to the *juge de paix*, conciliation proceedings, and the various processes of distraint. Yet, when all allowance has been made for the difficulty of the task, it must be confessed that the arrangement of topics is singularly illogical and disorderly. The first part is entitled "Procedure before the Courts," and the second "Divorce Procedure."

The former is by no means a model of systematic treatment; while the latter, as its title implies, comprises a miscellaneous assortment of regulations dealing with such varied subjects as offers of payment by a debtor, judicial separation, and the procedure incidental to arbitrations or the opening of a succession.

Yet, however faulty its arrangement, the Code of Civil Procedure contains some useful innovations upon the law as d'Agnesseau left it. The provisions in the First Book as to the procedure to be followed before the *juge de paix* are substantially based upon the law of 1793, but comprise a few marked improvements in detail, such as a simplification of procedure on appeal, and the prohibition of civil recoup objections to witnesses after evidence given. It was decided to take over from the Revolution the principle that suits should not be given to the law-courts until all attempts at conciliation had been exhausted; but the exceptions to the general rule of obligatory conciliation were multiplied. The law of 1790 had decided that affairs which interested the State, the communes, and public order need not in the first instance be brought before the *juge de paix* for conciliation. The Code extends the privilege—exemption from compulsory proceedings is nothing else—to minors, to commercial affairs which admit of no delay, to actions incidental to pending suits, and to actions directed against two persons. Even these exceptions have been regarded as insufficient. The Commission on the revision of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1800 revealed the presence of considerable dissatisfaction with compulsory conciliation. It was described as a formality "such as three-fourths of the cases which arise, and always long and burdensome." It was pointed out that the number of cases settled by conciliation was only 55 per cent. of those brought before the *juge conciliateur*; that ten or twelve days were consumed by the process; and that, where conciliation had failed, the record of the proceedings was often prejudicial to the interests of *bona fide* litigants in the Court to which the case was subsequently removed. It would, however, have been folly in 1806 to reject a promising experiment simply because it had broken down under the stress of abnormal circumstances. The Commission rightly held that conciliation proceedings had never had a fair trial; and that the conditions in regard to the temper of the country and the qualifications of the Bench were so far changed as to admit of these proceedings being continued with a good prospect of success.

This was the boundary beyond which the influence of the French Revolution was not permitted to pass. The rest of the Code is founded on the rules of the ancien régime, though some useful additions were made with a view to curtailing expenses, reducing formality, and abridging delay. The Court was given power to disallow the right of a party to conduct his case in person, whenever it had reason to believe that the course of justice would suffer from the passion, the inexperience,

on the obscurity of the pleadings. In order to defeat *avouement* attempts to win a judgment by default by intercepting the summons, it was laid down that execution could not be taken save "after an act necessarily known to the defaulting party." Some excellent provisions were added concerning the examination of experts; but, save for two slight changes, the whole procedure to be followed when the genuineness of a document was questioned in a civil trial (*pour incident civil*) was taken from *d'Aguesseau's* Grand Ordinance of 1737. Indeed the First Book of the Code of Civil Procedure may be roughly described as a revision of the Ordinances of 1697 and 1737 with some improvements and such additions as were rendered necessary by the institution of conciliation and other proceedings before the *Juge de paix*. Like the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure was a synthesis of old and new law; but the old law was here the dominating factor. The rule relating to the examination of witnesses direct that they shall be examined in camera, but in the presence of the parties to the suit. The survey of 1697 is substantially preserved. The witnesses are not examined in each other's presence; nor is the public admitted to hear the examination. But the presence of the parties is a guarantee that the judge will not tamper with the depositions. In the compilation of the Second Book, the Commission found less guidance in the great code of the seventeenth century; and recourse was had to the "edicts and declarations of kings, to local statutes, and custom." Here some considerable changes were effected, partly in order to bring the procedure into harmony with the Civil Code, and partly to correct some suspected tendencies of Revolutionary legislation. Whether these changes were always wise is a matter of grave doubt; and it has been alleged that the Code, by too sharply reacting against the new Revolutionary law of distraint (November 1, 1793), has damaged credit and rendered property almost impregnable.

In the main, then, the Code is an almost literal reproduction of the ancient ordinances and of the practice of the *Châtelet*. Even the most conservative lawyers criticize the luxury of proceedings, the profusion of documents, the extreme slowness and costliness which it entails or entails. It may be regarded as a blunder that it reverts to imprisonment for debt, though, in view of the fact that the *contrainte par corps* as *matière civile et commerciale* was not abolished till 1807, this step was clearly in accordance with opinion and manners. That a bolder and more drastic treatment was not applied to civil procedure is a matter for regret, but readily admits of explanation. The writers of the eighteenth century were either too vague or else too critical to afford any practical guide to the reformer. There was no French Jeremy Bentham, nor had the Revolutionary Assemblies produced a draft code of civil procedure which might serve as a corrective to the Grand Ordinance of 1697; and a reverence to the cautious founders of that and other legal monuments of the *ancien régime* seemed especially imperative to



was just escaped from a period of intolerance and corruption, when judges were ignorant and venal, and justice was frequently perverted to political ends. Personal influence may have contributed its quota; something may have been due to the absence of Napoleon and to the activity of Fignon—a conservative *Châtelet* lawyer whose Court had been abolished by the Revolution, and who now took a modest revenge by importing the practice of the *Châtelet* into the Code. But though public and laymen alike have grumbled over the Code of Civil Procedure, though the Academy has offered prizes for the best suggestions for reforming it, though two commissions have reconstructed it on paper, and nine statutes have amended it in detail, the course of business in a French civil Court is still substantially determined by the work of Napoleon's commission.

### *Criminal Procedure and Penal Law.*

As in civil, so in criminal procedure, the jurists of the Consulate and the Empire were presented with two sharply contrasted systems, the one the product of the monarchy, and the other of revolution. The salient features of the older criminal procedure, as first tabulated in 1698 by the Ordinance of Villars-Cotteret and afterwards incorporated in the Grand Ordinance of 1678, were, first, that the presence of the King or the lord is a party to every criminal proceeding; next, that the case is divided into two parts of unequal length, the instruction, a long secret enquiry before a single judge, and the judgment, given in secret by the whole Court upon the written evidence submitted to it; thirdly, that the accused is not permitted to be represented by counsel or to see the charges brought against him; and lastly, that he is on oath to answer all questions truth. In other words, the procedure was secret, inquisitorial, and highly unfavourable to the accused; and many flagrant violations of justice drew attention to its obvious defects. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the movement in favour of a reform of criminal procedure spread through the whole educated class in France. It had been preached by Beaumais, Voltaire, and Diderot; it was encouraged by Louis XVI, who carried through some elementary but precious reforms, such as the abolition of torture; and it led to some remarkable and comprehensive changes during the Revolution.

The lines upon which these changes were effected were English rather than French. All the legal reforms were laid in praise of the English system—the English jury, the English public trial, the English practice of allowing the prisoner to employ counsel, the English principle that no prisoner is to be examined on oath. The Constituent Assembly therefore addressed itself to the task of a radical reform of criminal procedure upon English lines. Two juries were introduced—the *jury d'accusation*,

corresponding to the English grand jury, and the *jury de jugement*, corresponding to the English petty jury. The secret preliminary instruction, which had been the longest and most important part of the proceedings under the ancien régime, was whittled down to a summary examination by the police-officer, to the possible hearing of witnesses by the jury discussion, and to the interrogation of the accused by the director of the jury, who was always one of the judges of the district Court. Further, although the instruction was held with closed doors, the public were now represented by the accusing jury, which examined the documents submitted to it by the *juge de paix*, and decided whether to bring in or to throw out the bill. Greater facilities were given to private persons to initiate criminal proceedings; there was more oral examination and less writing. An important change also came over the second stage of the proceedings, the trial proper. The procedure is oral and public instead of written and private. The accused has the assistance of counsel; the judge reads out the charges to him; he is put upon oath only if he wishes to advance charges against the witnesses. He is condemned or acquitted by the verdict of a jury of twelve men, but he is given a practically unlimited right of rejecting jurors. The criminal prosecutions are no longer exclusively initiated by the Government; and no prosecution proceeds to the second stage unless the accusing jury sees fit to draw up an *acte d'accusation*. In a word, the system of the Constituent Assembly was as favourable to the defence as the Ordinance of 1770 had been favourable to the prosecution.

During the Revolution these rules proved unworkable. At the best, a system so alien to French tradition, and making each large death upon the judicial temper of the populace, could only have succeeded in quiet times. As it was, the jury was introduced into the country during the one decade of its history in which it was almost certain to be violated. The excesses of Revolutionary law-courts and the prevalence of crimes of violence exhibited the weakness of the new procedure; and Merlin's Code of Delicts and Fugitives (October 25, 1799), heightening the importance of the written instruction, marks an early stage in reaction.

The rise of Bonaparte sharply closed the epoch of generous intentions and airy attitudes. Anarchy, rare in many departments, supplied protests against a soldier's temperance. An article of the Constitution of 1798 decreed that the public prosecutor was to be the agent and the nucleus of the executive power. A law, of January 27, 1801, provided for the appointment of government prosecutors in every arrondissement, gave them power to imprison pending the report of the accusing jury, restored the secret examination of witnesses in the absence of the prisoner, and rehabilitated written for oral procedure before the Jury discussion. On Jan. 7, 1801, in spite of the terms of the Constitution which guaranteed trial by jury for all crimes, special criminal tribunals were established exempt from the restraint of jury or appeal. The

members of the Tribunal were lost in their indignation. These new Courts, they said, were only the *Cours prévôtales* of 1870 restored; it was vain to urge that they were limited as to function, space, or time. In a short time all France would be covered with these tribunals; and what kind of tribunals were they? They denied the prisoner time and opportunity to prepare his defence; they deprived him of the right of being heard on questions of importance, of objecting to his judges, of being released on bail. Since the French was relieved of the necessity of explaining the grounds of his judgment, there was no guarantee that the judgment would be reached by any competent intellectual process at all; and, since the law denied the right to appeal, there was no redress if the procedure should be tainted by informality or injustice. To these criticisms the government's answer replied that the disorder of the country demanded exceptional measures; that the Courts were to be abolished two years after the conclusion of peace; that the procedure was to be public and oral; that the prisoner was to have the benefit of counsel and to be acquainted with the act of accusation; that it was impossible to obtain a verdict of guilty in the west or the south, where the jury had become the "subjugator of brigands"; that military tribunals had been established to deal with brigandage under the Convention and the Directory; that exceptional Courts were generally demanded by the prefects; and that the Constitution itself had sanctioned the suspension of the jury in case of armed revolt. The measure was carried in the Tribunal by 49 votes to 44, and in the Legislature by 492 to 28.

Meanwhile (May 28, 1871) a Commission had been appointed to draw up a criminal code. Their labours resulted in a draft comprising both penal law and criminal procedure (*Codex criminel comprenant le droit pénal*), which preserved the jury and was still predominantly English in character. But no sooner was this draft submitted to the law-courts than it became clear that Anglocrisis was falling out of fashion. Of the twenty-five Courts whose observations were published, only twenty-six pronounced in favour of the retention of the jury; twenty-three did not refer to the subject, while twenty-six, mainly from the south of France, were adverse. Of the Courts of Appeal, twelve were adverse, and seven favourable. The problem of the jury became a burning question.

The Criminal Code first came before the Council of State on May 28, 1874. The Emperor, in order to clear the ground, ordered the legislative section of the Council to prepare and print a list of fundamental questions relating to criminal law and procedure which might be debated before the articles of the draft Code came to be discussed in detail. Accordingly, on June 5, fourteen questions were submitted. Should the jury be preserved? Should there be a jury of accusation and a jury of judgment? How should the jury be constituted? On what grounds should objection be taken to a juror? Should the instruction be purely oral, or partly oral and partly written? Should several questions be

put to the jury of judgment, or one only—"Guilty or not guilty?" Should the verdict be given by unanimity or majority? Should there be criminal circuits? Should the penalty of death be preserved? Should there be life penalties? Should confession be admitted in certain cases? Should the judges have a certain latitude in the application of penalties? Should condemned persons who have finished their term of punishment be placed under supervision? Should reformed persons of subsequent good conduct be rehabilitated?

The debate extended over three days, and was characterised by great ability and acuteness. Capital punishment and imprisonment for life were passed without discussion. Confession was contested, but advocated by Napoleon and carried through. The main debate centred round the Jury; and here Napoleon, after listening to a number of speeches, most of them adverse to the retention of the institution, exhibited his views with characteristic decision. A tyrannical government, as the experience of the Revolution showed, could influence a jury more easily than it could influence a judge; and, given public trial and counsel for the defence, the jury was a superfluous guarantee. Besides, a jury would always acquit a man who could afford an advocate, and always condemn an offence against the government. Still, if it were well composed, and provided that counsel should not be permitted to address it, a jury might be allowed; but exceptional Courts would always be needed to chastise organised crime. If, however, a jury were allowed, the verdict should be given by a majority vote, for so the chance of errors would be diminished. In these views the Council only partially concurred. The retention of both Juries—that of Accusation and that of Judgment—was voted in principle; but it was decided that they should be named by the prefect from the Electoral College, and that the verdict should go by an absolute majority. If injustice were done, it might be remedied by the right of pardon.

With these large principles determined, the Council, under the presidency of Cambacérès, settled down to discuss the draft Code. Twelve sessions were held, and the work was proceeding fast, when it was disturbed by an intervention of the Emperor. In the great Jury debate, Napoleon had argued for the establishment of large Courts like the old Parliaments in order to give greater authority to the magistrature. "Did one not," he said, "see judges, even of the *Cour de Cassation*, dine with advocates, and contract habits of familiarity with them which destroyed the moral independence and prestige of their office?" But his idea found no favour with the Council. On October 30, however, the legislative session was prevented with a draft law on the amalgamation of civil and criminal justice which was to give effect to Napoleon's intention. The Council of State was again summoned to Saint-Cloud; and five days were devoted to the discussion of the Emperor's plan in his presence. "It is necessary," urged Napoleon, "to form great corporations,

strong in the reputation conferred by a knowledge of civil law, strong in numbers, above private feuds and considerations, in order that they may cause the guilty to turn pale and may communicate their energy to the prosecution. It is necessary, in fact, to organize the prosecution of crime. At present there is no such thing." It was argued on the other side that it had been difficult enough to gather the departmental juries, and that under the proposed plan of wider judicial areas the jury would be impossible. Napoleon replied that his Court might send judges on orders; but this did not satisfy the Council, whose view was shared and supported by the magistrates then present in Paris for the Imperial nomination. They reported that the proposed change would extinguish the jury, and that the jury was working better every day. At this Cambacérès confessed his surprise; and Napoleon tacitly withdrew his plan. After December 30 the work of the Commission was mysteriously interrupted. Twenty-five sittings of the Council had been held, over eleven of which Napoleon had presided; but opinion was not yet ripe for the changes which he had in mind, and he was content that opinion should ripen. Thus all the questions relating to criminal law and procedure which had engaged the public, the law-courts, the Institute, and the Council, were allowed to fall into oblivion for three years.

It was not till January 63, 1806, that the legislative action of the Council of State was commanded to resume its labours on criminal procedure. Their recollection of past proceedings was confused and unrefreshed; and the great questions which had excited so much controversy in 1804 were debated now as if they had never arisen. A close and crushing criticism from Napoleon settled the fate of the Jury of Accusation; but the Jury of Judgment successfully withstood the storm. Napoleon himself advanced arguments in its favour, provided that it was properly constituted. "The real interest of the accused," he said, "is to be judged by enlightened and not by ignorant men"; and this object would be obtained if the jurors were drawn from the Judges of First Instance and the Electoral Colleges. Thus remained the great question of the amalgamation of civil and criminal justice; and into this Napoleon threw himself with passionate energy. He had to vanquish an old prejudice against *litigant* judges, and a suspicion that the scheme might revive the Parliaments of the ancien régime in a new shape. Never did he wield the rapier of controversy with a more persuasive brilliancy. He touched on the need of curtailing the powers of the prefect, already excessive; on his desire for a vigorous local life, for more decentralization; on the respect due to the magistrature, which was now to receive greater dignity; on the sheer necessity of scoring crime; on the humbling influence which a term at civil business would exert upon the temperament of a criminal judge. Nor was Napoleon risk in principles only; he drew from his pocket two draft laws for consideration, and provided day after day till the scheme passed through.

The system of *Assise Courts* once safely secured, Napoleon could afford to admit the Jury, and to allow the Code of Criminal Procedure to proceed quietly on its way. In thirty-seven sittings (Jan. 30 to Oct. 30, 1808), the Council cut the Gordian knots over which they had fumbled in 1804.

In the Code of Criminal Procedure (*Code d'instruction criminelle*) the jury of accusation is suppressed. The depositions of witnesses are taken secretly in the presence of the *juge d'instruction* and his clerk, and in the absence of the prisoner; and all the guarantees of 1789 disappear. The defense cannot contest the choice of an expert made by a judge; the *juge d'instruction* is not compelled to hear the witnesses for the defense; and, during the whole of the instruction, the prisoner may remain in complete ignorance of the steps which are being taken against him. The regulations as to bail are so liberal as to be almost prohibitive, and they were contested in the Council. And yet, with this exception, this portion of the Code, utterly subversive though it was of the Revolutionary law, was passed almost without discussion. So great a change had been wrought by the advancing policy of despotism.

But while the Code of Criminal Procedure borrows from the Ordinances of 1679 almost all its rules of preparatory instruction, the rules for the trial in court were based upon the legislation of the Revolution. The accused was to be tried in public; he was allowed to produce witnesses, to be assisted by counsel, and to be heard in his own defence. A jury of well-to-do persons was permitted to return a verdict by a majority vote. The Code however maintained the special Courts which were authorized to decide without recourse to a jury upon cases of rebellion, false coinage, assassination if committed by armed bands, and armed smuggling; nor was any resistance offered in the Council of State to the permanent incorporation within the judicial system of France of these tyrannical and autocratic tribunals.

It cannot be denied that the apparatus set up in the Code for performing the preliminary business of penal judicature was, though complicated, highly effective as an instrument of explanation. Whoso in England no judicial functionary was then obliged to attend to any evidence except such as was voluntarily offered to him, in France the power of the State was at once put in motion to search out everything that could illuminate the case. On the other hand, the rule which required every question to the witnesses to be put through the medium of the presiding judge sacrificed much of the attractive force of the English cross-examination. The questions framed by the judge for the jury admitted a more delicate consideration of circumstances than the mere alternative "guilty" or "not guilty." But the Code of Criminal Procedure, though on the whole well adapted for the detection of crime and for the speedy trials of prisoners, presented hardly any barrier against the arbitrary use of executive authority. There was no adequate machinery to correspond to the English proceedings upon a writ of

*laurea juris*: the jurists were nominated by the prefects; the prefect might act as a *juge d'instruction*; and, in the secrecy of the preliminary instruction, a case might be prepared for the jury which the innocent prisoner would find it difficult to rebut.

### *The Penal Code.*

The Code of Criminal Procedure could not be put into force until the completion of a Penal Code; and on October 4, 1808, this task was given in hand. Some fundamental questions had already been decided at the *Jura* debate four years earlier. It had been settled that there should be capital punishment and imprisonment for life; that discharged convicts might be placed under police supervision; that a convict might be rehabilitated; that a minimum and a maximum penalty should be fixed for each crime, with latitude of choice within the boundary. It remained to revise the Code of 1791 in detail under the influence of the moral climate of 1808. The work was accomplished in forty-one sittings, and the Penal Code was decreed on February 2, 1810. On the single occasion upon which Napoleon presided, he expressed his desire for short sentences, which left a large discretion to the judges and the Government, on the pretext that "men had horses and the law had not"; but his general tone of penal law did not err on the side of leniency. In 1801 he had advocated with enthusiasm the penalty of branding, especially for forgery. "The forger is generally rich," he remarked. "If only condemned to labour, he returns to society, keeps a fine salon, and people live with him. This would not happen if he were branded by the arm of the executioner." And his defence of condonation was equally characteristic; it would, he said, tempt the relations of a conspirator or betrayer.

"Punishment," said Target, "is certainly not vengeance....It is not the object of law that a guilty man should suffer, but that crime should be prevented." This theory of punishment had recently been made famous in Bentham's *Treatise on Legislation* which was much studied in the course of the discussion. It is not however probable, considering the prevailing Anglophobia of the time, that the influence of Bentham upon the Committee was great; and such influence would never have been acknowledged. The memory of the crimes of the Revolution and the administrative needs of a strong despotism were far more potent influences. The Penal Code is severe, suspicious, and in places barbarous. The penalty of confiscation, which had been condemned by Montesquieu and excluded from the Code of 1791, was restored. The Legislative Section agreed almost unanimously to restore the penalty of branding, on the ground of "political reason and the general interest." The suicide was to lose his hand before undergoing the penalty of death. Men condemned to forced labour were to be employed upon the most

painful tasks. "They shall drag a ball at their feet, and shall be tied two and two with a chain when the nature of the work on which they are employed shall permit." The penalty of death was to be inflicted for murder and arson, for theft and brigandage endangering life and personal security, for corruption and false witness in cases which imperil the life of the innocent. Penal servitude for life was meted out to those who organised and committed associations of violence against persons or property, even when no actual crime had been committed; against unprovoked acts of violence which were of a nature to cause death; and against rebellion, armed gatherings, and "grave crimes." Deportation for life was assigned to "state crimes due to false political ideas, the spirit of party, or an ill-understood ambition," as well as to grave cases of forgery and perjury. So great was the suspicion of political meetings that it was provided that "an association of more than twenty persons, whose aim is to meet every day or on certain fixed days to occupy itself with religious, literary, political, or other objects, can be formed, except with the consent of the Government or under such conditions as public authority may impose."

The Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure bear very strongly the imprint of the times in which they were composed. Unlike the Civil Code, they belong to the later epoch of the Empire, when despotism had assumed its harder form, and the ideals of the Revolution had ceased to be serious factors in political life. Napoleon intervened only in the most crucial questions; but his attitude was understood, and his purposes were fulfilled. No despotism could have wished for a more powerful or terrible instrument than the combination of these two branches of penal law. It has been truly said of the compilers of the Penal Code that "they were far less concerned with devising means of repression sufficient for public safety, than with compensating the horror of crime by the horror of punishment." And, while the Penal Code displays its long catalogue of terrible penalties for offences against public order or the political principles of the Empire, the Code of Criminal Procedure furnishes the Government with the most ample means for the exploration of criminal charges and for the packing of the jury by whom these charges are to be tried.

### The Commercial Code.

A Commercial Code crowns the ordered structure of Napoleonic law. This was in the national tradition; for, ever since the days of L'Hôpital, Powers had possessed separate commercial Courts established "for the public good and the shortening of all suits and differences between merchants." Two great Ordinances, due to the initiative of Colbert, had fixed the outlines of French commercial law—the Edict of 1673 touching inland, and the Ordinance of 1681 touching marine



commerce. So excellent was the Ordinance of 1663 that it became the common mercantile law of Europe.

A commission was sitting in 1789 to investigate the commercial law of France. Commerce had grown; new wants were urgent; and the two great edicts of the seventeenth century, variously interpreted and composed with a labyrinthine of local customs, needed pruning and adaptation. Boregarts commanded the suspended task to be resumed; and on April 3, 1791, a committee of six was appointed to prepare a Code. Their draft was submitted not only to the law-courts but also to the commercial councils and tribunals, and duly revised in the light of their comments. By some mistake, however, this revised Code was handed in, not to the legislative section of the Council of State, but to the section of the Interior, where it slumbered peacefully in its pigeon-hole for several years. A curious incident served to disinter it. In the autumn of 1804, while the Emperor was campaigning in Germany, Paris was startled by a scandalous and signal case of fraudulent bankruptcy. The firm of *Régnier* had failed. A receipt came from the camp demanding a severe law; and an answer went back that such a law would properly form part of the Commercial Code. The Code then, replied Napoleon, must be instantly pushed forward. Accordingly, the draft was produced, and submitted to all the processes employed in the case of the other Codes. The discussion began on November 4, 1805, occupied sixty-eight sessions, and ended on August 23, 1807. The Emperor was absent during the greater part of this period; but, on his return, he demanded a general account of the proceedings, and held four sessions at Saint-Cloud (July 25, 29, August 1, 5, 1807) which began at 7 a.m. and lasted till the evening.

Two points riveted his attention; and on these he poured out his rich and effervescent eloquence. The first concerned the question whether the commercial Courts should take cognizance of all cases arising out of promissory notes, where the signatories had declared their intention of being bound by the law of commerce. Napoleon argued vigorously that no one, save a merchant, should be liable to imprisonment for failing to meet an obligation contracted by a promissory note. The obligations of private individuals were not so precise as those of merchants; for the former, credit was a reluctance and a law to disquisition. For his part, he was unwilling to see bills of exchange or other negotiable instruments used by those who were not in business. Such a practice would lead to the stabilization of fortunes, and spread alarm among the fathers of families. "A courtier who had uttered a promissory note from a young man might drag him before the commercial Court and get him sent to prison." This vehement advocacy, inspired by a hatred of speculation and of the free transfer of land, produced its due effect upon the Code; and, by Clauses 696 and 697, uncommercial persons and uncommercial transactions were exempted from the severe

parallel by which the commercial Courts were empowered to enforce the payment of negotiable instruments.

The second point which specially interested Napoleon was bankruptcy. The old law had assumed misfortune until fraud was proved; and in other respects it was characterized by objectionable leniency. The Council proposed, in the first instance, to expropriate the bankrupt and to vest the administration of his property in the hands of provisional syndics; then, to subject his conduct to strict examination; after which he might be brought before a correctional or a criminal Court according as his offence was one of negligence or fraud. In any case, action was to be taken by the public prosecutor and not by the creditors. These proposals were severe, but they were not severe enough for Napoleon. "Bankruptcy," he said, "takes away men's fortunes without destroying their honour; and that is what it is important to destroy." He argued in favour of leniency in order to prevent the bankrupt flouting his triumph of indifference. The creditors could not be trusted to humiliate the bankrupt, for their sole interest was to secure their debts as soon as possible. But justice would do it, even if it were but for an hour. It was also desirable that in every case the woman should share the misfortune of her husband. It was pointed out by more than one member of the Council that the proposals were too severe, and that to suppose every failure to be the result of fraud until the contrary had been established would injure credit, and bear heavily upon merchants and traders in the country districts. The clauses in the Code represent a somewhat softened version of Napoleon's views. The administration of the debtor's affairs is entrusted first to agents named by the Court of Commerce, and then to syndics named by the creditors; and the magistrate must be kept fully informed of the proceedings, so that on any indication of misconduct or fraud he may send the bankrupt before the correctional or the criminal Court.

Parliament has complained that the Code of Commerce was more carelessly drafted than any of the other Codes; and yet it was the Code for which there existed the most abundant materials. In the First Book, entitled *De Commerce Général*, the whole question of purchase and sale is disposed of in a single unimportant clause. There is not a word concerning price, promise of sale, or earnest money; nothing upon the conditions of weights, measures, and assay; nothing on patents or copyrights, on contracts of apprenticeship, or contracts between workmen and manufacturers or shopkeepers, on bank commissions or on the various kinds of loans which are used in commerce. The Second Book, *De Commerce Maritime*, being copied from the Ordinance of 1681 with little alteration save what was derived from later experience or later laws, is pronounced to be the best Book of the Code, though here again several topics are omitted, for instance, quays and piers, shipwrecks, and fishing. The Third Book, on bankruptcy, is

said by Pothier to contain some excellent dispositions, with others so full of objectionable matter that it is difficult to believe they could have passed uncorrected; and this verdict is confirmed by Loati, who shows how the Law of Bankruptcy breaks down. The Fourth Book, on the competence and procedure of the commercial Courts, is far from being either clear or precise, and is distinguished by the curious omission of any clause dealing with imprisonment for debt. No part of the Napoleonic legislation has required or received more amendment.

The Five Codes—a Sixth, the Code Rural, was drafted, but never passed—represent a great idea, the unity and comprehensiveness of French law. When it is remembered that a task demanding the most massive learning, the calmest and most scrupulous enquiry, was accomplished in the midst of unparalleled excitement and strain; that it was begun in the reverberation of a great war, when all the organs of government were being simultaneously re-created; and that it was continued and brought to a close while the country was involved in a series of gigantic and perilous foreign enterprises—we need not wonder that the expert has detected signs of perfunctory work and political passion. The print of despotism is stamped here and there on the Penal Code, the subjection of women on the Civil Law. It was left for future generations to make adequate provision for the needs of an industrial society, to regulate labour contracts, to protect the interests of the working classes against the tyranny of capital, and to expand the sphere of company law, so jealously contracted by the middle-class individualism of the Civil Code. Nevertheless, the Codes preserve the essential conquests of the revolutionary spirit—civil equality, religious toleration, the emancipation of land, public trial, the jury of judgment. Original they were not, but rather a hasty amalgamation of royal and revolutionary legislation, governed by the genius of Napoleon, dividing, traversing, and penetrating all complications in order to make law subservient to his rule. But, if in France herself the Codes were a symbol of a strict but enlightened despotism, in Germany and Italy they stood for liberty. Here they were the earliest message, as well as the most mature embodiment, of the new spirit. In a clear and compact shape, they presented to Europe the main rules which should govern a civilized society.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE CONCORDATS.

When, on March 18, 1800, Cardinal Chiaramonti became Pope Pius VII, he could hardly have expected permanent agreement with the French Republic. The outlook in France seemed dark indeed. Persecuted by the Directory, the clergy had little to hope from a Government created by an army whose leaders were among the most noted opponents of the Church. The past history of the more prominent civilian officials, Talleyrand and Fouché, gave no promise of goodwill to the Roman Catholic cause. The First Consul himself, while in Egypt, had openly professed his sympathy with Islam, and could scarcely be expected to restore the old religion of France. Even if any recognition of the Christian faith took place, the favour of the State was more likely to be extended to the plant constitutional clergy than to the non-juring Church, which, led by bishops who were mostly absent from France, was intriquing in the provinces on behalf of the Bourbons. On the other hand, a keen observer might have noted certain signs which pointed to a cessation of the active hostility of the Republic to the Papacy. The anti-religious tendency of the Revolution had never been more than superficial in the provinces, while, even in Paris, the hankering classes had preserved much of their respect for the Church. The clergy, too, began to experience a respite from their persecutions, and after 18 Bonaparte were slowly returning to France. The Government declared itself satisfied with a promise from parish priests of fidelity to the Constitution, and no longer insisted on the obstinate oath of fidelity to the Republic. Though a large number of clergy refused to form any connexion with the empire, the less enthusiastic members of the order, including some of the bishops, began to comply with the more moderate demands of the Consular Government. Moreover, the other Church, called constitutional, had by its servility to the Republic forfeited popular respect, while the persecution of the orthodox clergy had roused the sympathy of the people with that section, and contributed in no small degree to the unpopularity of the Directory. The second mission of the Consular Government was to retrieve the errors

of the Jacobins and were the Republic. It was imperative that the religious question should be settled; and, if an understanding with the orthodox clergy could be reached, the resulting union of the nation would greatly strengthen the position of the Government.

Nevertheless, it was natural that Pius VII should feel the utmost uneasiness as to his position, for the apathy of the Austrian Government seemed to leave him without any important friend. His delight, therefore, was great when he heard that not only had the First Consul told the Milanese clergy that the French people were of the same religion as they, but had also attended a Te Deum after the battle of Marengo. Better still, Bonaparte had told Cardinal Martiniani that he was willing to treat with the Pope. His terms were that the Roman Catholic faith should be "dominant" in France; and that all the Bishops, whether ordinary or constitutional, should resign their sees, so that the First Consul might name out a reduced number of dioceses, to which, in accordance with the Concordat of 1804, he would nominate, and the Pope institute, bishops loyal to the new polity. This measure, he added, would secure to the bishops a salary of 18,000 francs apiece, to indemnify them for the loss of the Church lands.

After a delay of some three months, due on the French side to the negotiations with Austria, and on the Roman to uncertainty as to Bonaparte's good faith, Pius VII decided to give the French Government a signal proof of his goodwill. On September 31, 1800, Mgr. Spina, Archbishop of Corinto, set out for Vercelli, accompanied by Father Caselli, a learned Servite. But the French Government transferred the negotiations from Vercelli to Paris, and the Pope could not but acquiesce. He therefore ordered Spina to Paris, but instructed him to discuss only the points raised at Vercelli, and strictly forbade him to sign any document whatever. Seeing that there was a prospect of an agreement between the Pope and the Republic, the royalist party now made a desperate effort to stop the negotiations. Through the agency of Cardinal Maury, Louis XVIII had done what he could to keep alive Pius VII's distrust of Bonaparte; and, when he heard that the Pope had not only issued a brief to the non-juring clergy expressing hopes of a settlement, but had also sent a mission to Paris, Louis tried to interest his half, the Tsar, on his behalf. But the victory of Hohenlinden began, and Bonaparte's offer of Malta completed, the conversion of Paul to friendship with the Republic. Louis could only protest.

Spina arrived at Paris on November 5, and found that, with the exception of Labrous, Bonaparte was the only official in favour of a religious settlement. Talleyrand secretly, Fouché openly, opposed the new policy; but Bonaparte was not a man to be intimidated by his subordinates. Since his return from Italy, he had attended mass with some regularity, not from any religious convictions, but in order to emphasize his desire for an understanding with the Church. A Deist,

but not a Christian, he admired the centralized Roman Catholic form of Christianity above all others: what he aimed at was the stability of his government. He calculated that, should the strife in the Church be ended, the Pope would become his ally. Consequently he was extremely anxious that negotiations should be rapidly pursued; and, as soon as Spina arrived, they began. Gergonne, whom the First Consul had previously approached, proved too hostile to the Roman Court for Bonaparte's purposes; and Bernier, a refractory priest—once a leader of the *Chouans*, now a government agent—was appointed to conduct the negotiations. An agreement was all but arrived at in the first three weeks. Bonaparte having offered to recognise the Roman Catholic religion, the Pope was prepared to acquiesce in the confiscation of the Church lands. Spina raised objections to the compulsory election of bishops from their sees by the Pope, as such a measure was *contra viam*. The Gallian Bernier acquiesced in this objection, and proposed that the Pope, after a "general exhortation," should suspend the disubdiness, whereupon the Government would appoint diocesan administrators *con jure monarchico*. Spina had virtually suggested this; but Bernier's apparent wavering induced Spina to raise his demands. He refused to agree to a promise of fidelity to the Government, and thereby destroyed all chance of an immediate agreement.

The negotiations were intricate and prolonged. Bonaparte, as usual in diplomacy as in the field of battle, at one moment pressed one point and withdrew another, then withdrew both and emphasised a third. By January, 1801, however, he had put Spina in possession of what may be considered as his definite intentions. Spina must have bitterly regretted his imprudent refusal of the French proposals when, between November and February, Bonaparte formulated his demands with greater precision and in more exacting terms. The phrase "*dominant religion*" was withdrawn in favour of a bald recognition by the Councils that the Roman Catholic religion was that of the majority of Frenchmen; the sons of bishops who refused to obey the Pope's request, or command, to resign were to be declared *ipso facto* vacant; the Church lands, even if unable, were not to be returned to the Church; the clergy must take an oath of fidelity to the Constitution or to the Government; and the married constitutional clergy were to be recognised as laymen in communion with the Catholic Church. Meanwhile, the Pope's demands had also been rising. In January and February he ordered Spina to press for the abandonment of the sale of the Church lands, while the preeminence of the Temporal Power thrust the spiritual needs of the Church into the background. So the Archbishop of Cordoba was told not to forget to claim the Legation, and to demand a compensation for the loss of Aragon. But these instructions led to nothing, for they reached Paris too late. In spite of Talleyrand's attempts to intimidate Spina into signing the draft convention, the Archbishop had succeeded in

transferring the negotiations to Rome, and so virtually relieved himself of all direct responsibility.

Simultaneously the First Consul, dissatisfied at the dishonesty of the negotiations and suspicious of Epina's good faith, appointed as minister in Rome a man whom he knew to be favorable to his policy. Council was ordered to combine assurances as to the Temporal Power with demands for an unreserved acceptance of the terms as they stood; but, at the same time, Bonaparte carefully inspired respect for the Pope. "Behave towards the Pope," he told Council in his last interview, "as though he were in command of 200,000 men." Council obeyed his master's commands in all respects; but Pius VII. in accordance with his usual policy, submitted the French project to two Congregations; and the arts of procrastination were so successfully practiced that no answer was given till May 12. It took the form of a counter-project, based on an alternative scheme which Bonnier had sent along with Bonaparte's terms. Any suggestion entailing recognition of the constitutional clergy was met with a direct non *passeamus*; to allow the confiscation of the Church lands would be to sanction the breaking of treaties such as Arnold of Brede and Wydlit; but the Pope was ready to give a dispensation to the present exception. Although the Pope had previously expressed the opinion that, if the phrase "dominant religion" were not used, "the whole fabric would collapse," the Roman theologians offered to sacrifice it, provided the Roman confusion were established as the religion of the State. It was urged that, if the First Consul was to have the right of nominating to vacant sees, this promise was imperative, in order to avoid offending the Tsar of Russia and the Kings of England and Prussia, to whom Bonaparte XIV had refused a similar right on the ground that those sovereigns were not Catholics. An excuse for meeting the First Consul in another matter was furnished by historical research. It was discovered that, to end the Donatist schism, all the African bishops had resigned their sees; and, as the French bishops had refused to resign in 1794, advantage might now be taken of that offer. Refusal would entail the sin of "detestable incontinence," which would justify the deposition of the offender. Finally, the question of the oath afforded a good opportunity for averting the capriciousness of the Pope to General Council; for, though the Fourth Lateran Council had forbidden the clergy to take oaths, the Pope was willing to sanction an oath of fidelity to the Government.

The Curia, therefore, conscious of its inability to resist, and anxious for a settlement, was willing to agree to the French proposals. But, before its offer reached Paris, the negotiations entered on a new phase. The long delay had irritated the First Consul; and his reaction at the failure of his diplomatic schemes was vented on the comparatively innocent Pope. The constitutional clergy were now allowed to hold a national council, while Talleyrand despatched an ultimatum to Rome.

The effect of these measures was to bring Cardinal Consalvi, the papal Secretary of State, to Paris. He arrived on June 20, 1801; and, after a dramatic reception by Bonaparte on June 21, the negotiations were resumed. The solution of the problem was aided, on the one side, by the absence of Talleyrand, and, on the other side, by the meeting, on July 2, of the council of constitutional clergy, which appeared to Consalvi to be a potential realization of the First Council's threat of a national religion.

Although Bonaparte refused to abate the demands he had made in January, the Cardinal drafted a counter-project (July 11) which Berlier declared to be consistent with Gallican liberties. Accordingly Joseph Bonaparte, Cretet, and Berlier were named as French plenipotentiaries; and on July 15 they met the papal envoys. The project submitted to the meeting differed markedly from Consalvi's, especially in some words (now heard for the first time) about police restrictions on the liberty of worship. The Cardinal offered a strenuous opposition to the new proposals, and at last succeeded in getting rid of the objectionable amendments. The new convention was brought to the First Council in the afternoon of July 14. He tore it up, and exclaimed at dinner to Consalvi that, if Henry VIII, who had not one-half of his power, could break with the Pope, the First Council would be well able to manage without him. Eventually, however, Bonaparte allowed himself to be persuaded by the Austrian minister, Philip Cobenzl, to renew the conference; and, on July 18, the Concordat was signed by the plenipotentiaries and accepted by the First Council.

The preamble of this famous convention defines the nature of the faith professed by the French nation and the Council. The sixteen articles which follow may be divided into three classes. Five articles define the rights of the Church—its freedom to exercise public worship (Art. 1), the prayers to be said at the end of divine service (2), the establishment of cathedral chapters (11), the grant of salaries to the beneficed clergy (14), the permission to Catholics to make pious foundations (15). Five others deal with the question of nomination to benefices. In the case of bishops, the arrangement of the Concordat of 1526 is revived (4, 5); the patronage of the parish living, taken away from the landlords in 1790, is now given to the bishops (10); the oath to be taken by the clergy is defined (6, 7). Other articles are dictated by the circumstances of 1801, and deal with the formation of new dioceses and parishes (8, 9), the resignation of the bishops then holding diocesan titles (3), the restoration of the churches and the alienation of lands (12, 13), the grant to the Republic of the privileges enjoyed at Rome by the Kings of France (16). Art. 17 provided for a new Concordat, should any future First Council not be a Catholic.

As signs of haste are apparent in the irregular arrangement of the clauses, so also does their phraseology betray a lack of collaboration.



There was a want of position, and there were many strange omissions. No number was fixed for the new dioceses. Not a word was said as to whether the Pope could refuse to institute a nominee of the Government. After a long struggle about the manner of making pious foundations, the Government had suddenly dropped its contention, but only when it put forward its claim to making police regulations for the execution of the Concordat; and these regulations were subject to no limitation but the will of the French Government. Nevertheless, vague as the terms occasionally were, they were precise enough to show that Bonaparte had attained the main objects for which he had been striving. The revolutionary settlement of the Church lands was maintained: liberty of conscience was recognized in Art. IV. The Pope's consent to deprive the bishops of their sees, if they refused to resign, permitted Bonaparte to map out the new dioceses; while the recovery of the power of nominating bishops, and the provision for the appointment to smaller benefices, gave the Government control over the ecclesiastical and political complexion of the clergy. Any deficiency in this respect could be made good by the police restrictions on liberty of worship referred to in Art. I.

On the other hand, if the Pope surrendered positions which he had once considered vital, his retreat was covered by the phrasology of the Concordat. The Government refused to recognize the Catholic religion as "dominant"; but the Consuls had been persuaded to make a public profession of that creed. Though the bishops were to resign their sees under penalty of deprivation, this clause was so worded that compulsion was veiled under an expression of confidence that the bishops would obey the Pope's exhortation. The vexed question of the oath of fidelity had been solved by substituting the oath taken by the clergy under the ancien régime, a compromise which could hardly be offensive to either party. The abandonment of the Church lands was represented, not as a matter of principle, but merely as a measure of circumstance; and this loss was more than counterbalanced by the guaranteed salaries of the clergy, the restoration of cathedral chapters, and the apparent abandonment of the Government's claim to regulate the manner of making pious foundations. Politically, too, the alliance of France with the Papacy gave the latter a friend among the Great Powers, and reconciled it with the first military State in Europe. Still, while Pius VII might congratulate himself on having improved the position of the Church in matters spiritual and temporal, he can scarcely have doubted which side gained most by the agreement.

The next step was to obtain the ratification of the Concordat. The complete success of the measure depended on the goodwill of no less than four parties—the Pope, the French Republic, the constitutional clergy, and the legitimate bishops. On August 28, 1801, the National Council was directed by order of the First Consul. A show of

resistance was made; and Le Coq, the President of the Council, with Grégoire and a few other bishops, protested against the reduction of the sees, demanded the restoration of regular elections, accepted papal institution only as a temporary device, and declared that bulls from Rome should be supervised by the French metropolitans. But no more was heard of these objections; and, when the constitutional bishops were requested to resign, only two refused. Although signs of trouble appeared at Rome, the attempt to resist the Concordat came to nothing. It was prompted by jealousy of Consalvi, on whose return the Pope departed from his usual custom of following the advice of the Sacred College. With some vacillation, he despatched two ratifications of the convention—the one absolute, the other conditional. With the latter on the married clergy, he also sent two bulls concerning the resignation of the bishops, the one addressed to Spina and through him to the constitutional bishops, the other addressed directly to the latter. Spina was left to choose which documents he should present; and he wisely sent in the absolute ratification and the "indirect" bull. Talleyrand's attempts to procrastinate were roughly defeated by Bonaparte, who, on September 8, 1801, ratified the Concordat on behalf of the Republic, reserving to himself the right of "providing by regulations against the more serious inconveniences that might arise from a formal execution of the Concordat." What this meant the next few months were to show.

Thus far, the process of ratification had been carried out with remarkably little friction. Nineteen French bishops, however, met in London, and refused to resign their sees. Encouraged by Louis XVIII, who saw a new chance of wrecking the hateful Concordat, twenty-six of their brethren in Germany followed their example. Later, some of these gave way; but there still remained thirty-five bishops to form a non-juring body called the "*petite église*," which survived till 1806. The majority of the legitimate bishops deserted the cause of Louis, and, by obeying the Pope, rallied to the Republic. Forty-four prelates resigned; and, after a final exhortation to the recalcitrant bishops, Pius VII issued the bull for the delimitation of the new dioceses. The resistance of the legitimate bishops caused considerable delay in the issue of this bull; and the legate appointed to execute the Concordat had to leave Rome without it. Bonaparte, on the advice of Cabanis, had requested that Cardinal Caprara might be appointed to this post. He was a pious and amiable ecclesiastic, devoid of insight into motives or character, easily intimidated and cajoled, and, asuncio at Vienna, had given much dissatisfaction to the Roman Court. The Pope, unable to refuse Bonaparte's request, attempted to tie Caprara's hands by instructing him to refuse institution to the constitutional clergy, and, backing back to the Temporal Power, to demand the restoration of the Legations and compensation for Arignon. The Legate was received by Bonaparte with great honour; but the delay in the issue of the bull

ceased his law, and he complained of being tricked by the Curia. In December, however, the bill arrived; and it was at length possible to submit the treaty to the legislative bodies for their acceptance as a law of the State. It was here that Bonaparte had reason to anticipate serious opposition. When, on August 8, 1804, the Concordat was read before the Council of State, not a word was said in its favour; even the Senate did not disguise its dissatisfaction. But, by a ruse on the Constitution, the opposition of the Tribunate was circumvented; the promised police regulations, which appeared under the title of *Articles Organiques*, somewhat glided the pill for the legislature; and, with remarkable celerity, the law, comprising both the Concordat and the Organic Articles, was passed, after a show of discussion, in three days (April 8, 1804).

The Organic Articles had been expressly kept back by Bonaparte until the bulls connected with the Concordat had been issued. Had these articles been known to Pius VII, he would certainly have broken off the negotiations—a fact which explains Bonaparte's assurance that the Pope should immediately perform his part of the bargain. Of the hundred and twenty-one articles, seventy-seven dealt with the Roman Church; and here Bonaparte was able to exact those provisions which he had been forced to cede from the Concordat. The supremacy of the State over the Church was asserted by provisions that no bulls, briefs, or legates from Rome, no decrees of General Councils or National Synods, could enter France without permission from the Government; the system of *appel comme d'abus* was revived; while other articles dealt with the more trivial questions of the ringing of church bells, the position, salary, qualifications, dress, and titles of the clergy. One liturgy and one calendar only were to be used throughout the Republic. Civil marriage was always to precede the ecclesiastical rite. Though obviously intended to restore the Gallicanism of the ancien régime, the preceding articles would not have excited opposition by themselves. What galled the Court of Rome was a clause which ordered seminarians to be taught the four Gallican articles of 1682: while the arrangement of the articles, by combining regulations for Catholics and Protestants, placed all religions on a level, and maintained the cherished principle of liberty of conscience.

All the formalities having been completed, the First Consul nominated the new bishops. On March 26, Capua, who had received authority to institute the First Consul's nominees, learnt that Bonaparte intended to nominate ten constitutional bishops. He was deeply mortified, for, though on his arrival in Paris he hoped that the number would be fifteen, and though, on March 18, he had been asked if he would accept constitutional nominees, he had, during the negotiations at Amiens, been lulled into the belief that no constitutional bishops would

be nominated. On April 9 he was received by Bonaparte in a solemn audience. Although he had been promised an exemption from the oath, usually exacted from papal legates, he read a Latin declaration, promising to respect the Gallican liberties. Next day the *Monitor* announced that he had signed the declaration. He protested, but was told that the matter was of no consequence; and there, with characteristic weakness, he let it rest. But he insisted that, if the constitutional bishops were to receive institution, they must retract their errors. Their refusal was unhesitant, but they consented to sign a letter drawn up by Bernier and Portalis by which they renounced the civil constitution. Capota was induced to accept this, but he required that it should be publicly announced that the constitutional nominees had been reconciled to the Holy See after explicitly renouncing their late errors before Bernier and Portalis. These two men, on the morning of their consecration as Bishops of Orleans and Vannes, informed the Cardinal that these conditions had been fulfilled. Capota thereupon (April 17) instituted the constitutional bishops, who next day denied the truth of the statements.

The publication of the Concordat took place on Easter Day (April 18, 1802). Bonaparte's victory was complete. He had triumphed over the Jacobins by forcing the generals to come to Arcis; by the Organic Articles he had apparently reduced the clergy to the condition of an obedient department of the State; by the convention with the Pope he had made an alliance with the most powerful moral force in Europe, had removed all religious reasons for opposition to the Republic, and had established his own position more firmly than ever. Nor can it be doubted that to the mass of the French people the achievement was most acceptable. What opposition there was had arisen among the remnants of the old revolutionists; but the loyalty of the bulk of the younger generation to the Catholic Church was shown by the enthusiasm which hailed Chateaubriand's *Œuvre de Christianisme*. In so far, then, as the policy of the Concordat agreed with the wishes of the French nation, there is nothing to be said against it. But experience was to show that in some ways its effect was the reverse of what Bonaparte intended. He had hoped that the clergy would revive its old loyalty to the Government, and resist all encroachments of the papal power. He did not see that, by putting the parish priests absolutely into the hands of the bishops, he gave the latter an army which might some day be used against him; and that, by depriving the bishops of their lands, he deprived them, now that they had lost their self-taxing power, of the mediating influence they had been able to exercise over the Government of the entire régime, and reduced them, in case of conflict with the civil power, to rely for support on their ancient rival, the Pope. The decay of Gallicanism and the rise of Ultramontaniam in France during the nineteenth century is to be attributed in no small degree to the Revolution and to the Concordat of 1802.

At present, however, the First Consul had every reason for satisfaction. Such was not the case with the Pope. When he heard of the Organic Articles, he delivered an allocution, which was the first of a series of papal protests against them; and he considered Caprara's weakness in the matter of the sixth testament to treason. Caprara, too, had said that Bonaparte would communicate at Rastat; and here again the Pope had been disappointed. In short, the effect at Rome of the news of recent events in Paris was disastrous: but, as the Pope did not wish to break with the Power which alone could restore to him his territories, he pretended to be satisfied with the explanation that the Articles were necessary police regulations. Meanwhile, in Paris, Caprara was busy ruining his master's interests. In May the nomination to the smaller diocesan bishop. Bonaparte desired that the constitutional clergy should be left undisturbed as far as possible, and treated the legitimate clergy with more harshness. Caprara, on his side, insisted on obtaining a reformation from the constitutional clergy. On hearing this, Bonaparte tried to intimidate the Legate by a threat to convert the French to Protestantism. Even Caprara saw through this; so Fouché, Talleyrand, the Archbishop of Aix, and Bernier in turn bombarded the unfortunate Cardinal with notes declaring that his obediency was ruining the new settlement. Their efforts, combined with a judicious offer by Bonaparte of the archbishopric of Milan, and an unbounded confidence in the piety and good faith of the First Consul, induced Caprara to give way. The Pope also yielded on this point, as he was not in a position to make trouble; for, by restoring France and Ancona, and by representing to the King of Naples that Benevento and Porto Cerre belonged to the Church, the French Government had laid the Curia under a considerable obligation.

The First Consul's wishes, therefore, thanks to Caprara, had now been met by the Pope in every respect; and relations between the two Powers became cordial. But it was not to be expected that this ill-assorted pair would long remain on friendly terms. The compliance of the Pope led Bonaparte to make farther demands. He restored, in violation of the privilege of the other Catholic Powers, that the five vacant places in the College of Cardinals should be filled by Frenchmen. If the Pope would not create five French Cardinals, he would allow none at all, and would hold no communication with the Sacred College. Here again the Pope had to give way.

Matters followed a similar course when Bonaparte wished to negotiate for an Italian Concordat: the Pope was unwilling to grant it, but unable to resist. In 1806 a convention between the Pope and the Italian Republic was formed, on the same lines as that with France; but its terms were generally more favourable to the Church. The religion of the Italian Republic continued to be that of Rome: two bishoprics were suppressed and only three archbishoprics allowed; cathedral chapters

were to be abolished; and education was put under the control of the Bishops. A clause was added, exempting the clergy from any obligation to carry persons suffering from a mental impediment. But in February, 1804, Mabi, the Vice-President, issued a decree analogous to the Organic Articles. The Pope protested that Bonaparte, as President, by allowing this decree, had violated the Concordat. The first article of the decree maintained certain laws which the Concordat had implicitly repealed; by another the President claimed certain rights formerly assumed by the Emperor, but never recognised by the Pope, and forcing on part of the privileges of the Duke of Milan, to which alone the President was entitled by the Concordat; thirdly, by adding the word "definitely" to the decree stating that no *secularisation* might be suppressed save by consent of the Holy See, the decree claimed the right of "conditional" suppression; and lastly, the attempt to exercise government control over the number of novices and ordinands was a clear violation of one of the conditions of the treaty. To these protests, however, Bonaparte turned a deaf ear.

Within the limits of France the policy of Bonaparte required subtler methods. We have seen how in May, 1803, he had insisted on the parishes being filled to a great extent by constitutional clergy. Exactly the opposite policy was followed with regard to the bishops. These were drawn for the most part from the clergy of the *ancien régime*, who, as converts to the Revolution and deserters from the old cause, might be relied on to give firmer support to Napoleon's government than those who had never wavered in their allegiance to the new order. But, to ensure the submission of the clergy, the prefects were ordered, on May 31, 1803, to exercise a censorship over all the pastoral letters of the bishops. When these protested, the regulation was interpreted as an order that the letters should be handed in to the prefect and printed at the Press of the prefecture. Any attempts at independence on the part of the clerical as of the secular Press were soon crushed; and in 1803 all the clerical papers were united into one, the *Journal des Curés*, issued under the strict supervision of the Government.

If Bonaparte hoped that the secular clergy of France would support him in the event of a quarrel with the Pope, and would use their influence for the purpose of facilitating conscription—and in the latter case his confidence was not misplaced—he saw clearly that the regular clergy might prove less amenable. Taking advantage of the peace proclaimed by the Concordat, many of the old religious Orders had returned to France and resumed their educational work. In June, 1803, Bonaparte suppressed all such communities in the German territories recently ceded to France; and in January, 1805, he issued an order to the prefects to prevent the revival of these Orders. In June, 1804, he decreed the suppression of all unauthorised congregations, and especially of the "*Filles de la Foi*," who disguised under this name the old Society

of Jean; but this sweeping decree was not rigorously carried out. Charitable communities were not molested; and Napoleon put under the high protection of his mother five associations of sisters engaged in works of mercy.

The Organic Articles had provided for the use of one liturgy and one catechism throughout France. Sure for the observance of the festival of St. Napoleon on August 15, better known as the feast of the Assumption, the single liturgy seems to have been an unreal ideal; but the *catéchisme* was ready in 1803, and made no small stir. It was based on that of Bossuet. But the First Council delayed its publication until his proclamation as Emperor; and in September, 1804, Combray heard of it. He ordered Caprera to prevent its appearance, on the ground that the publication of a catechism by command of the Emperor would be an infringement of the rights of the Church. In February, 1805, Caprera sanctioned the *catéchisme*; and the Vatican had to content itself with reprimanding its Legate. But the *catéchisme* did not satisfy the bishops; and Cardinal Fesch discerned the reason. It did not contain the doctrine *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. Anxious that a catechism which damned those who dared resist the Emperor should be well received, Napoleon, contrary to the spirit of the Organic Articles, inserted the doctrine. Loud applause greeted the appearance of the *catéchisme*; the bishops recorded their objections till 1808.

The proclamation of Napoleon Bonaparte as First Consul for Life in August, 1802, marks a further step in the development of his policy towards the Holy See. During the negotiations for the Concordat, La Fayette had remarked, "Citoyen Consul, assurez que vous n'avez aucun frère à Rome en robe noire"; and Bonaparte had not denied it. Now that he was to govern for life, all his relations with the Pope are seen to lead up to a coronation in Paris by the Pope. In order to persuade Pius VII to comply, he held out hopes of still further concessions to the Holy See; but he blotted that disaster would follow if the Pope refused. Casati, who showed himself too sympathetic with the Court, was recalled; and the First Consul appointed as ambassador at Rome his own uncle, Cardinal Fesch, who proved as bad a diplomatist as he was, subsequently, a good bishop.

In March, 1804, Fesch demanded the extradition of an *abbé* who was supposed to be implicated in the plots, but, as a naturalized Russian subject, was in no way amenable to the French courts. The Pope would have resisted this demand, had he not been cowed by the news of the murder of the Duc d'Enghien; once more he capitulated. On May 16, 1804, Napoleon was declared Emperor. A week earlier he had consulted Caprera on the subject of the coronation. The pliant Legate advised the Pope to accede to Napoleon's wishes; but Pius VII received the French advances coldly. The blood of the Duc d'Enghien was still fresh on Napoleon's hands. From motives of courtesy nothing

was said about this; but other excuses were put forward. The demand was unprecedented; and Paris was far from Rome. Some religious reason must be alleged for such a request, compliance with which would probably offend the Court of Vienna. The coronation with must not contain any allusion to the Organic Articles, or to liberty of worship; some attention must be paid to the protests against Melzi's decree; the constitutional bishops must retract their errors before the Pope in person. Caprara, who seems to have assured Napoleon that no difficulties would arise, was covered with confusion on receiving this despatch; and, on hearing its import, Napoleon roughly refused to receive the Legate. The Pope, however, was master of the situation; and Napoleon's diplomatic efforts show that he was aware of this. His dissimulations proving vain, the Emperor declared that, if his demands were not granted, the blame of overthrowing the Church settlement would fall on the Pope. Heult succeeded where threats and flattery had failed. Napoleon suggested that Pius VII had written to Vienna for advice. Stung to the quick, the Pope decided to go to Paris in order to prove his good faith. French gave assurance that the Pope's religious scruples would be respected; but, to the latter's disgust, the formal letter of invitation contained no mention of the interests of religion. As it was too late to decline, the Pope started, doubting whether he had not been tricked again, and insisting, it is said, on an act of abjuration against the event of his being detained in France against his will.

The Pope was received by the common people with enthusiasm and devotion; but by the officials generally, the "*Domino universalis*," though treated with respect, was made to feel his inferiority to the Emperor of the French. The only advantages that he was able to gain from his journey were the ecclesiastical marriage of Napoleon and Josephine the night before the coronation, and the omission of any mention in the *Mémorial* of the Emperor's self-coronation. That he could insist on the ecclesiastical marriage shows how advantageous a position Pius VII held before the coronation; while his failure to obtain the retrocession of the Legation, the restoration of the Church to a "dominant" position, or the abolition of divorce, is strong evidence of his weakness or his lack of firmness. After the coronation, the Pope's demands were met by polite reminders of the Emperor's services to the Church, and by assurances of Napoleon's desire for its welfare; and in March, 1805, Pius VII left Paris on his return to Rome.

Pius VII had now reached the nadir of his career. The spiritual gains won for the Church had not been obtained without sacrifice of principle, while the territorial advantage derived from his Gallophile policy had not been equal to his expectations. His compliance with Napoleon's demands had led to personal humiliation. Now, however, the turning-point was reached. The Emperor's arrogance rapidly increased; and the Pope determined to make no more concessions. The



Emperor became a persecutor, the Pope a martyr. But, though there were spiritual questions at issue in the quarrel, the clash was caused by temporal considerations. Napoleon's continental policy was incompatible with the territorial sovereignty of the Pope. The differences, however, were at first of another kind. In June, 1806, the Code Napoleon was extended to Italy. As it permitted divorce, the Pope protested against this fresh violation of the Italian Concordat. As usual, the Emperor resorted to religion, but authorized French to propose modifications. The promise was not fulfilled, and it was forgotten in the more serious trouble that arose over the marriage of Jerome. The Emperor, who could not brook this estrangement and had other matrimonial projects for Jerome, asked the Pope to quash the marriage, which, according to the decrees of the Council of Trent, was nullified by its secrecy. But the Pope replied that, as the decrees of Trent had never been published at Baltimore, he could not annul the union. Napoleon declared, perhaps with truth, that the Pope's refusal was a piece of spite because the Legations had not been restored to the Church; and, finding there was no chance of overcoming the Pope's resistance, he dispensed with his services and quashed Jerome's marriage by an Imperial edict.

If Napoleon had succeeded in keeping this dispute secret, his next step revealed to the whole world the delicate nature of his relations with the Pope. From this time forward, Napoleon gradually increased his hold over the Papal States, and entered on the policy which was finally to lead to their annexation and thus to complete the breach between him and Pius VII. When, in 1806, war between Austria and France was impending, the Court of Naples offered its neutrality, if the French Emperor would withdraw General Saint-Cyr from Otranto. Anxious to concentrate his forces, Napoleon, who was rather overweighed by his combinations, agreed to pay the price. He therefore ordered Saint-Cyr to join Masséna on the Adige; but instructed him, while on the way, to occupy Ancona.

For a time the Pope made no sign. Austria, with whom he was on bad terms, so far misunderstood the situation as to protest against the Pope's flagrant breach of neutrality in allowing the passage of the French troops; and indeed it was generally believed that the French occupied Ancona with the sanction of the Pontifical Government. But, after hearing of Uta and Trachlitz, the Pope sent a protest to Napoleon. It reached him in the anxious days before Austerlitz, and seemed to be a deliberate attempt to add to his difficulties. In his reply, written after the victory, Napoleon made no secret of his feelings. He told the Pope that Ancona had been occupied to protect the Holy See; and, in a violent letter to French, he threatened that, if the Pope continued his

unreasonable insistence, he would be reduced to the condition of Bishop of Rome. To justify his conduct, the Pope asserted that his protest was made to remove the impression that he was in collusion with the French, and once more denied the Legation and the repayment of money advanced to the French troops. But Napoleon now had further designs. The Continental Blockade must be enforced, the British ministers, Jackson, expelled, and the Papal ports closed to the British, the Russians, and the Swedes. This exorbitant request was put forward by Napoleon as successor of Charlemagne, Emperor of Rome. Facing the storm coming, Jackson withdrew; but the other demands had to be met. In accordance with the advice of the Sacred College, the Pope refused to close his ports, as he had no grudge against the nations concerned; and he pointed out that, in calling himself Emperor of Rome, his Imperial Majesty was talking nonsense.

Had not the quarrel been so bitter, the result of French might have improved the situation. The Cardinal was no longer on speaking terms with the Pope. He had grossly abused the Papal Government of complicity in the murder of a French trader, of taxing the tax levied for the maintenance of the French garrisons as ventures as possible, and of forming bands of men for the murder of isolated French soldiers. The inconvenience of the situation gave Napoleon an opportunity of annoying the Papal Court by substituting a layman for a churchman; but, by obtaining an ambassador with whom the Pope was on speaking terms, the Quirinal escaped from a difficulty. So long as French was at Rome, the only channel of communication between the Quirinal and the D clerie was Caprera, who was now worse than useless to the Pope, for the Emperor had paid his debts.

Before his departure from Rome, French notified the Provisional Government of the accession of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples. In reply, Count di Castaldi reminded him of the ancient supremacy of the Pope over that kingdom, and put in a claim for reparation. To this proud but injudicious answer Napoleon replied by advancing still further into the Papal States. If the Pope refused to close his ports, they must be closed for him: the Continental Blockade was not to be violated by the sluttishness of an insignificant Prince. Joseph therefore was empowered to seize Civit  Vecchia; and the protest against this step furnished an excellent excuse for completing the occupation of the Papal ports by the seizure of Ostia, while Bracciano and Porto Cervo were granted as principalities to Talleyrand and Bernadotte.

But the dismemberment of the Papal States did not shake the Pope's determination, though he accepted Consalvi's resignation, which had been offered as a conciliatory measure. On July 1, 1808, Napoleon, in a violent interview with Caprera, threatened to occupy the whole of the Pope's territory. Facing the approach of war with Prussia, Napoleon was anxious that the Pope should be terrified into yielding before the

crisis became acute. The troops at Ancona and Civita Vecchia were therefore ordered to seize the Papal revenues and incorporate the Papal troops in the French army; and, on July 8, the new envoy, Alquier, a former member of the Convention, presented an ultimatum, bidding the Pope choose between surrender and annihilation. But, although Caprara and Spina implored the Pope to yield, Pius VII would not give way; and events in the north for a time averted the threatened blow. After Jena, Napoleon tried to induce the Pope to capitulate by negotiating through the monks at Dresden. But the Emperor's diffidence was the Pope's opportunity. In October, 1806, he refused to initiate Napoleon's nominees to bishoprics in the newly annexed Prussian territory, on the ground that the Italian Concordat did not apply to those lands. Checked at Eylau, and busy with his combinations against Russia, Napoleon could only complain to Eugene of the wantonness of the step which compromised the Roman Court.

But the tables were turned when the Treaty of Tilsit left Napoleon free. The Emperor's tone became unbearably arrogant; and the retirement of Talleyrand from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs removed the diluting pen which had softened down so many harsh demands. As the Papal ports were in Napoleon's hands, it is not surprising that an offer made by Pius VII in October, 1807, to close his ports and meet the Emperor's wishes in any matter not entailing war, should have been considered insufficient. In spite, however, of *Lamarini's* assumption of the style of governor of the occupied Papal provinces, and in spite of his imprisonment of the officials who protested against the usurpation, the Pope hesitated to complete the rupture. Every title was needed, for the Pope had revoked Caprara's powers and ordered Cardinal de Raynon, the Papal plenipotentiary, to prepare to leave Paris.

Napoleon, however, seems to have decided to give the Pope an opportunity of making peace. A draft treaty was submitted, under the terms of which the Pope, in return for the Emperor's protection, would close his ports to infidels, heretical priests, and the British; make cessions, same with France; surrender Ancona, Civita Vecchia, and Ostia; recognise the new dynasty; abandon his claims against Naples; and extend the Italian Concordat to Venetia. Further, one-third of the Sacred College was to be French; and a new Concordat was to be made for the Confederation of the Rhine. To these stipulations were added, in the original draft, two clauses, directing that no protests should be made against the Gallican liberties, and that the treaty should be accepted without reserve. These clauses French had succeeded in removing; but Champagny refused to promise that they would not be reinstated. The Sacred College, to whom these preposterous proposals were submitted, emphatically rejected them. Napoleon thereupon ordered General Miulin to occupy the Castle of Saint Angelo, in order "to protect the rear of the Neapolitan army," and "to clear

Rome of brigands." Alquier was ordered to control the press and to crush any action against French interests; while Napoleon announced his resolve that, should the Pope issue any bull against him, he would arrest the Papal States.

When, therefore, on February 2, 1808, Media carried out the Emperor's commands, the Papal States became French in everything but in name. The Papal army was absorbed in the French; and, by the capture of the Neapolitan cardinals, the disorganisation of the Pontifical Government was rendered complete. As soon as any Secretary of State appeared to be gaining influence over the Pope, he was driven from the capital; and only the personal intervention of Pius VII. saved the last Secretary, Cardinal Pacca, from a similar fate. Less eminent personages were summarily thrown into prison. At last, on May 17, 1809, Napoleon issued from Schönbrunn an Imperial decree reading the "denunciation of Charlemagne, our august predecessor," and arresting Rome to the Empire. On June 10 the tricolour replaced the Papal banner over the Castle of Sant' Angelo. "Consecration est," exclaimed Pius VII. with the glib profanity of an Italian; and the next day there was affixed to the doors of the three chief buildings, a bull, "*Consecranda*," which, after asserting the supremacy of the Pope over all temporal sovereigns in language worthy of Boniface VIII., commenced the despoils of the Church. The reply to the bull was not long delayed. On July 6 the Pope and Cardinal Pacca were carried off. At Grenoble they were separated; the Pope was taken to Avignon, and thence to Ferras; Pacca was imprisoned at Fossatechia.

This act of violence was done by Napoleon's orders; of this his letter to Murali Rucchi conclusive proof. If he thought that the Pope's stubbornness would be bent by such methods, he was grievously mistaken. Now that he was really deprived of his freedom, and so cut off from his friends that he was compelled to make a secretary of his will, Pius VII. became infinitely more powerful than before. His policy was simple: he refused to perform any pontifical acts, knowing that, sooner or later, Napoleon would be put to serious inconveniences. Napoleon, on his part, tried, by an expedient which seemed perilously allied to certain Protestant ideas, to substitute the Gallican Church for the Pope. No doubt this had been the logical conclusion of the claims of the French bishops under the ancien régime; but never had the Church of France been in such danger of a supremacy of the Tudor type as during the later years of the First Empire. Confronted by the Pope's opposition, Napoleon announced in November, 1809, an Ecclesiastical Commission, with Fesch, Maury, and Tassy as its most prominent members, for the purpose of advising the Government upon the questions at issue. Proceeding to the inquiries submitted to it, the Commission denied the arbitrary power of the Pope in Church affairs, and sharply distinguished the spiritual from the temporal power of the Papacy.

Therefore, as the Concordat was a "qualitative contrast" between Napoleon and Pius VII, the latter was bound to observe it; and it was implicitly argued that the annexation of Rome—a matter which did not touch the Concordat—was not sufficient to justify the Pope in refusing to institute the new bishops. So far, the report of the Commission was in Napoleon's favour; but, on the other hand, a preamble was affixed, denouncing the Thirty of the Pope, while protests were raised against certain of the Organic Articles. Further, a National Council was declared incompetent to deal with questions which concerned the whole of Christendom; what was needed was a General Council, which could only be held under the presidency of the Pope. Finally, although Napoleon had not "essentially" violated the Concordat, the separation of the Pope from his cardinals was a serious matter of complaint, "the force and justice of which His Majesty would readily perceive."

These assertions sound in no way satisfied the Emperor; and in January, 1810, the Commission was suppressed. Meanwhile French men were falling recent; and dissatisfaction at the Emperor's policy had been rapidly growing. In spite of orders to the newspapers against any mention of the Pope, the bull of excommunication and the imprisonment of Pius VII had become known. The former was secretly circulated throughout France by an association called the Congregation of Paris, to which many of the nobility belonged. It had been founded in 1801, by an ex-Jesuit, as a purely charitable institution; but, its methods now becoming political, Napoleon arrested Alexis de Noailles and five other members. The Congregation pretended to dissolve, and thus anticipated the decree which suppressed all such bodies (October 1, 1809). On the failure of the Commission, the Emperor regulated the doctrine of the Church by *Sanctis Concilio*. It was by this means that the copying-stone was set upon the scheme of religious persecution on February 17, 1810. On that day the Senate passed a decree which, while annexing Rome as a free Imperial city, granting palaces to the Pope at Paris, Rome, and elsewhere, and guaranteeing him an income of 2,000,000 francs, declared that spiritual authority could not be exercised by a foreign Power within the Empire, and provided that future Popes, at their enthronement, should swear not to contravene the Gallian Articles of 1682, which were hastily declared common to all the Churches of the Empire. The result was that, in Italy, bishops and priests refused to adhere to these articles, and were transported in hundreds to Corsica, where they remained in strict seclusion until the fall of Napoleon.

The next victims of the Emperor's rage were the cardinals. Unable to obtain from the Pope a decree nullifying the union with Josephine and a faculty for marrying Marie-Louise, Napoleon created a duchy for the Archbishop of Paris, which granted his demands. Consalvi and twelve of the cardinals who had been brought to Paris refused to attend the ecclesiastical ceremony. They were driven from the wedding reception

with every autonomy. Transported to various provincial towns, they were reduced by the confiscation of their property to dependence on charity; and, being forbidden to wear the emblems of their rank, they received the name of the "Black Cardinals."

The question of the vacant sees of France and Italy continually grew more serious. On the advice of Cardinal Maury, who had deserted Louis XVIII, recourse was had to an expedient employed by Louis XIV in similar circumstances. The Emperor's nominee was to be appointed by the Chapter as provisional administrator of the diocese. But, unlike Louis XIV, Napoleon could not count on the support of the Chapters. The Congregation secretly distributed briefs from Savona, forbidding the Chapters to obey the Government's orders. Some Chapters resisted; that of Paris refused to accept Maury as archbishop. "Anxious to protect his subjects from the rage and fury of this ignorant and peevish old man," Napoleon deprived the Pope of all writing materials, and even of the Fisherman's ring. Yet, in spite of this diabolical treatment, Pius VII showed as yet no signs of yielding, although in 1800 Napoleon had made several efforts to induce him to come to terms. Latouchy (the Austrian diplomatist), then Spina and Canlis, tried to persuade the Pope to give way; but he absolutely refused, except under physical compulsion, to live anywhere but at Rome or Savona. He continued to demand liberty as a preliminary to all negotiation.

A new Commission was therefore appointed in January, 1801. Like its predecessor, this body demanded the liberation of the Pope. It declared the diocesan bishops capable of granting dispensations, and suggested that, if the Pope gave no reasons for his refusal to institute bishops, a return might be made, after due preparation of public opinion, to the Pragmatic Sanction of 1493. But it shrunk from the responsibility of actually recommending such a step, and reported in favour of the convocation of a National Council. Summoning the Commission before him, Napoleon denounced the policy of Pius VII, and, entering upon a discussion on the authority of the Pope, was completely routed by Emery. He now decided to summon the National Council. But, at the moment of its assembly, he made one final effort to obtain the Pope's adhesion to the *Sanatus Eram* of February 11, 1801. One Italian and three French bishops were despatched for this purpose. After ten days' negotiation (May 10-20), they succeeded in extracting an unsigned paper by which the Pope agreed that a provision should be inserted in the Concordats that, if he did not within six months give institution to the Emperor's nominee, the right was to lapse to the Metropolitan. No sooner were the bishops gone than Pius VII repented. But it was too late; Napoleon had won the *motu*.

The National Council met on June 17, in a spirit of vibrant devotion to Pius VII. An oath of fidelity to the Pope was immediately taken;

and long debates arose on the vexed question of the relation of the Pope to the Council. Napoleon desired that the Papal assent should follow the decisions of the Council; but the opposition to this was very strong. On July 3 the Council declared that nothing could be done unless the Pope had given his assent to its constitution; and they appointed a commission to learn his intentions. Napoleon's anger passed all bounds. Exaggerating the momentous occasion, he sent a message announcing that the Pope had been pleased to agree to the Emperor's demands. Though shaken at first by this news, the Council on the following day became convinced of its futility, and reaffirmed the decree of July 3. The Emperor forthwith dissolved the Council, and imprisoned three of its leaders at Vincennes.

Once more Cardinal Mazarin came to the Emperor's help, and counselled that wine which is bad is often good in bottle. Applying this parable, Napoleon summoned individually those members of the Council who had remained in Paris. As these prelates viewed the Emperor's policy with some favour, the task of converting them was not difficult. In a fortnight the persuasive arguments of the Minister of Public Worship, backed up by the sinister presence of the Minister of Police, bore fruit; and when, on August 3, the mutilated Council met once more, it decreed by a great majority that none could not be named for more than a year, and that, if the Pope did not give institution within six months, the right was to lapse to the Metropolitan.

The Imperial supremacy seemed now to be complete. By the decree suppressing Rome, the Temporal Power was abolished and the Pope deprived of his necessary liberty; the legislature, in the Senate Constitution of February 25, 1808, had defined the doctrine of the national Church; and now, by a decree of the National Council, the clergy had shaken themselves free of the spiritual supremacy of the Pope. But there was a fatal flaw in this conclusion. The decree of the National Council was expressly reserved for the approval of the Pope, without which it was null. Pius VII was not likely to sign away his spiritual supremacy; but Napoleon set himself to persuade him to do so. He sent some Italian cardinals to Savona to act as the Pope's advisers, and he carefully regulated the behaviour of the commission of the Council which brought the decree. The Pope, on the advice of the treacherous cardinals, yielded and on September 20 signed the brief "*Ex quo*," which not only nullified the Council's decree, but contained its very words. To the general surprise, Napoleon refused to accept the brief. Its language avowed of "the Gregories and Bonifaces"; and it did not explicitly extend the French method of appointing bishops to the late Papal States. But, though Napoleon tried to obtain a brief which merely accepted the decree *non phrasa*, Pius VII refused to issue another. He repeated his demand for liberty: Napoleon replied by asking for his resignation. It was clear that a real settlement was further off than ever; Pius VII

was reduced to the straitened captivity which he had undergone before the negotiations began; and Napoleon buried himself, amid his preparations against Russia, with a persecution of the clergy who seemed to be disaffected to his rule.

In May, 1812, to prevent the British carrying off the Pope, and under the pretence of doing a favour to the Emperor of Austria who was interceding for him, Napoleon ordered Pius VII to be brought to Fontainebleau. Pius VII arrived safely on June 19, although he nearly died on the way; and there he lived, in strict isolation, during the Russian campaign. That disaster changed the whole situation. It was now the Pope who held the Emperor in his hand; and on December 19, 1812, Napoleon made advances for a settlement of the dispute. His demands were more exorbitant than ever; he knew that the Pope would refuse them, but thought that a compromise would probably represent his real desire. On January 18, 1813, he suddenly descended upon Fontainebleau, and was apparently reconciled to the Pope. The two sat themselves up together for several days, and discussed the treaty. The result was that, on January 25, the Emperor and the Pope signed the preliminary known as the Concordat of Fontainebleau. The former renounced his pretensions to the Catholicity of the Gallican Articles, his claim that the Catholic sovereign should nominate two-thirds of the Sacred College, and his demand that the Pope should condemn the conduct of the Black Cardinals and exclude *di Pietro* and *Pacci* from the assembly. On his side, the Pope yielded only by confirming the Conciliar decree on institution to bishops, but he obtained the restoration of the suburban sees and the exclusive right of appointment to those posts; the ejected bishops of the Papal States were to be named bishops in *parishes*, until sees could be found for them in France and Italy, where the Pope would have the right of providing directly to ten bishoprics in each country. The Propaganda and the Propaganda were restored, and were to follow the Pope, wherever he might choose to live; and he was to enjoy a revenue of two millions.

The Pope, however, was not satisfied with the document, and this soon became clear. When the assembly restored to him the Black Cardinals, he began to betray his intentions. Napoleon, on February 13, made the Senate declare the new Concordat a law of the State. On March 16 the Pope, at the instance of the cardinals, protested against the publication of preliminaries as if they were a definite treaty, and sent a retraction to the Emperor, saying that he had been "led into error." Next day Napoleon retorted by declaring the Concordat obligatory on all bishops and chapters, and asserting that infractions would render the culprit amenable to the Imperial courts, not, as heretofore, to the Council of State. Finally, as the Pope had abrogated the Concordat, Napoleon imprisoned again *di Pietro* and many of the clergy who had been released by his amnesty clause. But the Emperor's



chance in Germany enabled the clergy to disobey him; and the Pope had no difficulty in making his wishes known.

After the crushing defeat of Leipzig, Napoleon became a suppliant; and the Pope took full advantage. Knowing that the Allies were fighting his battle, Pius VII turned a deaf ear to Napoleon's entreaties. At last, when, in January, 1813, the Allies crossed the Rhine, Napoleon offered the restoration of the Papal States. The offer was rejected; such a restoration was an act of justice, and could not be the subject of a treaty. On January 24 the Austrians entered Bayona; and the Pope was again carried off to Savona. When the Allies at Châtillon demanded his liberation, Napoleon ordered him to be conducted to the Austrian outposts; and on March 19 he left Savona on his return to Rome. His captivity had lasted nearly five years.

The year 1808 saw another dispute between the Emperor and the Pope reach a critical point. The negotiations for a Concordat with the Confederation of the Rhine were finally broken off. The condition of the German Church was little less than chaotic. During the last decade of the eighteenth century, *Josephism* had spread widely through the German Courts; and there were many cries for Church reform. In 1806 an attempt was made to satisfy the clamour. On February 25 the Diet pronounced the decree of secularisation. By that famous Act not only was the supremacy of the ecclesiastical Princes of the Empire extinguished, but the landed property of the Church was handed over to the civil power. As in France, compensation was offered to the clergy in the form of a state salary, which of itself was sufficient evidence of their dependence on the State. That the Governments were not slow to take advantage of the opportunity is evident from the general suppression of monasteries in consequence of the Decree.

Here, indeed, they were merely following the example of the second Catholic State in Germany. So early as 1803, Bavaria had begun, under Montgelas, a general reform of the Church on Josephist lines. Not only was an attack made upon the Monastic Order, but the supremacy of the State over the Church was uncompromisingly asserted by this Catholic monarch. A "spiritual" council, consisting of three Protestants and two Catholics, was formed for the regulation of Church affairs. Not spiritually, the Pope concentrated; and the objectionable council was dissolved.

Other German Governments, by virtue of a right long inherent in Protestant States at least, entrusted the Church to the supervision of a single minister. The most prominent of such were Benedikt Wurmshofer in Wurtemberg, Philip Joseph Brunner in Baden, John Loeb von Eck in Nassau, and John Henry Schmedding in Prussia, where, in 1815, an attempt was to be made to put the Catholic Church under the rule of the Lutheran ministry. The aim of these ministers was

at first not so much to separate the Church from Rome as to make the dioceses of their countries conformable with the boundaries of the State. A rearrangement of the German sees was indeed imperative. The growth of the German States and the disappearance of the Empire took away all excuse for the confusion of dioceses and state which prevailed throughout Germany; and the loss of the left bank of the Rhine had transferred some of the most important sees in Germany to France. There is no greater symptom of the change in the German Church than the fall of Mainz. That great church, the metropolitan see of all Germany, was reduced to the rank of a suffragan of Malines. The Archbishop, the sole remaining spiritual member of the Electoral College, was transferred to Batavia, where a small ecclesiastical State maintained a precarious and anomalous existence in the new Germany.

But, at the end of the Napoleonic era, the ministers of the German States, taking advantage, doubtless, of the position of the Pope, took a further step; and definite attempts were made to rid the Church of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In 1801 Prussia tried to unite her Catholic dioceses under one Prussian Catholic Patriarch. More significant still, in 1802, the King of Württemberg appointed a Vice-General at Ellwangen. This office, unable to obtain institution from the Pope at Fontainebleau, was ordered by his Government to take possession at once, but only obtained canonical institution from Dalberg, the Primate of the Confederation, after having been three months at his post. The Curia, while it disclaimed these changes, was not in a position to quarrel with any individual State, except in the case of Bavaria, with whom relations were broken off in 1805. The Government of Bavaria claimed the right of landlords to the alienation of the churches as their property. This led to friction with the Tyrolian bishops, who appealed to Rome with success. But the Government stood firm; the bishops of Chur and Trent were deported from their dioceses; and the negotiations for a Bavarian Concordat came to an end.

The idea of a Bavarian Concordat had been mooted as early as 1801. For this purpose, the Court of Munich had, in that year, opened relations with the Vatican; and the First Consul, anxious to increase his influence in Germany, accepted with alacrity the proffered post of mediator. But Rome, displeased with Montgelas' suppression of the Mendicant Orders, and unwilling to make concessions in Germany, determined to deal with the Empire as a whole, and rejected the mediation of France. Dalberg, however, was anxious for the conclusion of a Concordat with the whole Empire; for by this means, and by Napoleon's favour, he hoped to become Patriarch of Germany. In this he was at variance with the Bavarian policy, but was supported by the desire of secularisation. Bavaria again appealed to the First Consul, who instructed Fouché to support its claims. A triangular dispute, which existed between the Diet, the Pope, and Bavaria, remained indecisive; for the

situation was changed by the quarrel about Ancona, and by the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine. The position of Dalberg as Primate, and that of Napoleon as Protector, of the Confederation filled the Roman Court with apprehensions of the realisation of Jesuitical ideas under their influence. The Vatican at once reversed its policy: rather than strengthen the Confederation, it would negotiate with the individual Courts. Napoleon also changed his plans: he deserted Bavaria, demanded from the Pope a Concordat for the Confederation, and accused the Holy See of raising the Church in Germany. But the rupture with Bavaria did not serve Napoleon, for the Papacy continued to discuss the Concordat with the Confederation with more than usual alacrity. Dalberg drew up a scheme which satisfied his own ambitions, and which made him almost a German Pope. But Caprara, for once, did his master a service. Knowing the jealousy entertained by the Pope towards Dalberg, he adroitly proposed that they should send plenipotentiaries to the conference on the Concordat, and thereby blasted the prospects of the Primate's ambitions. No more was heard of the Concordat, for in December, 1808, Pius VII formally broke off negotiations; and, although Napoleon had vigorously upbraided the Pope for neglecting the "perishing Church" of Germany, not a word was said about it in the Concordat of Fontainebleau. It was reserved for the Germany of the Congress of Vienna to define and settle the tangled relations between Church and State.

It now remains to say a few words on the relations of Napoleon with the non-Roman and the non-Christian bodies under his rule. The Protestants of France were to Napoleon an unknown quantity. He imagined Protestantism to be a many-headed hydra, difficult to control. When he was drawing up the Organic Articles in 1808, a report was presented to him, recommending that, although the Government had declared the Catholic religion to be that of the majority of Frenchmen, it should none the less protect the Protestants, and give them the enjoyment of the same privileges as Catholics except as to the payment of their ministers. This distinction was based on the ground that the Concordat, by allowing the intervention of the State in Church affairs, gave compensation for the loss incurred in paying the bishops and priests. A further report on the Protestants, dated March 12, 1809, dealt with their civil rights and with police regulations for their worship; but, as nothing was said in it about the manner of nomination and about the oath of the ministers at their installation, Bonaparte disapproved of it.

Eventually the question was settled in the Organic Articles themselves. Forty-four of these dealt with the Protestants. They were divided into two Churches, the Lutheran, for the inhabitants of the German départements, and the Reformed, for the French Huguenots.

These articles were strictly framed to prevent any foreign influence filtering into France through the Protestants; and much importance was attached to the education of ministers. Two seminaries for the Lutherans, and one at Geneva for the Huguenots, were to be set up under the control of teachers appointed by the Government. Ministers were to be chosen by the local consistory, and their names submitted to the Government for approval. Before a minister could enter on his duties he had to take the oath imposed on the Roman clergy.

The Reformed or Huguenot churches were divided into local consistories, five of which formed the arrondissement of a synod. There was to be one consistory for every 4000 Huguenots; and each consistory was to contain not less than six and not more than twelve lay members. The synod, composed of a pastor and a layman from each church, was to be held in the presence of the prefect or sub-prefect, and was to last not more than six days. The Lutheran churches differed in having superintendencies and general consistories above the local consistories. Every group of five local consistories was placed under the supervision of a superintendent and two laymen, whose appointment was subject to the confirmation of the First Consul, and who were not to discharge their duties without the permission of the Government. The general consistories were to be three in number, at Strasburg, Mainz, and Cologne. They were to be composed of a lay president, two ecclesiastical inspectors, and a deputy from each "inspection." The president was to take the oath of allegiance; and the consistory was not to meet without leave from the Government or to sit for more than six days.

The Protestant articles were received with great enthusiasm by the Churches concerned. But, in the case of the Huguenots, Bonaparte had drawn the teeth of their organisation. Formerly they had been governed by a General Assembly and Provincial Assemblies, which regulated their discipline. Bonaparte destroyed the General Assembly and substituted a number of synods, whose authority was derived from the civil power. In short he centralised the Presbyterian system with still greater reason than did James VI in Scotland. He ordered the anniversaries of his birthday and his coronation to be observed as festivals in Protestant churches.

The Protestants were slow in finding no cause of complaint under Napoleon. No doubt, the smallness of their numbers was a protection to them. It was otherwise with the Jews. On returning from Austria, Napoleon heard of the extortionate interest (7½ per cent.) demanded by the Jews in Alsace; and his anger was kindled by reports that they evaded conscription. On May 30, 1806, he suspended for a year all contracts entered into between agriculturists and Jews in the eastern departments; and he decided to reform the "facets that were poisoning France." In order to free the Jews with the French nation, he decided to summon a "Jewish State-General." He first convoked an Assembly

of Jewish Notables. One hundred and eleven deputies met as Notables from France and Italy; and, later, seventy-one members formed the Grand Sanhedrin, composed of rabbis and laymen in proportion of two to one. This Sanhedrin was supposed to be a revival of the Jewish tribunal at Jerusalem; its functions were to turn the decrees of the Assembly of Notables into doctrinal law.

The questions addressed to the Assembly of Notables on behalf of the Emperor show what his intentions were. They fall into three groups. The first group deals with the relations of Jews to their neighbours and the country they live in. *Are they polygamous? do they allow intermarriage with Christians? do they allow divorce without recourse to the civil power? are the French in their eyes brethren or strangers?* The second group relates to the authority and position of the rabbi. The third contained the significant questions, "*Is usury lawful?*" and "*Are there any professions which the Jews are forbidden to exercise?*" Napoleon, who had intimated that the Notables must decide in his favour, received the answer he desired in all cases. Polygamy was forbidden; divorce was allowed only before the civil Courts; intermarriage with Christians was, after discussion, permitted, as the old law only forbade marriage with the Samaritan and polytheistic races. But such marriages, though entailing no infamy, could no more be performed before rabbis than before a Christian minister. It was further decided that French Christians were the brethren of the French Jews, that France was their country, that the rabbis had no authority, that no profession was forbidden, that usury was contrary to the Mosaic Law. The Sanhedrin turned these decisions into doctrinal law, and, to please Napoleon, expressly allowed the prohibition of usury. Carried away by their benevolent feelings, they even thanked the Pope for the protection afforded to their race since the time of St Gregory.

But, while the Grand Sanhedrin might have been useful in furthering Napoleon's object of moulding the Jews to his control, and in uniting conscription, it was useless in districts outside France, where the Jews refused to recognise its authority. The high-water mark of Imperial favour, however, had been reached; and on March 17, 1808, Napoleon issued a decree regulating Jewish worship. These Organic Articles provided that a synagogue should be erected in each department or group of departments where there were 1000 Jews, with a consistory to preserve order in the synagogues and facilitate conscription. A demand for salaries for the rabbis was refused; and, in order to check usury, it was enacted that loans to widows, orphans, soldiers, and domestic servants should be small and void, as also all loans raised on instruments of labour. "*Presidential and consular credit*" was annulled; the Jews were to trade honestly; no more Jews were to enter Alsace, nor were they permitted to enter other departments except as agriculturists; every Jew was to serve in the army, and schisms were not to be allowed; lastly, no

Jew was to engage in trade without permission from the prefect. This decree caused a strong reaction of feeling among the Jews. Though its duration was limited to ten years, its terms were insulting; and, though Napoleon, by 1812, had annexed twenty-two departments from its operation, the Jews turned to the secret societies, which, in 1806, had declared against the Emperor.

Napoleon's relations with the Churches illustrate what has been called the paradox of his career. He began by exciting antagonism among his subjects to the friend and champion of religion; by taking as a conviction, and a watchword of his best projects, "the religious opinions of his subjects had almost universally turned against him. He was hated by the Catholics for his barbarous treatment of the Pope; he was hated by the Jews for his broken promises and his insulting suspicions; he was hated by the secret societies for his despotism and his violation of Liberal principles.

Of these bodies the Catholics were by far the most important. Comprising as they did the majority of the population of France, Spain, Italy, and southern Germany, they were not to be lightly regarded by a ruler who aspired to universal dominion. No one was more conscious of this than the First Consul; yet, as Emperor, he did his best to wound their most tender feelings. It may be that in reality Napoleon was aiming throughout at one object. He knew that, if his government was to be secure, he must obtain the goodwill of the Pope. But Napoleon's idea of goodwill grew to be passive obedience. Remembering the importance that he attached to friendship with Rome, he tried to obtain it by force, and found that he had missed the cardinal aim of his policy. The Church turned against him, and undermined the basis of popular support on which he had placed his throne.

In France, the secret activity of the Congregation did much to excite that smoldering resentment against Napoleon which existed during the later years of the Empire; while the clergy, having nothing to hope for either from Napoleon or from a Republic, worked for the return of the Bourbons, whose head was, in deed as well as in name, "the Most Christian King." But the Pope's imprisonment had effects beyond France. The resistance of the Spaniards was stiffened by the thought that they were fighting not only to satisfy their wounded national pride, but were also standing against the infidel; and in 1808 the release of the Pope was a prominent aim of the Allies.

Not was superficialness of his early ideals the only mistake which Napoleon made. He mistook entirely the character of the Pope's resistance. He imagined that, just as he had beaten down the great continental Powers, so he could bend the puny form of the Papacy to his will. But he found that in spite of the extinction of the Temporal Power, the resistance of the Pope raised up an opposition which was as

intangible as the pressure of the Continental blockade, and against which the mightiest army was powerless. Force succeeded against the Pope so far that, when worn out by captivity and harassed by perfidious advice, Pius VII. was induced to sign the Treaty of Fontainebleau. But a Concordat of this kind, even if it had not been denounced by the Pope immediately after its signature, would have been useless. The Papacy wanted freedom if its confidence was to be given with a whole heart; deflected by an agreement which was such only in name, it aimed constantly at recovering its independence; and the antagonism between Church and State could not cease until that end had been gained.

After all, it may well be doubted whether a permanent agreement between Napoleon and the Papacy was possible. The former aimed at securing his own interest and satisfying his own ambition for universal dominion; the latter hoped by agreement with France to obtain not only peace for the Church, but the recovery of her lost possessions. Here indeed lies the severest criticism that can be levelled at the policy of Pius VII. It can be plausibly urged that, in the early years of his Pontificate, while negotiating on the spiritual welfare of his flock, his anxiety as to the Temporal Power weakened his defence; and further, that the diplomatic ability of the Papacy was not always equal to its reputation. On more than one occasion the Pope had the advantage; had he pressed it with greater energy, he might have obtained a greater measure of success. Finally, the imprudent character of Pius VII. led him to commit acts which were hasty, if not rash; while his denunciation of the Concordat of Fontainebleau may possibly deserve a harsher epithet. But, on the other hand, his conduct in adversity was indubitably admirable. Except at one moment, he never forgot the high traditions of his office. By his firm stand he raised the Papacy from the depths of contempt into which it had fallen during the eighteenth century, and he showed that the Holy See was a power to be reckoned with in Europe; while the patience with which he bore his sufferings in a captivity far sadder than that which his predecessor was to undergo, and the spectacle of the heloise old man, dragged across Europe at the risk of his life because he would not grant the demands of an over-weening tyrant, aroused at once the pity, the anger, and the enthusiasm of the world. In France, Pius VII. will be remembered, not only as the Pope of the Concordat, but also as the chief cause of the revival of a healthy activity of public opinion, dormant since the early days of the Directory. In Europe, the Pope, the Spaniards, and the allies who maintained the Continental Blockade, will be associated together as the primary examples which stirred the nations to the rising that eventually liberated them from the despotism of Napoleon.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## THE COMMAND OF THE SEA.

THE chief causes which led to the renewal of war between Great Britain and France in 1803 have been described in a previous chapter. Various occurrences which preceded the actual outbreak of hostilities appeared to indicate a design on the part of the French Government to invade England. In December, 1803, instructions sent by the First Consul to his so-called commercial agents in the British ports had been intercepted, and were found to point to such an intention. On February 18, 1803, in an interview with Lord Whitworth, he assumed a threatening attitude, and declared that, in case of war, he would risk his life and reputation in an attempt to invade England, though he did not undervalue the danger of such an adventure. "He acknowledged" (said Lord Whitworth) "that there was a hundred chances to one against him," but he went on to state that he could find army after army for the enterprise.

This violent talk alarmed the British Government, the more so as, according to Lord Whitworth's despatches, it was accompanied by naval preparations. Several French sail of the line had embarked troops in the Mediterranean; there was a considerable movement of French troops in Belgium towards Namur and Dunkirk; in the Batavian Republic, then under French control, a small naval expedition was fitting out. The British ministry saw in these things indications that some treacherous attack was intended, and at once made counter-preparations. A royal message to Parliament (March 8) stated that the military preparations of France rendered it expedient to adopt additional measures of preparation; bounties were offered to secure for enlistment in the fleet; there was a "hot press" in London for ship's men; all seamen and officers in foreign employment were recalled; and the militia were embodied. The number of men voted for the navy by the estimates had been only 50,000; 18,000 more were voted on March 14, and 40,000 in addition, when war became certain.

In reality, the British Government seems to have been misinformed as to the French armaments. The French archives do not reveal any



threatening movements either by land or sea, which is the more surprising, as it was not Bonaparte's habit to use threats without force to back them. The probable explanation is that he expected a long period of diplomatic correspondence to elapse before the outbreak of hostilities—a conjecture which receives support from the fact that, on March 6, General Dumas was permitted to sail for the French East Indies with a small force, with instructions drawn up in such a manner as to make it clear that war was not anticipated till about September, 1804. If Bonaparte had thought that hostilities were imminent, he would scarcely have risked the loss of this detachment. His irritation was great when, on March 14, he learnt that the British Government had taken his threats seriously, and, instead of giving way, was arming. On the same day he wrote a large number of orders and letters, all having war in view, and constituted two "national flotillas," with headquarters at Dunkirk and Cherbourg. Two days later occurred the famous scene with Lord Whitworth, with its demand of "Maitre or war," indicating that a conflict was inevitable. Yet, after this threat, Bonaparte once more drew back, perhaps to gain time for armaments and to permit Dumas to reach India. War, however, was declared by Great Britain on May 18, 1803. Bonaparte's first measure of retaliation was to seize and imprison every British subject within his reach.

At the outbreak of war the French navy consisted of 23 ships of the line ready for service or in commission, 25 frigates, and 107 corvettes or smaller vessels, with 107 small craft belonging to the invasion flotilla of 1804. The best part of the fleet was in the West Indies, where twelve battleships, eight frigates, and 25 smaller vessels were covering the operations against San Domingo. In the home ports or in European waters only five ships of the line and ten frigates were actually ready for sea; but this force, after two months' delay, could be raised to nine ships of the line and thirteen frigates, and in six months to 21 battleships (including those from the West Indies) and 19 frigates; while 40 out of the line were under construction in the French ports. There was the same want of timber as in the previous war; and timber and naval stores were again lacking. Of the Batavian fleet, comprising fifteen out of the line, all small, only six were in commission. Five others were new and in good condition; while four stood in need of extensive repairs. The dockyards were empty, and money scarce.

The personnel of the French navy was still diminished and inefficient. It had not recovered from the demoralisation caused by the Revolution, and by the terrible defeat of the Nile. The admiral was too old, and, according to Bonaparte, lacked energy and decision. They were badly depressed by the prospects of a naval conflict, and seem to have feared Nelson with an almost superstitious dread. Service with the fleet was unpopular and inglorious; the best men went into the army rather than into the navy. The Dutch navy was in no better plight,

and was more than ever ill-disposed to France, the British Government being suspected of intriguing with England. Bonaparte was credited with the intention of gradually creating a French navy of 180 sail of the line, to be supported by 60 Spanish, 50 Dutch, and 15 Genoese ships; but the execution of these vast plans demanded time, and could not have been completed in less than ten years. The alliance of Spain was guaranteed to France by treaty, but was of so little value that, though Bonaparte demanded of the Spanish Government the twelve sail of the line and the 54,000 men with whom it was bound to support France, he accepted, in lieu of this, an annual subsidy of £2,800,000.

Against the numerically weak and badly manned squadrons of France, England could place on the high seas a powerful force commanded by the men who had made their names famous in the war of 1793-1801. The fleet in commission in January, 1803, numbered 54 sail of the line with 86 50-gun ships and frigates, and numerous small craft. Besides the ships in commission, there were in reserve 77 ships of the line and 48 50-gun ships and frigates. In numbers the British navy was superior to any combination of two or even three Powers. Fresh ships were rapidly commissioned, as the tension between England and France increased; the sail of the line in service rose in May to 58, and in June to 60, with corresponding additions to the force of frigates. Excellent officers were appointed by Lord St Vincent, then at the head of the Admiralty. For the Mediterranean, Nelson was chosen, as this was the post of the greatest danger, and would make the highest demands upon a commander's activity. In the North Sea and the Straits of Dover Lord Keith was stationed with a small fleet. The main force in water near home was the squadron off Brest, which was to maintain a close blockade of that port; it was commanded by Cornwallis, who was probably, after Nelson, the ablest of British admirals.

The strategic position of England in the Mediterranean had been improved, as compared with that during the revolutionary war, by the acquisition of Malta. But, for the purpose of watching Toulon, Malta was of little importance; and it was scarcely used by Nelson, who would have preferred the island of Minorca in exchange. In the later stages of the war, during the operations in the Adriatic and the Levant, Malta proved of greater service. The main object of the British commander was to interpose a superior force between the French fleets at Toulon and Brest; and Malta lay out of the direct course between these ports. Until the battle of Trafalgar, the British forces in the Mediterranean made Gibraltar their chief base, and used the harbours in the north of Sicily as a "lying base" for action against Toulon.

Throughout the war the British fleets acted as Interior Lines, blockading the different French detachments in the various ports and preventing their junction—a strategic plan which was comparatively simple in days when the movements of ships depended on conditions

of wind and weather, and could never be calculated with exactitude beforehand. For this reason the French fleets were seldom able to combine effectively. But the difficulty of blockading both Brest and Toulon was great. Toulon, in particular, was so remote that any British force watching it was entirely out of touch with the Channel; and the blockaded squadron, if it escaped, could not be pursued immediately, since there was always doubt as to whether it would sail east or west; and this had to be ascertained before the British could move to the Channel. Bonaparte's Egyptian schemes were well-known, and had been emphasised by Sebastiani's report. When Spain ceased to be neutral in 1804, the difficulties of the British admirals were much augmented, as Cadix and Cartagena, both important ports and had to be watched or blockaded. But it was not necessary, as it had been when Spain joined France in the previous war, that the British navy should dominate the Mediterranean.

The Italian ports, with the exception of Naples and Sicily, were under French influence or in the hands of the French, while the coastline under French domination in the north of Europe extended beyond the limits of France proper as far as Hamburg and Bremen, which were more or less subject to French influence, through the French occupation of Hanover in 1803. As the war proceeded, practically the whole northern littoral of the Mediterranean became French, while in northern Europe French influence penetrated to the Baltic, so that, from the Niemen to Corfu, French bayonets repelled the British flag.

Since the British navy was far better trained and prepared for war in 1803 than in 1793, the strategy adopted was bolder and more determined. On the outbreak of war, the British fleets moved up to the hostile ports in the Atlantic and the Channel, and closely blockaded them. A force was at once directed against the French in San Domingo, whence the French Admiralty had already recalled most of their ships of the line. The British forces sufficed to defeat the French on the island, weakened as they were by disease and pressed on all sides by the negroes; and a naval blockade of the ports soon reduced them to starvation.

The first hostile movement in European waters was made by Cornwallis, who on May 17, the day before the declaration of war, got to sea with two sail of the line, and moved towards Brest. Next day, acting under an Order in Council of May 18, directing reprisals to be made against France, one of his cruizers captured a French vessel. The situation of the French fleet at this moment was critical, as nine sail of the line were on their way to France from San Domingo; of these one was captured in the West Indies; the remainder were expected by the British to sail for the Mediterranean, and preparations were made to meet them off Cape St Vincent. Contrary to expectation, they steered for the Bay of Biscay, two reached Rochefort; two more entered the Spanish harbours of Cadix; and the other stole into Cádiz. The

British squadron detailed to attack them had received two precise instructions; and thus the war opened with a strategic check instead of with a naval victory. One reason for the British failure was the want of frigates, which throughout the campaign of 1805-6, as in that of 1793, hampered the British admiral at every turn. So many vessels were required for the protection of commerce that the fighting fleets were deprived of their necessary assets; and Cornwallis was at times compelled to employ battleships in doing frigates' work.

The distribution of the French forces, before the return of the San Domingo fleet, was as follows. At Brest there were three ships of the line ready for sea, and fifteen approaching completion. At Lorient and Rochefort there were six ships completing. At Toulon there were three ready, and six nearing completion. Thus the French battleships were so much scattered that a great fleet action at the outset was impossible; and the blockade imposed by the British had to be accepted, until the squadrons could be reinforced. At Brest, Turgot was placed in command, to be succeeded later by Guichenot, who at the outset commanded at Toulon. At an early date orders were issued by Bonaparte, directing his admirals constantly to weigh and anchor, so as to train the crews, or, if the enemy ventured, to put out for short cruises.

The real offensive against England was to be directed by a flotilla of small craft, capable of conveying an invading force across the Channel in a single night. There were several stages in the development of the flotilla project. According to the first plan, a comparatively simple one, 316 armed craft of small size and light draft were to escort across the Straits of Dover a fleet of sailing-boats, carrying 100,000 men, the central idea being that small vessels could be rowed across in winter fog or calm, when the sailing ships of the period were useless. This plan, however, was open to so many difficulties and dangers that good authorities have believed Bonaparte to have intended it merely as a demonstration. Against this view, which is based ultimately on the theory that he never made mistakes, many facts may be brought forward. The most convincing of these is the lavish expenditure not only on the flotilla but also on the construction of harbours of refuge along the southern coast of France. Excavations, basins, moles, and dikes were begun at Antibes, Draguignan, Toulon, and Wimereux; and millions of francs were lavished upon them at a time when the French treasury was embarrassed for funds. Secondly, the French people looked anxiously to Bonaparte to end the war as speedily as possible, for, while it lasted, everything that had been won by the Revolution was at stake. Now the war could be rapidly ended only by an invasion of England. Thirdly, an invasion of England had frequently been contemplated before. That Bonaparte soon perceived some of the dangers of his flotilla project is perfectly clear; but, while he modified, he did

not abandon his plans. He began to think out the means by which he could obtain temporary command of the straits.

The idea of a transport flotilla of unarméd sailing craft, accompanied by a few small armed vessels, was given up almost at once; and the number of armed vessels was steadily increased. In May, 1803, there were to be, as we have seen, only 316 fighting craft; in July the number rose to 346, in August to 353. It was anticipated that the flotilla might be ready by November, and that the armed vessels would be able to clear a way for it by driving off the British fleet. These anticipations were not fulfilled. When Bonaparte visited Brest in July, only fourteen vessels of the flotilla were ready at that place. Numerous skirmishes with the British frigates and small craft went on along the coast, the British showing persistent energy, and attacking the French boats whenever they ventured beyond the shelter of their coast batteries. In these encounters, the British almost always had the upper hand, thus revealing the grave military weakness of the flotilla. The French soldiers complained bitterly of the timidity and hesitation of their seamen; they did not see that the whole project was absurd, and that to ask men in boats to attack well-armed and skillfully handled ships was to demand impossibilities.

In June, in a note to Decrès, his Minister of Marine, Bonaparte insisted on the necessity of having twenty battleships ready at Brest by November, and gave instructions for a large number of additional ships to be taken to hand. But he altogether overestimated his forces: in November only eight vessels were actually ready, so that Cornwallis had not the slightest difficulty in maintaining a close blockade at Brest, while other detachments watched Ferrol, whence the French vessels from Guiana and the West Indies had moved, and the Biscayan ports. It would appear from Bonaparte's order that, as early as June, 1803, he intended his fleet to act in close concert with the flotilla, which was to be ready before the winter for the attempt on England. The fleet was not to be actually present in the Straits of Dover: it was to divert the attention of the British blockade by raids in other directions.

In September, 1803, Bonaparte saw that the flotilla could not be counted upon by November, and postponed the date of action to January, 1804. At the same time he ordered Guarnier at Toulon to be ready to put to sea with ten battleships, though as a matter of fact only seven were complete. In December Guarnier was asked to give his opinion on the flotilla. It was extremely unfavourable; but he suggested that it might be possible for a handy, well-armed fleet to lead the enemy astray by feints, and then, by suddenly appearing in the Channel, to secure the command of the sea for two days, and so clear the way for the flotilla. The enterprise would be extremely bold and very hazardous; and the best way of accomplishing it would be either to sail round the north of Great Britain or run up the Channel past Brest,

and appear in the Dvina. Here we have the germ of the strategy subsequently pursued in the Trafalgar campaign. Six days later, in a letter to the admiral, Bonaparte disclosed his projects, giving a choice of three plans, all of which in substance involved a fleet by the Texel squadron in the direction of Egypt to mislead Nelson, and a gradual concentration of the French squadrons at Ferrol and Rochefort, to be effected by the Texel fleet moving out of the Mediterranean and successively getting them free. The whole force then concentrated was finally to appear off Brestoguo, while the Brest fleet was to make feints at Ireland, so as to occupy Cornwallis' attention. But, as Garraucy shrewdly pointed out, the element of surprise would probably be wanting in so complicated a plan; and for the French to move into the Channel with anything larger than a flying squadron of a few fast ships would be to court disaster. The British could detach in pursuit forces "quadruple or quintuple" the strength of the French squadron.

As the construction proceeded, the flotilla proved more and more unattractive and expensive. In November, 1803, Bonaparte went in person to Brestoguo and made some unwelcome discoveries. If the plan of a surprise invasion was to be carried out, it was essential that the boats should be able to get to sea at the very shortest notice. But this involved keeping them outside the basin at Brestoguo, since at the most only 100 boats could pass from the basin in any one tide. Outside the basin they were exposed to the British attacks and to injury by weather. Under the eyes of the First Consul five boats were wrecked by a storm; and the records prove that, for nearly six months, from November, 1803, to May, 1804, the flotilla only went out of the basin thrice and remained outside ten days in all. It had become a mere incumbrance, and had even ceased to cause the British admiral any serious alarm, so long as it was unsupported by a fleet of large ships. In April, 1804, the Brestoguo flotilla was caught by a storm when outside the basin, and forty vessels were driven to Chapeau. Experience proved that at least six days would be required to get all the boats out of harbour, so that for that period it would be necessary to command the waters of the Channel; but, all through 1803-4, there was no period of six days' continued fine weather. Thus the original idea of a surprise passage of the straits proved impracticable. Yet the sailing on the small craft and on the harbours continued; and Bonaparte refused to abandon his project, though he inclined more and more to the employment of the flotilla in conjunction with a squadron of large ships. His army in 1804 was concentrated between Brest and the Texel, waiting for the opportunity to embark; his fleets at Brest and Texel were steadily increasing.

Though the British Government did not seriously believe in the possibility of invasion, it neglected no precaution. In March, 1803, it had 626,000 men under arms on land, of whom 174,000 were regulars. The volunteer movement developed rapidly, though there was considerable

doubt as to the military value of the force which it produced; and in December, 1803, there were 468,000 men available in the three kingdoms belonging to this branch alone. Making heavy deductions, the Government could dispose of about 500,000 troops of all sorts during the period of danger, and could rapidly concentrate 100,000 of them against an invader disembarking on the south-east coast. Thus, even had the fleet been drawn off, as Bonaparte had originally contemplated, the position of Great Britain would have been tolerably secure.

In the spring of 1804, fresh instructions were sent to Latouche-Tréville, who had succeeded Guépratte at Toulon, to get to sea. He was to elude Nelson by feinting at Egypt, to pick up the French ship of the line which was blockaded at Cadix, then to make for Rochefort and set free the French ships in that port; after which he was to sail for out into the Atlantic, finally making a dash up the Channel past Corwenille, as soon as the winds were favourable, and putting into Cherbourg. Fretot and Brest were to be left blockaded. This plan contains all the characteristics of Napoleonic strategy: unexpected concentration of superior force at the point where that force could be used to the greatest advantage; hints to distract the enemy's attention from that point; disregard of minor considerations. Its defects were that it made insufficient allowance for the energy of the British admiral, and that it assumed a degree of training and seamanship in the French navy which that force did not possess. Bonaparte counted confidently on the mismanagement of the British Admiralty, of which he had a very poor opinion, and he underestimated the military genius of Nelson.

The date at which the French army of invasion was to cross was fixed by the First Consul for September, 1804. Points would no longer be necessary, if a French battle-fleet could reach the Downs, but it was important to have good weather and long days for the operation. All through the spring and summer of 1804 the concentration of the flotilla in the neighbourhood of Boulogne was going painfully forward, under the gaze of the British cruisers, which watched every movement of the French with keen-eyed vigilance. But the sections of the flotilla which had been constructed on the littoral of the Bay of Biscay found the British fleet off Brest a fatal obstacle to their passage, and never succeeded in effecting their junction with the Channel division. Of 221 small craft, only 25 reached the Channel from the Atlantic coast. In July, 1804, Bonaparte again visited Boulogne and inspected the flotilla. For a second time a storm occurred in his presence; the flotilla was scattered and thirteen vessels were lost; while, of forty boats at Étaples, nine had to be run ashore and several others were carried by the storm to various ports. The flotilla, even in summer, was the sport of the winds and waves.

On the night of October 2, 1804, an attack was made by the British force upon the flotilla in the Boulogne roads. Fire-ships and "catamarans," a primitive kind of torpedo, were employed. Their explosion

caused confusion in the French flotilla, but the loss of life was insignificant; and on the whole the French were rather encouraged than dismayed by this affair. From this point onwards the flotilla played but an unimportant part; and, though large sums were still devoted to it, it became more and more a mere subsidiary to the French fleet.

The complete inactivity of the French fleet during 1805 and the earlier months of 1806 must in part be explained by the want of men and the lack of stores in the naval ports. Even when the ships were ready, it was impossible to send them to sea. The flotilla made heavy demands for funds and men; and thus its equipment militated against the efficiency of the fleet, a fact which Bonaparte never seems to have perceived. In May, 1804, complaining bitterly that Tugnot remained immovable at Brest, and allowed himself to be shot in by a small British force, he removed this officer and replaced him by Guéroulles. When Guéroulles took over the command at Brest in June, 1804, twenty ships were ready for sea, but only seven were fully manned; and, to fill up the gaps, it was necessary to put out of commission a large number of boats belonging to the western section of the flotilla. In September, 1804, Guéroulles was directed to report on the possibility of getting to sea in November, and carrying a force of 10,000 men to Ireland; but the cessation of Bonaparte as Emperor interrupted the project, and no answer from Guéroulles is recorded. As there were accidents whenever his vessel weighed anchor, his reply is not likely to have been favourable, though his force had now risen to twenty-one ships of the line.

The strength of the Toulon squadron steadily rose; it numbered nine ships early in 1804; ten in the middle of that year; and eleven towards its close. On July 8, 1805, Nelson had arrived off Toulon, and had taken charge of the blockade of the port with a total force of nine ships, of which, however, four were frequently on detached duty. Only seven ships of the line were at first available for the blockade; and these were not in good condition, while their crews were weak, and, it would seem, in some cases of inferior quality. Reinforcements subsequently reached Nelson, raising the Mediterranean fleet to thirteen ships of the line; but he could rarely collect more than six off Toulon, and was always short of frigates. Owing to the inadequacy of this force, the blockade was not a close one. From time to time Nelson withdrew altogether to fill up his ships with water and provisions in Maddalena Bay, which was his real base. On these occasions he generally left two frigates to watch the French. His hardships were so few that it was unsafe for him to divide his squadron, while this method of blockade gave the French a chance of coming out; and it was his aim to get them out and defeat them. The plan aroused great misgivings among British officers, because it unquestionably afforded openings for the escape of the French and a possible concentration of their forces in the Atlantic. But it was the best adaptation of the available means to the end; moreover, the escape



of the French squadron from Toulon could not be so dangerous to British interests as the escape of the far larger and more formidable squadron in Brest. This last force was kept harmoniously shut in by the closest possible blockade; but, had it been thoroughly trained and efficient, it might have found opportunities for escape. For, as Collingwood said—and subsequent experience confirmed his judgment—ships are not like sentinels standing at the door; there must be occasions when the greatest vigilance may fail in preventing a sortie.

In the Mediterranean, the French made no move during 1803 and the early part of 1804. Nelson was now convinced that the French intended some fresh stroke against Egypt; Bonaparte's skillfully-devised false information had put him off the true scent. The British Admiralty were receiving accurate information from their agents in France as to French intentions, but they do not appear to have communicated their intelligence to Nelson. St Vincent had been replaced as First Lord by Lord Melville; and Admiral Gambier was now First Sea-Lord. Gambier was an officer of inferior capacity and poor judgment; timid to excess, he prevented Camille from carrying out a daring plan, which had been matured by Captain Page, for an attack with five-ships on the French fleet at Brest. Melville was a good administrator and understood the general outline of Bonaparte's plan. He thought that a move against the West Indies was probable.

In the autumn of 1804, relations between England and Spain became more than ever strained. The blockade of the French force at Ferrol was carried on by Cochrane with some respect for Spain's rights as a neutral. His haughty conduct was due to the hostile attitude of the Spaniards, who had given constant assistance to French privateers, and were reported to be fitting out a large number of ships in their dockyards, while they had permitted French gunboats to be sent from France to the squadron blockaded at Ferrol. It was known that Napoleon was drawing a large subsidy from Spain, exempting her in return from the fulfilment of the other conditions of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, because he thought that French interests would on the whole be better served by such an attitude of benevolent neutrality on the part of the Spanish Government. This state of affairs the British ministry had hitherto tolerated; but Spain was warned that any serious armaments on her part would lead to war, and that without further negotiations or notice. As Spanish hostility always diminished when the treasure-ships from South America were drawing near to Europe, and increased after their safe arrival, and as the British agents, in September, 1804, reported great activity in the Spanish dockyards, the British Government issued instructions to seize four of these ships which were due at Cadiz. The British commander off Ferrol was also ordered to prevent Spanish vessels leaving or entering that port and to communicate his instructions to the Spanish authorities. On October 2 the treasure-

ships were encountered off Cadiz by four British frigates. The Spanish commander was summoned to surrender, and disengaged the command, the forces being equal on either side, though he was quite unprepared to resist. A short but furious action followed, in which one of the Spanish vessels, with a number of non-combatants on board, blew up; the other three were captured, with treasure valued at £1,000,000. The act was denounced as one of piracy, but, in the circumstances and in view of the plain warning given to Spain, it was justifiable, the only mistake being that an inadequate force was employed.

War was reluctantly declared by Spain on December 18, under pressure from Napoleon. In the same month a Spanish official return gave the Spanish force available as fifteen ships of the line at Cadiz, eight at Cartagena, and nine at Ferrol: but two months would be required to get all these ships ready for sea. The arsenals were empty, at Cadiz the plague was raging, and there was a dire want of funds.

The alliance with Spain modified the strategic position, and led Napoleon to make important changes in his plans. In September, 1804, he had appointed Villeneuve to the command of the Toulon squadron, and had detailed 7,000 men under General Lauriston to embark on board the fleet. To Decrès he sent instructions and plans for several expeditions. In the first place, the Rochefort squadron was to sail to the West Indies, in order to reinforce the French garrisons there and seize Dominica and Santa Lucia. The bulk of the Toulon fleet was simultaneously to seize Surinam, and afterwards to join the Rochefort squadron. The whole force, thus concentrated, was then to appear off San Domingo, attack Jamaica, return to Ferrol, and thence the squadron in that port, finally putting in to Rochefort with twenty all of the line. Lastly, the Brest fleet was to sail with 18,000 men for Ireland, and, after landing them, to move by either the northern or the southern route to the Texel or Breda. These plans, however, appear to have been intercepted by British agents, since they disappeared for several days and eventually turned up in a damaged envelope, with the postmark "Breda." It has been suggested that Napoleon purposely allowed them to fall into British hands in order to divert British attention to Ireland; but this supposition is improbable, as the plans embodied many features of the combination which Villeneuve afterwards attempted to execute. On learning what had happened to his instructions, Napoleon ordered the fleet ships not to embark any troops, but to remain in readiness for sea.

At the close of the year 1804 the French fleet was at last ready to act, though they still lacked trained seamen. The strain of continued watching was becoming very serious for England; and only young and active officers could have supported the hourly exertion of such a blockade as was maintained. The strategy adopted was simple, yet well-adapted to the requirements of the situation. Every effort was

concentrated upon the command of horse vessels. If the French fleet escaped, the British blockading squadrons were to follow them and bring them to action, or to fall back on the main force at the entrance to the Channel, thus securing England against invasion. Unfortunately, however, it was not found possible to secure an overwhelming preponderance in force in European waters; the British fleet was scattered, and a large number of ships of the line were on distant stations. The Allied force at the close of 1804 consisted of eleven ships ready at Toulon, five at Cartagena, ten nearly ready at Cadiz, five French and four Spanish at Ferrol, five at Rochefort, twenty-one at Brest, and three at the Texel. These were faced by twelve British battleships in the Mediterranean, thirty-seven under Camille's off Brest and in the Bay of Biscay, nine in the North Sea, and five in British ports. On foreign or distant service were twelve ships of the line. Thus the total battleship force of England was seventy-five; that of the Allies was sixty-four.

In European waters the British preponderance was extremely slight; and the question arises whether it was a wise disposition which placed seven ships of the line in the East Indies and five in the West Indies, when, if used in Europe, they might have prevented the escape of the French. The economic importance of the East and West Indies was, however, very great at this period—a fact which explains both Napoleon's anxiety to conquer San Domingo, and the maintenance of so large a British force in distant waters. The Mediterranean fleet was the nucleus of all the important British squadrons; and Nelson was hampered in his work by the appointment of an influential but inefficient senior officer, Cuthbert, to command off Cadiz. Cuthbert impeded Nelson in various ways, and appreciated his services whenever they came within reach, which prevented Nelson from keeping a ship on the look-out at Gibraltar.

In December, 1804, fresh instructions were sent by Napoleon to Mincius, his admiral commanding at Rochefort, and to Villeneuve at Toulon. Both were to evade the British and immediately put to sea, the first standing for Martinique and the second for Cayenne. After forming a junction and doing as much harm as possible to the British possessions in the West Indies, they were to return to Ferrol, proceeding thence to Rochefort. The ultimate intention was that this concentrated force, in conjunction with the Spanish fleet and the West fleet, should cover the invasion of England. On January 18, 1805, Villeneuve, with eleven ships of the line and nine smaller craft, put to sea. His vessels were so crowded with troops and so deeply laden with stores that he expressed grave fear as to their stability and the safety of their masts. Nelson had retired to Malaga to water his fleet, and had only left two frigates on the look-out, so the way was open to the French. But, when Villeneuve had made one day's sail to the south, he was caught by a severe storm; two of his battleships and two of the smaller craft lost masts or yards; and three frigates were accidentally separated from the fleet.

Villeneuve, recognizing that a long voyage with damaged ships was out of the question, decided to return to port and effect repairs. On his way back, he captured a small craft carrying dispatches for Nelson from England. If, as is probable, the dispatches contained the secret information as to the true intentions of Napoleon which we know to have been reaching the British Admiralty, Nelson must have been left in the dark as to the ulterior purpose of the French at the most critical moment of the whole campaign. In March, 1805, he complained that he had had no news from England of later date than November 2, 1804.

As soon as he learnt that the enemy had put to sea, Nelson sailed from Mediolana Bay and started for battle, with the fixed resolve to bring them hastily to action. Learning from his cruizers that the French had been sent off Ajaccio, steering south, he concluded that they must be making for Egypt, as the wind was strong from the west, which would prevent their rapid movement through the Straits of Gibraltar. He hurried to Alexandria, heard nothing of them, and returned, overwhelmed with anxiety and fear, to discover that Villeneuve had been driven back to port by bad weather. Nelson's letters show that, then and afterwards, he considered the various possible destinations of the French, and was determined to follow them without further delay, whether to the West or the East Indies. The danger to be apprehended from the arrival of a strong French force in the West Indies was in his judgment very great. "If St Lucia, Grenada, St Vincent, Antigua, and St Kitts... fall," he had written, "in that case England would be in danger as the peace that we should humble ourselves"; and this statement explains his subsequent action.

On his return from Egypt, Nelson proceeded to the Gulf of Palma and provisioned there. Meanwhile Villeneuve put to sea again on March 24. Again the French squadron was followed and watched for some distance by the British cruizers; but again it disappeared from view. Villeneuve learnt from a neutral vessel whence Nelson was, and avoiding him ran on to Cartagena, in order to join forces with the Spaniards. The Spanish admiral, however, had received no orders to put to sea with the French fleet, and declined to move till orders arrived. Unwilling to wait, Villeneuve hastened to the Straits of Gibraltar, and on April 3 passed through them, to the rear of the alarm-guns from the Rock. Nelson did not hear of his escape till April 4. He then deployed his fleet between Sicily and the Algerian coast, in order to prevent any outward movement on the part of the French, and to cover Egypt and Naples, and waited for information before sailing west or east.

The greatest of Napoleon's projects was now in train of execution. The complicated plans had been further modified. Two squadrons were to escape from port, and open the French movement. The proceedings of Villeneuve's force have been described down to the second week in March. Maitland's detachment, consisting of five ships of the line and

five small craft, put to sea from Rochefort on January 31, 1805, heavily laden with troops and stores, and proceeded to the Antilles. On the way across, it captured the vessel *Albatros* which held French vessels whenever they moved; in three weeks the ships of his squadron lost nine masts or important spars. On February 20 *Milnebury* reached Martinique, and at once attacked the British island of Dominica; but, though he took the British by surprise, he could not reduce the island. He seized or destroyed thirty-three British merchantmen, levied contributions upon the islands of St. Kitts, Nevis, and Montserrat, and then returned to Martinique, where, according to his original instructions, he was to await Villeneuve. But, when Villeneuve was driven back after his first sortie, fresh orders were sent from France, which directed *Milnebury* not to expect help from Villeneuve, but to carry out his special mission independently. In other words, he was to convey some reinforcements to San Domingo and then return to Europe.

It was *Milnebury's* anxiety to obey those orders that prevented him from receiving a third despatch directing him, after all, to wait for Villeneuve. Villaret-Joyeuse, who commanded at Martinique, was desirous that *Milnebury* should assist him in the reduction of the Diamond Rock, an islet off the Martinique coast, where the British had a small post which annoyed passing French ships; and the delay which such an operation would have involved would have given time for the arrival of the third despatch. But *Milnebury* was anxious to get away; he feared that superior British forces were following in his wake; he thought, from the tone of his earlier orders, that his return to France was urgently required; and he pointed out that he had already stayed in the West Indies longer than had been intended. Accordingly he sailed off to San Domingo, where he landed a few men and some stores, and then returned to Rochefort, making a very slow passage and reaching that port on May 20. He had been five months at sea and, for all practical purposes, had done nothing beyond causing great alarm in England and the British West Indies, and obtaining some £50,000 by the sale of prizes and by contributions levied on the British.

Through the latter half of 1804 and the first weeks of 1805 circumstances had been accumulating about Napoleon's path. The attitude of Austria was becoming more and more threatening, as the general feeling in that country was that any failure of the French to invade England would bring about a war on the Continent by way of diversion. Relations between France and Russia were already broken off in consequence of the creation of the *Duc d'Angoulême*; and a personal appeal which the French Emperor addressed to George III, with the probable object of strengthening the hands of the British Opposition, was answered by a curt refusal to discuss terms of peace without consulting Russia and the Continental Powers. Under these menacing conditions, Napoleon, early in January, 1805, appears for a moment to have abandoned the

invasion project. Orders were sent recalling Misionay; and instructions were despatched to Villeneuve to undertake a movement against India. But, just after these despatches had been forwarded, the situation changed once more. A letter from the Austrian Emperor which arrived at Paris at the end of January reassured Napoleon, and led him to resume the "immense project"—his own term for the complicated plan of invasion. The orders to Misionay were revoked; but the counter-order, as we have seen, reached the West Indies too late.

A fresh series of orders, dated March 2, 1805, directed Ganteaume to put to sea with twenty-one battleships as speedily as possible, to sail to Ferrol and open that port, capturing eight British vessels which were watching it, and to form a junction with the ten or eleven French and Spanish ships now ready in the harbour. He was then to stand away for Martinique, where the Rochefort and Toulon fleets would be found; and then, instantly returning to Europe with at least forty sail of the line, to beat the British fleet off Ushant and move up to Brest, there to cover the passage of Napoleon's army. On the same day further instructions were sent to Villeneuve; and these are of great importance, being the last he received before putting to sea for the second time on March 23. They directed him to move from Toulon, pick up the Spanish ships at Cadix, and proceed to Martinique, there to meet Ganteaume and Misionay. If Villeneuve arrived before Ganteaume, he was to remain at Martinique, ready to put to sea at a signal; after waiting forty days, in case Ganteaume had not appeared, he was to move by San Domingo to the Canaries, to cruise off the Canaries twenty days, and then to return to Cadix, in the event of nothing having been seen of Ganteaume. Though every precaution was taken to keep these orders secret, they were known to the agents of England and the Bourbonnais even before they had reached their destination. "The facts," wrote the mysterious "Gé d'assé" of d'Antingues, on March 1, "are to move against the West Indies and to attack Jamaica. England will know in eight days the exact facts which I tell you....She places entire faith in these sources of information at Paris; she has found them too trustworthy in the past not to show such faith." Then there is good contemporary evidence that the British secret service was fully informed as to Napoleon's intentions. But these facts do not appear to have been communicated at once to the British admirals, perhaps because of the confusion at the Admiralty at this juncture, owing to the attack on Lord Melville, which culminated in the vote of censure of April 8.

Napoleon had hitherto based all his plans on evading the British naval force. His fleets were ordered to leave port without fighting; but this, in the case of the Brest force, was out of the question, as already did the large British fleet watch that place. Yet, at times, the blockading fleet fell much below the strength of the blockaded; and, had they been allowed to fight, the French had opportunities, which in consequence of

Napoleon's orders they were unable to see. On March 24 Ganteaume telegraphed to Napoleon that he was ready to sail with twenty-one ships, and that there were only fifteen British ships outside: there must be a battle if he went out, but his success was certain. Napoleon replied, directing him to go out but forbidding him to fight a battle. This reluctance to run an insignificant risk at one of the most critical moments tied the French fleet thereafter to harbour. The last opportunity never occurred, though at a later date Ganteaume was ordered not to shrink from fighting his way out. Dispirited by the threatening attitude of the British admiral, who a few days later received large reinforcements, Ganteaume on March 29 retired from Borthenness Bay to the interior of Brest harbour; and, when he did, received too late the news that Villeneuve was at sea, with pressing orders for himself to go out.

Meanwhile Villeneuve, after passing the Straits of Gibraltar, appeared on April 9 off Cadix. There he was joined on the same day by one French ship of the line and by six Spanish ships under Admiral Gravina, making his total force to eighteen vessels of the line. He was anxious to put as great a distance as possible between his ships and Nelson's, "as the enemy's squadron in the Mediterranean must be in pursuit of me, and may be able to effect a junction with that which has been blockading Cadix." As a matter of fact Orde's squadron, consisting of five ships of the line, narrowly escaped capture, and fled north without leaving touch with the allies or sending information to Nelson, thus rendering that officer's task harder than ever, since he was left to grope in the dark for the destination of the French. On April 11 Villeneuve was well on his way to the West Indies, but with only one of the Spanish ships in company. The Spaniards sailed wretchedly; and, if there had been any British pursuit, they must have been captured one by one. Napoleon was filled with satisfaction at the news that the junction with the Spaniards had been effected, and sent off pressing orders for Admiral Magon to start with two ships of the line from Brestfort and join Villeneuve at Martinique. He added further instructions which ordered Villeneuve to spend thirty-two days, after Magon's arrival, in the West Indies, to employ the time in attacking the British islands, and after that interval to return to Ferrol if Ganteaume did not appear. From Ferrol he was to go to Brest and there join Ganteaume, even at the risk of battle. Villeneuve reached Martinique on May 14, having occupied more than a month on the passage, and in conformity with his original orders—Magon had not yet joined him—took in water and made ready to put to sea as soon as Ganteaume should appear.

The alarm was great in London at this juncture. The Admiralty was distracted by the political attack which, at this moment, the Opposition were making upon the policy of its financial management. The First Lord, Melville, had resigned on April 9; and further complication followed, when, with utter disregard of national interests, Lord Selkirk

claimed the office for one of his supporters in the Ministry, and strongly opposed Pitt's appointment of Admiral Sir Charles Middleton (*Lord Barham*). Fortunately, Pitt stood firm; and his judgment was vindicated by events. The precautionary measures taken by Bonaparte were as follows. Cochrane, with six battleships, had left in March for the West Indies, where four British battleships were already stationed, in order to deal with *Misamis*; and on April 27 a secret order was issued by the Admiralty to Gardner, then in temporary command off Brest, to detach Admiral Collingwood with five ships to Madras. If Nelson with his fleet had not passed that point going west, he was to move to the West Indies and effect a junction with Cochrane, which would raise the force in the West Indies to fifteen battleships. If Nelson had passed, Collingwood was to rejoin the Channel fleet. At the same time orders were sent to the ports to expedite the fitting out of all available ships. A few days later, Orde was removed from his command; and Collingwood was directed to make at once with eight sail for Barbadoes. But, before he could leave, the news that Nelson was moving in pursuit of the French led to counter-orders.

That admiral had been searching the Mediterranean for Villeneuve; and was it till April 18 that he heard that the enemy had passed through the Straits, steering west and picking up the Spanish ships at Cadiz. The fact that the Spaniards, of whose incapacity at sea Nelson was fully aware, were in Villeneuve's company, seemed to point to a move towards Ferrol and Brest and Ireland; and he at once decided to make for the Solly Isles, from which point he could cover the Channel. He was detained for several days by unfavourable winds and by the necessity of conveying 2000 British troops on their way from England to the Mediterranean; but he used the delay to fill up with provisions and water. On May 10 he at last received from Admiral Campbell, a British officer in the Portuguese service, information which convinced him that the French were bound for the West Indies. Sending in all directions the information that he was following Villeneuve, he started with ten sail of the line "to save the West Indies." So far was he from being "deceived" away, that the mere news that he was on his passage caused a feeling of immense relief in England.

Notwithstanding the foul condition of his ships, so swiftly did Nelson make the passage that on June 3 he was at Barbadoes, where he picked up two battleships, raising his force to twelve. His arrival was speedily reported to Villeneuve, who in obedience to his orders had waited at Martinique, utilising his stay to effect the capture of the *Diamond Rock*. Bending, however, from Napoleon's later instructions to drive the British from the Antilles, he set sail for Barbadoes, intending to attack that island. On June 8 Villeneuve captured a British convoy, and learnt from prisoners that Nelson was in the neighbourhood with a force represented at from twelve to fourteen ships. This intelligence filled



him with something approaching panic; and, after a conference with Ganteaue, he decided to return forthwith to Ferrol. The Spanish crews were daily diminishing through sickness and desertion; and a prolonged stay might have forced him to abandon some of the Spanish ships. He sent back, in frigates, the troops embarked at Martinique and Guadeloupe, and hurried off to Europe with twenty sail of the line. He was fortunate in not being molested on his passage; but this he owed to the fact that Nelson was led by false information to make a move to Trinidad. On June 18, however, Nelson heard that the French had disappeared, and, with the judgment of a consummate commander, at once divided their course of action—if indeed definite information did not reach him from the British secret-service agents at Martinique, where Villeneuve appears to have been dangerously illative. He sent off a fast vessel with news for the Admiralty, and himself followed with his squadron. His fast ship sighted the *Allies* on her passage, and was then able to carry to London exact information of the enemy's movements.

Nelson was off the Spanish coast on July 18, steering for Gibraltar, and, after provisioning his ships and conferring with Collingwood, who had moved up to Cadix, sailed slowly northwards to the entrance of the Channel with his fleet, being much delayed by unfavourable winds, so that he did not form his junction with Cornwallis till August 18. His return to Europe had a discouraging effect on Napoleon, who at first flatly refused to credit it or to believe that the start gained by Villeneuve had been absolutely lost. Meanwhile the British Admiralty, having received Nelson's information as to the French movements, issued orders to Cornwallis to reinforce the British fleet off Ferrol, under Calder, by adding to it the squadron blockading Rochefort, after which Calder was to move to the west of Ferrol with fifteen battleships, so as, if possible, to intercept the allied fleet. It was a fresh complication and source of danger to the British that Altheman, who had replaced Missiessy, put to sea from Rochefort on July 17, as soon as the blockade was lifted, just obeying orders which were sent him from Paris at the last moment to sail direct for Ferrol, and acting on earlier instructions, which ordered him to cruise on the parallel of Ferrol from July 22 to August 8, and after this for ten days in the Bay of Biscay, when he was to put into Vigo. It was unfortunate for the French that he sailed without knowing that Villeneuve was expected back forthwith at Ferrol; and so it happened that he cruised at no great distance from Calder, without being near enough to be present at the battle of Finisterre.

On July 22, in foggy weather, Calder sighted the allied fleet. He had but fifteen ships to their twenty, though he had been given to understand that they would not have more than sixteen, and he had good reason to fear that the Rochefort ships might at any moment appear and form a junction with the enemy. He was a mediocre commander, incapable of bold or decided action, and unequal to the strain of so perilous a position.

But Villeneuve did not proceed to Brest; nor did he even effect a junction with Almirant, for a cruiser sent off with instructions to the latter's rendezvous was snipped up by the British almost in sight of both the French fleets. Almirant wandered aimlessly about the Bay of Biscay, out of touch with his colleagues, and performing no useful service. Villeneuve had been forbidden by Napoleon to go into Ferrol, and had some difficulty in getting his ships out of Corunna; both he and Gravina now despaired of success. He complained that he had "bad winds, bad sails, bad officers, and bad season... absolute naval tactics: we only know one manoeuvre, to form line, and that is just what the enemy wants us to do." When he started to move out of Corunna, his ships collided with each other, and fresh trouble ensued. It took him five days, from August 8 to 13, to get the fleets at Ferrol and Corunna to sea.

On his moving seaward, with a total force of twenty-nine sail of the line, various cruises were played the French a cruel trick: on August 18 several of Almirant's squadrons were sighted to the north, and were mistaken for British ships; at the same time Almirant mistook Villeneuve for his enemy. But for this mutual misunderstanding, the two would have met; the French fleet would have risen to thirty-four sail of the line; and the despondency of Villeneuve might have been removed by a real success. As it was, feeling that he had no chance of carrying out "the incandescent project," and finding that the wind was dead against him, Villeneuve on the 15th turned south to Cadix, in obedience to the express orders of Napoleon, bearing date July 14, which directed him, in the event of unknown circumstances, as if the position of the fleet did not permit him to attain the main object, to concentrate an imposing force at Cadix. These orders had been subsequently cancelled, but news of the fact had not reached Villeneuve. He was short of supplies, short of everything; and mishap succeeded mishap in the Spanish contingent. On August 20 he drove off Collingwood and entered Cadix, where his force rose to thirty-five, counting the six Spanish ships already inside that harbour. A few hours later, with stupefying audacity, the imperishable Collingwood once more closed in on the harbour, though his total force was only three sail of the line; and Villeneuve accepted this truly remarkable blockade. Powerful reinforcements for Collingwood were hurried south; and Nelson, after a brief visit to England, was despatched to Cadix to take command in what was to be the last and greatest battle of his glorious life.

For Napoleon the summer of 1805 had been a period of great suspense, as he was obliged to face at once towards Austria and England. On August 3 he arrived at Boulogne; five days later he learnt of the battle of Trafalgar, and at first expressed satisfaction at Villeneuve having effected a junction with the Ferrol fleet. On second thoughts, he despatched a letter to Villeneuve, blaming him for his weak conduct; and on the 15th, supposing the admiral to be at Ferrol, ordered

him to attack the British, provided the Allies could oppose twenty-eight ships to the British twenty-three or fewer. For the first time since he devised "the immense project," he contemplated a great naval battle. The explanation of this sudden change in his designs is probably that he saw the extreme danger of risking an invasion of England without the command of the sea, now that Nelson was back and Austria was preparing for war. A naval engagement must be won before he could cross the Channel; while, if the battle were lost, it would justify his abandonment of the British scheme without any loss of reputation, since the blame of the disaster would naturally be laid on the unsuccessful admiral. Subsequent orders, dated August 13 and 14, directed Villeneuve to attack the enemy, who were supposed to have but twenty-four ships, and then to move up to the Channel, where "we are ready anywhere; his appearance for twenty-four hours will suffice."

Napoleon had imagined a picture of the British disposition which was far from the truth. Nelson and Collingwood were in the Mediterranean; a large British force was in the West Indies; there could be nothing in Villeneuve's way. But these messages and orders did not reach the French admiral at Cadix; it was not till he was at Cadix that he knew he was expected to fight. Meanwhile Ganteaume was directed to move his ships out of Brst and to be ready for a battle when Villeneuve drew near. On August 22 a message was sent by semaphore, to be given to Villeneuve when he appeared at Brst, urging him to come up Channel at once, the army being embarked and England at his mercy. Napoleon directed that, if Villeneuve, in obedience to the earlier orders, should have fallen back to Cadix, he was immediately to leave that port, with the Spanish ships there and, if possible, with the ships at Cartagena, and sail for the Channel. Derris, however, filled with misgivings as to the invasion project, advised the Emperor not to bring the combined fleet north at that season of the year, but to regard its arrival at Cadix as "the decree of destiny, which reserves the fleet for other purposes."

Written on August 23, this letter appears to have decided Napoleon. Though he still wished to wait fifteen days before moving against Austria, his anxiety began on the 24th to march off to the Rhine, and was followed on the 26th and 28th by other portions of the army. On the 26th the British was ordered to be concentrated in the League of the Rhine which indicated the postponement of the invasion; on September 1 letters were sent to Villeneuve criticizing his conduct and directing him to take on board six months' provisions, to "dominate the coast of Andalusia," and to attack the enemy, if of inferior force. On September 8 a letter in Napoleon's correspondence contains, for the first time, the allegation that Villeneuve's movement to Cadix had defeated the project of invasion. It is sufficient comment to point out that on August 23, before he knew of Villeneuve's move northward to Cadix, Napoleon had written that the "army is in full march" against Austria.

In reality, it was Nelson's swift movements, the Austrian diversion in Napoleon's rear, and the hopeless unreasonableness of the British, that dictated the abandonment of the "Ionian project."

The final act in the great drama was yet to be played. On September 28 Nelson in the *Fleet* joined the fleet off Cadiz. He at once convened his captains and laid before them his arrangement for the battle. Such enthusiasm did his plan excite, so extraordinary was his influence, that none of his audience were moved to tears. The whole fleet was filled with exultation at the fact that he commanded it; a thrill of enthusiasm ran through the crews; and, as a small token of their regard for him, the captains painted their ships the colour he preferred. With true generalship, though he judged his force adequate for victory, Nelson sought to obtain a fleet which would secure "not victory but annihilation." And, just as Napoleon at the opening of his Italian campaign strove to attract to himself all available force, so Nelson begged his Government to send him ships, more ships, so that he might have the largest fleet possible at the vital point in contact with the enemy. "It is only numbers that can annihilate," he wrote to Lady Hamilton. Various detachments, however, among others the dispatch of a division to take in water and provisions at Gibraltar, reduced his force, in mid-October, to twenty-seven sail of the line.

The attack which he meditated, and the details of which he had communicated to his officers, was a double cutting of the enemy's line and concentration upon its center and rear, leaving the van out of the fight. If reinforcements joined him in time, he intended to attack in three separate columns and to effect a double annihilation; but, as the reinforcements had not reached him, he formed his fleet in two divisions, the second led by Collingwood, who had full authority to manage his own part of the battle. The central idea was that, having lured the enemy out of Cadiz, he should pass through them with one division of his fleet in line ahead, covered by the other in line ahead, get to leeward, and cut them off from that post-humous measure which would make a decisive engagement certain. In order to mislead the Allies as to his strength, Nelson kept only a small force close to the port; the bulk of his fleet cruised far away in the offing, out of sight of the coast, linked to the squadron before by a chain of cruisers and battleships.

On October 19 Villeneuve, having heard that Beatty had been sent to supersede him, determined to obey the orders of Napoleon and leave forth, his intention being to form a junction with the ships at Cartagena. His force comprised thirty-three sail of the line, but the crews of the French ships were short of their establishment by 2200 men, and the Spanish vessels were in even worse plight. Provisions were so scarce, in consequence of the strict blockade, that his crews were on the verge of starvation. Nelson made no premature attack when he learnt that the Allies were moving. He fell back, trusting to his orders

to keep good track, and headed for the Straits of Gibraltar to cut his enemy off from the Mediterranean. On the 20th he was in sight of Gibraltar; and then the last conference was held on board the Victory.

At noon on that day the allied fleet turned and steered south. Nelson watched them closely all that afternoon and night; the fleet he had selected for the battle, as a day glorious to the name of his family. At 6.50 a.m. on the 21st he made the signal to form line of battle in two divisions, the left or windward division under his own personal command, eleven ships strong; the right or leeward one under Collingwood, fifteen strong, while one ship was far off to the north. A little later came the order to prepare for battle, followed by another to "bear up east" towards the Franco-Spanish fleet. The British fleet consisted twenty-seven sail of the line, with a broadside of 80,000 lbs.; the allied fleet thirty-three ships, with a broadside of 80,000 lbs. The morning was grey and cloudy; a light wind blew from the north-west; and a great swell rolled booming in upon the cliffs of Cape Trafalgar, which showed to the seaward out of the mist of morning.

As the British fleet neared, Villeneuve, who had been heading southward, changed his course and stood north, seeing that a battle was inevitable, and wisely deciding to fight with a friendly port under his lee. His ships formed a long line, bent at an obtuse angle, the ends inclining towards the approaching British fleet. At the head of each British column sailed its admiral, Nelson to the left in the Victory; Collingwood to the right in the *Royal Sovereign*. Under Nelson's leadership the spirit of the fleet had risen to a degree of exaltation which was in itself the prelude of victory. Nelson, as he went to battle, declared to a friend that he looked for twenty prizes; the captains joked with each other as to the ships which they should capture. The approach was slow and tedious to excited nerves; while it proceeded, Nelson prepared the final order to his will and wrote his last paper, in which he asked for a great and glorious victory, with no misconduct in his fleet. His final order to the frigates accompanying him drew the sternness of his spirit and its remorseless insistence upon gathering in the full fruits of victory. These lighter vessels were not to save ships or men; they were to complete the enemy's annihilation; "capture was but a secondary object."

As the fleets drew nearer, Nelson was entreated by his personal friends to cover the orders which he wore on his coat, since in naval action of that date the leader was exposed to the enemy's fire at close quarters, and his decorations would attract the aim of their marksmen. He refused to comply with this request or to move to a light ship where the danger would be less, giving as his reason the importance of a great example to the leader. About 11 o'clock, perceiving that stormy weather was to be expected, he signalled to prepare to anchor, and soon afterwards made the last great appeal of his life to those he led, in the famous signal

"England expects that every man will do his duty." Originally he had intended a different and perhaps warmer appeal, cast in a form which expressed not expectation but certainty—"Nelson confides that every man will do his duty." But, even in its altered form, the signal evoked a soul and spirit like his own; "it seemed like inspiration to most of them." The last and irrevocable order of the Nelson battle, "Engage more closely," followed just before the firing began. Then, with the possible exception of an intimation to Collingwood that he meant to fight against the allied van, were all the important signals of that evening, illustrating the perfect forethought of the admiral, the complete preparation for all contingencies.

The bands played in the British ships as they went down to battle, in irregular lines, with little precision of formation. Just before closing, Collingwood, whose column, owing to the enemy's formation, was now nearly parallel with the allied van, gave the signal to bear up together, i. e. to turn to the right and attack as nearly simultaneously as possible. Nelson's column was still in line ahead, slightly converging on that of Collingwood. The first gun was fired by accident in a British ship; the next shots were fired by the *Alles* about midday at the *Royal Sovereign*, as she approached in advance of her line. A dense cloud of smoke gathered round their line as it moved north; Collingwood rounding his bow, headed for the twelfth ship from their van, but at the last moment veered and made for the thirteenth, which was larger. The *Alles* were in the closest possible order; but Collingwood was not to be denied. He drove straight ahead, ready to carry away the honours of the French vessel across of his quarry; and the *Foudroyant* gave way before his unflinching tenacity.

From the *Victory* the *Royal Sovereign* was soon to vanish amidst a tempest of firing in the thick cloud of smoke; then her tall masts showed on the farther side of the line, and it was known that Collingwood had gloriously performed his task. Some minutes followed before support reached her, but Nelson's confidence in his subordinate was justified. The *Royal Sovereign's* fire was deadly; it tore down the stem of the *Santa Ana*, and caused great confusion in the press of battle ships gathering round her. Her friends followed eagerly to her aid; there was no hanging back in the line; and as, one by one, the other ships judiciously brought their broadsides to bear, the battle in the van began to go decidedly in favour of the British.

On the left, Nelson watched with intense admiration Collingwood's form coast, as the *Victory* slowly covered the space between the *Santa Ana*. He started towards the French van, as he came within range, probably with the object of halting it inactive, and then turned sharply to the right and, after passing some distance down the enemy's line, turned left and broke through, driving his flagship through the smoke and fumes, and suffering heavy loss as the French guns raked him. He passed under

the stern of the tenth ship in the allied line, the *Suvarov*, pouring into her a raking fire, which brought clouds of dust and splinters from her hull. Then, after penetrating the allied line, he turned to starboard again and dropped on board a French 74, the *Redoutable*. It was about 11.50 a.m. when the Victory broke the French line.

When the leaders had struck the enemy's line and passed through it without disabling loss, the battle might be considered won. Of necessity, in such a scheme of action, the heads of the British columns would suffer most heavily in the approach; and this is doubtless the reason why Nelson led himself with Collingwood, as whose iron nerve he could absolutely rely. But, when the line was penetrated, generalship ceased for the moment; the rest was the work of the captains, to whom full initiative had been conceded. The logs prove that they too showed judgment and energy worthy of their leader, breaking boldly through the hostile line wherever they thought their efforts would tell most, or moving without further orders to meet the enemy's van, when it at last began to threaten the British ships in the centre of the fight. The battle of Trafalgar is the most perfect example of initiative among subordinates, as it is of the leader's scientific use of his weapons, that is to be found in the whole naval war. Though the details of the attack have been much disputed, especially in regard to the question whether the method indicated in Nelson's previous instructions was precisely followed or not, there is no doubt that its greatest merit—what he himself called "the Nelson touch"—consisted in the concentration of an overpowering force upon the rear half of the enemy's fleet, the bold occupation of the enemy's van with a force numerically inferior (under his immediate command) so as to leave his lieutenants free to do its work, and the handling of both columns in such a way as to prevent the enemy, till the last moment, from knowing how the attack was to be made.

Villeneuve's tactics, on the other hand, were of the simplest description. He intermingled the French and Spanish ships, to prevent subordination on the part of the latter, and then adopted a passive attitude, dictated, no doubt, by his officers' want of skill and practice in manoeuvring. As he had said at an earlier date, there was but one evolution of which they were capable, and this was forming line. But, if the leadership throughout the fleet was indifferent or bad, there was no want of individual courage. The French and Spanish vessels displayed the greatest bravery, and suffered terrible losses before they could be induced to strike.

The first French ship struck about 1 p.m., soon after the engagement had become general; it fell to Collingwood. From this hour onward, the frigates watching the battle sent a steady succession of surrenders: one two-decker at 1.35; two ships to the Victory and *Pierre-terre* at 1.50; "several" at 2 o'clock. With each surrender the demoralization of the allied fleet and the confidence of the British increased. But these results were not won without great loss to the British, both in officers

and men. A few minutes before the resistance of his antagonist in the French line was over, Nelson, while walking the Victory's quarter-deck, was struck by a bullet from the *Redoubtable's* top and mortally wounded. He fell with the words "They have done for me at last," and was borne below. His intellect remained undimmed for two hours, during which, again and again, he urged his flag-captain to give the order to anchor. About three he was told that a great and decisive battle had been gained; that fifteen of the enemy had been taken, and that no British ship had struck. The ruling spirit was strong even in death, and he cried that he had looked for twenty prizes. A little later consciousness ebbed from him; and with the last words "God and my country," this great servant of England passed away.

His presence was sorely needed in the last stage of the battle, to complete the victory which his genius had gained. The French van, five ships strong, turned and attacked the confused mass of British ships struggling with the allied centre. A large part of the British fleet was still intact, and might have been used to crush this detachment. But Collingwood, though incomparable as a subordinate, did not possess the force and decision of Nelson, and let the opportunity slip. Again, when the shattered French and Spanish ships in the centre and rear fled towards Cadiz, no general pursuit was ordered or attempted. Had Nelson been alive, it is doubtful if one of them would have been permitted to escape. The logs show continued signals at the end of the battle to the British ships, which, acting on their own initiative, were attempting pursuit, to "close round the stragglers"; and, as night came down, Collingwood restrained a final blunder by refusing to anchor his prizes.

The serious fighting ended with the repulse of the French van about three. Sporadic firing continued till five, when the French ship *Adolphe* blew up with a terrific report. Of the allied fleet, thirty-three ships of the line strong, one French ship blew up after she had struck, eight French ships and nine Spanish were taken. Four French vessels escaped to the north; eleven, French and Spanish, ran southwards to Cadiz. After the battle a violent storm set in, in consequence of which three of the prizes, with insufficient crews on board and in a shattered condition, were either recaptured by their own men or handed over by the British prize-crews, so the only way to keep them afloat and save the lives of all, while ten were wrecked or destroyed by their captors: so that ultimately only four ships remained in the hands of the victors. The British loss was 448 killed, and 1261 wounded; while that of the Allies, though never exactly ascertained, is stated to have reached the enormous figure of 8500; and this estimate may probably be accepted, in view of the fact that, out of a crew of 645 men, the *Redoubtable* lost 322 to killed and wounded.

The losses of the Allies did not, however, end with the day of the great battle. On October 23, Commodore de Coëtne Kerjulen put to sea from Cadiz with five battleships and five frigates, in the hope of



retaking some of the British prizes. His movements contributed to the recapture of two of the vessels already mentioned. But his force was caught by a storm, and three of its five ships were wrecked, so that there remained in Cadiz only one sail of the line, including the recovered ships. On November 8, four of the ships which had escaped from the French ran at Trafalgar, under Rear-Admiral Dumanoir le Pelley, were overtaken after a long chase and brought to action by a British squadron of five ships of the line and four frigates, then cruising off Ferrol under the orders of Captain Sir Richard Strachan, and after a prolonged resistance were taken and carried into Plymouth. Strachan was looking for Allmand's squadron, which however eluded the British fleet and returned safely to Rochefort, having done great damage to British commerce.

Brilliant as was the victory of Trafalgar—the climax of the prolonged naval struggle with France, and the last pitched battle of the war fought at sea between large fleets—it caused at the moment little jubilation in England. So closely had Nelson identified himself with the glory of the navy, so much had he endeared himself to his countrymen, that his loss seemed to them to outweigh the virtual annihilation of the enemy's fleet. The news of Trafalgar brought sorrow rather than rejoicing; and the British triumph seemed to be balanced by the French victories at Ulm and Austerlitz. No immediate effect was perceptible, yet from the close of 1805 the French navy ceased to cause serious anxiety in England; and, though more than once Napoleon attempted to repeat the combinations which had ended this disastrous, British predominance upon the sea was henceforward beyond dispute.

Before the battle of Trafalgar, but after his army had moved from Boulogne, Napoleon issued orders to Rear-Admirals Willaumez and Linois, both of whom held commands in the Brest fleet, to get to sea, the one with six ships of the line and the other with five, and to wage relentless war on British commerce. Both squadrons managed to escape on December 18, and soon parted company. But their exit was observed; and two powerful squadrons, under Sir John Warren and Sir Richard Strachan, were sent in pursuit. Willaumez sailed to the Cape, after a narrow escape from Admiral Sir John Duckworth, who saw him but, though almost equal in force, showed no anxiety to attack him. As the Cape was in British hands, the French admiral proceeded to Brazil and Martinique, off which island he had another narrow escape from a British squadron under Rear-Admiral Cochrane. While he was waiting at sea to catch a British convoy, storms scattered his fleet; and he was compelled with only one ship to make for Havana. He reached that port in safety, and returned to France early in 1807. The results of the expedition were miserable—seventeen merchantmen taken at the cost of two French ships of the line. Linois was even more unfortunate. His five sail of the line were caught at anchor in San Domingo roads, on

February 6, 1806, by Duckworth with eight sail of the line, and sustained a crushing defeat. Three of his ships of the line were taken and two destroyed; only the small craft with him managed to escape.

In January, 1806, Cape Cephaz was attacked by a small British expedition under Commodore Sir Horatio Popham, and captured with but little difficulty. The results of this conquest, and the subsequent failure of Popham and Whitelocke in their attempts upon Montevideo and Buenos Ayres, will be described in a later chapter of this volume.

In 1807, two important operations were undertaken by the British navy in European waters. The first was against the Sultan, who had been induced by Napoleon to declare war on Russia, with which Great Britain was still in alliance. A squadron of eight ships of the line was assembled off the Dardanelles under Duckworth, with orders to compel the Sultan, by a threat of bombardment, to surrender his fleet. Duckworth viewed the project with something verging on alarm; but, instead of either resigning his command or acting with alacrity, though he knew that the works commanding the Straits were being strengthened daily, he wasted time. While he was waiting, one of his ships was accidentally burned with heavy loss of life. At last, on February 19, 1807, he forced his way past the forts in the Dardanelles, destroying a small Turkish squadron on his progress and suffering trivial loss. But, though he now had Constantinople at his mercy, his indecision misdirected him; and, instead of taking instant action, he spent days in consultation with the British minister at Constantinople, while the Turks recovered from their alarm and prepared to meet him. He was cross there ever onward when he found that vague threats had no effect on the Porte; and on March 2, after showing himself off Constantinople, he returned to the Dardanelles and repassed the Straits next day, suffering considerable loss and damage in the transit. The whole expedition was mismanaged; and Duckworth was fortunate in escaping a court-martial. An attempt on Egypt was equally unsuccessful. The British took Alexandria, but were defeated at Rosetta, and in September agreed to evacuate the country. The Russian Admiral Senavin, who was in the Mediterranean with his sail, defeated the Turkish fleet in July; but, on hearing that peace had been made at Tilsit, he concluded an armistice with the Sultan and hurried back towards the Baltic. He succeeded in reaching the Vego, but was blockaded by a British squadron, and ultimately, in August, 1808, after Wellesley's landing in Portugal, was obliged to hand over his ships to the British Government.

The second expedition of 1808 was the direct consequence of the Peace of Tilsit. Information reached the British ministry that a secret article in this treaty stipulated that Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal should be compelled by France and Russia to close their ports to British ships and join in the war against Great Britain. This would add to the naval force at Napoleon's disposal twenty Danish, eleven Swedish,

and also Portuguese all of the line, and would more than repay the losses of Trafalgar. It was of the utmost importance that Napoleon should be forestalled; and Canning, then Foreign Minister, had sufficient daring to act at once. The weapon was ready to hand, in a large force had recently been mobilised for service on the Continent.

On July 18, eleven days after the signing of the secret articles, the resolution to seize the Danish fleet was formed; and on July 25 Admiral Gambier sailed from Yarmouth with seventeen sail of the line, subsequently joined to twenty-five, and a large flotilla of gunboats and transports, carrying 37,000 troops under Lord Cathcart. Though the Danes could not offer any serious resistance, when, on August 2, Gambier appeared off Elsinore, they refused to surrender their ships. The blockade of Zealand was therefore enforced by the British navy, while the army disembarked and drove its lines round Copenhagen. On September 2 the bombardment of the town began. It was continued till the 26th with terrible effect, when negotiations followed; and on the 7th the Danish Government decided to surrender the fleet. Eighteen Danish ships of the line, ten frigates, and forty-two smaller vessels were seized and most of them removed, the others being destroyed. The operations were well planned and skilfully carried out; and an ample force was wisely employed. That the attack was necessary no one will now deny. England was fighting for her existence; and, however disagreeable was the task of striking a weak neutral, she valued her own safety if she left in Napoleon's hand a fleet of such proportions. In Count Vandal's words, she "seized his brain, before he had seized it, the weapon which Napoleon had determined to make his own." During the operations against Copenhagen, Heligoland was occupied; it was used thenceforward as a depot for trade with the Continent. The island of Antselt was seized in 1809, and held till the close of the war.

The natural result of the seizure of the Danish fleet was that Denmark declared formal war, and joined France against Great Britain. A British fleet and a small expeditionary force were despatched to the Baltic early in 1808; and then it came to pass that, when the Spanish troops whom Napoleon had virtually interned in Pinar, under the Marquis of Romana, heard of the dethronement of their sovereign and showed signs of disaffection, a British fleet was able to take off the greater portion and to convey them back to Spain. During the three months of 1808 the British blockaded the Russian fleet, which showed little inclination to cause trouble. This blockade continued without interruption until 1812. From 1810 to 1812 Sweden was an swelling enemy; but the British and Swedish admirals mutually arranged not to attack each other. As for the Portuguese fleet, Napoleon was not able to seize it, since it withdrew to Brazil. At the same time the island of Madeira was temporarily handed over to British custody. In the autumn of 1812, on the approach of the French army, Alexander I

of Bonaparte decided to send his fleet to England for the winter, fearing that otherwise it might fall into the hands of the French. Seventeen Russian sail of the line accordingly withdrew to England.

On his return from Tilsit, Napoleon gave instructions for the fleet at Brest to be kept in readiness, and pressed forward the work of shipbuilding with greater energy than ever. A powerful expedition was organized at Toulon to attack Sicily. In January, 1808, Alamanó put to sea from Rochefort, headed a British squadron which was watching him, entered the Mediterranean coast, and with five of his ships reached Toulon. Ganteaume, who had been transferred to Toulon from Brest, was ready to put to sea, with instructions to attack Sicily, or, if this was impossible, to recapture Corfu. He sailed on February 7 with ten battleships, including Alamanó's force, and a number of smaller craft and transports, but was caught by a storm in which one of his ships lost two topmasts, and four others parted company, only rejoining him in the Adriatic. He reached Corfu unscathed, and having thrown reinforcements and provisions into it, returned to Toulon on April 18, again without opposition. The inferiority of Collingwood to Nelson as a commander and a strategist was shown by his conduct of these operations; with thirty sail of the line and fifty smaller ships, he failed to cut off the French fleet which had ventured into the Adriatic. The blockade of Toulon had been virtually abandoned, and the French were permitted to come and go much as they liked. Collingwood's failure at this juncture appears to have preyed upon his mind: he was old, ill, worn out by long years of devoted service, and would willingly have relinquished the command to a younger man; but, entreated by his Government to remain at his post, he obeyed, to die in harness in 1809.

In May, 1808, Napoleon formulated another "immense project," from the execution of which he was only diverted by the outbreak of the Spanish insurrection. It embodied most of the features of the old plans formed before the battle of Trafalgar. Great expeditions were to be made ready at Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, Pauillac, Nantes, and Toulon, in order to menace England on every side; while large forces were to encamp close to the squadrons, and to maintain if the British fleets relaxed their vigilance. Egypt, the West Indies, and Iceland were to be perpetually threatened, with the purpose of menacing not England by imminent alarms. Napoleon calculated that by midsummer, 1808, he would have all battleships available, and a year later, 77, which, added to 84 ships belonging to his various allies, would give an effective fleet of 161 sail of the line. But all these hopes and anticipations were shattered when it became clear that a national war had to be fought in Spain, and that, instead of adding the Spanish forces to his own, he would have to count them as hostile to him. In June, 1808, he directed Duroc to delay his naval armaments and to diminish the purchase of stores and supplies for the navy. Practically, this meant that the project

of invading England was again abandoned. In the same month, five French sail of the line, the last remnant of Villeneuve's fleet, which had been in Cadiz harbour since Trafalgar, were captured by the Spanish insurgents; and a French ship at Vigo shared their fate. An squadron were no longer needed off Cadiz, Ferrol, and Cartagena, large British fleets were sent free to watch Toulon and other French ports. The Spanish insurrection therefore greatly diminished the pressure on Great Britain, and, from the moral as well as the military point of view, had an important influence on the course of the war.

In February, 1809, the British fleet blockading Brest was driven off the port by a storm; and Villeneuve, who commanded the French fleet inside, put to sea with eight sail of the line. Had he shown energy, he might have captured in succession the small British detachments watching Lorient and Rochefort, in each of which ports lay three French ships. His orders were to pick up these squadrons and then proceed to Martinique. On February 24 he anchored in Basque Roads with eleven ships of the line, three of which were in no condition to put to sea; and, as he was at once blockaded by the British and feared an attack, he moved into Aix Roads, where defence was easier. In this operation one of his ships went ashore and became a total wreck. Napoleon thereupon removed him from his command, and replaced him by Almand. The British Admiralty prepared five-ships for an attack on the French; and Lord Cochrane, a bold and enterprising officer, was selected for the conduct of the operations, under Admiral Lord Gambier, who viewed the project with no enthusiasm. The attack was delivered on April 11; and, with the smallest energy on Gambier's part, the whole French fleet must have been taken or destroyed. The British five-ships, it is true, did little damage, but they created a panic in the French fleet, so that the vessels cut their cables and, drifting in the strong tides, collided with each other or ran aground. At daybreak on the 14th, all the French ships but two were ashore. All that was required to complete the disaster was an attack by the heavy ships of the British fleet. But Gambier did not move, and Cochrane was left to effect what he could with his light ships and frigates. The result was that five of the eight stranded French vessels eventually escaped, and only three of Almand's fleet were destroyed. But so low had the professional standard of the British navy fallen since the loss of its great leaders, that Gambier was regarded as having deserved well of the nation. Notwithstanding bitter protests from Cochrane, he was "most honourably" acquitted by a packed court-martial, and was even thanked by Parliament.

In the disastrous Walcheren expedition, however, there was little fault to find with the navy. This expedition was originally planned in March, 1809, to effect a diversion in favour of Austria; and, had the plan been carried out immediately after the defeat of Napoleon at

Failing, it might have brought about the fall of the Empire. But there was great delay in completing the preparations; and the French had time to win the battle of Wagram before the fleet and transports sailed (July 20). The naval force consisted of 37 sail of the line and 689 other craft, under Sir R. Stoddan. The army was 55,419 strong, and was under Lieutenant-General Lord Chatham, whose chief recommendation for command appears to have been that he was of high rank, and had been seen "in person exercising eight or ten thousand men much to his credit." The unfortunate results of this expedition will be described in another chapter of this volume. It must suffice to say here that the failure was due to friction between the army and navy, the selection of an incompetent general, and the despatch of the fleet at the wrong season of the year.

The only other naval event in Europe of any importance in the year 1809 was the destruction of two French battleships and a convoy in the Gulf of Lyons (October 20—November 1) by ships from Collingwood's fleet. The French were under the orders of Rear-Admiral Bouchon, who was conveying supplies from Toulon to the French army in Spain. Though Guichenot had eighteen French and Russian ships in Toulon, he made no attempt to support his subordinate. He was soon afterwards replaced by Alençon, who was subsequently sent to Lorient. Thereon, in March, 1810, Alençon managed to get to sea, but he went no further than Brest.

In the Adriatic the British navy slowly asserted its superiority. In October, 1809, the Ionian Islands, with the exception of Corfu, were reduced by small conjoint expeditions, which gave the navy a base in those distant waters. This was followed by a victory gained by Captain Blount off Lissa (March, 1811) over a strong French squadron of frigates, and by the capture of a French battleship, the *Breé*, in 1812.

From the date of the first despatch of a British expeditionary force to Spain, the British navy was called upon to protect the passage of transports and storeships, and to cooperate in the military operations. The best work in this quarter was achieved by Cochrane, who late in 1808 harried De la Pen in Catalonia. There were many complaints of the navy when Wellington was commanding in Spain. He blamed it in 1810 for insufficient support in the siege of San Sebastian, but not, it would appear, with good reason. He asked impossibilities, and, in the words of the First Lord of the Admiralty, appeared to wonder "a large ship within a few yards of the shore...so safe in its position and so inaccessible by the winds or waves as one of the Pyrenean mountains."

Throughout the later years of the war the main French squadrons remained inactive: and this though their numbers were steadily growing, and though, from 1810 onwards, Great Britain was at war with the United States. As a general feature of the war from 1805 to 1814, it

may be said that the French fleets never deliberately attacked; they only accepted battle when it was forced upon them.

Outside Europe, the reduction of the French possessions continued steadily all through the war, though it was not effected with the rapidity which might have been expected after the British navy had assumed its command of the sea. Numerous examples, and, in particular, the capture of *Mindanao*, showed how easy it was, down to 1803, for French squadrons to get to sea, and to throw reinforcements into the French colonies. In the West Indies, *Santa Lucia*, *Tobago*, and *Dominica* were reduced in 1803; *Surinam* in 1804; the Dutch island of *Curacao* in 1807; *Marie Galante* and *Delade* in 1808; *Martinique* and *Cayenne* in 1809; and in 1810 *Guaadeloupe*, the last of the French West Indian possessions, and the Dutch islands of *St Martin*, *St Eustatius*, and *Saba*. In the East the British were equally successful; *Pondicherry* and the other French colonies in India had not been evacuated by the British troops when war broke out, and were retained; *Amboyna* and *Benda Neira*, in the Dutch East Indies, were captured in 1810; in the same year *Bombay* and *Mauritius*, the headquarters of the French privateers in the Indian Ocean, were reduced; and in 1811 the valuable island of *Java* was taken from the Dutch. In Africa, the French colony of *Senegal* succeeded in 1803. Reference has already been made to the occupation of *Cape Colony* in 1805. Thus France and her allies were stripped of all their colonial possessions. Yet the loss of these bases did not render attacks upon British commerce altogether impracticable. At that date there were many weak points, on whose coasts it was possible for cruisers to rest and obtain provisions.

After the failure of his project of invading England, Napoleon determined to prohibit British trade on the Continent. As an answer to his efforts, a Blockade of the French coast from *Brest* to the *Elle*, with certain reservations, was proclaimed by the British Government in May, 1803. Napoleon's replies to this measure, embodied in the *Berlin*, *Vienna*, and other decrees, which jointly established what is known as the Continental System, are described elsewhere in this volume. The political effects of these measures fall outside the province of this chapter. As to their economic effects, though practically the entire coast of Europe was under Napoleon's control from the opening of 1806 to the close of 1811, and though British trade at sea was attacked by numerous French privateers and cruisers, the results were far less disastrous than might have been anticipated. The measures directed by Napoleon against neutrals contributed to the success of British shipping, by providing it with freight. Probably it would have been a wiser proceeding in his part, had he given all possible encouragement to American shipping, and sought to reduce British exports by a heavy differential tariff. The following figures, giving the clearances of British and foreign shipping engaged in the foreign trade of Great Britain (exclusive of

Ireland), will illustrate the effect of Napoleon's Decrees and the British Orders in Council:

*Clearances outward, in thousands of tons, for years ending January 5.*

	1802	1803	1804	1805	1806	1807	1808	1809	1810	1811	1812	1813
British,	1800	1450	1460	1470	1480	1416	1271	1281	1054	1287	1283	1273
Foreign,	661	474	887	696	448	651	205	890	1138	636	508	471

The records of 1813 have been destroyed. The remaining figures prove that, while British shipping slightly decreased in the earlier period of the war, and neutral shipping distinctly increased, from 1808 onwards British shipping gained ground, though the heavy demand for transports during the Peninsular War must be taken into account after 1808. The sudden increase of neutral shipping in the nominal year 1810, really in 1809, was due to the repeal of the American embargo, to the expansion of the Baltic trade when Napoleon's attention was concentrated upon crushing Austria, and to the fact that he intimated that he would permit the entry of neutral shipping, even if laden with British goods: while, in their anxiety to obtain markets for unsaleable produce, the British authorities were even more tolerant towards neutral shipping. But, when the neutral vessels put into French ports, their cargoes were seized and sold as destroyed by the French authorities.

There is a tendency to regard the Continental System as a disastrous failure; but the economic history of England suggests that it inflicted upon her industrial population fearful suffering and loss, and was perfectly well adapted to its object. The attempt of Napoleon to cut off the supply of raw material from the British manufacturers was so far successful that in England wool, silk, flaxen, and hemp rose enormously in price—silk, for example, from 54s. per lb. to 112s., and most other materials in proportion. The control of the Baltic by Napoleon, especially in 1810-11, shook England to her foundations. In 1812 the British people were forced to face with actual famine, owing to the demands of the French army for wheat and corn, the export duty levied at Danzig, and a general bad harvest. Wheat, in places, rose from 10s. a bushel to 45s.; and the foreign sources of supply failed. The trade was virtually free, but the cost of freeman, freight, and insurance was prohibitive. According to Tooke, these charges, on a vessel of 100 tons burden, occasionally amounted to £20,000 for the voyage to Cadiz from London and back.

It has been calculated (by Captain Mahan) that the average annual loss to British shipping by capture was 381 vessels, or an average of about  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. on the annual number of British vessels entering and clearing from ports in the United Kingdom. Such insurance figures as are obtainable suggest that the percentage of premium loss was much greater, since, even when neutrals were included, the average rate of insurance during the war was more than 5 per cent. To the Mediterranean, during the third quarter of the year 1805, the risk varied from



£ to 35 guineas, the lower figure being probably that paid for neutral ships. In 1811 the average rate sent to the Baltic was \$18, and home from that sea, \$18. Outside European waters, however, the risk steadily diminished during the war, with the reduction of the French colonies and the capture of French colonies and prisoners. The voyage to the West Indies was insured at 13½ guineas in 1805, while Villeneuve was at sea; the rate in 1809 was \$9. To the East Indies the rate was about 16 guineas in 1803, and \$9 in 1810. Freight rose in a ratio corresponding with the advance in insurance. According to Tucke, the freight and insurance on hemp rose during 1809-12 to twelve times the cost of the same items in 1807, a normal year; on tallow it was nearly fourteen times the normal; on wheat eleven times, and on timber ten times—all being cargoes from the Baltic. In 1809 as much as \$50 was occasionally paid for the freight of a ton of hemp alone. The value of a ton in time of peace was only from \$20 to \$30; that price was now quadrupled.

Except in the Mediterranean, where throughout the war France retained a certain amount of sailing trade, French shipping was annihilated. After their brief recovery during the Peace of Amiens, the French Channel ports reverted to the lamentable condition in which the earlier war had plunged them; and at Havre a large number of houses were uninhabited. Mettenrich, in 1810, speaks of the French people as "ruined by the entire destruction of their commerce"; but this was an exaggeration, as France enjoyed internal prosperity and a considerable export trade by land. Between 1802 (a year of peace) and 1811, when the Continental System was at its height, French exports increased slightly, while British exports fell off. On the other hand, the allies of France suffered heavily; the strain upon their population was heavier than had been the strain on France in 1794-1800; and they had no compensation for their losses. Their growing exasperation led eventually to the great explosion of national hatred which revolutionary Napoleon.

The following figures, given by Captain SÖDERMAN, indicate the intensity of the French attack upon British commerce, showing as they do the British merchantmen captured year after year by the French, and the French privateers taken annually by the British:

	1801	1804	1805	1808	1807	1808	1809	1810	1811	1812	1813	1814
British ships taken	122	267	307	313	338	408	573	618	479	475	511	520
French privateers taken	28	10	10	23	34	40	18	27	27	26	15	16

The collapse of the insurance rates would seem to show that the peril was greatest in 1805, when two strong French fleets were at large on the Atlantic. In the closing years of the war with France, the simultaneous conflict with the United States, described in a previous volume, complicates the calculations.

The losses of the French and their allies in the war were enormous. While the British navy did not lose a single vessel of the line in action or by capture, thirty-one French ships of the line were captured or destroyed by the British, while six more were captured by the Spanish insurgents; Spain lost twelve out of the line, Holland three, Denmark nineteen, and Russia one. But the British losses from storms and shipwrecks were numerous throughout the war, as was to be expected in a fleet which was constantly forced to keep at sea.

The renewal of war in 1805 led to a fresh blockade of the French coast; and, when the news reached the British authorities that Napoleon would probably endeavour to escape to America, the British cruisers in the Bay of Biscay were ordered to show the utmost vigilance. Napoleon, however, speedily gave up the attempt as hopeless, and surrendered himself to Captain Maitland of the *Bellerophon* on July 18. It was not inappropriate that the navy, which had frustrated two of the Emperor's greatest projects—the intended invasion of England and the attempted conquest of Spain—should also receive his final surrender. At the close of the war, the navy had reached a point of strength which has never before or since been surpassed or even equalled. In 1805 it counted 245 ships of the line, 237 frigates, and 621 small craft, a total of 1103 gunboats, and, though all of these ships were not fit for sea, they represented a force which was more than equivalent to the crews of all the other European Powers combined.

The service which the British navy rendered in this Titanic conflict both to England and to Europe can scarcely be overestimated. It saved England from invasion, and perhaps from conquest; it enabled her to continue her efforts unceasingly, and then, after she had, in Pitt's famous words, "sweat herself by her exertions," to "save Europe by her example." British success at sea proved to the world that the great conqueror was not invincible, and this at a time when his prestige on land was undermined by failure. Consequently, throughout the struggle, Great Britain remained the one centre of hope and encouragement to the Continental Powers; her endurance and success bred in them something of her own dauntless and indomitable spirit; and Trafalgar was the really decisive battle of the Napoleonic War.

## CHAPTER IX.

## THE THIRD COALITION. I.

(1805-6.)

On January 2, 1805, a month after his coronation as Emperor, Napoleon wrote to George III proposing peace, as neither nation had anything to gain by war. There was a marked change in his tone from that of 1803, when he declared that Great Britain was no match for France, and that, if the English were the first to draw the sword, he would be the last to sheathe it. Whether he had brought about the rupture of the Peace of Amiens of set purpose, or had felt overmuch on Andriani's assurance of the pacific temper of the British ministry and people, he had little reason to be satisfied with the result. Europe was too narrow a field for his activity; and his mind was incessantly revolving schemes of conquest and colonial expansion in east or west, to which England was the great obstacle; but the reversal of war with her had not furthered them. French trade had been driven off the sea; the French fleets were blockaded in their ports. Santa Lucia and other West Indian islands had again passed into British hands; San Domingo, for the reconquest of which such great efforts had been made, had secured its independence; and Louisiana, the new acquisition from which so much was hoped, had been sold to the United States.

England had kept her hold of Malta, and had become a focus of conspiracies against Napoleon's government and person. French troops had, indeed, occupied Hanover; but that was an affront to George III and an embarrassment to Prussia, rather than a blow to Great Britain. A superb army had been assembled round Bologna, with wings at Rome and Toul, for the invasion of England and Ireland. This army numbered 170,000 men; and there were 250,000 men elsewhere (in France, Holland, Hanover, and Italy) to be provided for. The public expenditure of France rose to thirty millions sterling; and it became necessary to supplement direct by indirect taxes. The outbreak of war had caused a financial crisis; and public credit was so low that deficits could not be met by loans. The burden of taxation and conscription provoked much discontent in France; and Napoleon tried to shift this burden, so far as possible, on Italy, Switzerland and the Rhine lands. He had gained a reluctant ally in Spain, which, as we have already seen, declared

war against England on December 12, 1804. But Spain was already paying an annual subsidy to France, and was making naval preparations (order issued from Paris: so it was an advantage to Great Britain to be able to treat her as an enemy. In England trade was prosperous and credit good. Supplies of more than £50,000,000 were voted in 1804: yet at the end of the session the Speaker could say: "We have now the proud satisfaction to see that the permanent debt of the nation is rapidly diminishing, at the same time that the growing prosperity of the country has strengthened and multiplied all its resources." Pitt, "the pilot that weathered the storm," had been recalled to the helm, and had begun to form the Third Coalition.

Napoleon had good reason for desiring peace: but, as usual, he desired it on his own terms. There, as stated to the Legislative Body by Champagny on Jan. 1, 1805, were such as justified the British Government in regarding his overtures as a mere repetition of his manoeuvres of two years before, designed to exhibit Pitt as the obstacle to peace, the irreconcilable enemy of the French people and of the institutions they had chosen, and to strengthen the hands of Fox and his associates. The reply to Napoleon's overtures was that the King must communicate with the Continental Powers, to whom he was united in the most confidential manner, and particularly with the Emperor of Russia, before he could give a specific answer. It was suggested to the King (January 30) that he should send an envoy to Paris to state on behalf of both Governments the indispensable conditions of peace. At the same time Pitt included in his budget a sum of five millions for foreign subsidies.

Alexander had been mortified at the secondary part he had played in the settlement of the affairs of Germany after the Treaty of Lunéville. His wishes, and even the promises made to him, had been disregarded by Napoleon: and he had recalled his ambassador, Miotoff. The despatch of a French division to Turin made him uneasy; for, while ostensibly a counter-stroke to the British retention of Malta, it was a step towards the annexation of southern Italy and the prosecution of Napoleon's cherished designs in the East. In October, 1805, the Austrian Government was invited to make arrangements for joint action with Russia; but it shrunk from the prospect of war. At length, in November, 1804, it consented to sign a declaration—the word "treaty" was studiously avoided—by which the two Powers bound themselves to help one another in resisting any further French aggressions in Italy or Germany, or upon the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Alexander was a compound of sentiment and self-seeking. Charm of manner and lofty aspirations veiled a steady pursuit of his own ends. The execution of the *Draughtsman* (March 30, 1804) "fired a mine already loaded"; the Tsar put his Court into mourning, and sent an indignant protest to Paris and to the German Diet. The French answer was that the First Consul did not interfere with the internal affairs of

Russia, and would permit no Government to meddle with the internal affairs of France; and there was a significant reference to the assassination of the Emperor Paul. A complete rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries followed.

The Russian Government had made overtures to Great Britain, as well as to Austria, in the autumn of 1803, with reference to French designs on Turkey; and the conditions of cooperation were discussed more actively after Pitt's return to office and the breach between Russia and France. Pitt was ready to lend money for the Continental Powers, but not for mere measures of self-defence. He desired a league, not against future aggression on the part of France, but for the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*, and for the erection of solid barriers. In November, 1804, Count Novosiloff was sent to London to negotiate an alliance on such a basis. But the Russian Government had other things in view. Prince Adam Czartoryski, whom Alexander had lately made his Foreign Minister, was an ardent young Pole, who hoped to bring about the reunion of his country under the kingship of the Tsar, compensating Austria and Prussia on their western borders for the loss of their Polish provinces. He maintained that, if serious should arise for dealing with the Turkish provinces in Europe, Moldavia and Constantinople should fall to Russia, while the rest might be formed into separate States under a Russian protectorate. On the other hand, England must surrender her maritime rule, and must hand over Malta to Russia; France might be compensated for her surrenders in Europe by an enlargement of her East Indian colonies; and in case of war, the protected British subsidy ought to be increased.

It is not surprising that, when such ideas as these prevailed at St Petersburg, the negotiation of an alliance proved difficult. A treaty was at length signed there on April 11, 1805, by which the two Powers agreed to form an European league for the restoration of peace and the balance of power. North Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and Italy were to be liberated from French control. Piedmont was to be restored to the King of Sardinia, and enlarged. Holland, Switzerland, and Prussia were also to receive additional territory, with the object of preserving a solid barrier against future French usurpations. The allies disclaimed any intention of disturbing the form of government in France. Great Britain, besides employing her own forces by land and sea, engaged to pay an annual subsidy of £1,250,000 for every 100,000 men employed by the Continental Powers against France, provided that the total number should not be less than 400,000. Of these Russia was to furnish 115,000, besides reserve corps on her own frontiers. It was agreed that England should restore the colonies and settlements in the East and West Indies which she had taken during the war; but Pitt resisted the Russian demands respecting Malta and the maritime rule, and this delayed the ratification of the treaty for more than three months.

Napoleon clinched the Coalition when it seemed not unlikely to fall through. He had determined that the Italian (formerly Cisalpine) Republic should follow the example of the French Republic, and become a monarchy. Napoleon destined the crown for his brother Joseph, and so informed foreign Powers; but Joseph declined to renounce his right of succession to the throne of France for a nominal kingship. Louis also declined; whereupon Napoleon decided to assume the crown himself. He announced his decision to the French Senate on March 17, 1805, adding that the arrangement was provisional, and that the crown would be separated on the advent of peace. By this concession he hoped to soothe not only Italy but Austria. He placed the iron crown of Lombardy on his own head at Milan on May 26, and chose his stepson, Eugene Bonaparte, as Viceroy.

An envoy from the Court of Naples despatched to the new title "King of Italy," and drew from Napoleon one of his customary outbreaks, in which he threatened to drive Queen Maria Carolina out of the peninsula. On June 4 he received a deputation from the Ligurian Republic, asking to be annexed to France. He granted the prayer which he had himself prompted, and so added to his naval resources the port of Genoa, and some thousands of excellent sailors. Lucca was turned into a principality for his sister Elise; and Parma and Piacenza were annexed shortly afterwards. By these steps, all Italy west of the Adige and north of Tuscan was brought under the direct rule of Napoleon; and little doubt was left at Vienna that he would soon demand Venice.

Austria had not recovered from the state of exhaustion to which she had been reduced by the wars of the Revolution. Her debt had risen to fifty millions sterling, while her annual revenue was under ten millions; and she had been driven to an irreparable paper currency. The loss of Venice would be a heavy blow to her financially, and would shut the door on her hopes of recovering lost ground in Italy. The Emperor Francis had at first shared the view of Archduke Charles that peace, retrenchment, and reform were the only way of salvation for the monarchy. He had made the Archduke War Minister in December, 1804, and had narrowed the functions of the Aulic Council for War. But the changes brought about by Charles did not find favour in high circles at Vienna; and there grew up a strong opposition to him. Champagny, the French Minister, wrote on July 26, 1805: "Archduke Charles, beloved by his own people, valued by all Germans, renowned throughout Europe, is not loved in his own family: he is too big for them." The Emperor was conservative by instinct, mistrustful of himself, but not inclined to delegate power. He sought wisdom in a multitude of consultations, and preferred the old system of government by boards to the new system of ministerial meeting in conference, which the Archduke had persuaded him to adopt.

Charles was deeply impressed with the defects of the army, and

wanted time to carry out his reforms. Both from a military and from a national point of view he was in favour of peace at almost any price. He pointed out (in a memoir dated March 8, 1804) that France could draw upon a population of 40,000,000 for her armies, while Austria had only 15,000,000, and could not apply conscription to more than half of them. Her finances were unequal even to a peace establishment. War would mean bankruptcy, for the British subsidies would not cover more than a quarter of the expenditure. Past experience showed how little the Russians were to be depended on as allies; and, even if Russia furnished 100,000 men, this would not make Austria a match for France. France would be neutral or perhaps hostile; no help could be looked for from the secondary German States; and Great Britain could employ such troops as she could spare from home to interception against French and British colonies. Instead of war, he urged alliance with France, which, being based on solid advantages for both sides, would be durable.

Coburg had made an attempt in this direction in 1803, when he succeeded Thugot as Foreign Minister; but it met with no success. Napoleon leaned to Prussia and Russia; and each year had brought changes to the disadvantage of Austria. His endeavours, as soon as he became Emperor, to represent himself as the successor of Charlemagne, roused the fear that the House of Habsburg would lose the titular headship of Germany, and led Francis to adopt a new title for himself, "Roman Emperor Elect, Hereditary Emperor of Austria" (August 11, 1804). Both he and his minister gradually drifted towards the war party, made up of the Archduke's opponents. They came to the conclusion that war with the help of allies would be a less evil than peace with isolation. If they feared Napoleon, they also feared Alexander; and they were aware all things considered that Russia should not come to an understanding with France unless Austria were a party to it.

Charles was perhaps too prone to play the part of Jeunebelle. A man prepared to prophesy smooth things was found in General Mack. He was a fluent talker who had risen from the ranks, and had been chief of Coburg's staff in the campaigns of 1798-6. He had unbounded confidence in himself; and not only the Emperor Francis, but British officers and the British Government, took him at his own valuation, though Napoleon spoke of him as a charlatan. He had commanded the Napoleonic army in 1798, and had been forced to capitulate; but the blame was laid on his troops. In spite of the strongest opposition on the part of the Archduke, Mack was made Quartermaster-General in the spring of 1805, and had the chief voice in the preparations for war. The Aulic Council of War was restored to its old predominance, on the plea that the Archduke could not act as War Minister while commanding in the field.

Novosiloff was waiting at Berlin for passports to proceed to Paris

as the basis of the reply of England and Russia to the peace proposals made by Napoleon at the beginning of the year, when Alexander received news of the occupation of Genoa. The Tsar at once recalled his army, considering the occupation a gross insult at such a moment, and pressed the Austrian Government to decide whether it would join the Coalition. If it consented, he was ready to increase his own contingent to 380,000 men. If it refused, it must not look to him in future for support against France. On July 7, 1805, the Austrian Government sent an affirmative reply, and acceded formally at St. Petersburg on August 9. It undertook to furnish 315,000 men; but its army fell far short of that number. Sweden also joined the Coalition, and promised 15,000 well-trained troops. Prussia declined to join, and asked Austria to unite with her in an attempt to mediate.

The French occupation of Hanover had given Prussia ample cause of concern. It was an infringement of the Treaty of Basel; it brought French troops into the midst of the Prussian dominions; and it was a severe blow to Prussian commerce, for it led the British to blockade the mouth of the Elbe. Napoleon was deaf to remonstrances on this subject, and he rejected the proposal that Prussia should guarantee the neutrality of Germany; that, as he told Lambeth (November 27, 1803), would close the road from Strasbourg to Vienna, which he should have to take if he went to war with Austria. Nothing short of an alliance would satisfy him. At the Court of Berlin the general sentiment was strongly anti-French, but there was the old jealousy and distrust of Austria; and the arguments for keeping on good terms with France were pressed by men like Haugwitz and the Cabinet-Secretary Lombard, who had the ear of the King. Others were against taking either side, and maintained that as much might be won by wise and skilful diplomacy as by war, with less risk, and without any sacrifice of men or money.

This course commended itself to Frederick William III, who was diffident, irresolute, and parsimonious. He declared that he would have no war unless he was himself attacked. Early in 1804 he appealed to the Tsar to know if he might count on him in case of need; and on May 24 declarations were exchanged at Berlin, providing for joint resistance to any fresh aggression by France east of the Rhine. The seizure of Sir George Rumbold, the British envoy at Hamburg (October 28, 1804), was a flagrant act of this description; and Hardenberg, who was by this time associated with Haugwitz as Foreign Minister, persuaded the King to send a remonstrance to Paris. Its terms were milder than Hardenberg wished; and Frederick William wrote at the same time to Haugwitz, asking how the matter might be settled without war if Napoleon disregarded it. The Emperor had wanted Rumbold's papers rather than his person, and he made a merit of releasing him at the request of the King of Prussia; but he said privately that he had had a bad quarter of an hour which he hoped to pay back with interest.



There was great excitation in Berlin at the unexpected effusiveness of the King's intervention; and the relations of the two Powers seemed to be on a better footing than before. Napoleon was acknowledged without delay as Emperor of the French, and later as King of Italy; and Black Eagle was sent to Paris in exchange for the Golden Eagle of the newly-founded Legion of Honour. This brought friction with Gustavus IV of Sweden, the Queen's illegitimate son, who returned his own Black Eagle to Berlin (but he might not be on the same roll with Bonaparte). He received a warning from the Prussian Government that troops would be marched into Swedish Pomerania if any steps were taken there which might affect the neutrality of northern Germany; but he signed treaties with Great Britain and Russia, and the Tsar sent a counter-threat to Berlin.

Swedish Pomerania was one of the border-lands which Prussian statesmen coveted, to round off their own fragmentary territory. But they hardened much more after Hanover; and Napoleon was startled (as he told the Austrian ambassador in May, 1805) that he could at any time secure Prussia by giving her a bone to gnaw. He had several intimations, especially after Hardenberg (who was himself a Hanoverian) became minister, that Prussia would like to occupy Hanover, if only as temporary custodian. Towards the end of 1804, the Prussian Government warned the Tsar on this point; but he strongly disapproved of an arrangement which would release 25,000 French troops for use elsewhere.

In the summer of 1805 General Wintzingerode paid a fruitless visit to Berlin, and then went to Vienna as the Tsar's military representative. He had conferences there with Mack and other Austrian officers, which ended in a protocol drawn up on July 15. The plan of operations was based upon the memoir already referred to, prepared by Archduke Charles in March, 1804, which (as Lord Milnesbrook remarked) "presents rather the blurred detail of obscurity to any attempt at depicting a campaign against the power of France, than a system of action and vigorous operations." The conclusion of the Archduke was that Austria, if successful, could hope to gain territory only in Italy; while, on the other hand, it was by way of Italy that the enemy could most easily reach Vienna. On that side, therefore, the Austrians should take the offensive in force; in the valley of the Danube they should occupy the line of the Elbe, and wait for the Russians to join them.

In accordance with this general conception, it was settled at the end of August that the army of Italy should number 24,000 men, and be commanded by Archduke Charles; there should be 24,000 men in Tyrol and Vorarlberg; and 28,000 men should form the army of Germany, commanded nominally by the Emperor, or by the young Archduke Ferdinand of Modena in his absence, with Mack as chief of the staff. A Russian army of 25,000 men, under Kutusoff, was to cross the Galician frontier in the middle of August, and reach the Inn

by the middle of October, twenty days (as it was reckoned) before the French army could arrive there from Bologna. It was to be followed by two others under Bernadotte and Buxhöveden. A Russian force was also to be sent to Stralsund, to form part of an army of 20,000 men under Gustavus, made up of Swedes, Danes, Hanoverians, and English, which was to recover Hanover and invade Holland; while an Anglo-Russian corps of 20,000 men, with 20,000 Neapolitans, was to drive the French out of southern Italy.

The utmost secrecy was observed about the negotiations and the preparations for war, but the Austrians should be warned before the Russians could join them. But Napoleon was on the alert, and took note of the gradual increase of Austrian troops in Italy and Tyrol. He warned the Court of Vienna, in June, 1804, that his attention was not absorbed by his preparations against England; and his tone became threatening when the recognition of his Imperial title was delayed. At the beginning of 1805 he demanded and received pacific assurances; at the same time he reinforced his army in Italy. He thought it unlikely that Austria would compromise herself when she had "nothing to hope for, and everything to lose"; and in any case he reckoned that she must show her hand three months before she would be ready for war.

In the meantime he hoped to carry out his project for the invasion of England, to which he clung with characteristic tenacity. The variations in this scheme and the events which hindered its execution have already been described. When, on July 28, Villeneuve, after his indecisive action with Calder, put into Vigo for repairs, Napoleon was beginning to change his mind about the intentions of Austria. On August 13 he told Talleyrand that he must know within a fortnight whether Austria meant peace or war, as the season was far advanced for a campaign. Late as it was, however, the Emperor Francis should understand that, if he decided for war, he would not spend Christmas in Vienna. The time had come to give Prussia her horse and to secure her help, in order either to paralyse the Coalition while Napoleon crossed the Channel, or to overpower it, if war should break out on the Continent. On August 6 the French ambassador at Berlin made a definite offer of Hanover, with a guarantee that the cession of it should be an essential condition of peace between France and Great Britain. Frederick William had scruples; he hesitated, but seemed inclined to negotiate; and to hasten the negotiation and settle details of cooperation Napoleon sent Duroc to Berlin at the end of August.

The invasion of England had been given up some days before. Some authorities have held that Napoleon never entertained, or had long abandoned, the hope of crossing the Channel. The Prussian ambassador, Lucchesini, and Aristide Charles, suspected at the time that the scheme was an excuse for keeping a large army on foot for use on the Continent; but the enormous expenditure incurred for the expedition, and the

incompleteness of the preparations for a Continental war, will only against this conclusion. Napoleon, however, was not the man to dwell exclusively on a single offence. It was his custom, as he said, "*faire toujours son devoir en deux jours*." The many disappointments he had met with, and the remonstrances of his naval officers, could hardly fail to cause him some misgivings about his project; and he had foreseen for some months that the action of Austria and Russia might oblige him to postpone it. No doubt it was with a sense of relief that he now turned his back on the sea, and entered upon land operations against troops which he had so often beaten. At any rate he could afford to risk no longer. He directed Talleyrand to prepare a circular charging how Austria had forced him into war; and on August 25 his army began its march from the Channel coast to the valley of the Danube.

The "Grand Army," as it now became, consisted of seven army-corps, six divisions of heavy cavalry or dragons, and a division of the Imperial guard, numbering altogether 180,000 men. The 1st corp, under Bernadotte, was in Hanover; the 2nd, under Marmont, in Holland; and the 7th, under Augereau, at Brest. The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th corps, commanded respectively by Duroc, Soult, Lannes, and Ney, were in the neighbourhood of Boulogne. Murat acted as the Emperor's lieutenant, and had general command of the cavalry. It was the best army that Napoleon ever led. Nearly half the men had seen some war service; and a quarter of them had served throughout the wars of the Revolution. Four years of continental peace and the prolonged occupation at Boulogne had given opportunity to make good all defects; and the officers of corps and divisions had learnt to work together. The generals, while rich in experience, were in their prime, or at an average hardly over forty years of age. But the captains and subalterns were not much younger; and, though they knew their business, most of them had lost the spring of youth, and were confirmed grumblers.

Owing to the sudden change of plan, there was a great deficiency of supplies and transport; and this was aggravated by the rapidity with which the army moved. Cloaks and shoes were ordered at the last moment; and some of the dragoons were without horses. The proportion of field-guns was small—less than two to a thousand men. Magazines were formed at Strasbourg and Mainz, and subsequently at Ulm and Würzburg; but the army practically lived upon the country as soon as it left France. "*Nulage became authorized*," says the Duc de Feltre, "and the districts through which we passed suffered cruelly; yet we were soon the less fatigued throughout the campaign." This developed the habit of marauding and relaxed discipline.

To gain time, Napoleon told Talleyrand to change his tone: "*Il ne faut plus d'excuses, il faut de la pusillanimité*." But it was too late. On September 3 the Court of Vienna rejected the French ultimatum; and, on the 24th, the Austrian troops crossed the Inn. The Elector of

Bavaria was called upon to unite his forces with those of Austria, but he had already thrown in his lot with France. Leaving Munich, he retired southwest with his troops (27,000 men) to Würzburg and Bamberg, to await the arrival of the French. Apart from hereditary antagonism to the House of Habsburg, the personal sympathies of Maximilian Joseph were with France, as were those of his minister, Metternich. By the act of mediation which followed on the Peace of Lunéville, Bavaria had gained a quarter of a million in population, with a richer and more compact territory; and the Elector hoped for further gain. He would have preferred neutrality, but Napoleon would not hear of it; and on August 24 he signed a treaty of alliance with France. Hope and fear led other South-German States—Württemberg, Baden, and Rhine-Barnstadt—to take the same course. The German people, to whose revolutionary France had brought more benefit than injury, made no protest.

The Austrian army advanced to the Rhr, and by the end of September there were about 60,000 men between the Lech, the Danube, and the Lake of Constance. This forward position had been recommended by Archduke Charles, in order to cover Tyrol and watch the passes through the Black Forest; but he was supported Archduke Ferdinand, who urged that Napoleon would beat Munich with 100,000 men before the Russians reached the line, and that only flying columns should be sent into Bavaria. Mack, however, persuaded the Emperor that it was impossible for Napoleon to bring more than 70,000 men across the Rhine.

On September 29 Napoleon explained to the Senate his reasons for war, and obtained an unconstitutional vote authorizing him to call out all the conscripts of 1800 as well as the reserve conscripts of previous years. This yielded him 150,000 men, of whom three-fourths were actually under arms before the end of the year. On the 30th he arrived at Strasbourg; and Murat crossed the Rhine there with the cavalry and Lannes' corps. This confirmed Mack in his belief that the French would approach the Danube, as in former wars, either through the Black Forest, or by skirting its northern border. But Napoleon intended to reach the line before the Russians, and to thrust himself between them and the Austrians; and this could only be done from the north.

On the 27th Ney passed the Rhine near Coblentz and pushed on to Stuttgart, where he was joined by Laurin and Murat, when their demonstration had served its purpose. Soult and Davout crossed lower down, at Speier and Mannheim, and took up the line of the Neckar to the north of May. Bernadotte marched from Göttingen to Würzburg, where he found part of the Bavarian army, and was joined on the 30th by Marmont. By the beginning of October more than 200,000 French and Bavarians were assembled on the Neckar and the Main. Angereau's corps, 14,000 strong, was on its way from Brittany; and contingents amounting to 16,000 men were being drawn from Baden, Württemberg,

and Hain-Damstadt. In the north of Italy Massena had nearly 80,000 men, while Saint-Cyr had 80,000 in the south.

Taking a south-easterly course and moving with a wide front, the Grand Army reached the Danube on October 8. It crossed at various points near Deggendorf and Regensburg, driving before it the weak corps of Kienmayer, the only Austrian troops east of the Lech. Ney was left to the north of the Danube, to bar the roads leading from Ulm towards Bohemia. Bernadotte marched on Munich with his own corps and the Bavarians, while the rest of the army converged upon Augsburg, which was occupied by Oct. 18. The troops had marched two hundred miles in a fortnight, in terrible weather and with scanty food. Napoleon had effected his object, but for some days he was not aware of the full measure of his success. He thought it probable that the Austrian army, whose strength he put at 80,000 or perhaps 100,000 men, had retreated northward into Tyrol, or had escaped eastward by skirting the base of the Alps. Assuming that only a small garrison would be left in Ulm, he ordered Ney to take it. Dapont's division thereupon advanced; but at Haidach, four miles north of Ulm, it encountered superior forces (October 11), and was obliged to retreat, leaving the northern roads open to the enemy.

If what has been aptly called "the fog of war" led Napoleon astray, much more was this the case with his antagonist. Archibute Ferdinand received instructions that, in case of any difference of opinion, he was to be guided by Mack, on whom rests, therefore, the whole responsibility. Mack was concentrating his troops at Ulm, when he learned that the French were on the Danube, fifty miles or more to the east of him. He began a movement on Augsburg; but his leading division came across Lannes' corps at Wertingen, and was nearly destroyed (October 8). Checked in this direction, and refusing to retreat on Tyrol, he determined to strike northward, and cut the French communications. This plan was soon dropped, and then again taken up; and on the 15th one corps (Warren's) advanced halfway to Nördlingen. But by this time Napoleon had fully grasped the situation; Soult, Marmont, and Lannes were hastening to envelop Ulm on the southern side. When the heads of their columns were approaching the Iller, a report reached Mack that British troops had landed at Boulogne, and that there was a revolution in France. He jumped to the conclusion that the French army was in full retreat, cancelled his previous instructions, and issued orders for pursuit. His drama, as he afterwards called it, was now dispelled. By the 18th the investment of Ulm was complete. The Archibute had ridden northward with a few squadrons; but Mack remained at Ulm with 80,000 men. It was not a place that could be defended against a serious attack, and it was short of supplies.

On October 17 Mack agreed to capitulate, unless he should be relieved within eight days. Two days afterwards he consented to an alteration

of the terms; the surrender should take effect immediately, but the corps of Ney should remain at Ulm till the 25th. The point about which Mack showed most concern was that Napoleon should not think ill of his generalship. Meanwhile Murat was in hot pursuit of the Austrians who had gone northward. Wurmser's corps was overtaken and surrounded; but the Archduke, with about 2000 cavalry, escaped into Bohemia. The corps of Jellachich, which had been sent to reinforce Mack, made its way back to Ymerberg much reduced. The total number of prisoners secured by the French was about 50,000.

Napoleon waited to see the troops at Ulm lay down their arms. On October 31, the day on which his naval power was shattered at Trafalgar, he left Ulm for Augsburg, after leaving his soldiers to deal with the Russians as they had dealt with the Austrians, and to settle the question whether the French infantry was the second or the first in Europe. He had still no easy task before him. Kutsoff had reached Bremen with 90,000 Russians, and was joined there by 15,000 Austrians. In a few weeks another Russian army would come up; and Archduke Charles might bring his troops from Italy to help in barring the road to Vienna, or might descend on the flank or rear of the French army as it moved down the valley of the Danube.

Prussia, too, had changed her attitude. Hardenberg had been in favour of accepting Napoleon with the conditions attached to the transfer. He disliked the system of neutrality which had been so long adhered to, and believed that a more spirited and less drifting policy was better for Prussia. Her enlargement and consolidation were his persistent aim, and he saw more prospect of effecting them by an alliance with France than by union with the eastern Powers. He was supported by the Duke of Brunswick; but Haugwitz advocated an armed neutrality. That was the course which the King decided on; and Doro (who arrived shortly afterwards) could not move him. He would give no facilities for the movement of French troops across neutral German States. Doro reported, however, that the Prussian army was quite unready to take the field; and Napoleon, while beginning to feel some distrust of the Prussian Government, felt more contempt for it. He blamed Bernadotte for deviating from the direct route from Göttingen to Wüzburg on account of scruples about neutral territory, and told him to pass through Ansbach on his further march to Ingolstadt.

The news of this effort reached Frederick William at a critical moment. The Tsar had been pressing him to join the Coalition, or at any rate to allow the Russian troops to cross Silesia. He had refused, and, when he was told that the Russians would force their way, he had put his case on a war establishment. Alexander was unwilling to carry out his threat; and the march of the Russians was delayed for some weeks. He sent Dolgorouki to Berlin with a fresh appeal; but

on October 8 the King reaffirmed his unshakable resolution to decline against any Power which should violate his territory. He learned immediately afterwards that the French had passed through Andau, three days before. His indignation was extreme, and was shared by his army and people, which had long felt sore at the mean part which Prussia had come to play in Europe. The desired provision was at once given to the Russian troops. On October 25 Alexander was cordially received at Potsdam; the sovereign renewed the friendship which they had formed at Minsk in 1802, and swore before the image of Frederick the Great to be faithful to each other. A convention was signed on November 8, by which Prussia undertook to grant to Napoleon conditions of peace substantially the same as those laid down in the Anglo-Russian treaty, except as regards Piedmont and the Netherlands. The King promised, if these proposals were rejected, to put 150,000 men into the field in order to enforce them; and a plan of operations was settled. Four weeks were to be allowed for negotiation with France, to give time for military preparations.

France was to obtain a better frontier, either by new acquisitions or by exchange; and the Tsar promised his good offices to bring about the union of Hanover. He sent Oubril to London with this object; but Pitt, while willing to pay a subsidy, declared that, "as for the exchange of Hanover, no minister would be imprudent enough to make such a proposal to the King, and great care will be taken always to avoid it from him." The British Government had been urging for some time past that the influence of France over Prussia should be met "by setting temptation with measure, and by acting at the same time upon the fears and upon the cupidity of the Prussian Government." They proposed to extend its possessions west of the Rhine up to a line drawn from Maastricht to Luxembourg, so that it might form part of the French barrier. This proposal was now returned as an alternative to the union of Hanover; but it was less attractive to Prussia, and was not regarded favourably by Austria or Russia. It was an offer, too, of part of the lion's skin before the lion was dead.

The affair of Andau is an example of that recklessness on Napoleon's part which made Siran Wiscounsell say of him: "*Don tenez les gens de vous tout soldat qu'il possible en perfection, il s'en va, faut de lui dire.*" But, if he constantly added new enemies to old, no one can have better how to deal with them in succession, and to make up for opposing odds by celerity and precision of stroke. By a rapid advance on Vienna he hoped to defeat Kutusoff before he was reinforced, and to force France to make peace, as he had done in 1800. He sent Ney with the Bavarians to make peace, as he had done in 1800. He sent Ney with the Bavarians into Tyrol, and ordered Augereau to follow with his corps as soon as it arrived. He directed Bernadotte and Marmont on Salzburg, where they would meet his own flank, and would be able to turn the left of Kutusoff if he should try

to hold the line of the Inn. But Kutsoff made no such attempt. In spite of Austrian reinforcements, he fell back from one line to another as the French approached, and fought only two-gated actions.

On November 3 Napoleon was at Lina. There he received proposals for an armistice from Francis; but, while ready to treat for peace, he refused to stop the march of his columns. Archduke Ferdinand had gathered about 6000 men in Bohemia, and a Russian force was rumored to be there also; so Napoleon formed a new corps under Mortier, made up of divisions from other corps, which was to march down the left bank of the Danube and push out reinforcements. This made Kutsoff uneasy, for he thought the object was to cut him off from the army which was crossing Silesia. Parting company with the Austrians, he crossed the Danube at Montev, fell upon the leading division of Mortier's corps, and nearly destroyed it. He then marched towards Olmutz, followed by Bernadotte. The Austrian corps which had been co-operating with him turned southward into the mountains, to keep the road over the Sommering open for the army of Italy, but was so roughly handled by Duroc and Marmont, that only fragments of it found their way to Presburg.

Napoleon entered Vienna, which was undefended, on November 11, and took up his residence at Schönbrunn. He at once organized an administration of the archduchy, and imposed a war contribution of four millions sterling. By a *roule de guerre*, permission was gained of the bridge over the Danube, which was to prove a formidable obstacle in 1809. Morat was sent on with the cavalry and with the corps of Lannes and Dordt to intercept Kutsoff. He sought to have succeeded, but he allowed himself to be tricked in turn by the Russian general, who professed that he was authorized to treat for the retirement of the Russian armies into Poland, and so gained time to reach Zazyw. Bagration's corps had to be left behind in possession of the French; but it succeeded in rejoining the army, after losing a third of its men in a fight against great odds at Hollabrunn. By November 19 Kutsoff had effected his junction with Buxhöveden's army between Brünn and Olmutz.

While the Austrian defence in the valley of the Danube had so completely collapsed, the vigorous offensive, which, according to the plan of campaign, was to be taken in Italy, had come to nothing. When Archduke Charles took command of the army of Italy on September 23, he found his divisions under strength and short of equipment and transport. He was soon called upon to send assistance to the army of Germany. He was a man of more ability than energy, cautious rather than enterprising, and subject to nervous conditions. His disapproval of the war and foreboding of disaster perhaps quenched his activity. At any rate he accepted the proposal of Masséna that six days' notice should be given before hostilities began; and under this convention the



two armies remained passive till the middle of October. By that time the Archduke had 60,000 men under his command, including 15,000 men in southern Tyrol. Masséna had only 35,000, but Saint-Cyr was bringing 10,000 from southern Italy. By dint of threats, Napoleon had forced a treaty of neutrality upon the Neapolitan Government, which was ratified on October 5.

In spite of his inferiority in numbers, Masséna denounced the convention and took the offensive. On November 19 he gained possession of the Castel Vecchio bridge at Vienna, which enabled him to pass the Adige. On the 23th he attacked the Austrian army in its intrenched position behind Caldiero. Three days' obstinate fighting ended in the repulse of the French; but the Archduke did not follow up his success. He had heard of the disaster at Ulm, and had already suggested that the Austrian forces should evacuate Italy and Tyrol. He had sent off some of his guns and stores, and now seized the opportunity to begin his retreat. Masséna followed and harassed his rear-guard, but did not seriously interfere with him.

On November 8 the Archduke reached the Tagliamento, and halted there seven days to give his brother John time to bring away the troops in Tyrol. Some of the corps there were cut off; Jellachich surrendered to Aguirre; and Rohan, after an adventurous march which brought him almost to Venice, surrendered to Saint-Cyr. With the remainder, John made his way by Villach to Marburg, where he was joined on the 25th by the army of Italy. Knowing that Napoleon had gone to meet the Russians in Moravia, Charles had thoughts of joining the Sarmatians and recrossing Vienna. The task should not have been too much for 60,000 men. He decided, however, to march round by Hungary, where he would meet with no opposition; and he had reached Komorn when he heard, on December 8, of the battle of Austerlitz.

Napoleon had joined Mörse at Brinn on November 20. He had hoped to dictate peace at Vienna; but Francis, though he continued to negotiate, could not be brought to cede Venetia and Tyrol. In spite of his success, or rather by reason of them, Napoleon's position grew critical. He was five hundred miles from the French frontier. Winter was approaching, and his soldiers were longing to get home. The conscription was causing great discontent in France; there were plots and a financial crisis in Paris. The corps of the Grand Army were scattered, scouting a huge horse-shoe round Vienna. Bernadotte was at Igla, watching the Archduke Ferdinand; Dornot had his headquarters at Pressburg, to hold Hungary in check; Marmont was guarding the passes of Styria; Ney, having done his work in Tyrol, had moved on into Carinthia; while Angereau had been sent north into Swabia. Mottet's divisions garrisoned Vienna. Masséna, who was expected to be at Gmiz, had halted at the Venetian frontier. Napoleon had only about 60,000 men with him at Brinn; while at Olmütz nearly 90,000

Russians and Austrians were assembled towards the end of the month, with the two Emperors at their head. If he attacked them, he could only hope to win a costly and barren victory, a prelude to a winter campaign. In a few days they would be reinforced by another Russian corps, that of *Erm*. By the middle of December their numbers would be more than doubled by the arrival of Bonaparte's army and that of Archduke Charles, while the Prussians would also come into the field. The British ministers were reckoning that more than three-quarters of a million of men would be available for the next campaign.

While giving his troops a few days of much-needed rest, Napoleon tried to break up the Coalition by means of diplomacy. Talleyrand urged him to make a friend of Austria, and to compensate her at the expense of Turkey for the sacrifices he required of her in Germany and Italy. As a powerful Danubian State, she would be a buffer against Russian encroachments; and her interests would be bound up with those of France. But Napoleon hesitated after an understanding with the Tsar. The news of Trafalgar had lately reached him; and, in the indirect war against England to which he was now reduced, the war of blockade, he looked upon Russia as his best ally. Stadion and Gyulay, who came to his headquarters to reopen negotiations on behalf of the Emperor Francis, were sent on to Vienna, to be kept in play by Talleyrand. Hungenin, the bearer of the Prussian ultimatum disguised as an offer of mediation, was detained two days at Igloo that he might not meet Stadion. Hungenin had a short interview with Napoleon, in which he was careful not to commit himself; and he, too, was sent on to Vienna. There he was profuse in his assurances to Talleyrand that the King was bound to nothing more than the tender of his good offices. Meanwhile Napoleon wrote to the Tsar, proposing a personal interview. Alexander declined, but sent his aide-de-camp, Dolgorouki, who was met by Napoleon at the French outpost on November 30. In reply to a suggestion that Russia should annex Moldavia instead of quarrelling with France, Dolgorouki said that the Tsar's policy was quite disinterested, and he stated the conditions which the Allies insisted on. These (as Napoleon wrote that day to Talleyrand) included the withdrawal of the French from Belgium, which was to be united to Holland. "What, Brussels too!" said Napoleon, "not even if you were on the heights of Montmartre."

By this time, however, another way of escape from his embarrassment was opening for Napoleon. The allied army began to advance on Britain. Gourtaryski advised Alexander to leave the army to Kutusoff, whose command was only nominal while the two sovereigns were with him. But Alexander had cooled towards his favourite, who was anti-Prussian, and had powerful enemies in the Old-Russian party. He lost a willing ear to Countess Elie Dolgorouki, who assured him that his presence and control would secure victory for his troops and glory for himself. He had chosen an Austrian, Colonel Weyrother, a man of the Mack type,

as chief of the staff, and was persuaded by him that Napoleon's apparent inactivity showed he felt himself no match for the Russians, and that he might be cut off from Vienna. A move in some direction was imperative, as supplies were running short at Olmütz; so it was decided to advance.

On November 22 the French outposts at Winkau were driven in. Napoleon at once perceived the design of the Allies, and did his best to encourage them in its prosecution. He drew his troops back, and chose a position between Brünn and Austerlitz, which seemed to lend itself to that turning movement at which Weyrother was aiming. He determined that this should be no ordinary battle, but should finish the war with a clap of thunder. The plateau of Pratzen offered such strong ground that the enemy might be deterred from attacking him there; so he left it to them, and massed his troops, as far as possible, in the hollow behind it. He intrenched a hill on the Olmütz road, and seemed to be making preparations for a rear-guard action to cover his retreat. He called up Bernadotte from Iglaa, and one of Davout's divisions from the Danube, so that by the day of battle he had 65,000 men at his disposal. The leisurely movements of the Allies gave him ample time.

The French position extended about seven miles along the Goldbach, from the Olmütz road southwest to Teltsitz. The southern half of it was occupied by a single division (Lannes's) of Soult's corps; but a few miles to the west lay Friant's division of Davout's corps, which reached Hagueno Abbey on the evening of December 1, after marching seventy miles in forty-four hours. In the northern half of the position, Lannes' corps was astride of the Olmütz road; Morot's cavalry was on his right; and to the right of Maist were Bernadotte's corps and two divisions of Soult's corps. The Imperial Guard and Outinot's grenadiers were in reserve behind Bernadotte. Napoleon massed his troops here for a counter-stroke against the enemy's centre, when their left should be engaged in turning the French right. His confidence was such that, on the eve of the battle, he told his soldiers what would happen.

Early on the morning of December 2—the first anniversary of Napoleon's coronation—three columns of Russians under Baulandien, with an advanced guard of Austrians, more than 80,000 men in all, descended from the plateau of Pratzen upon Teltsitz and Sobotitz. They expected to meet with little resistance there, and shading northward they were to join hands with a fourth column of 16,000 men, under Kollowrat, which was directed upon the centre of the French position. On the right, the corps of Bagration and some 16,000 cavalry under Lichsteinstein advanced against Lannes and Maist, mainly as a demonstration. The Russian Guards remained in reserve.

Napoleon did not wait for these attacks to develop. As soon as "the sun of Austerlitz," breaking through the mists, showed him that the plateau of Pratzen was comparatively bare of troops, he ordered his left and centre to advance. Soult's divisions (Saint-Hilaire and Vandamme)

encountered Kollowrat's column at the village of Pratzen, drove it back, and reached the plateau, cutting the allied army in two. Bernadotte and Lannes also drove back the enemy in their front. There were some brilliant cavalry charges, which ended to the advantage of the French; and, after four or five hours' hard fighting, the battle was won. The Austro-Russian right and centre retreated in disorder on Austerlitz, the two Emperors with them. Meanwhile Buxhöfden's columns had been making slow progress against the obstinate resistance of Lagrand and Pittot. Before they realised what had taken place on the plateau, their direct line of retreat was cut off. Their only way of escape was by the dyke which separated the lakes of Mlaza and Satschan; and on this the French guns concentrated their fire. Many were drowned in trying to cross the thin ice of the lakes. It is uncertain how large a deduction should be made from the 80,000 of the *Thirteenth Bulletin*, or even from the 6000 of *Tison*; but, at all events, 20 guns were afterwards recovered from Lake Satschan. Most of Buxhöfden's force laid down their arms. The total loss of the Allies was about 85,000 men and 180 guns; that of the French was about 7000.

But the losses were no adequate measure of the victory. It was Napoleon's *day of glory*, the battle of which he was most proud; and it completely demoralised the beaten army. "There were no longer regiments or army corps," says Cartwright, "there were only disorderly bands of wanderers." Austrians and Russians blamed one another for their defeat. They retreated in a south-easterly direction to Gding, where they crossed the March into Hungary. They were not closely pursued, for Marmé by mistake took the road to Olmitz. Alexander was deeply depressed, and listened to those who told him he had done enough for others, and must now think of himself. With his concurrence Francis asked for an interview with Napoleon, which took place on the 4th. An armistice was granted, on condition that the Russians should evacuate Austrian territory within a month, and that no other foreign army (i.e. the Prussian) should enter it. Napoleon is said to have offered to have Austria intact, if Russia would join in a treaty of peace excluding British trade from the Continent. Alexander would not consent, but he told Francis not to reckon any longer on the Russian army; and he sent word to the King of Prussia that he hoped he would find means of coming to an arrangement with France. At the same time he placed the corps of Tilly and Bessières, which were in northern Germany, at the disposal of Frederick William.

Negotiations for peace between France and Austria were begun at Nikolsburg, and completed at Presburg (December 26). No representation of other Powers, except Bavaria, were allowed to take part in them. Austria recognised all the changes already made by France in Italy, and ceded Venetia (including Istria and Dalmatia, but not Trieste) to the King of Italy, subject to the promise already made by Napoleon

that the crown of France and Italy should be separated at the general peace. The Emperor Francis renounced all feudal rights over Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden. He ceded Tyrol and Vorarlberg with several smaller districts to Bavaria, while his possessions in Saxony were divided between Baden and Würtemberg. The Electors of Bavaria and Würtemberg were recognized as kings; and so, by the loss of this, Napoleon bestowed a crown on the daughter of George III. Saxony was authorized to annex the free city of Augsburg, and Austria to annex Salzburg, the ex-Grand-Duke of Tuscany receiving Würzburg in exchange for it. On the whole, the Emperor Francis lost nearly three millions of subjects and one-sixth of his revenue. He agreed to pay forty millions of francs in lieu of the unpaid portion of the war contribution imposed on his hereditary States. On the advice of Archduke Charles, he replaced Colonel Kyburg, in order to appease Napoleon. The Archduke had an interview with Napoleon on December 27, but was unable to obtain any mitigation of the terms. The treaty was ratified on January 1, 1806.

The Austrian negotiators had been placed at great disadvantage by the signature of a treaty between France and Prussia a few days before. Haugwitz had held back his attention till he could learn the result of the battle which was imminent; and after Austria he expressed it. Talleyrand wrote on that day, "He seems to have come to avoid events rather than with any other object." On December 14 he was received by the Emperor at Schönbrunn. Napoleon had no exact knowledge of the Potsdam agreement, but he had learnt something of it, especially from Dolgorouki, and he poured out threats and reproaches. Later in the day he sent for Haugwitz again, and told him that Austria was ready to become his ally and was asking for Hanover for one of the Archdukes, but he would prefer alliance with Prussia. Haugwitz suggested a triple alliance, to include Russia. Napoleon said he asked for nothing better, but that would be a work of time, and he could not wait. "Napoleon's art of diplomacy," says Seeley, "was very similar to his fashion of making war. It was a singular mixture of cunning and audacity, made more effective by extreme sagacity." It prevailed with Haugwitz, who, on December 18, signed at Vienna the treaty dictated to him. The terms of this treaty were that there should be an alliance, offensive and defensive, between France and Prussia. The latter should send Cleves to a Prince of the Empire, to be designated by Napoleon (it was to be Maximilian), Neuchâtel to France, and Ansbach to Bavaria, rendering in exchange Hanover and a rectification of the Rhenish boundary. Prussia was to guarantee the changes made in Germany and Italy.

Having disposed of his principal antagonists, Napoleon turned his attention to the minor operations in the north and south, which he had hitherto disregarded. Agersvold was sent northward, and Manteuffel was directed to march on Naples with 40,000 men, accompanied by Joseph as the Emperor's representative. Napoleon had refused to admit any stipulations on behalf of the Neapolitan Bourbon into the Treaty of Pressburg;

and, on the very day on which that treaty was signed, he declared his intention to "haul down the throne that criminal woman who has so shamelessly violated everything that is sacred among men" (Bodwin 87). The Court of Naples had delivered itself into his hand. It had no longer ratified its treaty of neutrality with France than it assured the Russian minister that this convention, extorted by force, was not binding, and called on the Allies to furnish the assistance they had promised. Towards the end of November, 1805, 15,000 Russians from Coelo and 7000 British troops from Malta disembarked in the Bay of Naples. They were joined by a few thousand Neapolitans, and by the middle of December they reached the northern frontier of the kingdom. When news came that the Allies had been defeated at Austerlitz, and that a strong French army was marching on Naples, it was at first decided to retreat into Calabria; but the Russian general Lacy, who was in chief command, received orders from the Tsar to bring his troops away: and, in spite of the bitter reproaches of the Queen, they reembarked for Coelo in the middle of January, while the British forces sailed for Messina. The King and his court retired to Palermo.

The army which was to reconquer Hanover and invade Holland, under the leadership of the King of Sweden, proved equally inefficient. About 40,000 Russians and Swedes assembled at Stralsund in October, and after some delay (owing to differences between Gustavus and the Prussian Government) marched into Hanover. There they were to be joined by 50,000 British and Hanoverian troops under Lord Cathcart; but some of the British ships were delayed by adverse winds till the end of December. The Allies had done nothing but sit down before Hameln, where there was a small French garrison, when the victory of Austerlitz and the changed attitude of Prussia caused the army to break up. The British force reembarked at Bremen in February, 1806; and the Swedes and Russians retired to Stralsund.

Lord Harrowby had gone to Berlin in the middle of November, 1805, to settle the terms of alliance between Great Britain and Prussia. He was authorised to promise subsidies for 250,000 men; and, if Prussia hesitated to accede to the Anglo-Russian alliance, he might agree to some more limited engagement, such as the deliverance of Holland and north Germany. On Dec. 22 Hardenberg told him that, owing to the turn events had taken, the treaty must lie by for the present, but asked for a loan of 21,000,000. He also stated that, to prevent a Dutch occupation of Hanover by the French, Prussia intended to occupy it. The Russian troops there had been placed at the disposal of the King of Prussia; and he proposed that the British and Swedish troops should receive orders to retire behind the Prussians, but support them if they were attacked. This proposal, to which Pitt was not indisposed to agree, aggravated the bad faith which acceptance of the Treaty of Vienna would involve. The terms of that treaty were not known at Berlin till Haugwitz arrived

there on the 25th; and, even then, they were not disclosed to the British and Russian ministers. A State Council was held on January 3, 1802, to consider the terms. Hardenberg opposed the ratification of the treaty; Bismarck was in favour of it; Haugwitz and the Duke of Brunswick recommended that it should be ratified with certain modifications. This last was the course which the King adopted. He had repented, even before Austria's, of having committed himself to the Coalition, and it said to have given Haugwitz private instructions to prevent a breach with France in any circumstances. The modifications made were as follows. The alliance must be defensive only; Hanover should not be annexed, but ceded provisionally; Hamburg and Bremen should be included in the transfer to Prussia; but Antwerp, the presidency of the House of Hohenzollern, should not be given up. Lafayette, the French Minister, exchanged ratifications of the treaty as modified, but subject to the Emperor's approval; and on January 14 Haugwitz set out for Paris to obtain it.

Harvey had left Berlin a few days before, as the Anglo-Prussian treaty had fallen through. At his farewell audience, the King told him that he was endeavouring to make an arrangement by which he hoped to preserve the tranquillity of north Germany until a definitive peace, and trusted he should be supported in the event of failure. Of the details Harvey learnt nothing. His return was anxiously looked for by Pitt, who was then on his death-bed. He died on January 23, and the Coalition, already discomfited, lost its soul. The events of December hastened Pitt's end; but the "Austrian look" was already in his face before that battle was fought, when he could still say, "England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example." An insupportable sovereign and a violent Opposition had overruled a constitution never robust. It added to the European significance of his death that none of his colleagues could take his place; in the new ministry which was formed Fox was the principal figure.

Murray has described Pitt as a good peace minister, but "unsuited to surprising and terrible emergencies," and has contrasted him with Chatham. But the difference in their performance as war ministers was in the circumstances rather than in the men. The father had the good fortune to have Frederick as ally; the son had Napoleon as antagonist. Pitt's spirit was as lively and steadfast as Chatham's; and, if he was less inspiring, he was a better administrator, far more competent to deal with the financial problems on which the continuance of the struggle depended. Pitt suffers most by comparison in his excessive deference to the King, who was jealous of ministerial independence in military matters. But it should be remembered that, while Chatham reaped the benefit of the breach between George II and the Duke of Cumberland, caused by the Convention of Westminster, Pitt's hands were tied by the state of George III's health, and by the character of the war, a war of established authority against revolution.

## CHAPTER X.

## THE THIRD COALITION. II.

On his way to Paris from Vienna, Napoleon stopped at Mantua for the wedding of his step-son, Eugene Bonaparte, with the Princess Augusta, daughter of King Maximilian I of Bavaria (Jan. 14, 1806). The Hereditary Prince Charles of Baden, who was to have married this princess, became the husband of Josephine's niece, Stephanie. Napoleon had extorted a reluctant consent to these marriages from the south-German Princes, as he wished to bind them more closely to him; and he did not hesitate to remind them that it was not for their own sakes, but as part of the French system, that they had received new lands and titles. A marriage was also arranged between his youngest brother, Jerome, and the only daughter of Frederick, King of Württemberg. But Jerome was already married; the Pope had scruples about granting a divorce; and the marriage was deferred for eighteen months.

Hangwitz arrived at Paris a few days after Napoleon, to obtain his assent to the Berlin version of the Treaty of Vienna. The consent was ill chosen. The change of ministry in England had opened fresh prospects to the Emperor, and he was glad that the Prussian Court—"very false and very stupid," as he described it to Joseph—had not ratified the treaty as it stood. He wrote to Talleyrand (February 4): "If Mr Fox is really at the Foreign Office, we cannot cede Hanover to Prussia, except as part of a general arrangement which will secure us against the fear of a continuation of hostilities." Talleyrand was to take care, therefore, in dealing with Hangwitz, to leave Napoleon free either to make peace with England, or to conclude a new treaty with Prussia on a broader basis. No immediate overtures came from Fox; so the latter course was chosen. The concessions asked for by the Prussian Government were brushed aside. When Hangwitz urged that Aachen was the cradle of the Hohenzollerns, he was told that there is no need of a cradle when one is grown up. A new treaty was signed at Paris on February 15, 1806, in substitution for the Treaty of Vienna. Prussia was to annex and occupy Hanover at once, and to close the Elbe, the Weser, and the Rhine to British commerce. The alliance between Prussia and France was no longer



described as "offensive," but they guaranteed each other's territory; and the Prussian guarantee extended to the changes which might be made at Naples, to the newly-formed States of Germany, and to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The two Powers were to make common cause in any war which would affect these guarantees. In other respects the Vienna stipulations were renewed, except that the restoration of the Bohemian boundary was cancelled.

The new treaty was more onerous and more distasteful to Frederick William than the old one, but it was accepted and ratified at Berlin on February 24. A few months worse from Talleyrand, while Napoleon was at Munich, had made the Prussian Government so anxious of his assent to the changes which it desired, that the greater part of the army had been placed on a peace footing at the end of January. On the French side everything was ready for war, and there was practically no alternative to acceptance. Hanover was already occupied by Prussian troops; and at the end of March it was formally annexed, and its harbours were closed to British vessels. "It is the lowest of all degradations," said Heinrich von Rulow, "to stand at another man's bidding." For denounced the conduct of Prussia as "a compound of everything that is contemptible in servility with everything that is odious in rapacity." The British Minister was recalled from Berlin; the Prussian harbours were blockaded; and some hundreds of Prussian ships were seized. The King of Sweden joined in the work of blockade, and held Lauenburg on behalf of George III. His troops were driven out, but the Prussians refused to press him hard because of the Tsar.

What Alexander would say to the new treaty was the question which most disturbed Frederick William. He had sent the Duke of Brunswick to St Petersburg in January to explain his occupation of Hanover, and to give assurances that he would not help France against Russia in any war on the Eastern Question. He had in some extent fulfilled the Treaty of Paris, which bound him to do so, thus he made a fresh appeal to the Tsar, who had no wish to drive Prussia into the arms of France, and lent a friendly ear to the explanations offered. Alexander proposed an exchange of secret declarations; Prussia should bind herself not to take part in any attack on Russia, and to obtain the evacuation of Germany by the French troops within three months; while Russia undertook to come to the aid of Prussia if France should attack her. The King jumped at this proposal; and a secret declaration was drawn up by Hardenberg and sent to St Petersburg.

A dual ministry was the appropriate instrument of the double-barred policy of Prussia at this time. Hardenberg had been denounced in the *Messenger* as a traitor in English pay; and the French envoy, Lefort, was forbidden to have any dealings with him. In April it was freely admitted that he should ostensibly hand over the charge of foreign affairs to Haegevitze, and retire to his estates. But, while Haegevitze

transacted all business with France, Harchberg continued to act as the King's adviser in the secret dealings with Russia, communicating with him through the Queen. Queen Louise, already beloved for her charm and goodness, now began to display the patriotism and courage which have made her memorable. She used her influence on the side of the growing party which was indignant at Prussian subservience to France, and at the head of which was Prince Louis Ferdinand, "the Prussian Alcibiades," a nephew of the great Frederick.

Meanwhile Napoleon was building up his system. In northern Italy the French troops met with little resistance. They entered Naples on February 15, 1806, and Joseph Bonaparte organized an administration. At the end of March he was declared King of the Two Sicilies, without forfeiture of his rights in France. Gaeta held out, and the peasants of Calabria rose in insurrection on behalf of Ferdinand, but the rest of the country submitted. Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia were annexed to the kingdom of Italy, which was required to make some small cessions for the benefit of Napoleon's sisters, Elise and Pauline. Two months afterwards he made his brother Louis King of Holland (June 5). He had paved the way for this substitution of a republican government more than two centuries old by appointing a Grand Pensionary, Schimmelpenninck, in March, 1805. All power had been concentrated in the hands of this official, who came to be regarded by the Dutch as a French prefect, charged to extract money from them. The change, therefore, was not unwelcome in Holland. Caroline Bonaparte and her husband, Murat, were established in the grand-duchy of Berg, formed out of the duchy of that name ceded by Bavaria in exchange for Ansbach and the eastern part of the duchy of Cosen.

While providing for the members of his family, Napoleon reduced on making use of them as instruments of his policy. "I recognize no relatives but those who serve me," he said; and he discarded the recalcitrant Louise. The other brothers, though more submissive, were not content with the status of satellites, and did not perceive the width of the interval between Napoleon and themselves. On his part harsh language went along with much indulgence. It was his habit to scold and scold. In May, 1807, he wrote to Joseph, "I am not ill pleased with Louis"; yet, a few weeks before, he had been telling Louis that he should regard him as his inveterate enemy if he did not cancel a decree reestablishing nobility in Holland. Louis was a conscientious man, with bad health and low spirits. He identified himself with his subjects, and tried to protect them from his brother's rapacity. The differences began almost at once, which ended in his abdication in 1810.

Napoleon proceeded to reward his principal officers in such a way as to bind up their fortunes with his. He was well aware (as Proudhon says) that nothing isolated lasts long, and sought props for his throne from old and new France alike. He made Berthier Prince of Neuchâtel. He

created (1806) titular dukes in the newly acquired countries—twelve in Venetia, four in Naples, four in Lucca, Parma, and Piacenza—and conferred them on marshals and ministers. The new dukes were not allowed to interfere in administration, but they received one-fiftieth of the revenue of their fiefdoms for their personal use. Bonaparte and Prince Corvis, great enemies in the kingdom of Naples, were bestowed as principalities on Talleyrand and Bernadotte. Counts and barons of the new Empire were also to be created, and, to provide funds for endowing them, Napoleon appropriated domains-land in Italy to the value of 84,000,000 francs, and imposed a fixed charge on the public revenues. Dukes might shake their heads, but he knew that a few years of equality had not eradicated the love of honours and distinctions, and he hoped to rally the old aristocracy to the new Empire.

In the spring of 1806 Napoleon addressed himself to the reorganisation of Germany, which had been long in his mind, but had been only partially accomplished after Lüneville. The territory which Austria had been obliged to cede had been assigned to other German Princes and to the Kingdom of Italy; it had not been added to Prussia. Her profit was to be found in the realisation of the aims of Napoleon and Murat, the destruction of Germany as an unit. Napoleon's plan was to dissolve the Empire, and to form a Confederation of the Rhine, from which the two great Powers, Austria and Prussia, should be excluded. The principal States in this new Confederation were much to him, and would be obliged to lean on him for support. The smaller Princes, who had habitually looked to Austria, were to be swept away with some few exceptions. The treaty constituting the Confederation was drawn up by Talleyrand, and was ratified at Saint-Cloud on July 19.

The affairs of the Confederation were to be managed by a Diet at Frankfurt, consisting of a College of Kings and a College of Princes. The former was composed of the Kings of Bavaria and Württemberg, with the Grand Dukes of Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Berg. Its president was Dalberg, formerly Archbishop of Mainz, now of Bamberg, and Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, who was established with a university of his own at Frankfurt, and received the title of Prince Primate. A well-meaning but weak man, he dreamed of a western Germany, the ally but not the vassal of the Emperor of the West. As Archbishop of Mainz he had been useful in the negotiations of 1805, and was the only ecclesiastical elector who survived them; and he now again proved himself a servicable tool. The prince members of the Confederation, nine in number, formed the College of Princes under the presidency of the Duke of Nassau. Rectifications of frontier were arranged between the several members, and they renounced all claims to one another's territory. The modifications of 1805 were followed up by wholesale modification. The dukes, counts, and knights who were not admitted to membership lost their sovereign rights, and were

absorbed in the States recognized; but they retained their other feudal rights and their patrimonies. Ratibon and the free city of Nuremberg fell to Bavaria, as Augsburg had fallen already. Provision was made for the admission of other German Princes outside the boundaries of the Confederation. Napoleon was declared Protector; and an alliance was made between the Confederation and the French Empire, binding each to help the other in any Continental war. The contingents of the several States were fixed, the total amounting to 65,000 men, about eight per thousand of their population.

On August 1, 1806, the representatives of the several States announced at Ratibon their separation from the German Empire; and the French army declared that Napoleon no longer recognized its existence. Five days afterwards Francis II. resigned the Imperial dignity, and became Francis I., Emperor of Austria. Thus, after an existence of more than a thousand years, the Holy Roman Empire came to an unceremonious end.

Napoleon had thought it well to keep his army in Germany till these changes were accepted, and he had been furnished with a pretext for so doing. The harbour of Cattaro was ceded to him as part of Dalmatia; and he attached particular value to it as an inlet to the Italian peninsula. He meant to get possession of Montenegro, come to an understanding with Ali Pasha of Janina, and so gain influence over the Sultan and counteract the policy of Russia. The Russians and Montenegrins were alarmed at the prospect of French troops at Cattaro; and, before their arrival, the Austrian officer who was in command there was persuaded to hand over the place to a Russian force from Corfu. The French army was on the point of evacuating Austria when this news reached Napoleon. He went orders at once that the troops should halt, and that Brestach should be reoccupied. He informed the Court of Vienna that hostilities would be resumed if it failed to put him in possession of Cattaro; if the Russians refused to give it up, Austrian troops must join with French troops in besieging it. Francis appealed to the Turc, but Cattaro was not given up; and Napoleon had to content himself with seizing Ragusa. The Grand Army remained in Germany, living in cantonments at the expense of the country, and distributed from Frankfurt to the river Inn. Reinforcements had raised it to 170,000 men, and it could be easily assembled for a march either on Vienna or Berlin.

Shortly after Fox's accession to office, a Frenchman came to him with a scheme for the assassination of Napoleon. Fox caused the man to be detained, and sent information of the design to Talleyrand. Napoleon accepted this as the overture which he had been looking for. Talleyrand sent a courteous acknowledgment, and, in a separate letter of the same date (March 23), called attention to the Emperor's recent declaration to the Legislative Body, that he was ready to negotiate with England on the basis of the Treaty of Amiens. Fox replied that the King was equally desirous of a durable peace, but could only treat in concert with

Russia. It was Napoleon's rule to deal with his adversaries one at a time, and he would have nothing to do with joint negotiations. Neither side would give way; and there was a deadlock for some months. The Russian Government was loyally informed of what had taken place, but it had some misgivings. Its ambassador in London, Simon Woronzoff, wrote on March 24, "Fox wishes for peace at any price, and would abandon all his allies to obtain it." Oubril was sent to Paris, nominally to make arrangements about prisoners, but really to discuss the question of Cattaro, and to look after Russian interests generally.

Some British subjects who had been detained in France since the capture of the Peace of Amiens were released about this time; and among them was Lord Yarmouth (afterwards Marquis of Hertford), a personal friend of Fox. Talleyrand persuaded him, in June, to be the bearer of fresh proposals to England. "However should make no difficulty"; and on other points Napoleon, as Yarmouth understood, was ready to negotiate on the basis of *uti possidetis*. England might keep what she had—Malta, the Cape, even Sicily. Holland and Switzerland should be independent, if the Emperor were met on other points. As for Bavaria, Talleyrand said that she was disposed to trust directly with France. Yarmouth brought back a letter from Fox, consenting to a preliminary discussion, while still maintaining that Russia must be a party to any treaty. By that time Talleyrand had changed his ground, and insisted on the surrender of Sicily as a *pre paratu*; and Yarmouth was told not to produce his powers till that demand was withdrawn (June 22).

To become master of the Mediterranean was the chief aim of Napoleon's policy, as he told Joseph; and he pressed him to get possession of Sicily without delay. He was confident that 9000 French troops could force a landing and expel the English from the island (June 6). But the course of things in Italy did not bear out this view. A British force from Sicily, under Sir John Stuart, landed on the coast of Calabria; and on July 4 it defeated a French division under Reynier at Maida, the numbers on each side being about 2000. An *Paul Louis Courcier* (then serving as an artillery officer in southern Italy) wrote:—"With our good troops, and with equal numbers, to be defeated and broken up in a few minutes—such a thing has not been seen since the Revolution." The victory stimulated the Calabrian insurgents, but it was not followed up; and the surrender of Gaeta (July 18) made it necessary for the British to return to Sicily.

Oubril reached Paris on July 6. Napoleon had named him to be delayed on the road in the hope of coming to terms with England before his arrival. This hope was disappointed, and the British and Russian surveys took renewed together; but Talleyrand now found that Oubril was willing to keep secrets from his colleagues, and was more yielding. Oubril was told that the retention of Cattaro would bring war upon Austria; and he knew that Alexander was personally anxious to prevent

such a result, and was desirous of peace. By July 10 he was induced to sign a treaty, with which he at once set out for St Petersburg. Russia was to hand over Cuttaro, and recognise Dalmatia as part of the kingdom of Italy; France would recognise the independence of Ragusa and of the Ionian Islands, and would withdraw her troops from Germany within three months. The two Powers guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire; they were to bring about peace between Prussia and Sweden, and to induce the King of Spain to cede the Balearic Islands to Ferdinand's eldest son. On that condition the Tur would recognise Joseph as King of the Two Sicilies. He would also use his good offices to bring about a maritime peace.

Napoleon had moved his point as to separate negotiations, and he hoped now to be able to force the hand of the British ministry. If the second treaty were signed, he could count on the ratification of both. Yarnmouth was persuaded to produce his powers, and to discuss matters orally with Clarke, the French plenipotentiary. He "carefully forbore giving any written paper, or admitting even the possibility of any other basis than that of *ad pacificam*"; but he ascertained the French demands, and transmitted a draft treaty to London (printed in the *Correspondence de Napoleon I*). Ouellet's treaty, however, had leaked out, and had caused indignation there, both by its terms and by the manner in which it had been brought about. To fall in with Russian wishes, Fox had, it is true, entertained the idea that Sicily might be exchanged for Dalmatia, Istria, and part of Venetia, but not for the Balearic Islands; and such exchange was not to be forced upon Ferdinand. The Government thought Yarnmouth had gone rather too far; they associated Lord Lansdowne with him as joint negotiator in August, and soon afterwards recalled him. Lansdowne at once took his stand on the *ad pacificam*, except as regards Hanover; while Clarke declared it could never have entered the Emperor's mind to take that principle as a basis. Even Fox had come by this time to despair of peace. He wrote to his nephew, Lord Holland, "It is not Sicily, but the shuffling, insincere way in which they act, that shows me they are playing a false game." But Fox was too ill to pay much attention to affairs; he died on September 13. His successor at the Foreign Office was Lord Howick (afterwards Earl Grey). The negotiations dragged on for two months, each side hoping that the course of events would turn to its advantage, and desisting in time accordingly; but there was no approach to agreement.

The draft treaty prepared at the end of July had included provisions for the restoration of Hanover to George III, and for the indemnification of Prussia for her cession of Cleve, Ansbach, and Neuchâtel by other lands (Anhalt, Paltz, etc.) with an equivalent population. The Prussian eagle had turned vulture, Napoleon once said; and he thought little of making her disgorge her prey. Yarnmouth had let Lansdowne know that Hanover had been offered to England; and the news reached Berlin

on August 6, when Napoleon was claiming credit there for refusing to let Prussia in order to make peace with England. The indignation which it caused was heightened by other circumstances. Napoleon had lately jettied the Prussians out of the districts of Ems, Weslen, and Elben, which he claimed as part of the duchy of Cleve. There were rumours of other claims, and of the transfer of the Polish provinces to Russia, and of Pomerania to Sweden. When the treaty creating the Confederation of the Rhine was communicated to the Court of Berlin, the King of Prussia was invited to form a Northern Confederation and to style himself Emperor. He made proposals to Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Mecklenburg, and the Hanse Towns: but the answers were unfavourable, and it was soon found that they were prompted from Paris. As there were no signs of organized opposition to the Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon resolved to discourage that of the North. All these things convinced Frederick William that the Emperor meant to force war on him, or to render him incapable of resistance. He appealed to the *Tier*, and decided (August 9) to mobilize part of his army, not with the intention of declaring war, but to guard Prussian interests. It was important to gain time; and, as Liechtenstein had incurred Napoleon's displeasure, a new ambassador, Knobelsdorff, replaced him at Paris.

Towards the end of August an incident occurred which stirred all Germany. A pamphlet had been circulated, entitled "*Germany in her deep humiliation (Deutschland in seiner tiefen Erniedrigung)*." It was a hostile yet moderate appeal to Saxony and Prussia to save the German Empire on the brink of the abyss. It is said to have been written by an Austrian official, but it bore no name of author or publisher. Paine, a bookseller of Nürnberg, had helped to circulate it; and, by Napoleon's direction, he was tried by a military Court and shot (August 25). At Berlin the popular excitement became uncontrollable. A remonstrance was presented to the King early in September, calling upon him to dismiss Haugwitz and the Cabinet Secretaries, Boyne and Luchard, who were distrusted both at home and abroad. It was signed by Levin Nordmann and other prisoners, by two generals and by Stein. The King refused, but he and his ministers were carried away by the war party, now strengthened by the news that Alexander had refused to ratify Oubol's treaty.

There had been a change of ministry at St. Petersburg. Casternyok had resigned on June 17, and was succeeded by Baron Baulberg, a Livonian, whose sympathies were with Prussia. Oubol was declared to have gone beyond his powers, and was disgraced. The Russian Government demanded that France should give up Dalmatia, guarantee Sicily to Ferdinand, and find some compensation for the King of Sardinia; and the British Government joined in these demands. Napoleon learnt the *Tier's* refusal on September 3. He had hitherto looked upon the war with Prussia as mere effluence, which might be left to outside. It now

became more serious; and on the 24th he sent Borthier instructions to make arrangements for concentrating the army near Hamburg, if necessary, and to reconnoitre the roads to Berlin. He wrote to Frederick William begging him to discontinue his military preparations (September 18). The French envoys at Berlin, Dresden, and Cassel were directed to indicate that neither Saxony nor Hesse must arm, and that the entry of Prussian troops into Saxony would be regarded as a declaration of war. But Prussian troops from Silesia had already entered Saxony; on the 14th they crossed the Elbe near Dresden, and the Saxon troops were enabled to join them. The Elector of Hesse temporised, and eventually declared himself neutral.

Convinced that war was inevitable, the King left Berlin on the 21st for the head-quarters of his army at Neuenburg; and on the 26th he sent an ultimatum to Paris, demanding the immediate withdrawal of the French armies beyond the Rhine, and the Emperor's accession to a Confederation of the North, to include all the States which did not belong to the Confederation of the Rhine. Napoleon had left Paris the day before, and the ultimatum was delivered to him at Hamburg on October 7, when the term allowed for reply to it had almost run out, and when the French troops were in fact passing the frontier of Hesse. It was accompanied by a letter from Frederick William to Napoleon, which the latter described as "a very pamphlet," showing how Prussia had originated to France, and how ill she was requited.

The total number of men on which the Prussian Government relied was a quarter of a million, including Saxons and Hessians; but not half that number was actually available to meet the French. The Duke of Brunswick was named commander-in-chief; but his command was only nominal, as the King was present. Prussian tradition made this necessary, though Frederick William hated war and recognised that he had no gifts for it. Brunswick had distinguished himself in the Seven Years' War under his uncle Ferdinand, and had been described by Frederick the Great as "*ce héros dont l'esprit voit dieu se jeter en aide au braves, pourvu il le regarde*." He had many fine qualities, but he was more than seventy years of age, and wanting in decision. He was anxious about his duty, and held Napoleon in awe. A French officer who had been sent to Dresden reported at the end of September: "The Duke of Brunswick does not wish for war; he is afraid of compromising his reputation; he is timid, slow, and irresolute."

The Prussian officers generally were far from sharing the apprehensions of their commander. They believed that the French were, after all, "the men of Rastbach," and were no match for Prussian troops in open country. They were justly proud of the drill and discipline of their men, and had full confidence in the linear tactics with which Frederick had won his victories. These tactics, combined with a proper use of light infantry, afterwards served Wellington well enough in the Peninsula.



and at Waterloo. But the Prussian army was at a disadvantage in many ways. It had seen no war service for ten years. It was the King's army, not the army of the nation, and had no reserves behind it. It has always been a heavy burden on the country, and of late years the burden had been less patiently borne; civil interests had prevailed, an military reforms had been rejected if they involved much expenditure. The mistakes, says Clausewitz, were highly polished, but they were the worst in Europe. The officers were old; and *esprit* and *jealousie* were rife among them. Some believed in Prince Hohenlohe, others in Büchel, both of whom possessed abundant self-confidence, and were comparatively young, Hohenlohe being sixty and Büchel fifty-two.

Bismarck had proposed that the available forces should be assembled at Nuremberg to form one army under his command. But he was overruled. It was decided that, on the left of the main army, there should be another army under Hohenlohe to cover Dresden, and on the right, a separate corps under Büchel to protect Cassel. The greater part of Hohenlohe's army was afterwards brought over to the west of the Saale to take part in an advance through the Thuringian Forest, by which it was hoped to surprise the French army in its cantonments and to cut it in two. But this offensive movement had to wait for the expiration of the term named in the Prussian ultimatum, and before that date (October 8) it was abandoned. The Prussian armies lay between Elsnang and Jena, with a few thousand men east of the Saale, guarding the point where that river was crossed by the roads to Leipzig and Dresden. The initiative was left to the French.

It was the intention of Napoleon to march straight on Berlin from the river Main, while threatening attack from the lower Rhine by way of Münster. He expected that the Prussians would remain on the defensive behind the Elbe waiting for the Russians, and was surprised to find them advancing to meet him. This gave him an opportunity of repeating the manoeuvre of Ulm. His plan, as he explained it to his brother Louis at the end of September, was to mass all his forces on his extreme right leaving the country between Bamberg and the Rhine bare of troops. If the enemy should try to turn his left and cut his communications, he would throw them back upon the Rhine, which was guarded by a corps under Mortier at Mainz, and by Dutch troops under Louis at Wesel. If he were himself defeated, he should fall back on the Danube; but he had not much fear of defeat. The deployment of his forces would be a imposing and so rapid that the Prussians would probably hurry back to defend their capital.

By the evening of October 7 the Grand Army, numbering 180,000 men, was assembled on three main roads leading northward, with a front of about thirty miles. The 4th corps (Saxons) was at Bielefeld on the right, with the 6th corps (Ney) a day's march behind it. The 1st corps (Bernadotte) and the bulk of the reserve cavalry under Murat was

in the centre, about Krasnack, with the 3rd corps (Diervert) and the Guard behind them. On the left was the 11th corps (Lannes), a few miles south of Coburg, with the 7th (Angereau) in its rear. The south-German States had been called on for contingents, which amounted to 80,000 men; but they were left at first to guard the communication and to watch Austria, about whose course of action Napoleon was uneasy. He had been reassured to some extent by Archduke Ferdinand at Wittenburg; and he told his ambassador at Vienna to throw out hints of his inclination towards an Austrian alliance.

The general advance of the French army began on the 8th; and the Prussian detachments on the upper Saale fell back before it. On the 9th Bernadotte's leading troops overtook Tauentzien's division at Seidenitz and drove it in disorder to Mittel-Pöhlitz, where there was another division of Hohenzollern's army. To support these outlying troops Hohenzollern gave orders that the rest of his army should cross the Saale but it was too late, and he was obliged to bring the two divisions over to the left bank of the Saale, leaving the roads to Dresden and Berlin open. In consequence of Hohenzollern's first orders, Prince Louis, who commanded his advanced guard, marched to Staßfeld, and there encountered the head of Lannes' corps (October 10). He was killed in a sudden engagement, in which six French squadrons proved more than a match for eight Prussian squadrons; and his division was routed.

Having satisfied himself that there was no large body of the enemy in his front or on his right, Napoleon drew the heads of his columns together and turned them towards the east. By the evening of the 10th the leading troops of three corps were on the Saale—Diervert at Neumünster, Lannes at Jena, Angereau at Eisle. "If the enemy is at Erfurt," the Emperor wrote next morning, "my plan is to march my army on Weissenau, and attack on the 15th." He wished to give time for his heavy cavalry to come up, but the enemy must not be allowed to escape; and the battle planned for the 15th was fought on the 16th.

There was much perturbation at the Prussian head-quarters when it became known that the French were at Neumünster, between the King and his capital, and in possession of the Prussian magazines. Scharnhorst, afterwards the reorganiser of the Prussian military system, was Brunswick's chief of the staff. He urged that they should hold to their plan, and, if not attacked themselves, cross the Saale and fall upon the enemy's flank and rear. Brunswick thought it better to retreat northward, to meet the reinforcements which were on their way from Magdeburg under Duke Eugene of Württemberg; and his opinion prevailed. The King with the main army, 50,000 men, marched to Aschersleben on the 15th. Bülow's corps (15,000) was to follow. Hohenzollern, who had about 40,000 men, was to remain in his position near Jena for a day or two to cover the retreat, but was to act strictly on the defensive. Detachments amounting to more than 15,000 men had been sent through the

Thuringian Forest to strike at the French communications, and were too far off to be recalled in time.

The Saale was fordable at several points near Jena; but the high and steep banks made it a difficult river to cross. Open and level ground, however, was best suited to Prussian tactics; and Hohenlohe, instead of attempting to defend the town, drew back his left (Zermer's) division to the highest part of the plateau north of it. On the afternoon of the 18th Langer's corps not only occupied Jena, but established itself on the Landgrafenburg, a corner of the plateau; and Napoleon himself bivouacked there that night with the Guard. Hohenlohe was restrained by his instructions from attacking the French, crowded as they were in a narrow space, with steep slopes behind them. He supposed that Napoleon had gone southward to Naumburg with the greater part of the French army, and did not expect to be seriously attacked himself on the 14th. Napoleon, on the other hand, believed himself to be in presence of the main strength of the Prussians, and was not aware that Bernadotte's army had retreated. He had 55,000 men available on the morning of the 14th, and 35,000 by midday; and he had sent orders that Davout should march from Naumburg, and Bernadotte from Dornburg, to fall upon the left flank of the Prussians in the course of the afternoon.

With such odds against him, the stoutest Hohenlohe could do was to hold his ground for a few hours and then follow the main army. For this it was essential that he should have his troops well in hand; but the Prussian divisions, including Büchel's, were scattered over twelve miles of country, and were beaten in succession. A thick mist hampered movements on both sides for some hours, but served Napoleon's purpose, as it gave time for the troops in the rear to come up. By 10 a.m., when it cleared off, the French had gained possession of *Verschlüßthalgen*, the key of the plateau. Hohenlohe tried to recover it, but his tactics were not those of Frederick, who made use of columns for storming a village. Twenty Prussian battalions in two lines advanced in columns; but, instead of pushing home their attack, they halted and engaged in readiness first against the better-shuffled French skirmishers. Their endurance was at length exhausted, and they were falling back in confusion, when Büchel's corps tardily arrived from Weimar. In half-an-hour it was also put to flight; and by 6 p.m. Mursi was in Weimar.

Napoleon's victory at Jena was supplemented, and, as a tactical achievement, surpassed, by Davout's victory at Auerstedt. Following his instructions, Davout set out for Apolda at 8 a.m.; and, on reaching Haasdenhausen, his leading division met the advanced guard of Bernadotte's army on its way to Poitzburg, where it was to join the Uckerath. Having gained possession of Haasdenhausen, Davout turned his troops to right and left of it as they came up. He had only 26,000 men; in infantry he was outnumbered by three to two, in cavalry by six to one, in guns by five to one. Yet he held his ground for five hours against repeated

attacks, in one of which Blücher was mortally wounded. Soon after midday the French found themselves able to take the offensive; and by half-past two Frederick William decided to retreat on Weimar and rejoin Hohenzollern. This decision turned a repulse into a rout. The retreating troops had to change direction in order to avoid French corps, and they soon learned what had happened at Jena. With the exception of a few battalions, the whole Prussian army disbanded, many of the men leaving away their arms.

The battle of Auerstedt showed how largely the French success was due to the fighting qualities of the officers and men, apart from the leadership of the Emperor. Napoleon was incredulous when he received Davout's report. "Your Marshal was double," he said roughly to the aide-de-camp who brought it; and though he gave much praise afterwards to the Marshal and his corps, he took care that the battle should figure in his bulletin as a mere episode of the battle of Jena. If great credit was due to Davout, blame might soon be attached to the strategy which left him to fight against such odds. This caused Napoleon to be the more severe on Bernadotte, who was at Naumburg on the night of the 18th, and might have accompanied Davout. In the orders for the 14th, which reached Davout at 3 a.m., it was stated: "If Marshal Bernadotte should be with you, you might march together; but the Emperor hopes that he will be in the position which he has indicated to him at Dornburg." Bernadotte, on being shown these orders, decided to march to Dornburg, and cross the Saale there, though he knew there was a difficult defile. He heard heavy firing to south and to north of him, but he held on his way, and reached Apolda at 4 p.m., having played no part in either battle.

The streams of Prussian fugitives from Jena and Auerstedt flowed westward. Some of them made for Eckart, where 10,000 men capitulated on the following night, including Marshal Mollendorf and the Prince of Orange. The main body turned towards the Harz country, to reach Magdeburg by a circuit. The King gave the chief command to Hohenzollern, and hurried on to Elster, where he was joined by the Queen, who had been with the army, but had fortunately left on the eve of the battles. By the 20th the mass of the army was at Magdeburg; but Hohenzollern saw no hope of making a stand behind the Elbe, and decided to retire to Stettin. Soult's corps, which had been marching sixteen miles a day for a fortnight, was a day's march behind him; and Ney was following Soult. Fifty miles to the west was the Duke of Weimar, with the force which had been sent against the French communications.

While the Prussians and the corps pursuing them were desolating as we saw, Napoleon moved by the chord upon Berlin with the rest of his army. Bernadotte was sent towards Halle to intercept any detached troops drifting in that direction: on October 17 he fell upon the corps commanded by Duke Eugene of Württemberg, which was encamped there,

and drove it in disorder across the Elbe. On the 30th Duroc crossed the bridge at Wittenburg; and on the 25th his corps marched through Berlin, as a reward for its behaviour at Auenstedt. Lützen had occupied Potsdam, and frightened the governor of Spandau into surrender.

During these movements of the troops, Napoleon found time to deal with many other things. He had written a letter to the King of Prussia, proposing peace, two days before the battle of Jena, probably with the object of gaining time for his own combinations. To this letter the King replied from his last halting-place after the battle, asking for an armistice to allow of negotiations. The armistice was refused; but the King was invited to make propositions. Leuchthal had an interview with Duroc on the 22nd near Wittenburg, but he found Napoleon's conditions too hard for acceptance. Prussia was to cede all her possessions west of the Elbe, except Magdeburg, to renounce her place of federation with other German States, to receive her pledge of silence against Russia, and to pay an indemnity of 100,000,000 francs.

The Emperor did not wish for a settlement while the tide of his success was in full flow. He went to Wilna the day after the battle of Jena, and was received by the Duchess. It suited him to express admiration for her spirit, and to overlook the part played by her husband, who was related to the Tsar. At the same time he was dictating bulletins which blamed the Queen of Prussia to Arnika, Helen, and Lady Hamilton. "In politics magnanimity is the mark of a simpleton," he once said; but the pettiness of his conduct towards Queen Louisa, which drew constraints from Josephine, only served to expose her to the German people. The Duke of Brunswick, blinded at Auenstedt, was driven from his capital, to die at Altona a few weeks afterwards. He and the Prince of Orange were deprived of their duchies by a decree issued at Wittenburg on October 28, which also directed that possession should be taken of all Prussian territory between the Rhine and the Elbe.

The Elector of Hesse was the next victim. He had declared himself neutral, but he had mobilised 30,000 men, and his chief aim had been at the Prussian head-quarters. Napoleon wanted his land for the kingdom of Westphalia, which he was already planning; and he was resolved to get rid of a prince who had hitherto played off France against Prussia, and had tried "to fish from both banks." Mortier was ordered to march on Cassel from Frankfurt, and Levin from Weid. On October 31, when Mortier was within a day's march, the Elector was called upon to disarm, and to hand over his fortress and war-material. He fled to Denmark, and tried to negotiate; but on November 4 his deposition was announced, much to the satisfaction of his people.

Very different was the treatment accorded to another Elector, Frederick Augustus of Saxony. Not only had he mobilised his troops, but they had fought side by side with the Prussians at Jena. They

had, however, been unwilling allies, and were dissatisfied with their treatment. Saxony stood to Prussia much as Bavaria to Austria, and might equally be made to serve Napoleon's purposes. He had issued a proclamation to the Saxon people on October 10, announcing that he had come to deliver them from Prussian domination. At Weimar he made a similar address to the Saxon officers who had been taken prisoner, and allowed them and their men to go home, on taking an oath never to bear arms against him in future. This led the Saxon divisions to separate itself from the Prussians. It marched into Saxon territory, and asked for an armistice, which was granted on condition that the Elector recalled his troops and remained at Dresden. To this he acceded on the 18th. The King of Prussia, who was treating for peace without any regard to his ally, could not complain if that ally took the same course.

Saxony, however, did not escape all the penalties of her partnership with Prussia. Dresden was occupied by Brunswick troops, which, with other south-German contingents had been formed into a corps under Jomini, and had followed the Grand Army. The Saxon war-material and cavalry horses were appropriated to French use; and the country was temporarily placed under French administration. War contributions amounting to 160,000,000 francs had been imposed on the several States of northern Germany on the day after Jena; and of this total 25,000,000 fell on Saxony. On December 11 a treaty was signed at Poen by which Saxony joined the Confederation of the Rhine, and was bound to furnish a contingent of 30,000 men, though only 2000 were exacted for the campaign then in progress. The Elector received the title of King. Weimar and the other small Saxon States were admitted to the Confederation two days afterwards.

On October 23, when the French entered Berlin, Hohenlohe was at Ruppin, forty miles N.W. of it, and his vanguard, under Blücher, was a day's march behind him. Napoleon sent Masséu northward, followed by the corps of Lannes and Bernadotte, to intercept Hohenlohe. They overhauled him at Zossenstrick; but, by failing to his left, he succeeded in reaching Prenzlau on the 28th before Müse, and might have reached Stettin. Through the faulty of his chief staff officer, Manteuffel, who had been a bad adviser to him throughout, Hohenlohe was led to believe that he was surrounded by overwhelming forces. The troops with him at Prenzlau, numbering 10,000 men, laid down their arms; and other surrenders soon followed. Stettin capitulated on the 30th. It was a respectable fortress with a garrison of 5000 men, but its governor was over eighty years of age; and the prevailing demoralization made him yield to the summons of Lantke, who had ridden forward with a brigade of Hussars to reconnoitre it.

Blücher, on learning of Hohenlohe's surrender, turned round, and marched westward by Stettin. He had about 10,000 men, a number

which was doubled on the 30th by junction with the corps hitherto commanded by the Duke of Weimar. The Duke had given up the command on receiving the King's ascent to his retirement from the Prussian service, which Napoleon had made the condition of his retaining his duchy. Blücher, closely followed by Bernadotte and Sacken, and by Masséna, found himself unable to cross the Elbe, and was driven to take refuge in the free city of Lübeck. He was refused permission to cross the Danish frontier, so that he could retreat no further. The French attacked his positions on November 4, drove his troops back into the town, entered it along with them, and sacked it. Blücher had no alternative but to surrender next day. On the 8th Magdeburg capitulated to Ney. It had 24,000 men within its walls, including numerous generals whose ages averaged 68 years, while Ney had only 10,000 men.

Blücher had hoped that, by leaving nearly 24,000 French troops a week's march to the west, he would enable preparations to be made for defending the line of the Oder; but in this he was disappointed. There were not 20,000 men available behind that river. Kottbus followed the example of Stettin. It surrendered to Dornet at the first threat of bombardment (November 11), though it was well armed and garrisoned and abundantly provisioned. The garrison went home to bring in the French troops, as the bridge had been burnt. The King and Queen had left it a week before, and had gone to Grossenhain on the Vistula. In the middle of November they felt themselves unsafe even there, and retired towards Königsberg.

Napoleon had told Louis (September 18) that the struggle with Prussia would not last long, and that success was certain, though he foresaw that it was perhaps the beginning of a new Coalition. Within a week of the outbreak of war the Prussian armies were in full flight; and by the end of the month they were practically annihilated. The world was astonished at such a catastrophe to a State which had been a military model for half a century; but clear-sighted admirers had predicted it. Mirabeau had said: "The Prussian monarchy is so constituted that it could not base up under any calamity, not even under that which must come sooner or later, an incompetent government." Catherine II had described it as built upon the sand; and Guibert had said that the Prussian military system must fall to pieces under a weak king. A succession of able and masterful rulers had raised the country to a rank to which its real strength did not entitle it; and only such men could maintain it there. In alliance with other Powers it could have done much; it might have turned the scale in 1805. It chose isolation, and found itself driven to fight single-handed against a Power for which it was no match.

Alexander had assured Frederick William that he would do his utmost to help him; and the King had asked (in September) for 60,000 men. Neither of them had supposed that the help would be so quickly

succed, and that the Russians would become principals instead of auxiliaries. Two months had been allowed for them to come into the field. The Tsar had let himself be drawn by the skilful diplomacy of Sebastiani into a quarrel with Turkey; and on October 16 a Russian army of 80,000 men had been ordered to occupy the Danubian principalities. Napoleon was bound to take advantage of such an opportunity. He could not afford to give his enemies a respite of several months, and to forfeit the resources he might draw from Poland, though it was a terrible country for a winter campaign. The roads were not metalled, and turned to sloughs in bad weather; and the whole country became a swamp. There was nothing to arrest his advance to the Vistula; but he was in some doubt about the movements of the Russians, and wished to bring his army together again before he encountered them. Duvivert was told to advance cautiously to Posen, and thence towards Warsaw. He was to trust the Poles with great consideration, and encourage them to rise, but not to commit himself in writing. He was supported on his right by the south-German contingents under Jerome, which had moved on from Saxony into Silesia, and were employed in the reduction of Glogau, Breslau, and other fortresses, which made but a poor defence. Lannes was directed from Stettin upon Thorn; and Augereau followed in support of him. The Emperor himself remained at Berlin.

He had entered it in state on October 27, after spending two days at Potsdam, where he had visited the tomb of Frederick the Great, and deposited it of his sword and other memorials for the benefit of the invalids. The fragments of the column which commemorated Bismarck had already been sent off to Paris. "I always admired Frederick II," he afterwards said, "but I admire him twice as much since I have seen what kind of men they were with which he routed Austrians, French, and Russians." The population of Berlin received Napoleon, if not with enthusiasm (as the *Journal* declared), at any rate with curiosity and apparent friendliness. The night before, at the opera (as is stated in *Baron Parry's Journal*) "no one seemed to be thinking about his country, or pitying the Court, or troubling himself about the future; they were applauding the singing of *Iphigenia*, and still more the ballets, which were charming." Prince Hatzfeldt, the acting governor of Berlin, had forbidden the removal of arms from the arsenal, and the destruction of bridges, lest the city should suffer for it; yet, on account of a letter written before the French arrived, Napoleon threatened to bring him before a court-martial and have him shot as a spy. He eventually spared the Prince at the entreaties of his wife, and took credit for discretion in so doing.

Negotiations for peace were resumed at Berlin. Frederick William sent General Zastrow as Lombard's colleague; but no abatement of the French terms could be obtained. On November 6 the King held a council at Grosslight, and decided to accept the terms. But the stream of disaster which brought Prussia to this decision had already made



Napoleon repeat of them. Magdeburg was now in his hands, and he meant to keep it. The collapse of Prussia, and the want of spirit shown in every quarter, made him hold her cheap, whether as an ally or as an enemy. The alliance which he really desired, now as in 1803, was with Russia; and, if he continued at war with Prussia, he might use her as a lever to bring this about. He refused to grant an armistice, except on condition that his troops should occupy the country between the Oder and the Vistula; that Thorn, Gnesen, and Danzig, Sztettin, on the latter river, together with other places, should be handed over to him; and that the Russian troops should be sent home. Even to these terms the Prussian envoys agreed; and a convention was signed at Charlottenburg on November 16. The King, however, refused to ratify it. A despatch from St. Petersburg had informed him that, if he stood fast in the alliance, the Tsar would recall his troops from Turkey and come to his assistance with 140,000 men; but, if he made peace, Alexander would take his own course without regard to him. This led the King to follow the advice of Stein at a council held at Osterode (Nov. 22), and to reject that of Haugwitz and others, who were in favour of negotiation. Haugwitz retired; and the portfolio of Foreign Affairs was offered to Stein. He declined it, and suggested Manteuffel; but the King would not shut the door on peace by discarding a man so distinguished in Napoleon, and he appointed Zastrow. Lombard had been diagnosed, but the other Cabinet-Councillors, Beyme, still held his post; and Stein was more urged, with the support of Röchel and Hardenberg, that the Cabinet system should be abandoned. The King, though he recommended the system, would not consent to its abolition; and Stein retired for a time from the Prussian service.

Frederick William had made overtures to Great Britain as soon as war with France was imminent. The Prussian parts were opened to British vessels; the British blockade was raised; and ministers were sent on each side to negotiate an alliance. Lord Harcourt reached the Prussian head-quarters at Weimar two days before the battle of Jena, but he was not given an opportunity of discussing the questions at issue. After the battle he made his way to Hamburg, and taking the view that his instructions were practically cancelled by the course of events, he returned to England at the end of the month. The Prussian minister, Jacobi, who arrived in London on October 28, was authorised to promise that Hanover should be restored as a general peace; but this fell short of what the British Government felt bound to demand; and the preparations for sending an expedition to Hanover, to cooperate with the Prussians, were stopped. According to Genie, even Stein thought that France should keep Hanover, though he disapproved the manner in which it had been acquired.

While the question was still unsettled, Mortier marched into Hanover, and, in the middle of November, took possession of Hamburg and the

other Hans Towns. Having given up all hope of making peace with England, Napoleon determined to wage vigorous war. Those who excluded him from the ocean should be excluded from the Continent, and he would dominate the sea by the land. He would hold on to his continental conquests till England restored her colonial conquests: "It is with my land armies," he told Louis, "that I mean to recover the Cape and Surinam." On November 21 he issued his Berlin Decree, which declared the British Islands to be in a state of blockade, and prohibited all commerce or correspondence with them. British goods were to be confiscated wherever they were found, and British subjects imprisoned. "I have every reason to hope," he wrote, "that this measure will deal a deadly blow to England." Spain, Naples, Holland, and all his other allies were required to conform.

The Poles had long looked to French aid for the recovery of their independence; and the approach of the French armies filled them with hopes. These hopes Napoleon took care to encourage. He wrote to Fouché to send him *Kosciusko*; and, when that high-minded patriot refused to head an insurrection without definite pledges from the Emperor, forged proclamations were issued in his name. Napoleon knew that to commit himself to the restoration of the Polish republic would not only hinder that alliance with the Tsar which he was striving at, but would link the interests of Austria to those of Russia and Prussia. He was by no means easy about the intentions of Austria. The Condottiero, *Ferruccio Bergo*, the persistent enemy of the Austrian Emperor, was at Vienna on a mission from the Tsar, to bring about a fresh combination. A large army was gathering in Bohemia under Archduke Charles. Galicia at that time extended northward to the Bug, and came within a few miles of Warsaw. Napoleon was anxious that he would not meddle with it, offering at the same time to give part of Silesia in exchange for it; but the offer was not accepted. Larocq and Darcot warned him not to trust the Poles, who were divided by jealousy and party passions as of old. There was no doubt, however, that admirable fighting material was to be found among them; and the line taken by Napoleon was to declare that he should not prohibit the independence of the country until the Poles convinced him of their resolution and ability to maintain it, by putting at least 80,000 men in the field, organised and headed by the nobility. To meet the wants of a winter campaign, he called for a fresh levy of 80,000 conscripts from France; and he demanded 14,000 men from Spain to form a corps of observation in Hanover.

The Russian forces available against the French consisted of 60,000 men under Bennigsen, and about 40,000 under Buxhöwden. Bennigsen's army arrived on the Vistula in the middle of November, and occupied Warsaw; but Buxhöwden's could not join it for another month. The Prussians could only contribute a corps of about 18,000 men, commanded

by L'Estocq, who was placed under Bennigsen's orders. On November 25 Napoleon left Berlin for Posen; and on the same day French and Russian armies in contact thirty miles west of Warsaw. Bennigsen was not strong enough to stand his ground: he recovered the Vistula and retreated up the river Narva to Ostrolenka. Murat entered Warsaw on November 28, to the delight of its inhabitants. The Vistula was encountered with floating ice; and a fortnight elapsed before the bridges at Warsaw and Thorn could be restored. Napoleon remained at Posen till December 12, doubtful whether he should join his right wing at Warsaw, or his left, which was to cross at Thorn. News that the Russians were in retreat led him to decide in the former; and he arrived at Warsaw on the 18th.

By that time the two Russian armies had united, and had advanced again: they were encamped behind the Wkra and the Narew, with headquarters at Pultusk. Bennigsen was a Hanoverian, and Bludnerden a Livonian, and they were not so good terms: so Marshal Kamsinski, a veteran of the Turkish wars, and a genuine Russian, was appointed to command the whole, though he could neither ride nor see. Having thrown Davout's corps across the Narew, Napoleon drove the Russians out of Gostynin (Dec. 20), thereby taking their positions on the Wkra. A general advance of the French army followed. Ney and Bernadotte, who had passed the Vistula at Thorn, moved onward, threatening the enemy's right; Lannes, Davout, and Angereau moved southward from the lower part of the Narew; while Soult, crossing near Plock, formed a link between the right wing and the left. The whole army numbered about 150,000 infantry and 25,000 cavalry. The Russians drove back slowly as the French approached. Kamsinski, having lost his head, ordered a retreat to the Russian frontier, and hurried on to Lomza.

On December 26 Lannes had a very severe action with Bennigsen's troops at Pultusk, while Davout and Angereau were engaged at Golytsin. At Pultusk the French were largely outnumbered: at Golytsin the advantage of numbers was on their side; but in neither case could they claim much success. The Russians, however, continued their retreat up the Narew to Nowogrod. Napoleon had hoped to cut them off, but the weather and the state of the roads made turning movements impossible. The men went to their knees, and the guns stuck fast; hardly any food was to be found in the deserted villages, and none could be transported. Napoleon had to be content with having driven the enemy halfway to Grodno, and taken a large number of cannon which they had left behind. He returned to Warsaw at the beginning of 1807, and the army was placed in cantonments. Lannes on the Narew, Davout on the Narew, Soult north of Davout, and Angereau on the Vistula formed a semicircle covering Warsaw. Bernadotte's corps was sent into East Prussia, to cover the investment of Danzig and Gdansk, and to threaten Königsberg; and Ney was to be at Mlawa, to support either Bernadotte or Soult in case of need.

Napoleon reckoned on three months' repose for his army, and hoped to make good its numbers and equipment before he took the field again in the spring. By that time he expected to have possession of all the fortresses west of the Vistula, and he ordered intrenchments to be thrown up to these bridge-heads on the Vistula and the Narew. He believed that the Russians stood in more need of rest than his own men; and he and his officers enjoyed themselves at Warmer, Fried and around by the Polish lakes, "the most agreeable in Europe." Napoleon wrote to Joseph, "*Ma santé n'a jamais été si bonne, tellement que je suis devenu plus gai que par le passé!*" But before the end of January he was obliged to assemble his troops. Ney, on his own initiative, had followed L'Estocq's corps to within thirty miles of Königsberg, leaving a wide gap between his own corps and that of Soult. He was sharply reprimanded, and drew back his troops to their assigned position just in time to escape disaster.

Frederick William had urged the Russian commanders to take up a position which would protect East Prussia; and they had consented to do so. Alarmed by Ney's approach, the King left Königsberg for Marien (Jan. 6), and renewed his appeal. Bernadotte, who was chosen to replace Kascinski as commander-in-chief, collected his army at Elba on January 12, and set it in motion towards the lower Vistula. His object was, in the first place, to cover Königsberg and drive back the French troops threatening it, and then to raise the blockade of Danzig, and secure good winter quarters. Breaking the rear of Ney's corps as it fell back northward, the Russian columns were in the midst of Bernadotte's cantonnements before he had time to get his men together. He engaged their leading troops at Mohrungen on the 28th, and repulsed them; but he was obliged to raise the blockade of Gumbinnen, and to retreat to the northern border of East Prussia.

When Napoleon found that the Russian army was west of the Alle, he saw an opportunity of repeating the Jena manœuvre. By a rapid advance northward from Warmer he might place himself across the Russian line of communications. He marched with 75,000 men, and sent orders to Ney and Bernadotte, who had 54,000 men, to draw eastward and join him. The 5th corps remained behind to guard his rear, and to make head against the three divisions which Bernadotte had left to cover the Russian frontier, between the Reg and the Narew. Some instructions to Bernadotte, sent from Warmer on January 24, fell into Bernadotte's hands, and disclosed Napoleon's plan. Bernadotte had been giving his men three days' rest, and had just written to the King of Prussia that he believed the French would have to retire behind the Vistula. He immediately ordered his army to concentrate on Allenstein, but found Soult and Murat in possession there. He made a succession of night marches, hoping to cross the Alle farther north; but the French kept level with him, and also hung upon his rear. At

length, on February 7, he chose a position at Preussisch-Eylau, and offered battle. His army was becoming demoralised by forced marches in retreat, but he could count on his men's stubbornness in fight; and a halt would enable L'Herminier's corps, which Ney was trying to cut off, to rejoin the main body.

The country was open and unobscuring. It abounded in lakes, but they were frozen so hard that cavalry could manoeuvre over them; and everything was covered with snow. The Russian position was on high ground, strong against frontal attack but not well secured on the flanks. It was less than three miles in extent, and was held by 35,000 men. The town of Eylau lies in a hollow about half-a-mile to the front; and the French gained possession of it on the evening of the 7th. The French forces in front of the Russian position on the morning of the 8th did not exceed 40,000 men. Angereau's corps formed the centre, with one of Soult's divisions on his right, and the other two on his left. The Guard and the heavy cavalry were in reserve. Darcot was approaching the left flank of the Russians from Hartenstein with 17,000 men; and Ney's corps was expected to come up on the other flank. Bernadotte was two days' march behind, owing to the miscarriage of the orders sent him on January 31.

Napoleon wished to divert the enemy's attention from Darcot. He began the battle by the seizure of a mill near the Russian right, and then ordered Angereau's corps forward. It advanced in a blinding snowstorm, and the leading brigades deployed; but, shattered by the fire of the Russian guns, and charged by cavalry, it was driven back in disorder with a loss of nearly half its strength. The Russians followed up their success by a counter-attack, which almost reached the churchyard where Napoleon had placed himself, before it was repulsed by the heavy cavalry. Meanwhile Darcot was making progress, aided by Saint-Hilaire's division of Soult's corps. He stormed the Kneigshofen, on which the Russian left rested, and pushed on in rear of the position across the Friedland road. But his progress was arrested by the arrival of part of L'Estocq's corps early in the afternoon. He was forced to give up half the ground he had won; and his exhausted troops would probably have been overwhelmed at nightfall, had not the approach of one of Ney's brigades on the Russian right checked Bernadotte's preparations.

Napoleon had failed for the first time in a pitched battle. The Russians had borne out what the historians of the Seven Years' War said of them, "They cannot be defeated, they must be killed." They had lost more than a third of their number, but the French loss was still greater. Napoleon wrote to Duroc in the course of that night that he might find it necessary to cross the Vistula. Next morning he learnt to his great relief that the Russians had retreated, and that he could claim a victory. Bennigsen fell back on Königsberg, partly because his

troops were in want of food and ammunition, partly from an erroneous belief that Bernadotte's corps had come up; but he was much blamed by his own officers. The Emperor remained for a week near Eylau, to make good his claims to victory and allow of the removal of his wounded. He then drew back his troops into encampments, not, as before, in Poland, but across East Prussia, behind the Passarge and the upper part of the Alle. There became the base of the army; the head-quarters were at Osterode. The corps of Augereau had suffered so severely that it was broken up, and its units were transferred to other corps. Great pains were taken, then and afterwards, to minimise the French losses; and Napoleon professed to have exaggerated them in his bulletin, when he gave them as 1500 killed and 2500 wounded.

His experience at Eylau lowered his tone. A few days after the battle, he sent General Bertrand to Moscow to persuade Frederick William to make a separate peace. He was willing to restore all Prussian territory east of the Elbe, and he would not require Prussia to help him in a war with Russia. As for the Poles, he said, he attached no importance to them now that he knew them better. Zastrow favoured a separate peace, if the Tsar would consent, but Hardenberg, when consulted by the King, maintained that Napoleon was not to be trusted and that Prussia should hold fast to her ally; and his counsel prevailed. The Emperor then proposed an association for joint negotiations; but Alexander saw in this proposal evidence of the critical condition in which Napoleon found himself.

At the beginning of April, the Tsar went to Moscow to settle the King's purpose; and, by his influence, Zastrow was replaced by Hardenberg as Foreign Minister. By the end of the month Hardenberg was charged with the conduct of internal as well as external affairs, in order that there might be the unity of direction which was essential for vigorous prosecution of the war. The Cabinet system came for a time to an end. The two sovereigns went together to the head-quarters of the allied army at Bartenstein; and the Convention which afterwards bore that name was signed (at Schlippenbelle) on April 26. The two Powers bound themselves to do their utmost to drive the French out of Germany, and to create a German Confederation with a good military frontier. Neither Power was to make conquests on its own account; Prussia was to regain her old possessions or receive compensation for them. Offers were to be made to Austria, Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark, in order to secure their assistance. The Italian Question was reserved for future settlement; but the crown of Italy was in any case to be separated from that of France; and something was to be done for the Kings of Sardinia and Naples and the Prince of Orange. Napoleon's overtures were met by the proposal of a congress at Copenhagen.

Alexander recognised by this time that Russia, with all her powers of resistance, had not the offensive strength required for driving the French

back to the Rhine. Prussia was powerless; and the mixture of promises and threats which had been applied to her in 1805 was now applied to Austria. Napoleon, on his side, was audacious in his offers: he would fall in with the wishes of Austria about Turkey, or he would let her her part of Siberia. Proposals of alliance were accepted with hints of an alternative, an alliance between France and Russia; and this was the danger to which they were fully alive in Vienna. Stadion agreed with Archduke Charles in holding that war must be avoided, but he wished to have a voice in the final settlement, lest Austrian interests should be sacrificed. His policy was to hold out hopes to both sides, to find excuses for delay, and to offer mediation. This suited Napoleon, whose great object was to gain time. He assented in principle to the Austrian proposal of a congress at Prague, but claimed that Turkey should be excluded. Russia, France, and Great Britain did not reject it, but desired to know, as a preliminary, on what basis the French Emperor was prepared to negotiate; and the correspondence was prolonged until events made it superfluous.

The strain upon Napoleon's resources in the spring of 1807 was such as only he could have borne. To retire behind the Vistula would be a confession of failure which would strengthen his enemies; but to remain east of it was hardly possible. The country was exhausted; and he was short of transport and supplies. We find him pressing Talleyrand to send livestock and brandy from Warsaw, and adding, "this matter is more important than all the negotiations in the world" (March 18). The French soldier, reduced to meat and potatoes, is described as lean, sad, and dreamy, filthy in his person, and saving his skin. Many thousands of men and horses were wandering in search of food. The cavalry, with half-starved horses, could do little to check the raids of the Cossacks, who cut off convoys and caused a general alarm. The corps which had been left on the Narva held its own with difficulty.

The long line of communication across Germany was at many points open to attack by partisan corps, or by troops landed on the northern coast; and few men could be spared to guard it. Mortier had invested Stralsund at the end of January, but he was called away to besiege Kolberg; and the small force which he left behind was driven across the Pomer by the Swedes at the beginning of April. Alarms spread to Berlin and Berlin; but Mortier marched back to Stralsund and succeeded in bringing the Swedes to an armistice. Napoleon's instructions were to treat them well, and to distinguish between the Swedish people and their king. The Prussian Government had proposed that a British force should be sent to Stralsund, to cooperate with Swedes and Frenchmen. It might have done much both to hamper the French and to encourage the Allies; but the Guarille Ministry was not disposed to furnish either confidence or subsidies. Lord Hutchinson, who had been sent to the Prussian head-quarters at the beginning of the year, wrote and spoke to

a strain of "mingled despair and contempt" about the allied armies and their prospects. He signed a treaty of peace with Prussia (January 28); but it was not ratified for some months. The resources of Great Britain were devoted to expeditions to Egypt and South America, in pursuit of purely British interests, to the great discontent of the Continental Powers.

The change of ministry (March 25) which brought Canning to the Foreign Office led to a change of tone; and the satisfaction of Hardenberg for Zastrow made relations more cordial. Ratifications of the treaty of peace were exchanged on April 30; and, on June 27, Great Britain acceded to the Convention of Berlinstein, undertaking to pay a subsidy of \$1,000,000 to Prussia in the course of the year. She had promised, a few days before, to subsidize 10,000 Swedes, and to send 30,000 British and Hanoverian troops to Stralsund, to be under the orders of Gustavus, but responsible for employment elsewhere. But the change had come too late. Neither men nor transports were available when the Tories came into office; and Lord Cathcart arrived at Rügen with 4,000 Hanoverians, the first instalment of the expedition, on July 26, a week after peace had been signed at Tilsit.

Danzig, even more than Stralsund, threatened Napoleon's security on the Vistula; and he resolved to make himself master of it before concluding any armistice based on the *status quo*. Accessible from the sea and along the coast, and so well covered by inundations that it could only be attacked from the west, it was not an easy place to take. It had a garrison of 14,000 men; and the garrison, which consisted mainly of Germans and Poles under the command of Lesbzyer, was at no time more than 25,000. The place was partially invested on March 11, but the French batteries did not open fire till April 26; and it held out for another month. The defence compared favourably with that of other Prussian fortresses; and the governor, Rakocinski, repulsed launch from it, though personally he showed little skill or vigour.

At the beginning of April Napoleon shifted his head-quarters to Finkenstein, to be nearer to Thorn and Danzig. There he received the ambassadors of the Shah and the Sultan, and formed schemes for attacking Russia from the south. The Turks were to be joined by Mamonov with his Dalmatian corps, and were to march into Podolia, where Masséna, who was now commanding the 3th corps on the Narva, would meet them. But the Porte did not relish plans which would bring French troops into Ottoman territory; and the Turkish ambassador pleaded want of instructions. The treaty with Persia was signed on May 4; and French officers were sent to Teheran to instruct the Persians in the art of war.

At the same time Napoleon was drawing troops from all quarters to strengthen his own army. Provisional regiments of conscripts were hurried across Germany; and a new levy of 30,000 men (or boys) was ordered in France. It was the third levy within twelve months, and was



made a year and a half before the legal date. He was warned that he was cutting his corn before it was ripe; but he replied that young men of eighteen were perfectly fit for home defense, and he made a promise (which was not kept) that they should not be sent out of France. Early in June he had 210,000 men in first line, on the Vistula and the Narva, and 100,000 in second line, including garrisons. The Allies had also been reinforced, but could not muster more than 150,000 men.

The capture of Danzig had given Napoleon a new base, and had furnished timely supplies of corn, wine, and money. Being no longer tethered by a siege, he planned a general advance for June 18. To his surprise and satisfaction, Bennigsen anticipated him. The Russian general had been passive throughout the siege of Danzig, with the exception of an ineffectual "promenade," meant to assist a force sent from Königsberg to relieve that fortress. He now took the offensive when there was least reason for it, and tried to cut off Ney's corps, which was quartered near Guttstadt, in advance of the general line. Ney, however, withdrew his troops and fell back to the Passarge; and Bennigsen, finding that the whole French army was approaching, retreated to Heilsberg, where he had entrenched positions on both sides of the Alle. The positions on the left bank were attacked on June 19, but the Russians held them with their usual tenacity. The French lost heavily, and made no permanent impression. Napoleon did not renew the action next morning. He waited for all his troops to come up, and moved them round the Russian right, bearing the road to Königsberg, and interposing himself between the Russian army and L'Herminier's corps.

On the night of the 11th Bennigsen withdrew from his position, and repeated down the right bank of the Alle. At Friedland, on the morning of the 14th, he found himself in presence of a single French corps, a new corps which had been formed for Lannes, who had given up his old one (the 5th) on account of ill-health. Napoleon had directed Masséna on Königsberg, with the corps of Soult and Davout, and was at Eylau with the rest of the army. Bennigsen had fought Lannes at Poltsuk six months before, and had repulsed him, but had not made the most of his success. He now saw an opportunity of overwhelming him, and brought nearly the whole of his army across the river. But Lannes, deceived by woods, and reinforced from time to time, held his ground. By 5 a.m. the Emperor had brought up the corps of Ney, Mortier, and Victor (also Bernadotte), and had nearly 80,000 men on the field, while the Russians were under 50,000. The Russian left, under Bagration, was separated from the right by a ravine, and the ground behind it was *swamped* between this ravine and the Alle. Leaving Mortier to hold the right in check, Napoleon launched the rest of his troops against Bagration and drove him back through this narrow belt, where the French artillery made havoc of the Russian masses, and across the river. The trees were set on fire and the bridges were burnt. The right wing, retreating too

late, escaped with difficulty by forth lower down. The Russians lost more than 15,000 men, killed and wounded, the French about half as many.

It was a decisive victory, worthy of the anniversary of Marengo. The pursuit was not close, and the Russian army soon found shelter behind the Pręgl: but it was in such a state that Bonaparte wrote to the Tsar begging him to treat for peace, in order to gain time for its reorganisation. Believing himself unable to hold the line of the Pręgl, Bonaparte continued his retreat, ordering L'Estocq's corps to join him. It left Königsberg, which it was preparing to defend, and succeeded in overtaking the main force, after a narrow escape from being cut off. By the 15th the combined army had crossed the Niemen at Tilsit; but it left many thousands of stragglers behind.

Alexander was at Olita, inspecting a fresh corps brought up by Prince Lobanoff, when he received Bonaparte's report. Frederick William had gone to Mémel with Hardenberg; and the Tsar had received the letter, when they parted on the 14th, that he did not mean to yield to the cry for peace which had been growing for some time past at the Russian headquarters. But he was overborne by the emergency, and without waiting to consult his ally he authorised Bonaparte to ask for an armistice. Lobanoff was sent to act as envoy. He presented himself at the French outposts on June 18, a day destined to win other associations eight years afterwards. Napoleon demanded the surrender of Graudenz and of Königsberg, where GutsMuth had been showing an activity and resource which made its defence memorable. The Grand Duke Constantine, who brought Napoleon's terms to Alexander, urged him to accept them on account of the temper of the army, and even reminded him of his father's fate. The Tsar could not dispose of Prussian fortresses, or issue orders for their surrender; but this point was waived, and on the 19th an armistice was agreed upon between the French and Russians. Four or five days were granted to the Prussians to allow of their accession to it.

On the same day Alexander and Frederick William met again at Schwedt. "New Berlin" and found the political system completely changed," was Hardenberg's entry in his diary. Alexander had decided, not only to make peace, but to ally himself with France. This change was caused, as Hardenberg explained, by the conduct of the Austrian and British Governments, which had left him to bear the whole burden of the war. He had been greatly irritated by the refusal of the Austrian Ministry to guarantee a Russian loan of six millions, and by the ground given for it, that if the two countries fell out Russia might not keep faith as to payments. He had repeatedly asked, but to no purpose, that a British expedition should be sent to the north coast of Germany; and he knew that England was altogether opposed to his designs upon Turkey. He had nothing to gain by the war, and he was told that he was sacrificing his country for France. For the Prussians his officers

entertained even greater contempt than they had felt for the Austrians in 1805. Frederick William was bitterly aggrieved at the Tsar's desertion of him, but he could only submit; and his own past conduct gave him small right to complain.

Alexander made rapid progress on his new task. He sent Lobanoff to Tilsit to propose a personal interview, which Napoleon conceded with some affectation of indifference. It took place on June 25, on a raft moored in the Memel. The two Emperors discussed their future relations *à-la-400* for three hours, while the King of Prussia waited in the rain on the river bank to learn his fate. As a concession to Alexander, Napoleon granted an armistice to Prussia without surrender of the fortresses; and it was signed on that day. Nothing else is positively known of what took place. There was another meeting next day at which Frederick William was present. Napoleon treated him with marked neglect, and described him as "*un homme entièrement brisé, sans énergie, et sans courage.*"

The issues having been settled by the two monarchs, the details of the negotiations were left to the diplomats; but Napoleon would not let Hardenberg take any part in them, and Prussia was represented by Goltz and Falkenhayn. At the instance of the latter, Queen Louise was induced to come from Memel to Tilsit. Napoleon wished to meet her, and, after Eylau, had expressed his regret by Bertrando for "the manner in which she had been spoken of." She was led to hope that, by passing over her own wrongs, she might win back Magdeburg for her country; but, though Napoleon admired her, he yielded nothing to her.

The treaty of peace between France and Prussia was signed at Tilsit on July 9. Prussia was deprived of all her territory west of the Elbe, of the Polish provinces which she had acquired in 1793, and even of the southern part of West Prussia, acquired in 1732. Rastatt was assigned to Saxony, of which it was an enclave. Danzig, with a radius of ten miles round it, was made a free city under the joint protection of France and Saxony. By their surrender Prussia lost nearly half her area and population, the latter being reduced to less than five millions. She was required to recognise Napoleon's new creations, and to take common action with France and Russia against England. The treaty was supplemented by a convention (signed at Königsberg, July 15) respecting the withdrawal of the French troops from what remained of Prussia. This was to be completed by October 1, with some exceptions, but only upon payment of what was due to France for outstanding war contributions. The amount was not specified, and was not settled till long afterwards. Napoleon was well aware that the money, or security for it, could not be found; and that this condition would enable him to keep 100,000 men in Prussia at her expense as long as he wished.

The treaty of peace between France and Russia had already been signed (July 7). It made mention of the several nations of Prussian

territory, and put on record that it was only out of regard for the Tsar that Frederick William retained back part of his country. Napoleon had, in fact, thrown out the suggestion that Prussia should be expunged, and that the Vistula should be the dividing line between the two Empires. The treaty also stated Napoleon's intentions as to the disposal of the ceded territory. The provinces west of the Elbe were to be included, with Hesse, in a new kingdom of Westphalia, for his brother Jerome. The Polish provinces were to form the duchy of Warsaw, under the rule of the King of Saxony, except the district of Blaszewitz, which was given to Russia. Alexander accepted these arrangements, as well as those which Napoleon had made previously in Germany and Italy. He gave up Caffaro and the Ionian Islands, and promised to recognise Joseph as King of Sicily, if Ferdinand were indemnified by the Balearic Islands or Crete. He accepted Napoleon's mediation for peace between Russia and Turkey, while Napoleon accepted him as mediator between France and Great Britain.

The treaty of peace was supplemented by a secret treaty of alliance signed on the same day. It provided that France and Russia should help one another with all their forces, or with so much as might be agreed upon, in any war against an European Power, and should not make peace separately. If England should reject the mediation of Russia, or not make peace by November 1, recognising the equality of all flags on the sea, and restoring, in exchange for Hanover, all conquests made by her since 1805, the Emperor of Russia should give her one month's notice of his intention to make common cause with France. In that case, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, and Austria would be summoned to make war upon England; and if Sweden refused, Denmark would be called on to join in hostilities against her. If Turkey should decline French mediation, or if peace were not made within three months, France would make common cause with Russia against the Porte; and the two Powers would come to an understanding for the liberation of all the European provinces from the Ottoman yoke, with the exception of Roumelia and Constantinople. The deposition and death of the Sultan Selim, which occurred on May 23, 1807, did something to cover the character of this abandonment of the Turks.

Ratifications were exchanged on July 9; and the two Emperors parted well pleased with themselves and with each other. Alexander had discovered at their first meeting that "Bonaparte, with all his genius, had his weak side—vanity." He played upon it so successfully that he himself won some of the praise which he bestowed. Each sovereign believed himself to have secured an instrument to serve his own purposes.

## CHAPTER XL

## THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT.

ONE of the most marked characteristics of great men of action is their refusal to rest, even when they seem to have gained a market of glory and to have climbed to almost incredible heights of power. But of all those whom history depicts as agitated on by insatiable activity the most remarkable was Napoleon. To him a great victory was but an opportunity for pushing on a victorious career. It enabled him, by exhausting his enemy's resources, to force terms upon the vanquished at the sword's point; and the resulting treaty inaugurated no period of rest and recuperation, but a political campaign that promised to convert his remaining enemies and to strengthen the fabric of his own authority. Such a peace was the Peace of Tilsit. While diplomats and soldiers hailed it as the beginning of an era of quiet enjoyment, the victor looked on his diplomatic triumph as the beginning of a new time of activity, in which the forces of the Continent were to be used for the humbling of Great Britain, and in due course for the prosecution of new schemes in the East.

So complex and many-sided were the undertakings of the French Emperor in this period of his ascendancy that it has been found advisable to treat them separately, and to postpone to later chapters the consideration of his Continental System, and of his relations to Austria, Spain, and the Church of Rome. The present chapter, then, deals, first, with the events in Denmark, Portugal, the Baltic States, and Poland, which sprang directly from the policy agreed on at Tilsit; secondly, with the international relations which led up to the Congress of Erfurt; thirdly, with the very important work of national reform which went on in the Kingdom of France; and lastly, with the establishment of the Kingdom of Westphalia and the duchy of Warsaw.

The mental preoccupation of the French Emperor during his return from Tilsit to Paris was noticed by Madame Schlegel at Dresden. In her letters she alludes to his utter lack of interest in the art treasures of that city. When conducted by the King of Saxony to the Museum, he

hunted past pictures and statues at a pace which obviously caused no less inconvenience than annoyance to his host. This haste and pre-occupation were natural. Napoleon was at the turning-point of his career. His thoughts were doubtless intent on the complex plans sketched in outline at Tilsit with his new ally, Alexander I, which have been described in the previous chapter. The chief of them was that which bound the Allies to summon the Courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Lisbon to close their ports to British commerce, and declare war against England. A refusal on their part would bring on them the hostility of the two Imperial Courts; and, if Sweden failed to comply, Denmark would be compelled to declare war on her. A postponement of decisive action was clearly contrary to Napoleon's wishes; and it is known that, on his way back to France, he made his plans with a view to the speedy coercion of Denmark as well as of Portugal.

There was every reason why he should at once turn his attention to the former of these Powers. Denmark, holding the keys of the Baltic, had it in her power to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to a British expedition then off the shores of Swedish Pomerania. That expedition was a belated effort to comply with the requests for help urgently pressed by the Tsar during the spring. It had set sail from England at the end of June, and reached Elsinore on July 4-5, 1807; its aim was to help the King of Sweden in the campaign which he sought to run against the French in the north of Germany. The land forces, numbering about 10,000 men, were under the command of Lord Cathcart: they consisted mainly of Hanoverians who had been enrolled in the King's German Legion. Had the force set sail two months earlier, it might have effected a most welcome diversion against Napoleon's flank or rear. As it was, the British entered the Baltic and arrived off Elsinore just when peace was signed at Tilsit.

The action of Gustavus IV Adolphus of Sweden in denouncing the armistice which he had signed with the French general, Bernadotte on June 4 was equally inopportune. Strengthened by the signing of a convention for subsidies at Stralsund (June 30), and relying apparently on the arrival of a larger force than Cathcart actually brought, the Swedish monarch renewed the war after the interval of one month, at the very time when the success of negotiations at Tilsit set free large numbers of French troops for service against the Swedes and their allies. It is unnecessary to follow the fortunes of this expedition. The chances of success for the defenders of Stralsund were greatly lessened by the withdrawal of the British force, owing to events soon to be described. In truth the Anglo-Swedish expedition scarcely claims notice on its own account. Its importance lies in the fact that it precipitated vigorous action both on the part of the British Government and of the French Emperor.

The presence of a British expedition off Elsinore furnished an additional reason why Napoleon should press Denmark to side with him and

endanger the communications of Cuthbert. On July 31 the French Emperor wrote to Talleyrand, who had not yet definitely given up the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, directing him to express through the French Minister at Copenhagen his annoyance at the continuance of correspondence between that Court and the British Government, in spite of the promise already made to the contrary, and to demand that all communications should cease. The despatch ordered the French envoy to state further to the Danish Minister: "That, whatever my desire to treat Denmark well, I cannot prevent his [the Prince Royal's] suffering from the violation of the Baltic Sea which he has permitted; that, if England refuses the mediation of Russia, he must choose either to make war on England or on me; and that the friendship which the Prince Royal has testified for me, as well as the interests of Denmark, were me to hope that he will not hesitate in his choice." This letter is of importance in showing that the Prince Royal of Denmark had given Napoleon some ground for hoping he would take the French side, and the phrase quoted above concerning the "violation of the Baltic Sea," i.e., by Cuthbert's expedition, also bears witness to the Emperor's expectation that Denmark would keep the Baltic shut against a British fleet. He expressed the same desire to the diplomatic circle on August 5. Stopping before the Danish Minister, he remarked, "So you have allowed the Baltic to be violated. We laid down the principle that you were to be its guardians." After a long statement by the envoy, he closed the discussion with the words, "The matter will, I hope, be arranged."

The friendship displayed by Denmark towards France had long been known to the Powers joined together in the Third Coalition. In his official *Mémoire* of April 7, 1807, Hardenberg proposed, among other things, that Russia, Great Britain, and Prussia should take steps to make Denmark move. The same proposal took more stringent form in the Russo-Prussian Convention of Bartelsdorf (April 26, 1807), the ninth article of which specified that Russia and Prussia, together with Austria, Great Britain, and Sweden—in case of the accession of these Powers to the new compact—would endeavour to persuade the Court of Denmark to join the Coalition. Great Britain became a party to this convention; but no steps were taken immediately to force the hand of the Danish Government. Ouelke, the British Minister at Copenhagen, reported various small matters in which Denmark showed undue deference to Napoleon. The position of Denmark was, in truth, extremely difficult. Threatened by the naval superiority of the Coalition on the one side, she saw, on the other, the dash of Holstein menaced by a force of French and Spanish troops under Marshal Bernadotte at Hamburg. The Peace of Tilsit, far from lessening her cares, redoubled them. In fact Copenhagen became for a few weeks the central point in vast considerations of policy, those of the Sea Power and those of the Land Power.

The general situation was not unlike that of the years 1806-7, when

the First Consul and the Tsar Paul drove Prussia and Denmark into their schemes for the humbling of England's naval power. As at the time of the Second Armed Neutrality, so now Napoleon looked on the help of Denmark as essential to the success of his schemes; and on August 16 he ordered a demand to be sent to the Danish Government for the co-operation of its fleet with that of France, and for the exclusion of British goods from Danish ports. On the other hand, George III and his Ministers were equally resolved to paralyse the new hostile coalition at the outset by measures which, though less unfriendly in intention than those of 1801, proved in the event far more disastrous to the Danes.

We must now advert to the interesting but obscure question, how the British Ministry had been able to detect their adversaries' designs. On July 16 Canning received important despatches which warned him that danger was ahead. One of these was from an officer, probably a Russian, dated Mamel, June 26, 1807, describing the losses at the battle of Friedland and the friendly housing of the two Emperors on the occasion of their interview on the raft at Tilsit. The second was from Götting, giving bad news that had come through General Clinton, who had been at Mamel and on his return had called at Stralsund. The despatch also stated that the Danes now feared a military occupation of their mainland territories by the French, a danger which ought to be guarded against. The third despatch was from Macdonald, a British agent who had dined with General Bonaparte at Tilsit on June 22, and heard news as to the Tsar's ratification of the armistice and the general wish for peace. These tidings, coupled with the notorious partiality of the Danish Prince Royal for the French cause, caused Canning to take a step of great importance. On that same day, July 16, he appointed Broke Taylor British Minister at Copenhagen in the room of Götting, and instructed the new envoy to inform the Danish Government that a large British fleet would at once be sent to the Sound, in order to co-operate with the King of Sweden for the security of his dominions, to protect any British reinforcements that might be sent to Stralsund, and to safeguard British commerce in these waters. Broke Taylor was to announce that the naval preparations of Denmark and the "avowed designs of Bonaparte" had concurred in the formation of this decision; and that the presence of a large British fleet was necessary in order to counterbalance that of the French forces on the banks of the Meuse.

As yet, however, Canning seems to have entertained no thought of employing forcible measures against Denmark. That drastic resolution was apparently formed on or shortly before July 22, when he had news "directly from Tilsit," that the two Emperors, at an interview held on June 14 or 23, proposed to form a maritime league against Great Britain, "the occasion of Denmark to which was represented by Bonaparte to be so critical as it was essential." The Emperor of Russia is described as having "either accepted or refused this proposal." The source of



this name is unknown. A British agent, Mackintosh, and Dr Wylie were probably the only Englishmen at Tilsit at the time of the interview; and Mackintosh did not arrive in London until July 23, when he brought despatches from Lord Granville Leveson-Gower at Moscow. Seeing, however, that the rôle attributed to the Tsar in the sentence quoted above contrasts honourably with that assigned to Napoleon, we may with some approach to certainty infer that the news which reached Canning on July 21 must have come from a Russian. The gossip of Paris and London afterwards pointed to Talleyrand as having betrayed his master; but this rumour seems to be discredited by the details contained in the British archives and mentioned above. Still more certain is it that the news of July 21 came "directly from Tilsit," and that the decisive information did not come from Lützen, as some writers have asserted.

In any case, the information was incorrect in several important particulars. In the first place, the news as to the naval preparations going on at Copenhagen was afterwards discovered to be wholly unfounded, the Danish seal of the line being for the most part quite unfit to put to sea. It would appear also that Canning misinterpreted the plans agreed on at Tilsit. The details of the conversation of the two Emperors at their first interview on the raft are still but dimly known; it is, however, improbable that Napoleon succeeded at once in his effort to entice the Tsar into the formation of a league actively hostile to Great Britain. At the close of the interview, when he had strengthened his hold over Alexander by setting forth alluring plans respecting Turkey and Poland, he was unable to induce him to do more than offer his mediation for a peace between France and Great Britain in a sense favourable to the former. If the latter rejected the Franco-Russian terms, then, but then only, should Denmark be coerced into joining the new league. In short, the plan of coalition was conditional.

Canning, on the other hand, believed it to be absolute and immediate. He had no knowledge of the secret treaty of alliance signed at Tilsit, such as he would probably have had if Talleyrand had betrayed Napoleon's secrets. On August 4 the British Foreign Secretary instructed Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, British Minister at the Russian Court, "that, in the event of there not appearing any article on the face of the Treaty which affects the rights and interests of this country, your Excellency should further demand the communication of any secret articles to that effect or a formal disclaimer of their existence." Next day Canning informed Leveson-Gower that news had come of Bernadotte's arrival in Holstein: and he added these significant words: "The project of occupying the ports of Holstein and of employing the Danish fleet as part of a combined armament to cover the invasion of Scotland and Ireland was undoubtedly conceived by Bonaparte some time before any intercourse had taken place between him and the Emperor of Russia.... The success of this expedition [the British] are to be feared in the more

immediate and pressing dangers which existed independently of any Baltic League, though their probability and their magnitude would no doubt be instantly appreciated by such a conspiracy."

Thus the British Ministry based their action on evidence which was merely of a circumstantial character, and which we now know to have been incorrect in important details. Whatever was the truth as to the project of using the Danish fleet against Scotland or Ireland, that project in point of fact was subordinated to the policy agreed on at Tilit, which aimed at winning overbalancing political forces in order to compel Great Britain to accept the terms there formulated. Whether the British Ministry would have accepted these terms, had they been presented in their entirety, is of course only matter for conjecture. But such acceptance was by no means impossible. Talleyrand, in his letter to Napoleon of June 30, 1807, had expressed surprise at finding the tone of the British despatches far more favorable to peace than that of the Prussian notes. The *Forthland Cabinet*, however, in its alarm at the news which thereafter came from Tilit and Helsing, decided on a step which subjected the Danes to harsh and high-handed usage.

On July 23, 1807, Canning instructed Francis Jackson to proceed with the utmost speed to Kiel, and to demand from the Danish Prince Royal, then at that place, an explicit declaration of policy. Jackson was charged to present a treaty of alliance with England, one condition of which was the deposit of the Danish fleet in pledge. As is well known, the offer met with an immediate refusal; the Prince set out for Copenhagen; and hostilities at once began between Great Britain and Denmark. The British operations in Zealand and the capture of the Danish fleet having been described in a previous chapter of this volume, it is unnecessary to relate them here. The political results of those actions, however, claim attention in proportion to their importance. First, Great Britain suffered a loss of moral reputation which partly outweighed the gain brought by the accession of material strength to her navy and the added sense of security. The peoples of the Continent, unaware of the reasons that prompted the action of Great Britain, regarded it as little better than piratical. Only by degrees did this bad impression fade away, and then because it was counterbalanced by Napoleon's conduct in Spain. For the present, the French Emperor had public sentiment on his side, a matter of great importance when so complex and unpopular a régime as that of the Continental System was being imposed on peoples previously hostile. This adverse trend of opinion was destined also to increase the difficulty of England in finding allies among the old Governments of the Continent, which contrasted the tactics of the Grenville Ministry in helping their friends with the strategy shown by their successors in attacking neutrals. Further, Canning failed to accomplish his ulterior aim in sending this expedition, namely, that of forcing an Anglo-Scandinavian league as a counterpoise to that

of France and Russia. This aim he set forth in a memorandum which is contained in the British archives. He therein stated that his action was prompted, not by hostility to Denmark, but rather by the wish to compel her by the display of Great Britain's naval force to choose the British alliance, and secure the freedom of the Baltic Sea and the safety of Sweden. This hope failed in consequence of the actual resentment of the Danish Prince Royal, who spurned all the British proposals for a friendly understanding and ordered the continuation of hostilities after the British forces evacuated Zealand (October 1801).

Sweden also gained nothing by England's conduct towards Denmark. In fact, the position of Gustavus Adolphus at Stralsund was seriously weakened by the withdrawal of Gellhorn's force in order to support the attack on Copenhagen—a result which gave rise to explain the sudden resolve of the Swedish monarch to sue for an armistice and to abandon the mainland of Swedish Pomerania. On August 20 he evacuated Helsingland, and, under the pressure of French operations against Rügen, forced himself constrained to hand over that island to the French commander by a convention dated September 7. In a state of illness which was largely traceable to his misfortunes he retired to Sweden. There again he was soon to be beset, on the east by the preparations of the Tsar for a campaign against Finland, and on the west by the hostility of the Danes. At the close of the month of October, Denmark concluded an alliance with France, which empowered Marshal Bernadotte to cross the Belt and occupy Zealand. There can be little doubt that Napoleon had expected to gain an easy victory over the Swedes in Pomerania, and hoped that this further triumph would place the resources of Denmark at his disposal. A phrase in his letter of September 7 to Champagny, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs—"If England succeeded, the greatest loss would be the Danish vessels that she would destroy"—shows that Napoleon never ceased to look on Denmark as potentially the ally of France, and her navy as forming the right wing in the naval operations eventually to be carried out against the mistress of the seas. Phrases such as these, and the details contained in the British archives, serve largely to justify Castlereagh's policy, which on the surface appears unjustifiable. It rested on an indication the premises of which were incorrect, but which was based on a sound estimate of Napoleon's character and of his probable action. The Emperor's subsequent conduct added a further proof that, when he wrote the letter of September 7, he believed that Great Britain had failed at Copenhagen. When he heard the truth, his rage knew no bounds. The compiler of the *French Memoirs* states that, since the arrival of the news of the murder of the Tsar Paul, he had never seen Napoleon in such transports of anger. This is easily to be accounted for. The accession of the Danish fleet to the naval resources of France, Russia, Holland, Spain, northern Italy, and probably Portugal, might have turned the balance against Great Britain and restored either

her submission to the conqueror's terms or her utter extinction on her own element.

In order to secure this great result, Napoleon had also been maturing his plans for the conversion of Portugal. So far back as July 18, he charged Talleyrand immediately after his return to Paris to warn the Portuguese ambassador that the harbours of Portugal must be closed to British commerce by September 1, and British goods confiscated; in default of such action, hostilities would be begun by France. Spain also was urged to put pressure on her western neighbour, and, in case of resistance on the part of the Court of Lisbon, to join France in effecting the conquest of Portugal. The latter proposal secured, on the surface, to be merely the renewal of a plan for the partition of that kingdom discussed between Napoleon and the Spanish Minister, Godoy, early in the previous year; it now met with a ready assent from the latter, all the more so as it appeared to indicate Napoleon's forgiveness for the threatening declaration issued by the Prince of the Peace shortly before June. The alarm caused at Lisbon by the French demands was proportionate to the satisfaction felt at Madrid. Those demands took threatening form at the diplomatic reception of August 3, when the Emperor addressed an imperious summons to the Portuguese Minister. The Court of Lisbon was now in despair. Any hope that it might have entertained eighteen months earlier of resisting the power of France and Spain, had now vanished. Prussia was overthrown; the Tsar had made common cause with Napoleon; the naval resources of Great Britain seemed hardly sufficient to ward off defeat; and a strong French corps was mastering at Bayona. The Queen of Portugal, being at that time insane, the government was in the hands of her son, the Prince Regent, a man severely fitted to cope with the crisis.

The despatches of Viscount Strangford, British ambassador at Lisbon, show that that Court, laying aside all thought of resistance to Napoleon, sought by all possible means to induce the British Government to meet Napoleon's demands. On finding that the Portland Ministry had no thought of accepting his terms, the Lisbon Cabinet begged the British Government to put up with the appearance of a rupture between the two countries, and promised that in no case would the property of British merchants in Portugal be subjected to confiscation. The replies of the Prince Regent of Portugal to the French mandates were of the same tenour. While giving an all but complete assent, he stated that honour forbade his confiscating the property of British merchants who had settled under his protection. Armes were also secretly sent to Paris with the view of influencing the Emperor's councilors.

All was in vain. Napoleon's mind had returned with irresistible strength to the earlier plan of partitioning Portugal. While the appeals of the Portuguese Government were still coming in, he instructed Dumas to confer with Ingulhado, the agent who managed Godoy's private

occurred at the French Court, and he acceded to the plans of the Polignacs concerning Portugal. In his instructions to Duroc, dated Fontainebleau, September 28, he suggested the advisability of making the King of Spain, consort over Portugal, and of apportioning part of that kingdom to Godoy and to the Queen of Etruria (a daughter of the House of Spain) and her son. The following sentence is noteworthy: "As to the affairs of Etruria, you will make him [Napoleon] understand that it is very difficult for a branch of the House of Spain to continue to be established in the middle of Italy; that this offers great difficulties, now that the whole of Italy belongs to me, in respect of religious affairs, the morals, and the commerce of Leghorn, and by reason of the absolute incapacity for self-government from which that country suffers." The whole letter shows how in Napoleon's fertile brain diverse strands of thought were by degrees worked up into a firm and definite policy. The cession of Portugal formed an essential part of his great fiscal design for the ruin of England; but the bestowal of the Portuguese Prince to comply with his demand for the confirmation of all British products furnished an excuse for reserving to his former design of partitioning Portugal. This expansion of the Emperor's Iberian policy, it will be observed, had an intimate relation to his plans for securing complete domination in Italy in matters commercial, religious, and political. In order to secure free play in that peninsula for the working of the Napoleonic system, Portugal was to be partitioned between the Queen of Etruria, Godoy, and France. In fact, Portugal was now, like the Venetian Republic in the year 1797, to provide means for satisfying the demands of its more powerful neighbours and for extending the operations of Napoleon's statecraft.

The Spanish Court, unaware of the dangers which attended Napoleon's gifts, eagerly entered into his views; and, as a result, a secret convention was signed at Fontainebleau on October 27. It specified that the young King of Etruria, grandson of Charles IV of Spain, should cede that kingdom to Napoleon, receiving in return the province of Entre Miera e Douro, with the title of King of Northern Lusitania. A larger territory, namely, Algarve and Alentejo, was awarded to Godoy. The intermediate districts were not to be definitely disposed of until the general peace; the King of Spain received the title of Protector of the province Entre Miera e Douro. Napoleon guaranteed to him the possession of all his Spanish lands south of the Pyrenees, and awarded to him eventually the title of Emperor of the two Americas. A military convention of the same date arranged for the entry into Spain of 25,000 French troops to be marched against Lisbon, an enterprise in which they would receive the help of 11,000 Spanish troops; while 16,000 other Spaniards were to invade the north and south of Portugal. Another French corps of 40,000 men was to meet at Bayona, to be held in readiness to support the first corps if the British threatened to attack

9), but its entrance into Spain was made conditional on the consent of the two contracting Powers.

The signature of these conventions marks a third stage in the development of Napoleon's Iberian policy, and those who are acquainted with the methods of his statescraft cannot fail to notice in them the emergence of ideas which portended ruin to the House of Spain. The removal of 27,000 Spanish regulars into Portugal, added to that of 14,000 who were already serving under Berrodet in Galicia, robbed Spain of the greater part of her trained forces, and that too at the very time when Napoleon gained the right of sending first 25,000 French troops, and eventually 45,000 more, into the Peninsula. With the fate of Spain, however, we are here concerned only in so far as it originated in, and was developed from, the policy agreed on at Tilsit. Enough has been said to show that the Emperor's Spanish policy did not spring *Misera-ble* from his brain, but that it had three well-marked stages corresponding to the opportunities furnished by the course of events.

Even before the signature of the two conventions at Fontainebleau, Junot, the commander of the corps at Bayona, received imperative orders to start at once, "in order to forestall the English." He therefore crossed the Bidassoa on October 19. Despite the irregularity of his entrance into Spain, he and his men received a warm welcome from the Spaniards, whose goodwill enabled them to march at a rapid rate towards the Portuguese frontier. In the gorge of the border districts beyond Almeida the corps suffered terribly from want of food, the torrential rains of the winter, and the hardships of the mountain trails. The Spanish troops who accompanied them soon lost 1700 men from hunger and sickness, or by drowning in the torrents. Still Junot struggled on, under the stimulus of reiterated commands from Napoleon. The Emperor's correspondence bears witness to his eagerness on this head. It was enough to him that Portugal had declared the British ambassador and declared her adhesion to the Continental System. Junot (so Napoleon wrote on October 17, and again on the 31st) must be at Lisbon by December 1, either as a friend or an enemy to that Court, for "Lisbon is everything." The letter of October 23 to General Clarke, Minister of War, explains the ground of Napoleon's anxiety. After stating that, however accommodating the conduct of the Prince Regent of Portugal might be, Junot must hurry on to the capital and make no promises, the Emperor adds: "I wish my troops to reach Lisbon at the earliest time possible in order to sequester all the English merchandise. I wish them to arrive there, if possible as friends, in order to seize the Portuguese fleet."

Despite the solicitude of Napoleon and the utmost efforts of Junot's corps, the prize escaped. Under the pressure of urgent reinforcements from Sir Sidney Smith, then in command of a British naval force in the Tagus, and from the British ambassador, who had taken refuge on his

flag-ship, the Prince Regent decided, though with the utmost reluctance, to leave Portugal and set sail for Brazil. Taking with him the archives of the State, the treasure, the chief Ministers, courtiers, and all who specially feared the advent of the French, he entrusted himself to the protection of Sir Sidney Smith's squadron (November 29). Eight Portuguese sail of the line, four frigates, four sloops, and twenty merchantmen weighed anchor opposite the historic quay of Belem. Thence Vasco da Gama and Cabral had set sail in happier times on their memorable quests; but now the royal family and its most cherished supporters made for the New World amidst signs of universal grief. The lamentation proved to be prophetic; for this event was the precursor of many others which finally led to the separation of Brazil from the motherland. Portugal, in truth, had forfeited nearly every claim to respect, except that which is accorded to the weakness of old age. She had made no effort to preserve her independence. When, on November 30, Junco's van-guard neared Lisbon, almost in time to see the Portuguese sails at the mouth of the estuary, it was found to consist of barely 1350 foot-men and half-finished men. Yet the capital struck no blow to save its honour. The weakness that had crept over all the old Governments in turn seemed to have paralysed the once hardy and adventurous men of Estremadura. Even so, however, the escape of the Portuguese fleet and the departure of the royal family saved Napoleon the greatest annoyance. He had persuaded himself that the Prince Regent would not take this desperate step, and had urged Junco to do all in his power to induce the Prince and all those who had claims on the throne to repair to Bayona. He also hoped that the Russian squadron commanded by Admiral Senavrin, which was on its way back from the Mediterranean to the Baltic, would put in at Lisbon and prevent the escape of any Portuguese and British ships. Senavrin did arrive there; but his squadron was overawed by that of Sir Sidney Smith, who once more stepped in to save the Emperor's plans. After escorting the Portuguese fleet to sea, Smith returned and blocked the Russian ships in the Tagus.

The deliberations of the British Cabinet at this time are unknown; but we may reasonably conjecture that the capture of the Danish fleet and the prospect of saving the Portuguese men-of-war from Napoleon's grasp helped to strengthen their resolve to leave the risks of open war rather than meet the uncertainties and humiliations of a peace with Napoleon. Nevertheless, towards Russia the British Government maintained a friendly attitude, doubtless with the hope of dissolving the Franco-Russian alliance. It sent a conciliatory reply to the Tsar's offer of mediation, which was reached in turn agreed on at Tilsit. Canning stated that his Government was willing to treat on equitable terms for as desirable an object as a general peace, and required in turn a communication of the secret articles signed at Tilsit as a sign of the goodwill of the Tsar's Government to its present proposal. In order to smooth matters,

Canning had despatched to Larion-Guwer on August 23 full powers for the signing of a commercial treaty with Russia, on terms favourable to that Power. This was of no avail. The Russian Chancellor, Count Buzburg, returned an evasive answer on the subject of the secret articles signed at Tilsit. On September 1, indeed, he admitted in an interview with Larion-Guwer that there were such articles, but he pledged his word that they did not stipulate the closing of Russian ports to British ships and merchandise. He added the following significant words: "the Continental peace cannot be of long duration; any peace with France must be considered as a necessary respite, and by no means as affording any prospect of permanent tranquillity; neither the French Government nor the French people is ripe for peace; they retain too much of their revolutionary enthusiasm. We must employ this moment of repose in preparing the means of resistance against another attack."

This was the general opinion in Russian society. It was even more prevalent in the mercantile classes, where the prospect of the exclusion of British commerce excited general alarm. The policy agreed on at Tilsit was speedily disapproved by the Emperor's Ministers, the nobles, the clergy, and the trading classes; and Savary, who came on a special mission to St. Petersburg, soon reported that the "English" party had the upper hand. The news of the bombardment of Copenhagen excited no general resentment, being regarded as an act of timely vigour. The Tsar, however, on September 11 entered a sharp protest against that action; and the statement that he at the same time privately expressed his approval of it must be described as a ruse, originating in some disconcerted clique. He had just dismissed the borough and rather Anglophile Minister Count Buzburg, and now entrusted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs to Count Rostozoff, the chief partisan of the French alliance and a firm believer in Russia's mission to effect the overthrow of Turkey. The new Chancellor quickened his master's resentment against England; but motives of policy served to postpone an open rupture. In the first place Alexander wished to hear news that his Mediterranean squadron, about to return to the Baltic, had reached the French ports on the Bay of Biscay, where it would be safe from capture by the English. There were other reasons why he should more warily in so complex a situation and in dealing with an ally whom he secretly dreaded. By looking back part of what Napoleon required, he would give weight to the demands of Russia. The "English" party at St. Petersburg, however, made a false move which probably precipitated the rupture with Great Britain. Sir Robert Wilson, an ardent intriguer, had been stirring up the old hatred felt by the Russian nobility for France; but he was imprudent enough to introduce an English pamphlet on the policy of Tilsit which spoke with slight respect of the Tsar. Savary was able to present a copy of this brochure to Alexander, who at once gave orders for the expulsion of Wilson and the removal of



Narshinskoff, Stragoroff, and others of the English party from the capital. Doubtless, as Lord Gower to Leveson-Gower stated in his despatches, the demand of Napoleon for a Russian declaration of war against Great Britain had also a place in Alexander's calculations. On November 8, when the approach of winter promised immunity from British attacks by sea, he broke off all relations with the Court of St. James.

Next in importance to the relations of Alexander with Great Britain were his plans with regard to the Ottoman Empire. As has been already stated, Alexander's desire for conquests in Turkey had been whetted by Napoleon at Tilsit; and it was the keystone of Bonaparte's policy to render the French alliance less unpopular by turning Russian energies away from the campaign in central Europe, barren alike of glory and material reward, to those enterprises against the Turk which had rarely failed to win glory, treasure, and broad dominions for the Muscovite sobliar. Yet, while directing the gaze of his ally toward the Balkans, Napoleon had taken care to stipulate in the public treaty of Tilsit that hostilities between Russia and the Sultan should cease, the troops of the former evacuating the Danubian Provinces, which they then held, though the Sultan was not to occupy those lands until the signature of a peace with Russia. For the conclusion of this peace Napoleon offered his mediation, and thus gained the right to act as arbiter in the complex dispute arising out of the Eastern Question. By the secret articles signed at Tilsit, Alexander had ceded to him the Seven (Ionian) Islands and the Capture district on the mainland; and the occupation of these places, together with Dalmatia and Ragusa, placed the French in possession of points of vantage on the Turkish frontier fully equal to those which Russia held on the banks of the Danube. Furthermore, an article of the secret treaty of alliance specified that, if Turkey did not accept the mediation of France, or if she failed within three months to give effect to her promise after her peace with Russia, then France would make common cause with Russia against the Sultan, "in order to withdraw from the yoke and the vexations of the Turks all the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, except the town of Constantinople and the province of Roumelia." It was well known that this last clause met with opposition from Alexander at Tilsit; for it withdrew from the sphere of Russia's future activity the province and city that formed the goal of her most ardent ambitions.

The Turk showed his ill-humour by postponing the evacuation of the Danubian Provinces. For this conduct he had a plausible excuse. Article 4 of the public treaty of Tilsit enjoined unconditionally the evacuation of Russian fortresses and districts by the French troops; but there was no sign of its approaching fulfilment. In fact, Napoleon's procedure in the case of Prussia betokened a determination to keep that State wholly under his control. Alas in the negotiations and in the Treaty of Tilsit, the case of Prussia was set over against that of Turkey.

Napoleon wished to partition Prussia, just as Alexander wished to annex a large part of Turkey; and the French Emperor waived his views of aggrandisement at the time, in consideration of similar reticence being shown by his ally and rival in the case of Turkey. But it was not in Napoleon's character to let Prussia escape until he had drained away her strength. An opportunity came which promised not only to give free play to these vampire-like methods, but also indefinitely to prolong the French occupation.

Marshal Kalbrenn, when negotiating the terms of the Convention of Königsberg (July 18), for the restitution by France of the Prussian lands that she had conquered on the east of the Elbe, was guilty of a strange inadvertence. He allowed the insertion of an article stipulating the restitution of these districts to the Prussian authorities when the contributions and exactions imposed by order of Napoleon should have been completely discharged; but he failed to secure the insertion of a clause specifying the modicum charge. This omission gave Napoleon the opportunity of subjecting towns and districts to exactions beyond their power, and thereby indefinitely postponing the time of liberation. The Emperor's letters leave no doubt that he was personally responsible for this ingenious ruse. On July 18, 1807, he wrote to General Clarke that he did not intend to evacuate Prussia until the money should be paid; he then estimated the amount due from Brandenburg at 60,000,000 francs. On July 28 he again wrote to Clarke respecting the sum due from Brandenburg and Pomerania, which he reckoned at more than 120,000,000 francs. He added, "make the provinces pay all they can. . . If we can raise this sum to 200,000,000 francs, so much the better." This was from a land whose resources in 1805-6 was about 27,000,000 thalers (101,200,000 francs). With her domestic industries suffering from the French occupation, her foreign resources reduced by the naval war with England consequent on the adoption of the Continental System, the mutilated Prussia of 1807 was utterly unable to meet the exactions now imposed. The sum desired at once sapped her strength and cut off all hope of future deliverance, except by a step that involved political self-sacrifice, namely, inclusion in the Confederation of the Rhine; and there is every reason to believe that Napoleon had determined to drive her to this last step. Ultimately, in March, 1808, the sum claimed from Prussia was fixed at 115,000,000 francs; but the French interest, Dorn, played all possible difficulties in the way of the acceptance of the sum thus demanded for this sum. Even a personal appeal, which Prince William of Prussia made to Napoleon at Paris in the spring of the year 1808, failed to move him from his purpose. He finally replied that the annihilation of Prussia depended solely on the other political combinations which he had in view.

The instructions issued on November 18, 1807, to Carlsacourt, French ambassador designate at the Russian Court, reveal the advantages

which Napoleon hoped to reap from his very lucrative occupations of Prussia. Seeing that the Tsar desired to keep Moldavia and Wallachia, the French Emperor directed Caulaincourt to offer no opposition to that plan, provided that France should gain a part of Prussia fully equal in population and resources to those States. If the Treaty of Tilsit were to be modified, the change must be equally to the advantage of both the contracting Powers. If, however, the Russian Government hinted at a partition of Turkey, with the acquisition of Russia and Albania by France, Caulaincourt was to repel any such suggestion. The fall of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable, but it was to the interest of France and Russia to postpone its fall to a time when they could most profitably share its "vast *diver*," and when a hostile Power could not seize "Egypt and the islands, the richest spoils." In any case the two contracting Powers must march at the same speed. Napoleon declared that he would not evacuate Prussia until Alexander avowed his intention of restoring Wallachia and Moldavia to the Sultan: or he would evacuate Prussia partially when arrangements referring to a new order of things had been agreed on between the two Powers. A secret convention might be signed, "interpreting" the Treaty of Tilsit, whereby the two Powers would retain the parts of Prussia and Turkey agreed on between them. Caulaincourt was also charged to hold out the prospect of a joint Franco-Russian expedition against India through Asia Minor and Persia—a topic on which instructions had been forwarded to the French ambassador lately sent to Tishra. Russia must also be urged to invade the Swedish dominions on the side of Finland, while a Franco-Danish force was preparing to enter them from the west.

Such were the instructions issued to Caulaincourt. Though Alexander, on December 26, received that envoy with the graciousness due to his diplomatic position and to his own admirable qualities, he did not hide his chagrin at seeing the acquisition of the Danish lands restricted by a condition which deeply touched his honour. As Peterkin and Bartenstein he had taken up the rôle of protector to Frederick William and Queen Louisa. Even at Tilsit he had cared for them the province of Silisia. How could he, the chivalrous scholar of the Prussian Queen, give Turkish hands by a step which would entail the sacrifice, once again, of half her dominions? His pride revolted at so humiliating a bargain, every suggestion of which he waved aside. In point of fact, he had been prepared for such a proposal by the dispatches of Count Tolstai, Russian ambassador at Paris, who on October 26 and November 22 wrote to warn the Russian Government that Napoleon was about to compass the entire ruin of Prussia by seizing Silisia in the daily *of Warsaw* and the whole of Brandenburg in Jerome Bonaparte's Kingdom of Westphalia. The latter statement was probably incorrect, though there are grounds for thinking that the Emperor had held out to his brother the prospect of reigning at Berlin.

But, whether correct or not, Talbot's despatches awakened in Alexander some suspicions of Napoleon which he had with difficulty suppressed even at Tilsit. A time of doubt and hesitations pining around on both sides. Napoleon, on finding that Alexander was at once firmer, more astute, and more ambitious than he had at first believed, sought to adjourn every important question to a time that would be more favourable for France. In a postscript which he added on January 18, 1808, to a despatch for Caulaincourt, he informed him that the present state of things suited his (Napoleon's) wishes, and that the question of the partition of Turkey must be deferred.

A new situation, however, was brought about by the action of the British Government. George III. in his speech at the opening of Parliament on January 21, announced the firm resolution of the King and his trust in the support of the people during the present terrible struggle. The tone of the debates in the two Houses was equally determined. Napoleon replied by a Note to the Minister, on February 2, that peace would return some day, but only after events that would have deprived England of her distant possessions, "*principalement au-delà de la mer*." This hint as to an Oriental expedition served at the same time to flatter Great Britain with the first lesson and to hold out once more to the Tsar the vision conjured up at Tilsit. The certainty that the war would be fought out to the bitter end served to quicken the march of events both at Paris and St. Petersburg. It was promised to bring Austria into the Franco-Russian coalition. Already that Power had settled the outstanding claim of France in the convention which Metternich, Austrian ambassador at the French Court, signed with Champagny at Fontainebleau on October 11, 1807. For the Habsburgs that compact was little else than a series of surrenders. The delimitation of the Austrian frontier on the south was wholly in favour of the kingdom of Italy, the line of the river Isère being adjudged as the boundary between the two States; Trieste was saved with difficulty. The Habsburgs gained no compensation; and Metternich suggestively remarked to Stadion that the sole advantage conferred by that compact was that it left no question open with Napoleon. The French, however, now evacuated Bremen on the Russian frontier; and friendliness seemed to be the order of the day in Franco-Austrian relations. Below the surface there lurked the old suspicion and fear of Napoleon, as it seems in Metternich's correspondence. Nevertheless Austria undertook to mediate with a view to peace between France and England; but, largely owing to the opposition of Canning, her offer was freely declined. Accordingly, the Austrian ambassador, Count Starobinski, left London on January 23, 1808; and Asher closed his mission to Vienna on March 1. On February 28, 1808, Austria adopted the Continental System.

Napoleon at once sought to complete the isolation of Great Britain by a scheme which would bring Austria steadily into his political system.

He sketched the outline of the new plan at an interview which he accorded on January 22, 1806, to Metternich. The Austrian ambassador having presented a letter announcing the marriage of his master with the Grand Duchess Maria Ludovica of Saxe—it was his third marriage—Napoleon began to dilate upon the fatal obstinacy of the British Cabinet, which, he said, had brought him reluctantly to the determination to ensure the peace of the world by a step that must bring ruin to England, namely, an Eastern expedition and the partition of the Ottoman Empire. That event would benefit Russia more than France, who needed only "Egypt and some colonies"; but Austria could not stand by and see the partition of Turkey among other Powers. The dictates of sound policy required her to unite very closely with France in order to share the spoils. Metternich received the offer very guardedly, and suggested that Francis I. would almost certainly disapprove of so revolutionary a proposal, for his only desire was to maintain peace and the status quo. Napoleon, however, believed that he could force his hand, as Frederick II. and Catherine II. had forced that of Maria Theresa in the case of Poland. That he entered eagerly into the new scheme may be seen from two letters which he wrote to the Tsar and Caidinow on February 2. To his ambassador he stated that he would gladly see Alexander conquer Sweden and take over Stockholm itself, so as to make St. Petersburg the geographical centre of his empire. He also instructed Caidinow not to press for the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities by Russia, it being understood that the French would not leave Prussia. Above all he was to hold out the plan of an Eastern expedition, in which from 25,000 to 35,000 Russians, from 8,000 to 16,000 Austrians, and from 35,000 to 40,000 French troops would march through Asia to India; "nothing is so easy as this operation." That enterprise, of course, implied a partition of the Turkish Empire; and, in order to arrange details, he (Napoleon) wished to have an interview with Alexander. If the Russian Emperor could come to Paris, it would cause him the greatest pleasure; if this were impossible, and he could come only half-way, Caidinow must take his compasses and find the middle distance. Such is the first emergence in Napoleon's correspondence of the plan which was to lead up to the Erfurt interview.

Napoleon expressed the same wishes, but more vaguely and grandiloquently, in a letter of the same date to Alexander: he laid no stress on the help that Austria might give, but stated that, in the space of a month after they had come to an agreement, the French and Russian troops could be on the Bosphorus; that by May 1 the combined armies would be campaigning in Asia, and the Russians might be in possession of Stockholm. This letter has its theoretical side; but there is ground for thinking that the final refusal of Great Britain to consider Austria's offer of mediation, together with the challenge conveyed by the King's speech to Parliament, now sufficed to overcome Napoleon's

former reluctant to an immediate partition of Turkey, and induced him to press it on his ally with all the selectiveness that he had displayed at Tilsit. He saw in the enterprise an opportunity, similar to that which Frederick the Great and Catherine II had discerned in the partition of Poland, of composing the mutual jealousies of France, Russia, and Austria. It was true that France was not so well placed for the partition of Turkey as were Russia and Austria. But the defects of position might be made good by a vigorous policy, even during a time of war with Great Britain. Moreover it was clear that, if the Russians were deeply involved in the conquest of Poland and Sweden, they could scarcely have the upper hand in the partition of Turkey, especially if Napoleon secured the armed help of Austria in raising their naval preponderance in the Balkan peninsula.

Swift as was the transition of the Emperor's plans, yet his correspondence during the months of February—May, 1806, yields proof that it was decisive. He now bent all his energies to the task of consolidating his power in the territories which dominated the Mediterranean, namely, Corsica, Sicily, and Spain. On February 7-8 he wrote several letters showing the importance that he attached to Corsica and the rock of Sicily. An attack by British cruisers on Corsica would be serious (so he wrote to King Joseph), and the loss of that island would be the most fatal blow to his plans. At the same time he warned his brother that the rock of Sicily, where the Bourbon garrison stoutly opposed every effort of Joseph's troops, was "the most important point in the world." It was the key to Sicily; and the capture of Sicily (so he wrote to Dorey) would change the face of the Mediterranean. At the same time he pressed on the occupation of Spain by the French; and his letters of May 16-18, when he believed that affairs to be at an end, show that he valued Spain's possessions largely because her naval resources were now quite at his disposal "for the common cause." He ordered Dorey to march straight to Cadix in order to secure that arsenal for France. In all the ports of France and of her vassal States, from Amsterdam to Ancona, there reigned the greatest activity; and it is clear from Napoleon's letter of May 17 to Dorey that he wished to prepare for an expedition against India at the close of the year.

Alexander at first responded to the appeals and projects set forth in Napoleon's letter of February 2. On reading it he exclaimed fervently to Caulaincourt, "*Tout le grand monde... tout le langage de Tilsit!*" He declared that he would gladly go to Paris, did not circumstances forbid such a step. At some place, about halfway, such as Weimar or Tilsit, he would gladly meet his ally so as to arrange the details of the new scheme. He, however, expressed a wish to have some preliminary understanding as to the partition of Turkey; and amidst the discussion of details the first rupture speedily vanished. It could not escape the notice of Alexander and Bismarck that the genius of Russia in the north

were vague and prospective; while Napoleon's proposal to keep his hold on Prussia seemed to foreshadow the annexation of that State, and possibly the reconstruction of Poland on a larger scale by the addition of Polish and East Prussian lands. The partition of Turkey, however, was the question on which Castlereagh and Romanoff entered into the most eager discussion. The Russian Minister conceded to Napoleon Albania, Thrace, Epirus, the Morea, the *Agian Archipelago*, Egypt, the chief ports of Asia Minor—"the *schaher de Larant*"—and, perhaps, part of Syria. The French ambassador also agreed that Russia should have Moldavia, Wallachia, part of Bulgaria, and a considerable territory around Trebizond; but, when Romanoff claimed Serbia, Roumelia, and Constantinople, their debates became keen, almost contentious. Castlereagh remarked that Serbia lay beyond Russia's natural sphere of influence, and that it ought to go to Austria, or to some German prince who might marry a Russian grand-daughter. Above all, he declared to be owing ever to Russia both Constantinople and the Danubian, with all the districts north of them. Russia's interests, retorted Romanoff, demanded that she should hold both the keys of the Black Sea, and not one only. In short, he claimed all the lands east of the river Maritsa. He further pointed out that the proposed joint expedition to India would be all to the advantage of Napoleon. This drew from Castlereagh the question whether Russia was not at war with England; and he asserted that the other gains of France in the East could not be securely held unless she possessed the Danubian with an eastern frontier running from Rodosto to Adrianople. To this Romanoff replied that their interests would then be brought frequently into opposition. It would be far preferable, he urged, that Austria should be a buffer-state between the new dominions of France and Russia. The views of the Tsar were now found to have widened, probably under the influence of Romanoff. He cared little for Trebizond; but his mind was firmly set on the acquisition of Constantinople and the Danubian. When Castlereagh appealed to him in favour of his first proposal respecting Constantinople—that of making it an independent free city—Alexander at once replied that the plan of sending a great army to India showed neither, and that Russia must consider her own interests before she put forth such an effort.

In these discussions, it is observable that French policy relegated Austria to a quite secondary position. Part of Russia and Turkish Croatia, together with some control over Serbia and the north of Macedonia, would, Castlereagh assumed, amply satisfy her. Alexander assigned to her the coast-line west of the Maritsa, inclusive of Salonika, but only because he disliked having Napoleon as a neighbour. The same motive also dictated Romanoff's references to the continued occupation of Prussia by Napoleon's troops. Alexander clearly felt uneasy while a large force of French troops remained near his own borders.

The first week of March, 1808, was an anxious time for Napoleon, which left Cautincourt, and through him Napoleon, with the restriction that Alexander would not move his army towards the East until the French troops evacuated Spain, and Constantinople and the Dardanelles were allotted to Russia. Such was the substance of Cautincourt's despatch to Napoleon of March 15. Alexander's letter of that date to Napoleon was of the same tenor. Two projects of partition were drawn up, the one French, the other Russian. The acceptance of the Russian scheme was made the condition of the Tsar's acceptance of Napoleon's invitation to the interview.

If this was the tone of Russian diplomacy when Napoleon's Spanish enterprise started to be prospering, it was certain to harden when, a few weeks later, difficulties began to crowd upon the Emperor in the Iberian peninsula. Then, the first rumblings of popular wrath, which portended the mighty outbreak that was shortly to follow, already made themselves heard: and, while Napoleon betook himself to Bayona to set the crown to his new policy, Alexander could look with satisfaction on the progress of his arms in Finland. The Swedish King having refused to abandon the British alliance in deference to the Russian note of February 10, Alexander's troops promptly invaded Finland, overcame the few Swedish battalions engaged there, and early in March brought the fortress of Sveaborg to capitulate. On March 16 the Tsar issued a proclamation to the Powers, in which he spoke of Finland as a province conquered by his arms. The phrase has a twofold interest, first, because it explains the firm and decided tone which Russian policy then assumed towards Napoleon on the Eastern Question: and, secondly, because it has ever since been appealed to by the advocates of the Panslavonic programme in Finnish affairs, as justifying subsequent measures for the abrogation of the ancient rights of the Grand Duchy.

It may be well to advert briefly to this question, especially as the changes that came over the situation in Finland to some extent influenced Alexander's relations with Napoleon. Just as the French Emperor felt the need of modifying his plans under the stress of events in Spain, so too Russian policy, being under the control of a more sensitive personality, registered the changes that took place in the campaign in Finland. There, as in Spain, the resistance did not become serious until the regular troops were beaten back or dispersed. The defence of the Swedish force was tame in the extreme; but Alexander's reference to Finland as a conquered province cut the pride of that patriotic people to the quick: they prepared for a national resistance, and early in the summer inflicted several checks on the invaders. In that land of forests, lakes, and swamps, the efforts of partisan bands were no less effective than in Spain; and Alexander soon perceived that the real conquest was still to be effected. Prudence, therefore, as well as his own leaning towards liberalism prevented a more generous treatment of the Finns.



He had all along wavered between the advice of his military men, headed by Arakchaeff, Minister for War, and those who favoured an approach towards western democracy. The latter party now gained his ear, and urged him to end a troublesome strife by offering to the Finns a generous measure of autonomy. There was the more reason for taking such a step, seeing that Napoleon had not sent the expedition against Sweden from the west on which the Tsar had counted. In fact, a recently published letter of Napoleon to Czarismour (April 26, 1808) shows that he had rejoined on Bernadotte conditions as to the crossing of the Sound by 40,000 men at one time, which he must have known to be impracticable. Possibly Alexander suspected that his ally was holding back the promised help. In any case, his attitude towards the Finnish question underwent a change. Giving up the rôle of conqueror, he adopted that of conciliator; and, on June 17, 1808, issued a declaration which promised to the Finns the enjoyment of their ancient privileges, and the incorporation of the Diet of the Grand Duchy.

The sequel is well known, and can be only briefly described here. The resistance of the Finns slackened; and in November, 1808, a deputation of their chief men proceeded to St Petersburg to set forth to the Tsar the wishes of their people. In the same month a truce was concluded, whereby Sweden recognised the occupation of the province of Uleaborg by the Russians. The Russian officials who administered the Grand Duchy, Sprengporten and Sprengkili, cordially worked on behalf of the interests of the people; and on February 1, 1809, Alexander issued an order revoking the four Estates of the Grand Duchy at the town of Raase. On the opening day, March 27, he issued an Act of Guarantee in which, after stating that the will of God had placed him in possession of the Grand Duchy, he confirmed and sanctioned its religion and "the fundamental laws of the country, as well as the rights and privileges which each Order in particular, in the said Grand Duchy, and all its inhabitants in general, both great and small, have hitherto enjoyed by virtue of the Constitutions. We promise to maintain all these advantages and laws in full vigour without alteration or change." Thus did Finland gain its first charter of freedom under the eye of the Tsar, who became, in a constitutional sense, Grand Duke of Finland. Thus, also, did Alexander avert the troubles that had threatened at the beginning of the previous summer to weaken his position in the complex international questions then pending.

Very different at that time was the situation of Napoleon. While Alexander saw his proclamation of June 17, 1808, bring forth the fruits of confidence and goodwill, the policy of Napoleon speedily produced an immeasurable harvest of hatred and strife. The change thus brought about in Napoleon's position is instructively mirrored in his correspondence. On April 26 he had told Alexander that the revolutionary symptoms in Spain embarrassed him somewhat, but that he would soon be

ready to arrange "the great affair," that is, the partition of Turkey, with the Thor. On May 21 he wrote to Caulaincourt that Spanish affairs were "entirely settled"; that the Spaniards were quiet and even devoted to him; and that at any time after June 25 he would be free for the proposed interview, but it must be without any preliminary conditions attached to it. As for Spain, his views of that country down to the first days of June were, in the main, those of an adviser counting up the additions which he could make to his naval resources with a view to the great operations proposed for the following autumn and winter. On June 8, however, he heard disquieting news from Santander, Saragossa, and elsewhere, which caused him to announce to Alexander the postponement of his departure from Bayonne for a month; though he added that after that time he would be free for the interview. In a letter to Caulaincourt, dated June 15, he fixed the month of September for the interview. It was not until July 7 that he expressed to Decès his fears that he must postpone the great naval efforts on which he had been counting. This implied the abandonment of all plans for the partition of Turkey and the conquest of Egypt and India. It is significant that the news of the capitulation of Dussau at Baylen, which reached him at Bordeaux during his journey to Paris, turned his thoughts at once to the complex international situation. In a letter to his brother Joseph he writes: "*L'Espagne, la Pologne, l'Italie, etc.—tout à la fin.*" Three days later he sent Caulaincourt a letter, subsequently undated July 21, stating that, as Alexander had obliged him by recognising Joseph as King of Spain, he (Napoleon) had given orders to close matters with Prussia, that is, to evacuate her provinces. In another despatch of the same date he even informed Caulaincourt that he might withdraw his troops from the duchy of Warsaw and Danzig, and station his army on the left bank of the Rhine. A comparison of these intentions of Napoleon (which afterwards were modified by circumstances) with his former designs on Prussia will serve to reveal the enormous influence which the Spanish rising exerted on the affairs of Europe. It is not too much to say that it saved Prussia from virtual extinction and the Turkish Empire from partition.

There was another reason why Napoleon should now seek to conciliate Alexander by every means in his power. The fate of the Spanish Bonapartes had struck terror into the Habsburgs. This might have been expected. The mental equipment of Francis I. was inadequate. His narrow, pedantic outlook on international affairs left him a prey to fearful adventures, like Thugut, or subtle treacheries such as Coblenz. Between their diverse lines of policy he had wandered for many years. But in one respect his character displayed some firmness: he inherited the family pride of the Habsburgs and their veneration for ancient dynasties. These fundamental feelings were cut to the quick by Napoleon's treatment of the Houses of Braganza and Bourbon. On all sides Francis saw with bewilderment the old landmarks vanishing—

Etruria absorbed in the French Empire (January, 1806), and the Papal Legation annexed to the Kingdom of Italy (April, 1808). Nor were his fears laid to rest by the invitations that came from Paris to share in the approaching partition of the Turkish Empire. While Napoleon's legions held Elba, the duchy of Warsaw, and Dalmatia, Austria could expect but scant consideration either at his hands or at those of the Tsar, whom she had neglected to help in the spring of 1805. Having broken with England, the Habsburgs saw themselves utterly isolated. One source of hope alone remained—to trust the loyalty and devotion of their still numerous subjects, thoroughly to reform the administration, and to arm against all contingencies.

This was the advice of Stadion, the bold and enlightened minister who then held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The result was the decree of June 3, 1805, ordering the incorporation in a national *Landwehr* of all able-bodied men from eighteen to twenty-five years of age who were not serving in the regular army. The decree aroused an amount of enthusiasm almost unparalleled in the history of the Habsburg States. In truth the people were weary of surrender to Napoleon, and chafed under the burdens imposed by the Continental System. They therefore gladly answered the summons; and their zeal for military service was heightened by the news of the French disaster at Austerlitz.

Napoleon was at first perplexed by Austria's action. With his usual propensity to exaggerate the importance of material gain, he failed to see why the plea of a joint partition of Turkey should not bring the Habsburg Power wholly to his side. Thenceforward he decided quite correctly that its armaments were due solely to fear. Yet he did nothing to stir Austria's alarm. On August 15, at the first reception of the diplomatic circle held after his return from Bayona, he reproached Metternich with Austria's armaments, asserting that they must be set on foot either to attack or to intimidate France; that he (Napoleon) would reject by signing the Confederation of the Rhine and beginning a war which would be war to the death. The present conduct of Austria would induce the Emperor of Russia to declare that those armaments must cease; and, he added, if Russia became the arbiter in this matter, "I will no longer submit you to the future settlement of many questions in which you are interested." This reference to the Eastern Question, uttered in presence of the Turkish ambassador, alarmed everyone and reacted unfavourably on the Bourse. The bad impression thus caused was not removed even by a friendly explanation which he privately accorded to Metternich ten days later. The threat of August 15 was remembered as a notorious instance of Napoleon's incredible bias in favour of physical compulsion. This mental characteristic of his was well described by Talley, Russian ambassador at Paris, in his despatch of August 7 to his master: "It is only conduct that is simple and open but firm and resolute, and that rests on

adequate military force, which has any effect on his sovereign. Every concession beguile in him the desire for further concessions." The Court of Vienna had discerned the same truth. Indeed, under the pressure of Napoleon's supremacy, the statesmen of St Petersburg now saw the need of safeguarding the interests of the only State that stood between them and the conqueror of the West. The policy of balance maintained by Alexander with as much skill at Erfurt was but the expression of a truth the importance of which had already been recognised by every intelligent diplomatist on the Continent. The utmost length to which the Tsar would go in the way of aiding Austria was a suggestion which he made in a despatch of September 3 to Krasitz, his ambassador at that Court, as to the advisability of her remaining a passive spectator of the war in Spain; otherwise Napoleon might decide to fall upon the Habsburgs before entering on the Prussian War. "There will always be time," he added, "to adopt afterwards the course that circumstances will then suggest. By following this line of conduct, Austria would save me the painful necessity of taking sides against her, for I am bound to that course only when she shall attack." It would be difficult to judge from this language whether Alexander was an ally of Napoleon or of Francis I.

In vain, also, did Castlereagh press on the Tsar the need of speaking freely to Austria about her armaments, if he wished to see Napoleon evacuate Prussia. That wish lay near to Alexander's heart; but he came to believe that the evacuation would take place owing to the urgent needs of the Spanish campaign. While, therefore, he warmly approved Napoleon's offer to free large parts of Prussia from the crushing burden of the military occupation, he now did little to press for its fulfilment. He preferred to wait upon the logic of events. This passivity seemed about to be justified. As has been stated, the news of the French surrender at Baylen induced Napoleon to offer to arrange matters with Frederick William. Accordingly, negotiations began with a view to the evacuation of part at least of Prussian territory. They failed owing to an untimely incident, the capture of a letter written by Stein on August 18, in which that statesman imprudently referred to a war between France and Austria as inevitable, and cited the events in Spain as proof of what a courageous nation could do. The influence of this letter on the fortunes of Stein and of the German national movement will be referred to later in this chapter. Here we must notice that its effect on the negotiations between Napoleon and Prussia was equally disastrous. It enabled the conqueror to tighten his grip on Prussia and to raise his pecuniary demands. In the month of March, 1808, as has been stated above, he fixed 112,000,000 francs as the price of evacuation; now, after his army had lived on the country six more months, he raised the sum to 154,000,000 francs. After vigorous protests from Prince William of Prussia this was reduced to

140,000,000 francs by a convention signed at Paris on September 8, which stipulated that Glogau, Eibitz, and Stettin should be handed over to the Prussian troops on the discharge of that sum. The convention, besides limiting the Prussian army to 40,000 men, imposed other humiliating conditions, the result being that the King and Prince William to the conference at Erfurt in the hope of securing some alleviation of the trials of Prussia. The hope was a vain one. Napoleon's invitation at the close of his interview with the Tsar led to further negotiations. The three fortresses were not evacuated, and more exactions and insults were heaped upon Prussia.

In the month of September, 1808, the arrangements for the interview at Erfurt neared completion. So far back as the third week of May, Alexander had answered to Cautincoart that he accepted Napoleon's invitation without insisting on any preliminary understanding on the Eastern Question. Events proved that this concession on his part was premature, but at that time the campaign in Finland was beginning to take a sinister turn; and the shadow of the Spanish troubles had not as yet dimmed the lustre of Napoleon's glory. To the Erfurt interview, then, both monarchs came untrammelled by conditions, a fact which favoured Napoleon's diplomacy; but, while the French Emperor had gained in regard to diplomatic procedure, he had lost in the sphere of practical politics. The Spanish difficulty dogged his efforts at every turn, and still more so when, after the middle of September, the news of the Convention of Cintra flowed through to the chancelleries of central Europe. After this second blow he could no longer dictate his terms as to Constantinople, the Danubian, Prussia, and Austria; he came almost as a suppliant for the good services of the Tsar. Not that he adopted the rôle of a suppliant. Such a part comported ill with his temperament, and still more with his diplomatic methods; but the word expresses his position amidst the complex play of world-shakes. He no longer controlled them; he seemed on the point of being whirled into their vortex. Affairs in Spain called for his undivided attention; yet Austria's sentiments held fast so small part of his available forces in central Europe; and no one but the Tsar could end this conspirating situation. The rôle of arbiter which Napoleon had so triumphantly played at Tilsit passed to Alexander at Erfurt; and both men knew it.

Everything turned, then, on the ability of Napoleon to fascinate his rival by the display of that personal and political wizardry which had been so effective on the banks of the Niemen. External circumstances promised to favour him. The old Thuringian city itself appealed to the historic imagination of the Tsar. The sight of the crowds of royal Princes and nobles of Germany side by side with the diplomats of Europe compelled admiration for the genius and power of the modern Charlemagne. Erfurt had passed into his hands after the battle of

Jena, the choicest of the French regiments now formed the garrison under the command of Gudinot. Architects had been called in to beautify the chief buildings of the city in accordance with the pseudo-classical fashions of the time; and the haughtiest if not the ablest artists of the *Thiâtre Français* came in the conqueror's train in order to represent appropriate dramas before the two Emperors and a *parterre of Kings*. The arrival of the chief potentates on September 22 was the signal for a series of receptions and spectacles of unequalled brilliance. The charms of intellectual converse were not wanting. In a brief visit to Weimar, in the middle of the conference, the two Emperors saw Goethe and Wieland. Napoleon discussed literary topics with the former, and urged him to fix his abode at Paris, where he would find an adequate sphere for his powers. With Wieland the Emperor engaged in brilliant colloquy, depreciating the genius of Dantón and displaying his judgments on the Roman Emperors.

All this was but the scene setting designed to dazzle Alexander, and to begot in him that sanguine mood so needful for the success of Napoleon's designs. The task proved to be unexpectedly difficult. The splendour of the reception could not blind Alexander to the fact that the divergence of French and Russian policy was all but irreconcilable. The Tsar came to Erfurt with the hope that the embellishments of France would enable him to press on a solution of the Eastern Question entirely favourable to Russia. Napoleon, on the other hand, had resorted to his previous resolve to postpone that question until Spain and Sicily became naval bases that would secure to him the complete command of the Mediterranean. Their views were no less sharply opposed with regard to the armaments of Austria and the continued occupation of the fortresses of the Oder by Napoleon's troops. Diplomatic skirmishing on these questions probed serious and prolonged struggles, all of which served to convince Napoleon that the Tsar was no longer in that frame of mind which had rendered him so open to fascination at Tilsit. In vain did he now seek to bend him in compliance with his aims. Alexander replied but briefly to the disquisitions of his host, and maintained his position with a quiet obstinacy against which arguments, volentative offers, flights of imaginative statecraft, and threats were equally futile.

Their discussions respecting the Eastern Question are not fully known. It is clear, however, that Alexander agreed, or seemed to agree, to a postponement of the scheme in its larger form. Napoleon had placed his finger on the central point of the whole problem in the concluding words of his letter of May 31 to Cautchacov: "The fundamental part of the great question is always this—Who shall have Constantinople?" That question remained unresolved by the interviews at Erfurt. The arguments of Romancoff, who was most eager to show his countrymen some tangible gain from the French alliance, barely failed to secure

Napoleon's reluctant consent to the acquisition of Moldavia and Wallachia by Russia; and even this was to be deferred. But, in the present uncertain situation at Constantinople, the Sultan should decide to throw himself into the arms of England. If the Sultan made war on Russia, France was not to take part in it. France and Russia also agreed to maintain the remaining possessions of the Sultan. If Austria attacked France, Russia was to make common cause with the latter. Poland was definitely assigned to Russia. Clauses to this effect were included in the convention signed at Erfurt on October 18, whereby the Emperor renewed the alliance concluded at Tilsit.

Disappointed in his hopes of acquiring Constantinople and the Dardanelles, Alexander felt the less inclination to support Napoleon in any proposal to coerce or humiliate Austria. Thanks to the Spanish rising, and to Metternich's astute diplomacy at Paris, which had the tacit support of Talleyrand, Talleyrand, and Fouché, the Erfurt interview had no terrors for the Habsburgs. Talleyrand strongly advised that the Emperor Francis should present himself at Erfurt to defend in person the interests of his realm. Fearing, perhaps, to compromise his dignity at the congress, that monarch despatched a special envoy, Baron Vincent, in bearer of a conciliatory letter to Napoleon. The French Emperor received it coldly (September 28). His distrust of Austria redoubled after reading a despatch of Andriassy, French ambassador at Vienna, describing the conduct of that Court in the most hostile terms. "I understand now," exclaimed Napoleon, "why the Emperor did not come; it is difficult for a sovereign to lie to my face; he has deceived that task on M. de Vincent." A joint Franco-Russian note to Austria seemed now to be imperatively needed. But on that day Talleyrand (whose presence at Erfurt must be pronounced a strange blunder on Napoleon's part) had seen the Tsar and pointed out the need of supporting the European system, of which Austria was the pivot. The advice entirely coincided with that of Tolstol and, indeed, with Alexander's latest convictions. In vain, then, did Napoleon point out to the Tsar in successive interviews that the dismemberment of Austria could alone guarantee central Europe against war and crush the hopes of conceiving a future coalition that still were cherished at London. Alexander saw the need of supporting the buffer-states, and freely declined to participate in any measure for its dismemberment. Repulsed on this side, Napoleon refused to listen to Alexander's pleadings on behalf of Prussia. How could France evacuate the valley of the Oder, he exclaimed, if Austria were to be free to continue her preparations? If Alexander insisted on the evacuation, he (Napoleon) would at once fight out his quarrel with Austria before sending more of his troops into Spain. This threat sufficed to bring about compromise. Napoleon promised to evacuate the fortress of the Oder, while Alexander definitely undertook to help France if Austria should throw down the gauntlet.

The final proceeding at Erfurt was the dispatch by the two Emperors of a letter, dated October 18, to George III, in which they begged him to accord peace to the world and "to guarantee all the Powers then existing"; they also warned him that in the century now still greater changes would take place, all of them opposed to the interests of Great Britain. An accompanying dispatch reinforced the offer to treat on the basis of *uti possidetis*, and of reciprocity and equality. These vague expressions must be interpreted in the light of the then secret Franco-Russian convention of October 18, which, as noted before, stipulated that Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia should count as already belonging to Russia. Though unaware of the exact meaning of the phrase cited above, Canning replied on October 28 that Great Britain had always striven for a general peace on equitable terms, but that no such terms had yet been offered; that his Britannic Majesty was now united by treaty with the Crown of Portugal and with his Sicilian Majesty; that with the Spanish nation he had engagements which were no less sacred than those resulting from the most solemn treaties; and that these engagements must be respected in any ensuing negotiations. On November 28 Rostomoff replied that Russia would recognize the crown of the Kings, but would not admit those of the Spanish insurgents. On the same day Champagny refused to admit the Spanish insurgents to the negotiations, or the status of "the King who reigns in Brazil, the King who reigns in Sicily, or the King who reigns in Sweden." This brought a reply from Canning to Champagny, dated December 2, stating that the refusal to admit the Government acting on behalf of Ferdinand VII of Spain must be regarded as ending the negotiations for peace.

The chief practical results, then, of the Erfurt interview were the continuance of the Franco-Russian alliance, though on somewhat strained terms; Napoleon's reluctant concession of the Danubian Principalities to Russia; the prolongation of the time of immunity for Austria; and the assurance of Russia's triumph over Sweden.

It will be well briefly to review here the course of Swedish affairs from the beginning of the war of the Third Coalition down to the deposition of Gustavus IV and the choice of Marshal Bernadotte as Prince Royal. No monarch had striven so resolutely and persistently against the French Republic and Empire as Gustavus IV. Hereditary instincts and the events of his early life conspired to make him a champion of legitimacy. During the period following the Peace of Amiens he spent many months in Germany, seeking, in concert with other sovereigns and with Duke of Brunswick, to form a new league against France. After the creation of the Duc d'Angoulême, the young monarch felt for the author of that crime a hatred as intense as that which his father had turned against the Revolution. His advisers saw with alarm the growth of the same characteristics that had brought Gustavus III to his doom—a quibotic generosity unbalanced by passion



or kindly regard for the vital interests of his own people, seldom hesitated in arriving at decisions and extreme obstinacy in adhering to them, prone even to contradict or thwart his advisers, and determined in healing the wounds that his vanity or hoodlumness inflicted. At a critical time to the formation of the Third Coalition he imposed the negotiations by demanding an equivalent territory from Great Britain in return for a small contingent, and by sending back to Berlin the decoration of the Order of the Black Eagle, because Frederick William had conferred it on Napoleon. With such a sovereign accord was difficult and distant inevitable.

The ignominious end of his Pomeranian expedition in 1800 caused great discontent among his people. Nevertheless, the attack made by Russia on Finland in the following spring kindled anew their martial ardour. They gladly responded to the appeals of their monarch and furnished considerable forces. Had Gustavus put himself at their head and won credit, if not victory, in the field, the loss of the Grand Duchy would have been less keenly felt; but he remained at Stockholm and drew up an ineffective plan of campaign, which left the Swedes in small bodies to be crushed in detail. Little use was made of the patriotic ardour of the Finns; and, by the close of the year, the Swedes had virtually lost their hold on the country. In making preparation to withstand the Danish and Franco-Spanish forces that then threatened his western and southern borders, Gustavus revealed his incompetence as a commander and his captiousness as a man. On the arrival of General Moore at Göteborg with a British force of 14,000 men, the King insisted on the adoption of offensive measures which were quite incompatible with the orders of the British Government. When Moore represented this in the course of interviews at Stockholm, the King heatedly repudiated his views, and for a time placed him under arrest (May—June). Moore, however, managed to escape and sailed away with his whole force. Nevertheless the royal decree that Sweden had little to fear on this side. Bernadotte had a force of French, Spaniards, and Dutch, about 35,000 strong, in Jutland and the Danish islands; but Napoleon, as has been stated above, had no longer any interest in pressing Sweden hard, and sent orders which practically told his Marshal's head. La Romana's corps of 14,000 Spaniards also became increasingly restive as the news from Spain began to filter through; and their wish to escape from the grip of the conspiracy became a fixed resolve when the British authorities succeeded in sending a priest in disguise to inform them of the successful rising of their countrymen. They determined to flee as soon as ships could be sent by the British admiral, Koops. Meeting the gale of Bayona by gulf of his own, Bonaparte chased Bernadotte and finally succeeded in escaping from the archipelago with some 8000 men on British ships; the rest of the Spaniards were dispersed by Bernadotte or by the Danes (August).

Nevertheless, Gustavus failed to stem the tide of Russian conquest on the east. During the winter of 1807-8 the Muscovites made good their

hold on Finland, and finally by a daring march over the ice succeeded in seizing the Åland Isles. The Swedes were now at the end of their resources. A malignant fever had raged among the crews of their fleet during an expedition to the Livonian coast; and few ships or men remained for the defence of Stockholm. The deep-seated discontent of the nobles had now spread to the army and the trading classes; and, when Gustavus persisted in useless efforts that transcended his abilities, the movement that aimed at his dethronement assumed national proportions. At length General Adlercreutz, commander of the Swedish army of the west, marched to Stockholm and compelled the King to abdicate (March 29, 1809). On May 14 the Estates of Sweden confirmed this action, and called to the throne the Duke of Sudermania, with the title of Charles XIII. A change soon took place in the constitution, the Estates regaining the control which they had lost in 1789, and declaring their right to meet every five years, even if the monarch did not summon them. Charles XIII being advanced in years and having no son, the Estates recognised, as his heir and successor, Prince Christian Augustus of Ansbach, a connexion of the Danish House. These events facilitated the signature of peace. On September 17 Charles XIII came to terms with Russia in the Treaty of Fredrikshamn, whereby he ceded Finland to that Power. In December, 1809, the Treaty of Jorkbping closed the war with Denmark; and on January 6, 1810, the Swedish crown signed at Paris a treaty with France, recognising the adoption of the Continental System by his Government, and the exclusion of British ships and merchandise, with a reservation in favour of the unobstructed importation of salt. In return Napoleon ceded to Sweden her province of Pomerania and the island of Rügen.

A fatal accident to Prince Christian during a fit of apoplexy (May 88) once more raised the question of the succession to the throne, and that in a threatening manner. Count Fersen, who was unjustly suspected of complicity in the accident, met his death at the hands of the populace in Stockholm. In these untoward circumstances, the Swedish Diet looked round for a man of firm yet conciliatory character who would guarantee Sweden against trouble within and war from without. Charles XIII, in his perplexity, wrote to Napoleon, who urged the claims of the King of Denmark to the Swedish crown. That monarch was, however, known to be unpopular in Sweden; and nothing came of the suggestion. Charles XIII wished for the nomination of the younger brother of the deceased Prince Royal; but he declined the honour. In truth, the majority of the nobles and of the people wished for a man of wider influence and greater governing powers. Who could reconcile the claims of peace, order, and national prestige as well as one of Napoleon's marshals? It so happened that, in the transactions which Swedish troops had had with the French forces in Denmark and Halbslein during the late war and the overtures for an armistice at its close, they had

been greatly impressed by the personality of Bernadotte. His tall frame and martial bearing, the combination of vigour and courtesy in his speech and demeanour, and the fervour that had marked his dealings with the people of Hamburg and Holstein, alike served to inspire respect and esteem. His reputation spread across the Ocean; and a few influential men called for him in preference to one of the few known of Napoleon's paladins. Finally Charles XIII and the Diet convoked at Örebro decided to recognise Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, as heir to the Swedish throne (August 16, 1818).

Bernadotte signified his willingness to accept the honour if Napoleon awarded his permission. The request surprised the Emperor and placed him in a difficult position. Bernadotte was related to Joseph Bonaparte by marriage, having wedded his sister-in-law; but Napoleon always manifested a dislike for the tall Swede. In 1806 he had sought to remove him to the United States as ambassador, after the battles of Austerlitz and Jena he unjustly accused him of slackness in the handling of his army, and now he was on the point of sending him away to Rome as governor of that city, when the unexpected request came from Stockholm. To the Princess of Ponte Corvo he wrote on September 8 in cordial terms; but four days later he sent to the Prince a curt note (which has been greatly altered in the official Correspondence) signifying that letters-patent were being drawn up to enable him to become a Swede, with a restriction expressed binding him never to bear arms against France. As in duty bound, the Prince Royal declined to fetter his future action or that of his prospective subjects, and resigned his claim on the principality of Ponte Corvo, receiving 12,000 francs income in lieu of it. In this grudging fashion did Napoleon recognise the installation of a new royal family in Sweden.

The ignominious collapse of the old royal Houses of Sweden afforded one more proof of the weakness of the traditional monarchies of Europe. In nearly every case their rulers showed signs of mental instability or even of actual aberration, a sure proof of the exhaustion of the stock or at least of its incapacity to withstand the strain of the new environment. Only in one State did the monarch take to heart the teachings of adversity, and allow his ablest advisers to mould the national polity in accordance with the modified needs of the age. That State was the one which underwent the completest overthrow, but in the depths of its humiliation found the means of winning its way back to more than all its former glory. In truth, the regeneration of Prussia was due, not so much to the monarch whose mistaken policy brought her to that dire pass, but to certain of the leading men of Germany, whose instincts prompted them to offer their mental and administrative gifts on behalf of the one polity that could be called a national German State.

Never was there a sharper contrast between the actual and the potential in any commonwealth than in the Prussia of 1806-10. The

efforts of the Tier at Erfurt had failed to secure the removal of the French garrisons from the three chief fortresses of the Oder; the utmost that he could wring from his ally was a slight reduction in the French indemnity. As a set-off to this, heavier terms were imposed for the provisioning of the French garrisons in these fortresses; and certain claims, urged by the duchy of Warsaw in regard to frontier questions and the confiscation of the property of Prussians in that duchy, were driven home by the French authorities and the King of Saxony with a pettily and hostility almost past belief. The total of the contributions exacted by the French from Prussia itself has been reckoned at 681,227,000 francs; Duncker estimates it at not less than a milliard. The bonds of the Continental System were drawn tighter every year, to the practical extinction of Prussia's maritime trade.

But, while Napoleon and his satraps were ruthlessly endeavoring to complete the ruin of Prussia, the mind of Germany earnestly bent itself to the work of endowing her with fresh vitality. <sup>See Page 1</sup> Foremost among those who pointed the way to new sources of hope and strength was the philosopher Fichte. As the seer of the new national movement, Fichte deserves as much attention as is usually bestowed on agents of destruction. Born in a village of Upper Lusatia, in 1762, he received University training at Jena; thereafter he lived for some time at Zurich; but he found the chief inspiration of his life, as was the case with so many other thinkers, in Kant's philosophy and in the stern ideal of duty which it set forth. He became professor of philosophy at Jena, but vacating his chair in 1799, owing to a charge of heterodoxy, he settled at Berlin. After a time of absence from that capital, mainly due to the political troubles of the subsequent years, he returned thither and expounded to the citizens of the ruined State the ideal of civic duty which he owed ultimately to the teaching of Kant. Rejecting the impractical cosmopolitanism of his earlier years, he now pleaded for a revival of patriotism of an intelligent but enthusiastic type.

Fichte began his course of lectures, entitled *Speeches to the German Nation*, at the close of the year 1807, when the French troops garrisoned the capital. In the earlier *Addresses* he pleaded for an enlightened system of education, which, lifting its pupils above the selfish pursuit of petty interests, should inspire them with a noble zeal for the common welfare. Selfishness and particularism, he claimed, had ruined Germany; only the adoption of a national system of education could cure these deep-seated evils and inspire the people, irrespective of class and creed, with a love for the whole German race. In the *Fourth Address* he pointed to Pestalozzi's methods as affording practical means of instituting a fresh and vitalizing education, and expressed the hope that the State would apply it to the training of the young of all classes. Next, referring to the duty of the nation, he claimed that it must take precedence over that of the State; it must lead the patriot to devote himself and all his powers and

belongings to the public weal, and to offer up his life, if necessary, so that the nation, the one enduring entity here below, may live on. In other Addresses he pointed out what Germans had achieved in time past under the stimulus of patriotism, and brought the people to prepare to show themselves worthy of their sins.

The language of the Addresses was too academic to produce any wide impression at the time. Even so, considering Napoleon's *desol* of the principles of German nationality, it is strange that he did not seem to Fichte the doors matted out to Palm for a much slighter offence. However we may explain this riddle, certain it is that the appeal struck home, when, shortly after the delivery of the Addresses, the Spaniards showed what a people in arms could effect. The events at Saragossa and Baylen seemed to bring Fichte's plan within the range of practicality; while, on the other hand, its connection with religion, ethics, and history gave an intellectual basis to the national movement in Germany which was utterly wanting in that of Spain. The contrast between the sudden instinctive outburst of passion and outraged pride in the Iberian peninsula and the methodical and intellectual preparation now adopted by the German patriots goes far to explain, on the one hand, the barrenness of the Spanish movement, and, on the other, the harvest of mental and civic results with which modern Germany has enriched the life of central Europe.

In one direction Fichte's appeals had a speedy and noteworthy effect. The leading men of Prussia had been impressed by the mental apathy which followed the collapse at Jena-Auerstedt. When fortunes were reduced to small bodies of cavalry, something was clearly wrong with the moral of the people; and, in the days of despair that followed, every thinking man saw the need of building up the nation's life from the very foundations. As a system of national education promised to quicken the torpid circulation of Prussia, men were appointed to study the question. Some of them visited Pestalozzi's school at Yverdon, and brought back a report favourable in the main. Zeller, an enthusiastic disciple of the Swiss reformer, started a Normal School in Koenigsberg on Pestalozzian lines, which ultimately gained the approval of the King. German method subsequently improved on the somewhat fantastic ideas and crude procedure of the west, so that eventually his system became fruitful of good in primary education. Equally important and more immediately effective was the reform of the *gymnasiums* or higher schools. The teaching hitherto had been for the most part lax, one-sided, and superficial. But when, early in 1809, Wilhelm von Humboldt was appointed to the Ministry of Public Instruction, the whole system speedily felt the influence of his learning, enthusiasm, and organising power. Not that the subjects of education were greatly altered; in the *gymnasiums* of Prussia, as in the *lycées* of Napoleon, the classics still held the first place. The influence of Wolf and Niebuhr forbade the extension

invasion of "modern" and "practical" subjects, but the change in spirit and in thoroughness of work was profound.

Most important of all, perhaps, was the establishment of the University of Berlin and Breslau. This new development, which for the first time brought culture into close touch with public life, resulted from the political changes of the year 1807. Until that time, Prussia possessed three Universities, Königsberg, Frankfurt on the Oder, and Halle, besides two smaller ones; but the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit robbed her of Halle. Two of the Halle professors went at once to Meusel and begged the King to establish a *Hocharbeit* in Berlin. An order of the Cabinet appeared in September, 1807, declaring the need of founding an institution which should take the place formerly held by Halle. Königsberg was too remote, and Frankfurt on the Oder too poor, to provide the means of culture for the central parts of the monarchy. Circumstances therefore pointed to Berlin; but action was delayed, at first, because Stein was reluctant to expose a large number of students to the moral temptations of the capital, and subsequently because Humboldt feared the beseeching influence of the governing circles and the military caste at Berlin. As the work of rational reorganization proceeded, the advantages of Berlin were seen to outweigh these objections, Humboldt himself finally declaring that the contact between learned men and the official and military classes must prove "intellectually refreshing, thought-awakening, and naturally elevating" to the latter. Humboldt's report, conceived in this spirit, was published in May, 1809; and three months later appeared an Order of Cabinet assigning to the proposed University the palace of Prince Henry of Prussia at Berlin and a state subscription of 150,000 thalers (\$25,000) per annum. Fichte expressed the general feeling in his statement that this action was "the highest example of a practical respect for science and thought ever afforded by a State; for it was given during a time of the direst oppression, and under the greatest financial difficulty. It was not an occasion of display or elegance that was sought for, but an instrument for giving new health and vigour to the nation." Steffens, professor of physics at Breslau, also wrote that such liberality would never have been shown in the old days, had any request been made to remedy the miserable condition of the University of Halle. Despite the poverty of the young institution, illustrious men gave their services from the outset—Fichte for philosophy, Schöle (first Rector) and Savigny for jurisprudence, Schleiermacher for theology, Wolf and Bertrams for classics and antiquity, Niebuhr for history, and many others. In the opening year 1810-11 as many as 458 students matriculated; and a proof of the patriotic spirit kindled and sustained by the new seat of learning was to be seen in the ardour with which professors and students rushed to arms in 1813.

The University of Breslau took its present form in the year 1811, when the old University of Frankfurt on the Oder was incorporated with

the Roman Catholic College established by the Emperor Leopold I at Breslau in 1703. The new institution attracted less attention and fewer students than that of Berlin; but it served to further the work of permeating the mass of the people with the higher ideals of culture and civic duty which Fichte set forth in his inspiring phrases, "The ideation of the eternal and the divine in the world." On all sides the conviction spread that, if Prussia was to rise from her prostration, it must be accomplished (in the words of Hegel) "not by physical but by moral force." A conviction of this truth appealed to the ideal element then so powerful in the thought of Germany, and drew able men from the west to aid in the regeneration of the one national State left outside the ruins of the old political system. It is noteworthy that among the men who helped to raise Prussia from her ruins very few were born in that realm. Stein was a Rhinelander, educated in Hanover; Hardenberg and Schomburgk were Hanoverians; Niebuhr was partly of Danish, partly of Hanoverian descent; Blücher came from Mecklenburg; Arndt from Rügen; Gneisenau and Flügel were Saxons; but the new national instinct of Germany bound the feelings of all of them indissolubly to Prussia in the time of her overthrow.

The same instinct, itself an outcome of German idealism, also led to the formation at Königsberg of the Moral and Scientific Union, popularly known as the *Tagesbund* (June, 1808). Among its founders were Frobenius Krag, Barthelme, and Büchel. The King, during his long residence at Königsberg, came to have more sympathy with the cultured classes, among whom the influence of Kant was still powerful for good; and probably this explains the cordially guarded approval which he bestowed on this society for "the revival of morality, religion, science, taste, and public spirit," so long as it did not interfere in the domain of politics and administration. Most public men, however, Stein included, refused to enrol themselves in its ranks, regarding its aims as unpractical and visionary. Apart from its postwar efforts in the direction of moral revival, the *Tagesbund* probably had far less direct influence on the course of events than has generally been claimed for it; it was declared illegal in 1830, but continued to work through secret agencies. Stein compared the anti-Gallo fury of its members to "the rage of drowning sheep." It is, however, one of the weaknesses of practical statesmen that they are apt to undervalue influences which cannot be weighed in political scales; and it is improbable that that great class of quiet people, who before 1808 knew and cared nothing about public affairs, would have dared and achieved the mighty tasks of the year 1813, had they been merely passive material moulded by the efforts of legislators and organizers. Only by the infusion of moral enthusiasm into a new and skilfully devised policy could Prussia have acquired the strength and the tenacity of purpose displayed in the War of Liberation.

The first place among the men to whom Prussia owes the revival of

his powers must be accorded to Heinrich Friedrich Karl, Freiherr von und zum *Stein* (1757-1831). The son of an old family of Imperial Knights in the valley of the Lahn, he early showed signs of a strong practical capacity far in excess of the average of his class. At the University of Göttingen he learned to appreciate the merits of British institutions; and probably it was the study of them, as well as the sturdy positive bent of his nature, that intensified his distaste for the pedantries of the Imperial Courts, amidst which his lot was subsequently cast. In 1780 the fame of Frederick the Great induced him to enter the Prussian service; and for some years he served in the administration of mines and manufactures in the King's Westphalian lands. A diplomatic mission to Mainz in 1788 and travel in England in 1790-1 extended his knowledge of men and affairs; but it was not until the year 1800 that he held office at Berlin as Minister of State for Trade. In this position he firmly withstood the degrading foreign policy of Hurgwitz, but found all struggles against it thwarted by the Cabinet. After the disaster at Jena, when Hurgwitz was suffering from a sharp attack of gout, the King offered to Steiu the portfolio of Foreign Affairs; but Steiu declined on the ground of his incompetence for the position and his desire to see a change of system. In reality he wished to see the appointment of Hardenberg, the most outspoken opponent of France, and the complete abolition of the irresponsible Cabinet. In vain did the King propose a compromise on the latter point and persist in his exclusion of Hardenberg. Steiu was equally obstinate and somewhat overstepped the bounds of etiquette in his letters to the King. Finally Frederick William, shortly before the hurried retreat of the royal family from Königsberg to Memel, dismissed him, adding that he was "a refractory, insolent, obstinate, and disobedient official, who, proud of his genius and talents, far from regarding the good of the State, guided partly by egoism, sets free passion and from personal hatred and revenge" (January 2, 1807). For a time Steiu passed into retirement. In the month of April, 1807, Frederick William was constrained to entrust to Hardenberg the ministry of Foreign Affairs, with powers which foreshadowed those of a chief of a responsible Cabinet. When the negotiations at Tilsit began, Napoleon refused to negotiate through Hardenberg, on the ground that he was a Hanoverian and very English in sympathy; he also named Steiu among the three men whom he would gladly see in the Prussian Ministry. Some time elapsed before Frederick William brought himself to offer to Steiu the ministry of Home Affairs; but, thanks to friendly mediation, the baron resumed office with extensive powers on October 4, 1807.

The foregoing summary will have shown the masterful nature of the man who now held in his hands the reined affairs of Prussia, and the warning fatality of the events which placed him in power. Frederick William, after nine months of almost voluntary, resulting from his own



swearing policy, could not but give a wide liberty to the one side man whom Napoleon allowed him to choose as Minister; and the high of events pointed with irresistible force to a complete renewal of the old system. The King resigned the fact by entrusting to Stola the control of all the civil affairs of the State, and the right of sharing in the deliberations of the Military Commission (October 4, 1897). Hardenberg had wielded considerable power over all departments of the public service; but it was Stola's dictatorship in civil affairs that put an end to the disastrous dual system, under which power was divided, in varying and indefinite proportions, between the King's Ministers and the Cabinet, consisting of the King's private advisers. In place of the latter body, there was now to be a *Cabinetministerium*, consisting of the chief Ministers, who wielded full powers both as regards collective advice offered to the King and the administration of their several departments. This administrative reform was completed by the Edict of November 24, 1898, which established, first, a Council of State, including the royal Princes, all the Ministers, and certain Privy Counsellors; and secondly a smaller Cabinet of Ministers alone. The more important affairs were to come before the Council of State. The ministerial departments also underwent a remodeling which removed the division of powers and crossing of functions that often paralysed the old governing machine.

Still more important in its bearing on the life of the nation was the *Edict of Emancipation*, issued at *Munich* on October 9, 1898, which abolished serfdom, with its tangle of personal obligations, throughout the Prussian monarchy. These great changes were to take effect on October 8, 1898. The work on the rural domain was also freed by a decree of October 28, 1897. But this was not all. A conviction had long been growing that the wealth of the country would never develop until the material restrictions on the holding of land were abolished or profoundly modified. As the minister Scholz phrased it, "he who has an estate has no capital, and he who has capital is not allowed to have an estate." In other words, the old families were as a rule too poor to cultivate the soil properly, and were not allowed by law to sell "noble" land (*Adelsgut* or *adliges Gut*) to the burgher class. Similar limitations attended the holding of peasant's land (*Bauerngut*). The transfer of land from members of one class to those of another could only be legalised by the express permission of the King. Stola now decided to enforce the principle of free trade in land, abolishing the restrictions derived from old feudal customs, and imposing only such safeguards as would prevent the serious disintegration of peasant holdings. But the Edict of Emancipation went even further than this. It swept away the laws and ordinances which prevented the noble from taking up occupations previously confined to the burgher class; as also those which marked off the holdings of the latter class from those of the peasantry. In short, it swept away the caste system in regard to

occupations, and facilitated the rise of a peasant to the citizen class and even to that of the nobles.

The framing of this edict was not, to any appreciable extent, due to Stein. The "Imperialistic Commission" recently appointed by the King had reported on the topics named above in a sense practically identical with the terms of the Edict of Emancipation, even before the accession of Stein to office. It is to the King, who had long been desirous of abolishing serfdom, and to enlightened advisers like Stein, rather than to Stein, that the chief credit for originating the reform belongs; Stein, however, bore the official responsibility for the promulgation and carrying out of the edict, which aroused sharp opposition from the feudal nobles. After Stein's withdrawal from Prussia, Hardenberg carried through this measure and others abolishing certain monopolies in trade, to their logical conclusion, by the drastic decree of September 18, 1811. Peasants and peasants on feudal lands now gained complete possession of their farms or holdings, on condition that the lord received one-third of the land in lieu of his former seigniorial rights and claims for personal service. This decree again met with strenuous opposition from the privileged classes; but, in spite of their protests in the Chambers of Notables, which Hardenberg successively overruled, he carried it through by royal authority. Thus the change from feudal tenure to freehold, which in Prussia formed the chief practical outcome of the Revolution, was in Prussia distinctly due to the King's will and prerogative. The Cabinet receipt (first made public in 1873) which Frederick William sent to Hardenberg on September 6, 1811, leaves no doubt that the impulse towards this thorough agrarian reform came in a large measure from the King himself. That he and his Minister succeeded in carrying it through, in spite of the bitter protests of a large part of the nobility, was also indirectly due to Napoleon, who at the very same time was known to be planning the utter ruin of Prussia. Here, therefore, as in the reforms of Stein and Schöcherhans, we may discern one of the epoch-making results of the Napoleonic supremacy. Legislation, which would have been utterly impossible before 1806, was imperatively called for, if the crippled State was to gain strength enough to cope with revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Frederick William deserves greater credit than has usually been bestowed for discerning this important truth. Limited as were his views on foreign policy, he actively furthered the reforms which laid away the basis of the Prussian State. In his adoption of this course, so different from that of Louis XVI before the Revolution, lies the chief cause of the startling divergence in the fortunes of the Houses of Hohenzollern and Bourbon.

Side by side with the legislation which renovated the social and economical life of Prussia, there arose a new military system that was destined profoundly to influence the fortunes of the kingdom, and ultimately of all Continental States. Here, again, the demand for

reform originated largely with the King. Frederick William had never shared the superstitious reverence felt by most of the officers for every detail of the military organization of the great Frederick. Long before the collapse of Jena, he had privately indicated many of its weak points; and his doubts as to the efficiency of the army probably explain in part the pitiable shifts of his policy in the years 1804-6. On July 24, 1805, that is, sixteen days after the signature of peace with Napoleon, the King appointed a Commission for Military Reorganization, with Scharnhorst as president, and Gneisenau and Goltzmann among its members. Boyen joined the Commission in 1806. Subsequently the King set down in writing thirteen suggestions with regard to reform; among them were the dismissal of incapable officers, the improvement of the system of promotion for deserving officers, extension of the facilities for the promotion of non-coms, diminution of the number of exemptions from military service, election of the custom of recruiting among foreigners, the formation of larger reserve districts (*Reservekorps*), formation of divisions and corps, the drilling and use of cavalry and artillery in far larger units than before, together with various improvements in weapons, uniforms, drill, and tactics, as well as modernizing the army and its dispositions on the field of battle. Similar ideas had occurred to Alvensleben, Hardenberg, and others; and few intelligent officers (York was an exception) felt any doubts as to the need of drastic military reforms.

Frederick William here laid his finger on the weak points of the old system; and he gave a general though not unvarying support to the men who were determined to construct a truly national army from the ruins of the old organization, which placed a premium on noble birth and seniority among the officers, and relied almost solely on overdrilled arch and foreigners in the ranks. First among the officers who now pressed for a thorough change was Gerhard Johann David Scharnhorst (1755-1813). Born of humble parentage in a village of Hanover, he early received a training in the military school at Wilhelmsruhe. Thereafter he served with great credit in the Hanoverian army in the campaigns of 1792-6, and won some renown that displayed thought and originality. In 1801 he entered the Prussian service as first-lieutenant of artillery, and soon gave an impulse to the whole service by founding the *Artillerie Gesellschaft* at Berlin. In April, 1806, he showed his zeal for reform by advocating the formation of a national militia. Having further displayed his useful powers at Alvensleben, Laubach, and Eylau, he was able to live down the youth levelled at him as a mere theorist; and he enjoyed the confidence of all who looked for searching and practical reforms. With him was Gneisenau (1760-1821), whose staunch defense of Colberg also proved that study of the principles of the art of war was by no means incompatible with personal bravery and an inspiring influence. It is impossible here to do more than summarize the chief features of the

system inaugurated by the Military Commission. It began by asserting the duty of every man to serve in the work of national defence. Scharnhorst, in his memoir of July 31, 1807, pointed out the need of having a small standing army of about 40,000 men, which could quickly be reinforced from a national militia; he further sketched a plan for passing a certain proportion of men quickly through the ranks and thence into a reserve. A month later he suggested that all men between the ages of eighteen and thirty should serve. Consistent with their own expense so as to form a national militia or reserve army. For various reasons, Frederick William decided to reorganise the existing army before venturing on any novel experiments. Accordingly the officers who had been guilty of cowardly surrenders were severely punished; many more were cashiered; while merit received due recognition, and men in the ranks (thenceforth only Prussians) were treated as belated citizens of a free State. While these practical reforms were taking shape, Napoleon formulated a demand, in a secret article of the Franco-Prussian Convention of September 8, 1807, that Prussia should limit her army to 40,000 men for at least ten years, and should not form a militia or civil guard. Owing to this action of the French Emperor, the reformers at Berlin devised the famous "Landsturmgesetz," (*Erlösungsgesetz*), so called because the cadres at stated intervals were filled with recruits and depleted by their passing into a reserve. The working of the system was kept as secret as possible. Nominally the total of the army was kept at 40,000 men; but by the year 1812 Prussia had as many as 100,000 men trained to the service of arms. The organisation of the *Landwehr* belongs to the year 1813, and will be described later. Even when driven from power by Napoleon in the year 1810, Scharnhorst continued unofficially to further the extension of the system which began to make the Prussian army, in the words of the Military Commission, "the union of all the moral and physical energies of the nation." Herein lies the true grandeur of Scharnhorst and his colleagues. They placed their trust not so much in an improved organisation as in the growth of a new civic patriotism.

Closely connected, therefore, with the subject of army reform, is that of local self-government in Prussia. In order to understand the importance of the municipal reform of November 19, 1808, which laid the foundation of local self-government, the older method of control must be briefly noticed. Since the establishment of the Prussian War and Domain Chambers in 1703, the administration of the towns had fallen more and more under the control of the Crown. Under the plea of supervising affairs of finance and cognate matters, the central Government frequently appointed retired officers to the posts of burgomaster, treasurer, or councillor, in order to lighten the demands on the army chest. The right of re-appointment was allowed in certain towns; but, lest this privilege should lead to civic freedom, the municipal authorities

was subjected to the supervision of a tax administrator, whose will was law for the whole of his district. *Stato* had long seen the need of breathing into the towns of Prussia the civic life which had characterized the Free Cities in earlier days; and the reform promulgated in the Grand Decree of May in October, 1807, made some analogous measure peculiarly necessary if Prussia was to retain her place in the Germanic system. Accordingly *Stato*, with the help of *Schubert*, Minister for Prussia proper, drafted a scheme which received the King's sanction on November 19, 1808. The State still retained a general control over towns, especially in respect of the supervision of accounts and the satisfaction of new by-laws; but it now entrusted large power to the citizens, and swept away the rights of lords of manors over towns and over villages with more than 800 inhabitants. Citizens were now required to take their due share in all civic duties, and, if elected, to serve as appointed under pain of a fine. The elected governing body was thereafter to consist of a paid burgomaster, paid councillors, and unpaid councillors, these only being paid who gave all their time to public work. In large towns the chief burgomaster was to be chosen by the King from a list of three men nominated by the representatives of the citizens. Police magistrates might be appointed directly by the State; or it might charge the locally elected magistrates to superintend affairs of police.

Such, in very brief outline, was the scheme which granted or restored local self-government to the towns of Prussia. Inaugurated by royal decree and through the action of a Minister who was soon to be chased from office by Napoleon, it stands in the sharpest contrast to the French departmental system of 1790-99, that precocious child of fervid democratic beliefs. The more cautious procedure of the legislators of the north was destined to be abundantly justified. The survival of ancient civic rights, dimly surviving in some towns, and the new patriotism begotten by the breakings of the leaders of thought, helped to nerve the citizens of Prussia with a dogged resolve and a unison sometimes better suited to the working of free institutions than were the ebullient hopes and effusive demonstrations of the year 1790 in France. The haven of civic freedom was quietly introduced into the torpid mass of old Prussian life; and its working, though slow, was thorough. Anxiously, among the many influences that helped the down-trodden men of Berlin to accord a joyous welcome to their King and Queen on their memorable return (December, 1809), must be reckoned the new sense of civic dignity which the capital now enjoyed. Drifted subjects of the House of Hohenzollern the Berliners had ever been; now the tax-paying burghers of the past held up their heads as responsible citizens in a reformed commonwealth.

*Stato* was unable to carry out his statesmanlike plan of extending to the country districts the principles of self-government which he had accorded to the towns. Already the mirror of one of his letters by a

French official showed the ultimate aim of these reforms to be that of a national revival which should in due course lead to the expulsion of the foreigner. At first the Emperor was inclined to dismiss these designs scornfully. "These Prussians are poor, miserable people," he wrote on September 4, 1806, to Scholt, who was then holding down Prussia. But six days later he wrote to his marshals in more threatening terms: "I have demanded that he [Stein] should be chased from the [Prussian] Ministry; otherwise the King of Prussia will not return home." Napoleon also sequestered Stein's property in Westphalia. Still Frederick Wilhelm delayed complying with the imperial mandate, until, in November, Dessau and other French officers assured the Prussian authorities that the French would not evacuate their country so long as Stein remained in the Ministry. At last the blow fell, from Munich. An imperial decree of December 16, 1806 (omitted from the official *Correspondence*) declared "to named Stein" an enemy of France and of the Confederation of the Rhine, sequestered all his goods, and ordered his persons wherever he could be taken by French or allied troops. A letter to Champagny of the same date (recently published by Lavater) concluded with the order that, if Stein was captured, he must be shot. Napoleon's procedure was well enough known to such men not to need the clearer interpretation given to Champagny. Stein heard the news of his danger on January 4, 1807, and at once set out by night for the Bohemian frontier, which he reached in safety. After more than three years of retirement, he was to take service with the Tsar and help in the westward march of victory that set in at the close of the year 1812. Meanwhile his place at Berlin was filled by Hardenberg (June, 1807), a man equally hostile to Napoleon but more able to bend before the victor than the obstinate Stein.

Among the many influences that served to build up the new national spirit in Germany, that of literature must take a high place. Droysen well remarked that only by means of their literature were the Germans a nation; and the perception of the same truth explains the efforts which Napoleon made to bring Goethe and Wieland over to his side at the time of the Erfurt interview. He succeeded in fascinating them by his power of conversation, by the tactful eulogiums that he passed on their works, and by bestowing on them the Cross of the Legion of Honor. The historian Johann von Müller also yielded to Napoleon's attentions, and accepted a ministerial post in the kingdom of Westphalia. But these conquests, if such they can be called, had little effect. The younger men of letters came more and more closely to Prussia in the time of her misfortune; and during her hopeless efforts like those of Schill and the Duke of Brunswick-Olden in 1809 awakened passionate longings for national freedom throughout large parts of Germany. Arnst, Kleist, Körner, Richter, and others expressed the national feeling long before it found free vent in the rising of 1813.

Why German sentiment should have clung so steadfastly to Prussia is a question that shades philosophic research, as all questions of sentiment must do. There was, however, one truly inspiring personality in the Prussia of that period; and those who seek to analyze the inscrutable instincts that sway great masses of men may well question whether the single figure of *Queen Louise of Prussia* did not count for more than all the promises of good government held out to Germans by Napoleon. Her grace and beauty, the radiant happiness of her life in its early phases, the gladness and purity which she diffused in the Court circles of Berlin, the quietly severity with which she bore the misfortunes and humiliations of the months succeeding Jena, her patriotic efforts at Tilsit to awaken more generous impulses in the men who had slandered her, and finally the deepening gloom of her later years, all conspired to thrill every German heart with admiration and pity. Her return to Berlin amidst the enthusiastic homage of its citizens lifted for a brief space the clouds that gathered over her; but the trials of the past and the hopelessness of the situation in the year 1810, when Napoleon threatened to seize Stettin, told too deeply on that sympathetic and sensitive nature. Little by little her spirit sank under the burdens heaped upon her people by the conqueror; and in the month of July of that year death came to end her sufferings of mind and body.

In comparison with the story likestruggle of Prussia, the fortunes of artificial States like the kingdom of Westphalia and the duchy of Nassau possess only a slight and passing interest. They owed their existence to the fact that Napoleon, unable, for the diplomatic reasons stated above, to annex Prussia to the Confederation of the Rhine, was determined to dominate her on the west and on the east by the creation of two considerable States subject to his control. Of these new creations, the kingdom of Westphalia comprised the Prussian lands to the west of the Elbe, Brunswick, Electoral Hesse (Hesse-Cassel), and other smaller districts. In the most westerly of the districts torn from Prussia the rule of the Habsburgs had not yet taken deep root. Despite the dull and allegedly cruel of the former Elector, the Hessians retained the connection with France; while in Brunswick the cold sovereignty of the Duke was everywhere regretted. Nevertheless Napoleon hoped to win over the inhabitants by the reforms which are described in other chapters of this volume. The new Constitution of Westphalia was not unsuited to the needs of the people; but everything depended on the monarch. Here Napoleon was unfortunate. In vain did he inform the King, Jerome Bonaparte (November 18, 1807), that the sight of just laws and good administration in Westphalia would do more than the greatest victories to consolidate the Napoleonic system in Germany. In vain did he seek to inspire him with the ambition to do great things and the persistence that overcomes obstacles. Jerome had neither ambition nor persistence, except in the direction of display and luxury.

The scanty revenues of the kingdom were wasted on worthless favorites. The pay of the troops was in arrears, and in the spring of 1809 a serious mutiny broke out. The inability of the King to stop the progress, first of Schell, and afterwards of the Duke of Brunswick-Gotha, made a profound impression. Immermann has recorded his own youthful feeling of patriotism at these events, and the determined belief of the people at Magdeburg that Schell was not killed at Stralsund but would come back to cut off the French yoke. These incidents cut Napoleon to the quick. He overbore his brother with reproaches (April 30, 1809). "Your kingdom [he wrote] has no police, no finances, and no organization. It is not with dignity that the foundations of monarchies are laid. What is happening to you now I fully expected. I hope it will teach you a lesson. Adopt ways and habits suited to those of the country which you govern." Similar evidence might be quoted from several quarters to show that the failure of Napoleon's efforts to decentralize central Germany resulted largely from the failure of his brother Jerome. It was, however, also due to the exigencies of Napoleon's statecraft. His Continental System hindered commerce, and imposed ruinous burdens on the trading classes; the conscription aroused increasing deterioration, as larger and larger bodies were raised to fight the Emperor's battles; and the trend of public opinion set steadily away from Paris and towards Berlin.

The other State whose creation was due to Napoleon's desire to complete the isolation and subjection of Prussia was the duchy of Warsaw, not officially styled a Grand Duchy till 1808. It consisted of the Polish lands which Prussia had seized in the three partitions, with the exception of the Białystok district, which went to Russia, and the city of Danzig, constituted by the Treaty of Tilsit a free city under the protection of the Kings of Prussia and Saxony. Frederick Augustus, King of Saxony, received the new duchy for himself and his heirs. It contained upwards of 2,800,000 inhabitants, nearly entirely Polish. Oginski states in his memoirs that the small extent of the new State, and especially the severance of the Białystok district, struck Polish patriots with despair. Czartoryski, however, asserts that many of his countrymen looked on the establishment of the duchy as bemoaning the future restoration of Poland. In this hope they were disappointed. Napoleon had promised Alexander at Tilsit that the name Poland should never be revived; and after 1809 his desire not to offend the Habsburgs gave efficacy to this promise. Not until the Peace of Schönbrunn, by which the Grand Duchy acquired the Polish lands of Austria southwest of Warsaw, did it gain defensible frontiers; on the other hand, from the outset, the connection with Saxony, the right of sending troops and stores across Silesia, and other concessions wrong from Prussia, to some extent diminished its military weakness.

The Constitution of 1807 borrowed some of the forms of that of



1794, but little of its spirit. It was based in part on a draft presented to the Emperor by Polish magnates at Döbling in July, 1803; but in its final form it only partly met their wishes. In regard to religious worship it required *liber* toleration and freedom. The King, however, now wielded a power far greater than that accorded in 1791. He nominated the eighteen members of the Senate—six Bishops, six Prelates, and six Castellans. Furthermore, he and his senatorial committee could override the advice of the popular Chamber, the Chamber of Nations; and he alone could dissolve it. The Diet, consisting of these two Chambers, was required to meet every two years, on convocation by the King; but it had no right of initiating laws; this lay with the King and his Council of State, consisting of five Ministers and a Secretary of State. The members of the popular Chamber were chosen by electoral colleges or *colleges*, three of the nobles sending up sixty members and those of the commons forty. The Napoleonic departmental system was introduced, along with the *Cadre* Napoleon. But the essence of the new Constitution lay in the stipulation, laid down by Napoleon himself at Döbling, that Prussia alone should have a resident or envoy at Warsaw. This obviously deprived the King-Duke of all functions in regard to foreign policy; and, when it further appeared that Frederick Augustus could not name a minister to act at Warsaw on his behalf, this further limitation clearly placed the executive power of the new Constitution in the hands of the French resident, that is, in those of Napoleon himself. As in the case of Danzig, where the joint protectors of the Kings of Prussia and Saxony was a diplomatic fiction in face of the control vested in the French military governor, so also the political machinery of the new duchy served merely to disguise the indisputable fact that the making of government was the will of Napoleon. It is therefore difficult to credit de Pradt's story that Napoleon once accused himself of two capital errors in his dealings with the duchy—that of sending a prince (de Pradt) thither as ambassador, and that of not having made himself King.

The application of the principles of the French Revolution to the duchy of Warsaw naturally proved to be somewhat half-hearted and superficial. Serfdom was abolished in theory, but, as no land was forthcoming for the freedmen, they remained virtually in their old position. Civic equality in the eyes of the law likewise proved to be scarcely compatible with the deep-seated prejudices of Poland. Nor was it insisted on, when the aims of Darnau's government clearly were to make the duchy the eastern bastion of the Napoleonic system. Military affairs alone received much attention. The forces were to be raised to the total of 80,000 men; and the generosity of four Poles sufficed to equip six regiments within a short space. This enthusiasm, however, was partial and short-lived. Even at the outset, many patriots shared the distrust with which Kosciuszko had always regarded Napoleon's Polish policy. He now refused to serve the Emperor until he declared in favour

of the restoration of Poland. That declaration never came. On the contrary, the Emperor took care to still Polish aspirations; witness his instructions of March 31, 1806, to Darnot at Warsaw. "Maintain harmony with the Russians as much as possible, and hold in check poor Poles, who are hot-headed." The Emperor consented to relieve the financial burden of the Grand Duchy by taking into his pay 8000 Polish troops destined for Spain. Some 3600 were already serving under the French eagle. Despite this slight alleviation of its burdens, the new State felt the financial strain severely. Ravaged by war and subsequently burdened by the support of French troops, it was in no condition to bear the restrictions of the Continental System, which greatly hampered, even when it did not cut off, the export of grain and timber to England. Another grievance, slighter in reality but more galling, was the apportionment of twenty-seven Polish domains to Napoleon's marshals and generals. Some of these were of great extent. Darnot received the principality of Lwów with a rental of 4,551,208 francs; Lannes that of Sierce with 2,674,260 francs; in all, rentals to the value of 55,582,622 francs were bestowed on the paladins of the Empire. The Peace of Schönbrunn (October, 1809) detached from Austria and annexed to the Grand Duchy an additional territory of about 900 square leagues and some 1,500,000 inhabitants. The army was, however, increased to 40,000 men, and by the year 1811 to 65,000 men. The financial situation became worse than ever, the deficit for the year 1811 amounting to 21,000,000 francs.

Nevertheless, Napoleon possessed in the Grand Duchy a political asset of the highest value, such as his German policy never presented to him. In spite of all his melodramatic appeals to the memory of Charlemagne, he failed to attract the Teutonic imagination; and, if we inquire why so consummate a political artist achieved only a mediocre success among that horse-loving, sentimental, and politically backward people, the answer would seem to be that he never touched the deepest well-springs of hope. For his reforms, so far as they really served their needs, the Germans were thankful. But his efforts in this direction were soon at an end; and the people of the Rhenish Confederation, after experiencing the benefits of the *Code Napoléon* and of his administration, had little to look forward to but an increase of taxes, a heavier conscription, and the loss of the comfort of life under the operation of his commercial decrees. In their minds, the name of Napoleon called up no vision of national greatness and glory in the future. With the Poles it was different. Their imagination turned to the sphere of politics with an eagerness sharpened by the humiliations of recent times and by the memory of their former greatness. The appeal to the example of Stanislas was an appeal to no dim reminiscences such as the name of Charlemagne conjured up. It called forth visions of a real and reliable polity. Their temperament and their misfortunes therefore ally

disposed thus to see in Napoleon the Messiah of their race; and, having reached the clearest logicality of his plans and the grandeur of his ambition, they refused to believe that the anomalous situation which he created at Warsaw could be anything more than a temporary shift in his progress towards a consummation worthy of his powers, the resuscitation of the Kingdom of Poland in its ancient splendour. In that hope, ever baffled but never crushed, lay the secret of Napoleon's power in eastern Europe.

A survey of the period of the Napoleonic supremacy reveals the fact that, despite the seemingly complete overthrow of the European system at Tilsit, affairs tended speedily to revert to a state of equilibrium. It is true that Canning's wider plans for an alliance with all the Scandinavian States ended in comparative failure; Denmark ranged herself on Napoleon's side; and, as the pressure of events crushed Sweden from Great Britain, Napoleon and Alexander became supreme in the Baltic lands. It is also indisputable that Napoleon by masterful diplomacy held Prussia at his feet and kept the French and allied forces withdrawn from the Elbe to the Niemen. But the very magnitude of the means then exposed for the commercial strangulation of Great Britain led both Austria and Russia to adopt precautionary measures in which lay the seeds of future wars with Napoleon. Central and eastern Europe was, as it were, rolled in on itself, and began to find new means of resistance to the conqueror. Moreover, the eagerness with which he extended his political system over the north of Europe made an irreconcilable foe of the Vatican, and led to the Spanish rising with its immense consequences—the postponement of the plans for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, the preservation of Prussia, the encouragement of the new national movement in central Europe, and the Austrian challenge of the year 1809. For the complete success of his designs against England, Napoleon needed not only peace on the Continent, but the acquiescence of governments and peoples in his supremacy. Thereafter this became impossible, and it remained to be seen whether, with the feelings of fear and hatred now working against him in Court and cottage, even the Emperor could succeed, with his vast and complex enterprises, the Continental System.

## CHAPTER XII

## THE WAR OF 1809

THE war between Austria and Napoleon in the year 1809 was no mere fortuitous conflict. It arose almost spontaneously, as a historical necessity, out of the three hundred years' contest between France and Austria for European supremacy. In the eighteenth century the struggle against the supremacy of Louis XIV culminated in the war of the Spanish Succession. A century later, in the war of 1809, the House of Habsburg once more gathered its forces in order to break down the tyranny of Napoleon, which weighed so heavily on central Europe. But the war of 1809 has a character of its own; it was the first time since 1792 that in any continental State the whole force of a nation was called for military ends. Bearing in mind the almost simultaneous national risings in Spain, Tyrol, and northern Germany, we may regard the years 1808 and 1809 as the starting-point of the popular reaction against the despotism of Napoleon.

The Spanish rising in 1808 gave Austria the decisive signal to take up arms, a year later, against the French Empire. The signal came from abroad; it found the ground prepared at home. The domestic reasons for the step taken by Austria date back to the Peace of Presburg (December 27, 1805). That treaty, notwithstanding its stringent conditions, left Austria, though shorn of the prestige of a German Emperor, a great position in the concert of the Powers. It was, in the first place, the overture of friendship, but, above all, the alliance between Napoleon and the Tsar, completed at the Congress of Erfurt, which doomed Austria to political isolation, and thereby exposed her to the danger of annihilation by Napoleon whenever it should suit him to attack her. The first who fully grasped this danger was Count Stadion, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, a man of large views and conspicuous political ability, and an ardent patriot, who combined with great energy of character a detachment of the narrow-minded Austrian bureaucracy. It was he who, with the active support of the empress's Empress, Marie Louise Beatrix, and of Count Clemens Metternich, then Austrian ambassador in Paris, finally succeeded in urging his imperial master to

the point of war. Metternich believed that the French people were tired of war, and unlikely to support Napoleon much longer; so that, in the event of a conflict, there was reason to expect a popular revolt against the Napoleonic régime. Strange to say, Metternich found some support in Talleyrand, who, behind the scenes, was indirectly encouraging Austria to fight. The decision, apart from military and financial considerations, was not an easy one for Austria, seeing that the general attitude of Europe offered no certain prospect of her finding allies in the coming conflict. Before, however, we describe the struggle, we must briefly consider the general political situation; for war is simply "the carrying-out of diplomacy by forcible means."

In the spring of 1808, Napoleon's violent and despotic interference in the internal affairs of Spain, at that time his ally, confirmed the opinion prevalent in the Court of Vienna, that the French Emperor's lust of conquest was insatiable, and that, after the overthrow of Spain, it would be Austria's turn. Napoleon had not been backward with unfriendly acts, and even with open threats, against that country; nor had it escaped his notice that preparations for war had been going on for some time on the Danube. According to Count Stadion's view, it was simply a question of gaining sufficient time for the completion of military preparations, and, if possible, for a fresh coalition against France. Archduke Charles, who was superintending the reorganisation of the army, was of the same opinion, at least in principle. The memorial addressed by him to the Emperor Francis on April 14, 1808, is specially interesting. He therein solemnly adjured his Imperial brother, above all things, to introduce into the public administration a more businesslike system. Such a change, unfortunately, did not take place; but something was done to facilitate the preparations for war. Among other measures, the formation of a *Landwehr* was ordered by the Imperial edict of June 8, 1808. In this force were enrolled all male subjects, from eighteen to twenty-five years of age, who were capable of bearing arms, and not already serving in the standing army. The edict called forth from Napoleon's more than ordinary burst of anger. On August 18, in Paris, at the reception of the diplomatic corps, there was a violent scene between him and Metternich. The Emperor tried to represent Austria as a disturber of the peace, and threatened a war of extermination if her preparations were not instantly stopped. He also referred to England as the "invisible hand" which was pushing forward this war. As a matter of fact, since the death of Pitt, there had been no intimate relations between London and Vienna.

In a second interview with Metternich, Napoleon endeavoured to efface the impression of his menaces by more apologetic phrases; but Metternich was too experienced a diplomatist to be misled in such a way. He knew perfectly well that, between the two interviews, bad news had arrived from Portugal, where, in consequence of the landing of British troops,

the French under Junot were hard pressed. On the strength of this news, he sent word to Vienna that, in view of the development of affairs in the Italian peninsula, Napoleon could certainly not be meditating any immediate attack on Austria.

The Congress of Erfurt, which followed on these events, helped to throw the Austrian difficulty into the background in Napoleon's mind. Count Stadion, on the other hand, did his utmost to force the Emperor Francis to an energetic decision. He met, it is true, with opposition from most of the other ministers; and even Archduke Charles used all his influence to secure delay, saying that it was better to put off the war a little longer, until the military and internal affairs of the State should be on a more settled footing. The war party, on the other hand, could count on the support of the nation. Indeed, throughout purely Catholic Austria, recent events—the occupation of Rome by the French, the seizure of the Pope, and his appeal for help to Catholic Christendom—all served to increase the general determination of Napoleon.

Early in December, 1808, councils were held in the Hofburg in which Metternich's representations turned the scale in favour of war. These representations (contained in three memorials, two of a political nature, the third headed *états français: guerre d'Espagne*), starting from the assumption that Napoleon's supremacy was a permanent danger to the existence of Austria, led up to the conclusion that, in view of recent events in the Italian peninsula, now or never was the moment for Austria to strike. A deep impression was made by Metternich's calculation that, in a war with Austria, Napoleon would not have more than 800,000 men at his disposal. Stadion had arrived at similar results: he, indeed, placed the number as low as 150,000. These calculations, it may here be observed, proved later to be incorrect; the number had been underestimated. Archduke Charles considered the views of Stadion and Metternich too sanguine. He reiterated his protest against an early declaration of war, and suggested the end of March as the earliest possible date for the commencement of hostilities, if war should eventually be declared.

It was the object of the Court of Vienna, in the interval that remained, to seek the support of those Powers whose interests might presumably incline them to the side of Austria. But the prospect of forming a new Coalition was far from favourable. Among possible allies, the first was Great Britain, the traditional friend of Austria and the most implacable enemy of the Napoleonic system. But, as has already been stated, no close relations existed at that time between the Governments of the two countries; and even in Vienna it was admitted that, in the most favourable circumstances, the utmost that could be counted on from Great Britain was a subsidy. That she would also intervene by means of a military diversion on land (as she afterwards did at Walcheren) could not at that time be foreseen. It was after the outbreak

of the war that Count Starobinski was despatched to England by a Viennese Cabinet, to conduct negotiations which had hitherto been carried on through the Hanoverian Ministry.

There was some reason for hope that France would be won over. It is called "Reformers," who after the catastrophe of 1806 had been busy in the political, military, and social regeneration of Prussia, such men, Stein, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and others, looked as they were by a profound hatred of Napoleon felt by the population of northern Germany were ardently in favour of the Austrian alliance. At the outset seemed likely enough that Prussia would be drawn to Austria's aid. Even after Stein's resignation, the war party in Berlin refused to admit his defeat; and in January, 1806, a convention was actually concluded in Vienna by Major von der Goltz, in which it was agreed that Prussia should place 80,000 men in the field. But it did not escape the cautious character of King Frederick William III, any more than with those formal pledges by which he had bound himself to Napoleon in the convention of September 8, 1805, to form so bold a resolution—a resolution made more difficult, it is true, by the Franco-Russian alliance. During his stay in St Petersburg in the beginning of January, 1806, he was strengthened in his tendency to remain neutral and, in the end, he rejected all binding arrangements with the phrase "Without Russia I cannot join you."

That Russia should join, next, to any disinterested judge of the situation, have appeared out of the question. Her friendship with France had gained for her Poland and the reversion of the Danubian Principalities. All the same, various diplomatic attempts were made to lure the Emperor Alexander from Napoleon's side. But in vain. On March 2, 1806, the Tsar duly informed Count Schwarzenberg, the Austrian ambassador, that he would fulfil his obligations to France; that is to say, he would despatch an auxiliary force to help her against Austria. Nevertheless there was still some ground for the hope that Russia would not carry military coercion too far. As for the minor Powers, Denmark was on the side of France; Sweden was occupied by the war with Russia; and the smaller German States had, through the Confederation of the Rhine, become the vassals of Napoleon and the adherents of their former Emperor.

Then, when on February 8, 1806, war was finally decided upon by an Imperial Council under the presidency of the Emperor, Austria found herself alone, without an ally, pitted against the most powerful State and the greatest military genius of the time. She was still alone, when on March 2 Metternich declared in the Council that the movements of the French troops in Germany, and the mobilizing of the Silesian contingent, had compelled the Emperor Francis to place his own army on a war footing. Formal declaration of war there was none. Its place was taken by a lengthy official report, issued by the Court of Vienna and

widely circulated, and by a stirring proclamation, addressed to the army and the nation.

Peace, from a military point of view, was then in the mouth of her power. As regards numbers, military capacity, admirable organization, and masterly leadership, the French army was in the hands of Napoleon a terrible engine of war. In the winter of 1800-1, by means of a conscription relentlessly carried out, the nominal strength of this army (never actually reached) attained the number of 600,000 men. This included field-forces about 300,000 strong in Spain, 100,000 in the interior of France, 800,000 drawn entirely from the Spanish territory on the right bank of the Rhine, and about 60,000 in Italy.

At the same time, one fact must be clearly borne in mind: that the French army of 1800, as regards both its internal cohesion and its military discipline, was not the equal of the Grand Army of 1803, which Napoleon himself described as "the best army he ever commanded." The causes of this falling-off were various. In accordance with his widening schemes of expansion, the Emperor was possessed by a sort of *rage de number*; and the army, both officers and men, thus lost in quality what it gained in quantity. The financial resources of France were also so severely strained by incessant wars that the clothing, equipment, and provisioning of the troops left much to be desired; and pay was frequently in arrears. Moreover, many officers in the higher ranks of the service were beginning to be tired of war, and longed to enjoy their hard-won honours and positions in peace and quietness. Napoleon therefore was driven to economise in the more lavish items of rewards, so that his paladins might have something left to fight for.

But these defects were of but slight importance compared with the brilliant military qualities of the French army. Looking back on the overwhelming victories of the last ten years, it might well regard itself as invincible, so long as Napoleon was at its head. For pure fighting quality the infantry stood indisputably in the front rank. We shall see later what marvellous deeds were done, especially at Aspern and Essling, by the French infantry (including the German auxiliaries there engaged). In any case, the men of the French infantry must be regarded as superior to the Austrians, and the tactical skill of its leading was most decidedly greater. The French cavalry was brave, numerous, and well-mounted; and it was commanded by a large staff of distinguished officers. Its weakness lay in the rider's lack of care for his horse, which led to large numbers of animals dying on the march. But, as was proved by its brilliant charges at the battle of Aspern, the cavalry, when it came into action, was extremely efficient. The artillery had attained a prominent place in the French army; and Napoleon, who had himself risen from this branch of the service, knew how to handle it in a masterly fashion. In the war of 1809, the "grand battery" of Wagram became the classic instance of successful handling of large masses of field artillery.



The military resources of Austria, with a population only half as large as that of France, were very inferior to the French. According to official calculations, there were available, in the spring of 1809, 268,000 troops of the line and 204,000 of the reserves. But these numbers were never reached. The actual strength of the field army, at the outbreak of war, amounted to no more than 268,000 men, including 15,000 militia. It is true that the army had been in every respect reorganised since the catastrophe of 1805. Archduke Charles had then taken upon himself the functions of Minister of War, and to his circumspection and practical energy was mainly due the improvement in organisation and tactics that now became apparent. New service-regulations were introduced; equipment and arms were perfected. But the end chiefly aimed at was to raise the spirit of the troops. Such words as "People," "Freedom," "Fatherland," were heard for the first time in the army—words which, however, before long were again to be excluded from the language of Austrian policy. In 1809 a lofty sentiment of patriotism permeated the army, especially the German portion of it; and it was this universal enthusiasm for the fatherland which inspired its heroic conduct in the battles of Aspern and Wagram.

Among the various branches of the service, ancient tradition had allotted a leading place to the thirty-five regiments of the Imperial cavalry, which (except at Marmora) had invariably distinguished itself in war. The infantry, numbering 78 regiments and nine *Jäger* battalions, was somewhat clumsy in action, but admirable in discipline; and its grenadiers formed a picked body of troops, which remained unscathed at Aspern and Wagram. The field artillery, consisting of four regiments, was well trained, and during the campaign of 1809 superior to the French in the number of its guns.

The mobilisation of the Austrian army commenced in January, 1809. On February 25, 1809, the strategical concentration began. The plan of operations was to attack the French troops under the command of Davout in central Germany, together with the Rhinebund troops (in all about 200,000 strong), and to defeat them before Napoleon could bring up his reinforcements. The Austrian army in Germany was under the command of Archduke Charles, who was appointed commander-in-chief. The "army of Lower Austria," under Archduke John, was to proceed simultaneously against the French forces in Italy and Dalmatia; while a third army, under Archduke Ferdinand, was to invade the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. In accordance with this plan of operations, Archduke Charles assembled, towards the end of March, six army corps in western Bohemia. This position was opposite to the centre of the enemy's radius of concentration and close to northern Germany, in which a rising was expected. Two army-corps were also concentrated in Upper Austria in order to invade Bavaria on both banks of the Danube. Archduke John had orders to invade north-eastern Italy from

Willach-Lafach with two army-corps, and to dispatch a column to Tyrol, to form a nucleus for the expected rising in that country, which bore willingly the Hungarian yoke. A detachment was to advance into Dalmatia and cover the rear of Archduke John's army. Archduke Ferdinand's army-corps was to move from Cremona and to occupy Warsaw so as to watch, from thence, the Elbe above Berlin. Clearly, this plan of operations did not fail on the side of comprehensiveness.

On the French side, the situation did not admit of plans so definite in their aim, not only because the French army was at first strictly limited to the defensive, but because, scattered as it was over a wide extent of country, it could only proceed to the seat of war by sections. Napoleon had, it is true, completed his military preparations by the middle of January, 1809. While still in Spain, he sent orders to the princes of the Rhineland to place their contingents on a war footing. Troops were sent from France; and the Imperial Guard was dispatched from Spain to Germany. The French troops under Davout, then dispersed over northern Germany, received orders to march into Bavaria. But these orders were insufficient to secure to the Emperor at the outbreak of war those two most important factors of commercial superiority and initiative. At the beginning of April, the entire force which he could dispose of at the various seats of war (exclusive of Spain) amounted to only 165,000 men (French and Rhineland troops) in Bavaria; 16,000 (Poles) in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; 50,000 in Saxony; 57,000 in Italy north of the Po; and 18,000 in Dalmatia. In Bavaria the French army was not only inferior in numbers to the army of Archduke Charles, and far weaker in artillery, but it was also seriously dislocated. And in Bavaria lay the crux of the whole war.

Archduke Charles' original plan of operations had to be altered even before its execution began. The Archduke had meant to take the field at the end of March. But, as all the troops had not yet arrived on the scene of action, and as news had come that the French army of the Rhine was approaching Batisdon, the commencement of operations was put off till the second week in April, while the main army advanced from Bohemia to the Brenner-Passau line. Here, on the evening of April 8, were finally marshalled 134,000 men, forming a front scarcely twenty-eight miles in length. Besides these, 50,000 men under General Bellegarde were at Tabor, and 10,000 under General Jellachich at Salzburg. In all, 194,000 men crossed the Bavarian frontier on April 10. The Austrian offensive found the French army of the Rhine not yet assembled. Davout was engaged in carrying out the directions sent by the Emperor from Paris to Berthier, who was then at Strasbourg and was temporarily entrusted with the conduct of operations. These directions ordered a concentration upon Donauwörth. At the same date the various divisions of the French army, numbering 80,000 men, distributed in five groups, were drawn up

on the line Munich-Ratisbon-Würzburg (a line 112 miles in length), behind which 75,000 men lay between Augsburg and Donauwörth.

Archduke Charles had meant by rapid marches to reach the line in the direction of Landshut, while Hellegarde was to march upon Ratisbon, and Jellachich upon Munich. It would have been quite possible for the Austrian main army to reach the line by April 14. Instead of this, owing to the defective arrangements of the commissariat, it advanced very slowly, and accomplished only half a worned march daily. Hence lay one of the principal causes of the later Austrian reverses. It was the most valuable of all commodities in time; and the French generals knew how to handle it as economically that by April 15 the various divisions of their army were already drawn close together in the direction of Donauwörth. Then, all of a sudden, Balthazar interfered disastrously in the course of operations, with a view to effecting a concentration at Ratisbon. A change of orders became necessary, proving the truth of the saying: "Order—counter-order—chaos!" To be sure, Balthazar might have said he was only acting in obedience to Napoleon's commands; but Napoleon did not leave Paris till April 13, and even he, at such a distance, was not in a position to make arrangements in accordance with the actual condition of things.

Consequently, when the Emperor entered Donauwörth early on April 17, he found the situation far from favourable, since the disposition of the French forces made it possible for Archduke Charles to attack and defeat the scattered units one by one. But the Archduke, whose advanced forces had won several unimportant successes between the 11th and the 13th, had in the meanwhile become "skilled o'er with the pale cast of thought." Although, on the 14th, he had driven the Bavarians out of Landshut, and thus possessed himself of the key of the Dan, he abandoned his design of breaking through the enemy's front, and decided on the 16th to attack the French left wing under Ilsemt at Ratisbon, maintaining the defensive against the Bavarians on the right.

With the personal intervention of Napoleon the course of operations underwent a complete change. In the end, his energy succeeded in rectifying the strategic blunders of Balthazar. But even here, as in the *Marrano* campaign, Napoleon's merit has been much overrated. But for the remarkable tactical achievements of his marshals and the blunders of Archduke Charles, the "*Ratisbon campaign*" (so the military movements of April 19-23 are called) would have had a different issue. It was, above all, a serious mistake on Napoleon's part that he miscalculated the date when hostilities were likely to commence. He did not expect them to begin till a fortnight later, and he ought to have been much earlier on the spot.

The Emperor had originally intended to concentrate his forces on the left bank of the Danube, at a point further to the west, between Augsburg and Ingolstadt; but, having reconnoitred the enemy's position,

he decided, on April 17, to effect his junction on the left bank in the neighbourhood of Abensberg. The orders relating to this movement were conceived, it is true, in masterly fashion; but, as ought to have been foreseen, they became impracticable, in the most important details, when on the 18th the Austrian commander carried out his intention of making a determined attack, with all his available forces, on the French left wing. This wing consisted of four divisions under Durost, whom Napoleon had directed to approach the main army by marching to Neustadt in a southerly direction. Such a march, with the Danube in the rear and a vastly superior enemy in front, could only be carried out as a flank movement, one of the most difficult of all military operations. Napoleon himself would have been the first to condemn any other commander for attempting a movement so contrary to all the rules of war. Moreover, recent marches have shown that Napoleon gave this order without knowing how Durost was situated; it was, therefore, an order based on false assumptions. Durost, by means of magnificent generalship, succeeded, after a fierce battle at Hainau on April 19, in escaping the overthrow that threatened him; but this was chiefly if not entirely owing to the fact that, at the last moment, Archduke Charles failed to bring his entire force (which was far superior to Durost's) energetically into the field. Thus the Marshal succeeded in joining Lefebvre's corps, which on the 18th had also fought with equal success at Abensberg against isolated detachments of the Austrian army. If the events of the 18th meant no decided victory for the French, they had great influence on the whole future course of the campaign, seeing that, from this point onwards, Napoleon altered his tactics, acting solely on the offensive, while Archduke Charles confined himself to the defensive. Now, as Moltke said, "the offensive alone is real generalship"; and this was proved by the later incidents of the campaign of 1809.

On April 20, Ratibon, where only one French regiment was posted, fell into the hands of Count Bellegarde, who formed with his two army-corps the extreme right wing of the Austrian army, and had till now been operating by himself on the left bank of the Danube. But the possession of Ratibon had no further influence on the course of the operations, for on the 20th Napoleon with his united forces fell upon the Austrian left wing, and in the battle of Abensberg inflicted on it a decisive defeat. The following day Napoleon pursued the battle against the Austrian left as it was retiring upon Landshut, and cut it off from the main army. Durost advanced simultaneously upon the right wing and forced it to retreat. But the decisive blow against that part of the Austrian army which was under the direct command of Archduke Charles was not struck till the battle of Eckmühl (April 22). Here, in spite of a stubborn resistance, the Austrians were beaten; and a general retirement along the whole line of front became inevitable. This, however, could take place only by the separation of the army into two bodies.

The left wing, under Hiller, disappeared in a south-westerly direction towards the Isar; while the main army under Archduke Charles, going south, attempted to gain the left bank of the Danube. This it succeeded in reaching on the 5th by way of Ratiborn, which the French, after an obstinate defence on the part of the Austrian rear-guard, stormed on the evening of the same day.

Thus ended the five days' campaign of Ratiborn, in which the Austrians lost nearly 40,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Austrian army was broken up. Its condition after the defeat was such that the French Emperor had no further opposition to fear in his march on Vienna. On the morning of April 28 Archduke Charles himself wrote to his Imperial brother: "Napoleon's position grows steadily stronger; and I shall be very lucky if, after yesterday's defeat, I succeed in bringing the army with honour across the Danube. I have given your Majesty an accurate account of my position; and I must add that against such an enemy nothing more can be expected from what is left of this army."

As a commander-in-chief Napoleon remains to this day unequalled in the readiness following-up of victory. Casually perceiving Hiller's division of the Austrian army, the French Emperor appeared before Vienna on May 18. Three days later he rode into the Imperial city, which had offered only a feeble show of resistance. Meanwhile, Archduke Charles, who had reassembled his army, approached the Danube from Baden in the direction of Vienna, and about the middle of May took up his position in threatening proximity on the left bank. His intention was to cross to the right bank, and so threaten, if possible, the French communications. This plan, however, was frustrated by Napoleon, who was fully determined to win a decisive victory by a vigorous offensive. The battle was to be fought on the Marchfeld, where the Archduke had effected a junction with the troops under Hiller—that historic field where Rudolf of Habsburg conquered the Bohemian King Ottokar, and thereby founded the power of his House.

Napoleon's plan of attacking Archduke Charles on the Marchfeld was bold in the extreme, because he would first have to cross the Danube, and then to fight with the river in his rear. On May 18 he had gathered together 70,000 men south-east of Vienna. Having planted himself firmly on the left bank of the Danube at Aspern and Essling, he commenced operations by transporting his army by means of four military bridges to Lobau, an island formed by one of the numerous arms of the Danube. From Wauseng, a hill commanding a view of the wide plain of the Marchfeld, Archduke Charles had watched the movements of the French. He quickly brought his troops into order of battle, and determined to fall with his full strength upon the feeble force which Napoleon, who did not believe the Archduke to be so near him, had transported to the left bank of the river.

These troops did not amount to more than 17,000 infantry, with 9000 horse and 52 guns, under Marshal Desaix. Against these, about noon on Monday in Whitens week (May 21), 80,000 infantry, 15,000 horse, and 500 guns, formed in three columns, advanced to the attack. But, in spite of all their courage, the Austrians failed to take Aspern and Essling, the two points d'appui of the French. Aspern was defended by Masséna with Mellet's division, Essling by Marshal Lannes with that of Bonnet. Repeated attacks were made on these positions, only to be repulsed in every case by the indomitable defenders. On the other hand, the attempt made by Napoleon to break through the centre of the enemy's line by a great cavalry charge failed signally, owing to the stubbornness of the Austrian infantry. Equally unsuccessful was a second attack of the combined French cavalry, made about eight o'clock in the evening upon the Austrian horse. When it grew dark, Aspern was only partially in possession of the Austrians, while they had been altogether unable to force an entry into Essling. Nevertheless, the Austrian army held the French (as Masséna, the defender of Aspern, expresses it in his memoirs) "closely hemmed in by a ring of fire and steel"; and during the night the battle repeatedly flared up afresh.

At 5 a.m. on the 22nd Masséna recommenced the bloody work with a vigorous and unexpected attack on the Austrians in Aspern, and drove them from this fiercely contested position. Further fighting took place at Essling, which finally resulted in the hands of the French. At seven o'clock Napoleon began to deploy the forces massed between Aspern and Essling for a combined attack. During the night fresh bodies of troops, the 9th corps, under Lannes, the granadier corps, under Ordener, and the Imperial Guard, had crossed the Danube; so that in all about 25,000 men, with 8000 horse, pressed forward against the Austrian line. Before the tremendous onset of the French, who advanced in close order with the regularity of men on parade, some of the Austrian battalions began to waver, when Archduke Charles, seizing the banner of the 24th regiment, flung himself into the deep. His heroic example inspired his troops; and the advance of the French infantry was checked. Similarly the French regiments of horse, after overthrowing the enemy's cavalry in a magnificent charge, finally retired before the advance of the Austrian grenadiers. In the centre the battle came to a standstill.

At nine o'clock the news reached Napoleon that the enemy had set on fire and destroyed the largest of the military bridges. This was disastrous news. It might mean the annihilation of the French army, if the Austrians succeeded in taking Aspern and Essling; for in this case the French retreat across the Danube would be seriously imperilled. A furious conflict therefore again broke out round the two villages, whose position was now marked only by heaps of smouldering ruins. The struggle for Aspern and Essling is one of the most memorable and

also the most sanguinary combats in military history. At 4 a.m. the French won back Essling, which they had lost; and they held it till the end of the battle. Aspern, on the other hand, fell finally into the hands of the Austrians later in the day. But their strength also was exhausted. They were no longer able to hamper the retreat of the enemy, who, the same evening and during the following night, crossed over to the island of Lobau, after having with immense labour succeeded in retreating the bridges. The losses on both sides were enormous. The Austrians had lost from 22,000 to 25,000 men; the French from 18,000 to 20,000, the gallant Marshal Lannes being among those who perished.

The battle of Aspern made a powerful impression on both friend and foe. For the first time, the prize of victory had escaped the hitherto invincible Emperor. This fact remained unnoticed by the beautiful bulletin issued by Napoleon on May 22, in which he estimated the French losses at 4000, and declared that on May 22 he "renewed master of the battlefield." On the other hand, there is some ground for the reproach brought against Archduke Charles of having let slip the opportunity offered him by the critical position of the French army, which was forced to wait several days on the island of Lobau without food or ammunition. There is justice in this accusation as regards the afternoon of the 22d; but afterwards there appear to have been political reasons for the delay. At the end of May the Prince of Orange made his appearance at the Archduke's headquarters, as confidential envoy of the Prussian Court, with the promise of help from Prussia. In the beginning of June it seemed likely enough that King Frederick William III, under the pressure of the war party, would actually decide on taking part in the war. But when, at Kőnigsberg, on June 18, the Austrian ambassador, Baron Steigentesch, delivered letters to the King, both from the Emperor Francis and Archduke Charles, and endeavored to obtain a definite engagement, the King deferred his decision in the hope that things might become clearer in the future. Steigentesch returned with his mission unaccomplished.

Between the armies a seven weeks' armistice was arranged, which was used by both to obtain reinforcements. In the beginning of July an army of 150,000 men—partly French, partly troops of the Rhine Confederation, and including 50,000 horse—was massed on the island of Lobau, ready to repeat the attempt of the previous May. The French now had a numerical superiority, for Archduke Charles had but 125,000 men, including 15,000 horse, though he certainly held a strong position behind the Raasdorf with the Marchfeld before him. His artillery was slightly superior in numbers to the French.

In the night of July 4-5, amid thunder and lightning and in torrents of rain, the French columns began to cross the Danube on the four bridges. On July 5, at midday, their approach completed, they advanced in close columns from Gross-Enzersdorf against the Austrians, who at

even in the evening repulsed with heavy loss an assault upon the heights of Wagram. But the real attack did not take place till the following day. Napoleon had determined to direct it against the enemy's left wing, while the Austrian centre was to be broken simultaneously by a charge of densely-packed masses of cavalry and infantry. Archduke Charles had also decided to take the offensive, directing his main attack upon the French left, which was to be surprised at early dawn. But the order reached his generals too late, and the Archduke was obliged to change his plan. At 5 a.m. he pushed forward his centre, and fell upon the French in the village of Aspern. The struggle for the possession of this place was bitter and prolonged, resembling that for Aspern two months before. Fortune alternated: in the end the village remained in the hands of the Austrian grenadiers under the heroic General d'Aspre. On their right wing also the Austrian columns pressed forward victoriously by Süssenbaum and Breitensteiner to the backs of the Dumaie. At this moment matters looked critical for the French; but the Emperor, hastening to the centre of the fight, ordered 100 guns, the historic "grand battery," to be massed at Süssenbaum to check the Austrian advance. Soon afterwards he launched against the enemy a solid column, consisting of 30,000 infantry and 6000 horse, moving in an compact mass under Marmont's command. Though the French eventually succeeded, with heavy loss, in attaining their object, it was not at this point that the issue was decided. This took place in another part of the field, near Markgraben-Kautschel, where Marshal Durocat beat the enemy's intrenched left wing under Prince Rosenberg, rolled it up, and so tore a breach in the Austrian front. Their right wing was also forced back by Marmont at Aspern. Everywhere limited to the defensive, with no prospect of the long-expected help from Archduke John (who was to have advanced from Presburg and fallen on the enemy's right flank), Archduke Charles reluctantly gave, at two o'clock, the order to retreat.

Though a defeat for Austria, the battle of Wagram was one of the most brilliant feats of arms in Austrian history. The Austrian losses, in the two days' fighting, amounted to 24,000, killed and wounded. Those of the French were estimated at 18,000. On the following day Archduke Charles drew off his army in good order in the direction of Znaim and Igrow, pursued, though but feebly, by the French. There was some more fighting at Znaim on July 10 and 11; but an armistice on the 18th put an end to further hostilities. The Emperor Francis at first refused to sanction this; but on the 17th, at Komorn, he reluctantly consented to the cessation.

We must now turn to review the course of the war elsewhere. At the outset of the struggle, Austria was compelled to reckon on a conflict not only with the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but also with Russia, since



both these States were allied with France. Consequently, in March, 1863, a force of 85 battalions, 44 squadrons of cavalry, and 78 guns (28,000 men in all) were concentrated, as a 7th army-corps, in western Galicia, and placed under the command of Archduke Ferdinand. On April 15, the Archduke, from his base at Nowe-Miasto, commenced operations, aiming in the first place at the capture of Warsaw. This enterprise was open to the strategic objection that it exposed the right flank to a Russian force stationed on the Pruth; but it was not expected that this force would push forward with speed or decision. In addition to 40,000 Russians under Prince Galitsin, the Austrians had to face 17,000 Poles and 2,000 Saxons, whom Prince Poniatowski had assembled near Rzeczyca, a day's march north of Warsaw.

Archduke Ferdinand advanced rapidly, beat Poniatowski at Rzeczyca (April 19), and occupied Warsaw (April 22); the *Sto-ko-pot* at Praga was a suburb of Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula—remained, however, in the hands of the Poles. Early in May Poniatowski took the offensive, and on the 25th, after a successful combat, occupied Gura, at which point the Austrians had intended to cross the Vistula. The Archduke, finding himself unable to advance further against the main Polish army, determined to make a demonstration in the direction of Thorn, in order to divert the attention of the enemy from Galicia. The plan failed, however; for Poniatowski led his troops up the Vistula, occupied Lublin (May 14) and Sandomir (May 18), and on the 20th stormed Zamosc. At the same time the Russians advanced towards Lemberg, while a strong Polish force approached Warsaw. Thus threatened on all sides, the Archduke was forced, on June 3, to evacuate the city, and to withdraw to Opaszko, in the upper valley of the Vistula. Although the Austrians made some successful raids from this point, the further advance of the Russians from Lemberg, and the presence of 30,000 Poles, strongly posted near Sandomir, made the Archduke's position untenable. Early in July he fell back upon the line Vladimir-Zamosc, but was afterwards ordered to retire upon Olshita by way of Cracow. On July 18 the news of the armistice of Zamosc put an end to hostilities in this quarter. The Austrian Government has been blamed, with some justice, for undertaking the Polish campaign at all. The decision of the war lay, in any case, with the main army under Archduke Charles; and Poland was so far distant that events in that country could have no serious influence on the issue. On the other hand, the 80,000 men, who fought bravely but uselessly under Archduke Ferdinand, might well have turned the scale at Aspern or Wagram.

Now was this the only difficulty which stood in the way of Austrian success. It has been mentioned above that, on the afternoon of July 3, Archduke John was valiantly expected on the battle-field. Till that time he had been independently conducting the operations of the army of Inner Austria, consisting of 48,000 men, 8000 horses, and 130

guns, which had crossed the Italian frontier at Tarvis on April 8. On April 16, at Salsò, he came upon a Franco-Italian army of 35,000 men, led by Eugene de Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, and inflicted on it a decisive defeat. He followed up this blow by another at Caldiero on the 29th. But the bad news from Germany obliged the Archduke to retire to Wiltsch early in May. After a series of collisions, the issue of which was unfavourable to the Austrians, he had to abandon Galicia to the French (who in the meanwhile had received considerable reinforcements), and to withdraw into Hungary. On June 7 he arrived before the fortress of Raab, followed by Eugene, who was now attempting to cover the movements of the main French army towards Hungary. In Croatia and Dalmatia also there had been fighting with Marshal Marmont's corps, ending in the retreat of the Austrians.

On June 14 the Archduke again challenged the fortune of arms at Raab, but was beaten and obliged to retreat by way of Komorn to Presburg, whence he was summoned to take part in the battle of Wagram. It was his own fault that he arrived too late for effective interference. In any case, it is doubtful whether Archduke John, who could bring no more than 12,000 men into the field, would have been able to turn the tide of war at Wagram.

At the beginning of the campaign, Archduke John was also commissioned to deliver Tyrol from Bavarian rule, under which it had fallen by the Peace of Presburg. He despatched General Chasteler with 10,000 men, who were to push forward up the valley of the Drava by way of Belien towards the Brenner and form the nucleus of an army to assist the general rising of the loyal Tyrolese. Popular levies speedily rallied on all sides round their self-constituted leaders, attacked the feeble Bavarian garrisons, and drove them, in some cases after obstinate fighting, to leave the country. In four days the whole of northern Tyrol was freed; and the Imperial flag waved once more in Innsbruck. General du Chasteler now advanced to Trient and even as far as the Lake of Garda. He was, however, compelled to hasten back again to northern Tyrol, the recovery of which had been undertaken by the Bavarian General Wrede, who invaded the country with strong forces from the north and north-east the beginning of May. In spite of the heroic efforts of the Tyrolese, who in their mountain valleys fought the desperate warry with rifles, bayonets, and rocks, the Bavarians made progress and occupied Innsbruck on May 22.

General Wrede now despatched part of his forces to join the French main army, but he had no sooner done so, than the Tyrolese answered again the call to arms. On May 23, 35,000 Tyrolese under Andreas Hofer, the innkeeper of Füssen, and such popular leaders as Speitbacher and Peter Hauper, appeared before Innsbruck, which, after a fierce battle on the Iselberg, fell the same day into their hands. For the second time the Bavarians were compelled to evacuate Tyrol. But as the Tyrolese

refused to recognise the terms of the armistice of Znaim, the full weight of the French Emperor's fury was turned against the little country, which, in its courageous loyalty, believed itself strong enough to defy even a Napoleon. From all directions strong columns pushed into the Tyrolean valleys. But everywhere they met with so obstinate a resistance that they were forced to draw back; and on August 18, after a sanguinary conflict on the Iselberg, the Tyrolese for the third time marched victoriously into Innsbruck. As "commander-in-chief in Tyrol," Hofer now undertook not only the military but also the political direction of affairs. Europe beheld with amazement the triumphant resistance of the Tyrolese, who in very deed had proved the truth of Schiller's words:

"Dreadful is that people,  
Which on its bosom dares not state its ill."

Yet this heroic struggle was in the end to be crushed by sheer brute force, through the enemy's numerical superiority. Napoleon, furious at the expected failure of his arms, gave orders to the Viceroy of Italy to invade the country from the south, while the Bavarians poured into it from the north and east. The conflict raged with alternating fortunes in the hard-ried land, for even after the Peace of Schönbrunn (October 15) the Tyrolese did not abandon the struggle. But, when Hofer, after the so-called fourth battle on the Iselberg (November 1 and 2), was compelled to retreat, he himself led his fellow-countrymen give up the unequal contest. Nevertheless he countermanded the order, and soon gave out both the call to arms. But to alter the fate of his country was beyond his power, although the sanguinary strife was prolonged all December, incessantly renewed. Like the battles in the Peninsula, with extreme bitterness on either side. At length Andreas Hofer was betrayed into the hands of the French; and, after a trial by martial law, he was shot at Mantua, on February 21, 1809. He maintained his heroic constancy to the last, and himself gave his executioners the word to fire. The revolt of the Tyrolese, their heroic fight for their Emperor and for the deliverance of their country, will remain for all time one of the noblest pages in modern German history.

The rising of Austria against Napoleon gave the signal for several efforts in Germany to shake off the French yoke. At the end of April, 1809, in Hesse, which had suffered heavily through the bad government of King Jerome, there was a general rising under the leadership of Baron von Dörnberg, a cavalry captain. It was, however, suppressed with much bloodshed. Equally unsuccessful was the attempt of some officers, formerly in the Prussian service, to surprise the fortress of Magdeburg.

More importance attached to the enterprise of the Prussian major, Frederick von Schill, who already in the campaign of 1806-7 had won a

reputation for gallantry. On April 28, 1806, he left Berlin at the head of his regiment of Hussars, and crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg, in order to carry the insurrection into Hesse and Westphalia. On May 8 he beat the French troops who had been despatched against him from Magdeburg; on the 15th he captured the small fortress of Dimitz in Mecklenburg on the lower Elbe, meaning to move thence to Stralsund, where he intended to await the arrival of English ships. On the march thither, having meanwhile received reinforcements, including four guns, he fell (May 27) upon a body of Mecklenburg troops, which he put to flight, taking many prisoners, four standards, and two guns. On the following day Stralsund, after a brief resistance, fell into Schill's hands. But on May 31 some Danish and Dutch troops appeared before Stralsund and stormed it, after a fierce fight in which most of Schill's volunteers were killed or wounded. In the strife Schill himself met with a soldier's honorable death; and on September 16, eleven officers of his corps, who had been taken prisoners, were tried by martial law and shot, by Napoleon's orders, on the ramparts of Wesel. Although this attempt was doomed to failure, it at least served to rouse the spirit of patriotism throughout the length and breadth of northern Germany, and to kindle hatred against the alien rule of the French. Round Schill and his brave band poetry and legend soon wove a web of popular glories, which deepened the feeling of common nationality throughout Germany.

The same may be said of the heroic adventures of Duke Frederick William of Brunswick-Oels. At the outbreak of the war, he had formed a volunteer corps in Bohemia; and at its head, together with some Austrian troops, he invaded Saxony. On June 11 they occupied Dresden, and after several successful combats, forced the Saxon and Westphalian troops under King Jerome to retreat. After the armistice of Teynys, the Duke conceived the bold plan of fighting his way to the mouth of the Weser and thence taking ship to England. On July 20 he started from Götting with 2000 men, and, repeatedly beating back the French troops, won his way to Brunswick, which he entered on July 28. On the following day he and his "Black Troop" (so called from their dark uniforms) again defeated the enemy, who had pressed in hot pursuit to the very gates of his capital. Surrounded on all sides, the Duke was forced to leave Brunswick, whence he reached the lower Weser, and embarked with his men on board British ships at Elbfleth. His little troop subsequently fought with much honour under Wellington in Spain.

If it was only indirectly that England thus did a service to the "good cause," she had in the meanwhile, independently of events in Spain and Portugal, taken direct action in the war by the expedition to the island of Walcheren. In April, 1806, Count Stakenberg had been hastily sent to London as ambassador from the Austrian Court, to persuade the British Cabinet, not only to grant a subsidy, but to

undertake a military diversion on the German coast. After lengthy negotiations, Canning granted a monthly subsidy of £150,000. On the other hand the British Ministry declined the plan suggested by the Austrian Government for a landing at the mouth of the Weser with a view to aiding an insurrection in northern Germany. They determined instead on an expedition to the Scheldt. From a military point of view this plan was certainly not a happy one; it was chiefly dictated by political and commercial considerations. The chief point with Great Britain was to render Antwerp insecure.

The expedition did not leave the English harbour till July 28. It was in five divisions. A fleet of 28 ships of the line, 86 frigates, and a large number of gunboats, under Sir Richard Sturges, escorted the land-forces, which numbered nearly 40,000 men, under Lord Chatham, who was commander-in-chief. On July 30 the army landed on the island of Walcheren; on the 31st Middelburg, Veere, and Zierikzee capitulated. On August 1 General Fraser captured Fort Haan. The French squadron retired up the Scheldt to Antwerp, and found safety under the shelter of its guns. The British troops now advanced to the siege of Flushing, the most important point on Walcheren, defended by General Monnet with 3000 men. On August 3 General Hope occupied the island of South Beveland; but the attack upon Caland, opposite Flushing, failed. Flushing was by this time not only besieged from the land side, but bombarded by the British fleet from the sea.

Meanwhile the French had recovered from their first shock of surprise caused by the landing on Walcheren; and troops were rapidly despatched from all directions for the defence of Antwerp and the Scheldt. Marshal Bernadotte took over the supreme command. On August 16, however, Flushing was forced to capitulate. The British forces now attempted to press on up the Scheldt; but the river was so well guarded by its forts that they could make but little way. Meanwhile the French fleet had been carried up the river beyond Antwerp, where it was out of reach; the French fortifications had, by dint of great energy, been placed in a fair condition for defence; and a large body of troops stood ready for action in the open field. The moral and military commanders on the British side were unable to agree as to the further course of operations; and the troops suffered terribly from the malarial climate of Walcheren and South Beveland. On September 3 the British ships made another attempt to sail up the Scheldt, but without success; and on September 4 South Beveland was evacuated, after a council of war (August 26) had decided that the expeditionary force under Sir Eyre Coote should concentrate on Walcheren. On Sept. 14 Lord Chatham returned to England.

The French took no offensive measures, but left the destruction of the enemy to the climate and to sickness. Walcheren fever, as it was called, made terrible ravage among the British troops, so that at the end of December hardly half of this fine force (the largest that had

ever yet sailed from English harbours) were able to bear arms. On December 23 the remainder, after destroying the fortifications of Flushing, left Walsheren, and returned home. In England there was universal indignation over the result of this expedition, which had sent so many brave soldiers to a useless death, and swallowed up a huge sum of money. In Parliament severe attacks were made upon the Government; but the consideration of enquiry failed to come to any conclusion, except that there had been a want of unanimity among the commanders. Eventually the discussion led, not only to a rupture, but to a duel between Caning and Castlough; and both claimants resigned office.

During many months the peace negotiations, which had been begun at the outset of the armistice, made no progress. More than once they were on the point of being broken off; and a renewal of the war, for which the Empress Marie Louise Beatrix, Archduke John, and Count Stadion were very anxious, was expected. But presently Stadion's influence began to pale before that of Metternich, the result being a disastrous decision in the conduct of affairs, inasmuch as, since Wagram, Metternich had gone over to the peace party, and had ended by becoming a keen supporter of the Napoleonic system. He was upheld by Archduke Charles, who, immediately after the unfortunate issue of the Russian campaign, had urged the conclusion of peace. But, after the armistice, serious differences of opinion arose between the Archduke and his Imperial brother, in consequence of which the former resigned the supreme command and retired into private life—as irreparable loss to Austria and her army.

In the last week of July the preliminary for the peace negotiations began. These were opened at Altonburg on August 15 between Metternich, Nugent, and Champagny. But their course was anything but smooth. It was found impossible to accept in toto (on this point the Emperor Francis stood firm) the conditions of Napoleon, who demanded, in the first place, the abdication of the Emperor Francis, as well as large concessions of territory. In the middle of September it looked as if the Emperor of Austria had determined to continue the war, especially as a secret Prussian army, Colonel von dem Knesebeck, had declared the willingness of his sovereign to join Austria under certain conditions. Eventually, however, the arguments in favour of peace prevailed; and on September 23 the Emperor Francis dispatched Prince Liechtenstein with Count Balbo to Napoleon's head-quarters in Vienna, there to conclude peace. Peace was signed at Schönbrunn on October 14.

The Peace of Schönbrunn laid very severe conditions upon Austria. She ceded to Napoleon, for the Emperor of the Confederation of the Rhine, Salzburg, Boctingenden, and a large part of Upper Austria;

to Napoleon, for his own use, Austrian Poland, Trieste, with parts of Carinthia, Carinthia, Croatia, and Dalmatia—whose districts were hence, directly placed under a single government as the "Illyrian Provinces"; to Saxony, the whole of western Galicia; and part of eastern Galicia to Russia. She recognised the changes made, or to be made, in Spain, Portugal, and Italy; she adhered to the Continental System; and she paid a large indemnity in money. By a secret clause she undertook to reduce her army to 150,000 men. This treaty relegated Austria to a place among the Powers of the second rank. Her attempt to shatter Napoleon's supremacy on the Continent had disastrously failed. Metternich, however, had taken into his hands the conduct of affairs. With Stadion's retirement Austria lost a statesman of the first class, a man whose views were in harmony with the spirit of his time, who would have guided, not only the foreign, but also the domestic policy of the Austrian Empire into happier paths. The system which Metternich established was very different. So early as the autumn of 1805, he was already spinning the first threads of the intrigue which led to the marriage of the Archduchess Marie-Louise with Napoleon; and down to the year 1815 he steadily pursued a policy, in regard to foreign affairs, of acquiescence in the supremacy of France; while, in regard to domestic government, he from the outset displayed the reactionary tendencies which were in the end to prove disastrous to Austria.

The war of 1809, unfortunate as was its immediate issue, had one notable result. It destroyed, in the eyes of Europe, the halo of invincibility that had surrounded the head of Napoleon. It struck the beginning of the national awakening, the first step towards the overthrow of Napoleon's power.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM.

THE promulgation of the Berlin Decree against British commerce was one of those dramatic strokes by which Napoleon sought to double the effect of his actions. The popular imagination was awed by the suddenness with which the conqueror turned aside from the task of completing the ruin of Prussia in order to launch his thunderbolt against the hitherto invulnerable islanders, and to launch it, too, from the capital of Frederick the Great. In Napoleon's career the element of the melodramatic frequently obtrudes itself; but those who have observed the workings of his statecraft over a long term of years know that the stage thunder is but the climax in a carefully prepared situation, when the minds of all observers are in a state of tense expectancy. It is no exaggeration to say that the Berlin Decree of November, 1806, was the climax towards which Napoleon's policy had long been working on one of its best-marked lines. His power as a statesman lay in his skill in adapting to present needs the most practical among the ideas and theories woven by the brain of the former generation; and the events already described enabled him now to apply them to a huge part of the Continent of Europe. The Berlin Decree constitutes, perhaps, the highest example of a union of the practical and theoretical in statecraft. Overwhelmed by the suddenness of the blow, contemporaries could not see that it was but the outcome of thoughts and efforts, whose beginnings had long been observable. Briefly stated, the idea which took form in the Berlin Decree was to subject Great Britain to complete commercial isolation from the Continent in order to compel her to surrender at discretion. But this idea was by no means new. It had its beginning in the Mercantilist theory of commerce, in the teachings of Hobson on national economy, and in the speculations of the Physiocrats.

It is impossible here to trace in detail the development of these ideas from the time of their inception down to the revolutionary era, when some, at least, became political activities. Some general remarks only can be made. French statesmen who thought about the wider interests of commerce belonged with scarcely an exception to the



Mercantilist school. From the time of Colbert to that of Vergennes, the greatest statesman was he who could increase the internal resources of France, and set her free from all dependence on the foreigner. Turgot alone severed aside of set purpose in the direction of free trade with foreigners; and his action was speedily reversed. In concluding a treaty of commerce with Great Britain in 1763, Calonne and Vergennes were probably influenced solely by the belief that moderate duties would bring in a larger revenue than the prohibitive duties formerly imposed; and that treaty cannot be looked on as a triumph of Free Trade principles in France. The rebound towards the older fiscal methods in and after 1763 was overpoweringly strong; and, after the outbreak of war in February, 1793, public men of all shades of thought were ready to adopt any conceivable means in order to ruin British commerce.

The political theories of the age previous to the Revolution also served to confound the thinkers of France that the struggle with Great Britain would be easily won. The perfect State, according to Rousseau, was one that sufficed for all its needs and could do without foreign trade. The ideal commonwealth was "that which can subsist without other nations, and without which every other nation can subsist." Subsequent events emphasized the contrast here implied between the life of a self-sufficing agricultural community and that of a commercial State such as Britain or Holland. The agrarian reforms of the French Revolution tended to make France more self-sufficing, while Great Britain, under Pitt's able guidance, was fast becoming the purveyor of the world.

The lessons taught by Rousseau as regard to ethics and legislation had also been set forth by the Physiocrats in the sphere of economic theory. The teachings of Quesnay and of his followers rested on the assumption that the only true source of national wealth was the land, and that States would prosper in proportion as they developed agriculture and raw materials. Manufactures might be productive of refinement and utility, but could not add to the stock of national wealth, inasmuch as they did but change the form of existing material. Agriculture alone, therefore, was capable of producing a clear gain to the community; manufactures could not yield it, for they were "sterile." These views had no small influence on the leaders of thought in France before the Revolution.

As a result of these three diverse influences, there was a general tendency in 1789-93 to exalt agriculture and depreciate commerce. It was helped on by the cult of *Lycorgus*, to which Saint-Just gave so much vigor. It was probably the appeals to the legendary life of Sparta that were most effective among the militant Jacobins who came to power in 1793; but the speeches of members of the Convention contain many passages which show that England was not only hated as the shade of corrupting commerce, but also despised on the ground of economic and political unwisdom. Some even of the Girondins

took this view. Thus, on January 18, 1793, Kersaint, in presenting the official report of the Committee of Defence, used these words:—"The credit of England rests upon fictitious wealth: the real riches of that people are scattered everywhere...Asia, Portugal, and Spain are the most advantageous markets for the productions of English industry: we should shut those markets to the English by opening them to all the world. We must attack Lisbon and the Brazil, and carry an auxiliary army to Tippoo Sultan. The Republic of Italy offers you maritime prizes, the loss of which will tell on English commerce." In pursuance of this policy, the Convention, on September 25, 1793, excluded from French ports all goods that were not brought by French ships or the ships of neutrals; and on October 3 and 10 all merchandise produced in Great Britain or her colonies was proscribed throughout the French Republic. At the same time Cloots declared that the possession of the mouths of the Rhine was essential to the success of France in her new enterprise.

The Decree of October 25, 1793, carried the policy of commercial war to still greater lengths. The assembly stated that it was the duty of French legislation to encourage French industry, and to exclude every product manufactured by the enemy. The Act carried this into effect, and further declared that any ship laden either in whole or in part with British goods might be seized in any French port. A large number of goods were to be considered as British, namely, cotton, wools, and woollen stuffs, "English" carpets, bottoms, cutlery, hardware, machinery, tanned leather, refined sugar, pottery, &c. None of these might be exposed for sale, under pain of seizure. The same prohibition applied to the products of India unless accompanied by certificates of the Dutch and Danish companies, duly vouched by the French consuls.

Thus, the beginnings of the Continental System are clearly traceable in the thought and policy of France long before the advent of Bonaparte in power. He was in turn the pupil, the agent, and the master of the men who had long cried, in impotent wrath, "*Débrûlez nos Coûtumes*"; and no small part of his political influence resulted from his ability to give effect to their views. At the close of his early campaigns, he scanned the horizon for further means of carrying out the grandiose designs sketched in outline to the Convention on the threshold of the war. On February 28, 1796, he reported to the Directory that four courses were possible in the war against Britain—first, to attempt an invasion; secondly, to seize Hanover and Hamburg; thirdly, to make an expedition to the Levant; lastly, failing all of these, to make peace. In that year he attempted the third of these schemes. Its failure served only to popularize the methods of commercial war; and, according to his future minister, Mollien, the reason for the prohibition of English trade was never greater than at the beginning of the Consulate.

The Peace of Amiens brought about no resumption of friendly

trading relations. On the renewal of war in 1806 the First Consul seized Hanover, and sought to control Elbing. After the failure of his schemes for the invasion of England and his triumph over Austria at Austerlitz, he resorted to the plan of controlling northern Germany. By skilfully offering Hanover to the Court of Berlin, he sought to enslave Prussia under what he now termed his "cont-system." The experiment of inducing Prussia to take his side having failed, he used force against her in order to secure the same result. As a victor he launched from Berlin the famous Decree soon to be described in detail. The responsiveness of Russia in the field afforded him still wider opportunities; and the Peace of Tilsit gave him the prospect of sweeping against the midriff of the sea forces rather by far than had ever entered into the conception of the war of 1793. Yet, in reality, the Continental System existed in embryo in the words of the Amphibious of the Convention; and the Napoleonic Empire of the year 1805-6 was, in a sense, only an embryo of the strength of the plans which have been fully set forth.

The political and military events of the years 1805-6, which led up to the Berlin Decree, having been already described in previous chapters of this volume, it is needful only to glance at a few of the accompanying incidents which show the trend of Napoleon's policy. The importance which he attached to the coast of the North Sea is seen in his determination to control Holland at all costs, in the speed with which, after the outbreak of war, he overran Hanover, and in the means that he adopted for the coercion of the Hanse Towns. On every occasion when Prussia put in a claim for those cities during the bargaining of the years 1805-6, it was set aside. The conditions which he attached to his offer of Hanover to Great Power at the time of the discussion at Schönbrunn (December, 1805) point in the same direction. He insisted that, if Prussia acquired that objective, she must exclude British commerce from all her lands. In vain did Frederick William III seek to escape from the cruel alternative of war with Napoleon or war with England. On April 1, 1806, he reluctantly issued an edict which excluded British ships from the ports of Prussia and Hanover.

In point of fact this, rather than the Berlin Decree, was the event which definitely inaugurated the Continental System. It is true that Napoleon had already compelled neutral States to exclude British commerce—for instance, in the Treaty of Florence with the kingdom of Naples (March 28, 1806); but the present was the first occasion on which a great Power bent beneath the pressure of his commercial policy. The consequences were immediate and far-reaching. The *Greenwich-Box* Ministry at once placed an embargo on some 400 Prussian ships then in British harbours, declared the roads from the Elbe to the Rhine to be in a state of blockade (April 8, 1806), and thirteen days later launched a

declaration of war against France. An Order in Council of May 16, however, declared that the ports of the north-west of Germany and of Holland would not be closed to neutral ships, provided that they had not come from, or were not sailing to, one of the enemy's ports, and carried some of his goods and no contraband of war. Only on the coast between Ostend and the mouth of the Seine would the blockade be strictly enforced. On May 31 the British Government further declared that it would stop no ship in the Baltic Sea; and on September 22 it threw open the navigation between the Euxine and the Elbe. Evidently it was the intention of the British Government, with upholding its rights, to subject neutrals to as little inconvenience as possible. The causes of friction between the United States and France and England having been discussed in a previous volume of this work, they need not be further referred to here.

Such was the state of affairs when, on November 21, 1806, Napoleon launched his Berlin Decree. The preamble stated that, whereas Great Britain did not recognise International Law as observed by civilized nations, but extended her hostilities to ships engaged in commerce, to persons and individuals, and to their property on board merchant ships, and declared coasts to be blockaded on which she had not a single war-ship—measures which aimed at ruining the world's commerce to the advantage of her own—therefore Napoleon had resolved to apply against her the measures of her own maritime code. Accordingly he declared the British Isles to be in a state of blockade, and prohibited all commerce and correspondence with them. All British subjects found in any country occupied by French or allied troops were liable to imprisonment, their merchandise and property being also considered lawful prize. Half the proceeds of such acts of confiscation were to be used to indemnify merchants for losses sustained through captures made by British cruises. The Decree further declared that no ship coming from Great Britain or her colonies would be received in French or allied ports, and ordered the confiscation of ship and cargo whenever false statements were made on this head. The Decree was communicated at once to the Governments of Spain, Naples, Holland, and Etruria, and its adoption was reported as a sign of friendship to Napoleon; while every Government that made peace with him was immediately expected to comply with this and the later enactments of his Continental System.

The British Government, seeing in this Decree a deliberate attempt to cut off British trade with the Continent, retaliated by the Order in Council of January 7, 1807. The preamble stated that, whereas the French Government, in violation of the usages of war, sought to prohibit the commerce of all neutral nations with Great Britain and the acceptance of her merchandise by them, His Majesty would be justified in enforcing a similar prohibition of all commerce with France. He would, however, restrict the retaliation, and accordingly ordered that no vessel

should be permitted to trade between two ports whence British ships were excluded; any ship so trading would be warned to discontinue her voyage, and, if she persisted, would be captured and become lawful prize. Napoleon replied to this Order in Council by a Decree, dated Warsaw, January 24, 1807, which ordered the confiscation of all British merchandise and British colonial products seized in the Hanseatic cities—an action which led to the renewal of the British blockade of the coast between the mouth of the Elbe and the Rhine.

The provisions of the Treaty of Tilsit (July 7, 1807) having brought Prussia, Russia, and Denmark into collision with Great Britain, the King's Government adopted severer measures against the States that were included in the hostile league. An Order in Council of November 11, 1807, declared that, whereas the Order in Council of January 7, 1807, had not had the desired effect of compelling the enemy to withdraw the decrees against British trade or of inducing neutral nations to interpose to procure their withdrawal, but they were being enforced with increased rigour, His Majesty therefore ordered that, with certain exceptions, all ports whence British ships and goods were excluded should thereafter be subject to the same restrictions in regard to trade and navigation as if they were actually blockaded by a British naval force. That is to say, the Order asserted the legal validity of a blockade which in most cases would be merely fictitious. All trade in articles produced by countries excluding British ships and goods, or by their colonies, was to be considered unlawful; and all ships trading to or from the said countries or their colonies, together with all merchandise and produce belonging thereto, were thereafter to be lawful prize. Neutral ships that, prior to receiving notice of the present Order, had set sail from any port excluding British goods, and were destined for another port hostile to Great Britain, were to be warned by His Majesty's ships or privateers to discontinue such voyage and to proceed to a British port; if they departed such warning, they might be seized and confiscated. The same Order in Council granted certain exceptions in favour of neutral ships; but, in a later clause, it threatened the penalty of confiscation against any ship on which were found French "certificates of origin," that is, whose papers declared the cargo to be non-British. This clause must be pronounced harsh and overbearing.

A second Order in Council, also of November 11, 1807, held out certain inducements to neutral ships to trade with Great Britain. It relaxed the stringency of the old Navigation Acts in a way that had been foreshadowed by the statute of George III, "for permitting certain goods imported into Great Britain to be stored in warehouses without payment of duty"; it also allowed (but did not compel) neutral ships, which, owing to the operation of the foregoing Order in Council, had been obliged to put in at a British harbour, to discharge goods from an enemy's country on the usual conditions, so far as concerned duties and

"drawbacks." Merchandise thus imported might also be bonded and thereafter re-exported on the receipt of an official certificate. A third Order in Council of the same date declared the sale of ships by a belligerent to a neutral to be null and void at law. Orders in Council of November 25, 1807, extended trading facilities to neutral ships plying between British ports and hostile ports in the West Indies or America, also between the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, Gibraltar, or Malta, and any hostile port not actually blockaded by British ships. It was further decreed on the same date that the ships of Prussia, Lübeck, and Portugal, which had been captured or were liable to capture, owing to their compliance with French demands, should be released or held to be not subject to detention or seizure.

An examination of the text of these Orders in Council, which differ widely from the translation of last two often presented in literature, suffices to show that the British Government, while pressing severely on all States which freely placed their resources at the disposal of Napoleon, yet sought to lessen the hardships of those on which the Continental System was imposed by force. The facilities granted to neutrals were clearly of such a kind as to disprove the charge that George III's Government deliberately sought to ruin neutral commerce. On the contrary, it sought to attract neutral ships to British harbours, but only on conditions which contravened Napoleon's decrees. The aim clearly was not to ruin neutral commerce, but to make the Continental System odious to neutrals.

Information touching the Orders in Council of November 11, 1807, reached Napoleon at Milan on December 16. During his tour in Italy he had received news of the triumphant entry of his troops into Lisbon, the arrival of the Russian squadron in the Tagus, Alexander's declaration of war against Great Britain, and the departure of the greater part of the British force from Sicily. His letters and his actions of December 7-17 show that he expected the speedy collapse of England's power. The second Milan Decree, that of December 17 (the first is unimportant), must be read in the light of this belief. The preamble stated that the British Order in Council of November 11 subjected all neutral ships, not only to the right of search exercised by British cruisers, but also to a forced stay in a British port and a compulsory import on the cargo; and that such conduct would "denationalise" the ships of every neutral Power and cover with infamy every nation that allowed it. Napoleon therefore decreed that every ship undergoing such search or compulsory voyage to a British port was thereby denationalised, and would be considered lawful prize if captured by French or allied vessels; any ship, of whatever nation, sailing from any British port or from countries occupied by British troops, would count as good prize if taken by a French war-ship or privateer. The Decree asserted that those measures, being designed as a just retaliation for the barbarous code adopted in London, would not apply to nations that raised their flags to be

resolved to rule in the interests of the Dutch. By his use of the dykes, the marsh, and the commercial interests of his people, and by his mitigation of the contributions, he succeeded in earning the gratitude of his subjects and the respect of the Emperor. His chief difficulty lay in the finances, the public expenditure being three times as great as the revenue; and his appeals to Napoleon for financial relief met with hostile replies or recommendations to effect a reduction of the state debt.

But the chief cause of friction lay in the application of the Continental System to an essentially maritime State. Louis had to bear many bitter reproaches for his failure to seal up the Dutch coast against British merchandise. "You attack too high a price to popularity in Holland," wrote Napoleon on December 3, 1800. "Before being kind, you must be the master. You have seen by my message to the Senate and by my Decree that I mean to conquer the sea by the land. You must follow this system." During his capture at Erfurt in October, 1809, the Emperor threatened to close the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt unless Louis put an end to all trade with England; at present, wrote Napoleon, a hundred ships a month left the Dutch coast for those of the enemy.

By the end of the campaign of 1800 Napoleon had resolved to annex the kingdom outright; and in November of that year he wrote to Champagne to that effect. In his declaration of policy to the Legislative Body, he stated that Holland was crushed between France and England, and that she formed a necessary outlet to one of the great arteries of the Empire. On December 31, 1800, Louis (then at Paris) received an acid communication (quoted from the official Correspondence) to the effect that he might retain his crown if he would prohibit British commerce, maintain a fleet of fourteen sail of the line and seven frigates, and an army of 25,000 men. The latter earned him, however, of the probability of the annexation of Holland as the most fatal blow that could be dealt to England. In order to double the force of this threat, Napoleon on January 5, 1801, annexed the island of Walcheren, ordered his troops to invade Holland, and fiercely occupied Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom. The Dutch prepared to resist; but Louis, prostrate with illness, bent before his brother's demands, thus starting off for a moment the inevitable blow.

Meanwhile Napoleon, being dubious of using his hold on Holland in order to browbeat the British Government, urged Louis to act on foot negotiations through the medium of a Dutch banker, Labouchere, son-in-law of the banker Baring, with a view to intimidating England by the prospect of the entire annexation of Holland. Louis returned to his kingdom on April 11, 1801; and the negotiations began. Labouchere had some interviews with the Marquis Wellesley, Castlereagh's successor, who saw through the design. Nevertheless he allowed the negotiation to proceed, even though Labouchere had no official credentials. The affair was rendered unworkable by the intrigue secretly carried on by Fouché,

the French Minister of Police, who sent over an agent named Fagot, and afterwards sought, through the medium of a financier, Curmand, to sound the British Ministry on the subject of a possible accommodation. Napoleon was enraged when, at the end of May, he discovered the unpunished effrontery of his Minister. He disgraced him and ordered him to live in retirement in his abbeys of Provins.

These negotiations delayed, but did not avert the doom of Louis and of his kingdom. Even while they were still on foot, Napoleon insisted on the closure of the lower mouth of the Rhine, the observance of a more stringent fiscal decree, which had been promulgated on May 10, and the repatriation of several American ships which Louis had allowed to enter his harbours. Under these provocations, the patience of Louis and of his subjects gave way. Disturbances took place, in the course of which an insult was offered to the coachman of the French ambassador in Amsterdam. At once Napoleon withdrew his ambassador, instructed the *chapel d'affaires* who remained to "keep the quarrel open," and sent his troops into Holland. For a brief space Louis thought of calling his people to arms; but, on his councillors pointing out the hopelessness of such an effort, he resolved to abdicate. After drawing up the deed of abdication in favour of his son (the elder brother of the future Napoleon III) and writing a touching farewell to his counsellors, he set out secretly on the night of July 1, and fled to Toplitz in Bohemia. An Imperial edict of July 9, 1810, decreed the annexation of Holland to the French Empire. The French commercial decrees were at once put in force, and colonial produce was confiscated.

The annexation of Holland and the consequent cessation of Anglo-Dutch commerce added to the depression everywhere felt in Great Britain. To increase the trials of the people, the harvest of the year 1810 was a nearly total failure; that of 1809 having been deficient, there was no reserve of corn; and in August, the price of wheat averaged 115 shillings the quarter. Most fortunately, Napoleon did not adopt the device of stopping the export of grain. As is shown by his letters of February 8, July 16, and August 4, 1810, he suspended its exportation from his States only when he feared the approach of dearth; when reassured on this point, he sought to increase his revenue by allowing the export of corn, subject to a considerable duty, even to England. He confined his hostility almost entirely to the exports from England. Ships that received his license to export French, Polish, or Italian corn or other produce were not allowed to bring back goods from England, except such as were needed for the French and allied armies.

As a result of these curious arrangements, England survived the throes of dearth, which might otherwise have become actual famines. Owing to the consideration of Napoleon's commercial system, the continued of tropical lands which Great Britain enjoyed, and the policy embodied in the Order in Council of November 11, 1807, vast stores of goods



accumulated in bonded warehouses at her ports. Ultimately this circumstance was destined to tell favourably on the nation's industries, but for the present it embarrassed the mercantile interest. The official report, dated March 7, 1811, of the parliamentary committee appointed to enquire into the distress of the autumn and winter of 1810-1, traced it partly to the excessive amount of goods then imported, which had helped to bring about a sharp fall in prices, ranging from 40 to 50 per cent. in *Luxurious goods*. It further stated that the opening of new docks and the granting of facilities for placing goods in bond had attracted neutral commerce to an unprecedented extent, and that the produce of San Domingo and of the newly conquered colonies came almost wholly to British harbours. "From Europe the importations from places from which the British flag is excluded have been immense."

The tone of the report is clearly optimistic. It sought to minimise the present distress, and omitted to state that in November, 1810, the number of bankruptcies had been 375, nearly three times the average number. Nevertheless, in the main, its contentions were justified by events. The facts which it adduced as to the increase in the value of the exports of cotton goods (from £8,663,896 in 1808 to £15,615,723 in 1810) showed that this industry was successfully grappling with the strange conditions of the time, and had found in the new colonial markets a recompense for the partial loss of those of Europe. Indeed all discerning observers could see that the stores of colonial and tropical merchandise brought to British harbours would enable manufacturers, with the recent inventions of Watt, Crompton, and Cartwright at their disposal, to produce goods whose abundance, excellence, and cheapness would more than counteract the effect of the Napoleonic Decrees.

Napoleon failed to notice the operation of these wider causes that made for the triumph of England in the commercial war; he saw only her present diffinition. In the English newspapers he read of the misery and discontent of a large part of her population, the spread of lunacy, and the rapid growth of taxation and of the National Debt. Mollien, Minister of the French Treasury, states that nearly all the Emperor's advisers pointed jubilantly to the fact that British merchants lost 50 per cent. on exchange in their trade with the Continent, as a sure sign of the forthcoming collapse of that Power. This consideration probably furnished Napoleon with another inducement in favour of allowing corn and some other products to enter her ports. His great aim was to deplete the stores of bullion in London, lower the rate of exchange, and in every way undermine British credit. Finally, the old Jacobin illusion as to the inherent artificiality of England's position induced him, in the latter half of the year 1810, to adopt in succession three measures, which, it appeared, must tumble her rival in the dust. These were the *Truman* <sup>of August 8, the *Farther Rhine* Decrees of October 18 and 25, 1810</sup>

<sup>1</sup> the situation of the north-west coast of Germany at the close of 1810.

The first of these devices arose, apparently, from a growing conviction that, despite his efforts to keep neutrals from trading with his enemy, all colonial products brought to Europe came from British colonies, being fraudulently sent by British merchants under cover of neutral flags. In his various letters of August 22 to Lohren, Napoleon states that in reality there are no neutral ships, for they all "pay ransom" to the English and transgress his rules. He also admits, in a letter of September 2, to Duroc, that the "certificates of origin" mean nothing; they are all forgotten. Accordingly, he determined to tax all colonial imports. On the occasion of Holland and the confiscation of British goods, he had allowed Dutch merchants to send their colonial products into France on payment of a duty of 50 per cent. ad valorem; and they availed themselves of these terms. This seems to have convinced him that that class of goods could everywhere bear the same high duty, and that its imposition would serve to check smuggling on the coast and frontier, benefit the revenue, and equalize prices. Therefore, while staying at the Trianon, he devised the tariff of August 3; but its existence was kept secret and for a short time disavowed. It subjected every kilogramme of these articles to the following duties—American cotton 5 fr.; Levant cotton 4 fr. if imported by sea, and 2 fr. if imported by land; other cottons 3 fr.; cane-sugar 2 fr.; refined sugar 4 fr.; China tea 5 fr.; green tea 4 fr.; other tea 1 fr. 50 c.; coffee 4 fr.; indigo 5 fr.; etc. The average duty was about 50 per cent. ad valorem. In order to impose this tariff on his subject States, he sent secret agents to watch the chief trading centres of Germany and Poland, and to prepare for the seizure of illicit goods. He also sought to induce Prussia and Russia to adopt the same tariff, trying the great benefits that must accrue to their treasury, solely at the expense of British merchants and smugglers. Frederick William obeyed his behest; but the Tsar refused to go beyond the terms agreed on at Tilsit. Napoleon further announced that all depots containing such wares and situated within four days' distance of the frontiers of the Empire were liable to seizure; and he accordingly confiscated great stores of merchandise at Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Bonn, and elsewhere.

Fortune played a great prize in his power during the autumn. A large convoy of ships, which were nominally neutral but were laden with British goods, had called for the Baltic, in the hope of gaining the admission to Russian, Swedish, and Prussian ports that was still usually accorded. A long spell of contrary winds and the political uncertainties of the time kept them for some weeks near the Sound; whereupon Napoleon urged the Baltic Powers to confiscate the ships and cargoes. On October 19 he threatened to march against Prussia if she did not comply; and four days later he wrote to the Tsar in terms almost equally urgent, stating that England was in extremities, that her 600 merchantmen, now wandering about the Baltic, had been refused admission by Prussia, and that similar action on the part of Russia would help to end

the war. Alexander yielded to the instance of his ally, and confiscated many of the ships; Prussia and Sweden acted in the same way. A memorial sent by British merchants to the Tsar, and dated May 8, 1806, states that the cargoes then confiscated in Russia were valued at £1,800,000, and that this was the first occasion on which commerce between the two States had suffered serious loss.

On October 29 and 31, 1810, Napoleon issued the famous *Franco-Belgian Decrees*. The first ordered that all British manufactured goods found in the Napoleonic States should be seized and publicly burnt; the second established forty-one tribunals for the trial of persons guilty of introducing illicit wares and for the reward of informers and others who helped in their seizure. These Decrees provoked great discontent. At Frankfurt the French garrison held the chief points of the city while the seizure and burning of goods went on; and everywhere men prepared to do without colonial goods rather than pay the exorbitant prices which the licensed dealers were compelled to charge. Henceforth the Continental System had not brought actual privations to the trading classes and their patrons. Indeed, some towns near the coast of the North Sea had even benefited from the restricted trade in British goods. Strass, an eminent citizen of Overbrück in the kingdom of Westphalia, states in his memoirs that in the year 1806-9 long trains of waggons used to bring these wares from the coast through that city on their way into central Europe and France, and that King Jerome himself conceived at this profitable contraband trade. But the seizure and burning of British produce in the autumn of 1810 ushered in an era of terrorism and want, which reached its climax for all true patriots when the north-west of that kingdom was annexed to the French Empire, along with the whole of the north-west coast of Germany, including the free city of Lübeck (Dec. 16, 1810).

This event, together with the absorption of the Republic of Venice, resulted from Napoleon's determination absolutely to control the trade centres of northern Germany and the Saxonian road into Italy. He found from the reports of Havert at Hamburg that British and colonial manufactures came in from Heligoland and other small islands; while the coast of Oldenburg was a favourite resort of smugglers. The Emperor now pushed the policy of "Through" against Great Britain to its logical conclusion, in the manner described. The official statement accompanying the decree of annexation avowed that that measure was "conceded by circumstances. The immense stores at Heligoland threatened ever to flow into the Continent, if a single point remained open to English trade on the coasts of the North Sea, and if the mouths of the Jader, Weser, and Elbe were not closed against it for ever." None of the Emperor's acts caused more harm than this. By the same reasoning, any coast-line of Europe where British goods were smuggled in could be annexed forthwith. Prussia was in no position to offer a protest; but the Tsar even manifested his assent to the measure.

detrimentment of his position-in-law, the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. As will appear later, the Oldenburg affair, coming at a time when Alexander was beset by the complaints of his mercantile classes at the stoppage of all trade with England, paved the way for the war of 1812.

The growth and completion of the Continental System having been traced, it remains to advert, as fully as limits of space will permit, to the relations of their fiscal and maritime codes which both combatants permitted themselves to make under the guise of license. These were first granted by the British Government, which in the year 1806 began to allow neutrals to trade in a manner ostensibly forbidden by the Orders in Council. The practice being found to be convenient for the export of British merchandise, as many as 8000 licenses were granted in the year 1807; in the year 1809 the number exceeded 16,000, and in the following year, 18,000. The greater number were allotted to neutrals or merely nominal enemies, as Sweden, Prussia, and Russia, which were thereby freed from search and detention by British cruisers at sea. On arriving at their destination, the masters could produce their other papers, which freed ship and cargo from confiscation under Napoleon's edicts. This soon led to the practice of having two complete sets of papers, those only being produced which procured immunity from confiscation whether at sea or in harbor. A judge in the British Court of Admiralty stated in 1809 that the whole carrying trade of the world was being carried on under license, chiefly in hostile bottoms. The protests of British shipowners against this system and the capture of nearly 600 fraudulent neutrals in the Baltic in the autumn of 1809 led to its decline after that time. Justice Phillips, a severe critic of the system, blamed it as being contrary to the British Navigation Laws and unjust to honest neutrals, especially the United States, and as tending to foster bad faith and to place dangerously wide powers in the hands of officials. He states that licenses were often sold by British inspectors to their clients abroad, as much as 750 rix-dollars being paid for one by a merchant at Amsterdam. The merchants of Hull, in a memorial to Parliament (1814), also complained that licenses granted to our enemies had been the means of transferring to them a great part of the trade of that port. The only defense for the practice was that the Orders in Council could not be carried out rigidly, and that licenses facilitated British trade with the Continent, though at the cost of severe loss to British shipowners.

Napoleon adopted somewhat analogous expedients in the years 1809-10; but his licenses were granted mainly for the export of French, Italian, German, or Prussian merchandise on ships of those countries. In August, 1803, at the time of the Trianon Tariff, he extended the system, allowing the importation of sugar, coffee, etc., into French harbors, on condition that French manufactures of at least equal value were exported. Thereafter he and his officials strove to stimulate trade

by these means; large bribes were given by merchants for the grant of licenses on favorable terms, and the silk trade derived some benefit from these expedients; but the whole system speedily became a synecrope for misplaced activity, favoritism, and corruption.

The varying influence exerted by the license system of the two consulates on their maritime and fiscal policy makes it difficult to come to any clear judgment on the efficacy of that policy in either case. The facts as to the internal economy of the French Empire at the close of the struggle (1810-1) are even more difficult of interpretation. The working of the Fiscal Decrees varied greatly at different times and places, according to the deviations allowed by the Emperor and the corruptibility of officials. The official statistics respecting commerce and industry are also open to suspicion. Freedom of the press did not exist; and free persons ventured openly to complain, or to petition against grievances.

There is another disturbing factor that makes it difficult to form a conclusion as to the causes of French prosperity in the years 1800-10, in a land where the absurdities of the old agrarian system and the inequities of taxation had crippled the working classes at every turn, prosperity was certain to increase as soon as the revolutionary legislation had time to take effect. For various reasons this did not take place until the time of the Consulate. The Napoleonic Empire therefore gathered the harvest sown by the men of 1789. The victims of the area now thrown open to the operations of commerce, contrasting strongly with the restricted provincial areas existing before 1789, was another condition highly favorable to national prosperity; but it might be argued that the remarkable vitality of France during the Empire was due not so much to the Empire as to the members of the Constituent Assembly, who struck the shackles from agriculture, industry, and commerce. In and after the year 1806 Napoleon imposed instead of restricts on foreign commerce, even on the operations of the coin trade, the supervision of which he held to be "the most important and the most delicate" duty for a ruler. The whole fabric of the Continental System, rested on his conviction that, in the words of his Minister, Chapuis, he could make commerce "passive like a regiment." The history of earlier nations tends to show that such a policy is harmful in the main, however much it may stimulate particular industries.

The impact of Napoleon's forceful intelligence upon the industries of his 45,000,000 subjects led unquestionably to some beneficial results. When his Decrees practically excluded colonial wares, he sought to make the Empire entirely independent of them. More characteristic and generally was his action in regard to sugar. When it seemed that sugar must become an expensive luxury (it sold at six francs the pound in Paris in 1810) he charged his ministers to devise a substitute. The result is well known. A slight success was achieved in the making of *gypsu-sugar* by the chemist Fourcroy; but the experiments of Berard,

Imard, Delort, Chaput, and others led to a noteworthy triumph in the perfecting of the somewhat defective processes of manufacturing sugar from beetroot already attempted by Richard in Germany. As soon as the new methods were known to be practically successful, Napoleon issued a decree (March 25, 1811), whereby 26,000 hectares (about 80,000 acres) were to be planted with beetroot for this purpose, six experimental schools being also founded for the instruction of scholars in the details of culture and manufacture. The most suggestive decree of the decree, however, is that in which he ordered the entire prohibition of cane-sugar coming from "the two Indies" on and after January 1, 1813, because it might be supposed to be of British origin. Similar success having attended the production of a kind of indigo from wood, the same decree ordered the cultivation of wood on a large scale, the founding of four experimental schools in connection with this industry, and the entire extinction of the indigo of the two Indies after the above-mentioned date. Other efforts, more or less successful, were made to thrust upon manufacturers throughout the whole of the Empire the use of certain Italian products.

Some districts benefited by these Protectionist methods; and their gratitude was loudly proclaimed through the official press. The attempt, however, to force the produce of the Mediterranean by way of the Alpine passes to Milan and Frankfurt and thence throughout central Europe was directly doomed to failure. A German, Wilson, who travelled down the Rhine in 1812, describes the stagnation of trade owing to the irritating trade regulations that prevailed; and from other sources it appears that the districts which now form the Rhine Province persisted in clinging to trade with Germany and reaped little benefit from the opening up of commerce with the French Empire. Baron Pasquier well sums up the result of Napoleon's experiment in the statement that grain, even in its vegetable, produces noticeable results; and that French industry and powerlessness, supported by a million bayonets and an auxiliary force of chevau-légers, and thanks to the relief now and again afforded by the Imperial licenses, succeeded in meeting the needs of an enormous consumption.

The success of the Continental System and with it the fortunes of Napoleon depended, however, not so much on France as on her subject lands and allies. Unless every one of them consented to culture the hardships which it imposed until Great Britain surrendered, the whole experiment was doomed to failure. Napoleon, with his usual discernment, had always assigned the first importance to a complete control of the coast of the North Sea, and secondly to those of the Baltic, a fact which determined the general trend of his diplomacy after the renewal of war with England. Even down to the close of the campaign of 1812 he clung tenaciously to Hamburg, as being the natural inlet for British goods into central Europe. It will be well, then, briefly to review

the condition of that free city while under his control. At first the trade of Hamburg suffered little from the French occupation, which began in 1806. The French Minister, Bourgeois, was forced to be open to bribes; and the compilers of the decrees bearing his name insist that he did good service to his countrymen campaigning in Poland in 1805, by granting permission to German merchants secretly to procure 50,000 cloaks from England. He is said to have received altogether the sum of 128,000 francs from the city, besides a million more from merchants for immunities and licenses granted by him. Moreover, the proximity of the Danish port of Altona presented facilities for the smuggling of goods into Hamburg; and the sympathy of the whole population with the smugglers rendered the British and Milan Decrees almost inoperative down to the year 1810. Lloyd, a British resident, states that most of the imports came in from Altona and other parts of the coast in waggons. Women also smuggled silk, lace, and coffee.

The advent of Durost as commander of the French army in that part of Germany, and the Napoleonic Decrees of the emperor and actings of the year 1810, subjected the city to the severest hardships. In the following year more than 300 ships lay dismantled in the harbour; out of 428 sugar refineries only one remained at work; and all the cotton-printing works were closed. The more rapacious of the French officials seized goods which seemed to be of English make, even when satisfactory certificates of origin were forthcoming. Where all honest means of livelihood languished, informers piled a wicked trade. Employees, in order to spite their masters, were known to mix British goods with others in order to procure the condemnation of all. In short, all the conditions that drag the operations of trade round upon in Hamburg. The extortions of the inspectors completed its misery. French officials seized the Treasury bonds, and confiscated a fund containing the savings of the old and the poor. The fate of the great free city was one of unexampled severity; but everywhere throughout Germany the Continental System produced feelings of desperation and fear, which had no small share in bringing about the War of Liberation.

The northern States naturally suffered most from the exclusion of colonial goods. Italy and France could supply several of the articles prohibited by Napoleon's Decrees; but the north German, Swedes, and Danes found no palatable substitutes for tobacco, coffee, and sugar. The influence of this fact on the formation of political opinion may readily be imagined. The resentment of these peoples was directed, not against the British merchants, whose ships or smuggling droops occasionally hovered off the coasts, but against the Emperor who forbade the importation of the comforts of life or placed them beyond the reach of all but the most wealthy. Further, it must be noted that the export trade of these lands had consisted mainly of bulky articles such as timber, pitch, hemp, iron, corn, etc., sent to England. These were not adapted

to contraband trade, as were the risks and results of southern claims. Consequently the export trade all but vanished, except when Napoleon, for revenue purposes, allowed occasional shipments from Denmark.

Several circumstances served to make Sweden the centre of important political questions resulting from these economic facts. As has been already mentioned, Marshal Bernadotte became Prince Royal of Sweden and heir-apparent to the throne in August, 1810. The illness of the King speedily ascended to him the chief place in the Government. It soon became clear that he was indisposed to support the policy of the Continental System, which had been forced on Sweden in the spring of that year. War ensued between England and Sweden in November; but in both countries there was no desire to resort to hostilities which were to the interest of Napoleon alone. Thanks to the combined tact and firmness shown by Sir James Saunderson, the British commander in the Baltic, little harm was done to Swedish commerce and the way was left open for reconciliation. Napoleon, on the other hand, frequently showed his distrust of the Swedish Government, probably because Bernadotte was already sinking at the conquest of Norway from Denmark. The Emperor warned the King of Denmark of overtures in this connection, and pressed his commercial decrees rigidly on Sweden. On March 25, 1812 (a date which marked the adoption of the harshest measures towards all the Baltic States), he asserted that, if a single cargo of colonial goods were landed in Swedish Possessions, French troops would march in and establish the Imperial dominion.

Meanwhile Alexander I had offended Napoleon by limiting the clause of December 24, 1809, which virtually allowed the entry of colonial goods into Russia and prohibited the export of certain articles of luxury. When Napoleon upbraidcd his ally with this breach of the Treaty of Tilsit and sent troops eastwards, Russia and Sweden naturally drew closer together and laid the basis of that agreement which took definite form in the alliance of 1812. During the year 1811 the Tsar gradually abandoned the system prohibiting the entry of British goods; and the conclusion of peace between England and Russia in July, 1812 (as also between England and Sweden), virtually put an end to the Continental System. Already the British Government had repealed the Orders in Council, but too late to avert war with the United States. Commerce, however, began to follow its normal course in Europe, the downfall of the Continental System being assured by the campaigns of 1812 and 1813. The great commercial experiment broke down where failure might have been expected, namely, in Russia, Sweden, and northern Germany.

If we may judge from the spoken and written utterances of Napoleon, he could never bring himself even to consider the possibility of failure. With his love of control and his passion for the handling of vast masses of details, he faced the problem of rearranging the commerce and industries of Europe as happily as he confronted its stupendous



conciliatory, the expedition to Moscow. Very characteristic was his reply, on March 24, 1811, to a deputation from the General Council of Commerce and Manufactures in France, on the occasion of the birth of the King of Rome. After receiving the deputation with its legislative opinions, he proceeded to justify the Continental System and stated that in about six months his effort would place England to the heart. As for his tariff, it would remain unchanged, for it did the utmost harm to British trade. The French Empire would soon produce enough wools, langes, and, perhaps, cotton, to do without imports of these articles; and Europe would no longer need trade with England and the colonies. Then, turning to the manufacturers, he blamed them for making too many goods and at too high a price. They had France, Italy, Germany, and a part of Spain open to them; that ought to satisfy their wants if they paid attention to the demand. As for England, she would soon be bankrupt. Austria was actually insolvent, and Russia was following her in that path. France alone had stores of bullion in the Bank. The whole address illustrates his propensity to illusions on the subject of commerce. That wise counsellor, Mollien, often noted that his master had failed to grasp some of its essential facts; and the Emperor's letters yield proof that he believed the extreme distress of colonial wars to Europe to be more harmful to the English reader than to the continental consumer—a notion as mistaken as his suggestion that the confederation of these powers would be a good way of replenishing the coffers of Prussia, Westphalia, and Naples.

The course of events was to prove that nothing could shake his belief in the efficacy of these suicidal devices. State after State was flung into the crucible of his mighty experiment; yet the looked-for result never came. Finally, in his constant striving after the one final expedient that must secure the ruin of England, he came to the death-grapple with Russia. It is difficult to believe that this was the man who, in other domains of thought, soared at allegories. He himself was the chief allegorist, the supreme dupe, of the age. As he looked round on the Europe of his day, he took no count of the mighty forces of the industrial revolution that then were giving England with the strength of youth and were connecting all parts of the world by indissoluble ties; what he beheld was a mirage conjured up by his vivid fancy and boundless optimism.

Having reviewed the causes that determined the final hostility of the peoples of the north and centre of Europe to Napoleon's policy, we may now glance briefly at the influence exerted by the combatants on certain points on the fringe of the Napoleonic system. While the French Emperor had the advantage of the central position in his commercial warfare with England, his efforts were necessarily confined to the seaboard and to certain outlying parts of Europe. The armed

from Heligoland, from one or two of the Danish and Prussian islets, the Channel Isles, Lâzaro, Gibraltar, Sicily, Malta, Corfu, and certain parts of the Turkish Empire. There were, so to speak, several points constantly held out against the central mass; and, according to the laws of supply and demand, their power to wound increased automatically as the number of the Continent strengthened the barriers separating it from the outer world. The occupation by the Sea Power of those points of vantage produced, in most cases, few if any noteworthy results of a political character. But the peoples of Sicily and Turkey were affected by the great conflict in several ways. This chapter will therefore conclude with a brief notice of their history during this period.

The British occupation of Sicily was destined to exercise on the Italian people a far more abiding influence than that resulting from the long-continued presence of our forces in the Iberian peninsula. For this fact the two following reasons may be assigned. The Sicilians felt towards their royal House, that of the Spanish Bourbons, none of the sentiments which the Spaniards and Portuguese felt for their respective dynasties; and the political instincts of the townsfolk of Palermo and Messina were more akin to those of the British people than to the traditional policy of Ferdinand IV of Naples and his spirited Queen, Maria Carolina. The characters and careers of that ill-matched pair having been already described in a previous volume, it is needless to describe again the causes which dulled the affections of their subjects. Like other islands, the Sicilians had always been remarkable for their clinging to ancient liberties. The preservation of their Parliament was to them far more precious than that of the dynasty. The Queen severely expressed the contrast between Naples and Palermo in a letter from the latter place to her daughter: "This is a different country; people are constitutional; the King has not a say without the consent of Parliament; everything, including justice, is under dissimilar regulations and stands on a totally different footing; but we must get up with it." The Parliament, it is true, was of a feudal rather than a democratic type. It consisted of three Chambers, barons, clergy, and deputies of the Crown, the last named to some extent representing the chief towns. The Chambers met and voted separately; in the House of Peers the greater barons had several votes apiece. Parliament had the right of assembling at least once every five years; and during the vacations a committee of three from each Chamber supervised national expenditure and the carrying out of laws.

Such was the framework of government in which Ferdinand IV and Maria Carolina found themselves placed by the events of the year 1806, which deprived them of the mainland. The efforts which Joseph Bonaparte put forth to gain Sicily would doubtless have been crowned with success, but for the presence of British forces at and near Messina. The danger to the Bourbons came increased when Joachim Murat came

to the throne in place of Joseph Bonaparte. The "brave soldier" signified his intention by a vigorous effort to retake Capri; with superior forces he succeeded in overpowering Colonel Hadice Louis' small garrison and compelling it to surrender (October, 1808). This and other adverse events failed to damp the ardour of the Queen for the recovery of the mainland. The volcanic passions of her earlier years had now sunk into a daily glowing hatred, the outcome of spies, of her many disappointments, and of her resentment at the devilish indifference of the King. She spent large sums in stirring up revolts in Calabria; she maintained a small army of spies to watch every event on the mainland; she secretly helped to equip the privateers that preyed on Neapolitan merchantmen, and was consequently proved to have had no small interest in the spoils. In her growing rage at her impotence, she sent a brigand chief with 300 galley slaves to overthrow a sovereign who had Napoleon's legions at his back; and there are grounds for suspecting her of complicity in attempts at political assassination at Naples. Above all she fanned constantly at the provinces that held back Sir John Stuart, commander of the British force in Sicily, from supporting them and enterprises. Variable in all else, she showed unvarying dislike to the British commanders who succeeded Sir Sidney Smith on that station; in fact, hostility to England on points of detail tended to become as strong a motive at the Bourbon Court as hatred to Napoleon had been at the general of principle. The efforts of an Anglo-Sicilian expedition against the Neapolitan coast in the year 1809 having ended in failure, the Queen was reported to have set on foot intrigues with Murat's agents with a view to the eventual restoration of the mainland to Ferdinand IV, Murat receiving compensation elsewhere.

The truth on this matter will perhaps never be cleared up. That either Napoleon or Murat and his consort seriously entertained the thought of restoring Naples to the Spanish Bourbons is incredible. The Emperor's correspondence shows that he never lost sight of the need of conquering Sicily; and, if King Joachim ever entertained the outbreak of Maria Carolina, it was scarcely only with the aim of weakening the Anglo-Sicilian alliance. That Queen, however, with her avowed propensity to self-deceit and intrigue, kept up secret communications with Naples and the Court of Vienna through the years 1810-1, in a way that aroused the gravest suspicions of the British Government. The United Kingdom had acquired the right to some measure of control over the policy of the Court of Palermo, Sicily by providing the naval and military support which alone enabled that Court to exist, and secondly by the terms of the treaty of alliance signed at Palermo on March 24, 1808. These prescribed the furnishing of all possible means of mutual support by both parties in the present war, the maintenance by Great Britain of a force of not less than 10,000 men in Sicily, and the payment of a yearly sum of £200,000 to the Court, as well as the conclusion of

an early date of a treaty of commerce on conditions favourable to British trade. The Sicilian Government also promised not to make a separate peace with Napoleon; while Great Britain consented not to come to terms with him unless the interests of His Sicilian Majesty were safeguarded. Obviously the protecting Power had the right to insist on the due observance of this treaty; and, when the Queen was believed to be intriguing with her nominal enemies, when further her prisoners captured a British merchantman and great difficulty was experienced in obtaining its release, friction between the parties was inevitable.

Despite the increase of the British subsidy to £400,000 in answer to the increasing appeals of the Queen, her extravagance was such as to provoke a serious conflict with the Sicilian Parliament. That body met at Palermo on January 25, 1800; and Ferdinand, the custodian of the Queen's desires, proposed that it should increase the subsidy to the Crown from £300,000 ounces to £500,000 ounces (the ounce was then equal to 12s. 4d.), besides making further donations to the Queen and to the infant daughter of the Crown Prince. To these demands the Parliament, especially the Chamber of Barons, demurred; they had long been incensed by the favour shown to Neapolitan courtiers and by the exclusion of Sicilians from the Government, and now refused their assent to the many abuses of the State by granting only one-half of the required sum. Like Charles I of England in similar circumstances, Ferdinand dissolved Parliament, only to find its successor still more refractory. Thereupon the Queen urged him to adopt various illegal expedients, including even the sale of monastic lands through the medium of lottery tickets. To these measures Parliament opposed unwavering resistance, with the result that on July 18, 1801, Ferdinand arrested five of the baronial leaders, including the able and determined Prince of Belmonte. A deadlock now ensued, fatal to industry and commerce, and jeopardizing the very existence of the State.

It was in these circumstances that the British ambassador, Lord Amherst, retired in favour of Lord William Bontinck, who was to combine with his diplomatic duties those of commander of the British troops. The urgency of the crisis called for some such concentration of power in the hands of a strong man. Great skill and tact, however, were needed to dissuade the Queen of the notion that the English were about to seize Sicily and either keep it themselves or use it as a place in some diplomatic game of exchange. Unfortunately Bontinck lacked the qualities of charm and graciousness that were needed to win over the Queen to a true view of the situation. Stiff and unsympathetic in manner, he offended Maria Carolina from the outset, as later he offended her subjects. Meeting with firm resistance at Court, he called for London, and came back in December, 1801, armed with pet ordinances, which enabled him to stop the British subsidy until the terms of the treaty of 1800 were sincerely carried out. Financial needs and a

threat that Palermo would be occupied by British troops finally induced the King and Queen to capitulate, Ferdinand agreeing, on the pretext of illness, to hand over the government to his son, whom he named his heir after age (January 16, 1812). The Crown Prince at once restored the barons to favour, repealed the illegal taxes, and appointed more popular Ministers. Yet Bentinck's suspicion of the Queen remained unaltered, and when, in the month of March, he acquired further proofs of her correspondence with the French, he insisted on her removal into the interior of the island.

Meanwhile Castlereagh, who had succeeded Wellesley as Foreign Minister in Downing Street, deemed the time to be ripe for the application of British institutions to Sicily as an antidote to the Napoleonic reforms which were beginning to take root in the Peninsula. Believing as the Crown Prince was to introduce a foreign Constitution, yet his desire for cordial relations with England, in order to attempt the conquest of Naples while Masséna was absent in Russia, brought him to acquiesce in Bentinck's suggestions. Accordingly the Parliament which met at Palermo in June, 1812, proceeded to discuss and finally to adopt a Constitution which was modelled closely on that of Great Britain.

Had this Constitution been promulgated under more favourable conditions, it would probably have taken firm root; but this was impossible amidst the disputes and miseries of the year 1812. The abolition of feudal privileges annoyed many of the leading families; and their discontent enabled the Queen to make one more bid for power. She urged on the King to give up the arrangements of his country-house and to resume his authority. Ferdinand obeyed. On March 3, 1813, he suddenly appeared at the palace at Palermo, and announced that, having recovered his health, he intended to resume the government. Again Bentinck intervened, and threatened that, unless the Constitution were reprinted, the British alliance would cease forthwith. The Prince of Belmonte and Ruggiero Settimo also resigned their offices. Under severe pressure from both sides, Ferdinand listened to the advice of his son-in-law, the Duke of Otranto, and promised to withdraw to the country. Bentinck, however, now insisted on the departure of the Queen from the island, an expedient which had already been more than once discussed. After long and painful disputes, she left Sicily with her son and a few attendants, proceeding to Constantinople, Genoa, and finally to Vienna. Even there fate frowned upon this unhappy woman, great only in her misfortune. As she was about to return to Palermo and triumph at the fall of her many enemies, the hand of death intervened and laid her low at the castle of Hatzendorf (September 7, 1814).

In the meantime the overthrow of Napoleon led to the resumption by Ferdinand of his old governing powers (July 6, 1814). There being now no reason for the former strict control of Sicilian affairs, Bentinck was unable to prevent the ultra-royalists from working havoc in the

attitude of 1810. It was however little more than a memory. But, the tide of reaction rolled over Italy, that memory was held dear; when the Sicilians in 1848 in the hour of revolution that was idle to be passed on from capital to capital, their veteran leaders, glorie Siciliani, summed up their experience of the past and their aim for the future in the cry "Separation from Naples, or our English attitude of 1810."

The mighty force of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, which covered some of the greatest States of Europe, led to strange shifts of fortune in the Ottoman Empire. That corner of the Continent acted as it were a great tide-gully which changed according to the rise and direction of the main current of events. The career of Sultanic rule in Europe never seemed more hopeless than in the years 1801 and 1799-1801, and again in the period after the Treaty of J. Yet Turkey emerged from this cataclysmic epoch almost unscathed, perhaps even stronger than at its beginning.

The accession to power of Selim III in 1789 occurred at a time unequalled calamity, brought on by the persistent attacks of Catherine II of Russia and Joseph II of Austria. In vain did the new Selim set an example of austerity and vigour, and call his whole people to arms against the infidels. The Moslems were several times routed by Suvoroff and Lander. Only the death of Joseph II (1790)

the conclusion of a timely Prusso-Turkish alliance saved Turkey a overwhelming disaster. The new Habsburg ruler, Leopold II, came to equitable terms with her at Sistova (1790); but Catherine II died on heavy sacrifices in the Treaty of Jassy (1792), namely, the loss of all the Turkish lands east of the river Dnieper, the Sultan virtually acknowledging the suzerainty of Russia over Georgia, Armenia, and Mingrelia. Even this success seemed to the ambitious sultan merely a stepping-stone to the longed-for conquest of Constantinople; but the crisis in the affairs of Poland and France drew off her

attention towards central Europe almost down to the time of her death (1796). Her son, Paul I, at first adopted a peaceful policy, thus doing to Selim a time of respite for the many reforms which were so urgently called for.

It is difficult to conceive the disorder of the Sultan's dominions but time. His authority over the Moslem States of northern Africa of the slightest. The rise of the Mameluke power in Egypt left only shadow of authority in the hands of the Turkish Pasha at Cairo.

Wahabites were masters of nearly the whole of Arabia. The Druses other tribes of the Lebanon district were virtually independent; at the savage Gerasse put to death the Sultan's messengers with unity; and taxes were generally withheld by the Pasha of Bagdad, Mosul, and Ahalah. In Europe the Pasha of Wallach long defied

the Sultan's authority; and the notorious Ali Pasha had made good his independence in Albania. The Sultan and Greeks felt the pressure of their pasha's rule, but rarely that of the Sultan. Worst of all, Russia secured her protection to the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia; and the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainarjî (1774) had given her the right to champion the claims of all the Christian subjects of the Porte. As the custom of farming out the taxes placed immense powers in the hands of the local pashas, beys, and agas, as well as of the money-lenders whom they employed, the Sultan's authority was liable to be thwarted in every conceivable way. The armed forces of Turkey, paid and unpaid, were a source of weakness rather than strength. By far the most important among them was the privileged Order of the Janissaries, comprising some 150,000 members, though many of these were not liable to service in the field. They considered their membership as hereditary, generally appeared in the ranks only on pay-days, and exercised authority in the towns where they were settled. They had long possessed valuable trading rights, and, in fact, claimed to represent and enjoy the rights of the old Muslim conquerors, especially against the Christian realms.

Facing the opposition which the Janissaries were certain to offer, Selim now began to reorganise his armed forces on the European model, and introduced some uniformity in regard to arms, drill, and discipline. The opening of closer diplomatic relations with France in 1794, when, for the first time, the Porte despatched an ambassador to reside at Paris, enabled the French ambassador, Adolphe Dubouet, to take with him to Constantinople several officers, together with well-mounted pieces of artillery. But little progress was made. The Janissaries refused to make any change in their traditional methods, and the rupture with France, brought about in 1798 by Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition, stopped all progress, except in the organisation of the Turkish artillery. Greater success attended Selim's efforts to improve the civil administration. By curtailing the powers of the Grand Vizier and the pashas who governed provinces, he somewhat strengthened the fabric of government and the productivity of the revenue; but his efforts to abolish the farming of taxes led to no general result. He established regular embassies not only at Paris, but also at London, Vienna, and Berlin.

Despite Selim's efforts, Turkey was wholly unprepared to meet the dangers resulting from Bonaparte's expedition; and without the aid of Russia she would probably have lost both Egypt and Syria. Shortly freed from that danger, she was on the verge of others equally serious at the beginning of the year 1801, when Bonaparte and the Tur Paul prepared for an invasion of Asia Minor preparatory to the conquest of India. Once again, however, the restoration of the balance of power in Europe served to avert the projected perils of the Ottoman realm. Peace was concluded with France at Amiens (March 25, 1802), when the

Republic recognised the integrity of the Turkish Empire, procured the renewal of the former "capitulations" between the two Powers, and gained the right of sending French ships into the Black Sea. In one quarter the war had not been unfavourable to the Sultan's power. The fall of the Mameluks (an event facilitated by the perfidious measures of several of their chiefs by the Turkish pasha) the way for the gradual advancement of Turkish authority in Egypt. The death of Gussak Pasha at Acre in 1804 also had a similar effect on Syrian affairs. On the other hand, the successes of the Wahabites in Arabia, and their capture of Mecca and Medina in 1804 spread abroad the belief that the innovations of the Sultan were displeasing to Allah. Nevertheless Selim proceeded with his military reforms. In the year 1804 he organised the artillery, and placed it on a footing of privilege superior to that of the Janissaries; and in March, 1806, he decreed that the finest youth of the Empire should be taken, even from the Janissaries themselves, and enrolled among the Nizams or regular infantry. The privileged corps fairly refused to obey this decree, and in some cases killed those who strove to put it in force.

Selim's difficulties at this time were increased by a formidable rising of the Servians. Galled by the oppressions of the Janissaries and encouraged by promises of help from Russia, the distressed rebels rose under the lead of Kara George and Mikash Obrenovitch, felled a plot of the Janissaries for a general massacre, and captured some of the strongholds of Turkish tyranny in their hand. Their revolt was directed chiefly against the turbulent Janissaries of Belgrade; and they sought to prove that it tended to strengthen the Sultan's authority in the province. Selim, however, could not side with Christians against the Infidel; he arrested their depredations, and ordered Ali, the Pasha of Nissa, to disarm the whole population. The Christians scorned all thoughts of surrender, now that the Sultan was threatened by hostilities from Russia and by a general mutiny of the Janissaries. Kara George defeated the pasha; and in the campaign of 1805-7 the Servians not only drove back other Turkish forces but finally succeeded in capturing Belgrade and the remaining Turkish strongholds. At the close of this War of Liberation, military and governing posts were allotted to military chiefs, or *refendes*, among whom Kara George enjoyed a preeminence corresponding to his prowess and masterful will. A *Shaykhan*, or General Assembly of warriors, formed the ultimate source of authority; it delegated administrative and legislative powers to a Senate of twelve members; and by degrees a civil magistracy was established for each district. The confidence with which a formerly down-trodden people cast off its yoke and established its own institutions stands in marked contrast to the helplessness of the Sultan's Government and the hostile opposition of his privileged classes to all reform.

In the midst of these troubles, the subtle French diplomatist, General



Schwarzenberg arrived at Constantinople (August 9, 1807). Napoleon's instructions (dated June 29, 1806) directed the army to form a Franco-Turkish alliance against Russia, and to urge the Sultan to keep a firm grasp on Moldavia and Wallachia. Schwarzenberg soon succeeded in teaching Turkish pupils on the latter question; and, despite the threats and protests of the Russian and British envoys, Selim deposed the hospodars of these provinces (August 24). This amounted to a declaration of war against the Tsar, who speedily sent an army across the Pruth and entered Bucharest (December 27). In February, 1807, a British fleet under Admiral Duckworth forced the passage of the Dardanelles but failed before Constantinople. Equally unfortunate results attended a British expedition to Egypt. Meanwhile the campaign in the valley of the Danube languished. The main forces of the Russians were always directed against Napoleon; and Selim's efforts were thwarted at the outset by the selfish obstinacy of the Janissaries, who intercepted and routed a force of Nizams. Elated at this success, the reactionaries determined to rid themselves of the reforming Sultan. With the help of a fawning traitor, the Kaimakam Mevânî Pasha, the Janissaries of the capital marched to the seraglio, which was undefended, deposed their master, and placed on the throne Mustafa IV, the son of Abdul Hamid I (May 22, 1807). His tenure of power was short. A treaty with the Russians in August having set free the forces of Balaklar, the Pasha of Starichuk, that officer marched to the capital with the intention of restoring Selim, only to be defied at the last moment by the murder of the deposed ruler at the hand of Mustafa's servants. After wreaking vengeance for this crime, Balaklar raised to power Selim's young cousin, Mahmud II (July 28, 1808), whose firmness and ability enabled him ultimately to carry out many of Selim's reforms.

His difficulties seemed overwhelming at the outset. The news of Selim's deposition, which arrived during the conference at Tilsit, furnished Napoleon with an excuse for a complete change of front: the Franco-Russian compact aimed at the spoliation of the Turkish Empire. Matters of policy alone led Napoleon to defer this undertaking to a time when France should be firmly established on the Albanian coast, in Sicily, and in Spain. As has been already shown, the Emperor's aim of using the naval resources of Spain for the furtherance of his Eastern schemes set in motion the great events of the Spanish rising, which brought salvation to Turkey. The Emperor's policy at the Congress of Erfurt also served to prolong the time of captivity; while, on the other hand, the Tsar's growing fear of his western rival held him back from the prosecution of vigorous measures against the Turks. Great Britain, also, after coming into collision with Russia, had no interest in pressing hostilities against the Turks, and, thus in part to the friendly services of Austria, came to terms with the Porte in the Peace of the Dardanelles (January, 1809).

While, however, the diplomatic situation underwent an almost unanimous change in favour of the new Sultan, he failed to cope with the internal disorders. Sir Robert Adair, British Minister at Constantinople, reported the utter disorganization of the government, of the finances, and of the armed forces, whose horse-bush were not stabled even in presence of the enemy. At the close of the war with Austria, Alexander sent larger forces to the Danube; and the end of the campaign of 1809-10 saw him master of the strongholds on that river. In the following year the prospect of war with Napoleon imposed prudence on the Russians; but no considerations of patriotism put an end to the feuds of rival parties and the unceasing pretensions of the Janissaries. On both sides, therefore, there was a readiness to come to terms; and, after lengthy negotiations, the Treaty of Bucharest was signed (May 18, 1812). The Sultan thereby ceded to Russia the Moldavian lands to the east of the Pruth, and promised to grant an amnesty to the Servians. He insisted, however, that the Servian fortresses should once more be garrisoned by Turkish troops; and to this the Tsar consented. The Servians, who had put forth great efforts on behalf of their compatriots, thus saw one great result of their War of Liberation bargained away by their avowed champion.

Thus, by a singular concurrence of events, Turkey more than once during this period escaped a doom which seemed inevitable. Alone among the great Powers of the Continent, she escaped the grinding pressure of events which compelled them to reorganize their governments, their armies, and even their politics. Whether, in the like case, she would have been driven to employ the same healing process, is very questionable. What is certain is that she alone of the great States drew no new sources of strength from the strains and calamities of the time. Even the predilection of the Continental System, which might have given a great impulse to the trade of Turkey, as the only neutral State in Europe, led to no noteworthy result. The passage of rivers of contraband goods through Salonica and the Albanian ports into central Europe served to irritate the maritime instincts of the Greeks and Albanians; it breathed no new life into the torpid frame of Turkish industry. Above all, the Ottomans themselves felt none of those longings for reform which were implanted by the events of the Napoleonic era among the peoples of Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, and were destined to triumph over the reactionary forces of the succeeding age. None in regard to legislative achievements, the life of Turkey was barren also of those popular impulses, which, under wise guidance, strengthen the fabric of the State and invigorate the whole nation.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## THE FRENCH DEPENDENCIES, AND SWITZERLAND.

Napoleon told Bonaparte in August, 1800, that it was his policy to govern men as the majority wished to be governed. "It is," he said, "by turning Corsica that I finished the war in the Vendée; by turning Musulman that I established myself in Egypt; by turning Ultramarine that I won the Italian war. If I governed a people of Jews I would rebuild the temple of Solomon. So, too, I would speak of liberty in the free part of San Domingo, while I would confirm slavery in the *lie de Reaction* and in that part of San Domingo where slavery now exists." Such flexibility was undoubtedly a safer recipe for empire than the rigid propaganda of the Revolution. Administration must be adapted to man's needs; and these in turn are shaped by climate, locality, and historic forces. A good administration does not expect the virtues of humanity to be regular; it expects it to be irregular, and gently fits itself into the indentations, treating to time and some patient process of friction to plane down uncomfortable angles. It has fixed principles, but it applies them with charitable modifications. It is well-instructed, just, pure-hearted. It has its professional code of honour, of which it is proud. Checks and counter-checks do not obstruct its activity. It has the courage of its opinions and strikes hard at waste, inefficiency, and old abuses. It is served by every variety of trained and technical experience. It is neither radical, nor conservative, but knows when to be the one, and when the other. To build up an ideal bureaucracy capable of governing foreign people, both European and coloured, in such a way as to command their confidence and respect, is no easy task. It requires a high standard of public morals, a passion for public improvement, a restless equipment of fact, an ever-going good-humour coupled with strict attention to detail, an instinct which may be called propagandist on the part of the governing nation, and a readiness to learn and be guided on the part of the governed. Such a coincidence of happy qualities is necessarily the result of complex forces, and cannot be contrived by any one mind.

The French Empire at its zenith stretched from L'Isle to the Elbe and from Brest to Rome. It was divided into 130 departments, 46

of which were alien to France in race, language, and temperament. Dutchmen and Belgians, Germans and Italians, Croats and Spaniards were swallowed up in the great machine; and over and above these alien departments of the Empire there were the racial principalities and kingdoms, all of which were ultimately controlled from Paris and made to contribute to the military and financial strength of France. It may well be asked how a country which had managed its own affairs so badly as to experience ten years of hideous disorder could accomplish such a task as the civil government of these miscellaneous regions.

The French administration under Napoleon had believed in the universality of a ideal, and the negation of a person. It believed in that English customarily called "French principles," not with a passive traditional acceptance but with the zeal of a convert who with infinite struggle has relinquished his inner life. The best of Napoleon's servants regarded themselves as missionaries of some higher civilization, which it was their duty to diffuse through the world, and in this mission they saw the flow of Napoleon's character and genius. Discursive in thought, he failed to spell straight to his end; he was a mere judge of men; and when he had picked his team he drove it hard. His eye was everywhere. His appetite and memory for detail were such that scarcely work rarely escaped him, and he knew how to inspire and to encourage as well as how to frighten and to coerce. Nor was this all. Connected with the conviction which acted on the will, there was a great illumination of the intelligence. Almost every question relating to the fabric of society or the government of man had come up for discussion during the French Revolution. During experiments had been made, great disasters endured; and a rich experience was crowded in a narrow space of time. The new generation was more sober, more practical, more critical of vague ideas, and yet fully capable of being excited by the large horizons which Napoleon unfolded to France.

Another factor was, that the French Government, having a coherent body of principles to administer, found in almost every part of central Europe a state of opinion either favourable or not violently unfavourable to their acceptance. This was not only or mainly due to the fact that French principles could easily be explained and bore a self-evident and superior air of rationality about them. It was largely due to the long historic preparation which Europe had received for the acceptance of French missionaryry; to the general diffusion of the French language which prevailed in all the large towns in Holland, Germany, and Italy; and to the continuance of the feeling that France was the centre of the arts and sciences, and the centre of European intelligence. There were other causes of equal weight, among which may be mentioned indifference to the displaced rulers, fatigue consequent upon foreign war and civil turmoil, and the overwhelming machinery of the French

22-2

On the other hand, the Napoleon's system laboured under several great disadvantages. The Revolution, while increasing the material wealth of France, had spread great demoralization through political life; and, although this was to a considerable extent corrected by the return to strictly government under Napoleon, it was far from eradicated, and did much to discredit French rule abroad. Towns were pillaged of their art treasures; soldiers and civilians made fortunes by blackmail; bribes were accepted even by men in the highest places. Another great disadvantage was due to the war, and to the peculiar policy which the war forced Napoleon to adopt. On every new department and on every new dependency the war imposed a heavy tribute of men and money; and, in order to ease the French taxpayer, the dependencies, in addition to the expenses of their own levies, were forced to contribute to the support of the French army. Thus, while higher and more expensive standards of civil government were being introduced, the budgets of the vassal States were burdened by a military expenditure out of all proportion to the other items of the account. It is true that improved financial methods, the abolition of privilege in taxation, and the conversion of monastic wealth, enabled larger revenues to be raised with less loss to the taxpayer. But it must be remembered that the decline of the volume of commerce due to the Continental Blockade diminished important sources of revenue; and that in every dependency a considerable portion of the state domain was reserved for the benefit of French generals and other servants of the Empire. The object of these donations was to give to the military and official class a strong pecuniary interest in the maintenance of the French conquests, and to create in every vassal State a group of families attached to the Imperial connection. The result was to cause embarrassment to the local exchequer, and to aggravate the impression that the dependency was being exploited for ends which were not its own. The Continental Blockade was another and most harassing consequence of the war, leading as it did not only to great material losses, but also to the irritating intrusion of French custom-house officers. If the dependencies had been thoroughly incorporated in the French fiscal system, freedom of trade with the great French market might have offered some compensation. But they experienced all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of a fiscal connection with the Empire. They were not allowed to compete with the French manufactures, and they were compelled to lower or demolish their barriers against French wares.

There was another drawback incidental to the national imprisonment. French men of the best kind did not readily go abroad except in pursuit of military glory, and when abroad were generally anxious to come home again. Not were they apt at picking up the colloquial use of a foreign language, partly because they regarded any foreign language as an inferior kind of jargon, and partly because they expected foreigners

to talk to them in French. Napoleon was well aware of these drawbacks, and hoped to create in the midships attached to his Council of State a body of young, intelligent, enterprising civilians, drawn from every part of the Empire, versed in affairs, sufficiently wealthy to be above pecuniary temptation, and ready to go anywhere and do anything at a moment's notice. Had the Empire lasted ten years longer, the Council of State, with its brilliant nucleus of disciples, would probably have become a great seminary of public virtue.

Napoleon, who counted so many States, institutions, armies, and empires, was, despite his high administrative gifts, a frequent source of disorder, distrust, and even despair to the men who worked under him. He was very restless, constantly altering the boundaries of States, and rearranging the map of Europe. He was very inquisitive, employing hundreds of spies and police agents, and receiving secret reports even as to the conduct of his own lieutenants. He was often very harsh and unforgiving, and always brutally direct both in his written and spoken words. He therefore contrived, though perhaps only in the last four years of his Empire, to convey the impression that none of his political creations would be enduring, that he suspected his own agents, and that pity and benevolence had no place in the conduct of affairs.

The Italian Republic, whose formation and early history down to 1803 has already been described, made a beginning which impressed even persons at least as unprejudiced and ill-tempered. Count Miot, the Vice-President of the Republic, was not a man of sanguine temperament; and some deductions must be made by readers of his querulous correspondence. It would appear, however, that the blessings of self-government were inadequately appreciated by those for whom they were intended, and that, while the Electoral College regarded the franchise as a burden, the College of the Dotti resented the connection with France. The legislators preferred the salt to the soundness, and, through their factions and restless conduct, had greatly fallen in public esteem. Good projects and good clerks were difficult to discover. The "passive antipathy" against France was almost universal. With these complaints directed against his countrymen, Miot continued criticisms of the Napoleonic system. In January, 1804, he pointed out that the Republic was paying a third of its revenue to France, that the department of Olona alone sent to Paris one-sixth more revenue than had been raised by Austria from Milan and Mantua together, and that local expenses were augmented in the same proportion. Out of a budget of 90,000,000 francs, 4,000,000 were spent upon fortifications, 22,500,000 upon the French army, and 22,500,000 upon the Italian army. Moreover, while Miot desired *equitable freedom*, Napoleon refused to lower his own tariff in favour of the Italian Republic.

Nevertheless some progress was made towards the organization of

the State. The ministers were hard-working and capable, and carefully drawn from the different provinces; and the government, if not popular, was free from the taint of prostration. A Venetian prefect was sent to Bologna, a Neapolitan to Modena; and this principle of selection, based on the desire to obliterate local divisions, was uniformly acted upon by the French in Italy. A gendarmerie, organised on the French model, proved to be a most efficient instrument for the suppression of brigandage and other forms of crime. The conscription was introduced; and a native army was rapidly formed, in which the Romansh proved to be the most vigorous element, having a strong capital of their dialect upon the new and common language of the camp. In September, 1803, 6000 Italians were ordered up to the coast of the English Channel. In the following July the Republic was inspired to make a voluntary gift of 1,200,000 francs towards the war.

Still Bonaparte was dissatisfied. In 1804 he became Emperor of the French; and that the head of an Empire should also be president of a Republic seemed to him anomalous. He was not entirely pleased with Melzi, and *desoltesse* reflected that a French prince in Milan would have more authority than an Italian nobleman, especially in military affairs. It may perhaps also have occurred to him that a kingdom of Italy would revive historic memories and national hopes, and therefore enlist a large stock of active sentiment from the Lombard people that they were willing to give to the Republic. He determined therefore to revive the old Lombard monarchy, and to offer the crown to his eldest brother. The plan would fall in with other parts of a great scheme which was now shaping itself in his mind—the scheme of a number of allied and tributary kingdoms governed by members of the Bonaparte family. But Joseph and Louis both preferred their chance of accession in France to an Italian crown; so Napoleon took the crown himself. On March 17, 1804, a Constitutional Statute was issued, which called the Emperor of the French to the throne of Italy. But the kingdom was to be kept distinct from the Empire; and upon the condition of peace Napoleon promised to resign it to his natural or adopted son. To a deputation of the Republic he promised that he would make the new kingdom free and himself go to Milan to take the Iron Crown.

Napoleon's visit to northern Italy in 1805 was like the passing of a hailstorm over parched land. Wherever he went he poured out ideas, schemes, improvements. He was crowned King with great pomp in Milan Cathedral, and then nominated his step-son Eugene Bonaparte to act as viceroy. He told the Italian legislature (June 7) that good and splendid results always proceeded from a uniform and simple system, and that to this end he had simplified the administration. The Code had been given to Italy; and the Council had been asked to prepare a judicial system which should secure to the Italian people all the advantages of strong judicial benches, public procedure, and fair trial.

The jury, however, would not be admitted. To advance the credit of the country, the public debt was to bear the name of "*Mestre Napoleon*." Public instruction was no longer to be departmental, but based on a uniform policy for the whole kingdom. Departmental expenses were to be equalised, the richer departments being forced to contribute to the needs of the poorer. "My people of Italy," he continued, "is of all the peoples of Europe the least heavily taxed"; and he assured his hearers that no new charge would be laid upon them. Monasteries had been taken to provide the clergy with a suitable endowment; and, though some monastic establishments had been amalgamated, it was his intention to protect those which were of public utility, or which supplied the place of the secular clergy. "The Italians should remember that arms are the principal support of a State. It is time that the youth who live in idleness in the great towns should learn the fatigue and dangers of war." Eugene was reminded that he must study to please the Italians. "Cultivate their language; let them be your principal companions; distinguish them in a particular manner at festivals; approve what they approve, love what they love... Your grand interest is to treat the nation well, to know them all, their names, their families." He was rarely to preside over the Council of State, to speak little, to work twice a week with his ministers, to distrust spies, to write every day to the Emperor, to surround himself with young Italians, to study the history of all the towns in the kingdom, to be indefatigable with disaffected officials, to visit the fortresses, and every week to report on the force of each corps—how many were on the sick list, how many on the active list, where they were quartered, how went the conscription. An experienced French publicist, Miquet, was deputed to guide his footsteps.

Every man in Milan liked Eugene. He was not clever or experienced, but he was frank and manly, loyal and laborious, with a gift for the right word; a keen professional soldier rather than a statesman, but even as a statesman above the average of Italian rulers. He served Napoleon well, and was well served by his subjects. Indeed it was said in after-times, when the Austrians reled in Milan, that if you met a down-looking man in the streets, or heard of any one as a back-slover, as purchasing the instance in the collected edition of *Alfred*, he was sure to be an ex-civil servant of the Viceroy. The bourgeoisie was so strenuous, there was such a thrilling air of improvement and economy, of adventure and high politics, in the kingdom, that the whole tone of society was braced up. It was observed, for instance, that the Milanese aristocracy became more economical and flung away less money to carriages and theatres, and that in spite of heavy taxation they were richer at the end of the reign than at the beginning. It was observed that house-building proceeded rapidly, though the taxes rose from 82,000,000 francs in 1806 to 144,000,000 in 1809. The public works united with by the Government, the canals and roads, the ornamental



highways and gardens, constituted in themselves a kind of education. The Po was cleared of floating brushwood, so that it became navigable by night; the cathedral of Milan was finished; every important town received some embellishment. The prison and sanitary legislation was far in advance of earlier standards. Agriculture was encouraged by schools, credit freely distributed, public order enforced by a stricter police. The comparative immunity of northern Italy from crime during the later portion of Eugene's rule, and the subsequent prevalence of acts of violence, have been noted by Sir Samuel Romilly.

It is true that the government was a despotism. The legislature, which was somewhat obnoxious, was suppressed for criticising the first budget of the kingdom; and afterwards (March, 1805) a Senate was formed upon the French model to take its place. Being mainly composed of government officials, and scarcely qualified to register the acts of the sovereign and the Council of State, this body was both servile and useless. Nor was there any outside criticism. The press was kept down with a firm hand; and the faintest attempt at political comment was severely punished. Lattuada, the editor of a fashionable Milanese weekly, was put into a madhouse for hinting at the immorality of *Stiracchia*.

Yet the play of higher upon lower minds, if discouraged in the sphere of politics, was fortified in other directions. The great vice of Italian education had long been the sacrifice of solid learning to frivolous accomplishments. The French rule gave a more serious and practical bent to the Italian intellect. Special schools were instituted for music, agriculture, engineering. *Lycees* in the French style were planned in every department: at Milan, Bologna, and Venice, academies of art were created which were to elect a commission *dell'arte*, charged with the duty of embellishing cities; military education became quite as serious, and far more scientific than it had been elsewhere, even in Prussia; and the study of military history experienced a renaissance. The effect of the army upon the country was profound and far-reaching. It helped to obliterate provincial and social distinctions; it provided a career for talent; it rescued the rich from their lethargy, and forced an admirable school for patriotism; it restored to the Italians their self-respect. At the Bologna manoeuvres, in the Austrian campaign, at the siege of Eckberg and Stralsund, in the difficult fighting in Catalonia, at the battle of the Randa, and in the Moscow campaign, the Italian troops proved themselves inferior to none. Officers returning from the wars believed in the union of Italy.

The kingdom of Italy was successively increased by the addition of Venice in 1806, of the Marches in 1808, and of Italian Tyrol in 1810. Dalmatia, which was ceded to Napoleon together with Venice, was in the first instance placed under the control of Eugene, but afterwards (August, 1809) transferred to Murat; and, when three years later Austria was stripped of her remaining Illyrian provinces, these were

added to the command of the Governor-General of Dalmatia. Whatever may have been Napoleon's original intention when he appointed Eugène, when he arranged for his marriage, and when he adopted him as a son, he showed clearly by his subsequent conduct that he did not intend a Bonaparte to rule over a united Italy. For not only did he establish a French monarchy in Naples, but side by side with these two kingdoms he built up "a French Italy," an Italy annexed to the Empire, which seemed likely to swallow up the whole peninsula. Indeed, in 1809 he frankly told Eugène that, if he did not show real loyalty to the Continental Rhapsody, his Kingdom would be annexed to France.

Of these Franco-Italian provinces, Piedmont was the richest specimen. It was, as Bonaparte explained, a *600-de-part* necessary for France; and its hardy subalpine population, trained to the barrow and the camp, offered an additional reinforcement to annex it. Accordingly, from 1800 to 1814, Piedmont, divided into six departments, was administered as a French province by French laws. The French tongue, which had formerly been *hakimidia*, was now official; and a bilingual newspaper, the *Courier de Turin*, was provided by the Government, to educate the *chapequons* and the *rustics* in the language of their conquerors. The Piedmontese debt was taken over by France; tithes and feudal dues were suppressed; and the French fiscal system was introduced by Gaudin in all its vigorous completeness in 1808. But here, as in Lombardy, the First Consul was determined that the anti-clerical democrats, who had triumphed at the fall of the Sardinian House, should triumph no longer. General Monce, who governed the Piedmontese departments from 1803 to 1808, was, though married to an illustre Egyptian, himself well-bred, and ardently angled for the grace of the Piedmontese nobility. With all his orientation, his debts, and his amours, Monce rendered some substantial service to the province, organizing as he did a much-needed system of poor-relief, and completely stamping out brigandage. Napoleon, too, visited Piedmont in 1804, and was prolific in policies. Bread was to be cheapened; rivers were to be bridged; fortifications were to be demolished; and Turin, under the new administration, was to assume "the popular and paternal physiognomy of a French town." Three years later, wishing to curtail the Piedmontese for the loss of a Court, he created the post of "Governor-General of the departments beyond the Alps," and appointed his brother-in-law Camille Borghese to hold it. Borghese was a young, good-looking Roman, without intellect or parts, and would have been unequal to serious responsibility. But as a gaudy fly thrown to attract the nobility of Piedmont and Liguria (for the Genoese departments were placed within his sphere), Borghese could serve the Emperor's turn. He was instructed to speak French, to hold levees and give *haupats*, to write to the Emperor every day, and to take his orders from the ministers in Paris.

Piedmont had always been noted for certain peculiarities. It was

very monarchial; it was very clerical; it was very military; and it was very un-Italian. If the Sardinian House was to be ruled, annexation to France was as acceptable a destiny as any other, though there was a party who favoured a connection with the Italian kingdom. Being military in their tastes, the Piedmontese were not averse, as were other Italians, from the conscription; and the name of Napoleon was revered by many a veteran long after the Empire had passed away. Though many noble families still secretly hoped for a Sardinian restoration, many accepted office and title from the French. Eight Piedmontese entered the Senate of the Empire; nine at least sat in the Legislative Body; two were in Napoleon's Council of State. Winter amusements flattered the professional class; popular festivals and military reviews amused the people. Though the taxes were heavy, though the use of the French tongue was a source of hardship in the country districts, though the anti-clerical policy of the later Empire went against popular sentiment, and many parts of the Code were contrary to tradition, there was no serious opposition to French rule.

The boundaries of French Italy were eventually expanded by the annexation of Parma and Piacenza, of Tuscany, and of the remaining portions of the Roman State. In 1808 Morrea de Saint-Mary was sent as resident to Duke Ferdinand of Parma; and, after the Duke's death in October, 1808, he was named as administrator of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla. Morrea abolished torture, improved the judicial system, and prepared the way for annexation, which was formally proclaimed on Sept. 23, 1809. In 1809, after a peasant revolt had been crushed by Junot and the public debt liquidated by Gaudin, the duchies received the designation of "the department of the Taro," and were placed under the general government of Piedmont and Liguria.

The kingdom of Etruria, annexed three years later, was a more important addition to the Empire. Founded in 1801 for Louis, the weakly and ineffectual son of Duke Ferdinand of Parma, Etruria had experienced nothing but humiliations and disasters. The policy of the Court of Florence was controlled by Napoleon, who quartered his troops in the country, abstracted the *Venus de' Medici*, prevented the acceptance of his Code, and insisted upon the closure of Livorno to English vessels. The kingdom was overrun with French soldiers; and the Queen Regent, whose husband had died in 1802, was overruled by the French resident. But, though powerless to oppose French schemes, Marie-Louise was not the woman to support them. She had all the inertia, all the stupidity, all the object opposition of the Spanish Bourbons. While Napoleon was plunging deeper and deeper into his struggle with the Papacy, the Queen Regent of Etruria was the patroness of music and the plying of favourites; and her rule appeared all the more lifeless and dark, when compared with the active proceedings of Eliza Bonaparte in the neighbouring principality of Lucca. Herself able and laborious, as

admirable ruler of her tiny State, Eliza both envied and despised, envied and depreciated her Spanish rival. Her ambitions and aspirations were no secret to Napoleon, who, having created the Kingdom of Etruria to obtain colonial concessions from Spain, now came to view it as "a delinquency in the Italian portfolio."

On October 27, 1807, a secret treaty was signed with Spain at Fontainebleau, in virtue of which the lot of Maria-Louise was to surrender Tuscany for a principality in Portugal. When all had been settled, the Queen Regent was informed that she had ceased to reign, that she must pack up her goods and spend the rest of her life as a prisoner and an exile. On May 30, 1808, Tuscany was united to France, receiving three places in the Senate and twelve in the Legislative Body. In the meantime an Extraordinary Junta had been appointed to organize the country. It was headed by General Moreau, and contained among its members Clusien, the experienced prefect of Brussels, *d'Audoy*, the *Comte de Graciano*, soldier, philosopher, administrator, and philanthropist, and a young Piedmontese named Cesare Balbo, who was destined to make a mark in the annals of Italy. It was explained that the object of the association was to extend the French constitution, to aid naval recruiting, and to enable a military port upon the scale of Toulon to be constructed at Spezia.

Seven months and eighteen octavo volumes of edicts were issued to convert "the mother of modern civilization" into a little French frontier town. A French prefect was sent to Florence; the country was carved into three departments, Arno, Ombrone, Méditerranée; the Leopoldine system of justice and administration was swept away. The Italian language was however admitted into official acts and documents — a wise concession duly appreciated: and in time many prominent Tuscans rallied to the new government. In March, 1808, "a General Government of the Departments of Tuscany" was created upon the model of that which had been established in Tivoli. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, as it was now called, was given to Eliza Bonaparte; and it was hoped that the fortitude of a grand-ducal Court would bring consolation to Florence for the extinction of the Medici and the expulsion of the Bourbons. The powers of the Grand Duke were limited to transmitting the orders received from the minister in Paris to the Intendant of her Treasury, the director of her police, the chief of her staff, and a general of division (her own husband), all of whom were named by the Emperor. When Eliza attempted to neglect or amend the instruction of a minister, she was reminded that as a French subject she was liable to arrest.

Of all the Italian States, Tuscany had least to gain and most to lose by the imposition of the French system. Her judicial system had been excellent, her penal law mild and humane in comparison with that which she was now compelled to receive. She had already grown out of

freedmen and reformed her monasteries; and, though her administration was complex and still bore evidence of the historic dualism between Florence and Rome, it was the product of an intelligent race versed in the arts of management. The French improved the law of copyright, encouraged the cultivation of cotton, helped the woollen manufacturers, flattered the universities; and, by abolishing religious congregations, enabled the debt to be liquidated. But the most divided peasantry in Europe lacked the crude barbarity of the conscription; and all the benefits of French rule could not efface the resentment which the military policy of Napoleon aroused in the Tuscan mind.

The temporal power of the Papacy had long appeared to Napoleon to be anomalous and inconvenient; and in his first Italian campaign he had enforced the union of the Legations to the Cisalpine Republic. The March of Ancona, stretching along the eastern coast of Italy and connecting the Italian with the Neapolitan kingdom, formed the next object of attack. On August 5, 1807, Napoleon expounded to Eugène the advisability of annexing this portion of Italy; and on October 5 General Lemarrois was ordered to fix his head-quarters at Ancona, to assesthe the revenues, to take command of the papal troops in the district, and to establish a provisional administration. In the spring of 1808 the last portions of reserve war stores away. The March of Ancona and the duchies of Urbino, Macerata, and Camerino were incorporated in the Italian kingdom, divided into three departments (Macera, Macina, Tronto), and subjected to the Italian Concordat. Prince was despatched to liquidate the debt and arrange the budget. The port of Ancona was to be cleared; the city was to be fortified; and, while the coast was to be carefully surveyed, a regiment was to be formed out of the papal troops. But, while the northern provinces fell to the Italian kingdom, the most precious and distinctive portion of the State, including the capital, was annexed to the French Empire.

Of all the events which occurred during this crowded period of Italian history, none, not even the partition of Venice, cut so deep to the Italian heart. Religious scepticism was common enough in Italy; Galilean principles were widely held; men of intelligence readily acknowledged that priestly government meant stagnation and inefficiency. But the Papacy was a possession common to all Italians; and Rome was the sacred city of the race. An Italian might see the French in Piedmont, or even in Tuscany, and feel no murmurings of heart; but to gilden Rome, to arrest the head of the Catholic religion, was equivalent to impiety and treason to the deeper instincts. The protests for the annexation and the circumstances which attended it made collusion peculiarly ignominious. It was asserted that Charlemagne had wished the Pope to be a vassal of the Empire; that Pius VII had allied himself with Protestants; and that, if the Papal States were not annexed, Rome would become the "refuge of brigands raised or vented by the

members of his Majesty in the territory of Naples." The plain facts were that the Pope had declined to join in an offensive alliance against England; that he had restricted the extension of the French Concordat to Piedmont and Liguria, and the extension of the Italian Concordat to Venice; that he had refused to sanction the divorce of Savona; and that he asserted the old papal claim to supremacy over Naples. In other words, he had fought for the traditions of his office, for the spiritual and temporal independence of his Son.

To chastise such insolence, General Miolla was commanded (January, 1808) to quarter his troops in Rome, to seize the Castle of Saint Angelo, and to arrest every English resident and Neapolitan refugee. The Pope was then subjected to every humiliation. He was forced to dismiss one secretary after another; his guard was dissolved; a Roman newspaper was launched against the temporal power. On May 17, 1808, a few days before the battle of Aspern, a decree was issued annexing the Papal States to the French Empire; and a Consulta was appointed to carry on the government. The Pope responded with the Bull *Quam* *Misericordia*, directed against all who should take part in the spoliation of the Church; and for this offence he was made prisoner, hurried out of the capital, and transported to Savona. The act was concerted between Murat and Miolla, and transgressed the measure of Napoleon's instructions. But, once done, it could not be undone; and it proved the signal for a revelation of fortitude in an unexpected quarter. The Roman clergy did not stand high in the public esteem; and no section of Italian society seemed less likely to furnish a pattern of manly independence. Yet, when an oath of obedience and fealty to the Emperor was proposed to them, and though it was well understood that not only perjury, but Heresy and a livelihood depended upon their answer, the majority of them declined to swear. Arrest, imprisonment, exile made no impression. "I began to suspect," wrote Balbo, the secretary of the Roman Consulta, "that these despised priests were the strongest men, perhaps the only strong men in Italy." Out of 2200 monks, 1808 declined to accept pensions from the French Government.

Constantly with the prescription of the non-jurors, the transition was to be effected as painlessly as possible. The Consulta was told that it was Napoleon's intention to diminish rather than increase the taxes. A Senate of sixty members, chosen from the highest ranks of Roman society, was to conduct the affairs and flatter the pride of the city. Though feudal dues were to be suppressed, the nobility might preserve their titles and livings. Two Romans were to sit in the Imperial Senate, and two in the Council of State. On August 22, 1809, it was announced that a palace, a country-house, and a civil list of a million francs were to be allotted to a grand dignitary of the Empire thereafter to be named. Meanwhile the city was to lose its distinctively

ecclesiastical aspect. It was the first duty of the Congress to suppress the Inquisition. The wearing of the clerical habit was restricted to exclusives; the monasteries were dissolved; and a great reduction was effected in the number of dioceses and parishes.

The conduct of the Congress was marked by the real, the energy, and the consideration characteristic of the best French officials. The taxes were fairly assessed; and the liquidation of the debt was born, as elsewhere, provided for by confiscated monastic wealth. The medieval traditions which impeded judicial efficiency—torture, the right of asylum, the exclusive use of Latin in the Courts—were now abolished; while the brigand bands which infested the Campagna were at last broken up. The government took in hand the draining of the Pontine Marshes, the regulation of the Tiber, the restoration of the Appian Way, the improvement of agriculture and the industrial arts. Prizes were offered for the best compositions in Italian prose and verse; a national system of poor relief was instituted; a university was founded at Perugia; a plan was devised for the restoration of the ancient monuments of Rome, and enthusiastically received by Napoleon. When the Congress finished its work in January, 1809, the departments of Rome and Tuscanum were fully organized. The papal troops had been drafted into the Neapolitan army; the Colles were being administered in the Roman Courts; and bishops, carmen, and priests were drawing exiguous stipends from the French exchequer.

Nevertheless the city was not satisfied. Moret represented that the population had shrunk by forty thousand owing to the loss of the papal Court; and, as the taxes were doubled and the conscription was introduced, while the subordinate local officials abused their power, the populace looked back with regret to the soft and indolent rule of the Pope. But meanwhile Napoleon was expanding the birth of an heir; and his expectations were blended with new schemes and ambitions. On February 17, 1809, a *Sanatus Etsi* was issued, which declared Rome to be the second city in the Empire. The Prince Imperial was to assume the title of King of Rome, to hold an imperial Court there, and to renew the splendour of the arts; and, in order that the analogy with the old Empire might be more complete, it was added that the Emperors of France were to be crowned in St Peter's before the tenth year of their reigns. The independence of the Papal See was at an end. The Pope was to swear to the Gallican Articles, to accept a civil list of £200,000 francs, and to have a palace in Paris as well as in Rome. The expenses of the Sacred College and the Propaganda were declared imperial. "Rome will stand higher than she has stood since the last of the Caesars. She will be the sister of the cherished city of Napoleon." The "capital of a small State" was henceforward to become "one of the capitals of a great empire." In time the old papal feeling would die out. By throwing Church lands to the value of 600,000,000 francs

into the market, Napoleon intended to form a proprietary, whose interests would be bound up with the continuance of French rule.

In no quarter of Italy was there a more crying need for energetic reform than in the kingdom of Naples. Here was a people still plunged in medieval barbarism, ignorant, poor, lazy, superstitious, degraded not only by inherent faults of character but by long centuries of oppression and neglect. A rich and privileged absentee landlord class extorted, through the medium of its rapacious agents, every form of due or service which the unfettered tyranny of the noble caste had been able to devise. The burden of the State taxes fell almost entirely on the poor. The course of justice was habitually interfered with by the King; and the judges not only bought their places, but received presents from the litigants who pleaded before them. Torture indeed was abolished, but starvation and chains remained, and all the horrors of the dark and perfidious Neapolitan dungeons. Trials were still held in secret, and verdicts pronounced by authority. That the galleys might be filled more rapidly, prisoners were often tried in a batch and condemned without a pretence of justice; on the other hand, men were sometimes imprisoned for twenty years or more without being brought to trial. In the country districts brigandage was chronic, and was the only career which a young man of spirit could adopt. Agriculture was almost entirely neglected; it was strangled by fourteen hundred different kinds of feudal dues, by a vicious system of taxation, and by the free rights of grazing possessed by the nobility. Monks and priests, beggars and bandits, formed the staple of the country population; while in the capital, 150,000 half-starving and half-naked *lazzaroni* constituted a real danger to personal security. The feudal system combined the maximum of harm to the people with the minimum of benefit to the State. More than a hundred direct imposts were levied by the municipalities, which paid a fixed proportion to the government, and the remainder to the feudal lord. Almost every article of food was taxed; and the duties on silk, the *arredamenti*, were contracted out to a farmer. A heavy tax on salt, rendered additionally oppressive by compulsory purchase, was specially burdensome to the poor. The law was a chaos of precedents and customs, municipal statutes and royal decrees; but its authority was almost immaterial, for it was constantly supplemented or transgressed by the exceptional action of the Crown.

In 1806 Ferdinand IV was compelled to make way for Joseph Bonaparte: and there were some grounds for hoping that the second French occupation of Naples would be more permanent than the first. The Bourbons, after all, were intruders, half-French, half-Spanish; and the bloodthirsty wrongs which they had taken on their antagonists in 1799 had made them many enemies. Joseph was an Italian, who could speak the language and appreciate the characteristics of his subjects; and he came to Naples backed by the reputation of the Empire and



aided by the sword of Massena and Bèginier. Though no soldier and destitute of any conspicuous talent for action, Joseph had a good (and of course worse, and some genuine popular sympathies. That he was entirely subjugated by the will of his brother, and that he was over-land of display is true enough. But he was distinguished, laboring, anxious to improve the lot of his subjects, and it would be an insult to compare him to the degraded and worthless creature whom he displaced.

The situation was one of exceptional difficulty. The Queen of Naples had fled the bank and absconded with the fleet; and the whole coast was exposed to British criticism. The Pope declined to recognise the new King, and the Archbishop of Naples refused to consecrate him—a serious flaw in the eyes of a superstitious people. As the Court had taken the precaution of hoarding part of the year's revenue in advance, and commerce was interrupted by the naval war, the Government found itself from the first in grave financial embarrassment. A protracted campaign of a peculiarly harassing kind added to its perplexities. Gaeta, gallantly defended by the Prince of Hesse-Philippsthal, held out for five months against all the efforts of Massena's army; and this, combined with Sir John Stuart's victory over Bèginier at Maida, stirred up all Calabria to revolt. It was a war of ambuscades and skirmishes, of midnight assassinations and the firing of villages; and, while untold atrocities were perpetrated in the South, a British fleet landed a garrison at Capri within sight of Naples itself. There were other difficulties more tedious still. "You have tasks," wrote Napoleon, "with a woman who is quite possessed"; and more than one conspiracy was discovered which traced its origin to Maria Carolina.

Napoleon's own views as to the prospects and functions of the new government were unfolded to his brother with the brutal directness characteristic of all his correspondence. If the *lanciers* gave trouble they were to be shot; and three or four batteries might be erected which could throw bombs into different parts of Naples if the capital should prove restive. A few big villages should be burnt to edify the Calabrians; and a war contribution of 50,000,000 francs should be levied to meet immediate expenses. The King was to impose a severe and equal system of taxation which should bring in a revenue of 100,000,000 francs from the unshackled class, to create a number of big fiefs for French officers, and to introduce the Civil Code; so that, while the French love of inheritance would tend to subdivide Neapolitan fiefdoms, the establishment of a system of entails for a certain number of selected fiefs would strengthen and perpetuate the power of the French connection. If, however, the institution of divorce should offend clerical prejudice, Joseph was at liberty to drop it, and to leave the registration of births, marriages, and deaths in the hands of the priests. Above all he was warned against optimism. The utmost caution was required in making

a Neapolitan force. In every act Joseph was to ask himself, "How would this be if the French were beaten back to Alexandria?"

As a precaution against ill-fortune, Napoleon recommended the construction of a strong fortress, a sort of Strasbourg, in which the French might defend themselves for a year or two in the event of disaster to the eagles in central Europe. Meanwhile the chief duties of the Neapolitan King were to stamp out the Calabrian revolt, to conquer Sicily, to create a good army corps and a squadron, and to aid Napoleon to become master of the Mediterranean, "the principal and constant aim of my policy." He must not expect to receive financial aid from France; on the contrary, he must pay for the French army of occupation, and permit the establishment of six imperial *fabri*, to be increased to nine in the event of the annexation of Sicily, as well as a reserved domain producing a million francs per annum, to be distributed to French generals and officers. His ties to France were still imperiously emphasized. He was a Grand Elector of the Empire, the heir-apparent to the throne, subject in all matters foreign and domestic to his brother's will. But it was provided in the statute which conferred the Neapolitan crown, that it was never to be held with the crown of France.

An extraordinary situation requires extraordinary measures; and Joseph was compelled to raise a special tax of 5,000,000 francs from Naples and to negotiate a loan in Holland. Even so, his revenue was not adequate to his expenditures, three-fifths of which was accounted for by the army and navy. But by the end of his reign, thanks to the skill of Roederer, Neapolitan finance had been put upon a sound basis. The admirable French system of audit and control was introduced; the duties on commodities (*avvernement*) were taken out of the hands of the farmers, and henceforward collected by the State. In place of the old direct taxes, 108 in number, a single tax was substituted (*financerie*) upon all incomes, lay, ecclesiastical, noble, and non-noble, which were derived from land. The incredible complication of the Neapolitan excise duties was done away with; the customs tariff was revised. On November 27, 1807, Roederer was able to report that a tenth of the national debt had already been liquidated by the sale of national domains, and that measures had been taken for extinguishing three-quarters of the remainder by the confiscation of monastic lands. In the two years of Joseph's rule the revenue was doubled and the debt halved; and the only blots upon an otherwise excellent system were the retention by the State of exclusive and compulsory powers to sell salt, and a civil list which absorbed one-fifth of the revenue.

There were not the only reforms. Every commune was endowed with a free school, every province with a college. Communal and provincial councils were established, with consultative functions; and, though little could be expected of them at first, they might with experience develop into useful bodies. The abolition of feudalism was

decreed, and the whole land-system was revolutionised by the division of communal property, the abolition of primogeniture and entails, the conversion of the *enfiteusi* or rents of younger sons into freehold property, and the confirmation of the vast estates belonging to the Orders of St Bernard and St Benedict. While these changes increased the number of proprietors and promoted the agricultural energy of the population, measures were taken to strip the grazing rights on the fens of Agria, and to bring a larger average under tillage. Prison reform and law reform were other subjects which occupied the attention of the government; and, though the moment was not favourable to experiments in democracy, the prisons were placed for the first time under business regulations, and the country introduced to the benefits of public trial. In view of the Calabrian revolt, four extraordinary and semi-military Courts were created to dispatch summary justice; they were not abolished till 1808. The jury system was never introduced into any part of Italy; but, with these qualifications, and others belonging to the nature of the Code themselves, the judicial system introduced by the French forms a favourable contrast to the system which it displaced.

Joseph had reigned barely two years when, on March 19, 1808, he was commanded to exchange his Kingdom for the throne of Spain. From Bayona he issued a constitution to his former subjects, the main feature of which was a parliament of a hundred members, eighty of whom were to be named by the King and twenty by the electoral colleges. But even this limited concession to the parliamentary system was regarded as antislavery, both by the Government and by the Neapolitans themselves; and, though orders were issued in 1810 for the convocation of departmental councils, there was so general a reluctance to serve upon them that further progress in the direction of political liberty was arrested. French rule in Naples resulted in a liberal despotism, unaccompanied by constitutional forms or privileged corporations.

Joséphine Murat, being offered his choice, was determined to reign in Naples rather than in Portugal. His spectacular appearance, his brilliant military record, his affable manners, made him at once a favourite with the idle and impressionable Neapolitan populace; and his wife Caroline, the sister of the Emperor, a handsome and capable woman, added to his prestige and popularity. Primarily a soldier, "Joséphine" devoted his chief attention to military affairs. The Neapolitan army was steadily increased, until in 1814 its numbers stood at 55,000. A bold attack upon Capri resulted in the expulsion of its Corsican and Maltese garrison. This greatly improved the Neapolitans; and, though the attempted invasion of Sicily in 1808 was less successful and led to a formidable reinforcement of helplessness, Calabria was efficiently pacified by the systematic atrocities of General Maresca. In the meantime the reforms of the previous reign, many of which existed only on paper, were carried into execution. A Fiscal Commission, presided over by Giuseppe Zorbo, the Minister of the Interior, dealt with all the questions

which arose out of the new land-laws, distributed domain-lands, settled scales of compensation, and completed its arduous task by 1810. Through careful finance the revenue rose steadily, and showed a surplus in 1810 and 1811. Agricultural societies were founded in every province; and real energy was thrown into educational reform.

If the continuance of the French rule in Naples had depended on a syllable of liberal and intelligent Neapolitan opinion, King Joachim would have been secure. But, as time went on, the real discrepancy between the interests of the Neapolitan kingdom and the exigencies of Imperial policy became more and more apparent. The correspondence between Murat and his master is filled with complaints on the one hand, with reproof and reprimand on the other. Bourbons (says Murat) are thrown upon the Neapolitan exchequer which do not properly belong to it and which it can ill afford to bear. Native industry is damaged and the revenue diminished by the exemption of French imports from duty. Despite Rouman, the merchants are ruined by the Continental Blockade. The King petitions that he may be allowed to send home at least 15,000 of the French troops quartered upon his country; or that he may recall his own troops from Spain, where they are serving at the charge of the Neapolitan exchequer. It was all in vain. With regard to the blockade, Rouman, and military preparation, Napoleon was inexorable. In 1811 he threatened Murat with deposition. Yet there were already over 75,000 men on the naval and military establishment, a strain which bade fair to compromise the success of all the French reforms.

Great as was Napoleon's influence south of the Alps, it was no less far-reaching in Germany. The secularisation of the ecclesiastical principalities, the mediatisation of the Imperial Knights, the dissolution of Austria, the extinction of the Holy Roman Empire, the additions made to the dignity and power of the south-German Princes, the simplification of the political geography of the country—these achievements entitle Napoleon to be called one of the makers of modern Germany. Yet, while this was the ultimate result, it was far from being the immediate intention. In a letter to Louis, Napoleon said that it was the principal end of his policy to *desnationalise* (*dépayser*) the German mind.

The German mind, so far as it was expressed by the captains of literature, readily lent itself to the process. It was sufficiently cool and cosmopolitan to appreciate the fine points of French civilisation, and sufficiently intelligent to recognise the absurdities of the medieval German policy. Thus, while the Holy Roman Empire perished in an atmosphere of home-made ridicule, the new Rhine Confederation carried with it no distinct idea of historic sacrifice. The south-German Princes, enriched and dignified by Napoleon, had been enabled to pay off their old scores against Austria; and the south-German population was generally content to follow where its Princes led.

The influence of France upon the internal policy of the States of the Confederation was none the less marked for being indirect. It made at once for autonomy and centralisation, for civil equality and political subordination. The object of Napoleon being to extract military assistance from his German allies, every constitutional check upon the will of the sovereign was an obstacle which ought to be removed; and the Princes who were his confederates were ready enough to take the hint, and to purchase autonomy at home at the price of subordination in their foreign relations. But there were other parts of Germany where French influence was more directly exerted, parts which were ruled by French prefects or by German prefects obeying a French master. This French Germany, or German France, as it may be called, was made up of a series of acquisitions. The process began with the conquest of the Rhénish electorates in 1792; it ended with the annexation of the Hanseatic towns and the duchy of Oldenburg in 1811. It did not follow any prearranged plan, but was governed by the circumstances of the moment; and the component parts of the new territory were frequently altered, both as to their boundaries, and as to their organisation. Hanover, for instance, was subjected to military occupation in 1803; then part of it was taken away and incorporated in the kingdom of Westphalia (1804); then the remaining portion was given to Westphalia (1809); a few months afterwards, the whole of the original portion ceded in 1803 and most of the additional portion ceded in 1810 formed part of the French Empire. Some districts, such as Erfurt, never received regular civil organisation, but were simply charged with the support of French troops; others, like Fulda and Hana, after a period of military government, were fused into a State on the French pattern.

This inequality in the duration of methodised French rule must be taken into account in considering the history of French Germany. Ultimately the four Rhénish departments and the two departments formed out of the Hanseatic lands were administered on the same plan; but this outward similarity conceals the most divergent conditions. The four Rhénish departments had long lost all semblance of interest in their old masters, in the motley host of archbishops and bishops, princes and counts, Imperial towns and Imperial knights, who had borne sway over the land. They had never been in the full current of German life; they had no great university; their peasantry had greatly profited by the fall of the sovereigns and the land-sales of the Revolution, and were content enough with French rule, as soon as it put off Jacobinical notions. Until 1804 the departments rhénais suffered little from war. Nowhere was the Imperial government more intelligent, more meliorist, more anxious to make the "new Frenchmen" at home in France. The French language was encouraged, but not to the exclusion of German; the French market was opened to Rhénish trade.

It was far otherwise with the Hanseatic departments. The govern-

ments of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck had been such as to elicit a large amount of active municipal patriotism. The burghers of these city-states were proud of their politics and jealous of their independence. They had been forced to lend money on doubtful security to the French government of Hanover; and ever since 1806 they had been pillaged by French soldiers, and molested by French policemen. They lived for commerce, and their commerce was destroyed by the blockade; and in the loss of their liberties they saw little else than the desire of Napoleon to sweep men and money into his navy, to burn more English ships, and to plague their lives by more effectual requisitions and more searching domiciliary visits. Whereas the Rhine departments had been the earliest among the conquests of the Revolution, the Rhenish departments were among the latest annexations of the Empire. The Rhine province had been conquered in obedience to one of the oldest historical impulses of the French race: its conservation was a point of national pride, and the contentment of its inhabitants an important change upon national activity. The masses of the Esch, the Moselle, and the Elbe lay outside the proper sphere of French civilization. The conquest of these was a military measure; and, though good men were sent to survey and organize the new departments, few believed that the French control of this region would be permanent.

Among the Napoleonic States carved out of German soil the Grand Duchy of Berg was the earliest, and it presents some features of special interest. It was never actually annexed to the French Empire, and yet from 1806 to 1815 it was practically governed from Paris. It was never given a paper constitution, yet it received the French Code (with some modifications adjusted to local conditions), the French municipal system, the French taxes, coins, weights and measures. It contained within its borders the most important industrial region in Germany, and was therefore peculiarly injured by the Continental Blockade; yet its manufactures were shut out of the French and Dutch markets by a tariff wall. Desiring annexation in order to escape industrial ruin, it was kept at arm's length by the country which fixed its budgets, consumed its soldiers, and dictated the terms of its administration.

Formed in March, 1806, out of the Prussian duchy of Cleves and the Bavarian appanage of Berg, this little State was intended to serve as a convenient military outpost on the lower Rhine. It was a French "march" against Brandenburg, just as Brandenburg in old days had been a German "march" against the Woods; and, since it was formed for a military purpose, it was appropriately entrusted to the government of a soldier, Prince Joachim Murat, brother-in-law to the Emperor and the finest leader of horses in the French army. From the first, Murat complained of narrow boundaries and exiguous revenues; and, when the terms of the Confederation of the Rhine were settled in June, 1806, the Grand Duchy of Berg, while bound to contribute 8000 men to the army

of the Confederation, was practically doubled by the addition of parts of Nassau and Düsseldorf. The humiliation of Prussia in the following years paved the way for further increments: and, after some months of arduous negotiation, a treaty was struck (January 30, 1808) by which the Grand Duke received the Prussian countships of Mark and Tecklenburg, the Prussian portion of the principality of Münster, and the countship of Lippe, in return for which it was compelled to cede the important Rhine fortress of Wesel to France. It now contained some 300,000 inhabitants; but, though its area was modest, its social structure was diverse and complex. While Münster was Catholic and aristocratic, Nassau was humble and Calvinist. While in the county of Mark there was great industrial activity, Bavarian rule had done nothing to correct the ignorance and inertia of Berg.

The French administrators soon learnt to respect the work of their Prussian predecessors; but they had nothing but contempt for the confused and feeble portions of the old Government at Düsseldorf. Under the rule of Murat the French principles of equality were introduced into the financial system: and a Prussian custom which forbade burghers to acquire noble land in Cleve was abolished. As and was made of municipal autonomy; and, as in France, so in Berg, the budgets of the towns were now to be decided by the central executive. A supreme court of appeal was erected at Düsseldorf; and a legal commission was appointed to confer with lawyers drawn from the different provinces of the duchy as to the introduction of the Code. Many other important and beneficial schemes were planned or partially executed; but in February, 1809, the Grand Duke was summoned to Bayonne, and shortly afterwards invested with the crown of Naples. He had only paid two flying visits to his humble German principality.

César Bessières, who had helped to introduce French rule in Westphalia, was now appointed to act as Imperial Commissioner in the duchy of Berg; and, not long afterwards, the grand-ducal title was bestowed upon Napoleon Louis, Prince Royal of Holland, a child of four-and-a-half years. Bessières was a good and zealous administrator, careful of the best interests of the people, and prompt to redress their grievances at head-quarters. He was assisted by a German minister of the interior, and a German minister of justice; and, as he was himself conservative in temperament, the Government at Düsseldorf could not be accused of pusillanimy or iconoclasm. In a brief and tempestuous visit (1811), which has been immortalised in Heine's poetic prose, Napoleon attempted to quicken the process of change. A university, a *gymn*, a *lycée*, and a seminary were prescribed for Düsseldorf. The principles of the Concordat were to be extended to the duchy; and, while no boy was to be educated save in a French or grand-ducal school, some selected youths were to be dispatched to Saint-Cyr or Saint-Germain to receive such military education as would settle them to hold commissions.

Beugnot, in his memoirs, congratulated himself upon the splendid results achieved by his government; and the archives of Düsseldorf and Paris testify to the honest and enlightened zeal of the local administration. But here, as elsewhere, good intentions were wrecked by impossible conditions. Napoleon claimed half the domain, levied a war-contribution on the Prussian provinces added in 1806, and steadily raised his demand for conscripts. The taxes were tripled; but, since one-half of the revenue was employed for military purposes, religion, education, and justice were equally starved. Yet some permanent benefit was derived from the French occupation—the abolition of serfs, the establishment of free trade in land, the disappearance of internal customs-dues, the growth of a spirit of cooperation between contiguous districts which had hitherto lived self-centred lives, the break-up of the guilds, the foundation of a small proprietary, a better general law, a more active, intelligent, and helpful direction of the public works.

If the kingdom of Westphalia was the second of the Franco-German States in point of time, it was easily first in point of importance. It contained a population of 2,000,000 and extended over some of the most fertile soil in Germany. But, like all the Napoleonic States, it was devoid of marked boundaries or any pre-existing principle of inner union. Its main constituents were the electorate of Hesse-Cassel, the duchy of Brunswick, the Westphalian provinces of Prussia, and the southern portion of Hanover. Its capital, Cassel, was Hessian; of its three principal universities, Göttingen was Hanoverian, Halle was Prussian, Marburg was Hessian. Its chief fortress, Magdeburg, was Prussian. The Hessians, who formed the nucleus of the population, were rugged Calvinists, imbued with strong military tastes and a touching loyalty for the hard and selfish dynasty which had governed them so fit. The Brunsvickers, who had lived under a more humane and politic rule, were better educated and more enlightened; and it is a curious fact that, having more cause to regret the past, they were at once more willing and better trained to accept the present. Various as were its elements, and chaotic though it was by five small ridges and conspiracies, the kingdom of Westphalia attained a reasonable degree of consistency. The best talents rallied round the Crown; nobles and gentry took part in the administration. Prussians and Brunsvickers, Hessians and Hanoverians, all co-operated to carry on the work of the State.

The person nominated to rule the Westphalian kingdom was Jerome, the youngest and favourite brother of the Emperor, who had gained a little military reputation in the Russian campaign. Jerome was full of amiable intentions, agreeable in manner, quick in counsel, and by no means deficient of sympathy. But he was untalented, impatient, and self-willed; and he consistently sacrificed the material interests of his subjects to his own vulgar and prodigal pleasure. The Constitution, which was framed in Paris, laid down the conditions upon which the



Crown was to be held, and fixed the principles upon which the government was to be conducted. As a member of the Rhénish Confederation, the new kingdom was compelled to furnish a contingent of 20,000 men to the French Empire; and one-half of the allotted domains of the expropriated Princes was to be reserved for the Emperor to serve as donations to French officers. The King of Westphalia was to remain a French prince; and, in case of the expiration of his lawful line, his kingdom was to devolve upon the Emperor. The Civil List was fixed at the enormous figure of 2,000,000 *frs.* The Code Napoleon was to form the civil law of the Kingdom. Procedure was to be public; trial by jury was introduced in criminal cases; while conscription was declared a fundamental law of the Kingdom. The French monetary system and the French system of weights and measures were to be established. Corporations previously existing were doomed to extinction; and seigniorage and the exclusive privileges of the aristocracy were to suffer the same fate. The Estates of the realm were to be composed of a hundred members, named, after the Italian plan, by electoral colleges, but were denied the right of initiative or public discussion. Departments and prefects, districts and sub-prefects, mayors and justices of the peace, municipalities and mayors, were prescribed and accepted.

It was not a liberal constitution, but it was an advance upon anything which had been experienced in these provinces; and the Westphalians determined to make the best of it. The French system of justice won the approval of many competent lawyers, as alike more speedy, simple, and efficient than the law or the procedure to which they had been accustomed. The Jews, who everywhere were in Brunswick had been liable to the most onerous disabilities, now found themselves free and full citizens of the State; and, if the aristocracy suffered from the loss of feudal dues, this was in a measure compensated by places at Court and public offices. Military life was as costly in Bonn; and the Westphalians were proved attractive as a profession. The German prefects threw themselves with zeal into the business of administration; and, as the department of the interior was managed by German clerks, and presided over by an old minister of the Duke of Brunswick, French principles were applied with due consideration of German predilection. The facility of language never became arduous, for, though French was exclusively spoken at Court and in the Council, and the portfolios of war and justice were held by Frenchmen, German was never proscribed. It was the language of the law-courts, of the Codes (specially translated for Westphalian use), and of many of the public offices. It was still taught in the schools, though French was made obligatory in addition; and the official organs of the government, the *Moniteur Westphalien*, was bilingual. It is true that the machine of administration and of justice had been going by French officials, and that the highest posts in the Westphalian army were reserved to Frenchmen. But the French element in the

Government was not propenseness, as much then was sufficient to secure an intelligent and appreciative association of the principles upon which the business of the State was to be conducted. The all-important ministry of finance was held in succession by two Germans.

Yet, in spite of many elements of promise, the kingdom of Westphalia ended in shame and bankruptcy. The territories out of which it was made up were poor and backward; and, before Jerome set foot in his kingdom they had been exhausted by a year of French military requisitions. Every consideration of policy should have prompted Napoleon to ease the financial situation of the government which was to display to all Germany the benefits of the French method. But, if the kingdom of Westphalia had been a docile and trustworthy foe, it could hardly have been handled with greater harshness. Every penny which Napoleon could wring out of Westphalia for the French Treasury he was determined to exact. He claimed the debts due to the *Exchequer*; he claimed half the domains; he refused to pay the charges which had been incurred during the French military occupation of 1800; he exacted an immense war-contribution; he required the kingdom to maintain a force of 20,000 armed men, half of whom were in the first instance to be French; and, as soon as he was assured of their loyalty, he prompted his brother to raise more and more Westphalian troops. The Westphalian financiers found themselves confronted by a deficit, in the first year, of 80,000,000 frs. But all entreaty and expostulation were in vain. Napoleon would not listen to Jerome; and Jerome, with his *old* and *lucky* cousin, was not in a position to remonstrate with effect. In 1808 the Government expatriated two-thirds of its inherited debt, fixed the land-tax at 25 per cent. of the net revenue, and decreed a forced loan of 5,000,000 frs.

If enlightened finance ended in desperate extortion and bankruptcy, the greater part of the blame rests with Napoleon. He set an extravagant and untried youth to govern a new kingdom; he gave him too large an income; and he imposed financial and military obligations upon his subjects which they were quite unable to bear. A share in the disaster is also attributable to Jerome. He knew how the Westphalian treasury was suffering from the taxes and requisitions, how commerce was paralysed and houses were allowed to fall out of repair; and he was capable of describing to Napoleon the miseries of his subjects in tones of genuine compassion. But, though there were good and prudent heads in his ministry, he never checked for an instant the flow of his unceasing prodigality, and never surrendered a pleasure or a vice.

A third variety of political experiment was exhibited on the banks of the Main. In 1806 Napoleon had spoken of the free city of Frankfort as a centre of English conspiracy and contraband; and, when the Prussian war broke out, a heavy *hand* was laid upon the persons and liberties of the Frankforters. They were *compelled* to pay a war-tax of 2,000,000 frs. and to lose their characteristic autonomy. The city of Frankfort was now

included in the small principality composed of Aschaffenburg and Ratibon, which in 1806 had been created for Carl von Dalberg, the Prince-Primate of the Rhenish Confederation, and the last surviving representative of the great ecclesiastical Princes of Germany. Dalberg was humane and enlightened; and his great reputation as a patriot, a reformer, a man of letters, and a churchman, rendered him a useful ally to Napoleon. As he was unbounded in his enthusiasm for the Emperor, he could be treated with a territory of some strategical importance. But he was known to be elderly, weak, and amiable; and, while his policy was strictly watched by the French resident in Frankfurt, Napoleon made no scruple in quartering French troops upon his territory.

Dalberg addressed himself to the task of alleviating the disabilities of the Frankfurt Jews, and began a faint assault upon the exclusive privileges of the Lutheran Senate. But it was difficult for any of Napoleon's agents to obtain immunity from interruption. In 1806 the Dalbergian principality was entirely remodelled. The Prince-Primate was forced to cede Ratibon to Bavaria and to accept in exchange the county of Hesse and the bishopric of Fulda, both of which provinces had been utterly exhausted by four years of French military occupation. His State was now christened the Grand Duchy of Frankfurt, and bound to contribute a quota of 8800 men to the Confederation of the Rhine, to provide reinforcements for two months, to reserve an income for the Emperor, and to introduce the French legal and administrative system at the earliest opportunity. Upon the demise of the reigning Grand Duke, the principality was to lapse to the Viceroy of Italy.

The tragicalness of the situation which ensued may be imagined. On the one hand there is the mild old German prelate, having a constitution drafted on the Westphalian model, scattering his Estates to Hesse, carving his little principality into four departments, opening a university here and a law-school there, naming departmental councils and inviting their opinions, now sanguine and exuberant, now cowed and depressed, but meeting with an unexpected amount of intelligent German support, as well as a good deal of tough opposition from the oligarchy of Frankfurt. On the other hand there is the French agent, Flakowsky or Bacher, corresponding with the Foreign Office in Paris and calling the tune. He inspects every act and proclamation before it is published in the official gazette, and, in defiance of the Constitution, proscribes acts which have never received the assent of the Estates; he suppresses political newspapers, carries out domiciliary visits, greets the Prince-Primate if he is calm, checks him if he is hasty; while on the financial side he is aided by "the Director of Domains in the service of France," who arranges the budget and introduces the searching and unpopular methods of the French Treasury. Meanwhile English wars are burnt in the towns, and a continual procession of French troops passes to and fro through the country, which is burdened with the cost of their

support. Outwardly the Grand Duché is a little German State, governed on a constitutional system by an elderly German philanthropist. In reality it is a French military tyranny which cack by alienating every heart. Yet, notwithstanding, in the reaction which followed the downfall of Napoleon, the judicial system introduced into these regions by the French was substantially preserved.

In the catalogue of squandered opportunities the history of the Belgian departments should take a high place. At the outbreak of the French Revolution there seemed to be every reason for expecting a permanent and wholesome concourse between the French and Belgian populations. The inhabitants of the Austrian Netherlands had no history which could be called national, nor were they divided from the French by the barrier of language. Belgians had frequently taken service in the French army; and, in the revolt against the incoercible policy of Joseph II, the Belgian Liberals rested on the support and sympathy of France. It is true that in Luxembourg there was a genuine devotion to Austria, and that many wealthy Belgians had placed their savings in the bank of Vienna. It is true that a considerable trade was done with England. Yet such obstacles as these might easily have been overcome by just and considerate government.

There were, however, two circumstances which made the problem of Belgian incorporation exceptionally delicate. The population of the Netherlands was both devout and military. Nowhere, more perhaps in Spain, had the Catholic Church so complete and unqualified a dominion. It had neither been discredited by a Jesuit schism, nor shaken by the clarifying blasts of French philosophy. The doctors of Louvain persevered in their rejection of the Gallican Articles, and hurried into their disciples an abhorrence of Emancipation which had been deepened by the injudicious measures of Joseph II. During the Revolution and more particularly under the Directory, everything had been done to humiliate the conscience and to impair the well-being of these unfortunate provinces. They were pillaged by ignorant and brutal commissaires; they were subjected to the conscription; their taxes were increased; their Church was persecuted. With an irretrievable lack of statesmanship, the French Government applied to the Belgian departments all the religious legislation which had torn asunder the Church in France; and the consequence was that they raised a Belgian Union. Consequently, at the establishment of the Consulate, the nine departments, far from having acquired an attachment to their new masters, were angry, miserable, and impotent. Population had dwindled; roads were broken and neglected; banditti ranged over the country; and the heart of every parish was its non-juring and persecuted priest.

The policy of the Consulate was well calculated to heal the breach which had grown up between France and her new subjects. Capable

French prefects were sent to govern the départements, and ruled them with beauty, energy, and good sense. Canals and roads were made; prisons were reformed; brigandage was stamped out; order was introduced into municipal and village finances; a cadastral survey was pushed forward towards completion; and, while the material havoc was thus skilfully repaired, the Consulat brought peace to the Church, especially as the government wisely refused from appointing "Constitutional" bishops to the Belgian sees. Papalist to the backbone, the Belgian clergy did not go behind the decision of the Pope.

Still, the profound Eristianism of the Napoleonic system was sure, sooner or later, to cause trouble in this quarter. An able pamphleteering priest, Alfred Stevens, took up his pen against the *Cyprien* Articles, and poured satire on the new Imperial festivals and the new Imperial catechism. A great mistake was made when the Emperor insisted that the professors in the universities should subscribe to the *Gallican* Articles and teach them to their pupils; and the news of the formation of the University of France and of the inclusion of the Belgian départements within the sphere of its control was received in a spirit of angry distrust. The conscription had been peculiarly unpopular from the first; and the clergy loudly resented the obligation to promote it from the pulpit. In 1808 there was already widespread disaffection, which every fresh turn in Napoleon's quarrel with the Papacy served to intensify. Their resources injured by the blockade, their privacy violated by the police, their homes emptied by the conscription, their deepest religious sensibilities outraged by the religious policy of the Emperor, the population of the nine départements was in no humour to appreciate the splendid work of men like Chabouat at Brussels, or Micaud d'Unieux at Liège. Indeed, the closing years of the Imperial administration were disfigured by an ignominious persecution of priests and ecclesiastics.

It was comparatively late in the reign of Napoleon that the United Provinces, long a subordinate republic or kingdom, became a part of the French Empire. Napoleon's early dealings with the Batavian Republic, the conversion of the republic into a kingdom in favour of Louis Bonaparte (1806), and the events which brought about the occupation of Louis and the annexation of his kingdom (1810), have been described in previous chapters of this volume. It only remains here to consider the condition of the Dutch provinces during the brief period in which they were directly under Napoleon's rule. The degree of annexation laid down that Amsterdam was to rank after Paris and Rome as the third city of the Empire; that Holland was to contribute six members to the Senate, three to the Council of State, and twenty-five to the Legislative Body, not to speak of two judges to the Court of Cassation, three auditors, and three masters of requests. Leibniz, Duke of Posen, and Arch-Treasurer of the Empire, was appointed

Lieutenant-General in Holland and instructed to introduce the French system. "I am about to open the Continent to your industry," said Napoleon to the Dutch deputies who were summoned to Paris to assist in the task of incorporation. "My intention," he wrote to Lebeau, his urban and dignified lieutenant, "is to govern the country as well."

The consequences of the expulsion of "good King Louis" were rapidly made evident. The interest on the public debt was reduced by two-thirds; a tax of 40 per cent. was levied on colonial merchandise found in Dutch warehouses; a revenue of 60,000,000 florins was extracted from a population of 2,000,000; and, while the blockade was now for the first time strictly enforced, the conscription was introduced with all its rigours. With a singular refinement of stringency two Belgian prefects were appointed to rule the important departments of Zelder See (capital Amsterdam) and the *Brabant du Meuse* (capital Rotterdam); and the cruelty and rigour with which de Colles and de Staunart enforced the conscription left an indelible impression on the country. The domiciliary visits of the French police, the necessity of obtaining a police pass for the smallest journey, and the inquisitorial methods accredited by the new excise duties, increased the general discontent. It seemed to be the French policy to obliterate all the national memories. The names of the old provinces were abolished, and the country was divided into seven departments. It was enacted that French should be taught in all the primary schools, and that after the lapse of a year no person should be received as a master who should not be capable of teaching the rudiments. Every book had to satisfy the censors at Amsterdam or at Paris. All public acts had to be accompanied by a French translation; and, while no department was allowed more than one political newspaper, that newspaper had to be bilingual. That the country might be still further demoralised, a third of the officers in the Dutch army must be French, while it was a principle to employ, as far as possible, Dutch officers and generals outside their own country. The universities of Leyden and Groningen were converted into academies of the University of France, while *lycées* of the usual French pattern were set up in Groningen, Leyden, and Utrecht. It is true, as Mallock remarks, that the revenue derived from the Dutch departments, six *centes per head* almost double that imposed upon France, was exclusively spent in the departments themselves; but it was spent upon objects with which the population had no sympathy, dockyards and ships, fleets and soldiers. The best French administrators acknowledged that the Dutch had little to learn from them in economy, statistics, and business method.

Among the European dependencies of the Empire none were more unobedient, more remote, or more calculated to test the flexibility of the French system than the *Ulyssian provinces*, a tract of coast-land

extending from the Tyroler mountains to the Poenahill of Souda, and containing a sparse population of some two million inhabitants. Of this huge Adriatic domain two portions, the Venetian provinces of Dalmatia and the tiny republic of Ragusa, had been absorbed into the French system in 1806; the remainder, including the ports of Trieste and Fiume, was stripped from Austria three years later. A lengthy decree, issued on April 18, 1809, and published in the *Messenger* for May 18, placed the new dependency under three officials, a governor-general, a general intendant of France, and a commissioner of justice; divided it into one military and six civil provinces (military Croatia, civil Croatia, Carinthia, Istria, Dalmatia, Ragusa); ordered the creation of *lycées* at Laibach and Ragusa; and, while defining the outlines of the judicial and administrative system, commanded the introduction of the French Codes at the opening of the ensuing year.

Several currents of Imperial policy, some clear and steady, others hidden and intermittent, are reflected in the acquisition of the Illyrian provinces, which provided a strong bulwark against Austria, a military base against Turkey, and distant embowments for the French marshals. It was worth while to acquire a string of harbours in which a fleet might be built, and whence an expedition might start for the recovery of Egypt; worth while to win a new strip of coast for the Continental Blockade, and to divert the crowded assignments of Eastern cotton from the German route to Imperial territory. The Illyrian provinces were valuable, whether they were considered as a military march, or as a pawn in the game of diplomatic exchanges. The climate was *salubre*, the scenery romantic; and in the olive gardens and vineyards of the coast the French were reminded of their beloved Provence. Yet Illyria was for the most part a half-barbarous condition, without roads, without schools, without posts, plagued with brigands, and neglectful of the arts of agriculture and forestry. The woods which formerly clothed the Dalmatian mountains had been wilfully destroyed by the inhabitants, in order that they might escape the burden of supplying timber to the Venetian navy; and the upland population, though splendid in physique and valorous in temper, was poor, superstitious, and paralysed into economic inertia by the yoke of Turkish and Albanian brigands. There was more prosperity among the Italian shippers and fruit-growers of the coast; and the republic of Ragusa was specially notable for its polite and exclusive aristocracy, its prosperous middle class of retired sea-captains and merchants, and its well-to-do and laborious peasantry. But Dalmatia had always cost Venice more than it brought in. A detailed survey was unknown; taxes were largely paid in kind. In the interior there were still traces of archaic communism; justice and administration were alike venal; and, but for the active ministrations of the Franciscan missionaries, the rural population would have been left in utter darkness. In the subjects a few forward spirits had caught some fragments of

democratic philosophy; but otherwise the intellectual preparation for French rule was singularly wanting. The popular sympathies were Venetian, Hungarian, Austrian. The task of winning them over to France was entrusted to Marmont, the first governor-general, and the finest political intelligence in the Imperial army.

Marmont built the great coast-road which leads from Zara to Spalato. "The Austrians" (so went a Dalmatian saying) "discussed plans for eight years: Marmont mounted his horse, and when he got off the road was made." He broke up the robber bands, equipped the country with primary, secondary, and technical schools, and, divesting himself of the stereotyped anticlericalism of the army, assumed the protectorship of the Franciscan Order in Dalmatia. The solid sense of affairs, dear to the logical mind, was not one of Marmont's failings. His administrative aims varied according to the locality, small where communications were difficult, large where they were easy. He was not afraid to smother communal and feudal institutions, as for instance in military Croatia, where he successfully justified the arrangements of the Austrian Government to the critics in Paris. That he did not obtain financial equilibrium was due to the exigencies of the Empire and the maritime war, rather than to any lack of administrative dexterity on his own part or on that of *d'Arudy*, the financial intendant. The fiscal history of the Illyrian provinces is one of desperate expedients and growing deficits. Thus, while the rigour and effectiveness of the French Government procured permanent benefits to the dependency, these advantages were purchased at the expense of much temporary suffering. A report upon the Illyrian provinces, drawn up in July, 1813, for the instruction of the Duke of Otranto when he came to take up the governorship, speaks of the ruin of commerce, the ruthless exaction of taxes, the unsatisfactory personnel of the judiciary, the poverty and unpunctual remuneration of the clergy, the failure to appropriate the Civil Code, the opposition of every class in the community. This is a dark picture to be set beside the brilliant career of Marmont's memoirs. Yet in the archives of Paris there is ample testimony to the zeal and intelligence of the officials who were sent to explore Illyrian men and manners and to advise upon the institutions adapted to the country.

The project of restoring the French colonial empire in the West belongs specifically to the period of the Consulate. Then it was that Louisiana was purchased from Spain, and that a great army was despatched to San Domingo to revive the influence of France in the richest of her colonies. It was then also that the Spanish government was pressed to part with the Floridas in exchange for France. The loss of Egypt and the postponement of designs upon the further East would in this way be balanced by the formation of a new empire to and round the Gulf of Mexico, stretching from French Guinea northwards to the



St John's River and the lower waters of the Mississippi. Its centre-point would be San Domingo. In one direction it might be made to extend as far north as Lake Superior and the St Lawrence.

The colonial policy of the *ancien régime* had rested upon three principles—the preservation of an aristocratic planter society, based by slave-labour, the restriction of colonial commerce to the interests of the mother-country, and the exercise of direct political control by the central government. With all these principles Napoleon was in sympathy. He believed in the natural inferiority of the black; he supported slavery; he was in favour of commercial monopoly and jealous of the least symptoms of colonial independence. Yet, when he began to turn his attention to colonial problems, he found that the greatest colony of France was governed by a negro, who had drilled a black army, promulgated a constitution, and opened the ports of San Domingo to British and American traders. Everything which was most odious to Napoleon, black ascendancy, free trade, colonial autonomy, seemed to be concentrated in this island of the Antilles. He told his Council that he did not know the slaves of America, but that he had seen the slaves of Egypt and Darfour, and found them no better than brute beasts. "In the interests of civilization" he determined to destroy "the new Algiers which was being organised in the middle of America"; and no intelligence could have been more grateful than this to the exiled planters of the *Château d'Arson*, whose fortunes had been crippled by the "remains of the revolution," and who had long besieged the Government with demands for reparation and revenge.

The negro ruler of San Domingo styled himself *Toussaint L'Ouverture*. He was a man of rare endowments, so abstemious that a glass of water and two bananas would often suffice for a day's sustenance, so hardy and vigorous that he rarely slept more than two hours in the twenty-four. To the austere piety of a convert he added the soul of a revolutionary, the courage of a soldier, and the reserve of a statesman. His ascendancy over his fellow-negroes was complete, for he understood their nature, formulated their ambitions, and could speak in vivid and homely parables to their understanding. But he saw that the fortress of civilization was not to be captured by sudden violence, and that discipline is the master-key to progress. In the summer of 1794, at the darkest hour in the history of the French colony, when the mulattoes were freely raging in the south, and the western and northern strongholds had passed into the hands of the English or the Spaniards, Toussaint marched 4000 blacks to the rescue of the last French garrison in the island. His assistance was decisive. By May, 1800, the whole of the French colony, save Les Cayes, which still held out for Rigaud, the mulatto chief, had passed into the power of Toussaint.

It had been stipulated by the Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1795 that the Spanish or eastern half of the island should be handed over to France

on the conclusion of a general peace. Toussaint resolved to anticipate the event. He was aware that Napoleon had risen to supreme power in France; and emulation or precaution prompted him to surprise the masters of the whole island before the First Consul had time to intervene. Compelling the French commissioner at Le Cap to authorize the expedition, Toussaint marched his black army into the Spanish colony and quelled all before him. On January 23, 1801, San Domingo, the capital, was in his hands: and the sleepy Spanish Government had come to an end.

It is improbable that Toussaint intended to make himself independent of the French Republic. Himself a convert of French education, he had sent his two sons to be educated in France, and had refused an English offer to recognize him as king of the island. It is true that, in the constitution which had been drafted by a small host of white and yellow advisers, Toussaint had been appointed governor for life and given the power to name his successor. But, as throughout his career he had been careful to obtain the shelter of French authority, so now (July, 1800) he sent Colonel Vincent to Paris to lay the constitution before Napoleon. His idea was to found an autonomous government under French suzerainty, defended by black battalions, but assisted by the skill of white civilians and mechanics. Vincent reported that he was the only man who could rescue the colony from anarchy and keep it faithful to France. But there were letters from the West which spoke of him as full of treacherous designs.

Toussaint was fond of saying that the liberty of the blacks could only be consolidated by the prosperity of agriculture, and he set his face against agrarian revolution. Not only were the white planters urged to return to the island, but Toussaint forced negro labour back to the plantations and despoiled his competitors to revert to their old tasks. He would not even allow the blacks to acquire small plots of land, holding that a peasant proprietary would be idle and undisciplined. His finance was excellent; his policy of free imports from America was essential not only to the well-being but even to the continuance of the colony; and there had always been a party among the planters favourable to some scheme of colonial autonomy. On the whole, it would have been wise to leave him undisturbed, until he had shown clear proof of disloyalty to the French connexion.

The command of the French expedition was given to General Leclerc, the first husband of Pauline Bonaparte; and from his secret instructions the character of Napoleon's colonial policy may be judged. Leclerc was named captain of the whole island, but was instructed to maintain a strict separation between the French and Spanish areas. The blacks were to be disarmed everywhere; but, whereas in the French colony they were to be free, in the Spanish colony they were to remain in a condition of servitude. The French colony was to be divided into departments and municipalities, the Spanish into dioceses and jurisdictions;

"administration, commerce, justice, everything must be different." Toussaint and his principal generals were in the first instance to be delivered and confined in their commands, and then to be kidnapped and deported to France. When the black power had been broken—for it was likely that there would be some guerrilla fighting in the mountains—the French government would show its hand. All the principal agents, whether white or black, lay or clerical, of Toussaint's government, would then be deported to France. The exiled proprietors would be restored to their plantations; and the donations made by the black government would be annulled. The creoles would be compelled to send their children to France for education, and no public instruction of any kind would be permitted in the island. The foreign trade, as in old days, would be reserved for France.

Napoleon said at St Helena that the expedition to San Domingo was the greatest act of folly in his life. Short-sighted and disastrous it certainly proved to be, though Toussaint was successfully deported to die in prison among the rigours of the *Jura*. The yellow fever decimated the French army; the blacks fought heavily in the western mountains; and the resumption of the war with England closed the sea-ways to France and broke the project of a western empire. The fleet which was to have brought French organisations into Louisiana never crossed the Atlantic; the tricolour never waved over Florida. Yet, even apart from circumstances connected with the general war, Napoleon's colonial policy was neither honest nor wise. Toussaint is an enigma; but, whatever view may be taken of his intentions, he was treated with cruelty and guile. It was short-sighted to suppose that the system of slavery and freedom could coexist in the same or in adjoining islands. Such a policy would lead the free negroes to revolt from indignation, and the slaves to revolt from envy. Nor was it wise to revive the old system of preferential trade, which sacrificed the material interests of the colony to those of the mother-country. More might be said for the autocratic type of colonial government, for the substitution of nominated Chambers of Commerce with advisory powers for the old free planter assemblies. Measures were taken to strengthen the connexion between the mother-country and the colonies. A section of the Council of State was entrusted with colonial affairs; a representative from every colonial Chamber of Commerce was named to be resident in Paris, and a liberal allowance of places in the French pythæcum was allotted to colonial students. That the coexistence of the white and dark races might be promoted, Napoleon, according to his own account, contemplated legalising polygamy. Such was his colonial policy, full of noble aims and unwise expedients, and scoring every accepted canon of conventional morality.

The Act of Mediation (1802) brought Switzerland completely under the control of Bonaparte. For the year 1803 he appointed, as

*Lieutenants of the Swiss Federation, Louis d'Affry of Fribourg.* The choice was significant. D'Affry belonged to an old patrician family, which had supplied officers and ambassadors to France; and he himself had served in the Swiss guard under Louis XVI. He was, in fact, one of those creatures of the old régime of whom Bonaparte had said, "It is only the cables who understand service." Of attractive manners, polished and courteous, quick-witted and moderate in his views, he became a valuable servant to Bonaparte. The First Consul, moreover, in order to secure his services, paid over to d'Affry, on the day on which he took office, a sum of 51,000 francs from the secret service money at the disposal of the police, revived in his favour an extinct royal pension, and wrote him a letter in which he said, "I shall seize every opportunity of showing you favour." In similar fashion Bonaparte strove to gain over other members of the Swiss aristocracy, to whom, in his own words, he offered "power, honour, and wealth"; but in these attempts at corruption he was less successful.

On July 4, 1803, the first meeting of the Diet was held at Fribourg. It was presided over by d'Affry, who opened the assembly with an eloquent speech, in which he set forth the advantages of the Act of Mediation, and urged on his fellow-citizens the expediency of union, moderation, and attachment to France. General Ney, the French ambassador, then announced that France was prepared to conclude with Switzerland a defensive alliance and a military convention. This treaty, which marked a further stage in the dependence of Switzerland on France, produced a painful impression on the patriots. Bonaparte, in point of fact, called upon the Federation to furnish four regiments of 4000 men each; Switzerland, in return, had the right to send twenty young Swiss to the *École Polytechnique*; and Swiss officers were made eligible to all commands and dignities in France. The Diet, after a somewhat heated discussion, accepted the inevitable.

These Swiss regiments in the French service were never at their full strength. The soldiers were volunteers and were recruited with difficulty. In 1803 Bonaparte declared his intention of establishing compulsory service. The Diet protested against a measure contrary to the terms of the convention, and implored Bonaparte to agree to a fresh arrangement which should relieve Switzerland from her crushing military burden. Curiously enough, Bonaparte assented to this on the eve of his Russian campaign. On March 28, 1812, a fresh convention reduced the strength of each regiment to three battalions of 1800 men apiece. During the wars of the Empire the Swiss soldiers maintained their old reputation for bravery. "The Swiss," Napoleon wrote, "are the only foreign soldiers who are brave and trustworthy." In Russia the Swiss regiments were hardly engaged. Most of them were left on the battlefield, but they lost neither eagle nor flag.

Napoleon's protection did the Swiss more harm than good, for the

military convention of 1803 was cited by the Allies in 1814 as their excuse for violating the neutrality of Switzerland. It is only fair, however, to acknowledge that until 1814 Switzerland was preserved from the evils of war. In 1804 Bonaparte withdrew his troops, and this measure, which in other times would have been followed by disturbances, did not affect the tranquillity of the country. There was, indeed, an insurrection in the spring of 1804, but it was purely local in character. Some peasants of Zurich were dissatisfied because their Grand Council had fixed a higher rate for the redemption of their titles than that paid by the other cantons, and they rose in revolt. It became necessary to call in the Federal troops, and they had some difficulty in reducing the insurgents to submission.

This rising called the attention of the Diet to the need of a better organization of the Federal forces, and in 1804 the Diet asked Bonaparte for his permission to create a permanent staff, which should be the nucleus of a militia. Bonaparte flatly refused to accede to their wishes; and his refusal elicited from the *Landammann*, de Watteville, the following letter—"The chief aim of France is clearly to weaken Switzerland by depriving her of the military organization which she might and should have, and so to tie her down. This affects matter for the most discouraging relations; and there can be no doubt that, if France persists in her unjust refusal, doubt and distrust will soon replace the genuine feeling of attachment which, after the Act of Mediation, the conduct of the French Government inspired."

It needed some courage on the part of a *Landammann* of Switzerland to write this letter, for Bonaparte had now become the Emperor Napoleon, and no longer concealed his design of annexing to the Empire those cantons which were dependent on France. So early as 1803 it was believed in Switzerland that the last hour of the Federation had struck. The Emperor, when he looks up his camp at Padouga, desired to know if Switzerland was in a position to compel respect for her neutrality. Fortunately the Diet, on the recognition of hostilities, had decided to mobilize the Federal forces. This did not satisfy Napoleon, who was clearly seeking for a pretext to violate the neutrality of Switzerland if the war approached her frontier. Such was, however, not the case; and Swiss neutrality was preserved.

It may be said that, so long as the Empire lasted, the threat of annexation hung over Switzerland. In 1806, on the outbreak of the Austrian war, Napoleon said to the envoy Reinhard: "If I have need to march into Switzerland, I shall do it. I can always find a pretext; the most insignificant pamphlet aimed at me will serve my purpose." In 1809 certain events happened which seemed to foreshadow actual annexation: the formal absorption of Valais, which had hitherto remained an independent republic; and the occupation of Ticino by troops sent from Italy, on the pretence of putting down the smuggling of English goods.

Johann von Müller, in his letters written at the time, bewailed the fate of the old Federation; and it was commonly reported that Napoleon proposed to convert the ancient republic into a kingdom for one of his brothers or for his protégé, Berthier, who was already Prince of Neuchâtel. What is certain is that in 1811 the question of creating a kingdom of Helvetia for the Elector Charles of Baden, the husband of Stephanie de Beauharnais, Napoleon's adopted daughter, was seriously considered. But this project was never carried out.

Switzerland suffered much from the Continental Blockade. Ever since the middle of the eighteenth century she had possessed certain flourishing industries which had already gained a reputation abroad—the manufacture of cotton goods in St. Gallen, Zurich, and Olten, of linen and embroidery in St. Gallen, of silk stuffs in Zurich and Basel, and of clocks and watches in Geneva and the Jura. In addition to these, an important manufacture of machinery had been established at Zurich at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Act of Mediation had created hopes that a fresh impulse would be given to the industrial movement, and new markets created abroad. Napoleon had promised the Swiss an addition to the convention of 1803 or a treaty of commerce; but neither the promised additional clauses nor the treaty ever saw the light. Worse than this, although the convention had stipulated that the Swiss should be placed on the footing of the most favoured nation, an excessive prohibitory tax was laid on their cotton goods. The Swiss Government protested against an arrangement which was ruining one of their most flourishing industries; but Napoleon would not listen. On the contrary, he doubled the tariff in 1808; and in 1809 he forbade altogether the importation of Swiss cottons into France.

In Switzerland the Continental System was applied with extreme rigour. The inhabitants were ordered to exclude all British merchandise, with the exception of cotton yarn, a raw material indispensable to the cotton industry. Prohibitive duties were imposed on all colonial products, and all manufactured products of British origin discovered in the country were confiscated. When he saw that, in spite of his precautions, British goods were smuggled in, Napoleon forced the Swiss to establish on all their frontiers a network of custom-houses under French supervision. This involved the ruin of a great number of Swiss industries. At the close of 1800 more than 18,000 families were out of work. In 1804 the distress had become so great that the Diet decided to address a petition to Napoleon, beseeching him to put an end to their calamities. This appeal was unheard until the close of the preparations for the Russian campaign. But it was the Russian campaign which brought deliverance to the Swiss. Hardly had the news of the retreat of the Grande Armée arrived in Switzerland than there was a general relaxation in the Continental Blockade; and in the following year, after Leipzig, the

Diet, is an extraordinary session held at Zurich on November 12, declared formally that the Continental System was at an end.

During these years of subjection the Diet could hardly effect much, but it showed an anxiety to do something towards improving the future of the country. Among the first tasks of the new Government was the liquidation of the debt of the Helvetic Republic, and the settlement of questions relating to the national funds and the management of the public estates. A committee, appointed in 1803 to deal with these matters, rejected all claims to indemnity in respect of confiscations suffered during the Revolution, whether such claims were made by civil or religious corporations or by private individuals, and determined the share of each of the cantons in the national funds. The Diet would have been well pleased could it have secured the money for the central authority; for the latter, however insignificant were its powers, had certain expenses to meet. In the absence of a central fund, these expenses had to be paid out of the yearly sums contributed by the cantons towards the maintenance of the Federal forces.

The Diet, too, would have been glad to create a uniform system of weights, measures, money, and customs duties throughout the various cantons. Proposals to this end were made by certain deputies who had suffered from the existing confusion, so prejudicial to the trade and the general prosperity of the country; but, as most of these reforms would have been contrary to the Act of Mediation, it was impossible to adopt them. The cantons, on the other hand, did not hesitate to infringe certain provisions of the Act. Thus, in spite of the declaration that all religious beliefs were free, and that any Swiss might reside in any canton, some of the national governments, mostly those in Old Switzerland, forbade the settlement of Protestants in their territories. Liberty of thought was, moreover, reduced to the narrowest limits; and the press was subject to a censorship not less rigorous than that which existed in France.

A confederation which possessed neither authority nor resources was incapable of carrying through any great work of public utility. All matters such as the repair of roads, the creation and maintenance of canals, the straightening and embankment of rivers, and the replanting of mountain-sides, were left to the cantons; and they, in the absence of funds, did nothing. Fortunately, the spirit of initiative, always strongly developed in the Swiss nature, made good the insufficiency of state resources. Many important works were, during this period, undertaken by private individuals. In 1804, Escher, a celebrated geologist of Zurich, undertook, at the instigation of the Diet and with the help of some fellow-countrymen, to drain the marshes which reached from the lake of Wallenstadt to the lake of Zurich, a distance of four leagues; he cut a canal through them and so brought a wide extent of barren and unhealthy land into cultivation.

To turn to the sphere of moral activity, the Swiss Society of Public Utility, which has produced and still produces important results, was founded at Zurich in 1810 by certain philanthropists. Other institutions of an educational character date from this period, such as the schools of Pestalozzi at Burgdorf and Yverdon, and the agricultural school and general institute of the Bernese Jolimont at Habsyl. There was at the same time no slacking of intellectual activity. While Erlang in Germany, Johann von Müller continued and completed his history of the Swiss Confederation. At Zurich, Pestalozzi wrote his educational books, Martin Utterl and Ulrich Hegner their popular tales. In Aargau, Heinrich Schöller published his novels and his historical works. French Switzerland was adorned by the brilliant society which Madame de Staël assembled at Coppet, and which included Benjamin Constant, the publisher of *L'Europe*, Sismondi, the Genevese historian, Bonstetten, the Bernese philosopher, and August Wilhelm Schlegel, the German critic. Geneva, although at that time actually part of France, remained the intellectual centre of French Switzerland. The Genevois were not inclined to allow their national spirit to be absorbed by France. Ever since the Reformation, there had been a continual exchange of ideas between Great Britain and the city of Calvin; and all the publicists of the Genevois school, Burmannet, Delécluse, and J. J. Rousseau, were strongly influenced by English writers. "Geneva," said Sismondi in 1803, "is a city where men speak and write in French, but where men read and think in English." To meet their taste for what was English, Marc-Anguste Pictet, Professor of Physics at Calvin's ancient Academy, where he was the worthy successor of Horace-Bénédict de Saussure, founded in conjunction with his brother, Pictet de Rochemont, the *Bibliothèque britannique*. This review rapidly took an important place in Europe as an international organ. In this publication the Genevois ventured, at a time when to speak fearlessly of things English was looked upon as treason, to keep the Continent informed of all that was passing in England. Its influence is shown by the remark of Talleyrand, who, at the Congress of Vienna, observed to Pictet de Rochemont, "Your review has behind it such a weight of public opinion that its suppression would have amounted to a coup d'état."



## CHAPTER IV.

## THE PENINSULAR WAR, 1808-14.

In dealing with the political schemes of Napoleon it is not always easy to discover what is end and what is means: whether a particular project is carried out merely for its own sake, or is also intended as a step towards some farther goal. This is prominently the case with the invasion of Portugal, described in a previous chapter. It has often been maintained that when the Emperor launched Junot's corps against Lisbon he was thinking of nothing more than bringing Portugal into line with his other vassal-states in the matter of the Continental System. A careful study of his manoeuvres, however, would seem to make it probable that he was also using the whole affair as a cover for a long-projected attack on Spain.

So far back as 1803 he had written to a confidant, "*Un Bourbon sur le trône d'Espagne, c'est un volcan trop dangereux*"; and with far better justification, after he had received Godoy's boldness proclamation on the battlements of Juno, he had vowed to take his revenge in due season on the presumptuous favourite and his insubordinate master. "*J'ai juré de lui rendre ce qu'il m'a fait, que je ferai contre lui d'état de me venger.*" No one could have blamed him if, after signing the Treaty of Tilsit, he had turned sharply on Spain and demanded the dismissal of Godoy, or even declared war on Charles IV. Ten years later, at St Helena, he acknowledged that this would have been the most expedient as well as the most honest course to take. In place of it he adopted the tortuous and Machiavellian policy of which the first step was seen in the Treaty of Fontainebleau. Godoy, instead of receiving condign chastisement, was presented a kingdom for himself in southern Portugal, on condition that he should allow a French army a free passage to Lisbon, and lend his aid for the expulsion of the House of Braganza. It is impossible to believe for a moment that the Emperor ever intended to sail into real existence Godoy's "principality of the Algarves." When he offered a crown and a realm to one who had deserved as ill at his hands, it was clearly with the object of cajoling him into admitting French troops into the Peninsula, and with no

intention of carrying out his promise. After Junot had obtained possession of Portugal, no steps were taken to establish the "principality of the Algarves."

Meanwhile, before Junot had reached Lisbon, the domestic troubles of the Court of Spain had at last reached explosion point. On October 27, 1807, Charles IV. arrested his son Ferdinand, accusing him of having plotted to dethrone him and to murder his mother and her favourite Godoy. The Prince of the Asturias had undoubtedly been intriguing behind his father's back; he had written to Napoleon to beg his protection, and to ask for the hand of a princess of the House of Bonaparte. He had been organising a party of malcontents, who hated the "Prince of the Peace"—such was Godoy's title—as much as he did himself. But his schemes were vague and futile, the most he did was to write obnoxious letters to Paris, and to take precautions against Godoy's hardly-disguised intention to exclude him from the succession. The only compromising documents found in his possession were two drafts of a manifesto denouncing the favourite's designs, and an undated commission appointing the Duke of Infantado (one of his personal enemies) military governor of Madrid and New Castile. He declared, probably with truth, that this last paper was intended to be used only in the case of his father's death or permanent disablement.

But the best proof of Ferdinand's innocence of the grave accusations brought against him is his character. He was very obstinate and a good hater, but he was also cautious in the extreme, and so destitute of courage and proper pride that, though he could resent, he could never revenge an insult, if the least risk was involved. When arrested at the Escorial, he gave up the names of his confederates in the most craven fashion, and sent to his parents two letters couched in the most disgusting terms of self-abasement. The King had already written to Napoleon stating that his son had been discovered in a plot against his mother's life; he had also published in the *Madrid Gazette* a manifesto to the effect that the Prince had been detected in treasonable plots, and that the conspirators were to be tried and punished. But whether it was that the old man shrunk from bloodshed, or that Godoy thought that he had done enough in discrediting Ferdinand in the eyes of the nation, matters were pushed no farther. The Prince was pardoned by a magnificent and turgid royal proclamation; and his partners, Infantado, the Canon Ferrigais, and certain others, were allowed to be acquitted after a formal trial. Nothing could have suited Napoleon's plans better than the publication of this scandalous domestic quarrel; it was indifferent to him whether public opinion regarded Charles IV. as an unnatural father or Ferdinand as an unnatural son. In either case the prestige of the Spanish royal family was diminished, and interference in its affairs became easy.

Meanwhile he was proceeding with his plan for introducing more

French troops into Spain. The Treaty of Fontainebleau had provided that, if the English sent an army to Portugal, the Emperor might relieve Junco's expeditionary corps, after giving due notice to the King of Spain. With this excuse, an army-corps of 25,000 men under General Dupont had been collected at Bayona. On November 22 Dupont received orders to cross the Bidasoa, though no English force had been heard of. No intimation of this movement was sent to the Spanish Government; and Charles IV and Godoy were so much alarmed as they were surprised by the news that the troops of their ally had crossed themselves in the valley of the Ebro. On January 8, 1808, they were still further startled by the appearance of a third army-corps under Marshal Moncey, which occupied Almag and Navarra; whereupon Dupont pushed forward to Burgos and Valladolid. Now was this all. On February 10 a division of 14,000 men, half French, half Italian, under General Dalmazo, began to pour into Catalonia and made its way to Barcelona. As Catalonia is not on the way to Portugal, there was no excuse whatever for the appearance of this fourth army in the north-eastern corner of the Peninsula.

On February 16 the Emperor finally threw off the mask and began a series of frankly hostile acts towards his unfortunate ally. On that day the French troops quartered in Pampeluna occupied the citadel of that fortress by a treacherous coup de main. On the 19th Dalmazo seized the citadel and chief forts of Barcelona. On March 2 the weak-kneed governor of San Sebastian allowed himself to be coerced out of that rocky stronghold by threats of force. Finally, on March 18, Figueras, the border fortress of northern Catalonia, was surprised by a French detachment, supposed to be passing peacefully through the town.

The Spanish Court was plunged into wild alarm by the news of the seizure of Pampeluna and Barcelona. Godoy hesitated for a moment whether he should declare war on his treacherous ally, or follow the example of the Prince Royal of Portugal, and bid the King and Queen fly to Cadix and embark for America. He seems to have thought that there was little use in attempting resistance: a fifth French army-corps under Beresford had now commenced to cross the Bidasoa, so that more than 100,000 French soldiers were already south of the Pyrenees. Moreover the bushwaring Maza had appeared at Burgos on March 18 with a commission as "Lieutenant for the Emperor in Spain." At last Godoy resolved to advise instant flight, without any attempt to defend Madrid or central Spain.

But the Spanish people now intervened. The King and Queen had left Madrid for Aranjuez; and their departure for Andalusia had been announced for March 18. On the preceding night a fierce riot broke out in the little town, which was crowded with hangers-on of the Court. Every Spaniard now understood that Godoy had ruined the realm by leading it over to Napoleon, and that his cowardly and obsequious

policy had led to far deeper humiliation than could have been caused by the most unfortunate of open wars. He had to pay for nearly twenty years of corrupt and selfish rule, which had led Spain to her ruin; and the explosion of wrath against him was all the more fierce for its long suppression. A rising mass of soldiers, peasants, and citizens entered his palace, but sought for him in vain. The crowd then gathered under the King's windows, yelling aloud for the favourite's head, and shouting for the Prince of the Asturias. Charles IV was terrified; the Queen brought her son to parlay with the mob, and dispose them on any terms. Ferdinand himself was able to announce that Godoy had been dismissed from office and banished from the Court. But next day the favourite was detected as he was drinking away; the royal guards rescued him from his first captives in a very battered state, and dragged him into the palace. This brought the multitude even more aroused to his gates; and it seemed as if some bloody scene from the French Revolution was about to be repeated. Then came the hour of Prince Ferdinand's opportunity. He told his parents that their personal safety and the life of their favourite could only be secured by an abdication. Without delay the old King wrote a brief statement, in which he announced that his age and infirmities compelled him to resign the crown to his very dear son, and heir, the Prince of the Asturias. Armed with this, Ferdinand faced the mob, promised them that Godoy should be imprisoned and brought to trial, and begged them to disperse without further violence. He was hailed as King amid universal acclamings; the troops took the oath to him as sovereign; and Godoy was sent a prisoner to Villavieja (March 19, 1808).

All over Spain, the fall of Godoy was received with feelings of intense relief; and much was hoped from the young King, as if it were likely that the son of Charles IV and Maria Luisa of Parma would prove a hero and a statesman. Ferdinand's first acts proved his unwisdom and timidity; instead of retiring to Andalusia and concentrating what was left of the Spanish army, he went to Madrid (March 24), though Murat had arrived there on the previous day at the head of Bonaparte's army-corps. Having taken possession of the royal palace, he wrote a flattering letter to Napoleon, assuring him of his adherence to the French alliance, and renewing his request for a bride from the Imperial house. It was evident, from the first, that he had taken a false step. The French ambassador refused to acknowledge him as King; while Murat behaved to him in the most discourteous fashion, and, what was more ominous, sent a French escort to guard the person of the former King and Queen.

Meanwhile Napoleon had been forced to face the new problem created by the revolution of Aragon. Down to this moment he had apparently hoped to scare Charles IV, his Queen, and their favourite out of Spain, and then to present himself to the nation as their saviour

from the tyranny of Godoy. This was no longer possible when a young and popular King had mounted the throne. It would have been wise to accept the situation, and receive the homage of the new sovereign, whose protestations of obedience respect to his patron were all that could be desired. But Napoleon resolved to push on his beliquious plan in spite of the new political situation that had been created by Ferdinand's accession. The protest was ready at hand, for Charles IV had no sooner recovered from his first terror, than he drew up a secret protest in which he declared that his abdication had been extorted from him by threats of bloodshed. Long before this document had reached Paris, Napoleon had written to his brother Louis, King of Holland, offering him the Spanish crown; it is therefore clear that he had been intending in any case to refuse to recognise Ferdinand, and that the protest of Charles IV had nothing to do with his decision. It was, however, welcomed as a useful card in the game; and Murat was directed not only to send the old King to Bayonne, but to forward Godoy in his master's train.

Meanwhile the Emperor declared his intention of visiting Madrid in person. He sent before him his aide-de-camp, General Savary, who visited the young King, and, as all the Spanish witnesses unite in declaring, informed him that his master intended to take him into favour, and to bestow upon him the head of the Bonaparte prison whom he had named as his consort. Unless he had received some such assurance, the cautious Ferdinand would most certainly have refrained from getting himself in the Emperor's power. But on April 10 he was persuaded into setting out to meet his mighty guest, and was finally induced to cross the Bidasoa into French territory. When he reached Bayonne (April 20) he was put under guard, and informed that Napoleon had resolved to depose him; but that if he would sign an instant renunciation of the Spanish crown, he should receive in compensation the kingdom of Etruria.

The King, warm though he was, plucked up courage to refuse this monstrous proposal. Thereupon the Emperor produced Charles IV and his Queen, whose arrival at Bayonne had been timed so as to follow that of their son by a few days. He confronted Ferdinand with his parents; and a lamentable scene followed in his presence. On being told that his father was still the lawful King, and that he himself was a rebel who had been guilty of high treason, Ferdinand preserved a calm silence. When he refused to sign a document declaring that he withdrew his claim to the crown, his father tried to strike him with his cane, and his mother burst in with a string of abuse worthy of a schoolgirl. The Emperor put an end to the altercation by threatening Ferdinand out of the room. He then offered to abdicate if he were allowed to return to Madrid, summon the Cortes of the realm, and arrange his reconciliation in due form. But this would not have suited Napoleon's scheme; and the

offer was refused. Two days later they arrived at Bayona the news of the bloody *Dos Mayo*, the great insurrection at Madrid (May 3). Thereupon the Emperor told Ferdinand that if he did not abdicate within twelve hours he should be tried for high treason. Terrified by this threat, the young King assented, on May 6, an instrument restoring the throne to his father. Then appeared the second half of Napoleon's scheme; he procured a treaty, signed on the glorious day, by which Charles IV "cassigned all his rights to the throne of Spain and the Indies to the Emperor of the French, the only person who in the present state of affairs can reestablish order." The old King and his wife knew that they could never return to Madrid, and out of revengeful spite had lent themselves to a scheme for disinheritng their son. They reached in return certain revenues and estates in France, and retired into obscurity in company with Godey. The miserable tale spent the greater part of their remaining time in Rome, the objects of universal contempt. Ferdinand's enforced abdication could not buy him similar liberty; he was interned in Talleyrand's manor at Valençay, and spent six years there under strict military guard. He spoke his status as martyr by adulatory letters to Napoleon; in 1820, he even congratulated him on his victories in Spain.

We must turn back eight days from Ferdinand's final abdication, to explain the outbreak at Madrid which had caused Napoleon to apply the last turn of the screw to his captive. Within a short time of the first arrest of the young King at Bayona, it had become known in the Spanish capital that treachery was on foot. The chiefs or cowardly ministers took no action; but the news got abroad in Madrid, and preliminary signs of trouble began to be seen. They were brought to a head by an order from the Emperor to Murat, bidding him arrest and send over the frontier all the remaining members of the royal House.

On May 3, when the French escort was preparing to move from the palace the young prince French, the last of the sons of Charles IV, an unarmed or half-armed mob fell upon them, broke up the coach, and attacked the soldiers with stones and stilettoes. Murat had been warned by his master to be ready for outbreaks, and to treat the rascals to a whiff of grape-shot if they should rise. He dispersed the rioters by a couple of volleys from his guard. But this was only the beginning of the trouble: the whole populace of Madrid turned out at the sound of the mockery, and flung themselves upon the French with such weapons as they could procure. The battalions in the city were almost swept away by the furious assault, which was far more formidable than Murat had expected; more than thirty French officers and several hundred soldiers were killed or wounded. But within an hour the brigades of Marcey's corps came marching down from their camps outside the walls, and cleared the streets with much slaughter. The Spanish garrison of Madrid took no part in the struggle. Only two

officers, named Durré and Valerín, with a handful of artillerymen, joined the rioters and perished with them.

For a few days after the *Des Mays*, Murat at Madrid, and his master at Bayonne, lived in a sort of *Soll's paradise*, imagining that they had made an end of all open resistance to their will. Murat assumed the presidency of a "Junta of Regency," chosen from among the most pliant of the old officials who had been corrupted by twenty years of Godoy's rule. On May 18 he announced to this body that the Emperor desired them to ask for a new King, and suggested that the person designated should be Joseph Bonaparte, who for the last two years had been the ruler of Naples. The contemptible Junta did as they were ordered, and duly petitioned the Emperor that his brother might be granted them as a King. In order that some semblance of national consent might be displayed, Napoleon drew up a list of some 150 magistrates, who were directed to present themselves at Bayonne and use in person for Joseph's acceptance of the throne. Of this body no less than 51 were base and weak enough to obey the mandate. On June 15 the deputation met the Emperor at Bayonne and accepted Joseph as their ruler, receiving many promises of liberal reforms and wise governance from that well-intentioned prince, who little understood the monstrous task that his brother had imposed upon him.

But, long ere Joseph Napoleon I had been proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies, the whole country had flared up into insurrection. It took some time for the news of the treasury at Bayonne, followed by that of the *Des Mays*, to penetrate to the remote corners of the Peninsula. But, when the nation began to comprehend the situation, a wild outbreak of patriotic rage followed. It was not led by the lords and constituted authorities, who for the most part displayed themselves by a cowardly timidity. The effervescence came from below; and the leaders were non-official persons, local magistrates, street-demagogues, and sometimes clerics. The movement was spontaneous, unselfish, and reckless; in its wounded pride, the nation challenged Napoleon to combat, without any thought of the consequences, without counting up its own resources or those of its enemy. Every province, in many cases every town, acted for itself. But, though there was no union or organization, the same spirit animated every region; and all, without exception, rose in arms between May 24 and June 15. It was an unhappy feature of the insurrection that in many places it was stained with massacre. The populace was incensed against its late rulers almost as much as against the French. Old partisans of Godoy, colonels who refused to lead their regiments against Napoleon, officials who had shown zeal in carrying out Murat's orders, were assassinated on all sides. In Valencia a priest led out a band of ruffians who murdered the whole of the French merchants resident in that great seaport.

It took some weeks for even the rudiments of a Government to be

formed out of the turbulent and patriotic class which prevailed. In every province local "Juntas" then emerged, and began to call out the strength of the region for the holy war against the treacherous Emperor, the enemy of Church and King. It was unfortunate, but inevitable, that the Juntas were largely composed of furious but incapable zealots, ambitious-demagogues, and self-seeking intriguers. There was an absolute want of statesmanship and organizing ability; and even parochial patriotism could not supply their place. No central Government whatever was established for some months; and each province fought for itself without much regard for the fate of its neighbours.

The military position at the end of May stood somewhat as follows. The French troops whom Napoleon had pushed down into the Peninsula during the last six months held a narrow triangular wedge of territory, piercing into the heart of New Castile. Toledo and Madrid formed its apex, a line drawn from San Sebastian to Pampeluna was its base. In addition to this there were two outlying French forces, that of Junot, mainly concentrated at Lisbon, and that of Duhenna, which lay at Barcelona. The central army, formed of the troops of Massena, Dapout and Soult, was about 75,000 strong: Junot had about 35,000 in Portugal, Duhenna some 14,000 in Catalonia. But the latter two generals were completely cut off from communication with Madrid.

On the Spanish side, the Juntas found about 100,000 regulars and militia at their disposal; but these were scattered about in provincial garrisons, badly provided, and wholly unfit to take the field immediately. The main force lay in Galicia and Andalusia, where large detachments had always been kept for the purpose of protecting the coasts from English descents. In each of these provinces there were about 30,000 men available. Of the rest, there were a few battalions in Extremadura, Valencia, and Catalonia, but in mid-Spain hardly a man. Thus the forces of the insurgents formed a sort of umbrella, extending around the French wedge which ran into the heart of the land. New lines were being hastily prepared on every side, but arms and equipment were hard to find, owing to the depopulated state in which Godoy had left the country; while the stores of Madrid, Barcelona, Pampeluna, Figueras, and San Sebastian were in the hands of the enemy. When the fighting began, the remains of the old standing army were the only serious belligerent force on which Spain could count: the rest of the Spanish force consisted of undrilled and ununiformed peasants, offered by enthralled and often incompetent civilians.

It was fortunate for the Spaniards that Napoleon at first misconceived the problem that lay before him. He had always nourished the greatest contempt for the fighting power of Spain, and was under the impression that the armies which he had already pushed south of the Pyrenees were amply sufficient to hold down the country. But these armies were, as a matter of fact, very imperfect instruments of conquest. When



the Emperor organized the forces which worked their way to Madrid, Lisbon, and Barcelona during the winter of 1807-8, he had not drawn upon the veteran corps which lay in Germany. Jacob's corps, indeed, was of good material, being composed of old battalions picked from the garrisons of western France. But the corps of Moncey, Dupont, and Bessières were a hap-hazard assembly of second-rate troops and poorly-organized provisional units. They included only about 5000 men of old French regiments; but round this nucleus were gathered some 15,000 Sals, Germans, and other auxiliaries, and no less than 60,000 conscripts of 1807, hastily organized in "provisional regiments," "legions of reserve," and *battalions de marche*.

The Emperor had collected a very raw and ill-expected army; he next proceeded to dispose of it on mistaken lines. He had made up his mind that the Spanish invasion was a mere flash in the pan, the work of weeks and months. The suppression of it would be a mere matter of police; he imagined that a few flying columns would be able to secure the insurgent districts and take possession of the chief strategical points without much difficulty. His orders read as if some isolated *fueros*, rather than a national rising, had to be suppressed. While Bessières and his corps were to keep open the road from Burgos to Madrid, and to detach a force to subdue the provinces of Aragon, two expeditions were to be sent out from the capital, the one to reduce Seville and Cadix, the other to conquer Valencia. The first of these columns, 15,000 strong, was to be led by Dupont; the second, 7000 strong, was given to Moncey. Both were composed entirely of conscript battalions and Sals auxiliaries, without any stiffening of veteran troops.

The despatch of the two expeditions from Madrid took place on May 26 and June 4 respectively, and was the last executive order carried out by Murat at his master's behest. He fell ill of a fever a few days later, and returned to France; his place was taken by Savary, the betrayer of King Ferdinand, an officer wholly incompetent to face the threatening situation that was gradually developing itself.

Moncey passed the mountains of Cuenca without opposition, and met with no resistance till he had reached the borders of the kingdom of Valencia. There he was twice opposed, in the defiles that led down to the shore-plate, by an irregular mass of new levies, which he thrust aside with ease. When he reached the city of Valencia, he found it packed with many thousands of combatants, including some regular troops, and roughly fortified with many batteries and earthworks. He made two attempts to storm the place (June 28), lost 1000 men, and saw that it could not be taken without a battering train and a regular siege. By a rapid retreat he checked his adversaries, and drew back to the vicinity of Madrid (July 18).

Very different was the fate of Dupont. He too, like Moncey, met with little opposition during the first days of his march. The defiles

of the Sierra Morena were not defended against him; and his troops did not fire a shot till they reached the bridge of Alcala, in front of Cordova, where they dispersed a horde of 50,000 or 12,000 peasants who tried to cover that ancient city. Cordova made no resistance; nevertheless it was sacked the same evening (June 7). Here Dupont's advance came to an end; he found that between him and Seville lay the Spanish army of Andalusia, nearly 30,000 regular troops commanded by General Castaños. The proximity of the mountains had since belated him and cut his communication with Madrid; his conscripts were suffering dreadfully from the summer heat and malarial. He wisely refused to advance farther, and, when Castaños began to move slowly towards him, evacuated Cordova and fell back to Andujar, the point of junction where the routes from the Sierra Morena come down into the valley of the Guadalquivir. He wrote to Madrid for reinforcements, which Santry did not refuse; two fresh divisions of conscripts were sent him, which brought up his force to some 22,000 men. Thus strengthened, he might have defended the passes of the Sierra Morena, though he could not have conquered Andalusia. But instead of retiring to the passes and awaiting the decisive, he engaged in the plain at Andujar. He lacked the moral courage to confess to his master that the offensive campaign he had undertaken was hopeless.

At last, a false rumour that the Spaniards were detaching troops to close the passes behind his back led him to commit the fatal blunder of dividing his small army into two nearly equal halves, and sending off his lieutenant, Vedel, with 10,000 men to secure the *Dupetta Perra*. Castaños then thrust two divisions under General Belling into the gap, and seized the town of Baylen, halfway between Vedel and Dupont. This was a risky move, as the intervening force might have been crushed if the two French generals had acted in unison. Dupont at once evacuated Andujar, and marched with 11,000 men to clear the road, while Castaños' main body followed him at a leisurely pace. At Baylen Dupont found the road blocked by Belling with 7,000 men. He fought till night, with much courage but little skill, endeavouring to pierce the Spanish line. But Belling held firm, and beat off five partial and successive attacks. When the French were thoroughly exhausted and demoralized, Castaños appeared in their rear and ordered them. Dupont then offered to capitulate, if his army were granted a free return to France. Terms were being discussed when, late in the afternoon, General Vedel, with the other half of the French army, came up in Belling's rear and began to develop an attack upon it. Vedel had shown criminal negligence and torpidity in delaying his appearance; he had refused to hurry, though he knew that Dupont was engaged, and though a distant cannonade had been audible all the morning. When informed that his chief was proposing to surrender, Vedel wheeled off and retired towards the passes. But Dupont nevertheless

made a convention with Costello, whereby he stipulated that not only his division, but that of his lieutenant, should capitulate and be sent back to France. This was unjustifiable conduct; but still more unjustifiable was that of Vatel, who tamely came back and laid down his arms, when he might easily have marched off to Madrid (July 23). In all, 14,000 unwounded men surrendered; more than 8000 had been lost in the fighting. When the French were secured, the Junta of Seville detained them all, and never allowed them to return to France.

This disaster, the worst check that the French arms had suffered since Marmou capitulated in Egypt nine years before, had immense effect not only in Spain, but all over Europe. The responsibility for it must be divided between the Emperor himself, Dapont, and Vatel. Napoleon, under a false idea of the Spanish strength, had sent out an army too small and too raw to accomplish such a task as the conquest of Andalusia; Dapont had shown both incapacity and want of moral courage; Vatel's timidity and lack of initiative had doubled the disaster. The Emperor accused them both of cowardice and treason, and had them tried before a military commission, which found them guilty of criminal negligence and of "signing a capitulation containing shameful conditions," but of nothing more. Dapont was imprisoned till 1814; Vatel was pardoned after a few years and again employed.

The first result of Baylen was that King Joseph and Savary, considering their forces insufficient to maintain such an advanced position in the capital, hastily evacuated Madrid (August 1), and did not halt till they had crossed the Elba. Meanwhile four other series of operations had been in progress. The Spanish army of Galicia under General Blake had descended from its mountains into the plains of Old Castile, with the intention of cutting the communications between Madrid and Burgos. Marshal Bessières, whose camps had been held off by Napoleon to protect that line, met him at Medina de Rio Seco on July 14, and inflicted a complete defeat upon the Galicians, though they recovered 22,000 men to his 14,000. This victory, however, had no further effect than to cause for King Joseph a safe retreat from Madrid; Dapont's disaster deprived Bessières of the power of following up his success.

The second independent campaign raging at this moment was that which centred at Saragossa: it was the most creditable to the Spaniards of all the operations of the summer of 1808. The kingdom of Aragon was almost destitute of regular troops; only about 1000 trained men were available when the revolution broke out. But Joseph Palafox, a young and ambitious adventurer, who had led the rising and been selected as captain-general, collected a considerable body of half-armed peasants and townsmen at Saragossa, and with them made head against the 15,000 men under Generals Vothler and Lefebvre-Desnoettes, who were detached to subdue Aragon. His defence of Saragossa (June 15—August 19) was an extraordinary feat. The French having broken

through the flimsy medieval walls of the city, Palafors, instead of capitulating, threw up barricades across the streets, defended house after house, beat back many assaults, and was still fighting bravely inside the town, when the news of the fate of Dupont and the evacuation of Madrid compelled Vexier to retire. The story of Palafors' answer to the French summons, when the rebels had been placed, "No surrender, and war to the last party-wall" (*¡Guerra hasta el último alfiler!*), seems well authenticated; and the obstinate courage displayed by his Argosians in the street fighting contrasted strongly with the helplessness of similar levies when forced to give battle in the open.

While Vexier was being held at bay in Saragossa, Duhous, commanding the French army in Catalonia, was also brought to a standstill. His troops, concentrated at Barcelona, found their communications with France cut off by the general rising of the province. To open them again, Duhous delivered two attacks on the fortress of Gerona, which blocked the road to Perpignan. Both were beaten off (June 22-23, and July 22-August 16); and the French general was compelled to shut himself up in Barcelona, where he was blockaded for nearly four months by the insurgents, and reduced to great straits.

The fourth local campaign in which Napoleon's expeditionary forces were involved during the summer of 1808 was that of Junot in Portugal. The Spanish rising had isolated the 33,000 French who lay in and about Lisbon; but Junot resolved to defend his conquest without taking any heed of what was going on elsewhere. Fortunately for him, Portugal was completely disarmed; the old army had been disbanded or sent across the Pyrenees; and all the armaments were in the hands of the French. The efforts of the people, who rose on all sides between June 6 and June 16, were of necessity weak, for there was no nucleus of trained men, and arms were hard to get. Junot's flying columns scoured the whole country and held down central Portugal with ease. He was still in good hopes of maintaining his position, when, on August 3, he received the news that on the preceding day a British expeditionary force had landed in Mondego Bay.

The arrival of this army marks a new stage in the history not only of the Peninsular War but of Europe at large. The British Government was about to turn aside from that system of sending out small forces to inflict *piu-grades* on non-vital spots in Napoleon's empire, which Sheridan wittily called "its policy of flicking sugar-islants." Urged on by Castlereagh, who already had in the winter of 1806-6 advocated an interference on the Continent on a large scale, and had hoped much from the expedition to Hanover, and by Canning, who, following Pitt's ferment, was fascinated with the idea of a really national and popular rising against Napoleon, the Portland Cabinet had resolved to strike hard. Even the Whig Opposition could not cavil at the proposal to aid a people so badly betrayed as the Spaniards, or make any attempt to

defied the morality of Napoleon's late designs. On the arrival in London, on June 4, of despatches from the Asturias asking for help, followed soon after by similar missions from the other Juntas, the Government promised speedy and ample assistance. In all some 50,000 men were directed to move, and more were to follow.

Lord Castlereagh had intended to place at the head of the whole the young lieutenant-general who commanded the force which sailed from Cork, Sir Arthur Wellesley, the brother of the great Viscount of India, already known for his victories of Assaye and Assagum. But the Duke of York and the War Office were against the scheme; and there were members of the Cabinet who disliked the Wellesleys. After the first troops had actually set sail, the Government resolved to place over Sir Arthur's head two senior officers of no special distinction or ability, Sir Hew Dalrymple, governor of Gibraltar, and Sir Harry Burrard. Sir John Moore also, who was ordered up from the Baltic, would outrank Wellesley, who was thus placed fourth instead of first in command.

Before he was aware that he was superseded, Wellesley had sailed; he landed his 9000 men in Mondego Bay on August 1-2, 1808. The Portuguese welcomed him; but he found that their forces were little more than a useless mob, and that he must depend on his own resources. Four days later he was joined by another British division, and set out to march on Lisbon with some 18,000 men. On August 17 he met at Redinha a small force which Junot had despatched to delay his advance, and drove it out of a strong position by a vigorous attack. This raised the victory of Portugal, who sailed out of Lisbon with his followers. Having gathered Elvas and Almeida, and left a whole division to oppress the discontented populace of the capital, Junot only brought 14,000 men to the front. Wellesley, having been joined by two more brigades from England, had over 16,000 British troops in hand, besides some 3000 Portuguese insurgents.

The landing army was encamped at Vimeira, with its back to the sea, when on August 21 it was suddenly attacked by the French. Wellesley had chosen an admirable position on a line of rolling hills, and showed in this, his first European victory, that masterly power of handling troops on the defensive which was to make his reputation. Junot's vigorous but ill-combined assaults were driven back with awful slaughter; and the victor was about to let loose his reserves upon the broken masses of the enemy when his head was suddenly paralysed. Sir Harry Burrard had landed at this untoward moment, asserted his authority, and forbade a pursuit. Thus Junot was able to gather his routed battalions together and to cover the road to Lisbon. Next morning (August 22) Burrard was superseded by Dalrymple, who was much surprised to receive on that same day proposals from Junot that he should be allowed to evacuate Portugal under a reservation. The French general was expecting every moment to hear of a revolt in Lisbon; his

troops were not inclined to face another general action; and he saw no better way "*pour nous tirer de là malade*."

Dalrymple, overjoyed at finding himself distancing terms as he had been two days before, eagerly accepted the idea of a convention. He was justified in accepting Junot's offer: time was of importance; and the French might, if driven to despair, have retaken Lisbon and made a long and desperate defence. But Sir Hew weakly conceded every demand that was made by the French negotiators, including several that were most offensive to the Portuguese; e.g. he allowed the French to depart laden in the most shameless fashion with the plunder of palaces, monasteries, and churches, and guaranteed immunity to native traitors. On August 26 this famous Convention of Cintra—fabled so called, for it was neither discussed nor signed in that pleasant spot—was executed. Before the next month was out, 25,000 French troops had been shipped out of Portugal, and the whole kingdom was delivered. It was now possible to think of bringing aid to Spain.

But neither Dalrymple nor Burnet was destined to lead the victors of Vimeiro into the uplands of Castile. When the news of the Convention was received in England, universal indignation was expressed. It was thought that Dalrymple had let off the French too easily, and that he might have forced them to unconditional surrender. Letters from officers who complained of the way in which the pursuit at Vimeiro had been conducted, and complaints from the Portuguese provisional government, added fuel to the flames. All three British generals were recalled, and sent before a Court of enquiry. This body reported that, in its opinion, they had all acted according to the best of their judgment and shown proper zeal, and that no further proceedings should be taken. But, while the two senior generals were never despatched on active service again, Wellesley, whose conduct had contrasted so splendidly with that of his superiors, was sent back to Portugal as commander-in-chief in the coming spring.

Much had happened before Sir Arthur resumed his place at the head of a British army. King Joseph and Savary had evacuated Madrid, crossed the Ebro, and fallen back to the foot of the Pyrenees. This long retreat caused almost as much indignation in Napoleon's breast as Espana's surrender. He had at first directed Joseph to hold on to Madrid at all costs, then to stay his retreat at Aranda and Valladolid. But both his despatches arrived too late; and, by August 15, the remains of the army of Spain, still nearly 70,000 strong, were concentrated between Miranda and Milagro on the Ebro. The Emperor, on hearing the news of Baylen, had ordered three veteran corps of the army of Germany, those of Victor, Mortier, and Ney, to march for Spain, and had drawn together other reinforcements from various corners of the Empire. He had hoped that Joseph and Savary would hold out in some advanced position till these援軍 arrived. But all such hopes were

now at an end; and the conquest of the Peninsula had to be begun *de novo*. It was not till the end of October that the heads of the columns from Germany began to cross the passes. While they were marching across France, the Emperor went off to Eckart.

Thus, from the day of Baylen to the opening of the new campaign, the Spanish insurgents had three full months in which to organize their forces. Unfortunately, they did not turn the time to good account. The provincial Juntas showed no desire to relinquish their local sovereignty in favour of a new national structure. When they were at last induced to create a supreme authority, it was not a complete regency of a few members but a "Central Junta" of no less than thirty-five delegates. This body was only got together on September 25, and, when it met, it proceeded, like a debating society, to discuss constitutional reforms, instead of turning all its energies to making ready for Napoleon's advance. The most fatal fault was that it refused to appoint a single commander-in-chief for its armies, and tried to direct independently the movements of half-a-dozen captain-generals of the provincial armies. These officers became personal rivals, intrigued with the Junta, and refused to cooperate with each other. Hence came military chaos and lamentable waste of time. By the end of October, only about 110,000 men had been pushed up to the line of the Ebro to face the French, though about 60,000 more were being drilled and equipped far to the west. Indeed, the only important addition made to the army at the front after Baylen was that of 2000 of La Romana's troops from Denmark, who landed at Santander.

The Spanish strategy at this moment was hopelessly bad. The Junta had allowed their two main armies to drift apart; Blücher, with 60,000 men of the Galician army, had advanced into Biscay, with the intention of turning the French right; while Castaños and Palafox, with the armies of Aragona and Aragón, some 60,000 strong, were executing a similar movement far to the east on the side of Pamplona. To connect these two armies there was nothing but the army of Extremadura, 12,000 strong, which was concentrating at Burgos. Thus the Spanish army had two powerful wings but practically no centre.

To aid the Extremadurens at Burgos, it was intended that the British army from Portugal should be brought up. After the departure of Dalmatry, the command of this force had devolved on Sir John Moore (October 6). He had ordered orders to march into Spain and join our allies: but he found much difficulty in starting his troops, owing to his want of transport and his absolute ignorance of the relative practicability of the various inland roads of Portugal. Receiving false intelligence from the native engineers that it was impossible to move guns over the Serra da Estrella, by the straight road from Lisbon to Almeida and Salamanca, he took the unfortunate step of sending nearly the whole of his cavalry and artillery on a vast detour, by Elvas,

Talavera, and the Escorial, while he marched with his infantry columns direct over mountain roads by way of Calatayud and Guadix. The consequence was that, while 145,000 infantry reached Salamanca in detachments between November 18 and November 23, they could not move till, on December 3, the guns came in from their long tows to the south. Moore's little army at Salamanca was not the only British force which had been sent to aid Spain; a separate division under Baird, 13,000 strong, had been landed at Corunna in the middle of October, and directed to push inland and join Moore in Old Castile. But, much hampered by want of transport, Baird only reached Astorga on November 25. He was still far from his junction with Moore when news arrived that the Spanish armies on the Ebro had received a series of appalling defeats, and were retreating in disorder before the French.

Napoleon held back his army in Navarre till the great reinforcements from Germany had arrived, and 200,000 men were under his hand. He then struck with the wildest and shattering power of a thunderbolt at the weak centre of the Spanish line, and opened for himself the road to Madrid. The first battle was fought at Zorrosa, in Biscay, on October 28, when Blake's army of Galicia, still bent on its turning movement, was thrust back by Marshal Lefebvre, and had to retire westward. The Galicians were making off, pursued by two French corps, when Napoleon led his main body over the Ebro, and on November 10 dashed to meet the little army of Estremadura at the combat of Guescoat in front of Burgos. Next day (November 11) Blake's retreating army, overtaken by Victor at Espinosa in the Cantabrian mountains, received an equally disastrous beating, and was forced to disperse into the hills with the loss of the whole of its artillery. A full month passed before its wrecked, 20,000 strong, were rallied at Leon by the Marquis of La Romana. There remained intact, of all the Spanish armies, only the combined host of Andalusia and Aragon under Castaños and Palafox. On November 23 this force shared the fate of its fellows; its main body, 45,000 strong, was defeated at Tudela by Lannes. Quarrels between Castaños and Palafox were largely responsible for this disaster; their plans were so badly arranged that one-third of the Spanish army did not fire a shot, while the other two-thirds were being routed and dispersed. Palafox' divisions now drew back to defend Saragossa, while Castaños and the Andalusians made off for Madrid by way of Calatayud. They narrowly escaped falling into the hands of Ney, who had been sent to intercept them, and escaped in wretched plight over the mountains.

Such was the depressing news which Moore and Baird, still far from effecting a junction with each other, received in the last days of November. It seemed that there was no Spanish army left with which the British could co-operate; and Moore despaired of being even able to meet Baird in safety. Judging himself far too weak to confront Napoleon's main body, he issued orders for a retreat on Lisbon, and directed Baird to fall



back on Caceres (November 28). He believed that Spain was rotten and that Portugal was indefensible, and he was prepared to evacuate even Lisbon if the French should push their invasion home.

Meanwhile the Emperor, as soon as the news of Tudela reached him stood straight at Madrid. He was only vaguely aware of Moore's position on his flank, and paid no attention to him. The Junta he made a hasty attempt to cover the two defiles which lead to Madrid having driven to Sagoria and the Guadarrama pass the wrecks of the Euzemaduran army, and thrown into the Somosierra pass a force composed of new levies and a few isolated battalions of the army of Andalusia. The Emperor, leaving Sagoria alone, advanced in a single column against the Somosierra, and forced it after a short combat on November 30. On December 2 he appeared in force in front of Madrid. The Spanish capital was an open town devoid of any regular defenses and had no quarters save some of the fugitives from the Somosierra. But the populace were in a paroxysm of patriotic frenzy, and had sworn to make a second Sangreza of their home. They held out for one day behind extemporized batteries and earthworks; but, when the French stormed the *Monte Retiro* heights, which commanded the whole plain, and forced their way into the Prado, the enthusiasm died down and the town surrendered (December 8).

From Dec. 4 to Dec. 22 Napoleon remained in the neighbourhood of Madrid, laying down laws and drafting projects for the reorganization of Spain, and giving his troops a short rest before they should be called upon to march on Lisbon and Cadix. His reserves and outlying columns were beginning to come in; and he had, in and about Madrid, some 75,000 men. Meanwhile Lannes, with the army which had won the fight of Tudela, was directed to besiege Sanguesa and make an end of Palencia; while Marshal Soult, whose corps lay in Old Castile, covering the Emperor's flank and rear, was directed to invade Leon and disperse the wrecks of Blake's old army. The Emperor's next move would have been to march on Lisbon, either he assumed that Sir John Moore would have withdrawn when he heard of the fall of Madrid.

But nature had gone otherwise in the north-west of the Peninsula. Moore had ordered a retreat on Lisbon on November 28; but on December 2 he changed his mind, mainly because he had heard exaggerated reports of the desperation with which Madrid was defending itself, but partly also because he had been at last (December 2) rejoined by his long-lost artillery and cavalry, and had discovered that there was nothing to prevent Baird from joining him. In these circumstances, however rejoiced that he should not retire without striking a blow in behalf of Spain. Accordingly he resolved to execute a diversion in Old Castile, and to make a raid on Valladolid or even on Burgos, with the object of disrupting the Emperor's line of communication. In this plan he persisted, even when, on December 3, he received news

of the surrender of Madrid. He knew that his move was a dangerous one, and wrote to Baird that "both you and me, though we may look big, and determine to get everything forward, yet we must never lose sight of this, that at any moment affairs may take the turn that renders it necessary to retreat." They must advance "with the hand" and ever ready to swoop off to the rear. Moore marched from Salamanca on December 11; two days later, he learnt from a captured despatch that the Emperor was unaware of his presence, and that Soult was lying in an isolated position on the Cori6n river, with less than 20,000 men. He thereupon resolved to change his direction, and to endeavour to surprise and defeat Soult before he could be reinforced. Turning north, he was joined by Baird on December 20, which raised his force to about 37,000 men. He drove in the French cavalry in several successful combats, and on December 24 lay at Salamanca close in front of Soult. The Marquis of La Romana, Blake's successor, was closely besieging up the disorganised works of the army of Galicia to his aid.

A bottle would have followed next day, had not Moore received from a Spanish source, on the afternoon of the 25th, the news that Napoleon had at last heard of his whereabouts, and had started from Madrid in pursuit of him with the main body of his army. Without a moment's hesitation, the British general bade his columns to the rear, and clipped off westward on the road to Benavente and Astorga. He had thrown up his base in Portugal, and was intending to retreat to Fife and Corunna. He did not start a minute too soon. Napoleon, on receiving tardily but certain news of the advance of the English army against Soult, had at once given orders (December 19-20) that the greater part of the troops at Madrid, not less than 60,000 men and bayonets, should hasten by forced marches to throw themselves upon Moore's rear, and cut him off from his retreat on Portugal or Galicia. The sight of the red-coats in the distance had at once drawn him off from all his other plans; and the idea of capturing a whole British army excited him to almost frenzied exertions. He drove his troops across the snow of the Guadarrama pass in the midst of a blizzard which snowed down hard and men, and swept them across the plains of Old Castile at a breakneck pace. But Moore was too quick for him. When the cavalry of the Emperor's van-guard reached the line of the Esla on December 25, the British were safely across the river and out of danger. As the French pressed on, Lord Paget turned back with his horsemen, and cut to pieces the *chasseurs à cheval* of the Imperial Guard at Benavente (December 26), capturing Lefebvre-Desnoettes, their commander, and many of his men.

The Emperor urged on the pursuit for two days more, but threw it up in disgust at Astorga on January 1, 1809. It is usually said that he turned back because of news received concerning the threatening attitude of Austria. This was the official view; but it seems probable that reports of intrigue at Paris, in which Fouché, Talleyrand, and

Munoz were all reserved, had more to do with the Emperor's orders. The pursuit was handed over to the corps of Ney and Soult. About 45,000 men were ordered to follow Moore and La Romana, whose retreating army had fallen back on Astorga just as the British arrived. The rest of the force that had taken part in the Emperor's movement was sent back to Madrid or stationed in the kingdom of Leon.

The retreat of the British from Astorga to Corunna occupied only twelve days; but an immense amount of misery was compressed into that short space of time. Moore believed that his best policy was to withdraw with such rapidity as to leave the enemy far behind. He had calculated that the generals would probably follow him no farther than Villafraña, so that he would have a quiet and undisturbed embarkation at the end of his retreat. Accordingly he made very long marches, not infrequently by night; the army covered on the average seventeen miles a day, in a rugged mountain country covered with snow and cut up by torrents and dingles. The troops, profoundly disgusted at not being allowed to fight, and wearied out by perpetual marching, got out of hand. Many regiments left multitudes of stragglers behind, and plundered the villages by the road. Drunken marauders and footsore stragglers fell by hundreds into the hands of the pursuing French cavalry. But the rearguard under Paget held together steadily, and roughly repulsed the enemy when any attempt was made to drive them in. Yet the French stuck to the heels of the retreating army, and could not, as Moore had hoped, be shaken off. On January 11 the British reached Corunna, in a very dilapidated condition, only to find that the transport-fleet had not arrived. It came up two days later, and the embarkation began. But Soult had also appeared; and, to secure a quiet departure, Moore had to fight the battle of Corunna (January 16). Four days' rest and the advent of the long-awaited opportunity for fighting had pulled the army together; and, when Soult assailed the British infantry—the cavalry and guns were already on board—he suffered a bloody repulse. Moore was mortally wounded by a cannon-ball in the thick of the battle, or he would probably have attacked in his turn and driven the French into the river Nura, which lay at their backs. But his successor, General Hope, was content with having repulsed Soult, and embarked his troops at leisure next day.

Thus ended Sir John Moore's celebrated campaign, which undoubtedly saved Spain and Portugal for the moment, by diverting the Emperor from his southward advance, and by drawing his field army, which might have marched on Lisbon and Cadix, into a remote and rugged corner of the Peninsula. "As a diversion it has succeeded; I brought the whole of the disposable force of the French against this army," wrote Moore in his last despatch; and this was absolutely true. The conception was so fine, and the result so satisfactory, that it seems unnecessary to criticise the details of the operations. But we may agree

with Wellington that "Sir John Moore's error was that he did not know what his men could do," and allow that he drove them too fast in the march from Astorga to Corunna, with great resulting loss. Of 6000 men lost by the way, none are doubt perished owing to their own indiscipline, but more because they were marched beyond the limits of human endurance. But this was a cheap price to pay for executing Napoleon's original plan for the conquest of the Peninsula, just when he himself was on the spot and able to combine the movements of all the French corps in a way that was never again possible.

After abandoning the pursuit of Moore to Soult and Ney, the Emperor returned to France. His great war of attrition, the capture of the British army, had failed, and the projected invasion of Portugal and Andalusia had been postponed; but, in the main, he was not discontented with the results of his campaign. The spirit of the Spaniards—so he flattered—was completely broken. "*Les affaires d'Espagne ont à peu près terminé*," he wrote to one of his ministers; and he returned to suppress intrigues in Paris and to watch Austria. Moore's diversion had, however, allowed time for the Spaniards to rally, and had stopped the French advance for two months. By that time the shattered Spanish armies were once more reorganised, and able to resume their stubborn if too often unsuccessful resistance. The Spanish affair was far from being "nearly at an end," as Napoleon supposed. He had yet to discover that to defeat a Spanish army was easy, but to destroy it difficult. The routed have dispersed, took to the hills, and reassembled again to give farther trouble. Spain was not the country to be subdued by a single blow as Austria is. The loss of Madrid counted for little or nothing; every province continued to fight for its own hand, and no region could be considered conquered that was not held down by a French garrison planted at every cross-road.

During the midwinter of 1808-9, Moore's diversion had caused the suspension of the French operations in all quarters save two, Aragon and Catalonia, the two regions from which no troops had been withdrawn for the march to Corunna. Lannes had been sent with two corps to take Saragossa, into which Palafox had withdrawn his part of the army that had been routed at Talavera. The siege began on December 20, 1808, and lasted for exactly two months. Palafox was no strategist and made numerous blunders of detail, but he was obstinate and enthusiastic; and his position was far stronger than it had been in the preceding July and August. He had nearly 40,000 more or less organised fighting men; and the filthy walls of his city had been strengthened by earthworks and batteries since the first siege. The Aragonese fought with their usual obstinacy; and it was not till January 27, 1809, that the French succeeded in breaking through the outer curtain of Saragossa. Three weeks of deadly street-fighting still remained before them. Lannes only won his way by blowing up house after house, and storming street after

street. When the place surrendered, it was burned fire and sword, pestilence and famine, had destroyed the garrison. Over 20,000 fighting men, with more 50,000 of the population, had perished. Desperate but ill-organized patriotism had failed when pitted against military science. But it was clear that the people who could make such a stand were not likely to become the passive subjects of the French Emperor.

In Catalonia matters went no less badly for the Spaniards. General Saint-Cyr, whom the Emperor had sent to relieve Dalmaze and his beleaguered army, commenced his operative action by taking Roua (December 5), and then pushed through the mountains to success Barcelona. He routed Belling, the victor of Baylen, at Cardener on December 16, and cut his way through to join Dalmaze. Their united forces then rallied out and beat the army of Catalonia at Medes de Ray (December 22) just outside Barcelona. Even then Belling's spirit was not broken. Rallying his troops, he took the offensive, but he was defeated by Saint-Cyr for a third time at Valls (February 22, 1809). In this last fight Belling was mortally wounded; his broken host shut itself up in Tarragona or took to the hills, leaving Saint-Cyr free to commence the siege of Gerona, the great fortress commanding the road from the French frontier to Barcelona.

Meanwhile the Spanish line of defense was being reconstructed. The wrecks of Castille's old army had gathered in La Mancha, and took their post at the foot of the passes of the Sierra Morena, under General Cacerual. The still more dilapidated divisions camped at Guadacal and the Somosierra rallied behind the Tagus. They were in a fearful state of discipline, and had murdered their general San Juan on a wild charge of treason; but their new commander, La Cuesta, a maroon and incapable but sanguine veteran, reduced them to order by a series of military exercises. Blake's old army of Galicia, now under La Romana, after passing from Maza's retreating force at Astorga, had retired into the mountains and was reorganizing at Oviedo. Blake himself had been sent to Valencia, and was busy in getting together a fresh army in that fertile and well-peopled province. Including other levies in the Asturias and Andalusia, the Emperor Junta, which had now established its seat at Sevilla, could place some 100,000 men in the field in March, 1809.

But more important, in the end, than the revival of any Spanish army was the fact that 6000 British troops still remained in Portugal. These were the battalions that had been left in Lisbon when Masséna marched to Salamanca in the preceding autumn. Their very existence, general, Sir John Cradock, kept them close to the Portuguese capital, ready to embark if the French should advance in force. Fortunately for Portugal, for Great Britain, and for Europe, the British Government had resolved to continue the struggle in the Peninsula at all costs. In February General Beresford was sent out to reorganize the Portuguese army, with some scores of British officers to help him, and a great

store of new arms and equipment. On April 8 a far more important announcement was made. Sir Arthur Wellesley, the victor of Vitoria, was named commander of the British forces in Portugal, and ordered to sail for Lisbon at short notice. This appointment was due to Lord Castlereagh, who showed a steady confidence in Wellesley, and always employed him as his chief military adviser. The general had stated that, if granted a British army of 25,000 or 30,000 men and the control of the native forces, he would undertake to hold Portugal against any French army not exceeding 100,000 men. This was contrary to Sir John Moore's dictum that Portugal was untenable; but the Government, urged on by Castlereagh, resolved to take the risk. Reinforcements began to be sent out: Wellesley himself reached Lisbon and superseded Craik on April 22, 1809.

Now he landed, the campaign of 1809 had begun. Before quitting Spain, Napoleon had laid down the general lines that were to be followed by his marshals. Soult, leaving Ney behind him to hold down Galicia, was to march with his own corps from Corunna on Portugal, and to take first Oporto, and then Lisbon. He imagined, as Napoleon said he hoped that the Portuguese capital might fall before February 15. On the other side, Victor, with his corps and certain reinforcements, was to cross the Tagus, crush La Costa's army of Estremadura, take Badajoz, and then march on Seville. Sebastian's corps was to deal with the other Spanish army in the south—that of La Mancha under Cuesta; but Victor's was to be the decisive blow. Catalonia and Aragon were side-issues of comparatively little importance.

The French columns duly advanced, in obedience to the Emperor's orders; but inevitable hindrances—bad roads, bad weather, and difficulty of supplies—caused them to start far later than he had intended. Soult left Corunna with 53,000 men, after turning over the charge of Galicia to Ney. On March 9 he crossed the Portuguese border near Chaves; La Romana, with the weeks of the Spanish army of Galicia, had retired northward, wisely refusing battle. Soult's invasion of Portugal was an unbroken series of combats with a half-armed peasantry, backed by a few battalions of disarmed line-troops. They did their best, but were utterly unable to stand before the French veterans. At last, on March 27, the Marshal forced his way to Oporto, and found in front of the city a line of hastily constructed earthworks manned by 30,000 insurgents, headed by their bishop and uncontrolled by any proper military organisation. He stormed the lines two days later, and made a horrible slaughter of the Portuguese, several thousands of whom were driven into the river.

But here Soult's initiative came to an end: he was unable to carry out the Emperor's instructions by advancing against Lisbon. He was cut off from all communication with other French armies by insurgents in his rear. The remains of the Portuguese forces that he had beaten were hanging in a great mass on his left flank; if he left a competent

garrison in Oporto, he would not have enough troops for the first advance; and he now knew that there was a British force awaiting him somewhere near Lisbon. Accordingly he halted, went out firing salutes to open his communication with Galicia, and wrote to the Emperor to more troops. Meanwhile he amused himself by assuming quasi-royal state at Oporto, and seems to have dreamed of becoming "King of northern Lusitania."

The other French advance had come to a similar standstill at about the same moment. Two Spanish armies, it will be remembered, had been collected for the defence of Andalusia—that of Cartagena covering the eastern point, that of La Cuesta beyond the line of the Tago. On March 27 Sebastian beat Cartagena at Ciudad Real, and forced him to take shelter in the Sierra Morena. But the French general had resolved neither to press his victory: it was Victor who was to deliver the great blow. On March 18, that morning crossed the Tago high up, then turning the position which La Cuesta had taken behind the central course of the river at Almaraz. He had about 32,000 men, a force slightly exceeding that of the Spaniards, who drew back when their flank was turned, and retired across the mountains into the valley of the Guadalequiv. Here La Cuesta was reinforced by a division drawn from Cartagena's army and offered battle, for he was as much at home as he was unskilful in the field. He took to hand no less a scheme than to surround the French in the open plain near Medellín, and advanced in a line five miles long and only four men deep. The natural result followed: the French cavalry broke his left-center by a furious charge, and then rolled up his isolated wings in detail. The slaughter was awful, for there was no friendly mountain or rock to shelter the routed troops: more than 7000 were cut down, and nearly 3000 made prisoners (March 28). Nevertheless Victor's offensive was exhausted at Medellín, just as that of Scott had been at Oporto. Insurrection had burst out in his rear: his army was weakened by detachments, and suffering from want of food. He could hear nothing of Scott, whose advance on Lisbon was to synchronise with his own on Seville. He declared that he was not strong enough to besiege Badajoz, much less to invade Andalusia, and halted in the valley of the Guadalequiv, clamouring for reinforcements, which King Joseph at Madrid was too weak to send him.

Such was the condition of affairs when Wellington landed at Lisbon. The French invasion had come to a standstill. Scott would not move without reinforcements from Bay, nor Victor without reinforcements from Madrid. Wellington at once grasped the situation: he had at his disposal, counting the newly-arrived regiments from England, some 85,000 British and 15,000 Portuguese troops. This was enough to enable him to deal a crushing blow at either Scott or Victor, while leaving a detached force to "contain" the other. Without a moment's hesitation, he resolved to deal with Scott first, and, leaving 12,000 men

at Alentejo to watch Victor, marched with the rest on Oporto, supposed in the north, he intended to rush back to Estremadura as deal with the second French army.

Everything favoured Wellesley's enterprise. Soult had dispersed his army to hunt down the Portuguese insurgents, and was attacked before he could concentrate. At the moment when the blow fell, he was more intent on suppressing a republican conspiracy among his own officers than on watching for any advance on the part of the British. On May 12 Wellesley was in front of Oporto, while Soult was hurried assembling his troops and preparing to retreat. Noting the confusion in the French ranks, Wellesley carried out at midday his astounding passage of the Douro, throwing his advanced guard across a broad river edged with precipitous cliffs, when he noted that the enemy he neglected to guard all the passages. The river was completely secured and Soult was hunted out of Oporto and driven eastward, in search of the divisions of his army which had not yet been able to join him. As Wellesley had thrown a Portuguese force under Beresford across the line of retreat by which the enemy could retire up the Douro into Spain. Thus intercepted, Soult rallied his reining columns, but found that it was shut in between Wellesley, Beresford, and the impenetrable and endless mountains of the Serra de Santa Catalina. Burning his baggage and destroying all his artillery, he escaped by goat-tracks over the hill towards Galicia. Harried pursued by Wellesley, and harassed by its poverty, he finally got off with the loss of 5000 men, and led his camp in a disorganised mass to Orense. He found that Galicia was no safe harbourage for him; the whole province was up in arms, and the detachments of Ney's corps were fighting for existence against La Romana's army and the local guerrillas. With some difficulty Soult and Ney ultimately concentrated at Lugo, and resolved to devote themselves to crushing the Galician insurrection.

As they were thus engaged, Wellesley had scarce time for a blow at Victor in Estremadura. But, while he was hurrying his victorious troops from Oporto to Alentejo for a rapid strike at the 1st corps, the French army of the south was enduring such dire starvation that Victor at last resolved to retire towards Madrid, before the whole force about became ineffective from sheer exhaustion. He evacuated Estremadura about the middle of June, and retired to the valley of the Tagus fixing his head-quarters at Talamara. Then he abandoned all that he had won at Madrid. This rearward movement of the 1st corps compelled Wellesley to revise his plans, since Victor was no longer isolated, but had fallen back to a position where he was in close touch both with Madrid and with Sebastiani in La Mancha. After taking counsel with La Costa and the Junta at Seville, Wellesley consented to embark in the first and only campaign which he ever undertook in company with a Spanish colleague and without supreme control over



the whole conduct of affairs. The scheme was ambitious, yet not unpromising if the details had been properly carried out. The Junta undertook that Venegas, now in command of its army of La Mancha, should attract the attention of Sebastian and King Joseph by a cautious demonstration against Madrid. Meanwhile Wellington was to march up the Tago, unite his forces with those of La Costa, and endeavour to catch and crush Victor's corps while still isolated. He did not fear interruption from the other French armies, following Ney and Soult to be occupied with the Galician insurrection.

On July 18 the British troops, just 30,000 strong, joined La Costa's Extremaduran army, which had been raised to a strength of 35,000 men, near Almaraz; and the two bodies marched in company against Victor. The Marshal drew back before them, evacuated Talavera, and retired towards Madrid. Matters looked fairly well, though La Costa had proved a very perplexing colleague. It was, however, not he, but Venegas, who ruined the campaign. That officer, instead of detaining Sebastian in his front, remained inactive, and allowed the enemy to march away unopposed. Thus Victor, Sebastian, and King Joseph, who had brought up the last reserves from Madrid, were able on July 25 to mass nearly 50,000 men in front of Wellington and La Costa, ignoring completely the army of La Mancha.

There followed the bloody battle of Talavera, extending over the two days (July 25-6). Wellington and La Costa had taken up a position extending from the Tago to a bare hill three miles north of it. The Spaniards held the right in the town of Talavera and its suburbs and olive-groves, the British the left, partly in the plain, partly on the isolated hill which marked the end of the line. Victor, overruling King Joseph and Jourdan, who were theoretically in chief command, delivered three desperate attacks on the British position, leaving only a few thousand cavalry to contain the Spaniards. He had cover before met the British, and, looking on the thin line opposed to him, exclaimed, "*si on n'ajoute pas ça, il faudrait craindre d'être la guerre.*" Practically the whole of the French infantry threw themselves upon Wellington's half of the line, with a superiority in numbers of nearly two to one. The fighting was desperate, and at one moment the British left-centre was broken. But Wellington saved the day with his single reserve brigade; and the French drew back, leaving 17 guns and 3500 killed and wounded upon the field. The British had suffered even more heavily in proportion, losing 5500 men out of 30,000 present. The Spaniards were but slightly engaged, and their casualties were trifling.

Both armies were exhausted; and when, during the night, the French retired from the field, Wellington was unable to pursue them. King Joseph's position was now a dangerous one, for Venegas and the army of La Mancha had at last come up, and were beginning to threaten Madrid in his rear. But an interruption from a new quarter suddenly

changed the whole face of the campaign. On July 30 the news came in that Soult with a considerable force—how great no one yet knew—was marching from Salamanca on Plasencia and the middle Tago, so as to cut the British communications with Portugal.

A few words are necessary to explain the appearance of this army upon the scene. When Soult had been driven back into Galicia in May, and had there met Ney, the two Marshals had agreed to cooperate; Ney was to clear the coast-land, Soult to sweep the interior. But they were jealous and suspicious of each other's loyalty; and the joint movement was a failure. Ney was checked by the insurgents at the entry of the Oitaben; Soult, disregarding his colleague's difficulties, made off to the south-east, and ultimately descended into the plains of Lara. Therefore Ney, deducing that he had been betrayed and abandoned, suddenly evacuated Galicia, withdrew all his garrisons, and returned into the plains by another route. Then, by June 30, Galicia was delivered from the French; but, on the other hand, two corps, 32,000 strong, which had been locked up in this remote corner of Spain, had returned to the valley of the Douro, and were now available for the main central operations of the summer campaign of 1808.

It was this fact that revised Wellesley's plans for the recovery of Madrid. On hearing of the advance of the British and Extremaduran armies along the Tago, Soult had written to King Joseph (July 12), asking for leave to fall upon the rear of the Allies, while the troops of Victor and Sebastian were detaining them in the front. He had been given permission so to do, and had received, in addition to the two corps lately arrived from Galicia, a third, that of Mortier, which had recently been driven back from Aragon into Old Castile. With this large body of troops, about 80,000 strong, he marched from Salamanca on July 27, the first day of the battle of Talavera.

On July 28 Wellesley was warned that French troops were descending upon Plasencia and threatening his communications with Portugal. On August 2 he started off to fight them, believing that Soult was riding in his rear with no more than a few divisions. But, on the following day, an intercepted despatch revealed to Wellesley and La Costa the real strength of the approaching enemy. They at once saw the danger of their position, and retreated behind the Tago by the bridge of Arroyo, abandoning at Talavera 4800 wounded, for whom no transport could be procured. There was still some danger that Soult might anticipate them at Almaraz, the main passage of the Tago; but Wellesley seized this important strategic point by a forced march (August 7), and the situation became comparatively safe. The Anglo-Spanish armies had now a broad river in front of them, and a fair line of retreat behind; and the French could no longer hope to surround them. On August 5 Soult forced the passage of the Tago at Arroyo, driving off the Spanish division which tried to defend the bridge;

but this was his last forward move. The only remaining incident of the campaign was that on August 13 Vergas gave battle to the King and Sebastian at Almonacid near Talavera. He was beaten and forced back into La Mancha, with a loss of 2000 men. It is difficult to say whether he was more to blame for his culpable slowness at the commencement of the campaign, when he failed to detach the 4th corps in his front, or for his culpable rashness at the end of it, when he courted and suffered a wholly unnecessary defeat. No further active operations occurred in central Spain till the autumn. The French army dispersed in order to get food; and Wellington, in equal danger of starvation at Almona, retired on August 20 to the valley of the Guadaleva, where he remained quiescent for several months recruiting his army. Thoroughly disgusted by his experience of co-operation with Cuesta, he refused to lend himself to any of the plans for offensive action in company with the Spanish armies which the Junta proposed.

While the Talavera campaign was in progress, there had been sharp fighting in Aragon and Catalonia, regions in which the war always took a course wholly unaffected by the main struggle in Castile and Portugal. General Blake, having raised a new army in Valencia, had advanced in May with the object of recapturing Saragossa. He was attacked (May 22) by Suckut, the new commander of the French army of Aragon, but repulsed him in a sharp fight at Alcañiz. Continuing his advance, Blake pursued Suckut and brought him to action again at Maria just outside the gates of Saragossa. But on this occasion the Spanish army was beaten (June 18); and, after suffering a second and more decisive defeat at Belchite (June 18), the Valencians dispersed in disorder, leaving Suckut master of the plains of Aragon.

Rosespide, in Catalonia, Saint-Cyr had been occupied during the whole summer and autumn in the siege of the fortress of Gerona, a place of very moderate strength, but held by a gallant and resourceful governor, General Mariano Alvarez, and a garrison whose courage and endurance surpassed even the level that had been attained by the defenders of Saragossa. From May 8 to December 10, 1809, the French lay before its ramparts, keeping up an incessant bombardment and making assault after assault upon the breaches. They won the outworks, but could not penetrate into the town, till sheer starvation and incessant fighting had practically annihilated the garrison. Blake came up from Valencia with the wreck of his army to disturb the siege, but was too weak to drive off Saint-Cyr, and only succeeded in prolonging the agony of Gerona by throwing in a few convoys and some trifling reinforcements. On December 10 the place surrendered, the governor and nearly the whole of the surviving defenders being prostrate in the hospitals. From first to last the siege had cost the French 80,000 men. This was undoubtedly the most brilliant piece of service performed by the Spaniards during the whole Peninsular War.

Long before Gueona fell, the ball in the main operations in Castile, which followed upon the battle of Talavera, had come to an end. Seeing the French paralyze the Spanish Junta, resolved to take the offensive again in October. They asked, but asked in vain, for the cooperation of Wellington (now Viscount Wellington), who warned them that if their armies tried to fight general actions they would be beaten, and brought them to confine their efforts to the defence of Andalusia. Nevertheless the Junta ordered a new advance on Madrid. Two forces were to take part in this scheme, starting from two remote bases. The larger consisted of the old army of La Mancha, formerly commanded by Vanege, to which had been added the greater part of the army of Extremadura. La Cuesta had been involved in August; Vanege had been disgraced after his defeat at Almonacid; and the united force was entrusted to General Arriaga, an officer more rash and decidedly more incapable than either of his predecessors. He was ordered to march on Madrid with some 20,000 men and to hear down all opposition. At the same time, del Parque, with La Romana's old army of Galicia, now amounting over 20,000 Spaniards, was ordered to advance into Leon, and to move on Salamanca and ultimately on Madrid.

Del Parque started first, pushed boldly forward, and met the French 6th corps, commanded by General Marchand in the shape of Ney, at Tordesillas near Salamanca. Taking a strong position, he awaited the attack of the enemy, and beat them off, the assailants losing an eagle and 1800 men (October 18). Marchand was forced to evacuate Salamanca, which the Spaniards occupied. After a pause, del Parque advanced again, but found that the enemy had received reinforcements, which made him too strong to be faced. The Spanish general began to fall back, but was surprised and beaten at Albu de Tormes (November 29). His army fell back, with a loss of 8000 men, partly on Galicia, partly on Ciudad Rodrigo.

The fate of Arriaga in the south was far worse. Starting from the passes of the Sierra Morena on November 3, he made a sudden dash for Madrid, driving before him at first the small French detachments which occupied La Mancha. But, having reached Océla near Aranjuez, only three marches from the capital, he found heavy forces gathering in his front, was stricken with sudden irruption and indecision, and waited to be attacked by the enemy. King Joseph, having collected the corps of Mortier and Sebastiani and the Madrid reserves, fell upon him with 30,000 men on November 13, and inflicted on him a defeat less bloody, indeed, than that of Medinâ, but even more disastrous. The French made no less than 15,000 prisoners; some 4000 Spaniards were killed or wounded. It took five weeks to collect the wrecks of the army in the Sierra Morena; and, even then, only 15,000 out of the 30,000 men with whom Arriaga had started could be rallied.

The rest of Océla sealed the fate of southern Spain. Napoleon

was now free from the Austrian troubles which had absorbed his attention during the summer of 1808, and was at liberty to turn his whole attention to the Peninsula. He sent up large reinforcements, and ordered a general advance, before the enemy should have recovered from the effects of Albu de Torres and Ocaña. It was in his power to throw the great mass of his troops either on Seville or on Lisbon; in other words, to break the centre of the Spanish line of defence and occupy the fertile Andalusia, or to overwhelm Wellington and drive the British out of Portugal. Fortunately for Great Britain and for Europe, the Emperor chose the easier enterprise, and ordered Soult, with the corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and Mortier, to force the Sierra Morena, occupy Andalusia, and drive the Spanish army of the south into the sea. The conquest of Portugal was to be postponed till the next year. Accordingly Soult led out some 70,000 men at midwinter, three times as many as he had at Ocaña, and in less than a fortnight overran the whole kingdom. On January 30, 1809, the passes of the Sierra Morena were forced at three points; Seville fell on January 31; and by February 4 the French advance-guard was in front of Cadiz, the only town that had not been submerged by the flood of invasion. The demoralised troops of Andalusia had dispersed or fled into Murcia; and Cadiz itself was only saved by the Duke of Albuquerque, who threw himself into the town with 10,000 men from Extremadura just before Victor arrived.

The loss of Andalusia appeared the crowning disaster of the whole war; and many observers, both French and English, thought that the end was at hand. But it was really a blessing in disguise; the whole Imperial field-army available for offensive operations was absorbed by the tasks of partitioning the newly conquered kingdom and of besieging Cadiz. No surplus troops remained for an attack on Portugal; and meanwhile Wellington was preparing the defence of that realm with a thoroughness which no one expected. He had completed his regular army, drilled and armed some scores of thousands of militia, and got well to work on the famous lines of Torres Vedras, against which the advancing wave of French invasion was to surge in vain during the coming year. In short, the seven additional months of preparation which were granted for the organisation of the defence of Portugal were all-important.

There was a long gap in the offensive operations of the French between the conquest of Andalusia and the commencement of the invasion of Portugal. The former enterprise had been completed in February, 1809; the latter did not begin till August. The reason of this delay was that the Emperor waited till the spring before sending across the Pyrenees the reinforcements from Germany, which were to form the bulk of the army destined for the march on Lisbon. Nearly 100,000 troops were ultimately poured into the Peninsula for this purpose, including two new corps, the 6th and 9th, under Junot and Drouot, 20,000 men of the Imperial Guard, and several others more than 100,000.

the command of the whole, Marshal Masineira, lately created Prince of Eoiling for his services as the *Duque de*, had been selected. The Emperor's choice was good, for despite his personal faults—he was selfish, greedy, and quarrelsome—Masineira was more capable of conducting a great campaign at the head of 100,000 men than any other of the marshals. He took up his command at Valladolid on May 15, 1810.

Meanwhile Soult, in the far south, was busy with the siege of Cadix. It was an unpropitious enterprise; for the town, situated at the point of a peninsula projecting far into the sea, and separated from the mainland by a broad creek, is almost impregnable without the assistance of a fleet. It was to little purpose that the French bombarded the outlying defences at long range. Cadix was "observed" rather than besieged; and Victor's corps had always to be left in front of it. That of Sébastien lay at Granada and Malaga, charged with the duty of keeping down the insurgents of the Sierra and watching the Spanish army of Murcia. For farther offensive operations Soult could only count on Morillo's corps; the Emperor had directed that he was to use it, when Masineira was ready to start the main attack on Portugal, for the reduction of Badajoz and Elvas, and finally for an invasion of the Alentejo which would take Lisbon in the rear. But Masineira was long in moving; and Soult waited for the signal without impatience, being well content to devote himself to organising the civil government of Andalusia—a profitable viceroyalty for one who loved money and was an indefatigable and unscrupulous collector of works of art.

In the eastern parts of the Peninsula the war during the spring of 1810 did not stand still, as in the north, but it was inconclusive in its results. Suchet, having reduced the plains of Aragon to obedience, risked an advance against Valencia with a column of 15,000 men, a force too small for the enterprise. He was repulsed (March 5-10) and forced by the news of fresh revolts in Aragon to retire to Saragossa. Warned by this check that he must not go too far afield till he had made all safe in his rear, Suchet now turned his attention to the reduction of the fortresses on the borders of Aragon and Catalonia, and speedily captured Lerida (May 16) and Mequinenza (June 8). He had now won his way far down the Ebro valley; and one further push would take him to the sea, and enable him to cut the communications between Valencia and Catalonia. Meanwhile Argensola, who had replaced Saint-Cyr in Catalonia in time to receive the surrender of Girona in December, 1809, fared far worse in the new year. His only success was the capture of the petty mountain fortress of Hostalrich (May, 1810), while his failures were many: for the Catalans were obstinate and enterprising, and their general, O'Donnell, was a man of resource. So many of Argensola's outlying detachments were cut off, and so many of his enterprises proved fruitless, that only in the summer the Emperor recalled him to France in disgrace, sending Macdonald, Duc de Tarente, to supersede him.

But events in Aragon and Catalonia were unimportant compared with the great invasion of Portugal, which was just about to commence. At no period of the struggle did matters look so hopeful for the French as at this moment. Mascha had under him 100,000 men, of whom three corps (the 1st, 6th, and 8th), over 70,000 strong, were to form the *armée d'Espagne*; while the 5th corps and other troops guarded the plains of Leon in his rear, and the Imperial Guard came up to occupy Navarre and Old Castile. This seemed an overwhelming force to turn against Wellington, who had less than 80,000 British bayonets and sabres, about the same force of Portuguese regulars, and a mass of native militia useless in the field and only fit for raids and bickering in the mountains. Moreover, the British general had always to guard against the chance of a separate invasion of the *Alentejo* by Soult, for in his rear. To aid him there were two weak Spanish armies, the remnants of old Pasop's old force—one in Galicia, the other in Extremadura near Badajoz; together these forces did not number 35,000 men, and they were much demoralised by their late defeats. Neither gave any profitable assistance during the campaign in Portugal.

When Mascha began his advance, the two Castiles, with Aragon and Andalusia, were quiet. The guerrilla bands which afterwards troubled them had not yet developed their strength; and the French garrisons were so strong that no corner of central Spain was left unguarded. In this summer there were no less than 370,000 French troops in the Peninsula—a larger number than was ever seen before or after. Everywhere, save in Catalonia, the Spaniards seemed discouraged; and it appeared probable that no further effort would drive them to despair and surrender. The Supreme Junta, which had hitherto conducted the war, had become so unpopular that it resigned its powers to a Regency of five members on February 3. But the new Government, if not so arrogant and unteachable as the old, inspired little confidence. Had the invasion of Portugal proved successful, there would have been no power of resistance left in Galicia, in Galla, in Valencia, or even in Catalonia; and the war would have ere long finished on.

Mascha had resolved not to start on his great enterprise till all the troops from Germany were nearing the front; and some of them, especially the 5th corps, were still far in the rear. He had also resolved to secure his base of operations in Leon, by capturing the fortresses of north-western Spain, before he crossed the frontier of Portugal. Astorga, the outer bulwark of Galicia, had fallen on April 22, after an honourable defence. The greater stronghold of Orahed Rodrigo made an even more creditable resistance, its governor, Harroth, holding out from April 23 till July 19 against all the efforts of Ney. His brave defence caused the invasion of Portugal to be postponed till August, to the satisfaction of Wellington, who needed every moment that he could gain for the organisation of his defence. He had refused to risk

a battle for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, though proved to do so both by the Spaniards and by some of his own officers; his forces were not yet strong enough to face the French in the plains, and lay distributed along the hills of the Portuguese frontier, observing the enemy from a distance.

It was not till August 24 that Masena crossed the Coa at the head of the main body of his army. He then laid siege to Almeida, the fortress which protects north-eastern Portugal against attacks from the side of Spain. It was defended by a good native garrison under an English governor, General Coa; and Wellington had ordered it to delay the enemy as long as Ciudad Rodrigo. But on the third day of the siege a shell exploded the main powder-magazine; nearly the whole town was destroyed; and Coa was forced to surrender next day (August 27). Having mastered Almeida with such unexpected ease, Masena rolled up all his columns, 60,000 strong, collected his stores and provisions, and advanced into Portugal on September 15.

On plunging into the interior of Portugal, Masena was surprised to find the whole country-side, and even the larger towns, completely deserted by their inhabitants. This was the first intimation that he received of Wellington's new and original scheme of defence. He had obtained from the Portuguese Regency permission to order all the people of the invaded districts to retire from their homes after destroying all their food-stuffs. The wealthier classes were to make their way to Lisbon or Oporto; the rest to take refuge in the mountains, or in regions to which the French columns could not easily penetrate. Knowing that Napoleon's armies relied chiefly on local requisitions, he rightly supposed that such a device would soon reduce the invader to great distress. Meanwhile he had prepared a secure refuge for his own army, by constructing across the neck of the peninsula on which Lisbon stands the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras. These were not mere field entrenchments, but solid closed works constructed by ditch and palisade, and furnished with ample provision of heavy guns from the Lisbon arsenal. Skilled engineers, aided by the whole of the able-bodied peasantry of Estremadura, had been at work on them for more than half a year; and they were now perfectly complete. The first line was 26, the second 22 miles long from sea to sea; they included 166 closed redoubts, defended by 407 pieces of artillery. The ground in front of them had been cleared of all cover, and on the most exposed points the slopes had been scraped away. Finally, to provide against the possible but unlikely contingency of the lines being pierced, a third series of fortifications had been built at the mouth of the Tagus, to allow the army to embark in safety in the event of disaster. A very large force would be required to man so long a front. Wellington had arranged that the whole British army, nearly 80,000 strong, five-sixths of the Portuguese regulars (a force of about the same strength), and some 80,000 Lisbon and Estremaduran militia should hold the lines.



He even borrowed during the autumn 7000 Spanish troops from the army of La Romana, which lay at Badajoz, so that, in the end, he could count on nearly 100,000 men for the defence, though a large proportion of them were of inferior material.

But this was not the whole of Wellington's plan. The cities of southern and central Portugal were not taken inside the lines, but were ordered to wait till the French army should have passed on into the interior, and then to cut its communications, burn its rear, and engage it in a set of mobile columns. They were directed to avoid all serious fighting with large forces, but to destroy stragglers and detachments, cut off convoys, and prevent the enemy from foraging for food. If Masséna dropped small parties to guard the more important points on his line of advance, they would be cut off and destroyed. If he kept his whole army in a mass, he would move on in a sort of perpetual blockade, with an active but intangible enemy harassing him on all sides. When he reached the lines of Torres Vedras and was forced to stop, he would find himself the besieged rather than the besieger. The main difficulty in Wellington's plan was the dreadful sacrifice imposed on the peasantry of central Portugal, who were asked to quit their houses and destroy their possessions in the face of approaching winter. But a combination of patriotism and wholesome fear of the marauding propensities of the French sufficed to cause the orders of the Regency and the commander-in-chief to be carried out.

Masséna was entirely unprepared for the tactics used against him. He imagined that he had but to win a battle somewhere in front of Lisbon, and so to compel the British to embark: the capital and the whole kingdom of Portugal would then be his own. He advanced through northern Beira for ten days, while the army of Wellington retired before him, refusing to commit itself to a fight. The route which he had taken, to the north of the Mondego, by way of Viseu, at last brought him in front of the position of Bussaco, where the main road to Coimbra and Lisbon crosses a range of precipitous heights. On this commanding ridge, which overlooks all the upland of central Portugal on one side, and the plains of Coimbra on the other, Wellington stood at bay; he did not intend to make a permanent defence of the position, well knowing that it could be turned on the left, but merely to check the French if they should venture on a direct attack. His troops were eager for a fight, and he was anxious to indulge them if it could be done without risk. It would be useful too, from the political point of view, to retire to the lines of Torres Vedras only after having won a victory which should impress public opinion.

Masséna acted much as Wellington had hoped. He had never before seen a British army in battle, and thought that this might be driven, by a vigorous attack in column, even from such ground as that which lay in front of the convent of Bussaco. He had a distinct superiority in

numbers—about 25,000 men to 30,000—and knew that half his opponent's army was composed of Portuguese, for whom he had a supreme contempt. Accordingly, on September 27, he launched Ney's corps against Wellington's left-centre, and Reynier's against his right-centre, keeping Junot's in reserve to clinch the victory. The two great columns of assault were directed against the least precipitous parts of the English position: but even here the slope was steep; and, when the French had failed to take summit under heavy musketry fire, their order was broken and their impetus spent. Charged vigorously by Crauford's light division on the left, and by Platoon's 2d division on the right, they were rolled down the hill in fearful disorder and with great loss. The actual clash of battle hardly lasted an hour, but the French lost five generals and 4400 men killed and wounded. Wellington's casualties were less than 1000; and only a third part of his army had been engaged. It was a matter of immense relief and encouragement that the Portuguese line regiments had stood perfectly steady and had contributed their fair share to the victory. After this Wellington knew that he could safely trust them in line of battle—a piece of knowledge which well-nigh doubled his fighting power.

Having suffered this well-earned punishment for trying to "rush" a British army securely posted in a good position, Masséna took the obvious step of turning Wellington's left wing by the directions road through Balsa. His opponent had expected this move, and promptly resumed his retreat, evacuated Coimbra, and fell back towards the line. The Marshal occupied the deserted town, where he found food-stuffs, that had not been properly destroyed, in quantity sufficient to enable him to resume his advance (October 1). Now that he had reached this point, prudence seemed to demand that he should establish a new base at Coimbra, and have a division to guard it and to care for the 5000 sick and wounded who now encumbered his march. But Masséna felt that he would require every available man for the battle in front of Lisbon which he believed to be impending. Accordingly he took the rash step of leaving all his sick and wounded at Coimbra under the guard of half a battalion, and with the remainder of his army hurried on in pursuit of the British (October 4). The remedy for this blunder was not long in coming. On October 7 Colonel Thuret, the commander of the nearest militia brigade, learning of the weakness of the force at Coimbra, surprised the place at dawn, and captured both the garrison and the men in hospital, 5000 in all.

Wellington's army passed within the line on October 11, warning the whole population of northern Estremadura, which moved down to take refuge in and about Lisbon. On the following morning Masséna's columns came up; the Marshal had only heard of the existence of the line five days before, and was even now unaware of their strength. But when he had surveyed them with his own eyes, and had made use of

two tentative attacks on some of the outlying positions, he recognised the hopelessness of his situation. He had now not much more than thirty men left, and saw that it would be insane to risk an attack with such a force. His provisions were running out, and the Beira militia had closed in upon his rear, so that he commanded no more ground than that on which his three army-corps were massed. His conversations with Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo had long been cut; and he had not the least idea what was going on in Lissa, or whether his reserves were on their way to join him. Nevertheless he remained for a month in front of the lines, hoping against hope for some chance to make a successful assault, and then retired to Santarém, thirty miles up the Tagus. He despatched, meanwhile, letters to the Emperor begging for instant aid, but all the results of his campaign should be lost.

In and about Santarém the French army abode from November 16, 1810, to March 5, 1811, obstinately refusing to retire, though by the end of that time it was suffering from sheer starvation. When the resources of the region had been worn up, the army had to live by pushing marauding columns into the surrounding districts—columns which were always opposed and often destroyed by the Portuguese militia. Wellington refrained from attack; for hunger was doing the work of the sword, and the invading army dwindled day by day.

Masineu had hoped for more effective assistance from Soult, who, according to the Emperor's orders, was to cooperate in the attack on Lisbon by advancing into the Alentejo, and threatening the Portuguese capital from the south. But Soult's movements were begun too late; he had no love for Masineu, and refused to hurry. He came up with a single corps, the 8th under Mortier, into Estremadura, and prepared to capture Badajoz as a preliminary to the advance into Portugal. On February 19 he destroyed the Spanish army of Estremadura at the battle of the Gebora, and then began to press the siege of Badajoz. The place made a weak defence, and was surrendered by its cowardly or treacherous governor Inez on March 16.

Five days earlier Masineu had in despair abandoned Santarém and started on his weary retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo across the mountains of central Beira. The army of Portugal would have perished if it had remained a fortnight longer in its advanced position. It was now in a desperate plight; nearly all the horses were dead; the men, debilitated by long privations, left the columns in the night and hunted the Portuguese peasantry in the mountains in the search for food. The atrocities which they committed on these marauding tours surpass description, and brought about horrible retaliation on all French parties supplied by the natives. Prisoners on either side who were merely shot were thought to have got off lightly.

On hearing of Masineu's departure, Wellington started off in pursuit with five divisions, giving two others to Blenheim, with orders to march

through the Alentejo into Spanish Estremadura, and, if possible, to relieve Badajoz. Bernadotte's march, however, was made fruitless by the surrender of Badajoz two days before the army of vanguard could reach its vicinity. Masineu's retreat from Santarém to Ciudad Rodrigo occupied just a month (March 5—April 6), and was conducted with great skill. Ney, who took charge of the rear-guard, fought a long series of partial actions to detain the British van, but nearly always drew off just in time to escape serious loss. The only occasion on which the French were severely punished was at Sabugal (April 5), where the British light division surprised the Red corps in a fog, and killed or wounded more than 1800 men.

The French army had entered Portugal on September 18, 1810, with some 68,000 soldiers and bayonets, and had received some 8000 or 1000 men in reinforcements while at Santarém. When it recrossed the frontier on April 5, it numbered only 45,000 men. Masineu therefore had lost some 23,000 men during the seven months of his campaign—for more by sickness and starvation than by the sword, for he had fought only one general action, that of Bussaco, and a dozen combats, in none of which (save Sabugal) the casualty list was heavy. He had been dislodged from Portugal, not by force but by Wellington's use of the terrible weapon of hunger. The price that the Allies had paid for their success was no insignificant one: a broad strip of central Portugal had been reduced to a desert, and many thousands of its inhabitants had perished. But thereby the rest of the realm had been saved; and the end was well worth the sacrifice. For the moral effect of Masineu's defeat was enormous: the Emperor had sent forth his lieutenant, with much pomp and circumstance of war, to "drive the invaders into the sea." The whole of Europe had been summoned, as it were, to look upon the spectacle of the parliament of the English for their rash attempt to defend a section of the Continent against the invincible French arm. For many months the fall of Lisbon had been prophesied; and Masineu's checks and retreats had been usefully concealed. When the weakness of the army of Portugal fell back on Ciudad Rodrigo, the facts could no longer be kept secret. The offensive power of the French hosts in Spain was spent; and it may be said that the retreat which began at Santarém only ceased at Tróia.

During the six months which Masineu spent in Portugal, the course of the war in the other regions of the Peninsula was on the whole favourable to the French. The successful operations of Soult, described above, were carried out in spite of a strong division which the Allies conducted on the side of Cadiz. That place was full of troops, including an Anglo-Portuguese division of nearly 3000 men under General Graham. The Spanish Government was anxious to make what use it could of this accumulation of forces. Power at Cadiz was no longer in the hands of the Regency which had been appointed in

February, 1810: a Cortes, or national parliament, had been summoned to meet on September 24. It was not a very representative body, since many provinces were in the hands of the French, and the delegates who sat for these regions had not really been chosen by the people. But it was energetic and vigorous, if too much given to ill-timed discussions. The Spanish Liberals had a predominance in it; and the "aristocrats" or partisans of absolute monarchy were in a decided minority.

When the news of the departure of Sicily and the 8th corps for the siege of Badajoz became known at Cadix, the Spaniards were eager that something should be done to disturb the small army under Victor which was blockading the city. Accordingly, in February, 1811, a Spanish force of 9000 men under General La Peña, accompanied by 8000 British under Graham, was sent down the coast to Tarifa on shipboard, and put ashore with the object of attacking the French lines from the flank and rear. The expedition was not quite large enough for the end in view; for Victor had nearly 30,000 men dispersed along his front, and, without entirely evacuating his redoubts and batteries, could gather a force sufficient to turn back La Peña and Graham. The Anglo-Spanish army marched for three days along the coast, and on March 5 reached the heights of Barrosa, overlooking the southern extremity of the French lines. Here Victor, aware of their approach, had gathered all the available troops of the 1st corps. He sent one of his three incomplete divisions to demonstrate against the Spaniards, who formed the head of the Allied long column of march, and fell with the other two upon the British, who formed its rear. La Peña allowed himself to be overruled by the few thousand men on his flank, and sent no aid to Graham, who had to fight a battle of his own, with about 4500 men opposed to 7000. Nothing daunted, the British general turned about, and fell upon the advancing columns with desperate resolution, though he had to attack uphill. Once more the line proved too strong for the column; and Graham's infantry shattered and drove off the French with a loss of 8000 men, six guns, and an eagle, his own casualties amounting to 1100 killed and wounded. La Peña, in spite of his colleague's urgent entreaties, refused to send his cavalry or reinforcements, or even to take up the pursuit of the routed force. Indignant at this decision, Graham led his troops back to Cadix. La Peña followed two days later. The two generals entered on a campaign of wrangling; and the expedition, which might have wrecked half the French lines, came to an ignominious end. No more was attempted on the side of Cadix for some months.

Meanwhile, in eastern Spain, Suchet was co-operating with Masdonald, who had superseded Angereau in command of the army of Catalonia. Their main object was to capture Tortosa, and so to block the communications between Catalonia and Valencia, and cut the Spanish defence in two. In December, 1810, Masdonald, though much harassed by the indomitable Catalans, succeeded in pushing southward, and placed

himself in a position from which he could cover the siege of Tortosa, while the actual attack was confided to Suchet and the army of Aragon. The operations were conducted with Suchet's usual decision and activity: the defence was so feeble as to cause not the least suspicion of treachery; and Tortosa fell on January 4, 1813, after holding out for less than three weeks. This was a serious blow to the patriotic cause: Catalonia was henceforward isolated, and only kept in touch with the other un subdued Spanish provinces by means of the British ships ever hovering about its coast. Yet it showed no signs of weakening in its defence; indeed, the most daring exploit of the Catalans during the whole war was carried out in the spring following the fall of Tortosa.

On April 9 the bands of its northern border took by surprise the great fortress of Figueras, which commands the road lying France to Gerona and Barcelona. Maderuel had at once to depart with the larger half of his army to attempt the recovery of this important place. Meanwhile the Emperor ordered Suchet to take charge of the conquest of northern Catalonia, and assigned to him the remainder of Maderuel's troops. Thus strengthened, he was ordered to lay siege to Tarragona, the one great support of that region still in Spanish hands, and the rallying-point and arsenal of the Catalan army. Suchet, leaving Maderuel to seek for himself in front of Figueras, concentrated every man for this enterprise, and sat down before Tarragona on May 4. Contreras, the governor, made an honourable defence; but the place was stormed on June 24, and worked from cellar to garret, with much unnecessary bloodshed among the civil population. The loss to Spain was great; and the surviving Catalan divisions had to take to the hills since the last of their asperity was gone. Yet still they held out, and the province remained unsubdued.

We must now return to the operations of Masséna and Wellington. When the Prince of Essling recoiled across the Spanish frontier on April 3, the only fruits remaining to him from his nine months' campaign were the two fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. While the French army was retreating to the neighbourhood of Salamanca, Wellington laid siege to Almeida. The Marshal had to make his choice between allowing it to fall unopposed, or leading forward his exhausted army once more in the hope of raising the siege. As night have been expected from his inevitable temper, he chose the latter alternative. But, seeing that his cavalry was almost destroyed, and that he could not horse half his guns, he made a desperate appeal to his colleague Beresford, the commander of the army of the north, to aid him with all his artillery, and as many squadrons as he could concentrate. The younger marshal showed no great zeal for the enterprise, but brought 1500 horse and a single battery to Ciudad Rodrigo on May 1. With this small auxiliary force, and the whole surviving strength of the army of Portugal, some 32,000 soldiers and bayonets, Masséna marched on Almeida.

On May 5 the French Wellington's army, about 54,000 strong, scraped across his path on the heights of Fuentes d'Onoro. On the first day of battle Masséna endeavored to force back the British line by a frontal attack; he failed, and after waiting a day despatched half of his troops to turn Wellington's right flank by a *détour* to the south. On May 6 the struggle was renewed; again the assault on the British front was repelled, but the turning column forced back the extreme southern wing of the allied army, and compelled its general to throw back part of his line on to new ground. Here he stood to receive a third attack; but Masséna dared not deliver it. His ammunition had run short; his troops were exhausted; and his colleague Beresford and his corps-commander were unwilling to persevere with the attempt to relieve Almeida. He was forced to abandon the place to its own resources, and drew off on May 8. In the two fights he had lost nearly 2000 men, Wellington not more than 1800. Brenier, the commandant of Almeida, on hearing of the result of the battle, blew up the walls of his fortress and sallied out at midnight (May 11) with his garrison, to cut his way through the lines of the besiegers. His courage was rewarded by success, and he escaped with two-thirds of his force to Masséna's outposts. But Almeida, the last hold of the French in Portugal, was lost; and Masséna had fought to save the place, not the garrison.

The Marshal's career had now come to an end. Napoleon, dissatisfied with his conduct of the campaign of Portugal, observed that "Masséna had grown old," and superseded him by the young and ambitious Marmont, who had still his eyes to win as the commander of a large army. The new chief arrived at the front on May 6, and took over the charge of the army of Portugal on the 18th. His first action was to disperse his exhausted divisions into cantonments in the province of Salamanca, where they began to repair the losses they had suffered during the late campaign.

The state of the French army was not concealed from Wellington, who resolved to utilize the enemy's exhausted labors for a raid into Extremadura, and an attempt to capture Badajoz. Leaving four divisions on the Portuguese frontier opposite Marmont's army (May 16), he marched with two to join Marshal Beresford and the force which had been detached against Soult at the moment of Masséna's retreat from Santarém. But, before he could arrive, matters had come to a head in this quarter, and a battle had been fought. Beresford had marched from Lisbon into Extremadura at the end of March. His operations were dilatory; and it was not till May 3 that he succeeded in driving off the 8th corps, which Soult had left on the Guadiana, and in invading Badajoz. The remains of the Spanish army which had been crushed at the Gebora, and other troops sent from Cadix, now came to his aid, under Castaños and Blücher.

On May 19, after receiving news of the investment of Badajoz, Soult

marched from Seville with the reserves of the army of Andalusia, and on May 12 presented himself with 25,000 men in front of the position of Albuera, where the allied army stood prepared to dispute his passage. Beresford had drawn off his army from the trenches three days before, and had concentrated nearly 30,000 men; but of these less than 5000 were British. Nor was his fighting-ground well-chosen; his front was covered only by a track everywhere fordable; and dense woods on the further bank prevented him from discerning the enemy's movements.

At dawn on May 16 Scott delivered his attack against the flank and not the front of the Allies. Crossing the stream high up, under the cover of the woods, he fell unexpectedly upon Beresford's right wing, which was composed entirely of Spanish troops. While endeavoring to change their front, Blake's regiments gave way; but Beresford came up with the British 2nd division, and attacked the head of the French column. At the moment when the troops were doing a furious rain-storm swept over the hill-side; and, under cover of it, a brigade of French light cavalry charged in upon the flank and rear of the British and absolutely annihilated the three leading battalions. The surviving seven battalions of the 2nd division maintained for a long time a desperate and bloody battle with the 5th corps, in which neither side gained an inch. Scott's rear brigades were rising up, and Beresford flinched and thought of retreat; but he was persuaded by Colonel Hardinge to throw into the fight his last troops, three British and three Portuguese regiments of the 4th division. Myers' fusiliers thrust aside Scott's reserves, and falling upon the flank of the 5th corps drove it off the field. This struggle was the most bloody incident of the whole Peninsular War; on both sides the infantry had maintained the battle at close quarters, and had fallen by companies and battalions as they stood. Over 6000 French were killed or wounded; but their proportion of casualties was as nothing to that of the British, who lost 4000 men out of less than 5000 present. The Portuguese had about 400 killed and wounded, the Spaniards 1800, so that the total casualties among the Allies were not much less than those of the enemy. They had also lost a gun, five standards, and 800 prisoners. But the object of the battle had been achieved, in spite of Beresford's suicidal management: after lingering for another day in front of his adversary's position, Scott retreated towards Andalusia, leaving 1500 of his men wounded to the mercy of the Allies. The victors therefore were able to resume the siege of Badajoz on May 20.

When Wellington arrived from the north and assumed command in Extremadura, he resolved to press the siege with vigour. But his engineers were unskilled; his Portuguese battering train was both small and weak; and two assaults were beaten off with loss. On June 12 he was obliged to retire from before the well-defended fortress, for Marmont had united his whole army and marched southward to join Scott. The British



divisions left near Almeida had executed a march parallel to that of the French army of Portugal; but, even when they had been united to the force in Extremadura, Wellington had not the numbers to face the two Marshals combined in the open field. He therefore retired to the Portuguese frontier, and took up a position behind the Coja river, which he strengthened with field-works; here he waited with 60,000 men to live, inviting an attack. Soult and Marmont had brought 68,000 men to relieve Badajoz, but only by stripping Leon and Andalusia of their garrisons, and leaving their rear exposed to the incursions of the Spaniards. From June 25 till July 4 the two Marshals lay in front of the Coja, threatening an attack. These twelve days were the most critical period of the campaign, for hardly ever again were the French in a position to assail Wellington with superior numbers and force him to fight for the safety of Portugal. But they held back, and on July 4 Soult marched away to save Seville from an attack by Blake. Marmont, too weak to fight without his colleague's assistance, drew off to the valley of the Tagus, and the crisis in Extremadura came to an end.

Seeing no immediate hope of recovering the siege of Badajoz, for a moment against it would have brought back both Soult and Marmont to the Guadiana, Wellington resolved to transfer his main force back to the north, and to threaten Ciudad Rodrigo. On Aug. 1 he set out for Almeida and Sabugal with six divisions, leaving two in Extremadura. Beresford was not again trusted with the command of this independent corps; and the detachment placed to observe Soult was committed to the future to the charge of a cautious and steady general, Sir Rowland Hill. On arriving near Ciudad Rodrigo, Wellington began preparations for the siege; but the battering train, which was to come from Oporto, was still far off; and for some weeks he could do no more than blockade the fortress from a distance. This demonstration, however, was enough to call Marmont out of his entrenchments; assembling his whole army, he left the valley of the Tagus and called to his aid Donnas, who had lately succeeded Bessieres in the command of the army of the north. More zealous than his predecessor had been at the time of Fuentis d'Oñoro, Donnas came up with four strong divisions; and, when the two armies joined near Salamanca on Sept. 11, they numbered 60,000 men and bayonets. Against such a force Wellington could do nothing, as he was inferior in numbers by nearly a third. Without firing a shot, he allowed Ciudad Rodrigo to be relieved (Sept. 22), and retired into the Portuguese mountains.

The enemy followed hard upon his steps; and he was forced to give his retreat by two narrow actions, at El Bodon (Sept. 25) and Aldea de Ponte (Sept. 27). On the 28th Wellington had concentrated his army to a strong position in front of Sabugal, where the ground was so much in his favour that he dared to offer battle. Marmont and Donnas, being without the provisions and transport which would have

justified them in commencing a serious invasion of Portugal, refused to attack. They retired after retreating Ciudad Rodrigo, and dispersed their armies into winter quarters. Wellington at once came down again from the heights and renewed the blockade of the fortress. But he was not in a position to prove it closely so long as the roads and the weather were favourable to the reconcentration of the army; he lay for two months waiting the moment when a rapid march would be practicable.

Thus the main series of operations in Spain came to an end in October. The French offensive was spent; neither north nor south of the Tagus had their commanders dared to resume the invasion of Portugal, even when they had collected an imposing force and greatly outnumbered Wellington's field-army. To concentrate such masses for a serious campaign, they were forced to strip the provinces in their rear; and, when these regions were left ungarrisoned, they lapsed at once into insurrection. Such could not quit Andalusia, nor Mariscal Leon and the Tagus valley, for more than a few weeks, under pain of seeing the country behind them aflame. Enormous as was the force—over 300,000 men—which the Emperor had thrown into Spain, it was still not strong enough to hold down the conquered provinces and at the same time to attack Portugal. For this fact the Spaniards must receive due credit: it was their indomitable spirit of resistance which enabled Wellington, with his small Anglo-Portuguese army, to keep the field against such largely superior numbers. No sooner had the French concentrated, and abandoned a district, than there sprang up in it a local Junta and a ragged apology for an army. Even where the invaders lay thickest, along the route from Bayona to Madrid, guerrilla bands maintained themselves in the mountains, cut off couriers and escorts, and often isolated new French army from another for weeks at a time. The greater partisan chiefs, such as Mina in Navarre, Julien Sanchez in Leon, and Paez in the Cantabrian hills, kept whole brigades of the French in constant employment. Often beaten, they were never destroyed, and always succeeded to strike some daring blow at the point where they were least expected. Half the French army was always employed to the fruitless task of guerrilla-hunting. This was the secret which explains the fact that, with 300,000 men under arms, the invaders could never concentrate more than 70,000 to deal with Wellington.

There is little that needs description in the operations in eastern and southern Spain during the latter months of 1811. On August 8 Scott defeated an attempt of the army of Murcia to invade the Kingdom of Granada, but was unable to push his advantage, having to keep a watchful eye on Cadix and Badajoz. His only offensive movement in the winter was an attempt to take the small fortress of Tarifa, near the Straits of Gibraltar, which was handsomely repulsed by the British garrison of the place (Dec. 1811). Macdonald in Catalonia was occupied by the long siege of Figueras till September had almost arrived; and,

even when it had fallen, he accomplished little against the indomitable Bombers of the mountains.

Further south, however, matters went differently. After capturing Tortosa, Suchet had resolved to leave Catalonian affairs to his colleague MacDonald, and to strike at Valencia, the largest and wealthiest city in the whole nation which still remained in the hands of the patriots. In September he led the greater part of the army of Aragon down into the Valencian coast-land, and laid siege to the rock-fortress of Sagunto, which forms the chief bulwark of the fertile *Huerta*. It was well defended by General Anido; and, when it had beaten off two assaults, Blake came to raise the siege with the whole of the armies of Murcia and Valencia. Suchet turned to meet him, and on the plain south of Sagunto was fought (October 25) the last pitched battle of the war in which a Spanish army, unaided by British troops, attempted to face the French. Blake, though he attacked vigorously, was defeated with a loss of 5000 men. But his disaster did not end here. Sagunto surrendered next day; and Suchet then pushed on against Valencia itself. He had obtained leave from the Emperor to draw on the army of the north for reinforcements; and, when he had been joined by Balle and two divisions from Navarra, he advanced on a broad front, sweeping Blake's army before him. On December 28 he fought a long, running fight with the Spaniards, and drove two-thirds of them, with their commander-in-chief, into the city of Valencia; the remainder escaped towards Murcia. Blake had not intended to be shut up in this fashion; the place had no regular modern fortifications, nor had it been properly provisioned. He made two futile attempts to break out, and was forced on Jan. 9, 1809, to surrender at discretion. This was the last and not the least of the disasters of the Spanish armies; 14,000 men laid down their arms, and only a remnant was left in the field to maintain the struggle in Murcia. Suchet was now at the height of his fortunes: he had been made a marshal for capturing Tortosa, and was now created Duke of Albufera and given viceregal power over all eastern Spain. But the capture of Blake's force was to be the last, as well as the most striking, of his exploits.

Even before Valencia fell, the fortune of war was beginning to turn on the more important theatre of war, along the Portuguese frontier. Wellington had been watching his opportunity for a renewed attack on Ciudad Rodrigo, and found it at midwinter, when the armies of Portugal and the north were dispersed in distant cantonments. He calculated that he might count on three weeks before they could concentrate in such force as to drive him off. Hence he was forced to work in haste, under pain of seeing his scheme fail if the place had not fallen within that time. But all went well; on January 8 he invested Ciudad Rodrigo and brought up his battering train. On the 18th he had begun to breach the walls: on the 19th the 8th and light divisions

stormed the place. This was sharp work, for, by the strict rules of siegecraft, the attack should have been held back some days longer, till the fire of the defence had been subdued and the breach had been made more practicable. But speed was necessary, and Wellington's happy audacity was justified by the result. The splendour of the success was somewhat tarnished by the misconduct of the victorious troops, who sacked the town in the most senseless fashion.

Marmont had called out his army from its encampments on receiving the news that Wellington had invested Ciudad Rodrigo; but bad roads and worse weather prevented him from concentrating at Salamanca before January 25; and by that time he had received news that the place had fallen. Seeing no profit in a winter campaign, he sent back his divisions to their old quarters. Wellington, thus left undisturbed, proceeded at once to carry out the second half of his great plan. As soon as he was certain that Marmont's army had dispersed, he marched with six divisions on Estremadura, there to join the detached corps of Hill. Starting on March 4, he reached the gates of Badajoz on the 16th. The moment was even more favourable than he could have expected for a great offensive movement: Napoleon had now the Russian war looming clearly before him, and had begun, for the first time since the war began, to draw troops from Spain. In February he had recalled 15,000 men of the Imperial Guard from the army of the north, and had directed Soult and Suchet to send him their two Polish divisions; he had also ordered off some German troops; so that, as a net result, the army of Spain was 30,000 men weaker than it had been in the autumn of 1811. This disposition was most important, as it was now far more difficult for the enemy to concentrate superior numbers against the Anglo-Portuguese, either in the valley of the Guadiana or in that of the Duero.

Badajoz, like Ciudad Rodrigo, had to be besieged "against time": for it was clear that Soult and Marmont might unite to relieve it, as in June, 1811, if the siege were long protracted. Accordingly, Wellington pushed matters as fast as he could. On the immediate day after the investment had begun, he ordered the place to be stormed, though his preparations were still incomplete and the defence was still strong. Badajoz was taken, though at the cost of dreadful bloodshed: nearly 8000 men were killed or wounded, and the main assault on the bastion failed. But Picton and Leith, with the 3rd and 8th divisions, penetrated into the town by escalade; and the French were forced to surrender. Excesses far worse than those committed at Ciudad Rodrigo disgraced the storm; the troops got entirely out of hand, and fell to plunder, rape, and arson, in the most desperate fashion. It was three days before they could be restored to discipline.

Soult arrived in Estremadura with the bulk of his army a few days after Badajoz fell; he refused to fight when he heard that the place was lost, and retired to Seville. Marmont, instead of marching straight to

the Guadiana, had taken the unwise step of trying to dash off Wellington by a feint into central Portugal. But the British general disregarded this diversion, believing himself quite capable of dealing with the Marshal when Badajoz should have fallen. He was justified in his belief: for, on hearing of the disaster, Marmont hastily withdrew from Portugal and fell back to the middle Duero.

On learning that Marmont had retreated, the British general determined to pursue him, and to push matters to a decisive issue in Leon. But, before marching on Salamanca, he resolved to strike a blow which should make the united action of the armies of Portugal and Andalusia even more difficult than it had recently been. Their sole line of communication was by the best bridge of Almaraz on the central Tago: if this was destroyed, they had no way of keeping touch with each other save the circuitous route through Madrid. Accordingly Hill was directed to send a lightly-equipped expedition through the mountains and to break the bridge. This feat he accomplished on May 18, surprising and storming the two forts which guarded the structure, and burning its piers. Having thus secured himself from the danger that Bonaparte might come up in time to intercept the army of Portugal, Wellington challenged Marmont to battle by marching straight on his head-quarters at Salamanca, and laying siege to the forts which dominated the town (June 17). The Marshal, having concentrated the greater part of his divisions, appeared three days later in front of the British army: but he found that he was somewhat outnumbered by the allied forces, and instead of attacking, retired behind the Duero (July 2). The Salamanca forts fell ere he had completed his retreat.

The campaign then stood still for a fortnight, while Marmont was waiting for reinforcements. He called in the French garrisons of the Asturias, and brought aid from the army of the north, in command of which Caffarelli had now superseded Dorsenne, and from King Joseph at Madrid. Both promised him help, but both were tardy in carrying out their promise; and Marmont was impatient. When he had been joined by the Asturian division alone, he crossed the Duero and resumed the offensive. Wellington fell back before him, till he had reached the immediate vicinity of Salamanca, and then drew up his army on the heights to the south of the town (July 28). The contending forces were very nearly equal in numbers, each having about 42,000 men in line; but Wellington was handicapped by the fact that more than a third of his army was composed of Spanish and Portuguese troops. Over-eager to press his adversary, and to cut him off from the direct road to Portugal, Marmont took the dangerous step of pushing his left wing forward to turn Wellington's right, and extended his lines on a much longer front than was safe. While he was executing his flank-march across the front of the British position, Wellington came down upon him with the speed and fury of a thunderbolt. The isolated

French left wing was suddenly assailed in front by Wellington's right, which descended from the heights, while the 3rd division under Pakenham, which had been concealed in woods and had escaped Marmont's notice, fell upon its flank and rear. Three French divisions were routed and dispersed in half-an-hour, and Marmont himself was grievously wounded by a round-shot as he was hastening to repair his flank. The remainder of the army of Portugal, the centre and right of its line, moved themselves in a defensive position, and fought hard to save the day; but they were gradually pushed off the field by a concerted attack from front and flank. They lost 8000 killed and wounded, 7000 prisoners, two eagles and 12 guns; and Clusel, who had succeeded to the command, was unable to rally the wrecks of the army for many days. The disaster would have been still greater, if a Spanish force which Wellington had placed to block the ford of Alba de Tormes, over which the routed host retreated, had not left its post without orders before the battle.

The victory of Salamanca shook the French dominions in Spain to its very foundations; and its results were felt to the remotest corners of the Peninsula. King Joseph and his army of the centre had started from Madrid on the day before the battle, and would have joined Marmont, had he only waited three more days before fighting. As it was, the King and his 15,000 men had to retreat in haste, as soon as it was known that Wellington was moving on Madrid. The latter had sent one division and his Spanish auxiliaries to pursue Clusel, while with the rest he marched upon the capital. Joseph was forced to fly, with his Court, his officials, and the Spaniards who had sold themselves to his cause, a mixed multitude of 10,000 souls. Fearing that, if he retired towards France, he would be taken in flank by the British, the King ordered a retreat on Valencia, where he could take refuge with the victorious army of Suchet. On August 12 Wellington entered Madrid in triumph, and next day compelled a garrison of 1500 men, which Joseph had left in the *Real Sitios* forts above the city, to lay down their arms. Leon and both the Castiles were thus delivered from the power of the enemy. Nor was this all; Suchet to Arichaba now found himself cut off from all the other French armies, and saw that he could no longer maintain his position in the far south. Everlasting with bitter regret the splendid provinces where he had reigned as Viceroy for three years, he concentrated his whole army, some 60,000 men and bayonets, and marched to join Suchet at Valencia. The Spanish troops thereupon emerged from the long-blockaded Cebré and reconquered Arichaba: while Hill, left with no enemy before him in Extremadura, moved up the Tago to Madrid.

The very completeness of Wellington's success had led to a dangerous concentration of the French armies, which, giving up the attempt to hold down the provinces of the south and centre, had gathered in two

threatening masses. Soult, Suchet, and the King had nearly 60,000 men at Valencia; the army of Portugal had fallen back to join the army of the north; and 40,000 men were assembled about Burgos and on the upper Ebro. It was clear that Wellington, with some 60,000 men concentrated at Madrid, could not face these overwhelming numbers if they acted in union. But he hoped to keep them apart, and he had just received from the Cortes the chief command of all the native forces of Spain, which gave him the power of ordering divisions from many quarters against the enemy. Unfortunately, the Spanish generals were distrustful and even disaffected; and comparatively little profit accrued to Wellington during the autumn of 1812 from this quarter. Only the Galician army, some 11,000 men, was at this moment actively engaged in his support. The forces which had come out of Cadix made little attempt to distract Soult; and the Murcians and Valencians were completely covered by Suchet. A British force of 6000 men from Sicily landed at Alicante on August 7, but was far too weak to have any effect on the general course of operations on the eastern coast.

Trusting, however, that the great accumulation of French troops at Valencia might not be immediately dangerous, Wellington left Madrid on September 1 with four divisions, and joined the troops whom he had left in the Duero valley, with the intention of pushing back the French force in the north. Hill, with three divisions, remained at Madrid to guard against any movement on the part of Soult and the King. On September 19 the British main army appeared in front of Burgos; and Clausen retired before it to the Ebro, after having thrown a garrison into the forts above the city. Wellington was of opinion that Burgos must be reduced before he could venture to pursue the French into Alava or Navarre; he therefore invested its citadel. The siege lasted just a month (September 19—October 19). It was the most unfortunate operation which he ever conducted. The place, though small, was strong; and the material provided for the attack was lamentably insufficient, only eight heavy guns being available. For want of transport, a sufficient train was never brought to the front; and Wellington was killed. Though the outer works were captured, four successive attempts to storm the citadel failed; and a whole month was wasted.

This repulse enabled the French to combine and arrange for a general forward movement against the allied armies. Suchet, who had succeeded Clausen in command, led the armies of Portugal and the north to relieve Burgos; while Soult and the King, leaving Suchet to hold down Valencia, marched upon Madrid with 60,000 men. Wellington would probably have fought Suchet if he had not been aware that even a victory in this part of the field could not save Hill from being crushed by the superior numbers that were moving up against Madrid. He was compelled to fall back in order to unite the two halves of his army, and, while retiring slowly from Burgos along the valley of the Duero, sent

Hill orders to abandon New Castle and join him at Salamanca. The two retreats were carried out with complete success, and the whole allied army was concentrated on the Tormes by November 3. But the two armies of Soult and Beresford had also combined; and nearly 100,000 men were facing Wellington on his old battlefield south of Salamanca: during the whole war the French had never before gathered so large a force upon a single line. The British general had hoped that the dearth of provisions and the miserable autumn weather would arrest the further progress of the enemy. But Soult pressed on, always turning the right of the allied army; and Wellington was forced to fall back for three marches more till he had reached Ciudad Rodrigo (November 18). This last stage of the retreat was made in dreadful rain over roads that had become almost impassable, and cost the retreating host several thousand men in sick and stragglers, who were left behind to perish or fall into the hands of the enemy. But the French also were in a desperate state of exhaustion, and at last desisted from the pursuit.

In spite of the failure at Burgos and the losses in the subsequent retreat, the net results of the campaign of 1812 had been most satisfactory. Though the French had reconquered Madrid and Toledo, they had been compelled to evacuate all northern Spain. Extremadura, Andalusia, and La Mancha had been completely freed from the invaders; and the casualties of the Imperial armies had exceeded 40,000 men. They were now thrown upon the defensive, and had lost confidence in their ultimate success. But this was not the worst of their misfortunes. At midwinter arrived the news of the Emperor's sudden departure in the retreat from Moscow; and shortly afterwards he began to requisition troops from Spain to reconstitute the Grand Army. Soult was summoned off to Germany, and with him many other generals, a number of complete regiments, and a still greater proportion of cadres composed of picked officers and non-commissioned officers, who were to train the mass of conscripts which was being levied for the next campaign. Yet so numerous were Napoleon's resources that, after deducting men in hospital or detached, there were still nearly 200,000 French troops left in the Peninsula in the spring of 1813.

Of these, 60,000 men were under Suchet in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia; the remainder—the armies of Portugal, the south, the centre, and the north—were still facing Wellington. Yet the British general was able to commence the operations of the new year with a greater prospect of success than he had ever before enjoyed. He had about 70,000 fighting men of the best sort in his own Anglo-Portuguese army; and with these the main blow would have to be delivered. But he was also in a position to utilize all the scattered Spanish forces as he had never done before. Bellerophon and some other generals who had disobeyed orders in 1812 had been removed in disgrace; and in 1813 Wellington could rely upon obedience. There were about 60,000 Spanish regular



troops available in Galicia, Estremadura, and La Mancha; but quite as important were the *guerrilleros* who had been stimulated to redoubled activity by the successes of the previous year. Indeed, it may be said that these bands were of greater profit to the cause of Spain in 1808 than were her armies; for their daring and constant raids during the spring diverted the attention of the French from the early operations of Wellington, and caused them to spread their divisions far and wide in regions remote from the real point of danger. So harassed were the French that Marshal Jourdan, who directed King Joseph's armies since the departure of Soult, determined to make a desperate attempt to lead down the main bands before concentrating in face of Wellington. This fatal error was committed in March, when the whole army of the north and four divisions of the army of Portugal were drawn up into the northern mountains, and devoted to the sole task of exterminating the *guerrilleros*. Dispersed in numerous columns, and cut off from each other by the active insurgents, these 40,000 men were no longer available for the main operations upon the Douro.

While Chamel and Foy were hunting Mina and his companions to little effect, the line of battle from Salamanca to Toledo was too thin for safety. The French armies were dispersed over an immense front; and, to draw together in any strength, they would be forced to fall back far to the rear and to abandon vast tracts of territory. Meanwhile the campaigning season had arrived; and Wellington saw his advantage. It was clear that the French would expect his main attack to be delivered from the direction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, as in previous years. Their defensive position had been taken up to guard against this eventuality. But, instead of repeating his old move, Wellington secretly passed up five British divisions to the north of the Douro into the Portuguese province of the Trás-os-Montes. Bussacos, not Ciudad Rodrigo, was to be his real base; and the larger half of his forces was thus placed in a position from which it overlapped the extreme French right wing, and could turn its flank whenever it attempted to make a stand. Jourdan had forgotten to guard against this possibility, since this north-eastern extremity of Portugal was so rugged and so badly furnished with roads that it had never before been used as the starting-point of a large army. Graham, the victor of Barrosa, was placed in command of this corps; while Wellington remained in person at Ciudad Rodrigo, with three divisions, lest the news that he had gone northward should arouse the suspicions of the enemy.

It was not till May 15 that Graham had struggled through the defiles of the Trás-os-Montes, and commenced his descent into the plains of Leon behind the French flank. Wellington himself therefore only set out on the 23rd; but, when once the advance was begun, the results were startling. The enemy's van-guard retired from Salamanca without

Old Castile. But, every time that he thought that he might stand to resist Wellington, he discovered that Graham had marched around and was behind his right wing. The British attack had been directed so far to the north that the French could not concentrate within any reasonable space of time. Orders had to be sent to evacuate Madrid and Toledo in hot haste, and to direct every available man on Burgos. The isolated divisions engaged in guerrilla-baiting in Navarre and Biscay were also called in to join the main army. But Wellington gave the retreating army no leisure; still, when he had reached the ground in front of Burgos, the enemy had only 55,000 men collected. Joseph and Jourdan saw that to offer battle with such inferior numbers would be ruinous, and reluctantly fell back beyond the Ebro, after blowing up the citadel of Burgos (June 12-13). The King had vainly hoped to defend the line of the Ebro; but, instead of attacking this in front, Wellington once again pushed forward Graham and his left wing, which crossed the river far to the west of the French head-quarters. Once more Joseph had to draw back, till he reached a strong position in front of Vittoria, where he was covered both in front and in flank by the streams of the Zadorra. Here at last he stood to fight, having collected some 65,000 men. But Wellington had nearly 80,000 men in line; with such a numerical superiority, he naturally attacked at once.

The essential part of Wellington's tactics in the battle of June 21 was to push forward, once more, his left wing under Graham, so as to turn the French right, and cut them off from their line of retreat, the great high road to San Sebastian and Bayonne. This was accomplished early in the day; but the enemy, drawing back his exposed wing behind the Zadorra, kept Graham for many hours from advancing further. Yet the loss of the power to retreat on Bayonne was fatal. For Wellington, attacking vigorously with his centre and right, crossed the lower course of the Zadorra at several points, and drove in the main body of the French towards the town of Vittoria. If the road behind them had been open, Joseph and Jourdan might have retired without any ruinous losses. But Graham was blocking the way; and the debilitated host had to retreat by the only route left to them, a rough mountain track to Salvatierra and Pampeluna, crowded for the passage of an army encumbered with heavy impediments. The King had with him not only a vast train of artillery, but a great survey of Spanish religion—his partisans from Madrid—and countless marriages and vagrant ladies with treasure, pictures, state archives, and valuable property of all sorts, the accumulated spoil of six years of conquest. The whole of this heterogeneous mass of rubbish was thrown upon the narrow Pampeluna road, and hopelessly jammed within a few miles of its starting-point. The debilitated army abandoned everything, and fled over the hill-sides. In actual casualties it had not lost heavily—some 6000 killed and wounded, and 1000 prisoners; while the Allies had 2000 men *hors de*

combat. But the French had saved nothing but their persons; the whole equipment of the army of Spain was captured by the victors, 148 guns, 566 caissons, nearly 471,000,000 sterling in the military chest, besides several thousand carriages laden with valuables. Seldom has an army shared such plunder as fell to the Allies that night.

The vanquished host reached Pamplona in complete disorder, and Jourdan, after strengthening the garrison of that place, ordered the retreat to be continued beyond the Pyrenees. On June 26 the whole force re-entered France, and only halted at Bayonne, where desperate measures were taken to rally the remnants, and to reft the army with artillery drawn from the arsenal of that fortress and from the depôts at Toulouse and Bordeaux. The pursuit had not been vigorous, for Wellington had turned aside the greater part of his army to hunt the columns of Foy and Clavel, which had not succeeded in joining Joseph in time for the battle. Both were hard pressed, but ultimately escaped to France by devious roads. When he found that they had eluded him, the British general told off his Spanish auxiliaries to hunt Pamplona, and two of his own divisions to besiege San Sebastian. With the rest of his army he advanced to the frontier, but refused to cross the Bidasoa till the two great fortresses had fallen. Their sieges began simultaneously on July 1, 1813. Thus ended this brilliant and skillful campaign, which had lasted only forty days (May 22—July 1), and had closed all northern Spain of the enemy. If the four French armies of Portugal, the center, the south, and the north, could have been concentrated on a single position, they would have outnumbered the allied forces. But Wellington never allowed them to gather, hurried matters to a crisis with unswerving determination, and finally drove the enemy over the Pyrenees, at a cost to himself of not more than 6000 men in the whole series of operations.

The campaign of Vittoria is separated by a gap of some three weeks from the second campaign of 1813, that of the Pyrenees. During this space, Napoleon had time to send Soult from Dresden, to reorganize the army of Spain. Joseph and Jourdan were recalled to the interior of France in disgrace; and the Emperor expressed his opinion that, with a change in leadership, his hosts would be able to reverse the offensive and deliver Pamplona and San Sebastian. Though four divisions of cavalry left for Germany, the French still counted more than 160,000 men. Some 8000 were in Pamplona, about the same number in San Sebastian, 1800 in Bastida. After deducting a garrison for Bayonne, Soult had some 85,000 with which to take the field.

Before proceeding to relate the campaign of the Pyrenees, it is necessary to cast a glance at eastern Spain. So long as King Joseph held Madrid and Toledo, Berchet had been able to retain Valencia. He even assumed the offensive, and on April 11 beat Elio's Spaniards at Tudela and Villena. Two days later he attacked the Anglo-Sicilians on

the heights of Castellá, and was beaten off with loss. But Sir John Murray, the officer who commanded this force, made no attempt to profit by his victory, and remained passive throughout May. On the last day of that month, acting under orders from Wellington, Murray put his troops and a Spanish division on board ship at Alcoriz, and sailed for Catalonia. He was directed to join the Spanish army in that province and to lay siege to Tarragona. The purpose of this move was to give Suchet full occupation during the campaign in Old Castile. When the news of the landing arrived, the Marshal hurried north with part of his troops, and, joining Dumas, the officer left in command at Barcelona, marched against Murray. That general fled with unbecomely haste on hearing of the approach of the French, abandoning his siege artillery while he hurriedly embarked his troops (June 12). He was superseded five days later by Lord William Bentinck, and afterwards tried for cowardice and disobedience to instructions. The court-martial ruled in an acquittal, though he was censured for gross errors of judgment.

On July 2 Suchet received the news of Vittoria, which compelled him to evacuate Valencia, since the garrisons of that province would have been in a perilous position when New Castile and Aragon had fallen into the hands of Wellington. He retired beyond the Ebro, and a little later abandoned Tarragona, after blowing up its fortifications (August 17). The Anglo-Sicilian army, with the Spaniards of the Marquis force, advanced along the coast and took up positions whence they could observe Barcelona from a distance. On September 19, Suchet, thinking that they were passing him too close, advanced against them, and routed Bentinck's van-guard at the mouth of Ordel. But, as he did not use his advantage, the Allies continued to hold Tarragona, and to push the siege of the garrisons which Suchet had left behind him at Tortosa, Lerida, Monzon, and other places. The Marshal would have done far better to have evacuated there; for he lost the services of 18,000 good troops, when he was never in a position to recover. The Emperor began to withdraw troops from his army for use in Germany during the autumn; and, as Suchet's own body grew feebler, it became increasingly clear that he would never be able to relieve his retreating garrisons. In the winter of 1813-4, the struggle in Catalonia devolved down into a mere war of demonstrations and skirmishes of outposts.

Far otherwise had matters gone on the shores of the Bay of Biscay. On July 21, Soult, in accordance with his master's orders, resumed the offensive. The allied army was now ranged on a long line upon the Franco-Spanish frontier, so as to cover the sieges of San Sebastian and Pampeluna. Soult's opportunity lay in the fact that the hills impeded the lateral communications between the British divisions. He secretly moved 60,000 men far inland to his extreme left, and fell upon the troops under Picton and Hill who were guarding the passes of Roncesvalles and Aizoa. He hoped to overwhelm them, by a twofold

superiority of numbers, before Wellington could bring to their aid the corps stationed nearer to the sea. He would then push on, relieve Pamplona, and force the allied army to quit the frontier by a general attack on their flank and rear. This ingenious plan miscarried, partly owing to fog and rain, which delayed the French advance, but more because of the long and vigorous resistance of the British outlying brigades. Maia and Bazamoulin were both forced in the end (July 30-31); but their defence gave Wellington time to concentrate in front of Pampelona a force which, though much smaller than that of Soult, was yet strong enough to hold him at bay. At the battle of Bazamoulin (July 27-28) the Marshal strove in vain to storm the heights held by the allied troops. Reinforcements were hurrying up from the west to join Wellington; and the Marshal had no alternative save to fall back on France. This series of fights, generally called the battles of the Pyrenees, had cost him 10,000 men.

Wellington now pressed the siege of San Sebastian and Pampelona, hoping to secure both places in time to allow him to advance into France before the winter came. But his efforts were not at first successful. British siege-craft was seldom efficient in those years; and San Sebastian lost off two assaults. The town was finally stormed on August 31, and the castle surrendered nine days later: but the success cost 6200 men. Soult, on the very day of the storm, made a last attempt to raise the siege, but was heavily repulsed at the combat of San Marcial by the covering force, consisting mainly of Picquet's and Leach's Spaniards. Pampelona fell on October 31, by starvation, not by assault. Thus Wellington's entry into France was delayed for four months.

But, on October 7, the British general had already begun his preparations for advance by forcing the lines of the Bidassoa, which Soult had strengthened by a long chain of redoubts. Finding the broad river at low tide, the British divisions swept all before them and captured all the enemy's works. The French then fell back on a second and stronger line behind the river Nivelle. This series of positions was carried on November 10, after a series of desperate assaults on almost impassable peaks and cliffs, where the storming columns had to crawl and climb up the cliffs of the Rhone and other lofty mountains. A third line of positions now faced the British, formed by the river Nive and the fortress of Bayonne behind it. A month of heavy rain and cold delayed the attack on this new line of defence; but, with the return of fine weather, Wellington forced the passage of the Nive (December 9) and advanced close to the suburbs of Bayonne. His army was now divided into two halves by the Nive, a fact of which the indomitable Soult tried to take advantage. He first massed his whole field-force against Wellington's left, and strove to crush it before it could be repaired by his right, which had to cross the river by a single distant bridge. After severe fighting, this attack failed (December 10), whereupon the

Marshal shifted his main army to the east bank of the Nive, and repeated his experiment against the British right. At the battle of Saint-Pierre (December 13), the entire French army was repulsed by one British and one Portuguese division under Sir Rowland Hill; and Soult was already failed, when the appearance of the reserves from beyond the river forced him to head a precipitate retreat. The battles of the Nive had cost the Marshal some 2000 or 7000 men, and would have sufficed by themselves to discourage him from making any farther attempts to assume the offensive. But his position was rendered utterly hopeless when, shortly after, he received orders from the Emperor directing him to send two divisions (14,000 men) to aid in the defence of the eastern frontier. His army was now reduced to less than 50,000 men, little more than half the strength which Wellington could put into the field. If he lingered much longer at Bayonne, he ran a chance of being shut up.

When, therefore, Wellington manifested an intention of surrounding Bayonne, by casting a great bridge of boats across the Adour below the city, and transporting several divisions to its northern bank, Soult was driven to retire into the interior and to leave the stronghold in its fate (Feb. 26, 1814). He retreated, not directly northward along the road to Bordeaux, as might perhaps have been expected, but eastward in the direction of Toulouse, so as to place himself upon the flank of the allied army. This move made matters more difficult for Wellington, who could not push forward and have Soult in his rear, but was constrained to turn aside and pursue him along the roots of the Pyrenees, moving every day farther from the sea, from which alone he could receive supplies and reinforcements. He was forced also to leave 30,000 men to besiege Bayonne.

The first stage of Soult's retreat was marked by the battle of Orthez (February 27). Knowing that the British army had been defeated by the large force left before Bayonne, the Marshal offered a defensive battle on the heights above the town, but was driven out of his position after a hard day's fighting, and forced to resume his retrograde movement to the east. After the battle, Wellington detached two divisions under Beresford to march on Bordeaux, where the partisans of the Bourbons had promised to hoist the white flag as soon as British aid came in sight. Beresford's detachment reached Bordeaux on March 12; and the republicans were as good as their word, opening the gates to him and proclaiming the Duc d'Angoulême, who had come out in the wake of the British army, as Prince Regent. This movement was not without its consequences, for, if the allied sovereigns had made peace at Châtillon, as was quite possible, the Bourbons would have been left exposed to terrible punishment at the hands of the Emperor. Wellington had given them this warning of this, but they nevertheless carried out their agreement. All the neighbouring departments were practically on the same side; and the invading army was readily supplied with information and provisions

by the peasantry. Soult's attempts to raise a partisan warfare in the rear of the Allies met with no success. Still less fruitful was Napoleon's last desperate dash. On March 18 he released Ferdinand VII from Valencia, having made him sign a treaty of peace, which the Spanish Cortes very properly ignored.

Soult's retreat did not end till he had fallen back under the walls of Toulouse (March 31), where he once more stood at bay in line which he had caused to be thrown up outside the city. He had some 32,000 men left. Wellington, owing to the detachments at Bayonne and Bordeaux, was not greatly superior in force, having only six Anglo-Portuguese divisions and a Spanish corps, less than 30,000 soldiers and bayonets. In spite of the strength of Soult's entrenchments, he resolved to attack (April 10). The business turned out more formidable than had been expected. The assault of Foy's Spaniards upon the French centre failed; and it was only after desperate efforts that the 4th and 5th divisions succeeded in stamping the lines upon Soult's left, and driving the enemy back into the town, which was surrounded by the captured heights. The victors lost 4800 men, far more than the vanquished, who, protected by their entrenchments, suffered only 2000 casualties. But the result of the battle was sufficiently clear, when Soult on April 12 evacuated the town, and retired still farther east, to join Suchet, who was coming up to his aid with the small remnant of the army of Catalonia. Toulouse, if the combatants had but known it, was an unnecessary battle; for Paris had capitulated to the Allies on March 30, and Napoleon had abdicated on April 6. Unnecessary also was the bloodshed before Bayonne on April 18, when the French garrison made a sortie, which cost each side 600 casualties.

So ended the great struggle which sapped Napoleon's strength, though it was not the direct cause of his fall. He called it himself "the running sore"; and such indeed it was, considered from his point of view. For it was the constant drain of men and money to the Peninsula which rendered him too weak to fight the Powers of central Europe. What might not have happened in Saxony in 1813, if the Emperor had been able to dispose of the 300,000 veterans locked up behind the Pyrenees? If, with the new army that he actually commanded, he almost achieved success, the experienced troops of Soult and Suchet must certainly have turned the balance in his favour, and have enabled him to impose on the Allies a peace that would have left his Empire intact, even if his prestige had lost some of its ancient splendour. His paid in 1823 the price for his inopportune doings at Bayonne in 1808. The never-failing, if often ill-directed, patriotism of the Spaniards, and the skill and resources of the overhauling Wellington, had detained for six years in the Peninsula the army with which he might have dictated peace to Europe.

## CHAPTER XVI.

## RUSSIA AND THE INVASION OF 1812.

THE circumstances in which Alexander I, at the age of twenty-three, succeeded to the throne of Russia, have already been described. His tutor, the Swiss La Harpe, had infused him with the idealistic spirit of the humanitarian philosophy of the eighteenth century; and this tendency endured throughout his life. On the other hand, in his father's circle at Gatchina, Alexander had acquired a leaning towards a pretensions-militarism, and established friendly relations with Alexei Arakcheieff, the chief representative of this new military school. Base and vulgar in spirit, infinitely hard and cruel, devoid of courage, but an absolutely trustworthy servant, Arakcheieff was destined to be the scourge of Alexander's reign.

The reforms which the new monarch introduced affected only the organization of the central government, and left the fundamental evils of the Empire untouched. The arbitrary power of a corrupt administration, under an absolute ruler, and the servile condition of the peasants, remained as before. Alexander's first counsellors were the friends of his youth, Count Kuchel, Count Strogonoff, Prince Chaptovskii, and Novossiltzoff, who, like him, lived in a world of ideas, the political ideas of western Europe. The last three were called the *Triumvirate*. La Harpe's restraining influence must also be taken into account. Alexander's discussions with his friends, in what was called "a non-official committee," influenced the entire policy of the Empire, and showed traces of English and Polish influences. This committee formed a plan for presenting Russia, on the coronation day, with a Bill of Rights based on the English Habeas Corpus Act; but this scheme was never carried out. The only change made was in 1808, when the Government Boards were replaced by eight Ministries. The Emperor's theoretical Idealism was accompanied by a deep-rooted and obstinate adherence to autocracy. The powerful bureaucracy of St. Petersburg soon recognized that the new Tsar was by no means inclined to allow it more than a superficial share in his unlimited power. Those who understood his character regarded without alarm the plans which Alexander was then



wondering for the liberation of the serfs. The Emperor loved the form of freedom as people love a play. He was pleased that his government should wear the appearance of liberty; but more than the appearance he would not allow.

In June, 1805, began the period of Napoleon's influence, which was extremely unpopular in Russia. The Russian nobility, for all its French culture, was generally disaffected towards Napoleon. Alexander, however, admired in him not only the commander of genius but also the great organizer. He at once perceived the immense advantage which the modern French absolutism had over the old traditional absolutism of Russia; it was the advantage of system over caprice, of organization over anarchy. The Tsar determined to concentrate power in his own person, but at the same time to transform the obsolete autocracy into a modern monarchy, by combining with it some sort of popular representation. In January, 1808, he appointed Arakcheieff Minister of War, that he might have at his side an ever-inspiring figure of enormous energy, who would take off his shoulders the detestable responsibility of despotism. On the other hand, towards the end of the same year, he gave the chief of his state secretaries, Michael Speranski, supreme authority in initiating legislation. The son of a poor country parson, but a man of great talents, Speranski rose from the position of pupil to that of teacher in the educational seminary of St. Petersburg. By his capacity for work and his extensive knowledge, he had already proved of great assistance to many courtiers, high officials, and ministers, men like Kozlov, Tsvetkovskii, and Katchalov. In Speranski the Emperor found a keen and logical intellect, fertile in political ideas, a man who knew Russia, and was familiar with modern French statecraft.

During the years 1809-12, Speranski, collaborating as Secretary of State with the Karpovs, came to occupy a unique position in Russia, one in fact superior to that of the ministers themselves. Yet he never abused this enormous influence by turning it to his personal advantage. The model for Speranski's project of a Constitution (1809) was the French Constitution of the year VIII (1799). He strove to accommodate its principles to Russian conditions, so as to form, out of the free system of land and houses, a system of local self-government and a central representation of the people—the so-called *Gosudarstvennaia Duma* or Supreme Diet. The initiative in legislation was to come from the Emperor; but no law was to take effect until it had been drafted and sanctioned by the Diet and subsequently approved by the Council of State and the Karpovs. Laws and institutions were of more importance than personalities in the eyes of the reformer. Of all Speranski's attempts, however, the only one that was carried into effect was the organization of the bureaucratic Council of State (Jan. 1810). To the end of his life, Alexander nourished these plans of reform; for his inability to carry them out he blamed the unfavourable conditions of

the day and the immortality of the nation. But, when the first excitement of his reform projects had passed off, his real interest and ambition were directed to foreign politics.

It was Alexander's favourite, Prince Cauterwit, who first gave utterance to the Pan-Slavic idea in regard to the East. He made the federation of all the Slavonic nations his final aim, hoping thereby to ensure the redemption of Poland. At this the deliverance of the Turkish provinces in Europe from the Sultan's yoke had been regarded as an eventual object of policy. In the following years the annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia, and even the partition of the Ottoman Empire, were the main subjects of discussion between France and Russia. Early in 1808 Cauterwit was commissioned to meet with the Emperor Alexander and Count Romanzoff at St. Petersburg concerning an expedition to India, to be preceded by a partition of Turkey. Russia was simultaneously invited to occupy Stockholm. Romanzoff brought forward Russia's claim to Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles. For this, even Egypt and Syria seemed to France an insufficient equivalent. Cauterwit demanded at least the Dardanelles or the Asiatic side of that strait, suggesting, as an alternative, the conversion of Constantinople into an independent State under a French prince. Amid such disagreements, no agreement was possible. The scheme of partition was wrecked on Napoleon's jealousy of the aggrandizement which the possession of Constantinople would confer on Russia. Thus the first rift was made in the Russo-French alliance.

Meanwhile Alexander had been carrying on, since 1806, a war with Turkey, which at the outset had been promoted by the intrigues of French diplomacy. Finally the Turc resisted, in case of victory, to annex Moldavia and Wallachia. At first, the Russian commanders, Mikhelson and Protorevski, had but little success; it was only under Prince Bagration in 1806, and the young Count Nikolai Kamenski in 1810, that the Russians captured the fortress of Ismail, Silistria, and Batakai, and gained two important victories. When, in 1811, the veteran general Kutaisoff took over the command, the war was quickly brought to an end. The new commander-in-chief allowed the Turkish ruler to cross over to the northern bank of the Danube, surrounded him in his camp at Silhodula, and compelled the Turkish army to surrender. The Peace of Bucharest (May 18, 1812), was the result. Under pressure of the impending war with Napoleon, Russia had to content herself with the acquisition of Bessarabia, by which the river Pruth and the Kilia mouth of the Danube became the frontier.

At Tilsit, where the foundation of the Russo-French alliance was laid, the Polish question had also been taken up. Since the latter part of the eighteenth century, Polish patriots, in the hope of restoring their political existence, had looked to France and Russia. After Tilsit, however, they made an effort to conceal their expectation of obtaining

from Napoleon what Russia could not grant without reservations. For Napoleon, Poland was only one more piece on the politico-military chess-board. Alexander, unwilling to enrich himself at the expense of Prussia, conceived the idea of creating a grand-duchy of Warsaw; and Napoleon adopted this suggestion. The result of this agreement have already been described. What the Russian Emperor feared was that, in the event of a re-establishment of the Polish kingdom, he would be forced to cede to it the provinces which had once formed part of Poland. He therefore regarded with a jealous eye Napoleon's friendly attitude towards the grand-duchy of Warsaw. The Peace of Tilsit (1807) added to the grand-duchy 1,500,000 inhabitants in eastern Galicia; while Russia gained, as compensation, only about 500,000 in the district of Tanenopol. The Tsar's anxiety led to the drafting, in January, 1810, of a convention with France, directed against the aspirations of Poland. The kingdom of Poland was never to be re-established; even the names "Poland" and "Pole" were never to be applied to the former divisions and inhabitants of that kingdom.

Though this convention was not yet ratified, the friendship between Napoleon and Alexander appeared for a time to have taken a new lease of life. The French monarch even became a sister for the hand of the Grand Duchess Anna, sister of the Tsar. The wedding was, however, avoided by the hatred which the Empress Dowager, Maria Feodorovna, cherished for the Corsican usurper. At the first sign of legislation on the Russian side, Napoleon resolved to anticipate a refusal by betrothing himself to a Habsburg princess. This union was the signal for a radical change in his foreign relations. He refused now to ratify the convention about Poland; and the Russo-French alliance rapidly cooled. In order to win the Poles to his side, Alexander, at the beginning of 1811, offered through Czartoryski to revive the kingdom of Poland, on the understanding that the Tsar should bear the title of Polish King; the rivers Dniester, Dnieper, and Dniipr were to be the boundaries between the two States. At the same time he discussed with Ogiński a plan for constituting a grand-duchy of Lithuania out of the eight governments of western Russia, in order to pave the way for a revival of the Polish kingdom, which was to be linked to Russia by a personal union. In this context for the favour of Poland, Russia was once more wooed. Alexander's designs upon the grand-duchy of Warsaw were no secret for his adversary, who began, early in 1811, to prepare for war.

Napoleon conceived that a war with Alexander, like his former friendship, would enable him to give the coup de grâce to British trade and influence. In order to bring his war with England to a speedy and glorious end, Napoleon strove to increase the rigour of the Continental Blockade, especially in the Baltic ports. In pursuance of this policy, the duchy of Oldenburg was incorporated with France in January, 1811; and an uncle of the Tsar was thus dethroned. The Continental Blockade had

already been very detrimental to Russian trade with England. The exports of raw material fell off; the balance of trade turned against Russia; the value of her paper currency was greatly diminished. To counteract these misfortunes, neutral ships were allowed to participate in Russian colonial trade; and an attempt was made, in the tariff of December 24, 1812, to check the import of French luxuries.

Mutual recriminations took place, each sovereign representing the other with preparing for war. In his negotiations with Tchernitsheff, early in 1813, Napoleon insisted that Russia should continue with France in severe repressive measures against British and American trade. Alexander replied by demanding that the French should evacuate Prussia and withdraw beyond the Oder. Napoleon now regarded war as inevitable. On May 3 he left Paris and went to Dresden, where many German Princes, headed by the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, paid court to him. He had counted on a simultaneous attack on Russia by Sweden and Turkey, but was disappointed by Sweden's rapprochement to Russia, and still more by the Peace of Bucharest. War with Sweden had lasted for a year and a half; but the Peace of Frederiksborg (1809), which ceded Finland to Russia, had left no lasting scar on relations between the two Powers. By his occupation of Swedish Pomerania in January, 1813, Napoleon drove the Swedes into the arms of the Tsar. The result was a rapprochement between the Crown Prince, formerly Marshal Bernadotte, now Regent in Sweden, and Alexander I. Early in April they concluded a treaty, under which Sweden was to be compensated for the loss of Finland by the prospect of obtaining Norway. In July Russia also concluded an agreement with England and Spain. Her whole strength thus became available for the decisive struggle.

If Alexander was to undertake a war against Napoleon, he required a victim on whom to shift the responsibility for the French alliance, in order to win back to his side the patriotic feeling of his subjects. A treatise "*On the old and the new Russia*," written by the celebrated historian Karamzin, emphatically stated that the Tsar's reforms were the cause of the general dissatisfaction, in that they tended to weaken and destroy aristocratic government. A protest was thus supplied. Alexander determined to sacrifice Speranski in order to satisfy the Conservatives, and, in particular, the Old-Russian party, and to stimulate the warlike enthusiasm of the country. A coalition formed by the enemies of the liberal reformer was joined by Arakcheyeff, Count Roostopchin, Balashoff, Minister of Police, and the Swedish Baron Arnfeldt. But all these were only tools of the Tsar, who used them to entangle Speranski in the coils of a pretended plot, in order to accumulate on his head the guilt of the detested reforms, and of the Francophil policy of the last five years.

The 25th of March, 1813, the day on which Speranski fell and was banished to Nijni-Novgorod, marks a turning-point in Alexander's

career, for he now entered deliberately upon a life-and-death contest. Viss-Adolphe Stakhoff, the narrow-minded representative of Old-Russian tendencies in language and literature, was appointed Secretary of the Council of State in Speranski's place, and entrusted with the task of issuing manifestoes designed to bring together the Tsar and his people. About this time, Alexander's mental and spiritual development began to take a turn towards faith in the Bible and a plain mysticism, which added strength to his resolve. The French Emperor appeared to him even the embodied principle of evil; and it seemed to him that he might be the instrument of Providence destined for Napoleon's overthrow.

Napoleon had been pushing forward his preparations since the beginning of 1811; and thus it was possible for him to bring into the field such an army as modern Europe had never before seen. The total strength of the Grand Army, with its baggage-trains, amounted to about 680,000 men, including 550,000 infantry and about 100,000 cavalry. Of this force, the French composed rather less than half: the rest was made up of the troops of the allied States, the Italian, Illyrian, Polish, and Rheneish contingents, and Austrian and Prussian auxiliaries. These troops, exclusive of the Imperial Guard, and of the Austrians under Prince Schwarzenberg, formed eleven army-corps and four divisions of cavalry. The French troops consisted chiefly of the Imperial Guard, commanded by Marshals Lefebvre, Mortier, and Soult; the first four army-corps, under Marshals Duroc, Godefr. Ney, and Eugene, Flouvy of Italy; and the first three corps of cavalry reserve, under Murat, King of Naples. Poles, Saxonians, Saxons, and Westphalians, under Poniatowski, Grawert, Saint-Cyr, Reynier, and Vandamme (whose place was afterwards taken by Jümel), formed the next four army-corps. The fourth corps of the cavalry reserve was composed of Poles, Saxons, and Westphalians, under Latour-Maubourg. To the tenth army-corps, under Mollath, belonged also the Prussian auxiliaries. These were the troops destined for immediate service at the opening of the campaign. Their total strength, at the passage of the Niemen, amounted to 400,000 men. The sixth army-corps, under Marshal Victor, at first remained behind in Prussia; a considerable body was afterwards separated from this corps, and, with the Neapolitans, who came up later, was placed under the command of Angereau, as an eleventh army-corps. The reinforcements brought up in the course of the campaign amounted to at least 140,000 men; to these must be added the troops with the baggage-train and baggage-trains. In all, nearly 610,000 men, with 1600 field-pieces and 100 siege-guns, crossed the Russian frontier in the year 1812, besides officials, servants, and drivers.

Owing to the large number of horses, the opening of the campaign was postponed till it was possible to find grass. Napoleon had perceived that the provisioning of such an enormous body of troops would constitute the chief difficulty, and had made special regulations

wonderfully. But, as the commissariat authorities were by no means equal to their task, the troops, during their march to Moscow, had to fall back on the system of requisitions, a system which acted very detrimentally on discipline. Moreover, the measures taken for replacing losses were inadequate; while, owing to the size of the army and the large sums consumed by the operations, Napoleon could not make his personal influence everywhere felt. His lieutenants were but poor substitutes. On principle, he had trained his generals to habits of dependence, and even the highest of these, such as Murat, and Berthier, Chief of the Staff, were by no means born commanders; moreover, the Marshals declined to obey anyone but the Emperor. Napoleon himself was no longer, either physically or mentally, the man he had been. Corpulent and in poor health, he was less capable of action and endurance than before. Mentally, also, he had suffered a great change. Having hitherto succeeded in all his enterprises, he had lost all sense of the attainable. In his determination to be at once Emperor, Generalissimo, Chief of the Staff, and Minister of War, he had taken upon himself a burden too great even for his capacity. All these things considered, it is clear that the Grand Army bore within itself the seeds of dissolution.

Although Russia had also been arming since the beginning of 1811, she was unable, at the outset, to oppose equal forces to Napoleon. The available troops were formed into three armies of very unequal strength. The first army of the west, under the command of Barclay de Tolly, Minister of War, contained over 100,000 men; the second, under Prince Bagration, was only about a third of that number. The third, or reserve army, under General Tormasoff, was about 40,000 strong. Thus the total strength of the first line was 175,000 men, with 200 guns; to which may be added 10,000 Cossacks. On the other hand, the Russians could reckon on considerable reinforcements. In the first place, there was the army of the Danube, under Admiral Tchitchagoff, now set free by the Treaty of Bucharest, and numbering over 50,000 men. There were also the troops from Finland, and two reserve-corps on the Dvina and the Pripiet. Thus, the troops in the second line numbered, in all, rather more than 100,000. In the third line have to be reckoned the recruits, the militia, and the Cossacks. Yet the total strength of all the forces which were gradually brought up to repel the French attack, amounted in the end to little more than 400,000 men.

The Russian army was not only considerably inferior to the French in respect of numbers, but it possessed no commander in any way comparable with Napoleon. Kutusoff and Bennigsen had already been defeated by him. Kutusoff, now physically a wreck, had recently fallen into disfavour with the Tsar for having acted contrary to his wishes in delaying the peace with Turkey. Bennigsen, who was given to intrigue, was, as a German and one of the murderers of Paul, very

unpopular with the national party. Alexander was therefore obliged to take over the supreme command himself. Requiring military advice, he unfortunately selected a theorist, General von Pflü, whose plans fell to pieces at the first trial. When, in July, 1812, Alexander left the army, Barclay de Tolly, as Minister of War, assumed the supreme command. An honourable man and a capable general, but without conspicuous talent, and a foreigner to boot, Barclay was hardly equal to his task; nor was his strategy, though correct in the circumstances, understood by his subordinates.

Alexander, from fear of his great opponent, was inclined to adopt the purely defensive plans of his counsellor, General von Pflü. On the assumption that Napoleon would cross the Niemen at Grodno, whence he could advance upon either Vilna or Minsk, an army was to be opposed to him in both these directions. The first army was afterwards to retire upon the extended camp at Delna; the other was to operate against the enemy's flank and rear, as was to advance to Bobruisk. Pflü's plan was approved by the Emperor; orders were therefore sent from Vilna, which Alexander entered on April 26, to prepare the camp at Delna. The first army of the west, under Barclay, was already concentrated about Vilna; the second, under Bagration, gathered more afterwards at Volkovisk; Tormassoff, with the reserve army, remained at Lelch in Volynia.

Meanwhile it became clear that the enemy would cross the Niemen at Kovna. Napoleon had prepared no detailed plan of campaign; he had merely drawn the outlines, leaving the details to the decision of the moment. His intention, at the outset, was essentially as follows:—to break through the enemy's right wing with his reinforced left; then to fall upon the concentrations of the enemy's left and centre, so as to separate Barclay and Bagration. After Napoleon had himself reconnoitred the Niemen on June 28, several bridges were thrown across the river, a little above the town of Kovna, after dark. In the small hours of the 29th the army began to cross; next day the passage of the main column was practically completed, and the advance upon Vilna began. Orders were sent to King Jerome to march towards Grodno and follow hard upon the heels of Bagration.

On the 29th the Tsar left Vilna. As Barclay at this moment had only two infantry corps at his disposal, and his advance-guard could no longer join him, he also began (on the 29th) his retirement on Brzostok and Delna. On the same day Vilna was taken by the French. The advance of the French army was designed to separate the two Russian armies of the west. To carry out this plan, Davoust advanced upon Minsk, there to lie in wait for Bagration, whom Jerome was to drive in his direction. The plan, however, miscarried, owing to Jerome's failure to pursue Bagration closely. There were excuses for Jerome; but Napoleon was so angry with his brother that he placed him under

the command of Marshal Duroc. Deeply hurt, Jerome left the army and returned to Cassel. Meanwhile Duroc had continued his march, and thus compelled Bagration to turn aside towards Moberish.

Napoleon himself had remained stationary with the centre at Vilna. He selected his residence in the capital of Lithuania to set up a pseudo-government there, and turn its military resources to account. In his regulation of Polish affairs he committed a fatal error. At the end of June the Polish Diet had met at Warsaw; it had declared itself representative of reconstituted Poland, proclaimed the restoration of that kingdom, and set about uniting Poland and Lithuania. Napoleon, however, was anxious not to offend Austria and Prussia, or to make peace with Russia impossible; he therefore refused to approve definitely the decisions of the Diet, thereby damping the ardour of the Poles.

It was some time before Napoleon grasped the failure of his plans against Bagration; when at length it became clear to him, he decided to send forward to the Dwina those divisions of the centre which had hitherto been detained at Vilna. On the right wing, Duroc, who had now the command of Jerome's army, received orders to proceed towards Magileff. Napoleon himself left Vilna in the night of July 16-17. By his inactivity at that place the Emperor had lost much valuable time; and his operations, so far, had produced no satisfactory result. In spite of great sacrifices, he had only succeeded in hindering Barclay's junction with Bagration. And this was, after all, a doubtful advantage; for it was to Napoleon's interest that the two generals should combine and do battle with him as soon as possible.

Meanwhile the first army of the west had effected its retreat to the camp at Dwina. Alexander, trusting to Pash's counsel, had at first intended to make his stand against the French army at this point; but he was soon apprised of the strategic disadvantages of this position and the defective fortification of the camp. The hollowess of Pash's counsel was now revealed to the Tsar. Alone to the probability of his left wing being encircled, Alexander now determined on accelerating the retreat as far as Vitebsk, and there effecting a union with the second army of the west. Bagration was ordered to march to Vitebsk by Magileff, there to join forces with Barclay. After the first army of the west had returned to the right bank of the Dwina, leaving behind it Wittgenstein's corps, now raised to 52,000 men, it was only about 22,000 strong. The march from Dwina to Vitebsk by way of Polotsk began on July 18. Wittgenstein's corps remained behind between Dwina and Dwina to guard the St Petersburg road. The course of events having shaken the confidence of the Tsar, he now (July 18) decided to follow the advice of his intimates, and to betake himself to Moscow, where, in the centre of the kingdom, he might superintend the conduct of the national defence. From Moscow was issued the order to the northern and central provinces for a general levy. The Tsar's



declaration that the war was a national war, and his avowed intention to conclude no peace so long as one hostile soldier remained on Russian soil, kindled great enthusiasm throughout the Empire.

On July 20 Davout had taken Mogileff with but slight opposition. The Marshal was convinced of the necessity of turning Bagration's way, in spite of his superiority, and for this purpose concentrated his forces at the village of Safanovka, south of Mogileff. On the 22d Kulevski, at Bagration's orders, attacked him in this position, but without success; nor did Bagration venture to renew the attack. On the contrary, he withdrew across the Dnieper and marched on Smolensk, which he reached on August 2. Napoleon had meanwhile begun his advance by Glukhaja upon Vitsek, and thus frustrated Barclay's intention of marching from Vitsek by way of Orsha to join the second army. At Ostrowno, on July 23, there was a smart encounter between Osterman and the French van-guard under Hant, who forced the Russians to retire. The news of Bagration's failure at Mogileff now forced Barclay to decide on retreat, an operation which was successfully carried out. On August 1 the first army of the west reached Smolensk, where, on the next day, the junction with Bagration was effected. Napoleon now gave up the pursuit, and returned with the Grande to Vitsek.

Here he decided to give the army two weeks' rest, in order to rally the stragglers and establish magazines. Though comparatively few of his troops had come within sight of the enemy, the Grand Army had already lost more than 100,000 men. Nevertheless Napoleon was firmly determined to outface his reckless advance. He did not yet perceive that the intrinsic weakness of Russia was unsuited to his strategy, and this mistake was the chief cause of his enormous losses. The idea of postponing the completion of the campaign till the next year had some attractions; but many considerations made against it. Not only the supremacy of France in Europe, but Napoleon's own position in the eyes of the French nation, depended on his advance. The Emperor needed before all things a conspicuous success in order to justify himself, and to maintain his prestige. His whole plan of campaign was therefore founded on a brilliant offensive, rather than on regular methods of warfare, in which defensive action would take a certain part. Besides, the means at his disposal were such that he might well hope to bring the war to a rapid conclusion with one crushing blow. Napoleon therefore decided to continue his advance by way of Smolensk to Moscow, following the line taken by the Russians in their retreat.

The two Russian armies now united at Smolensk numbered 134,000 men, with 9000 cannons. The first army, under Barclay, was posted on the right bank of the Dnieper; the second, under Bagration, on the left. Both the Tsar and the army, and particularly Bagration, von Toll, and Grand Duke Constantine, were now very anxious to take the offensive. Early in August, Barclay attempted forward movements against the

French centre at Rodin, and upon Pouchkin; but his action was unexecuted, and the Russian offensive came to nothing. Napoleon now determined to advance (August 15). His plan was to march on Smolensk by the left bank of the Dnieper, and, by capturing that place, to entrench the Russian retreat upon Moscow. On the 14th the whole army set out in one great column.

The news of its advance compelled both Barclay and Bagration to march as quickly as possible on August 16 to the aid of Kutusk, who was holding Smolensk with about 15,000 men. Murat and Ney reached that place early on the 16th; Napoleon arrived about 9 a.m., and Davout was approaching. An energetic attack was imperative, if the French were to take the place before the arrival of the Russian army. Napoleon, however, decided to await the rest of his forces, and limited his efforts that day to a useless manoeuvre. This delay gave the two Russian commanders time to come up. But the expected battle did not take place; 20,000 men, under Dokhtoroff, were left to hold Smolensk; the rest of his army Barclay intended to withdraw as soon as Bagration had secured the road to Moscow.

Napoleon, expecting the Russians to make a sally from Smolensk, let the early hours of the 17th slip by; it was 3 a.m. before the attack began. Poniatowski, Ney, and Davout advanced almost simultaneously. After about three hours' fighting, the French succeeded in taking the suburbs, but were unable to penetrate further; their guns failed to effect a breach in the walls. A violent conflict raged till midnight. Barclay, knowing that the way to Moscow was now secure, believed himself justified in evacuating the town; for, if the French should cross the river above Smolensk, the Russian army might be in a very dangerous position. But Napoleon, who had intended to renew the attack on the 18th, did nothing that day but concentrate his army and prepare for the passage of the Dnieper. His behaviour before Smolensk indicated a great dissipation of mental energy.

The bridges having been raised early on the 18th, Ney at once crossed over to the right bank of the Dnieper, and was followed in the course of the day by Murat, Davout, and Joutet. The French pressed hard on the retreating enemy, and there were three engagements at Valutina-Gora and Ladima; but, as Napoleon returned to Smolensk and Joutet did not attack, Murat and Ney were unable to prevent the Russians from effecting their retreat. Had Napoleon remained at Smolensk, he would have been able to continue the campaign in the following spring with good prospects. The hope of winning a decisive battle and of making peace at Moscow induced him to press forward; but in extending his advance beyond Smolensk he committed perhaps the gravest error of the whole war. The means at his disposal were no longer adequate to such a task. To provide for the advance it became necessary to establish a strong reserve at Smolensk. The force under Victor was

therefore commenced up; it crossed the Niemen at Kovno on September 4, and arrived at Smolensk on the 27th, over 24,000 strong. Napoleon himself did not leave the town till August 25. Robbing and burning as it went, the French army marched forwards across Old Russia.

The feeling in the Russian army and the difficulty of his own position had now convinced Barclay of the necessity of a battle. He intended to bring on a decisive engagement at Tchernoe-Zaimishche, where the Russian army had arrived on August 29. But in the meantime his retention of command had become impossible. National pride, irritated by recent events, demanded heavily that he should give way to a Russian. Yielding to this demand, Alexander appointed General Kutuzoff (recently raised to the rank of Prince) commander-in-chief of the Russian forces. Neither personal inclination nor confidence on the part of the Tsar had anything to do with Kutuzoff's appointment: it was a political necessity.

Kutuzoff was sixty-seven years old. Physically weakened by age, he lacked the mental energy required for contending with Napoleon, but he had talent enough to play a Fabian part. His chief merit was that he could see when conditions were turning in his favour, and knew that, if the worst came to the worst, the winter would help him to expel the French. Endowed with much native cunning, he felt confidence in his ability to conquer the great man, by guile if not by battle. Barclay had saved the army in spite of itself. The enemy's numerical superiority, which, at the outset, had stood in the ratio of three to one, now stood only at that of five to four. Kutuzoff knew how to turn this saving of his predecessor to good account. The new commander-in-chief joined the army on August 29. He had to fight a battle, since that was the object of his appointment. But, as the position chosen by Barclay at Tchernoe-Zaimishche was open to criticism, the retreat was continued on the 31st as far as Borodino, where the army arrived on September 8.

In the expectation that the new Russian commander would accept battle, Napoleon gave his army two days of repose (September 2, 3) at Ojtsk. On the 4th the advance was continued. A strong redoubt had been constructed near the village of Sharandino, in front of the Russian left. On September 5, Napoleon launched his advance-guard against this redoubt, which was defended by Prince Gortchakoff; Duroc also took part in the attack. Later, Poniatovski, on the extreme right of the French, succeeded in turning the enemy's left, whereupon the Russians abandoned the redoubt and retired after nightfall upon their main position. Even after the losses of the last few days, the two Russian armies still numbered 108,000 men, with 640 guns, exclusive of the Cossacks and the militia. The French army was between 120,000 to 150,000 strong, with 587 guns. The Russian position formed a shallow convex curve. On the right, the line followed the bank of the Kaluzha, a tributary of the Moskva; in the centre, near the village of Borodino, it fell back a little from the former, and then bent round by

Semenovskoe to Utitsa on the old Smolensk road. While the right wing was unassailable, the left, being without natural protection, was a weak point in the position; yet the first army, forming the bulk of the Russian force, was drawn up on the right, while the weaker second army was posted on the left. The latter position, not being covered by the Kaloucha, was defended by trenches. Raskovski's battery was posted to the right of this position, on the high ground between Borodino and Semenovskoe; on its left, between Semenovskoe and Utitsa, three small entrenchments had been thrown up. Napoleon had not been able to obtain clear information as to the ground, and supposed that Raskovski's battery and Bagration's entrenchments stood on the same ridge. The Emperor decided on a frontal attack; Potemovskii alone, with his weak corps, was to turn the Russian left.

The battle of Borodino, or of the Moskva, began at 6 a.m. on September 7. On the French left, the Viceroy advanced first and took the village of Borodino; lost it, and took it again; then crossed the Kaloucha with the greater part of his troops, and deployed against Raskovski's battery. About 10.30 a.m. this position was taken; but the Russians, reinforced by General Yermoloff, soon succeeded in recapturing the entrenched battery, and in repulsing the enemy with great loss. Meanwhile Durov, with the divisions of Demais and Compans, had advanced at 8 a.m. against Bagration's entrenchments. Round these three rapid for hours a severe struggle, with varying results. On Durov's left, Ney's corps and Friant's division took part; Janet filled up the space between Durov and Potemovskii. About 11.30 a.m. the French succeeded in finally capturing the entrenchments, already thrice won and lost, and in driving back the second army with great loss over the depression of Semenovskoe, where part of the reserves came to its aid. It had lost nearly all its senior officers, Bagration himself being mortally wounded. Kutousov remained inactive the whole time at Gorki, far behind the line of battle, leaving Barclay, Bagration, and Yermoloff to their own devices.

An attack by Murat's cavalry failed; and it was past midday when Friant succeeded in taking Semenovskoe—a success which drove the Russians in this part of the field back to the edge of the forest. But Murat, Durov, and Ney believed themselves unable to advance further without reinforcements; and these Napoleon refused to send. The Emperor was suffering from a severe chill, and stayed for the most part far in the rear by the Chevroline redoubt. About midday, Platoff's Cossacks and Uvaroff's cavalry vainly attempted, by outflanking the French left, to divert the enemy's attention from the Russian centre. The Raskovski battery was captured by the French soon after the loss of Semenovskoe; and the whole Russian centre fell back behind the depression of Gorki. At 4 p.m. the battle gradually died out, in consequence of the complete exhaustion of the troops on both sides. Only on the French right Potemovskii continued fighting till nearly 6 p.m.

The losses on both sides were enormous. The French lost over 25,000 men, the Russians half of their troops of the line. Napoleon had himself to thank for the fact that the result of the battle did not justify these sacrifices. If he had called up his Guards, who were still 50,000 strong, he might have annihilated the Russian army. Kutusoff had intended to continue the battle the next day; but, in view of his losses, he abandoned this intention, and on September 8, before day-break, began his retreat. Napoleon having withdrawn his advanced troops after the battle was over, the Russians were able to feel that they were not defeated; the commander-in-chief even claimed a victory.

The French Emperor remained at Mojaisk till September 18. Kutusoff meanwhile continued his retreat as far as the village of Fili. At a council of war, held on the 13th, Bessières wished to renew the offensive, but Barclay was of the opposite opinion. His advice was adopted by Kutusoff, and the retreat was resumed in the direction of Riazan. The army retired through Moscow, and was followed by nearly the whole population of the capital. Out of 600,000 inhabitants only about 15,000 remained behind; among these many strangers, especially French, and the drag of the population, besides thousands of wounded Russians. To cover the retreat, Milenskiitch remained behind with the rear-guard. Murat and Sebastiani being very anxious to occupy Moscow intact, he demanded and obtained an armistice of some hours, which enabled him to withdraw undisturbed (Sept. 14). With him went the military governor of the city, Count Rostopchin. During the afternoon of the same day, Napoleon, who had vainly waited for a deputation from the authorities, made his entry into the Russian capital.

The abandonment of the city produced a strange and surprising effect on the French army. Several fires broke out on the evening of the 14th, in different quarters of the city; but these were attributed to accident. On the following evening a great part of the city was in flames; a few days more, and three-fourths of the houses were in ashes. Napoleon, who had established himself in the Kremlin on the morning of September 15, was on the following day obliged to make his escape through the burning buildings; he took up his quarters outside the city in the Peterovskii palace. Not until the 18th, when the fire had abated, did Napoleon return through the smoking ruins to the Kremlin. Moscow was burnt neither by Napoleon nor by Count Rostopchin. Probably, the fire was in part accidental, and due to plunderers, both Russian and French; in part the deliberate work of patriotically-minded inhabitants. It began in the shops and warehouses, along the outer wall of the Kremlin, and around the *Tramata*, a public square laid by. On the 18th the fire was at its height. The noise of the flames overbore the roaring of the sea; the sky glowed; and it was possible to read by night within three or four leagues of Moscow. Robbery went hand in hand with fire.

It was not so much the French themselves as their allies, the Russian troops and the Poles, who displayed the most brutality and greed. Every corner was ransacked, under the pretext of using something from the flames. The victims turned the churches into stables for their horses, chopped up for firewood the parish altars with icons, and used the altars for dinner-tables. A slaughter-house was set up in the Petrowski current; and the converted church was turned into a butcher's shop. The gold plate of the Cathedral of the Assumption and other churches was melted down. The altar of St. Philip was scattered on the church-floor.

But neither fire nor plunder could bring the enemy to terms; and the approach of winter warned Napoleon to abandon the capital for a more secure position. Retreat, however, meant a confession of failure; and this he was anxious to avoid. He therefore remained in Moscow as long as there appeared any hope of peace. But Alexander was firmly resolved to make no peace so long as a single hostile soldier remained on Russian soil; he would rather let his beard grow and eat potatoes with the earth. Kutusoff, feeling that the unfavourable impression produced by the Russian retirement must be effaced, adopted the advice of Toll, and resolved to change the direction of the retreat from Riazan to Tula or Kaluga. The main army, therefore, returning to the right bank of the Moskva, marched on September 17 by way of Pskovsk to the old Kaluga road, and on the 21st took up a position on the right bank of the Pskov, near Krasnâ-Pskova.

Napoleon had ordered Murat to pursue the enemy on the road to Riazan with a strong advance-guard; but that general, in spite of his strength in cavalry, had completely lost touch with the Russians. About Sept. 30 Napoleon heard that the Russian army was posted on the road to Tula, and that the Cossacks were threatening the French line of retreat on Mojaïsk. He therefore dispatched Penetrovski and Bessine, one after the other, in the direction of Pskovsk and Kaluga, to meet the enemy. In the Russian head-quarters a general attack was feared, in consequence of which it was decided, on the 28th, to continue the retreat as far as Tarutino, beyond the river Nara. There the army remained for three weeks, receiving reinforcements which raised the number of regular troops to 92,000 men. An advance-guard, under Milorodovich, was now forward; while Tormasoff, who arrived on October 30, took over the command of the main army.

Meanwhile guerrilla warfare began to assume serious proportions. Early in September, Denis Davydoff, a lieutenant-colonel of hunters, began to organise the partisan forces. Before long, uzbuzs, dragoons, and Cossacks, under Davydoff, Derokhoff, Figue, and Salsaria, harassed round the hostile army, seized its provision convoys, destroyed or captured French detachments in the rear, and drove the French guerrillas from the towns. The peasants flew to arms, forced bands, and seized

the French spies, messengers, and stragglers, whom they slaughtered without mercy.

Napoleon had let September pass in complete inactivity. His position was growing worse every day; and he felt that, in order to enforce peace, something must be done, and that quickly. Early in October he formed a plan for a demonstration in force against St. Petersburg; but, finding his generals were against it, he let it drop. As Alexander did not beg for peace, Napoleon was forced to take the first step himself. On October 5 he sent General Lauriston to the Russian headquarters, to open negotiations; but, in so doing, he only betrayed the untenability of his own position, without getting any nearer to peace. In the end, therefore, he decided on retreat. It is true that, apart from fodder, which had run low, there was still, in spite of reckless waste, a large quantity of provisions in Moscow. The difficulty of provisioning the army was chiefly felt in regard to the troops outside the city, especially those of the advance-guard. As to numbers, the army, in spite of reinforcements, was, on the evacuation of Moscow, reduced to 100,000 men and 500 guns. Napoleon, at the outset, did not intend to retreat beyond Smolensk. The natural line of retreat was by way of Velizhinsk, Zubtsoff, and Beloi to Vitebsk; it passed through a poor country, but one uncragged by war. But to choose this route would have implied a confession of fear. It was in accordance with Napoleon's character that he decided upon the route by Kaluga to Smolensk.

On the morning of October 18 Napoleon suffered a rupture at Vinkovo, opposite the Russian camp at Tarutino. Though the rupture seems now of slight importance, Napoleon at once gave orders for the retreat. The same evening the greater part of the army bivouached on the old road to Kaluga. A strong detachment under Mortier was temporarily left behind in Moscow, for Napoleon wished to make it appear that his return to the capital was still possible. The cavalry horses were in very bad case; but the most serious symptom was the falling-off in discipline. The French host resembled a herd of nomads rather than an army; men, horses, and waggons were loaded with booty. The arrangements for the ammunition and for the clothing and provisioning of the troops were utterly inadequate.

Napoleon had selected for his line of retreat the new road to Kaluga by Pondsikole, on which, by hastening his pace, he might hope to get past the Russian army at Tarutino; but he had actually struck into the old road which goes through Tarutino itself, in order to anticipate a possible attack on the part of Kutsoff. The latter, however, did not advance further; so, on October 26, the French army turned to the right to Pondsikole. On the night of October 26-27 Mortier also evacuated Moscow. He had been directed by Napoleon to destroy the Kremlin and all the public buildings except the Foundling Hospital; but he carried out the order in a very superficial way.

The Russian generals were very badly informed as to the enemy's movements. It was not till the night of October 28-29 that they had definite news of the flank march of the French army from the old to the new Kaluga road; whereupon it was decided to head off the enemy at Malo-Yaroslavets. On the 31st, at 3 a.m., Delistréoff reached that place, and finding the French in occupation, at once attacked. After some hours of indecisive fighting, the Viceroy Eugene arrived with the rest of his troops, who were followed by the Guards and Davout's corps. A little later the Russian main army also came up, Rasnitsin first, and then Kutusoff himself. The struggle for the burning town lasted till 11 a.m.; eventually the French succeeded in driving the Russians out of the place. Kutusoff fell back a little during the night; but he had attained his end, and barred the road to Kaluga against his opponents. Napoleon had either to force his way through, or to retreat to Mojaisk and thence to Smolensk through an exhausted and desert country.

After long vacillation, and much reconnoitering and consultation, the Emperor, on October 26, formed the momentous decision to retreat upon Mojaisk—a course which meant nothing short of destruction for his army. On the same day, Kutusoff, perceiving, as he thought, in all the movements of the French army an offensive directed against Kaluga, also gave orders to retreat. Tol and the British commander, General Wilson, in vain urged the commander-in-chief to fight a decisive battle. Kutusoff hoped that the Grand Army would melt away of its own accord, and preferred to build a golden bridge for his opponent. Moreover, he was by no means persuaded that the complete destruction of Napoleon and his army would really be a benefit for the world; he feared that the heritage of the French Emperor might fall, not to Russia, but to Great Britain. Consequently, at the last moment, Napoleon found the hindrance to his retreat by way of Mielga removed. But his power of decision was already impaired by consciousness of failure. He fell back upon a compromise, and drew off his troops on the road by Berezna, then taking a circuitous course, with all the disadvantages incident to such a route, which he might have avoided by marching straight on Mojaisk.

Winter, which this year had been slow in coming, now set in. By the end of October the men were shivering by the bivouac fires at Volkovo, with some degree of frost. Provisions were running to an end; the ranks were thinning, the men fatigued; the Cossacks became bolder in their attacks. Serious news reached Napoleon at Vienna: Tshitsingoff had driven Schwarzenberg back to Brest; Sakh-Cyr had evacuated Polotsk; and Victor had hurried from Smolensk to his relief. The Grand Army itself was in peril. Napoleon alone, with the Guards and the Württemberg troops, had outstripped his pursuers. The main Russian army was close to Berezna at Vienna. Milenskiitch clung to the banks of Eugene, Poteminski, and Davout; Platoff and his



Cossaks pressed on their rear. On November 3 Miloradovich had advanced from the south towards the main road; his cavalry encountered the head of Beresin's column, already hard pressed by Platoff. Eugene and Podstolinski were obliged to turn back to his assistance; but the former vainly tried to beat off the Russian infantry approaching from the south. Thereupon the French generals determined to continue the retreat toward Vienna; it was carried out amid incessant attacks. The French troops passed through Vienna in disorder; Ney was the last to leave the neighbourhood of the banking town.

For the next few days the march to Smolensk went on without a halt. Want and disorganization now reached a terrible pitch. Hiverdick had long composed the almost exclusive diet of the troops; the Guards alone retained a small ration of meat. On November 6 it began to snow; two days later the ground was covered, and the roads became slippery with ice; the thermometer fell to 5° Fahrenheit. The soldiers were attacked with a strange sickness. A man would suddenly look as if he were drunk, stagger, fall down in the snow, and die. On November 7 fifty men of Ney's corps perished in this way.

On November 8 Napoleon arrived at Smolensk. There he heard that Vitolsk was taken by the Russians, and that Eugene's corps had been attacked by Platoff while crossing the Vop, and had lost heavily in retreating to Smolensk. In Smolensk efforts were made to provide the different corps with the necessities of life; but, as the distribution was made without respect to circumstances, many of the troops, particularly the stragglers, were neglected, and through sheer hunger committed violent excesses. In spite of all this the Emperor succeeded in bringing his effective force up to 48,000 men; and he still hoped to be able to get the army into winter quarters on the Dvina and the Dniester. With this intention he ordered the Poiss, the Westphalians under Funot, and the Legion of the Vistula, with the trophies of war, to go ahead of him, on the high road to Krasnoi; he himself left Smolensk in his carriage, on November 14, with the Guards and the cavalry.

The Russian main army still numbered over 80,000 men. Kutsoff might very well have appeared at Krasnoi by November 18. Instead of this, he kept back his troops for a day's rest; and it was not till the afternoon of that day that he sent forward Miloradovich with the advance-guard to the main road; while Napoleon concentrated the Guards, the Legion of the Vistula, and Funot's troops at Krasnoi. From some prisoners the Emperor learnt (November 18) that Kutsoff, with his whole army, was in the neighbourhood, and boldly resolved to wait for the Viceroy, Duroc, and Ney, at Krasnoi. Intimidated by the presence of Napoleon, Kutsoff, in spite of his overwhelming superiority, advanced but slowly. It was late in the afternoon of the 18th before there was any fighting, when the Viceroy approached with his slender force from Korytza. Thanks to Miloradovich's excessive caution, the

Vitrey was able to stop the fight at nightfall, and to reach Krasnol by passing round the enemy's position. On the 17th Napoleon determined to advance in person to attack the Russian main army, with what forces he still had, in order to free the road for Davout and Ney. Davout was thus able to march past Miloradovich, who confined himself to artillery fire, and to join Napoleon, who was engaged in a smart encounter with the feeble Russian centre. The Emperor, considering it hazardous to wait any longer for Ney, now gave orders to retreat. The consequence was that Ney, instead of meeting Napoleon on the 18th at Krasnol, came unexpectedly upon the Russians under Miloradovich in the afternoon of that day, and was obliged to retreat with enormous loss. He turned northwards to the Dnieper, crossed it by night near Synkowskie, leaving behind all his waggons and guns on the left bank, and joined the Vitrey with only about 500 men.

Katouff, having let the French escape, left Miloradovich to pursue them with the advance-guard alone, while with the main army he took the direction of Lower Bessarabia, in the hope of barring the enemy's path again at that place. It was intended that Wittgenstein should follow close on the tracks of Oudinot and Victor, while Tchitchagoff was to hold the narrow defile at Krasnol. It was now Napoleon's intention to join Schwarzenberg by way of Minsk; and with this object his movements were directed towards Bortsoff. He hoped it would still be possible to take up winter quarters behind the Berezina. But on the 18th Minsk was taken by the Russians. Orders were therefore sent to Dombrowski to hold the bridge-head at Bortsoff with his Pole; Oudinot was despatched in that direction; and the French main army crossed the Dnieper on the 19th at Orsha.

Meanwhile, on Napoleon's right, where fighting on the Dniep (July—October) had ended in Wittgenstein's advance to Chasenkil and Viatka and Victor's retirement towards Senno; while, to the south, Tormasoff had successfully withstood the Austrian onset. On the notification of the Peace of Bucharest, Tchitchagoff brought up the army of the Danube, and, taking Tormasoff's place at the head of the combined forces, marched towards the Berezina. The situation in the rear of the French main army, at the moment when its shattered remnants approached the Berezina, was thus very grave. Wittgenstein, with more than 50,000 men, stood ready at Chasenkil to advance against Oudinot and Victor, who were posted with 22,000 men at Cherev and Krasnyaga; while Tchitchagoff, with more than 50,000, was marching upon Bortsoff, in order to drive Dombrowski from this important point.

Napoleon, believing himself to be in possession of the passage over the Berezina at Bortsoff, ordered the destruction of the position trains, with their waggons, which had been provided at Orsha; but General Elzé had fortunately preserved some waggons with coal, instruments, and iron material for building bridges. Meanwhile the situation of the French

array became more and more perilous. It was poured by an enemy fortified by victory, and now, thanks to reinforcements, far superior in numbers. Mikedovich disposed of more than 25,000 men; the main army, under Kutusoff and Tormassoff, added 60,000 more. By November 21 the bridge-head of Borissoff was lost to the French. Next day Tchitchagoff crossed the Beresina at that point, and pushed his advanced-guard towards Loshitsa, but was driven back again by Oudinot to the right bank. Napoleon was now convinced that the passage of the Beresina below Borissoff was barred by Kutusoff's approach as completely as that by the town itself was stopped by Tchitchagoff. His only course, therefore, was to force his way by Zambin to Vilna between Tchitchagoff and Wittgenstein. On Nov. 23 he directed Oudinot to three bridges across the Beresina at Vassilovo, where the road to Zambin passes that river, and ordered Victor to stop Wittgenstein's advance against Oudinot. Victor, however, in the end, fell back on Loshitsa. Through the junction with Victor and Oudinot, the strength of the French main army again rose to between 37,000 and 40,000 men, not counting many thousands of stragglers. It was with this army that Napoleon was to attempt the passage of the Beresina, in the face of an enemy three times stronger, and surrounding him on all sides.

Both Wittgenstein and Tchitchagoff believed that Napoleon would cross south of Borissoff. Wittgenstein therefore advanced but slowly, although Victor, by his retreat upon Loshitsa, had left the way open; and he did not reach Studianka, near the crossing-place, till November 27. Thus, left to his own resources, Tchitchagoff failed at the decisive moment to bar the way. Conceiving that Napoleon would make his way to Minsk below Borissoff, where Oudinot was making a point of preparations, Tchitchagoff with his main force marched southward on the 28th, leaving behind him, opposite Borissoff, only Langeron's Silesie corps, and at Brill, opposite Studianka, a detachment under Chaplitz. On the 28th, Chaplitz also was ordered back to Borissoff; and there remained only a small detachment, under Korotki, opposite Studianka.

Preparations for throwing the bridges across at this place were begun on the 28th. In order to prevent the enemy from opposing the passage, Oudinot's whole artillery, numbering forty guns, was mounted on the heights of Studianka. On November 30, to the astonishment of the French, the farther (right) bank of the river appeared almost free from the enemy. There was, in fact, nothing there but Korotki's detachment, which was soon driven off by a small body of cavalry and sharpshooters who crossed the river on horseback or on rafts. Meanwhile two tow-bridges were begun, a larger one for carriages and cavalry, and a smaller one above it for the infantry. The river being swollen and full of ice, the work was unusually hard; but, early in the afternoon, the smaller bridge was completed. Oudinot at once crossed by it, sent a detachment to secure the Zambin defile, and then advanced southward

with his main forces. Three hours later the artillery followed by the larger bridge. The passage of Ney's corps was delayed by the break-down of the larger bridge during the night of November 26-27.

About midday on the 27th Napoleon himself crossed with the Guards, and took up his head-quarters in the village of Zambiv. On the left bank there still remained the corps of Victor, Davout, and Eugene, with the great mass of the unattached troops, and, mixed up with them, the whole of the baggage train. It was on this day that the Russians first appeared in the neighbourhood of the crossing. On the right bank of the river, Kienigk and Chaplitz failed to make any impression on Ordynot; while Tschichagoff, who had now returned, declined to order a general attack. On the left bank, Victor took up his position at Smolanka to cover the crossing against Wittgenstein. Instead, however, of attacking Victor, Wittgenstein continued his march to Borissoff, and falling upon Partoussant's division, which had been left behind at Stary-Borissow and had lost its way, he surrounded it and forced it to surrender. Further delay was caused by a third break-down of the larger bridge; but, during the night of November 27-28, other bodies of troops passed over.

On November 28, Wittgenstein and Tschichagoff, reinforced by Yermoloff and Platoff, made, for the first time, a combined attack on the French army on both sides of the river. The conflict was severe, and lasted all day. On the right bank, where the country was covered with woods, the Russians on the Borissoff-Zambiv road were unable to deploy, and were repulsed by Ordynot and Ney with great loss. On the left bank, Victor's corps, posted on high ground, stoutly withstood Wittgenstein's attack and checked the Russian offensive. During the night Victor crossed the river, leaving only his rear-guard behind. Meanwhile, the unattached troops and the carriages had been passing over without interruption. Those who straggled were trampled under foot: many fell into the water. Many families, women, and children, who had followed the army from Moscow, here found a miserable end. On November 29, about 9 a.m., the bridges were set on fire.

The French losses were frightful. They amounted to at least half of the regular army, that is to say, from 20,000 to 25,000 men. On the other hand, Napoleon's reputation was saved. The passage of the Berezina should not be regarded merely as a direst catastrophe, but as the greatest achievement in the retreat of 1812. The Emperor owed his deliverance, above all, to the magic of his name and the prestige of his arms. Wittgenstein and Tschichagoff were both afraid of him: neither was anxious to come to close quarters. Besides, Kutsoff believed that he could attain his end without a pitched battle.

With the passage of the Berezina, the Grand Army of 1812 was extinct. Hunger, cold (= 15° Fahr.), and the Cossacks, finished the work of destruction. The remnants fled in wild haste to the Niemen,

On December 3, three days after the passage of the Beresina, the ordered ranks of the main army numbered only 8000 men, rank and file; on the 10th, only 4000. On the Russian side, the light troops, who were entrusted with the pursuit, refused to complete the annihilation of the French army; the main body followed slowly behind. In the face of his terrible losses, Napoleon gave up all hope of shaking the sight. The thought of abandoning the army, which he had rescued on hearing of Makh's conspiracy, had now ripened into a resolution. The 22th bulletin, dated from Molochevka, December 3, was meant to prepare the world for his return. He confessed the ruin of his army, but laid the blame on the early commencement of the Russian winter. At Smorgoni, on December 5, he announced to his generals his intention of departing for Paris, in order to raise another army. He entrusted the supreme command to Marmt, and left Bortolier with him. Accompanied only by a few of his intimates and a scanty escort, he set out the same day, and, travelling by Vilna, Warsaw, Dresden, and Mainz, reached Paris in safety at midnight, December 18-19.

As head of the State, Napoleon was at this moment more indispensable in the capital than on the field. But Marmt, the daring leader of an advance-guard, was by no means the right man to rescue the remnants of the army. Under him the last trace of discipline vanished. Only a few thousand men of the Guards still held together; all the rest disbanded. Some reinforcements, Laison's division, Wrocl's army, came up; but they were speedily lost in the general wreck. On December 8 Marmt reached Vilna; but the appearance of some Russian cavalry refused to make him retreat hastily on Kovno in the night of December 9-10. Near the hill of Posenikie, where there was a steep rise in the ice-covered road, Ney, with what was left of Wrocl's and Laison's force, sought to check the Cossacks; but the attempt ended in the complete destruction of his troops. Everything that the French had hitherto dragged with them—guns, baggage, and trophies—was here lost. On the same day Vilna was occupied by the Russians. The misery in the town was indescribable. Nearly all the houses were filled with sick and wounded, the courtyards with the dead, and the streets with stragglers clothed in rags. Beyond Vilna the pursuit was carried out only by Platoff's Cossacks and the cavalry of the advance-guard. These were sufficient to score the French back over the Niemen. An attempt made by Ney to hold the bridge at Kovno and the town itself failed, as the Niemen and the Vilna were frozen hard. On December 16 Kovno also was taken by the Russians.

Here, on the Niemen, which at that time formed the western limit of the Russian Empire, the pursuit ended. The Grand Army had disappeared. Only about 1000 men of the Guards remained in order; the rest roamed over the country, singly or in small bands, nearly unarmed and in rags. The only available troops were the two wings, under

Schwarzenberg and Mantonald, which together amounted to over 60,000 men. These, with the Poles, who had crossed the Niemen at Ulta, and the stragglers, altogether about 100,000 men, were all that was left of the Grand Army. More than 800,000 men were lost, over 100,000 army horses, and about 1000 guns. The prisoners numbered upwards of 100,000; many others had deserted, or filled the hospitals; the great mass, about a quarter of a million of men, had found their graves in Russia. The Russian losses were estimated at 800,000.

Katouff was inclined to be satisfied with driving the invaders across the frontier; but Alexander was firmly resolved to prevent fresh defeats to attack. The prospects of a general rising of Europe were favourable. On December 24, 1812, General York, the commander of the Prussian auxiliaries, concluded with the Russians the Convention of Tauragga, by which, of his own authority, he broke with the French and declared his corps, for the time being, neutral. On January 13, 1813, Alexander's main army crossed the Niemen.

The Napoleon of 1812 was, for the world, no longer the republican general of 1793. United by marriage with the Imperial House of Habsburg, he stood nearer to the ancient régime than to the Revolution. He no longer appeared as the deliverer of the nations, but as their conqueror and oppressor. For the restoration of Poland or the abolition of serfdom he displayed little genuine zeal. The part which destiny had assigned him in history was played out. He worked no longer in the interests of humanity, but for the selfish ends of his personal or dynastic ambition. He had no serious idea, in Russia, any more than in Spain, of furthering the revolt of the people against an obsolete social and political system: all he did, therefore, was to turn the national rising against himself as a foreign conqueror. When the "Patriotic War" was over, his defeat gave to the victorious national-conservative party complete supremacy in Russia. If Poland was to be restored, its restoration would be due to the Russian Emperor alone.

To turn to the cause of Napoleon's annihilation—it was neither the Russian front, nor the national rising, but his own strategic blunders that brought it about. He desired, in one year, to bring to a victorious end a campaign which, at the very least, required two. It has been considered his capital error that he continued his march on Moscow beyond Smolensk. Even supposing that, during the first year, it was feasible to beat the Russian army at Moscow and occupy the city for a short time, nothing can excuse the folly of driving half a million of men by forced marches into the heart of Russia in order to reach Moscow with only 100,000. It is clear that, not only from a social and political, but from a strategic point of view, Napoleon, towards the end of his career, gradually degenerated. But, as his creative genius became exhausted, his vast schemes only grew vaster still.

## CHAPTER XVII.

## THE WAR OF LIBERATION (1813-6).

The weight of the Napoleonic despotism lay heavy upon Europe, crushing alike her kings and her peoples. Besides England, which controlled the sea, Russia was the only remaining independent State. The British power was to be broken by the Continental Blockade; and in the spring of 1812 huge columns of armed men marched eastward to the subjugation of Russia. Napoleon penetrated victoriously into that country, and made his way to Moscow. It looked as if the whole continent of Europe was to become French. For some time nothing was heard of the Grand Army. Then, on December 12, news reached Berlin that Napoleon had been forced to leave Moscow, and was in full retreat. *Leader and leader* gave the rumour of a terrible tragedy. But rumour fell far short of the reality. During the first weeks of 1813, broken masses of men, for the most part sick or wounded, crossed the Prussian frontier, begging and plundering as they went—soldiers, officers, even generals of the highest rank, wrapt in rags, frost-bitten, hollow-eyed and wasted. This was all that was left of half-a-million of soldiers, all that was left of the Grand Army. At sight of such a disaster the mind of Germany was deeply moved; men felt that a new era was about to dawn; now was the time for action—now or never.

It was natural to expect assistance from four directions—from England, Sweden, Austria, and Russia. England was the implacable enemy of Napoleon. Allied with Spain, she had defeated his armies, advanced nearly to the frontier, and driven off part of the French forces against herself. But, though her wealth gave her the means to help—a means subsequently used to effect in the Treaty of Reichenbach (June, 1813)—she could not herself carry on war in Germany. Sweden, long dragged at the heels of France, was now, under the guidance of Bernadotte, aiding at the acquisition of Norway, hitherto in the possession of Denmark. When Napoleon refused his consent to this act of robbery, Sweden went over to his enemies. At the end of 1813 the French ambassador received his passports; on March 24, 1814, a treaty was

evacuated with Great Britain; and, soon afterwards, 12,000 men landed in Swedish Pomerania, without, however, pushing farther inland.

More important than Sweden was Austria. She was, it is true, in alliance with Napoleon, but she was longing to throw off his yoke, and was therefore merely keeping up an appearance of hostility against Russia. At the end of January, 1812, Austria concluded a secret agreement with that country to cease hostilities, in consequence of which she withdrew her forces, without, however, any immediate rupture with Napoleon. She left Russia and Prussia to bear the first brunt of the new conflict, while she formed an army of more than 100,000 men, with which she proposed to play the part of peace-maker at the right time. By the middle of April Austria seemed to be an ally of France, and had begun to mediate as an independent Power. Her leading statesman, Count Metternich, endeavored to strengthen his position through the Princes of the Rhine Confederation, proposing to Saxony, Bavaria, and Württemberg a kind of neutral league, which should aim at a peace ensuring the independence of Germany. But he only succeeded in winning over the King of Saxony for a short time; that monarch, dismayed by Napoleon's threats, instantly collapsed, and submitted to him once more.

None of these three Powers, then, contemplated taking immediate action in Germany. Even victorious Russia played her own game. There were two parties in that country, one of which desired to terminate the war at the Prussian frontier, the other to carry it further. The champion of the former policy was the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Count Kutusoff; the latter was headed by the Tsar Alexander, who was strongly influenced by his German entourage and by the prospect of acting as deliverer of Europe. Alas, Alexander could hardly have carried his country with him; but he found Prussia on his side. With Prussia the decision really rested; and that country, as we shall see, pronounced in favour of war.

Even after the Russian disaster, Napoleon's situation was by no means unfavorable. Besides France, he had with him Italy, Illyria, the Netherlands, and all Germany with the exception of Prussia. Against him were Russia and Prussia alone: the former weakened by war, precarious in movement, unprepared for a struggle beyond her frontiers; the latter financially ruined, with her government in disorder and her military strength reduced. France, it is true, was almost depopulated by her many wars; her prosperity was injured by the Continental Blockade; a profound and passionate longing for peace was dominant among her people. The subject or allied nations, which had once welcomed the French with jubilation, now groaned under the foreign rule; even Italy, her racial ally, was in part hostile. But fear ruled them all: they murmured, but they obeyed. It was therefore probable that in the coming war Napoleon would be able to master the larger force, while he



also enjoyed the advantages of single command and of a military genius unequalled in history. No wonder if at first the King of Prussia was alarmed, and hesitated until his people almost forced him into this apparently hopeless war, by the side of an ally who had once before, at Tilsit, left him in the lurch. But, since Tilsit, the conditions were completely changed. It was no longer the Cabinets that waged war, but the nationalities revolting against the universal domination of France.

When, on December 18, 1811, Napoleon entered Paris, his Ministers were agreed in advising the peace for which France, they asserted, was loudly clamouring. Napoleon made proposals for an armistice, but was unable to communicate with Alexander; and Austria's mediation was of no effect. Nevertheless, in February, 1812, negotiations were actually begun, and continued without any formal rupture till June 4, when an armistice was concluded at Plawitz. This fact is important. Time was required for the setting on foot of another Grand Army. While on the march to Russia, Napoleon had created certain cohorts, as they were called, for the defence of the Empire, numbering about 80,000 men. In November, 1812, he sent orders from Moscow for a new conscription for 1813; the levy (of 127,000 men) took place in the following January. Further levies raised the total demand to the enormous figure of 450,000 men; but this number was never attained; and there was great difficulty in providing a complement of trained officers, especially for the cavalry.

The result of Napoleon's energy, grasp of detail, and magnanimity, was that by the end of April, 380,000 men, including the German and Italian troops, with 487 guns, were with the colours on the banks of the Elbe and the Weser; that the fortresses on the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe were strongly garrisoned; and that reinforcements were pouring in along all the roads from France. The infantry was, on the whole, of first-rate quality; the artillery was good; the cavalry alone was inadequate, both in men and horses. Napoleon had desired to make it specially strong, but at first it numbered only 15,000 men. Such were the forces employed in the spring campaign. Things were different in the following autumn, when it became evident that the military resources of France had been overstrained. There was an army, numerous indeed, but an army of the most heterogeneous description, flung together at haphazard, raw youths along with men over age, differing in physique and discipline; while the corps of officers left, in the lower grades, much to be desired. Moreover, the troops never had their heart in the conflict, and were only kept together by a sense of military honour. In the higher commands there were grave defects. The marshals were glutted with glory and honour; they longed for rest and enjoyment; they feared defeat. Good tacticians there were among them, but no good strategists, except perhaps Duroc. Napoleon himself was no longer what he had been. True, his genius remained; but his will, his decision,

his self-confidence, even his health, had suffered. His life had been too full, and even his Titanic strength, mental and physical, had been affected by the efforts and the catastrophes of the Russian campaign.

Of Napoleon's opponents the foremost was Russia. Her field-army numbered only about 134,000 men, including 80,000 cavalry. A blow of February 3 commanded the formation of a strong reserve army; but this force was so slow in getting into shape that by the end of July only 68,000 infantry, 14,000 cavalry, and five batteries were available for reserves and reinforcements; and of these a third was lost on the way. This was not enough to keep the numbers at the front even up to their own low level during the spring campaign. The army was composed of tired soldiers; but, as they were thrown together at random, the tie of comradeship was lacking.

Prussia had been brought to the verge of ruin by the Peace of Tilsit. Her territory was reduced to four provinces, her population to 4,800,000 souls; she was burdened with a war-debt of 180 millions; her army was limited to 40,000 men. But her very misfortunes helped her to revive. Under Scharnhorst's direction a new, a rational army was created. Then came the war of 1812. Prussia was obliged to supply an auxiliary corps to Napoleon; the leaders of the reorganization were discredited and resigned their posts; everything fell into stagnation and disorder. The consequence was that in 1813 Prussia was unable to raise her forces to a war footing as quickly as had been expected. Difficulties arose from the fact that part of the country was occupied by the Russians (with whom as yet there was no treaty), another part by the French; still more from the terrible want of money; finally, from the character of the King, and from that large section of the bureaucracy which expected all salaries to come from above.

This time, however, it was a question, not of kings and officials, but of the soul of a people. The Prussian nation had endured too much under the pitiless hand of the conqueror of Jena, and in the grim school of suffering had acquired a moral force which now revealed itself in its elemental power. The people were resolved to win back their highest possessions, their rights as men and citizens, by desperate combat if there were no other way. The enthusiasm for freedom and fatherland swept through the country like a post-up mountain forest. All classes, all ages, flew to arms; men, boys and grey-haired patriarchs, even young girls, entered the ranks. Those who could not offer their own lives on the altar of their country gave what they had. In a few weeks the country, impoverished as it was, contributed in free gifts the value of half-a-million of thalers (\$78,000), and thus lightened—one may even say, made possible—the heavy task of the Government.

In the face of all this, King Frederick William maintained an attitude of shy detachment. He was conscientious and painstaking, but slow and hard to move, and pusillanimous in his decisions. He dreaded the

revolutionary tendencies of a popular movement. The conviction that a terrible end was preferable to unending terrorism could not be expected in the representative of an hereditary dynasty. Many even of the best men, like Scharnhorst, at first feared this popular violence but little to their taste; they regarded it as futile sentimentalism. But the popular pressure was too strong, and in the end it carried away both bureaucracy and Court. Scharnhorst was recalled to office; Gneisenau came to his aid; and in the Chancellor Hardenberg Prussia found the man who could steer her straight in her time of need.

A notice of orders was issued, calling the troops under arms. The want of officers was met, so far as possible, by promoting cadets and non-commissioned officers. Though sorely hindered by want of money, of uniforms, and of equipment, the mobilisation of the field-army was almost completed by the end of March; but that of the reserve battalions, especially those of the *Landwehr*, was much in arrears. The *Landwehr* had been embodied by a royal order of March 17; but not a single corps took part in the spring campaign. A preliminary order for raising the *Landwehren* was issued on April 21; but it was impossible to carry it out. One unique feature of the war was to be found in the "Free Corps"—divisions of patriotic volunteers, who, not being Prussians, could not serve in the Prussian line. The best known was that of Lüna, raised by officers of Schill's former corps. In this band Theodor Körner, the foremost singer of the War of Liberation, fought and fell. Altogether, the strength of the Prussian army, after complete mobilisation, was estimated at 250,000 men; but, at the beginning of the campaign, not more than 60,000 combatants could be mustered. Typhus had already made great gaps in the ranks. But with each stage of the advance the military enthusiasm of the people grew, and with it the military resources of the State. This explains the fact that, throughout the spring campaign, the fighting troops were steadily reinforced; and that, during the armistice, the strength of the whole army was considerably increased. Although in numbers and discipline the Russian army at first appeared the stronger, the Prussian troops, in spite of their inferior numbers and the large proportion of young soldiers, soon proved themselves the more formidable. This was attested by Napoleon himself.

What at the outset seemed so dishonourable—the presence of Prussian auxiliaries in the Russian campaign—had in the end the happiest result. The Prussian corps had operated on the left wing of the Grand Army, to the Baltic Provinces. It thus escaped the destruction that befell the main body, and was enabled to form a fine nucleus for the national force. The commander, General von York, was not on good terms with his superior, Marshal MacDonald. The King had privately expressed a wish that fighting with the Russians should be avoided so far as possible, while they on their part made similar proposals to the Prussians. Negotiations became more lively after the retreat of Napoleon. The

King had, in August, directed York to break off from the French if they should be driven across the Prussian frontier, informing him further that he contemplated abandoning the French alliance, as soon as circumstances would permit. Thereupon, on December 30, 1813, York came to an arrangement with the Russian general, Dieblich, under which the Prussian corps was to remain neutral until orders arrived from the King, and the Russians were to be allowed to march freely over the Prussian frontier-roads. This purely military convention induced the Russians to continue the offensive, and, indirectly, led to the great popular rising in Prussia. York threw himself to the neighbourhood of Tilsit, Maslowitz to Königsberg, whence, on the appearance of the Russians, he removed to Danzig.

On January 11, 1813, Murat, King of Naples, the commander-in-chief of the Grand Army, now practically annihilated, transferred his head-quarters to Poznań, where, six days later, he was replaced by the Viceroy Eugene. The military situation at this time was as follows. The extreme left of the French position rested on Danzig, a fortress garrisoned by 30,000 men, of whom a third part were sick or unserviceable. The right wing consisted of the Austrian auxiliary corps under Schwarzenberg and the 7th corps (Saxons and French) under Reynier, in all about 40,000 men, who retired upon Warsaw. In the centre lay the fortress of Thorn, with a garrison of 4000 men. The French then practically held the line of the Vistula. Behind it lay Eugene with a field-army of 16,000 men, mostly unfit for service. Behind the Oder stood Langerbe who, with 10,000 men, had to guard the Mark of Brandenburg and the fortresses on the Oder. Grenier's division, about 18,000 strong, was hastening from Italy towards Berlin.

Against these inefficient and widely-scattered forces the Russians could mass about 110,000 men. Their army, on crossing the Niemen, broke up into four divisions. Wittgenstein, with 30,000 men, pursued the fragments of the Grand Army towards Königsberg and Elbing; on January 13 he crossed the Vistula, dispatched a portion of his troops to operate against Danzig, and marched with the rest to Stargard in Pomerania; here he halted in order to effect a junction with the second corps, 38,000 strong, which, under command of Tschichagoff, was approaching slowly by way of Thorn. Further south Kutusoff, with 30,000 men, was marching from Lok upon Plock; while Miloradovich, with about 30,000 men, followed Schwarzenberg and Reynier.

Eugene employed the time allowed him by the slowness of the Russian movements in strengthening and reorganising his army. He could do nothing with the troops which had just come from Russia, except to use them as garrisons for the Prussian fortresses; with the rest, about 12,000 men, he stood fast at Poznań. Schwarzenberg, however, evacuated Warsaw without a struggle, and marched, not eastwards to Kalisz, but northwards to Osnabrück under the pretext of covering Galicia. Eugene

received no help from the Prussians, whose mutual understanding with the Russians became more and more apparent. Consequently, though Grawert's division reached Berlin, where it was combined with that of Lagrange to form a new corps (the 11th), under Gervais Saint-Cyr, the growing disaffection of the inhabitants was such that this corps dared not abandon the Mark. When, therefore, Tschitschagoff reached Bromberg, when Wittgenstein's light troops began to raid the country far in Eugene's rear, and the French troops had suffered two reverses, the Viceroy's position became untenable; and on February 18 he was forced to evacuate Posen. On the 18th he reached the Oder at Frankfurt, where his position was rendered more secure by the neighbourhood of Saint-Cyr. Shortly before that date, on the 15th, Seydlitz had been surprised by the Russians and so severely handled that he reached the fortress of Glogau with only 3000 men. Thus the French line of defence was pushed back to the Oder.

The action of York was highly embarrassing for the King of Prussia. Outragedly he was Napoleon's ally; and the French occupied his country, as we have seen, up to the Vistula. No one could be more anxious than Frederick William to shake off the oppressive French yoke; but he dared not move in any direction, such was his fear of Napoleon, and his dread lest failure should endanger the very existence of his State. His hopes, for the present, were limited to an acceptable peace; and with this view he turned to Vienna. Not until he perceived that nothing was to be hoped for in that quarter did he begin to look eastward to Russia. In order not to break with France, he informed the French ambassador that York's action had aroused his surprise and indignation, and followed this up by sending a special envoy to Paris with instructions to pacify Napoleon; he even ordered York's dismissal. But the officer who informed Murat of this order travelled on to the Emperor Alexander and proposed an alliance.

A double game of this sort was the natural resource of the weak; and Hardenberg played it very skilfully. He managed to explain away every proceeding on the grounds of necessity and the repellent attitude of France; and he was fortunately able to convince Saint-Marcq, the French ambassador at Berlin, who involuntarily played the part of a friendly reporter. It was, however, clearly necessary to get the King away from Berlin, where he was in constant danger from the French garrisons. A report was therefore spread that he was going to Russia, there to raise a new contingent for Napoleon. In Berlin a High Commission of Ragnow was established to represent the sovereign in case of sudden need. On Feb. 22 Frederick William left Potsdam unattended, and reached Rastadt on the 25th. He was now free to act, and deeply determined to risk everything for the rehabilitation of his kingdom. As Austria hung back, he was forced to join with Russia, in the hope that events would bring Austria into line. But the utmost action was

required. The object was to put Napoleon in the wrong, and to give the King an appearance of being forced to side with Russia against his will. Accordingly the Prussian ambassador in Paris, after setting forth the difficulties of Frederick William's position, made counter demands which it was certain the Emperor would refuse; while General Kauschek was sent to the Tsar with full powers to conclude an alliance.

For some time the negotiation made little progress; on the one hand, because Russia demanded a large slice of Polish (formerly Prussian) territory; on the other, because Frederick William still shrank from decisive action. Eventually these hindrances were overcome—a result to which Napoleon's continued ill-treatment of Prussia contributed: and on February 26 an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded at Kalisch. Russia undertook to furnish 150,000 men and Prussia 90,000; while the Tsar pledged himself, in a secret article, to restore Prussia to the political and financial position which she held previous to 1806. It was agreed that Prussia should be enlarged by acquisition in northern Germany. The treaty was not published till March 18, when Prussia declared war against France.

Even more important than the Russian alliance was the strengthening of the national feeling, a process which had been pushed forward by all possible means since the King's arrival in Berlin. The volunteer *Äger* divisions were quickly formed; and all exemptions from military service were abolished. The country was divided into four military departments, with a military and a civil governor over each. The reorganization of the Prussian army was, for the time being, concluded by the issue of regulations for the organization of the *Landwehr*.

Meanwhile important events were happening elsewhere. York had transferred his head-quarters from Tilsit to Königsberg, where he took over the functions of Governor-General of East and West Prussia, and raised his weakened corps to the effective footing of 80,000 men. These provinces being occupied by the Russians as officially hostile territory, they deputed as their representative Baron von Stein, who, as a former Prussian minister and now adviser of the Tsar, was admirably fitted to watch over the interests of both States. He ordered a meeting of the General Diet of the Prussian Estates, which, under York's influence, decided on the establishment of a militia force of 80,000 men, a reserve of 15,000, and a general levy (*Landsturm*), in which all men from eighteen to forty-five were to serve. Then York, in agreement with Wittgenstein, transferred his troops to the left bank of the Vistula. The conclusion of the alliance with Russia, though it was not yet made public, hastened their movements. During the advance the Russians remained in front; for until March 18 the Prussians were not, to engage in overt hostilities against the French, and even then to avoid them as far as possible.

On February 18, as we have seen, the Viceroy Eugene had reached

Frankfort on the Oder with 18,000 men, and had effected a junction with Salski-Czyl's force of 18,000. The fortresses on the Oder—Stettin, Kustrin, and Glogow—as well as that of Spandau near Berlin, were strongly garrisoned. Russian scouts, under Tchernicheff and Tettenborn, had already crossed the Oder; and on the 30th the latter had even pushed his way into Berlin, where fighting went on in the open streets. But, as the capital could not be held with cavalry alone, the Russians retreated northwards, carefully watching all roads leading to Berlin. These events in his rear made a very sensible impression upon Eugene. He left his van-guard on the Oder, and betook himself and his main army to Berlin and the neighbourhood, entering the capital on February 22. Thus he practically abandoned the line of the Oder, and that without any necessity: for Wittgenstein had not as yet approached the river: Kutusoff, with the main army, was a long way off at Kalisch; and Sacken remained in Poland with about 30,000 men. As yet the Prussians had not declared war. In these circumstances Eugene ought to have continued to hold the line of the Oder. He was able to mass on that river 40,000 men and 100 guns: while in Magdeburg a new corps was being formed, which by March 1 amounted to 22,000 men. But general uncertainty and fear of a popular rising drove him to retreat. Meanwhile Wittgenstein had come up; and his van-guard, having crossed the Oder on March 1 and 2, pressed on to Berlin. Eugene did not wait for him, but in the night of March 3-4 fell back upon Wittenberg towards the Elbe. He and his 30,000 men had retreated before about 18,000 Russian light troops, and abandoned without a struggle the capital of Prussia.

Meanwhile the Prussian forces in Silesia, drawn from various parts of the kingdom, had been raised to 25,000 men. The command was given to Blücher, whose courage and energy inspired unbounded trust. But he was essentially a practical soldier, not given to wide-reaching plans and strategy: therefore the two most talented officers in the Prussian service were associated with him—Schadowitz as chief of the staff, and Grolman as quarter-master-general.

Things were now so far advanced that the Russo-Prussian alliance could be carried into effect. Kutusoff took command of the combined armies. Wittgenstein, with York and Bülow, led the right wing: it numbered 24,000 men, and was to march upon Magdeburg by way of Berlin. The left wing was under Blücher's command. It included Wittgenstein's Russian corps and the Prussian corps, in all 40,000 men. Dresden was its objective. Kutusoff took a middle route with the reserve, the so-called main army, numbering hardly 24,000 men.

Early in March the Vistula completely abandoned the line of the Oder and fell back on that of the Elbe, where he soon received reinforcements. His main body he transferred to Magdeburg and Dresden. Distance also obliged him (March 12) to abandon Hamburg, which was

entered by Tattenbom and his Cossacks amid the jubilation of the inhabitants. Napoleon, disapproving of many of Eugene's measures, ordered him to collect 80,000 men before Magdeburg, making that point a centre from which to defend the line of the Elbe. This led to the withdrawal of most of the French troops from Saxony.

An energetic offensive was obviously the right strategy for the Allies. This was what the Prussians desired, but the advance was stayed because the van-guard was too weak, and Kutusoff, contrary to agreement, remained at Kalisch. Wittgenstein and Blücher, however, approached the Elbe. Through the weakness of the French forces at Magdeburg their position at Dresden was so far weakened that they were compelled to evacuate the Saxon capital, which was occupied by Blücher. Soon afterwards York's van-guard appeared east of Magdeburg; and the lower Elbe was crossed by light troops. Napoleon, well knowing the importance of the lower Elbe, appointed Darnau governor of that district, and gave the command in Bremen to Vonlowow. On April 1 General Morand, having crossed the Rhine, occupied Lüneburg with 2000 men and nine guns. Here he was surprised by Dümberg's and Tschouditch's light troops, and his force was annihilated. It was but a small affair, but its moral effects were far-reaching. It was the first real victory won on German soil; and the news was received with general rejoicing. Unfortunately, on the very next day, Darnau appeared with a superior force, and drove Dümberg and Tschouditch back across the Elbe.

There was brisk fighting at Magdeburg also. Here, on April 3, Eugene crossed the Elbe with about 45,000 men, forced Bernier to retire, and took up a position with his centre at Naltein. Wittgenstein determined to attack him on the 5th with 80,000 men. In those places the advanced French forces were engaged, and were everywhere defeated. Eugene lost 10 killed and wounded 700 men, besides 1000 prisoners. The next night he began to retreat. His attempt to recover Berlin and scatter the forces of the Allies was fruitly executed, and altogether unsuccessful. Blücher and Bernier followed his retreat, with the object of watching Magdeburg. York, with the Russians, marched up the Elbe to Roslau and Dessau, where a bridge was built over the river. The further plan of campaign was that Wittgenstein should operate in conjunction with Blücher to the west of the Elbe; but, as the enemy had over 80,000 men in Magdeburg, Blücher dared not lose touch with Blücher. York reached Kötzen on April 18, while Eugene occupied the left bank of the Saale, and approached the Harz mountains with his main army. Meanwhile Blücher had reached Leipzig and the Mulde, where he was compelled to halt, as the French were said to be gathering in force about Hof and Erfurt. All he could do was to make himself master of the territory between the Elbe and the Saale, and to keep in close touch with Wittgenstein.

Not till March 7 did the Russian main army begin its march from



Katzbach into Saxony. It numbered only 55,000 men, and could not expect to be reinforced by more than 50,000 reserves before the end of May. On March 15 it reached Bunsdorf in Silesia, where Blücher soon afterwards died. Blücher thus found himself crippled as before, the more so since, in spite of all the efforts of his men, the enemy's designs remained obscure. Wittgenstein was in a similar situation. It was known that Napoleon had gathered a powerful army on the middle Elbe, and that it had begun to march eastward. While Wittgenstein waited more certain intelligence of the movements of the enemy's main army towards Erfurt, he began (March 20) to draw nearer to Blücher on his left. The latter also concentrated his forces in order to effect a junction with the rest of the Allies.

As the news from the west grew more and more threatening, Schwarzhorn proposed to abandon the defensive, and to attack at once. It was however determined that the main army should cross the Elbe and accept battle on the left bank, presumably between Leipzig and Altenburg. Wittgenstein proposed, in this case, to fall suddenly on one of the hostile columns during their approach. Schwarzhorn looked forward gloomily to the future; he thought that they would all be too late.

It cannot be denied that the Allies showed themselves incapable of using the favorable moment when the main French army was still distant. Blücher's and Wittgenstein's united forces amounted to 65,000 men, a strength amply sufficient to engage Eugene, drive him from Magdeburg, and fight him in the open field. The opportunity had now passed; their front was, it is true, strengthened by the Russian main army, but this reinforcement could not compare with the masses which Napoleon brought into the field. Previously they would have had to deal with an opponent by no means eager for the fight; now they had to contend against the genius and invincible resolution of the Emperor.

As for Napoleon, while with indelible zeal he was gathering together an immense army in France, he kept his eye all the time on Germany. About the middle of March he was thinking of crossing the Elbe, and relieving Dantz. This was a survival of his Russian schemes, and had little prospect of success. The situation of the French in Germany was growing steadily worse; consequently Napoleon found himself compelled to meet the enemy on the Elbe and to protect Saxony. He therefore concentrated two armies, a main army under the command of Marshal Ney on the lower Main, and another not far from Magdeburg under Eugene, which served to secure the middle Elbe and could also advance north-eastward into Saxony. The two armies might effect a junction behind the Saale. On April 15 the army of the Main began its march, while an Italian corps approached from the south. On the 18th Napoleon left Paris. He stayed in Mainz till the 24th, in order to overcome the various difficulties which obstructed the raising of the new army. His plan was as follows. The army of the Elbe, about

60,000 strong, was to take up a defensive position, guarding the Thuringian Forest: the army of the Main, comprising over 160,000 men, was to concentrate at Erfurt under Napoleon's command; while the Italians and Bavarians, 40,000 strong, approached from the south by way of Coburg. Napoleon had thus a force of more than 300,000 men, with which he hoped to engage and defeat the far weaker enemy in the neighbourhood of Leipzig. From three directions the troops poured forwards towards the lower course of the Saale, between Halle and Jena. On April 25 Napoleon joined the main army at Erfurt, which five days later appeared on the banks of the Saale; while the Allies took up a position behind the Elster and the Pleisse, extending from Leipzig to Altenburg on the east. The Emperor had at his disposal 145,000 men, including 16,000 cavalry and 400 guns. The Allies at the most could only muster 80,000 men. A swift and decisive victory was required by Napoleon if he was to recover his reputation; and this victory seemed secure. All he had to do was to press forward.

On May 1 he crossed the Saale, and marched straight on Leipzig. As Napoleon had no precise information about the enemy's position, he hoped, by marching in this direction, to turn their right wing, drive it in upon the centre, and crush it by a series of heavy blows. He therefore kept his main force in a central position near Kaja and Lützen. At 5 a.m. on May 2 the movement began. Napoleon succeeded in pressing back the Allies on the left and occupying Leipzig. Further south, his centre advanced towards the Elster with its front to the east. As some of the enemy's forces were to be found here, Napoleon looked himself to Leipzig. Suddenly a violent cannonade was heard on his right flank from the direction of Görschen. The Emperor at once took to the situation, and, while holding Leipzig, turned his whole force against the enemy. The Allies had taken up a position somewhat south of Leipzig, supposing that Napoleon would approach by way of Zeitz. When it became known that he was advancing by Lützen, and, it was supposed, in extended columns, Wittgenstein determined to attack him in the flank, while Blücher was to make an attempt on Leipzig. The army began its march during the night; but it was 11 a.m. before it reached a point south of Gross-Görschen, where it formed three lines, with Blücher in the front and the Russian Guard in the rear. The troops were so fatigued that they had to rest an hour. At midday Blücher advanced upon Gross-Görschen, surprised the French at that point, and routed them; but behind the village he encountered a stubborn resistance. At one o'clock the whole line was engaged, from Klein-Görschen to Stönsdorf. At first the Allies had a numerical superiority, but French reinforcements kept coming up. At 3.30 p.m. Napoleon, with the Guard, appeared behind Kaja. The fighting was extremely severe, especially round Gross-Görschen and Kaja; but the superior forces of the French steadily gained the upper hand, and at

8 p.m. Napoleon ordered a general advance. In spite of desperate resistance, the Allies were forced at 7 p.m. to retire in a direction southward of Gross-Görschen. In the centre the battle was lost.

Under cover of night the defeated army pulled itself together. The Russian Guard, 11,000 strong, had taken no part in the struggle; and a large Russian corps, that of Milorodovitch, remained inactive at Zeitz. Wounded as he was, Blücher hurled eleven squadrons upon the enemy during the night, but they were repulsed. The Allies withdrew in perfect order, and subsequently crossed the Elbe at Dresden and Meissen. The French lost 18,000 men, the Allies only 10,000, exclusive of the slightly wounded. During the pursuit many more fell out, so that eventually Napoleon, on reaching the Elbe, had 81,000 men less than when he crossed the Saale—a proof of the bad moral of his army.

Early on May 4 Napoleon pressed on with the main army towards Dresden, while Ney with an auxiliary force operated on the left. The pursuit, however, was not effective; it was not till a week later that the French occupied Dresden-Neustadt. Meanwhile Ney pushed back the Prussians under Bülow; and, at Napoleon's bidding, the Saxon fortress of Torgau surrendered. The Allies were in bad luck. Each laid the blame of their defeat on the other. The Prussians were for pressing northwards to guard Berlin; the Russians for marching outwards to Bouxira, in order to remain near to Russia and Austria. The armies were about to separate, when Frederick William, fearing this would be fatal, gave in. Leaving the defence of Berlin to Bülow's weak corps, the combined forces slowly moved to Bautzen, and took up a position on the heights behind that town, where they were joined by Barclay with 18,000 men. Napoleon remained in Dresden till the 17th to strengthen and reorganise his army. His main force amounted finally to 120,000, Ney's army to 81,000; the army of the lower Elbe under Dornau numbered 30,000. Against these forces the Allies, with Bülow's corps, could only muster 118,000 men.

Napoleon, on being informed of the movements of the Allies, determined to attack and defeat them in conjunction with Ney. His troops advanced cautiously towards Bautzen, until it became clear that the Allies intended to accept battle there. On May 19 the French main army deployed west and north-west of Bautzen, with the Saxon in their front. Ney was at the march with two corps, his object being to turn the Allied right. Wittgenstein, unaware that Ney had more than one corps, planned to attack him unexpectedly with the forces under Barclay and York. Soon after 1 p.m. the fight began. During its course, Barclay committed the blunder of first ordering York to abandon his position, and then bidding him resume it. This second advance led to a fierce struggle, which lasted, with varying fortunes, till 11 p.m. The attempted surprise had failed; and during the night the Russians and Prussians fell back as the main body.

The position of the Allies was now as follows. In front of them flowed the Spree, as yet a shallow stream, its banks covered in the centre by the town of Bautzen. Their main force rested on the heights above the town, while their advanced posts reached to the Spree. They numbered 92,000 men, including 50,000 Prussians. Gortschakoff's Russians were on the left, Blücher in the centre, and Barclay on the right wing; the Russian Guard formed the reserve. The position was a strong one, but too extensive, and it was broken up into three ill-connected portions; moreover the ground was unfavourable for cavalry. The weakest point was on the right, which was incompletely secured. This was the very point that was threatened by Ney.

At noon on May 18 Napoleon crossed the Spree and attacked the Allies' advanced posts, in order to prevent them from withdrawing on the approach of Ney. He shrewdly aimed at defeating the decision until the next day, when his second army would come into action. By nightfall Bautzen and the ground in front of it were won from the Allies. The Russian left wing appeared to be seriously threatened: whereupon 4000 men of the reserve were sent to its relief. Napoleon's plan for the 18th was admirably conceived. At daybreak a fierce attack was made on Gortschakoff's division; and Ney quickly followed with on the right. Supposing that the issue would be decided on the left, Alexander sent thither another 8000 of the Guard, thus reducing the reserve at the very outset to 6000 men. Napoleon's tactics were entirely successful on the Allied left, where the Russians were fully occupied till evening. He was equally triumphant on the right. Here the Russians had to meet the enveloping attack of Ney's superior force; they received no reinforcements, and were pushed back in spite of a fierce resistance. Finally Blücher was forced to intervene in order to wrest the important position of Freiditz from the French. It was now midday. Napoleon's centre began to move. The Prussians made a desperate but ineffectual defence; their right was turned. Meanwhile Ney's force had increased to 45,000 men. In full strength he hurled himself upon Freiditz, took it, and, attacking Blücher in front and flank, forced him to retire. Had Ney continued his advance against the Prussians, they would have been destroyed; but he failed to grasp the situation. Part of the centre still held its ground firmly; and thus Blücher gained time to extricate himself from his perilous position. The French, however, again made a general advance, and the Allies withdrew from the field. They retreated in good order, without losing a single gun. The losses during the three days amounted to about 80,000 on both sides. A second time Napoleon had conquered, but again the victory was indecisive.

Still fighting, the Allies slowly retired, protected by their powerful cavalry. Almost daily there was fierce rear-guard fighting. It was evident that from a military point of view the Allies were still strong; on the other hand, in the field of diplomacy they showed a deplorable lack of

unsuitably. Wittgenstein was now replaced by Barclay, who was disinclined to risk another battle and advised the abandonment of Silesia, if necessary, and a retreat to Poland. The Prussians, on the other hand, were for defending Silesia and remaining in the neighbourhood of the Austrian army. Alexander was won over to this plan. The army swung round to the north-west, and on the 20th took its stand on the heights of Pilsen, not far from Schweidnitz. The northern provinces of Prussia were thus abandoned to the enemy.

Elsewhere the successes of the French were slight. Generals and troops were depleted by the unbroken strain and fruitless fighting with an enemy ready at any moment to fall upon them with its superior mobility. Ney, in a fit of ill-temper, actually sent in his resignation. The French advanced but slowly; and so truly did the Allies maintain their ground that Bertrand and Marmont were left behind. Napoleon despatched one division to Breslau and another, under Gudinot, to Berlin. Blücher had mustered 50,000 men, including a large body of militia, for the defence of the capital. Supposing that he had a small force to deal with, he attacked Gudinot on the 28th, but was repulsed. Victor also now turned northwards. If Gudinot had made an energetic advance, it would have gone hardly with the Prussians; but his slowness allowed Blücher to take up a strong position at Lützen, where he repulsed Gudinot with the loss of 3000 men.

The French had better luck on the lower Elbe under the cautious Davout. That district was to have been defended by the Russian general Wallmoden; but he was inadequately supported, and, finding the Danish forces on the enemy's side, he abandoned Hamburg, which the French recaptured on May 22. But risings in the rear of the French constantly impeded their concentrations; Prussian and Russian partisans secured the country beyond Halberstadt; and on June 7 a body of 6000 men actually penetrated into Leipzig.

On the other hand, Napoleon, whose main army now extended over a front some 80 miles long, threatened the allied line of retreat with his left wing. The position of the Allies was bad: they were in danger of being forced back upon Austrian territory. But suddenly there came a complete change. So early as May 18 Napoleon had despatched General Caulaincourt to Alexander to treat for peace. On June 1 it was agreed, through Austria's mediation, to suspend operations on the narrow for thirty-six hours. Finally, on June 6, at Pläswitz, the Powers consented to an armistice to last till July 30, a period afterwards prolonged for another month.

The question arises: What were the causes that led to the armistice? Napoleon has indicated two—his want of cavalry and the doubtful attitude of Austria. Evidently he overestimated the strength of Austria, or did not realise the deplorable condition of the allied forces. His own troops had proved insufficiently trained; though he had won two

victories, he had lost 25,000 men more than his opponents, and he had 50,000 men in hospital. His ammunition was exhausted, his communications inadequate; guerrilla bands harassed his communications; and, worst of all, his marshals desired peace. An armistice, Napoleon hoped, would give him time to complete and reorganise his army, to win back Austria, and possibly to divide Russia and Prussia.

But the Allies were in still worse case. Their numbers had sunk very low; they suffered all manner of want; the Russian and Prussian commanders were always at odds. The long retreat, the incessant fighting, and the want of supplies, had weakened the discipline of the troops; they had been driven back almost to the frontier: the hopes of defeating a Napoleon were almost at an end. There could be no question that rest was far more necessary for the Allies than for the French, who, with one supreme effort, might possibly have touched their goal. If, nevertheless, Napoleon concluded an armistice, this proves that he was no longer the general he had been, that he no longer possessed that confidence and iron will which had directed victory to his banners. The Armistice of Pläwitz was one of the gravest errors of his life; its acceptance sealed the preliminary conditions of his fall.

The armistice was not the prelude of peace, but a season of preparation for the decisive campaign. On both sides the work was carried forward with the greatest zeal. The Allies marched in winging over Sweden and the Crown Prince with the promise that his army should be reinforced by strong Russian and Prussian contingents. To arrange with England was more difficult, for Anglo-Prussian relations were traversed by Guelph interests in Hanover; nevertheless British subsidies were sent. The most important Power to gain was Austria. Metternich had kept up relations both with the Allies and with France. He was aware of Napoleon's pretensions, but was not anxious to see Russia's position made too strong; it was to the advantage of Austria that both Powers should be checked within their natural limits. This end he tried to gain by intervention, with a view to ending the war. On June 7 he proposed certain definite bases of peace, to which the Treaty of Rastenbach, made during the armistice, added the important undertaking that, if the conditions therein laid down were not accepted by July 30, Austria would declare war on France.

The proposals made by Austria were that the grand-duchy of Warsaw and the Confederation of the Rhine should be abolished; that the Elbian provinces should be restored to Austria; that the Hansa Towns and other portions of northern Germany annexed in 1810 should be retained; and that Prussia should be replaced in a position as good as that which she had in 1806. These terms were by no means unfavourable to Napoleon; but he could not bring himself to renounce his dream of universal sovereignty. Even the disastrous defeat of Vitoria (June, 1812),

while it encouraged the Allies, could not break down his obstinacy. Metternich finally sent an ultimatum, fixing August 18 as the limit of time for Napoleon's reply. On the 12th Austria declared war. It was well for Europe that Napoleon's ambition allowed no change of conditions at the crucial moment. At the head of a powerful army he still hoped to defeat a loose coalition.

Nobody was more pleased with the turn of events than the Prussian and German patriots, inspired as they were by a profound and passionate hatred. Speaking of this time, at St Helena, Napoleon said, "I saw the decisive hour drawing near; my star waned; and I felt the rope slipping from my hands." Military preparations were pushed forward. On the renewal of war, the whole force of Prussia amounted to 271,000 men; and that number was raised to 390,000 in the course of the year. It was indeed a nation in arms.

The Russian field-army now numbered 184,133 men and 658 guns; the Prussian 161,784 men and 368 guns; the Austrian 187,945 men and 330 guns; the Swedes, the Anglo-Germans, and the Mecklenburgers, 58,871 men, and 98 guns—in all 523,103 men and 1561 guns. If to these are added the reserves and the available Austrian troops in Italy, amounting to 880,000 men, we have a total of 880,000 combatants. But Napoleon, on his side, had summoned the strength of France and the Rhineland to his camps in Saxony, Silesia, and the Mark, in the number of nearly 700,000 men—a large part, it is true, being unserviceable recruits. Both armies presented a strange mixture of nationalities, but Napoleon's troops were all drilled on the French system; they were armed alike; and, excepting the Rhineland troops, were mostly commanded by French officers. The French had the advantage in the military experience of their senior officers; their artillery also was superior, but their cavalry was inferior to that of the Allies. Lastly, the French were guided by one sole will, while the Allies were crippled by divided command and divergence of interests.

Various plans of operations were discussed by the Allies. Eventually a scheme, the so-called *Reichenbach plan*, was accepted by Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, and subsequently by Austria. Its purport was that three armies should be formed, the largest, known as the main army, in Bohemia, under Austrian command; the second, about 120,000 men, in the Mark, under the Crown Prince Bernadotte; and a third, of 50,000 men, under Prussian command, in Silesia. They were only to accept battle if their superiority were undoubted. If the enemy in mass should attack one of the armies, it was to retreat while the other two advanced quickly, with a view to pressing hard upon his flanks and communications. The whole plan proved that the Allies did not face to close with so great a strategist as their opponent.

Napoleon was expected to begin the attack in Bohemia. He deferred the formation of a plan till the last moment. Then he determined to

adopt the line of the Elbe and its fortresses as his base; to retain 800,000 men, facing east and south, to watch the enemy's movements in Saxony and Silesia; and to despatch 110,000 to attack Berlin and the Jewish Crown Prince. Napoleon thus abandoned all idea of a rapid offensive, and allowed himself to be seduced, apparently by hatred of his late marshal and of the Prussian capital, into a side movement which could lead to nothing decisive. The possible conquest of Hanover would have acted very differently.

The Russian and Prussian troops succeeded in joining the Austrians before the termination of the armistice, thus bringing up the army in Bohemia to a total of 224,000 men with 682 guns. The chief command was given to Prince Karl von Schwarzenberg. The three sovereigns were at his head-quarters; and, as he acted with their consent, he possessed a certain authority over both the other armies. Schwarzenberg was a man of honour and devoted to duty, but he had neither self-confidence nor talent for supreme command; and his generalship was over-cautious, dilatory, and uncertain. This led the self-willed Alexander to interfere not unbecomingly in an arbitrary manner; and many others put in their word. It was under these conditions that a Council of War was held on August 17, by which it was determined to advance with three columns upon Leipzig. But as Dresden, not Leipzig, was the decisive point, this meant being touch with the army of Silesia, and giving the enemy a chance to invade Bohemia.

On August 22 Schwarzenberg crossed the frontier of Saxony and occupied the Erzgebirge, then turned towards Dresden. To his astonishment he met with no serious resistance, for Napoleon, with the Guard, had marched off to attack Blücher. Dresden was covered only by Saint-Cyr's corps; and, if Schwarzenberg had pushed on with speed and resolution, the Saxon capital must have fallen. But he was half-hearted; and it was not until the afternoon of the 29th that the Allies, to the number of 60,000, stood before the gates of Dresden. Even then they did not attack at once, thinking they had plenty of time; and yet the defenders could already see the campfires of the approaching French. The favourable moment had passed. Napoleon was at first badly informed as to the movements of his opponents, and supposed their main force to be in Silesia. He hesitated for a time, but finally decided to advance into Silesia with 150,000 men, to beat the Silesian army, and to return to Dresden in time to prevent its fall.

After the departure of the Russian and Prussian divisions, the forces which remained in Silesia, near Breslau, consisted of a Prussian corps of 26,000 men under York, and three Russian corps numbering 66,000, about 100,000 men in all, with 582 guns. They were commanded by Blücher, a very different man from Schwarzenberg. A good tactician, but ignorant of strategy, he passionately hated Napoleon, and was probably the only general who did not fear him. Schwarzenberg having



died from the effects of a wound, his place as Blücher's adviser was taken by Gneisenau, a far-seeing, courageous, and talented man, who, by careful study of Napoleon's campaigns, established the principles of the modern art of war. The higher Russian officers, especially Langens, were mostly unknown; Blücher, though brave and intrepid, was inclined to inaction. Unfortunately, too, the self-willed, apolitical York was on bad terms both with Blücher and with Gneisenau. It was only the common purpose and the firm and prudent conduct of Blücher that kept together these conflicting forces.

The struggle in Silesia was severe. On August 18 Macdonald was forced to abandon the line of the Katzbach; and the French army of the Rhine, though numerically superior, was pressed back. Three days later Napoleon arrived, at once took the offensive, and repulsed the Allies with the loss of 8000 men. Blücher instantly perceived whom he had to deal with, and therefore retreated, according to the general plan of campaign, but so as to keep close to the enemy. By the 23rd the French must grow weaker; and Blücher supposed they had given up the pursuit. As a matter of fact, they were advancing all along the line; they repulsed the Allies in three successive fights, and continued their forward movement on the following day.

The situation of the Silesian army was now very serious. Provisions, equipment, and clothing were insufficient; the troops were tired out; in spite of great sacrifices they were unable to hold their ground. Blücher feared that his army would be destroyed piecemeal, and determined to try the desperate remedy of a pitched battle. On August 25 Napoleon had hurried back to Dresden with a portion of his army, leaving over the command of the remaining troops to Macdonald. The Marshal dispatched 60,000 men in a side direction, and crossed the Katzbach and the Neisse with 67,000 men, intending to fall upon Blücher's flank. As the Prussians also advanced, the two armies came unexpectedly into collision. In consequence of the heavy rain the river Neisse was rising back high. The French crossed the swollen torrent, and climbed up the steep right bank. Falling into disorder, they were attacked by York's corps at close quarters before they could gain a foothold on the plateau. A fierce fight ensued; the Prussian cavalry were forced to give way, but the Russian squadrons broke through the French flank and rear and decided the battle. The French cavalry was flung back upon their own infantry; and the whole force was driven in confusion down the hollow lanes and precipitous slopes. Prussian batteries placed on the edge of the plateau fired into the disorganised masses hurled in by the torrent below. Darkness close put an end to the work of destruction.

The French were beaten, but it was only their centre that had been engaged on the high ground; their left wing had not come up. It was the pursuit which turned the partial into a decisive defeat. The French were hampered in their retirement by the rivers; their retreat became a

most. The Prussians also suffered terribly owing to the weather; hunger and want of clothing and ammunition hindered the pursuit. On the 25th Macdonald crossed the Elbe; finally, after another fierce fight at Bunsen, the river Quale separated the two armies.

Blücher now received the news of Napoleon's victory at Dresden (August 26-27). Fearing that the Emperor would hasten to relieve the army of the Bober, the Prussian general left his main army on the Quale, and with his van-guard only pursued on Macdonald, who at last succeeded in concentrating his army at Götitz. On September 1 Blücher was able to report that Silesia was free, and that 180 guns, 800 ammunition waggon, and 18,000 prisoners had been taken. If Prussian generalship had not yet attained its full perfection, it had already demonstrated its medical principles—ruthless employment of all forces, cooperation of all branches of the service, energetic use of cavalry, and strenuous pursuit.

We turn now to the army of the north, which consisted of 115,000 Prussians, Russians, and Swedes, under the command of Bernadotte, together with Tauentzien's 4th Prussian corps, which, after deducting the garrison troops, comprised 55,000 men for action in the field. Tauentzien was independent, but he was directed to keep in touch with the Crown Prince, whose main force consisted of Blücher's Prussian corps of 88,000 men. Napoleon had appointed these divisions of his army to act against the army of the north—the Berlin army under Grolow, with 68,000 men; Grolow's intermediate corps, with 15,000; and the army of the lower Elbe, about 25,000 men, under Darnow.

The Crown Prince of Sweden had his political as well as his military ends; he was cunning, reserved, and untrustworthy; as a soldier, he was a mixture of capacity and incapacity; moreover, fear of Napoleon, his former master in warfare, made him downright cowardly. Of his generals, Blücher, a clear-headed, enterprising commander, though self-willed and difficult to manage, was by far the most notable. The conflicting views of the Crown Prince and the Prussian generals were apparent from the first. Bernadotte certainly wished to save Berlin; but he preferred retiring behind the shelter of the Havel and the Spree to being beaten by Napoleon. For the Prussians the defense of Berlin was the main point. They desired, therefore, if it must be, to leave their homes to flames before and not behind the capital. But, as there seemed no serious risk in delay, the Crown Prince also remained in the north, until he realized even on August 17 that the army of Grolow, then in process of concentration, was all he had in front of him.

Napoleon was busy with Blücher and Schwarzenberg; but, as he stood in need of a moral success, he ordered Grolow to break through the combined army of the north and occupy Berlin. On August 31 the Marshal began to advance, and after two days' fighting succeeded in passing the defenses and masses of the Neije. The chief difficulty was

overcome; and Gudinot, believing that he would meet with no serious resistance till he reached Berlin, continued his march in three divided columns. But things fell out otherwise. Bernadotte resolved to attack him with his whole army, while Tauernitz engaged the French right wing. Gudinot's right therefore came into collision with the Prussians at Hakenfeld, and was repulsed. In the centre Reynier was victorious at Gross-Bersen, after which he imprudently bivouacked. Hardly were his troops encamped when Prussian shells burst suddenly in their midst. Bülow had heard the sound of fighting. He first advanced his guns, the infantry taking up a position behind them. The village of Gross-Bersen and the windmill hill were stormed. A French counter-attack failed. Reynier was forced to give way; the support of the left French column came too late; and Gudinot was forced to retire with the loss of 2000 men. Berlin was saved.

Unfortunately the pursuit was weak, partly through Bernadotte's fault, partly through Bülow's. The Crown Prince was hampered by his fear both of a renewed attack by Napoleon on his front and of a flank attack from a camp on his right. This was not, as Bernadotte supposed, Davout's army, but Girard's division, which on the 27th was encamped about 2000 strong at Hagenberg, not far from Sobitz. Against it the Crown Prince despatched the Prussian general Hindersfeldt, with 12,000 men, all militia. He succeeded in surprising Girard, and all but annihilated his division. Only six battalions got away.

Meanwhile the main army of the Allies was drawn up before the Saxon capital, garrisoned by Saint-Cyr with only three divisions. Napoleon was approaching to its relief. Had the Allies made a comprehensive and energetic attack, they might have taken the place. Fighting actually began early on August 26, but was carried on in so slack and disconnected a fashion that Saint-Cyr was able to hold out till the arrival of reinforcements. Napoleon had been in Dresden since 9 a.m. He halted by the bridge over the Elbe and directed the reinforcements to their places as they came up. By 3 a.m. all his infantry had reached the left bank. He had despatched General Vandamme with a strong corps to Pirna, there to cross the Elbe and outmanœuvre the retreat of the Allies. Meanwhile it was decided at head-quarters to cease fighting; but, as Schwarzenberg gave no orders to that effect, the battle blazed out afresh about 4 a.m. The defeat of the Allies was a foregone conclusion. Their front was nearly two miles long; and there was on their side no unity of generalship, no connected movement, no clear aim. On the other side there was sound generalship, masterly use of the ground, the capacity to seize the decisive moment. When the Allies were worn out, the French began to attack. By nightfall the Allies had gained nothing, but, rather, had lost ground; while Napoleon, on the other hand, had deployed all his forces and prepared for a steady advance.

The Allies were still 140,000 strong, and the next day were reinforced

by 25,000, while Napoleon had only 100,000 men. But this numerical superiority was more than cancelled by the moral depression of the one side and the exaltation of the other. The Council of War, chiefly influenced by the King of Prussia, decided to stand firm the next day. Napoleon planned a comprehensive attack on both of the enemy's wings, in order to drive Schwarzenberg into the difficult mountain country. This operation was facilitated by the fact that the left wing, 20,000 strong, was divided from the main army by the valley of Plesse. Meanwhile Vandamme had arrived at Pirna. At 7 a.m. on the 27th the French began to advance; and before long a fierce fight was raging. At 5 p.m. the allied left was completely broken. Till then Schwarzenberg had held his ground, but now the defeat of his left wing began to tell. Schwarzenberg announced that want of the least resources compelled the Austrian army to retreat into Bohemia—a resolution which decided the fate of his allies. The retreat was to be made in three columns, the eastern consisting of the Russian and Prussian divisions, which were to move by Dohna to Toplitz; the other two of Austrian troops. Accordingly, as circumstances permitted, the troops left the field. The losses of the Allies on the 27th amounted to 25,000 men, besides from 8000 to 6000 lost in the retreat. General Horvath, who had joined the Taur, was killed in the battle.

On a pitch-dark night, amid torrents of rain, over rough and obstructed roads, marched the dense masses of the main army, fatigued, starving, and dejected. Under a hot pursuit their destruction would have been certain, especially that of the eastern column, which had been ordered to take the Pirna road, already, in all likelihood, occupied by Vandamme. When Napoleon heard next day of the retreat, he determined on an energetic pursuit. His first idea was to get ahead of the enemy with a strong force on the Pirna road; subsequently he transferred his main strength westward, where Murat was to fall upon the Austrians in flank and rear. Vandamme was to continue his march upon Toplitz. On the 28th, his advanced troops came up with the Russian rear-guard at Peterswald; the latter, however, held their ground till the whole column met near Nollendorf. Fierce rear-guard actions were fought, first at Nollendorf, and later at Kohn, which enabled the French to debouch from the hill country.

At this point the Russian general Ostermann received a letter from the King of Prussia, describing the perilous position of the main army with the Emperor Alexander, and requesting him to hold back the enemy. Seeing the last sheltered position, Ostermann risked the unequal combat. Meanwhile the King sent his adjutants in all directions to gather troops for the relief of the main army, and Alexander adopted a similar course. They hoped to collect by the next day (August 30) a force sufficient to check Vandamme's impetuous advance. In the interval, Ostermann, with his 12,000 men, was thrown on his own resources. In

front of the Russians was the village of Pristina. The battle, which began about 10 a.m., grew hotter as the French forces increased. Three times Pristina was taken and lost. When, late in the afternoon, Vandamme advanced to the decisive attack, Duke Eugene of Württemberg headed the cavalry against his flank. The French advance was checked, but they hoped to renew it next day with large reinforcements, for Vandamme believed that either Saint-Cyr or Morier was ready to support him. More than 8000 Russians had fallen, but they had gloriously discharged their task. Strong reinforcements poured in, until the Allies could muster 80,000 men. A counter-attack was planned for the following day. Grave anxiety was felt for Kléb's Prussian corps, which was still entangled in the hill country behind. But this very circumstance might be turned to advantage. Kléb was ordered so to direct his movement as to fall on Vandamme's rear. In compliance with these instructions, and also because his own retreat was cut off, Kléb turned outward and took the same road by which the enemy had advanced before him.

Vandamme now stood before Kulm across the road, with his right wing resting on the high ground. The Allies resolved to throw their superior force on his left and drive him up against the hills. If Kléb came up in time from Nollendorf in Vandamme's rear, he would be surrounded on three sides. The battle began early on August 30. In spite of a stubborn resistance the Austrians were already succeeding in their aim when the sound of Kléb's guns was heard. Having reached the heights of Nollendorf, he fell upon a French detachment between that place and Kulm, and brought his artillery into play. Recognizing the dangerous nature of his position, Vandamme at once determined to unite all his forces at Kulm, and, if possible, break through the Prussian line. But now the Russians and Austrians pressed forward. Before long all was in confusion, and at Kulm two French divisions laid down their arms. Meanwhile the main French force hurled itself upon the Prussians, and with the fury of despair swept three brigades out of their path; but, rushing forward in confusion, they encountered a fourth Prussian brigade, which completed their destruction.

Vandamme's division was almost wiped out; 10,000 prisoners fell into the hands of the Allies, including Vandamme himself. The fact is that Napoleon had left him in the lurch. He had mistaken the direction taken by the enemy, and, when he ascertained the truth, he had delayed to send speedy help. The battle of Kulm marks a turning-point in the campaign; it nullified Napoleon's victory at Dresden and completed the effects of the reverses at Gross-Beross and the Katzbach, to which indeed that of Kulm was partly due. At Kulm, for the first time, the combined efforts of the three allied nations had won a victory. Even the dependent Schwarzenberg began to hope; and Metternich finally broke off his secret relations with Napoleon.

Napoleon himself began to hesitate. He abandoned the Napoleonic method, which consisted in dealing rapid and crushing blows. He had, by his delay, forfeited the overwhelming success which a solution prompt of the allied arms would have attained: now he thought of advancing upon Berlin, but, as he dared not move so far from Dresden, he sent Ney instead. He himself meant to take up a central position near Hoppenwerda, which would enable him to fall upon Blücher's right flank, to support Ney, and to cover Dresden. On September 3 he received news of the disaster that had befallen Mackenrodt, whereupon he advanced against Blücher, but the latter again withdrew beyond his march. At the same time the Emperor received news that the army of Dürerode was again on the march, while his own troops were in extremity from hunger and want. He therefore abandoned his pursuit of Blücher and hurried back to Dresden, which he entered on the 6th. Meanwhile Saint-Cyr had yielded slowly to superior numbers. Napoleon reached the front on the 6th, and attacked and repulsed the enemy. The situation seemed to be improving, when news arrived of fresh disaster, the defeat of Ney at Dennewitz. Napoleon appeared to take it calmly, but he sent secret instructions to the Minister of War in Paris to take measures for the defence of the French frontier.

Ney had had orders to move towards Jüterbog on September 4, as so to attack Berlin in conjunction with the Emperor on the 6th or 10th. He found the French army, about 55,000 strong, on the right bank of the Elbe, in evil case; and he had no precise information as to the enemy. In obedience to his orders he set out on the 5th, and drove the Prussians under Tauxemien back upon Jüterbog. Bülow was further west; but in the night he moved eastward, and unknown to the enemy, encamped within two miles of him. Early on the 6th, Tauxemien marched to join Bülow with 8000 men, when he observed the French approaching, and took up a position on the high ground north of Dennewitz. Ney, not expecting any serious combat that day, had made no reconnoissances. His three corps set out at different times, and consequently arrived at long intervals on the battlefield.

The country near Dennewitz is a lofty table-land, intersected from west to east by the Alsbach, whose narrow banks could only be crossed by bridges at Dennewitz and Eckartsch. The rivulet then cut across the French line of advance and divided the battlefield into two parts. When Bertrand had got past Dennewitz, he attacked Tauxemien, and after an hour's fighting compelled him to give way. A cavalry charge temporarily relieved the pressure, and gave Bülow time to throw himself on the French right. Bülow's first advance was repulsed, but, as fresh reinforcements appeared, he succeeded in gaining possession of the prominent hill, an important point, and occupied it with 24 guns. The French line of battle was then forced in a westerly direction, so that its centre now rested on the village of Dennewitz. The Prussian

left now advanced, and after a fierce conflict drove Bertrand to retreat. Meanwhile Ney's corps came into action on the French left between Domschitz and Göhlisdorf; Gudinot came up later, and forced Bontell's division, which had joined the Prussian line on the other side of Göhlisdorf. The French were now in overwhelming superiority; they recaptured Göhlisdorf; and, as the Crown Prince was still too often away, the battle was apparently won.

Ney, however, threw away his chance. Failing to perceive that the decisive point was in the south, he ordered Gudinot to reinforce the troops on the northern bank of the stream. Gudinot obeyed, and withdrew his men from the front. At this moment the Prussian troops themselves in force upon Göhlisdorf, took it after a desperate struggle, and captured also the commanding position of the windmill hill. Hageler and Bertrand were now forced to abandon their positions; and Ney failed in a desperate attempt to break through the enemy's line. The arrival of reinforcements from the Crown Prince crushed the last efforts at resistance. Darkness and exhaustion put an end to the pursuit. The Prussian losses amounted to more than 16,000 men; the French but 12,000 men and 23 guns.

The defeat at Domschitz prevented the French army of the north from prosecuting the attack on Berlin, while it placed the Crown Prince in a position to molest the Emperor's combinations—an opportunity which he neglected to use. It was Blücher's flank march to the middle Elbe which brought about a turn of the tide. Further north, the course of the campaign was influenced by the reverses at Gross-Berona and Domschitz. In that quarter Davout commanded an army neither numerically formidable nor otherwise trustworthy. Napoleon had intended that Gudinot and Davout should simultaneously advance upon Berlin, the former from the south, the latter from the north. But the course of events had condemned Davout to comparative inactivity; and Gudinot's defeat had forced him to withdraw further from Hamburg. Wülmaden was therefore able to cross the Elbe, and, defeating a French division on the Göltzke, to reverse Hammer. Hamburg became an isolated subject.

We left Napoleon to the Elbingshe, where tidings reached him of Ney's defeat. He determined at first to continue his advance towards Bohemia, but subsequently, fearing to move too far from Dresden, he returned thither, directing Saint-Cyr to hold the coast of the Elbingshe. Since the recommencement of hostilities, the Emperor had lost nearly 150,000 men, 800 guns, and an immense quantity of war material. His communications were constantly disturbed by roving bands. It was almost impossible to provision his army; the hospitals were full to overflowing; the courage and efficiency of his troops diminished daily. The Emperor no longer attempted great enterprises; he restricted himself to taking advantage of the enemy's mistakes, while he himself

committed the grave blunder of clinging obstinately to Dresden, though his position there had become untenable.

The army of Bohemia was equally inactive. For some time no important movements took place. After the defeat at Dresden, it was considered desirable to withdraw Blücher from Silesia to Bohemia; and on September 11 orders were actually sent him to that effect. Fortunately, however, he remained in Silesia; and, with Saint-Cyr's retreat to the east of the Erzgebirge, the situation changed. Nevertheless, in spite of their numerical superiority, the Allies were still unwilling to seek to close quarters, and attempted only minor operations. Hope lay rather with Blücher and the army of the north. Eventually the Prussian general succeeded in saving the Crown Prince, and finally the main army, to more energetic measures.

Napoleon found himself half surrounded by superior forces, which, with the army of Poland, amounted to 350,000 men. His position becoming increasingly critical, he finally abandoned the right bank of the Elbe, and drew up his army in a hook line, facing east along the river from Meissen to Königstein, and south from the Erzgebirge to Paderew. Hearing that the army of Bohemia was at last marching to the north-west, towards Chemnitz and Leipzig—a plan which had more than once been taken up previously and dropped—he was in hopes that he would now be able to attack it, when news came that part of the army of Silesia was on the march. He expected an attack on Dresden, and discovered too late that Blücher had crossed the Elbe.

On September 3 Napoleon, abandoning his advance against Bohemia, had turned against Blücher, whose main base was at Görlitz. Blücher received early information of the danger, and retired during the night. The Emperor reached Görlitz, but returned to Dresden. Blücher now again advanced, and drove back Marmont's beyond Bautzen, but, with Napoleon so near him, did not feel equal to an energetic attack. He decided to await Bernadotte's arrival, and then to push forward rapidly, and cross the Elbe between Torgau and Wittenberg. Bernadotte, with the army of Poland, at length reached Bohemia unobserved. The numerical superiority of the Allies was now such that a decisive battle became inevitable; but, as Schwarzenberg and the Crown Prince still hesitated, Blücher decided to force their hand. Leaving his corps to cover Silesia, he marched westward on the 8th. The Crown Prince declared himself ready to cross the Elbe with him, and restored the bridge over that river near the village of Elster. On hearing of this, Ney dispatched Bertrand to Wartenburg, a town on the left bank of the Elbe opposite to Elster. Bertrand here assembled his whole corps, about 14,000 men, with 32 guns, in a position rendered almost impregnable by the surrounding marshes and water. An attack was only possible on the extreme right by the village of Haiditz. Bertrand, knowing that he had the army of Silesia in front of him, garrisoned this



place with only 1500 men and six guns. With great difficulty the Allies succeeded in breaking through at this point, while the main French force was held fast at Wartenburg. The Prussians suffered fearful losses; one battalion was reduced to sixty men. Blücher taken, Blücher gave orders to attack Wartenburg from this point. The Prussian divisions forced their way through water and masses into the French positions. Other divisions now advanced from different sides; and Bernadotte was forced to beat a hasty retreat with heavy loss. The passage of the Elbe was accomplished. From the strategical point of view it was the most awful action of the campaign.

The situation was completely changed by the simultaneous advance of two allied armies upon Leipzig, one from the north, the other from the south. Their object was to combine, Napoleon's to frustrate their combination by defeating them singly. He had still 227,000 men; but he was obliged to divide his forces, employing the larger half for the attack, the smaller for the defence. In spite of this division, his effective force was still a match for either of the hostile armies. He determined to hold Dresden and its environs with Saint-Cyr's corps alone, and himself to advance with 100,000 men against Blücher and the Crown Prince, while the King of Naples was to hold up the slowly advancing army of Bohemia. After defeating the armies of the north, the Emperor intended to join Murat by way of Leipzig, and to crush Schwarzenberg.

On October 3 Napoleon set out against Blücher. He advanced to the district between the Mulde and the Elbe, while the Crown Prince crossed the Elbe near Dresden and searched cautiously for a short distance along the left bank of the Mulde. On the 9th, near Halles, Napoleon almost caught the army of Saxony, which hardly succeeded in evading the attack of his immensely superior forces by falling back on the Crown Prince. Napoleon found himself in painful perplexity; he knew nothing of the enemy's designs; he received bad news from Murat and Saint-Cyr. On the other side Blücher and the Crown Prince were at variance. Bernadotte was anxious to avoid fighting, and preferred to take shelter behind the Saale; Blücher, on the other hand, wished to approach the army of Bohemia, to march on Leipzig, and, in combination with the Crown Prince, to risk a battle. Eventually, nothing was left for Blücher but to cross the Saale at Halle. In his new position he confronted the French, with the Crown Prince behind him.

Meanwhile a French detachment crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg, dispersed the Prussians belonging that place, and took Domsa. The Emperor hoped that this movement would force the Crown Prince to withdraw to the right bank of the Elbe, leaving him free to fall upon the army of Bohemia with 200,000 men. But, learning that Blücher was still at Halle, and that the retreat of the Crown Prince was doubtful, he made up his mind that the time had come to concentrate his forces at Leipzig. The forces which had crossed the Elbe were therefore

ordered to seize the bridges over that river, and then to march upon Leipzig, whether the French divisions on the left bank of the Elbe had already begun to move. The French occupation of Dessau had a depressing effect on the Crown Prince. Blücher begged him to march straight upon Leipzig; but he preferred a junction at Halle. Finally, on October 13, in accordance with orders received from head-quarters, the army of Silesia set out alone, following the right bank of the Elbe in the direction of Leipzig.

Napoleon had hoped, by taking advantage of the inner line, to beat the allied armies singly before they could effect a combination. But his design had failed; it was he who in the end was compelled to fall back on Leipzig, while the Allies pressed forward against it from the north and south. We left the army of Bohemia on the borders of Saxony. When joined by the army of Poland it numbered 240,000 men. But Schwarzenberg was incapable of an energetic offensive. Leaving Hennigsen and Colloredo to guard Bohemia, he commenced his north-westerly march on September 26; but his movement was so undecided and dilatory that he did not reach Altenburg till October 14. Nothing went right. Though the cavalry were exceptionally strong, they were not sent forward, but kept in the rear; the divisions continually fell into disorder; above all, Schwarzenberg dreaded an encounter with Napoleon, and endeavored rather to manoeuvre the enemy out of Saxony. Such a scheme was foredoomed to failure. In spite of his great numerical superiority, he failed to tear asunder the veil which Napoleon had drawn over his operations against the northern army, and did nothing to hinder its eventual defeat. It was entirely owing to Blücher that, on October 14, the three allied armies were near enough together to be able to plan a combined attack for the 16th. Masséu recommended the forces operating against the main army, but had only three weak corps at his disposal. Nothing but his own boldness and the enemy's indecision enabled him to hold Schwarzenberg in check, and thus give the Emperor time to engage Blücher and Bernadotte.

On the 15th news was received at head-quarters of the conclusion of a treaty with Bavaria, also a despatch from Blücher saying that he was at Halle, with the Crown Prince in his neighbourhood. The despatch ended with these words: "The three armies are now so close together that a simultaneous attack, on the point where the enemy has concentrated his forces, might be undertaken." Blücher proved himself, now as ever, the compelling power. Schwarzenberg, however, could not make up his mind to any comprehensive movement against Leipzig, but persisted in his endeavour to avoid an encounter with Napoleon, with which aim he pushed his army a little to the left—a movement which would either have enabled the enemy, with superior numbers, to attack the allied forces separately, or to withdraw in time before being surrounded. At this point Russian influence intervened, and effected a

continued movement upon Leipzig. Unfortunately it was carried out in three sections, on the right of the Pleiss, between the Pleiss and the Elster, and on the left of the Elster. Wittgenstein was to make a reconnaissance in force; and this led, on the 16th, to an engagement at Liebertwolkwitz, the greatest cavalry fight of the campaign.

Murat had at his disposal about 52,000 infantry, 14,000 cavalry, and 100 guns. These he posted on hilly ground south of Leipzig, his left resting on Liebertwolkwitz, his centre on Wachsen, and his right on Markklesberg. The range commanded the country stretching north, its highest point being the Gölzchenberg, between Liebertwolkwitz and Wachsen. It thus formed a position well protected against an enemy approaching from the south. The Allies began the battle with inadequate forces. Attacks and counter-attacks were made and failed; a turning movement was vainly essayed by Murat; a general advance of the French cavalry was repelled. Meanwhile the Austrian infantry had succeeded, after a hard struggle, in occupying the greater part of Liebertwolkwitz; but the French artillery prevented them from advancing further. At Wachsen the fighting was indecisive. The cavalry attacks having failed all along the line, Murat pushed forward his infantry; but it was too late. The Allies were reinforced; and the French abandoned their attempt. Round Liebertwolkwitz the conflict raged till evening, when the Austrians evacuated the village. In the end, both armies retained their positions. Murat still held the heights, and thus secured for Napoleon an advantageous ground for the decisive battle; but his cavalry was severely shaken.

At the allied head-quarters it was decided to employ the next day in preparing for a great battle on the 16th. Blücher received orders to march upon Leipzig, and to effect a junction with an Austrian division at Markklesberg. On the 16th the main army took up the positions which had been assigned as the starting-point for the operations of the 16th. On the 16th Napoleon had arrived at Leipzig. There were many reasons against his venturing on a decisive battle. His troops had suffered greatly, particularly the cavalry; the *Mahomedan* troops were disaffected and meditated desertion; the generals were sick of fighting. If, nevertheless, the Emperor stood firm, he did so trusting to his guns and his star. He hoped to annihilate Schwarzenberg before the army of the north could arrive. With Blücher in the field this was a rash hope; it failed, and the mistake proved fatal.

Napoleon still had 190,000 men with 734 guns, a force amply sufficient for victory, seeing that it was under single control; whereas, on the side of the Allies, a multiplicity of leaders destroyed the requisite unity of command. The allied armies numbered over 300,000 men, with 1835 guns. But, on the first day of battle, the Allies were short of 100,000 men, while only 18,000 were missing on the French side. On the other hand, the moral of the allied troops was decidedly

explosion. At last they were face to face with the arch-enemy, and could repay him with interest for the suffering he had inflicted on them. Less confidence was felt at head-quarters: Schwarzenberg, as usual, opposed an encounter with the greatest of living commanders.

Napoleon directed General Bertrond to take up a position at Lindenau, west of Leipzig, with 10,000 men. A force numbering 20,000 was to cover Leipzig on the north; but, as the enemy was supposed to be still distant on this side, this force was to cooperate, if possible, with the main army. The latter, amounting to about 110,000 men, was drawn up in the form of a crescent south of the city, in much the same position as that already held by Marmt, stretching from the banks of the Pleisse to Heilsbrunn. Against this position the Allies advanced in a wide semicircle. There was a wide divergence in the views of their commanders. Schwarzenberg was for attacking from the west, so as to crumple up the Emperor's line and bar his retreat: but, in order to carry out this plan, they would have had to cross the Pleisse, between which and the Elster lay nearly impassable fens, where a few thousand men could have suffered for the defence. This plan was therefore given up; and, by Alexander's advice, the Russians and Prussians remained on the right bank of the Pleisse, while only the larger portion of the Austrian force crossed that stream. The result was that the Allies had only 64,000 men on the main battlefield, which left them numerically inferior to the French; and that three separate engagements took place, at Lindenau, at Connewitz, and on the right bank of the Pleisse. As Schwarzenberg led the Austrian contingent, the supreme command in a manner devolved upon the Russian general Barclay. The monarchs of Russia and Prussia stationed themselves on the Waidenberg; Napoleon was at Wachen. The 16th of October dawned dull and cold: rain and mist partly hid the operations.

The Allies advanced in four columns. The attack was opened about 8:30 a.m. by Kleist's Prussians, who after an hour's fierce combat wrested Markklesberg from the French. Meanwhile the second column, under Duke Eugene, advanced against Napoleon's centre at Wachen. This village also fell; and the whole French line seemed to waver. Suddenly everything was changed. Napoleon appeared on the field, and at once took advantage of the scattered formation of the Allies. Sending 177 guns to the front at Wachen, he opened an overwhelming cannonade, under cover of which dense masses of infantry moved forward. After an obstinate resistance the Russians were forced back into the plain, where, having no cover, they were mown down by thousands. Meanwhile, on the east, Markklesberg was several times lost and won; on the west the Austrians under Klenau captured Liebertsdorffchen, but had to surrender it again. The allied line began slowly to give way.

Napoleon now determined to break through the weakest part of the enemy's line at Wachen, despatching Moutonville to turn their right. The sovereigns, recognising their danger, requested Schwarzenberg to

transfer the Austrian reserves to the threatened quarter, and called up from the rear the Guard and grenadiers; but much time was lost before these orders were carried out. Between 12 and 1 o'clock the French advance began. Under cover of a shower of fire from 100 guns, 18,000 cavalry under Murat galloped forward. They divided into two parts, the smaller advancing against Kleist, the larger against Eugene. Behind the cavalry the Emperor massed his infantry, while Manteuffel advanced on the French left. At first all went well. Murat's powerful column rode down two battalions of infantry, took 35 Russian guns, dispersed a division of Russian cavalry of the Guard, and stormed on to within a few hundred paces of the Wachtberg, where the Emperor Alexander stood. If the infantry had followed up the charge, the battle would have been won. But at this point the cavalry, already in some disorder, was checked by a march between two lakes; the defenders hurried up from all sides; and the French advance was stopped. Unsupported by reserves, one regiment after another turned round, the bags were strewn back, while the French guns fired indiscriminately upon friend and foe. The attack on the allied left shared the same fate; here, too, a fatal blow was all but dealt, when the Austrian reserves came up and checked the charge. It was doubtless owing to Napoleon's absence that the infantry had failed to come up at the right moment; and now the retreating squadrons prevented the foot from deploying. All they could do was to form squares and repel the counter-attack. Secondary collisions occurred at various places; and at 5 a.m. the battle in this part of the field ended in a serious *recommence*.

Meanwhile the main Austrian force had been losing heavily and to no purpose among the swamps and thickets on the left bank of the Pläsen. Schwarzenberg at last recognised his error, and sent a detachment to the chief scene of action, whether he himself followed. On the extreme left, at Lindenau, the Austrians, in spite of their superiority, had no success. Thus, on the whole, the French had won the day, for they had repulsed the attack of the army of Bohemia; but they had gained no decisive victory, and this was all-important. Such a victory would have been theirs if Ney and Marmont had joined in the main battle. Napoleon called them up, but Marmont was engaged with Blücher; and Ney, who was already on the march, was forced to go to his colleague's assistance. He arrived on the field too late, having dragged his corps—which might have decided the issue on the north, as on the south—backwards and forwards to no purpose.

Just as the cavalry charge at Wachen was at its height, a dull rumble was heard down the north. Blücher took it for a distant thunderstorm; but Napoleon's practised ear recognised the sound of guns, and knew what it meant. He turned his horse round, and rode full speed to Möckern; hence his absence from Wachen at the decisive moment of the fight. Blücher had started early, and his steps were hastened by the

speed of heavy firing at Wachen; but, as the Crown Prince gave him inadequate support, he was compelled to advance with great caution. He arrived when Marmont was on the point of starting; and the latter at once saw that everything depended on keeping him back. With this view he took up a strong position between Möckern and Ebnitzsch, posting forty guns behind the former village. Blücher, for his part, knew that the army of Bohemia must be relieved, and that therefore he must go forward without counting the cost. Six times did the Prussians under York attempt to storm Möckern, which was stubbornly defended by the French. A savage hand-to-hand struggle raged in the narrow village streets. House after house was taken; but the French artillery prevented a complete occupation, and even enabled their infantry to recover the larger part of the village. An attack on the heights behind Möckern was repelled with heavy loss; and the battle seemed lost. In this extremity, York hurled his cavalry upon the enemy; the charge was successful, and the French gave way. The infantry instantly followed up the attack: and Marmont's forces fell back upon Leipzig in disorder.

The struggle for the possession of Möckern was the bloodiest episode of the whole war. The Prussian losses were estimated at between 3500 and 7000 men; those of Marmont were about the same. The total losses of the two armies cannot be exactly reckoned; approximately they were, on the side of the Allies, 55,000 killed and wounded, besides 2000 prisoners; on that of the French, the numbers were 33,000 and 3500 respectively. The "Battle of the Nations" had thus cost over 60,000 men. After the battle of Borodino, it was the most sanguinary in modern history.

On the morning of the 17th the allied armies stood ready to renew the struggle; but, as Napoleon did not attack, they put off the combat till the following day, when the arrival of the Crown Prince and Bernadotte would give them a crushing superiority. The only movement was made by Blücher, who drove the French farther back upon GutsMuth; but, as quiet reigned to the south of Leipzig, he too paused.

Napoleon's position was clear enough. He had been mistaken about Blücher, and had gained no real victory at Wachen. Two avenues alone were open to him, either to heat a speedy retreat, in order to extricate himself from the toils, or to resume the battle instantly, in order to make the most of his advantage over Schwarzenberg. He did neither, but gloomed and undecided, sat brooding over the prospect. Finally he despatched to his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, the offer of an armistice; but no answer was vouchsafed. While he hoped and waited, time went by; and his doom implacably approached.

In the evening of the 17th he decided to continue the battle on the morrow; but he despatched Bertrand to cover a possible retreat by securing the passages of the Saale. Mörler had orders to guard the pass of Lindenau; and the whole army was concentrated round Leipzig.

The French line formed a sweeping semicircle on the south, west, and north sides of Leipzig, resting to the southwest on the Pelise at Lützen, to the northward on the Elster at Götzitz. The centre of this position, at Pausdorf, was left weak, because Napoleon believed that the army of the north would not take part in the battle. The comparative strength of the forces had changed very much to his disadvantage. The French army numbered only about 180,000 men, of whom 5000 Saxons and Württembergers subsequently deserted. The Allies were twice as strong; they were able in the course of the day to bring up about 320,000 men, of whom over 180,000 were fresh troops. Nevertheless, Napoleon, unaware of this fact, still hoped for victory.

Schwarzenberg had kept only a weak Austrian detachment on the left bank of the Pelise. The main army was to the south of Leipzig, Blicher to the north. The space between was to be filled on the left by Bennigsen, when he arrived, on the right by the Crown Prince. But the latter was unwilling to expose himself unless Blicher made over to him Langewiesche's corps and Saint-Priest's division; that is to say, half the army of Saxony. It was an exorbitant demand; but the Field-marshal, with proverbially self-derogation, was ready to grant anything, in order that the army of the north should go forward.

Schwarzenberg formed the main army in three columns. The first, under the Prince of Hesse-Hanau, was to drive the French from the Pelise; the second, under Barclay, was to advance by way of Wachsen; the third, under Bennigsen, to the right of that position, was to push forward by way of Hoffmannsdorf and Silberstein. The three attacks were to be made simultaneously at 7 a.m.; but Bennigsen did not arrive till 8 a.m., and the Crown Prince till 4 p.m.; while, in spite of the large number of troops available, the reserves were not brought into play. These circumstances, combined with a grievous lack of generalship at head-quarters, enabled Napoleon for some time to hold his own.

The Austrians, on the extreme left, began by capturing several villages, and won their way to Connewitz; but here they were again driven back by the Young Guard and the Pelise, until the arrival of reinforcements enabled them to make another stand. It was a serious disadvantage to the Austrians that Barclay, their neighbour on the right, did not make a simultaneous advance. He found Wachsen and Liebertsdorf unoccupied, but was met at Probsthaida by a heavy fire. The Prussians and Russians forced their way into the village, and, though repeatedly driven out, had occupied the greater part of it, when the din of 150 guns brought them to a halt. Shaken by this cannonade, they were attacked by the Old and the Young Guard with some 200 regiments, and driven from the village. The slaughter was so terrible that Schwarzenberg withdrew his troops, and left Probsthaida to the French.

The cause of Barclay's delay was his desire to await Bennigsen's information. When the latter at length came up, he had a vastly

superior force against Macdonald. The French made a desperate defence, especially at Hohenhausen: but nowhere eventually held. All the neighbouring villages fell into the hands of the Allies: still they could make no further advance. To the left of Macdonald stood Reynier with the Saxons and Württembergers. Both, especially the Saxons, had long been disaffected; but the King had not dared to desert Napoleon. These troops now took the matter into their own hands, and the majority went over to the Allies. The rank and file welcomed them with cries of joy, the generals with coldness. The King of Prussia coolly remarked, "These gentlemen from Saxony are a little late; they could have moved as many men." Reynier, left with only 4000 men, defended Pommersdorf obstinately, and till 4 a.m. kept the enemy at bay.

At this point the northern army struck in, the Prussians under Blücher in front. They stormed the burning village, but a further advance was repelled with loss; and Napoleon, coming up with the Young and the Old Guard, recaptured Pommersdorf. It was only for a time; the Allies were reinforced, and the place became untenable. The French retired, but, till night fell, they held their ground in the village of Stöben. The next village to Stöben was Schönbüchel, which formed the key of the French position on the left bank of the Parthe, north of Leipzig. Here stood Marmont with his weakened corps. Langensien attacked him at 3 a.m.; and a conflict ensued, which, if possible, exceeded all the rest in violence. Finally Langensien engaged his entire corps; but not till midnight did the French evacuate the village, in which there lay 10,000 killed and wounded men. Here, too, Blücher's advance finally told. On the extreme right Sacken led the attack, while York had charge of the reserves. The Russians, after some preliminary success, were driven back beyond Gohlis, so that the Prussians had to come to their relief and to storm the village again. Wittenberg fell after severe fighting. The French were at length forced back to their entrenchments before the Half-gate of Leipzig.

The war went down in thick wreaths of smoke and the thunder of 1500 guns. Each side had lost about 25,000 men, the French rather less, the Allies rather more. Even now the battle, as a whole, was undecided. The French had repulsed every attack on their right wing; on their left and centre they had lost a number of villages; but it was only in front of Blücher that they were driven back upon Leipzig. Their line of retreat by Lindenau still remained open. The Allies could not claim a victory; rather they expected a renewal of the fight next day. Schwarzenberg gave orders accordingly. Blücher judged the situation more correctly, his opinion being that the essential thing was to block the enemy's retreat. He made little impression on Schwarzenberg, but Frederick William agreed that York should hasten on to Merseburg. York's cavalry reached Halle by the following morning.

On a low stool by the waist-fire sat the Emperor of the French.



He recognised that his position was untenable, and gave orders for the retreat. Then, utterly exhausted, he fell asleep. The directions which he appears to have given to construct bridges were not obeyed; and the army had to wind its way through the narrow streets of Leipzig, to pass out by a single gate, and to cross the river Pleisse at Lindenau by a single bridge. The operation necessarily took a long time. The retreat began at night, part of the troops being left to defend the outposts of the city as long as possible. The confusion was terrible; all order was lost; Napoleon himself was carried away in the stream of fugitives.

At daybreak on October 19 the Allies perceived that the field was empty and the battle won. They marched in from all sides towards Leipzig, slaying and robbing; but the possession of the city was disputed for hours, and the struggle was continued in the streets. On the Ransdorf bridge there was a fearful crash. It was already threatened by Gortchak's Russians, when suddenly it was blown into the air. This cut off the retreat of the troops who were still on the further side of the Pleisse. The Italian and Kleinschmidt troops laid down their arms, or turned them against their former comrades. The Polish and French, who acted as a rear-guard, made a desperate defense: when all was over, they flung themselves into the river. Many were drowned, among them the brave Marshal Piatkowski. Whole regiments and many generals, including Reynier, Lauriston, Beresford, and Mackintosh, were taken prisoners. But the victory was dearly bought. It was calculated that during the four days' battle 150,000 men were killed or wounded. The losses of the Allies were even heavier than those of the French; and 30,000 sick lay in the hospitals of Leipzig.

Napoleon's position was critical, all but hopeless. His line of retreat, or rather flight, passed across the left wing of the Allies; and almost the whole of Germany had to be traversed before a halt could be made. It was obvious that an energetic pursuit and an intelligent use of the resources offered by a hostile country were all that was needed to complete his annihilation. But neither was attempted. The Coalition was incapable of such swift and purposeful action. One Austrian detachment approached Napoleon's flank obliquely, but effected nothing. York alone showed himself dangerous, by seizing the passage of the Saale and compelling the Emperor to take the route through the Thuringer Wald by Erfurt. At Eisenach a detachment of Blücher's force vainly tried to stop his march. Instead of being allowed to press the pursuit, Blücher now received orders to march upon Glessen and Weimar, so as to oppose a possible passage of the Rhine at Coblenz: but Napoleon hurried straight on to Mainz. Near Ransau his further progress was hindered by the Russian general Wrede with some 40,000 men. The Russians fought obstinately, but after a three days' conflict (October 23-25) they were thrust aside. The French continued their march, and on November 2 crossed the Rhine at Mainz. Lack of

unanimity and noble generosity on the part of the Allies had saved Napoleon's army. But he had suffered serious additional losses on the way, and brought back to France only about 75,000 men, of whom 25,000 soon afterwards fell victims to typhus, and many others wasted away. Within little more than a year, two French armies, amounting together to nearly a million of men, had perished.

The autumn campaign of 1813 was by no means a masterpiece of Napoleonic strategy. The Emperor met the Allies with an army of almost equal strength; his generals were the most experienced in Europe, while two of the hostile armies were led by men of inferior ability; and yet he was completely defeated. The main causes of his defeat were in the man himself. His old genius still glowed within him, but he had left behind him in Russia his energy and his magic certainty of victory. Formerly his armies possessed both mobility and staying power; now he was tied and bound by the connection with Dresden. Dresden offered many advantages; with it he held Saxony in his hand; but it lay too near the English, and too far from the enemy's vulnerable points; and it was an unprotected town. Magdeburg, with its fortifications, would have made a better base of operations. Had it been occupied, the posthumous Schwarzenberg would have had to come out into the open field; Berlin would have been within attainable distance; and the Emperor could have left the defence of the city to its own ramparts and its own garrison. He would then have been to a certain extent free, whereas now he was crippled in every movement.

Moreover, he was always seeking new plans, but executed none of them with energy, independence, and consistency. Instead of using to the full the advantages of inner lines, by first annihilating one opponent and then attacking the next, he kept making partial advances and strokes in the air, which fatigued his troops and finally led him to Leipzig. He was allowed his victory over the main army to be turned into the defeat of Kulm. It must, however, be allowed that in the conduct of single battles he displayed far greater energy than in the strategic handling of his armies as a whole. A French officer, who was taken prisoner, said of the Emperor that his present strategy was strikingly different from the past: he had lost his old activity; he betrayed a great craving for comfort, especially for sleep; he was irritable and morose. In short, he resembled a sick Titan, suffering from some secret hurt; and his achievements were no longer proportionate to his resources.

Germany was now free to the Rhine; her territorial Princes returned to their capitals; only a few fortress towns still remained in the hands of the enemy. It might have been expected that the Allies would have at once invaded France; on the contrary, there ensued a long pause in the military operations. Military and political reasons, the very nature of

the Coalition, brought about a kind of armistice, a relaxation after the strain. The allied armies occupied the line of the Rhine; and the sovereigns of the Great Powers assembled at Frankfurt, where their conflicting aims and wishes at once asserted themselves.

Austria had, in the meanwhile, fought victoriously in Italy, and fully recovered her earlier position. The loss of her former Belgian possessions might now be counterbalanced south of the Alps. Thus she had no interest in the complete overthrow of Napoleon. On the contrary, to continue the war implied further sacrifices of men and money; and its result could not be foreseen. If it ended favourably, it would advance the prospects of Russia and Prussia more than those of Austria. The Crown Prince of Sweden, who commanded the northern army, was opposed to the invasion of France. He could not forget that he had once been a French Marshal, and he had his eye on the French throne; but his influence was rendered comparatively ineffective by the fact that he stood at the conquest of Norway, which involved war with Denmark. The army of Blücher, on the other hand, demanded an energetic offensive; but Blücher and Gneisenau were only generals, and Frederick William was anything but warlike. Timid and unenterprising, he chiefly aimed at preserving his army, his only defence among dissatisfied rivals. In the Russian head-quarters opinions were divided. Here many generals and diplomatists held that to continue fighting at an ever-increasing distance from their own frontier would bring little profit to Russia. The Tsar, on the other hand, was eager to press forward; he longed to counter Napoleon's entry into Moscow by his own entry into Paris. Besides, the more strongly he figured as the tutor of the Revolution incarnate in Napoleon, the more would his voice weigh in the final settlement, when he meant to assert extensive claims to Polish territory. On this point Austrian and Prussian interests were naturally opposed to those of Russia. On the other hand, his warlike mood chimed in with that of Blücher, and of the Tory party now in power in England. For years her army had fought victoriously against Napoleon in the Peninsula; and Wellington had now crossed the Pyrenees with some 80,000 men, and occupied a firm position in the south of France.

The claim of so many opposing views might well have brought about an agreement with Napoleon; and Europe actually beheld the incredible spectacle of the four Powers making overtures to their vanquished enemy and offering him the "natural" boundaries of France. Early in November a French envoy had two interviews with Metternich at Frankfurt. The terms proposed by the Allies were that France should retire behind the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, resigning her conquests in Germany, Italy, and Spain. This offer meant, practically, a return to the limits of 1792; it left Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, Savoy and Nice, in the hands of France. But Napoleon could not abandon the dream of universal empire; he returned (Nov. 16) an evasive answer, suggesting a

European Congress. A fortnight later, Castlereagh practically accepted the terms, but it was now too late: the Allies had virtually withdrawn their offer. It may be doubted whether they had ever really agreed in making it. England was determined not to leave Antwerp in Napoleon's hands: Prussian statesmen dreaded the presence of his armies on the Rhine: the Tsar meant to dictate peace at Paris. The policy of Austria was, at worst, doubtful; but Metternich himself does not appear to have expected that Napoleon would yield. It was therefore with feelings of relief that most members of the Coalition heard the news of a decision which implied a fresh recourse to arms.

There was, however, military grounds which hindered an immediate continuance of active operations. The armies of the three eastern Powers were in bad case; those of the Rhinebund Princes who had come over had to be incorporated; and it was necessary to determine the further conduct of the war. Various plans of campaign were projected, the boldest being that of Gneisenau, which aimed at Paris as the final goal. The scheme proposed by the Emperor Alexander was eventually adopted in its essential features.

The allied forces were now distributed as follows: on the right, the army of the Crown Prince, 102,000 men and 316 guns, and the army of Silesia, under Blücher, 62,000 men and 232 guns; in the centre, the main army, under Schwarzenberg, 208,000 men and 682 guns; on the left, the Austro-Italian army, about 62,000 men, and that of Wellington, about 50,000 men. To these must be added about 100,000 men, not yet concentrated, who were to besiege the German fortresses still held by the French, making a total of about 638,000 men.

The forces at Napoleon's disposal were numerically far inferior. Of the 600,000 men with whom he had begun the campaign, only about 75,000 had crossed the Rhine. His position was far worse than it had been a year before. He had lost Germany, and with it the Rhinebund troops: and he could no longer carry on war in the enemy's country. France, moreover, was becoming exhausted, while the strength of the Allies, now joined by Bavaria, Saxony, etc., was proportionately increased. A new army had to be created by means of reckless conscription. But the French people were tired of war, the men came in slowly, and in December only about 85,000 troops were available for the defence of the Rhine, a line upwards of 600 miles in length. The Emperor's embarrasments were increased by want of arms, ammunition, and horses, by the untrustworthiness of his marshals, and finally by a superabundance of fortresses in Holland and Belgium and on the frontier. His greatest fear was for Belgium, on account of the large factories of arms situated in that country: he therefore concentrated his chief force in that direction and on the lower Rhine. The upper Rhine and the Swiss frontier were insufficiently protected. Marmont commanded the northern section of the frontier as far as Cologne, and Masséna the southern.

Napoleon secretly hoped that the Allies would leave him in peace till the spring, but he was disappointed. Austria, not without an eye to the war in northern Italy, proposed the plan of Langres as their final destination and the most important scene of operations. According to the plan finally adopted, half of Bernadotte's army was to march into Holland by Düsseldorf and Cologne; while Blücher with the army of Silesia was to cross the middle Rhine and occupy the enemy till the main army should have penetrated into France from the direction of Basel and Schaffhausen. The latter was then to press upon Napoleon's right, and effect a junction with Wellington's army and that of Italy.

On December 23 the Bavarians, under Wrede, crossed the Rhine and laid siege to Hülchingen. Blücher transferred the main part of his force to the left bank on New Year's Eve at Caid, the rest crossing at Lebstadt and Mannheim. The Crown Prince contented himself with besieging Hülchingen, which was held by Davout, and dispatched but a weak division to the conquest of the Netherlands under the Prussian general von Hillem. Blücher pressed vigorously forward, took Coblenz, and laid siege to Mainz. An attempt to enter Mayence at Kottbusheim miscarried; but on January 16 and 11, 1814, Blücher crossed the Saar, and Mayence was forced to retire hastily upon Metz, before whose walls York's van-guard appeared on the 18th.

Meanwhile the main army had moved forward on an extended front to Colmar. The forces opposed were very small, and it would have been easy to reach Langres; but it was remarked that Napoleon was assembling 80,000 men, and action rendered progress slow. Then, however, an serious resistance was encountered, the army advanced on January 14 to the neighbourhood of Langres, where it reached the enemy. Three days later an officer was sent to demand the surrender of the fortress, which, to his amazement, he found empty. Mortier had left it unobserved, and retired beyond Chaumont. Further operations were deferred, in order to allow the rest of the army time to come up.

The French abandoned the line of the Moselle to the army of Silesia without a blow; and Blücher, leaving York before Metz, turned towards the Meuse. He had vainly tried to persuade the commander-in-chief to initiate a general movement on Paris. Gneisenau wrote to the Austrian chief of the staff: "We only need a single battle to make us complete victors. For this purpose the main army should advance to the middle Seine, and the reserves which are to cover its flank and rear should be posted, not on the Rhine, but at Châlons-sur-Marne. All we have to do is to press on towards Paris without delay." But the advice was unheeded; and the weakened army of Silesia was thus thrown on its own resources. It pushed on, however, and on the 15th captured the line of the Meuse with little difficulty. Continuing the pursuit, Blücher defeated the French at Ligny, and pressed on to the Marne, which Sacken's van-guard crossed at Joinville on the 33rd. In nine days, in spite of floods,

from roads, and the resistance of the enemy, the army of Shoba had advanced seventy-five miles, crossed three rivers, and joined hands with the main army.

Schwabenberg had not yet left the commanding position of the plateau of Langres, partly owing to military, but still more to political considerations. Cautincourt, Foreign Minister at Paris, had suggested negotiation—a proposal agreeable to Metternich, but not to the Tsar. It was eventually settled that a congress of plenipotentiaries should meet. Meanwhile the army slowly groped its way forward. On January 24, the vanguard encountered Mortier at Bar-sur-Aube. There was a sanguinary but indecisive battle, after which Mortier evacuated his position by night as stealthily and secretly as at Langres. He retired on Troyes, feebly pursued by the Allies.

Blücher, having reached Brienne, and come into touch with Schwabenberg, now urged the commander-in-chief to advance directly on Paris. His resolution was not disturbed by an attack upon his rear-guard at St Dizier, so fully did he rely on the cooperation of the main army in this operation. But Schwabenberg declined to move, merely ordering the two nearest corps to go to Blücher's assistance if he were hard-pressed. With a general so minded, disaster was to be expected. The attack upon St Dizier was the beginning of Napoleon's offensive.


Domestic politics, the new conscriptions, and other causes, possibly even indiscipline, had hitherto detained Napoleon in Paris. He left the capital on January 25, and reached the camp at Châlons on the following day. Here, among his troops, he was once more possessed by the old warlike spirit. He had about 42,000 men near St Dizier; Macdonald was coming up with 10,000; and Mortier with 30,000 was in the neighbourhood of Troyes. Without delay Napoleon attacked the nearest division of the enemy at St Dizier, surprised it, and then separated York and Blücher. He then pursued the latter, and, in order to prevent his junction with the main army, attacked him at Brienne (January 29). Blücher was not surprised; but the fighting went so much against him that in the night he abandoned the field, and fell back on Schwabenberg, making a further stop between La Rothière and Tonnay.

\* \* \*

At this moment the famous order Blücher's command happened to be transmitted entirely of Russian. As Napoleon did not advance, Blücher pressed forward. At 1 p.m. on February 1 he fell upon La Rothière. The roads were impassable; and it was snowing heavily, with a strong wind. After some hours' fighting, Wrede decided the action by repulsing the enemy's left wing. The Württembergers joined him; and at nightfall La Rothière was taken by the Russians. A fresh advance on the part of the French was only repelled with the aid of reinforcements. The battle was now won; but lack of reserves and a terrible snowstorm

prevented Blücher from following up his victory, which, even so, cost Napoleon 6000 men and about 10 guns.

Down to this point the conduct of the campaign leaves the impression that Napoleon was not himself; now he shook off his lethargy and rose to the greatness of his task. For the victorious Allies there began a series of defeats. They believed that Napoleon's power was shattered, that the way to Paris lay open, and that all they had to do was to follow up their advantages in military fashion until the peace negotiations should bring matters to a definite conclusion. With this object, Blücher was again to separate from Schwarzenberg, and, keeping to the right of the main army, to march on Paris by way of Châlons, while the main army kept on in the direction of Troyes. On February 7 the place was occupied. On the 9th it was reported that Napoleon, he then being crushed, was advancing against Blücher. Next day Blücher sent word that he was attacked by a superior force, and begged Schwarzenberg to assist him by falling upon the enemy's rear. Under pressure from the Emperor Alexander a half-hearted movement was made; but Schwarzenberg's lack of energy and insight, and the divergence of Russian and Austrian diplomacy, spoilt everything, and the army of Silésie was left in the lurch.

The political causes of this disastrous error must now be briefly explained. In view of the prevailing want of harmony among the Allies, the British Government sent out Lord Castlereagh, then Foreign Minister, to take part in the pending negotiations. On his arrival at head-quarters, about the middle of January, he found the Coalition in imminent risk of breaking-up through the mutual jealousy, suspicion, and selfishness of its component parts. The great thing was to bring Austria into line; and this Castlereagh succeeded in doing by allaying Metternich's fears <sup>about</sup> Poland and Saxony, and persuading him that France must be left <sup>with</sup> her old boundaries to secure the safety of Europe. On the other <sup>hand</sup>, Alexander had to be coaxed into entering upon any negotiations <sup>at all</sup>; and this was only effected by a threat on the part of Austria <sup>to withdraw</sup> from the Coalition. The Conference opened at Châtillon <sup>in France</sup> on February 5. Castlereagh represented France. On the 7th <sup>the</sup> Allies stated their terms, which went far beyond those of 1806. France was now to give up Belgium, the Left Bank, Savoy, and Nice, she was to retire within the boundaries of 1791; England would restore some colonies by way of compensation. The news of these demands reached the Emperor at Naples at a moment when his fortunes seemed almost desperate. Castlereagh had been instructed to make peace on the basis which had been offered and refused two months before; but Napoleon was not yet beaten so low as to accept the new demands without a further effort. He shut himself up for a day and a night, by the morning of the 9th he had resolved not to accept the terms, but to annihilate Napier 

then to drive back Schwarmberg. The first part of his plan all but succeeded.

Blücher had marched forward sure of victory; and York, believing Napoleon to be held fast by the main army near Troyes, drove Marmont out of Châlons; the Russian cavalry pursued Macdonald. Thus the separate divisions drew far apart. Finally York pressed on down the Marne against Châtillon-Thierry. Sacken advanced in the centre; Napier formed the left wing at Sénaux; the other divisions of the army were still farther in the rear. As most of the cavalry were operating against Macdonald, there was a lack of troops for countermarching. On the 9th there was a skirmish on the left at Sénaux. This caused some alarm at head-quarters, but nobody believed that there was any serious danger. York occupied Châtillon-Thierry, and proceeded slowly down the river. Sacken engaged the enemy at La Ferté, and met with a stout resistance. The news from the left wing became more threatening: it was reported that Napoleon with some 35,000 men was at Sénaux. Thereupon Blücher ordered up York, Sacken, and Kleist, and summoned Wittgenstein, whose force formed part of the main army. But, before these movements could be executed, the storm broke.

Napoleon, with the greater part of his troops, had abandoned his insecure position at Troyes in order to fall upon Blücher, and, holding the inner line, was able, by rapidity of movement, to attack the enemy before he could collect his forces. On February 10 he repulsed the Russians at Bruy and turned their flank at Champagny. It was only by furious fighting with the bayonet that 3000 men with 15 guns were able to break through and reach Châtillon-sur-Marne. On the 11th York and Sacken attempted to effect their junction at Montcaillon. Napoleon hastened thither, and at once attacked Sacken, who had arrived first. Had Sacken been reinforced by York at the right moment, it would have gone hard with the French; but the Prussian commander deliberated too long, and sent only two brigades to the support of his Russian colleague. Sacken's 14,000 men were defeated by superior forces, the enemy breaking through between the Russians and the Prussians on their left. As the Allies held the Marne in their rear, their retreat was extremely difficult; that they succeeded in effecting it was due to the courage of a Prussian brigade, which lost heavily in covering the retirement. Next day, at Châtillon-Thierry, where two bridges had been hastily constructed, the Allies were again attacked, and had to fight a severe rearguard action before they could place the Marne between themselves and their pursuers. Thence they directed their march on Sénaux.

Meanwhile, Blücher with 15,000 Prussians and Russians, had remained stationary on the road leading westwards from Montcaillon, in complete ignorance of what was passing. It was not till the evening of the 11th that he received the news of York's retreat. In order to relieve York, he advanced towards Éperay on the 12th, repulsed the French divisions



there, and pushed forward until he stumbled on Napoleon. The Emperor had left only a small force to pursue Baden and York: with the chief part of his army he turned towards Montmirail, and behind Vauclausp succeeded in massing 50,000 men. Blücher's van-guard had advanced too far: it was driven out of Vauclausp and retired in disorder on the main body. When Blücher recognised the strength of the enemy and discovered with whom he had to do, he at once retreated. It was almost too late. The French cavalry pressed hard upon him, and continuous rear-guard fighting inflicted on the Prussians a loss of 4000 men, half of their force, while the Russians lost 3000: the French loss was not over 800. The army of Silesia was thus defeated in detail, and completely broken up. The total loss amounted to 16,000 men.

The causes of this disaster may be briefly stated. It had been intended to march upon Paris in concentric formation; but this plan was gradually abandoned. The main army chugged more and more towards the left, and moreover delayed its advance; the troops which should have linked it up with the army of Silesia were diverted from this purpose; consequently Blücher's left flank was left uncovered without his knowledge, and the danger came upon him unawares. Carelessness, mistaken orders, want of unity, and various mishaps did the rest. Had Napoleon been able to follow up the army of Silesia, it would have been annihilated; but threatening news from the Seine recalled the Emperor to the defence of his capital. Thus Blücher gained time to reassemble and reorganise his scattered divisions at Châlons. Reinforcements were already on the way; and Blücher was expected from the Netherlands. Blücher therefore remained in Châlons till the 19th, when he again set out to join the main army. "We acted," said Goltzschew, "as if we had not been beaten. Five days after the defeat we again took the offensive."

Schwarzenberg had been slowly advancing. His cavalry already ranged as far as Meles and Fouchéshöfen. But the news of Blücher's misfortunes caused him to halt; he lost heart, and even began to draw back. The French in front of him recovered courage and gained some small success. Napoleon himself now appeared. Leaving Marcourt behind after the fight at Vauclausp, he had, on the 14th, turned against Schwarzenberg. Having only 55,000 men at his disposal, he summoned even the veterans to join him in the field. Meles was ordered to detain Blücher in Holland; Angereau was to attack the Austrians in southern France and threaten their left flank. Having himself defeated two advanced bodies of the enemy, Napoleon took measures to secure all the passages across the Seine from Nogent<sup>le-Roi</sup> to Mantes.

Mantua's conference at Châtillon<sup>la-Ronde</sup> had been suspended for a week (February 9-17), owing partly to a mandate from Alexander, partly to Napoleon's anxiety to defeat Blücher. They were only resumed when Metternich reported his threat to withdraw the Austrian force.

The Allies were willing to make peace on terms which would have left France the limits of 1793, provided that Napoleon would renounce all claim to influence beyond them. Castlereagh was ready to accept these conditions; his master, encouraged by his recent success, was more ambitious. He was resolved not to cede Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine, and he instructed his army accordingly. So depressed were the Allies that, at Schwarzenberg's suggestion, they asked for an armistice; but Napoleon refused to pause except on the basis of the "natural frontier" of France. In these circumstances, Schwarzenberg received his only hope of safety to lie in a general retreat. His decision was hastened by a fresh reverse. In order to cover the withdrawal, he intended to hold the outlying position of Hambourg till the evening of the 18th. But on the 18th the Crown Prince of Württemberg, who commanded there, was attacked by Napoleon, and, after a stout resistance, driven out of the town with the loss of 2000 men.

Schwarzenberg, believing his own strength to be insufficient, now called on Blücher to join him, on the understanding that, if the latter could reach *Méry-sur-Seine* by the 21st it might then be possible to renew the advance. Blücher replied that he would be on the spot. There seemed to be every prospect of a decisive battle; and on the 20th Gneisenau and Grolman went to head-quarters to discuss a plan of action. But again a change occurred. Schwarzenberg had received news that Austria was pressing up the Saale from the south, and that other hostile forces were marching towards Geneva. Instead of effecting his junction with Blücher and then attacking Napoleon with a superior force, he became anxious about his flank and rear.

On February 28 a council of war was held at Troyes, at which Schwarzenberg's proposal to retreat prevailed. He informed Blücher that for the present he dared not risk a battle, and directed him accordingly to retire northwards towards the Meuse, to join Wintzingerode and Dürst (whose corps was to be at his disposal), and, having effected his junction, to divert the attention of Napoleon from the main army. This meant yet another upstart<sup>101</sup> of the two armies; but it did not at once relieve Schwarzenberg<sup>102</sup>; for Napoleon gave him no rest. Pushing on, he stormed Troyes; and the 20th army retired beyond *Bar-sur-Aube*. On the 28th, at a council<sup>103</sup> was held at that place, it was decided that the main army should continue its retreat by way of Chaumont to Langres, and that Blücher should act independently. The Field-marshal had already set about executing his part of the plan, furious at Schwarzenberg's retirement, but overjoyed at recovering his independence, together with a large accession of strength. After some fighting at Méry, he attacked Marmont at Sézanne, in order to draw off Napoleon's forces. Marmont was defeated, and Napoleon now became seriously anxious about Paris. Leaving his position in front of Schwarzenberg, he marched northwards with a large part of his army on the 27th.

On his approach Blücher skillfully withdrew, and crossed the Meuse. The object of the Prussian commander was then attained.

Hitherto, the conference at Chatillon had produced no result. But, within the Coalition itself, mutual relations had improved; and this was even more important than immediate success in the field. On February 21 Napoleon had written to his father-in-law, urging him not to sacrifice the interests of Austria to those of his allies, but to accept peace on the basis offered at Frankfurt. Received a little earlier, this proposal might have broken up the Coalition; while, on the other hand, Alexander and Frederick William were seriously considering whether they should not abandon the connexion with Austria and prosecute the war alone. What prevented so disastrous an issue was Napoleon's strategy and the very success which he had recently obtained. His refusal of an armistice disgusted the Emperor Francis, who, on the 27th, returned an unfavourable answer to his overtures. Under pressure of arduousness and alarm the alliance was now compressed into a closer bond, which took shape in the Treaty of Chaumont. By this important treaty the Four Powers bound themselves not to negotiate separately with Napoleon, but to continue the war till France should be reduced to her pre-revolutionary limits. The forces that each was to maintain were defined; Great Britain promised large subsidies; the League was to be defensive or offensive as might be requisite. Napoleon was given till March 11 to accept the terms mentioned above.

Even while the Treaty of Chaumont was in the making—it was dated March 1, though not actually signed till the 30th—its effects, combined with those of Blücher's movement, began to be felt. After Napoleon's departure from Troyes, only a few troops under Oudinot, Macdonald, and Milbradt remained in front of the main army; and on February 27 Schwarzenberg was again able to order a general advance. This proved the turning-point of the campaign. After a brave resistance, Oudinot was utterly defeated at Bar-sur-Aube. The Allies took heart; Troyes was retaken; and the whole French force was driven back beyond the Seine. On March 7 Schwarzenberg drew up a memorandum designating Paris as the goal of a <sup>new</sup> <sup>spring</sup> campaign. On the same day Blücher fought the first of his <sup>new</sup> <sup>spring</sup> battles.

The French had been forced to abandon <sup>the</sup> <sup>land</sup> almost without a struggle. On December 2, 1813, the Prince of Orange had made his entry into the Hague. Blücher occupied the country with his Prussian corps and some Russian detachments under Wismigrode; and the French were slowly driven out of Belgium. Before this operation was complete, Wismigrode and Blücher received orders from Blücher. The troops that remained behind were under the Duke of Weimar, who failed to drive the French altogether from the Netherlands. In the south Wellington defeated Soult at Orlhaz (February 27), and following up he reconquered Bordeaux (March 13).

While awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from the north, Blücher was hard-pressed, first by Marmont and Mortier, then by Ney, finally by Napoleon. His only means was to go to meet his opponents. He therefore crossed the Aisne, and, taking advantage of the surrender of Soissons on March 3, effected his junction the same day. Blücher's army now numbered 100,000 men, a force as superior to that of his opponent as to enable him again to take the offensive. That the advance did not immediately take place was due to various reasons. Extensive illness and enrichment had laid the veteran Field-marshal on a sick-bed; Gneisenau and Büffing also fell ill; and, in consequence, unity and energy of command were wanting. Political considerations also came in. It was felt that all the work was being thrown on the Prussian army; the numbers were dwindling; and yet this army was all that secured to Prussia a place among the Great Powers. It was therefore determined to proceed to Laon, a strong position on high ground, surrounded by open country which would give full advantage to the superior strength of the Allies. On Napoleon's approach, Blücher occupied the plateau of Craonne with a force of 25,000 Russians. These troops were attacked, on March 7, by 40,000 French, against whom they held out for a whole day, inflicting on the enemy very heavy losses. It was only with difficulty that the army of Silésia effected its concentration at Laon: but that operation was practically completed by March 8.

The position at Laon was extremely favourable to the Allies. Facing south, it sloped steeply upwards to the flat summit on which stands the town; and on the north-eastern side it was protected by a marsh. On March 9 Napoleon advanced to the attack. A thick mist in the early morning enabled the French columns to deploy unseen: the Guard, under Ney, formed the centre. At 9 a.m. began a struggle, with varying fortunes, around two villages at the foot of the hill. When the mist dispersed, the weakness of Napoleon's force became apparent; but the Prussians still remained on the defensive. In the afternoon Victor's corps arrived. Once more the battle flamed up and continued until dark, but without result. While Napoleon was fighting in the south, Marmont, on the other side of the marsh, attacked from the east, but, in the face of superior numbers strongly posted, had even less success than the Emperor. After nightfall York made a counter-attack on Hermoy. The French were taken completely unawares, and Marmont's corps was put to flight with a loss of 8000 men. An energetic pursuit combined with a turning movement would have destroyed Napoleon. But at this moment Blücher was impeded by illness; and Gneisenau, who took over the command, dared not risk a decisive battle in the face of the reluctance of his generals.

In spite of the defeat of his right wing, Napoleon remained in position; and on March 10 there was some more fierce but ineffectual fighting. The Allies ran no risks; and the Emperor perceived that victory

was out of the question. He therefore withdrew early on the 11th, and crossed the Aisne almost unopposed. Even now the Allies failed to make use of their victory; Napoleon, on the other hand, displayed marvellous energy, although his position was really desperate. On the 18th he wrote to his Minister of Police, "I am still the man I was at Wagram and Austerlitz." He surprised the Russian guard, *Sauve-Prieux*, at Rheims, and captured the town. From Rheims he dictated on March 17 his last proposals for peace. The limit of time allowed by the Allies had expired on March 11; but a further prolongation was granted, at Caulaincourt's request, in order that he might still persuade his master to listen to reason. But not even the failure at Laon could abate Napoleon's pride. He now demanded that the Allies should evacuate French territory, offering, when that was done, to recognise the independence of Holland, to hand over Belgium to a French prince, and to give up the control of countries beyond the borders. But he said nothing definite about the Left Bank, and he claimed the restoration of all colonies. These terms could only have been justified by such a victory as it was no longer in Napoleon's power to gain. They were not even discussed. Before the army reached Châtillon, the conference was closed. Its only result had been to strengthen the cohesion of the Allies.

When Napoleon recognised Blücher's strength, he left Marmont and Mortier to watch him, in order to fling himself upon the main army. The latter, instead of advancing, had meanwhile been moving slowly hither and thither. On March 18 Cassin's patrols announced the Emperor's approach on the right flank. Schwarzenberg, rightly assuming that Napoleon meant to cross the river at *Andenau-Aebe*, took his measures accordingly; and there the battle was fought. Napoleon was unable to bring as many troops together as he wished, because Blücher had again begun to advance and had defeated Marmont. On the other hand, he did not come upon the six corps of the main army, but only on the Bavarian corps under Wrede, whom, after a hard fight, he compelled to fall back. On the following day Schwarzenberg succeeded in concentrating his forces. The moment had come for destroying Napoleon; but for this Schwarzenberg lacked determination. He delayed the attack, whereupon Napoleon led his troops boldly against him. The enterprise would have been his last, had he not perceived the enemy's strength in time and hasten a hasty retreat. Only the French rearguard was caught by the Allies and driven from *Andenau-Aebe*. Thus the Emperor had fallen back before Schwarzenberg as before Blücher. It was to no purpose that he brought together on the same day 80,000 men; the number was insufficient.

Recognising the facts, Napoleon now endeavoured to gain by skilful manoeuvres what he could not achieve by fighting. He retired, not westwards upon Paris, but eastwards towards St. Dié, hoping to check the allied advance by an attack upon their communications. But the plan

unhindered. The Allied commander decided to join Blücher and march on Paris. Blücher's illness hampered the movements of his army; but, when Marmont and Mortier disappeared from his front, and the sound of fighting was heard from Jock-sur-Jocke, it marched in that direction. The junction was to be effected on the 28th at Meaux. On the way thither, the main army came unexpectedly upon Marmont and Mortier. Had it been in closer formation, the two marshals could hardly have escaped; as it was, they fired badly. The Crown Prince of Württemberg engaged Marmont at Sainte Croix and drove him over the Saane, where he took up a position with Mortier. There was a hot fight, in which the French, after a brave resistance, were worsted, losing many men and guns. The remainder were attacked at Laferrière-Gaudier by York; but he could only reach them with his rear-guard, and the French beat off the attack. Blücher was more fortunate; he fell in with a detachment of 6000 men, and drove it back upon Laferrière-Chapereole, where it encountered the main army and was annihilated.

The march on Paris now began in earnest. The Emperor's plans having been discovered through an intercepted letter, the Allies left 10,000 cavalry to watch his movements, and, turning their backs upon him, marched down the valley of the Marne with 180,000 men. Paris has two natural bulwarks—to the north Montmartre, to the north-east the thickly populated plateau on whose northern edge stand Boulogneville, Pantin, and Belleville. There the French drew up all their available forces for the defence of the capital, Mortier at the foot of Montmartre forming the left wing, and Marmont the right. Here, on March 30, the last battle was fought. The result was a foregone conclusion. The main army opened the fight by attacking Boulogneville, first with insignificant forces. The French made a courageous defence, so that the Allies advanced but slowly and with heavy losses. At 2 p.m., however, a vigorous advance drove Marmont back to the extreme edge of the plateau, whereupon he despatched an officer to negotiate. Meanwhile the army of Silesia had engaged Mortier. The latter had repulsed the Prussians at La Villette, but was unable to withstand the onset of Prince William of Prussia and an attack on the barriers of the city. On the right flank Blücher deployed his forces against Montmartre. Other divisions occupied Vincennes, and pressed on towards Charenton.

On the preceding day the Emperor had fled from Paris. King Joseph and his brother Jerome watched the battle from the heights of Montmartre. When they saw that all was over, they mounted their horses and rode away, directing the marshals to treat with the enemy, and then proceed to the Loire. The negotiations resulted in an armistice, by the terms of which the capital was to be evacuated. In the evening the Allies bivouached on the slopes in full view of the city they had so valiantly defended. But as yet they had not settled with the Emperor; and they prepared for a renewal of the combat.

Napoleon had meanwhile wasted his energies in futile plans of rescue and undecided movements against a force consisting of a few mobile squadrons of horse. Surrounded by a gaping void, cut off from all connexion with the diplomacy of Europe, he saw all the cords broken out of which he might have woven a ladder of escape. At Vitry he received the tidings of the fate that threatened his capital. He hurried towards Paris, and, accompanied by a few loyal adherents, reached Fontenoyblanc the 1st advance of his army. Here, on March 30, he was joined by Marmont's cavalry. He was pressing on towards the capital, when he heard that it had capitulated; and in despair he returned to Fontenoyblanc. On the following day more troops came up; he took heart again, and dreamed of hurling himself boldly upon Paris at their head. The idea was madness. His marshals refused to follow him, and inspired him to throw up the game. He still clung to the belief that something might be saved by diplomacy. But it was too late; the overthrow was complete. On April 11 Napoleon signed his abdication.

Already, on March 31, the victors had made their entry into Paris. At once the marshals, with their guards, reached the Porte St Martin, then turned to the right towards the Champs Elysées. They entered in full military pomp, trumpets blowing, drums beating, bayonets shining, banners waving, and uniforms of all colours glittering in the sun. The people of Paris cried, "*Vive le roi ! vive Louis XVIII !*" The glory of the Bourbons rose from its ashes; that of the Empire seemed for ever departed. Yet it was only in seeming; the wings of the Imperial eagle were not yet finally clipped.

During the brief campaign of 1814, Napoleon had displayed all the greatness of his inexhaustible military genius, but at the same time the aberrations of an overwrought brain. He had lost all sense of reality; like a desperate gambler he tried to win back what had long been lost. Instead of continuing the war with the sole object of obtaining by negotiation durable and rational results, he betrayed in his diplomacy an insatiable ambition, which he could not realise by victory in the field. The material resources and the military strength of France were at length exhausted; and she succumbed to half Europe in arms.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## THE FIRST RESTORATION (1814-25).

At 10 o'clock on the morning of March 31, 1814, the rulers of Russia and Prussia rode into Paris. From early dawn a vast crowd had posted itself along the route from the Place du St Martin to the gardens of the Tuilleries, and watched in sad and anxious silence the long procession of foreign troops. A few shouts saluted the noble presence of the Tsar, as he advanced along the Boulevards; but it was not till he reached the Boulevard des Italiens that he was made aware of the existence of a Bourbon party in Paris. Here loud cries of "*Vive le Bourbon*" rent the air; and a party of some forty young nobles stoned by their noisy demonstration for the silent tranquillity of the mob. Elsewhere there was hardly a token of royalist sympathy, or a clue to the real feelings of the capital. Yet a royalist embassy, Baron de Vitelles, had assured the Tsar that Paris would declare in no uncertain terms for the Restoration.

In the absence of the Emperor of Austria, it lay with Alexander to determine the future government of France. It was a problem which he had for some time past been anxiously considering, yet without reaching a positive solution. He was clear that Napoleon was impossible; but his view as to the succession was still fluid and uncertain. Bernadotte and Eugene were thought of for a moment and waived aside. A wisely organised republic—as it was hinted to a royalist agent—might best accord with the French spirit; but, if the French did not care for a republic, there was the alternative of the Bourbons. Upon the qualities of the Bourbons once the Tsar had pondered much, and he found them deficient. The princes would return embittered by misfortune; and, even if they could master their own resentments, the animosities of the *frangés* would prove less amenable to discipline. The clergy, the Protestants, the spirit of the new generation, would be opposed to them; and it was doubtful whether they could rely upon any substantial measure of support. It was true that royalism was making head in some regions of the south, and that the Duc d'Angoulême had been received with acclamations in Bordeaux. But Alexander and Metternich were both impressed by



the fact that in the wide area covered by the eastern campaign they had been unable to discover the faintest traces of a Bourbon party. Still, if France should declare for the old monarchy, Alexander was not prepared to oppose her choice. There was a statesman in Paris who had laid a plan for fixing the wavering purposes of the Tsar. Talleyrand, whose special gift it was to shine "in a crisis or at a congress," had determined to have a direct and personal share in the political settlement. When the official world led by command to Elba, he contrived to be turned back at the barrier, and thus to be left the sole person of importance in the capital. He had gauged Alexander, knew that he had impressed him once, and was confident that he would be able to impress him again. In an interview with Masséna he invited the Tsar to be his guest.

The Tsar accepted the proposal. "M. de Talleyrand," he said, "I have determined to step in your house because you have my confidence and that of my allies. We do not wish to determine anything before we have heard you. You know France, its needs and desires. Say what we ought to do, and we will do it." Talleyrand replied, "We can do everything with a principle. I propose to accept the principle of legitimacy, which recalls to the throne the Princess of the House of Bourbon." The Tsar concentrated his doubts. Could France be detached from the *clique* for whose cause she had just fought with such desperate heroism? Would she accept princes for whom she had manifested the most bitter hatred during a period of twenty years? Would the old monarchs receive any constitutional support from councils created by Napoleon and named by his creatures? To these objections Talleyrand replied—and his answers were confirmed by Dillig, Lohs, and de Pradt, who had been summoned to the conference—that, if once it were made clear that no peace or truce would be made with Bonaparte, the Legislative Council would themselves invite the Bourbons. Alexander was deeply impressed. He walked up and down the room enlarging with emotion upon the horror of war and the crimes of Napoleon, and then, turning to the King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzenberg, invited them to consent to a proclamation, which should pledge the Powers not to treat with Napoleon or any member of his family. Two hours afterwards the proclamation was posted; and a regency under Marie-Louise was thus formally excluded from the sphere of possible solutions. On April 1 a Provisional Government was named, including, in the person of Montaigne, at least one confidential friend of the banished King. Next day, the Senate, so pliant under Talleyrand as under Napoleon, decreed the deposition of the Emperor. The Legislature ratified and the law courts sustained the decision. Sensible men saw that enough had been done for dignity, and that only then could France obtain liberty and peace.

Forty miles away, in the palace of Fontainebleau, sat Napoleon. It is true that the force around him did not exceed 25,000 men; but

what might not desperate courage and skillful leadership effect? At a council held on the morning of March 31, the Marshals advised a retreat to the north; but Napoleon, choosing as ever the more dangerous and attractive alternative, decided to maneuver before Paris and to oblige the enemy to give him battle. He ordered the corps of Marmont and Mortier, which had just evacuated the capital, to stop at Reims, where they would form his advance-guard in an aggressive movement. The allied generals, with a feeble population of 200,000 souls to watch, looked forward with anxiety to a resumption of the strife.

Alexander had often told his French friends that the army was the nation, and that nothing solid could be done unless the army were gained over. A few generals had sent in their adhesions to the Provisional Government; and Dupont and Drouot had accepted posts—the one as Minister of War, the other as Commandant of the National Guard; but the defection of individual generals was a matter of slight moment, so long as the army remained faithful to Napoleon. It was therefore determined to invite Marmont to put his troops at the disposition of the Government, and to march them into Normandy, where they might serve as the nucleus of a constitutional army. Marmont owed everything to Napoleon, and had fought with brilliant skill and courage during the last campaign; but he complained that he had been constantly placed in the most difficult and hazardous positions, and that he had been rebuffed and humiliated after the defeat of Laon. He knew that his surrender of Paris had spoiled Napoleon's calculations; he was disillusioned and weary of war, and perhaps also desirous of playing a great rôle in history. Selling his conscience by the command of the Senate, and making no express stipulation that the personal safety and liberty of Napoleon should be respected, should he fall into the hands of the Allies, he promised to move his troops from Reims to Versailles in the night of April 4-5.

But meanwhile events were occurring at Fontainebleau, which threatened to put a new complexion upon affairs. On the morning of April 6, as Napoleon was preparing to strike his final blow, news came that the Senate had decreed his deposition. The general order was that headquarters were to be transferred to Fontenay; and, after the midday parade, Napoleon retired to his room to make his last preparations for the march. But the discontent of the Marshals and the officers of their respective staffs had now reached a crisis. The army was destitute, and was melting away by desertion. The loss of the capital, the news of its altered political attitude, not to speak of their wariness, affected the judgment of the senior officers. They were stripped of illusions, satiated with achievements, and unprepared to face civil strife. They marched into Napoleon's room and represented the situation. A letter from Beaumontelle was read out. "Very good, gentlemen," replied the Emperor with unexpected compliance, "since it must be so, I abdicate"; and then, as all present accepted his proposals for a regency in the

name of the King of Rome, he drew up the Act of Abdication and appointed commissioners to treat for a suspension of arms. Suddenly, swept away by a convulsion of feeling, he threw himself on a sofa, strode his thigh, and cried, "Nonsense, goodness; let us have that and march to-morrow! We shall beat them." An impassioned argument followed; but the Marshals were in earnest and bore him down. He wrote and signed with his own hand an abdication in favour of his son. Caulaincourt, Ney, and Marmont were sent to lay the document before Alexander. On their way through Moscow they induced Marmont to go with them.

The Tsar had formerly proclaimed his intention of never treating with Napoleon or any other member of his family; he had then already decided against the proposal of a regency. But what if a regency were the only plan which the army would accept, the only plan which would avoid further bloodshed? The members of the Provisional Government waited anxiously in Alexander's salon while the envoys expounded their case in an inner chamber. Then, dismissing the envoys, Alexander called to the Government, and explained with animation the advantages which would accrue from the acceptance of Napoleon's propositions—a Government served by able and experienced men, enjoying the sympathy and support of Austria, respecting the habits and the over interests of France, and finally commanding, as no other Government could, the entire allegiance of the army. Talleyrand, Dalmberg, and Drouin replied that, if a regency were established, Napoleon would be back again at the end of a year; that many members of his family were too ambitious to be content with a subordinate station; and that the claims of the Bourbons had now been so far revived that it was impossible to discard them without injustice and injury. The Tsar listened attentively, and admitted the envoys to a second audience. Again the envoys were dismissed, the members of the Government admitted, and the arguments of the army warmly pressed and energetically combated. It was 2 a.m. before this singular and costly debate came to a close.

Count Pozzo di Borgo got up on April 5 to look at the sunrise. As he was standing at the window a hand was laid upon his shoulder; and the Tsar apprised him of the joyful tidings that Marmont's corps had arrived at Varenville. "You see," he said, "it is Providence who wills it; the marshals and dukes have it. No more doubts, no more hesitation." General Souham had in fact taken the decisive step without waiting for Marmont's orders, having learnt that Napoleon was about to be informed of the intended desertion of the corps. Alexander's way was now cleared. The army was divided against itself. The envoys were instructed that the abdication must include the whole family of Napoleon.

On the evening of April 12, after many patched negotiations, Napoleon ratified the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which banished him to the island of Elba and settled the rank, title, and revenue to be enjoyed by himself and the various members of his family. The terms of the treaty were

on the whole liberal—an annual revenue of two million francs for himself, with millions of one million to the Empress; a revenue of two millions and a half to be distributed among the members of his family; a capital sum of two millions to be expended in gratifications to his followers; the full sovereignty over the duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla for the Empress, with easements to her son and descendants; and lastly the island of Elba for himself in full sovereignty. The plan of exile was chosen by himself, as preferable to either Corda or Cadix—alternatives which had been offered by the Tsar. Yet at times the transaction appeared intolerably humiliating to his proud and sensitive nature. "Why should they make a treaty with a vanquished man?" he asked; and over and over again, catching at straws of hope, he demanded the return of the Act of Abolition. On the 18th he refused capitulation and talked coldly with Malet of suicide. In the night he took a poison or an opiate which he had carried on his person all through the Russian campaign; but his recovery seemed to him to indicate that he was still destined for high things, and on the 19th he signed the Act. A week later he took leave of his Old Guard, embraced the eagle, and left Fontainebleau.

Thus was the way prepared for the Bourbons. It was, as Guizot truly says, a trait of Napoleon's genius that he never forgot them and knew them to be his only rivals for the throne of France. They were not exactly restored by the foreign armies; they were not restored by the voice of France; they owed nothing to their own merits or exertions. They came back because France was tired and dumb, disinclined to breed a republic, or to embark upon a sea of experiment. To the Napoleonic men, such as Talleyrand, who interpreted France to the foreign conquerors, a constitutional monarchy was the only solution. It would enlist a long array of glorious memories; it would preserve the heritage of the Revolution; it would make the least possible disturbance in the administration. The white and the red specter would alike be exorcised by a monarchy restored on constitutional conditions.

But there was a fundamental difficulty in the scheme. It was of the essence of the old monarchy that it was absolute and unconditional, and that its title was based not upon the will of the people but upon hereditary right. If, then, the Bourbons were restored, and if their restoration were not only made to depend explicitly upon the grant of the French people, but were also accompanied by conditions settled beforehand by the popular voice, what became of the principle of legitimacy or the old monarchical tradition? The head of the Bourbon House had always claimed that he had never ceased to be King of France. How could he then loyally accept terms which implied that this claim was false? And yet, if no terms were settled, if it were not made clear that the basis of the monarchy had been changed, all the conquests of the Revolution might be lost, all the evils of the ancient régime might be

retained. The Constitutional Charter—the phrase came from Talleyrand—which was adopted by the Senate on April 6, frankly departed from the old principles. It assumed “freely to the throne Louis-Stanislas-Xavier of France, brother to the late King,” scrupulously excluding any mention of an official title. It provided that the Charter should be submitted to a plebiscite, and that Louis-Stanislas-Xavier could only be proclaimed King of France after he had signed and sworn to adhere to the constitutional and practical provisions contained in the document. There was next to meet the general needs of the situation—the King, master of the executive power; the legislative power divided between King, Senate, and Elective Chambers; responsibility of ministers; taxation by consent; the jury system; the irrevocability of the sale of Church lands; the continuance of military pensions and ranks; the recognition of the new as well as of the old nobility. The influence of Montaignon obtained the unreserved attribution of the executive power to the King, the royal right of nomination to the Senate, and the advisability of ministers to the two Chambers. But the greed of the senators threw a dark shade of discredit upon the Act. A provision was inserted to the effect that all the existing members of the Senate were to form part of the new Second Chamber, and that the senatorial endowments were to be equally divided among them. The leaders of liberal opinion argued that this transparent exhibition of cupidity had been permitted by Talleyrand in order to favour the establishment of autocracy; and so brisk was the shower of opprobrious pamphlets that the Provisional Government resorted to the censorship of the press. It was a grave misfortune for France that in solemn a transaction as the establishment of a limited monarchy should have been discredited from the first by the selfishness of some of its principal promoters.

Louis was in England, prostrate with grief; but Monsieur (the Comte d'Artois) was at Nancy; and Vitrolles persuaded Talleyrand that it would be well to receive him in the capital as his brother's lieutenant. There was brilliant sunshine on April 18, the day of the solemn entry. As the Prince, attired in the uniform of the National Guard, rode down the Boulevards, the enthusiasm was indescribable. His few utterances were felicitous, and one, which was repeated for him afterwards by Count Beaupré—"Nothing is changed save that there is one Providence the more"—went round France like wildfire. Tears were in every eye as the "*Dominus, saltem, pro regem*" was chanted by ten thousand voices. At the end of the ceremony, the old servants of the Prince, who had wept his absence for five-and-twenty years, embraced his knee; and he raised them with a touching grace. When he reached the Tuileries, he dismounted from his horse, addressed the National Guard in some appropriate words, and, shaking hands with several officers and soldiers, bade them remember the day, protesting that he would never forget it. "How can I be fatigued!" he said in the evening to Beaupré,

"it is the only day of happiness which I have tasted for thirty years," "Do you understand such enthusiasm, such exaltation?" said Napoleon, turning to Vissière during the service at Notre Dame. "This could have befitted it?" Concord and loyalty, sentimentality and reason, experience and hope, were all combined in the intoxication of that day.

As yet nothing had been done to settle the title and constitutional position of the Prince, who was somewhat loosely described by Talleyrand as the "Chief of the Government." His royalist advisers wished him to assume the title of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, arguing that his brother was already sovereign of France and competent to delegate his authority. Such a claim was however in clear contradiction to the spirit and the terms of the Charter. The Senate declined to acknowledge powers delegated by a sovereign whose title it had not admitted, and was unwilling itself to confer them without limiting conditions. As the contest threatened to become acute, Alexander intervened, and a prudent compromise was arrived at. On the one hand, the Senate confirmed the provisional government of France upon the Comte d'Artois with the title of Lieutenant-Governor of the kingdom; while, on the other hand, Monsieur replied that he was acquainted with the constitutional act which recalled his brother to the throne, and that, while he had no authority to accept the Constitution, *re*, knowing his brother's sentiments and principles, he could assure them in the King's name that he would admit the fundamental conditions, which he then proceeded to state. The Senate and the Legislature were delighted with the admission of an adviser which seemed to promise so fairly for constitutional rule. But to his principal confidant, Vissière, the Prince spoke words of evil omen, "You, the engagement is taken. We must keep to it faithfully; and, if after some years it appears that things cannot go on, we shall have to try something else." The experiment was made in 1830.

Fat and gaily, indolent and sloven, with a constant turn of phrase and the nonchalant and playful temper of the dilettante student, Louis XVIII was watching the course of events from his exile at Harbottle. Sixty years of life had sharpened his wit and enlarged his knowledge of the Latin classics without bringing him ideas or passions, or training him to the management of affairs. His carefully built, completely prohibitive of horse exercise, disqualified him from playing the rôle of popular hero, despite the countervailing advantages of a finely cut countenance, a resonant and agreeable voice, and flashing eye. He had been so long absent from France that he was ignorant of her new men and her new ways; and, coming at an advanced age out of the shadow of a stationer's retirement, he was unfitted for strenuous action in glare and heat. Yet, despite all this, he had some qualifications for the part which he was now suddenly called upon to play. His bearing was dignified and graceful, his language delicate; and in all the smaller concerns of life he possessed an exquisite tact. A kind of fatalism, half religious, half

epicurean, if it reduced to the neglect of business, supplied him with a stock of passive courage, which was occasionally impressive. His natural moderation and sweetness of disposition, his absence of religious animosity, his wise abstention from the intrigues and exaggerations of the day, his power of alert and sensible criticism, were all clear advantages. "He is," said the Duke of Wellington, "the most cautious man I ever saw, and the best sovereign for this country." Nor was his past record unimpeaching. In the Assembly of Notables he had supported liberal measures, and during the early months of the Revolution he was generally understood to be in favour of a limited monarchy. It is true that he subsequently proclaimed his complete attachment to the system of the ancient régime, describing it as the "Ark of the Covenant", but in later years he had publicly renounced this desperate position. In a declaration published at Nîmes on December 4, 1804, he had promised to forget the past, to recognise liberty and equality, and to secure existing interests if he were recalled to the throne. He was prepared, in fact, to accept the position of a constitutional king—a situation, so his friend the Prince Regent may have taught him, by no means incompatible with the pursuit of pleasure.

An acceptance of the senatorial Constitution was accordingly passed, when advice from Paris superseded and prompted a higher step. Learning that his brother had been received without promise or wish, that the Senate was denied and its Charter without authority, Louis determined to assume the royal title, and to ignore the pretension of a discredited body to confer a crown or to impose conditions on its wearers. At St. Omer, before the gates of Paris, he issued a declaration which promised constitutional rule, while it safeguarded the legitimist principle. The document declared that the plan of the Senate, though good in its essential particulars, was hastily composed and would require modification. Accordingly Senate and Legislature were suspended for June 12, with a pledge that the terms of a liberal Constitution would be submitted to them. With this profession, as disastrous to the extreme republic as it was disgusting to the throne, Louis XVIII entered Paris.

His entry took place on May 8, under a rainless sky; but "it was not," says Braguet, "like the entry of Napoleon. The heart did not speak to him." Sadness alone was mingled with nervous enthusiasm, when he the King with acclamations of the Imperial Guard, which constituted two companies to the escort. Yet, even if Chateaubriand, the greatest living master of French sentiment, had not proclaimed them, the education of the House, long fallen and now restored, would have struck the sensitive heart. In the evening a vast crowd filled the Carrousel and the gardens of the Tuileries, calling again and again for the King and his niece the Duchesse d'Angoulême. A pamphlet from the pen of Lady-Tollendal ran through the town, celebrating the virtues and the sorrows of that simple, narrow, and austere lady. But, with her meagre features,

murdered King, and stars regaled crowd, she was not destined to capture the heart of France. Her life had been fatally blighted in the Temple prison. In the male members of her House there was little of romance, of tragedy, or of heroism.

The two first tasks of the new Government were to draw up a Constitution and to sign a peace. A select number of senators and deputies was appointed to confer with three royal commissioners under the presidency of Droubay, the new Chancellor, and to prepare a Charter for the acceptance of the Chambers. The institution of a House of hereditary Peers, named by the King, unlimited in number, deliberating in secret, and invested with the power to try cases of high treason, was passed with the understanding that the senators should preserve their undiminished. A Chamber of Deputies, to be composed for the present of the existing legislators, but in the future to be elected on a higher franchise, was to initiate all money-bills. It was in accordance with French tradition that the head of the Government should have power to make rules and ordinances "necessary for the execution of laws and the security of the State"; and no danger was anticipated from this branch of the prerogative. The right of initiative and legislation was accorded to the Crown; but the Chambers were given the power to suggest the principles and even the details of bills. The expediency of a Civil List voted for life was one for which the French mind was long prepared. The system of the vote, by which the Chamber of Deputies was to be renewed by a fifth every year, had been tried under the Directory; and, though perhaps unfavourable to the establishment of strong party government, it seemed likely to diminish the intensity of electoral crises. Freedom of worship was readily accorded to all the creeds; and only four voices were raised against declaring the Catholic faith to be the state religion. After a heated discussion, the maintenance of the revolutionary land-settlement was unconditionally guaranteed; and wise provisions were added to secure the abolition of confiscation, the retention of the jury, and the independence of the judicial bench. But, while the liberty of the press was formally permitted, it was distinctly stated that laws would be passed to chastise its abuse. Such were the main outlines of the Charter. Extreme royalists resented its concessions; and Bonapartists were outraged by the closing words "Given at Paris in the year of grace 1830 and in the nineteenth year of our reign." The word "Charter" itself, and the ancient preface, "*Nous accoutions, nous faisons concession et octroi*," showed clearly enough that the contracted theory of sovereignty had been cast to the winds. Still the bulk of the nation was satisfied. The Charter embodied the highest political wisdom which had been extracted from twenty-five years of democracy and despotism.

Even more important than the Charter was the Treaty of Peace between France and Europe, signed on April 30, and published on June 4. The situation was such that, while peace was a most imperious



necessity for France, so glorious or honourable peace could be concluded. It was necessary to withdraw the French garrisons beyond the Rhine in order to persuade the removal of the foreign armies from the soil of France; it was necessary to accept the proposal of Metternich that all specifically French concerns should be there and then settled in Paris, while questions affecting the balance of power in Europe should be reserved for a congress in Vienna. It would have been too dangerous to defer the conclusion of the peace, in the hope of extracting advantages for France from the discussions which were sure to arise in Vienna. Indeed, the Allies were masters of the situation, and could dictate their terms. They were fully alive to the necessity of treating France with generosity, and of ensuring the adroit of the new dynasty with a popular peace. When France declined to pay a war-indemnity to Prussia, Russia, England, and Austria acquiesced in her refusal, and she demanded was withdrawn. The art-galleries of Paris were permitted to retain the spoils with which Napoleon had enriched them. The provisions with reference to the ships in Dutch waters were liberal. But it was a settled principle that neither in Europe nor in the colonies must France ever again be permitted to exert a dangerous preponderance. Belgium, the Left Bank of the Rhine, the conquered lands in Holland, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy were to be ceded by France. The frontier of the fallen monarchy (1792) was to be the frontier of the monarchy restored, with an addition of territory comprising Mouthier and Arignen, Chambéry and Annecy. The *Île de France*, Tobago, and Santa Lucia were retained by England, which had acquired them during the war. The country, which had nourished many *émigrés*, and the Court, which had tried to obtain Luxembourg and a line of strong Belgian fortresses, were bitterly disappointed at so meagre a salvage; and it was not the least of the unlooked misfortunes of the Bourbons that their restoration was associated with the national humiliation of a contracted frontier and shrunken colonies.

In spite of the temporary optimism which the return of the Bourbons had evoked, the condition of public opinion in France was disquieting. The army was for the most part disaffected to the white cockade, and to such extent depleted by desertion that in April scarcely 20,000 men remained under arms. The three or four millions possessors of national lands troubled for their property, which had become enormously depreciated by reason of the prevailing insecurity. The peasantry had expected the re imposition of tithes and feudal dues. In many places the villagers, indignant at the maintenance of the *droits ruraux*, drove out the tax-collectors and burnt their registers. The Bretons and Vendéens went still further, and refused even to pay direct taxes. "We have fought for the King," they said; "we ought not to pay any taxes at all." In some places the *all'quered* between those who had accepted and those who had resisted the Concordat broke out

ance; and the members of the *Parle Église*, returning from a twelve years' exile, loudly claimed to resume their old functions, and equally agitated for the restitution of Church property. "The country districts," wrote Dupont, "and a large number of the towns are opposed to the friends of the King." This opposition was, however, scattered and disorganised; and a large part of it might reasonably be expected to melt away under a strong administration, all the more so since the world of politics and finance, literature and law was, with few exceptions, on the side of the monarchy. The vast body of the middle class, the manufacturers, the merchants, the indifferents, were heartily glad of peace and willing to support the new régime. The general staff of the army had put on the white cockade; and Ney, Angereau, Mordremelt, and ten other generals drawn from different branches of the service, joined the King's Council of War. Men of such diverse antecedents as Carnot and Fontanes, Fouché and Haugot de L'Isle, accepted the situation. There was likely to be plenty of quiet support if the monarchy managed well, and plenty of criticism however well it managed.

The ministry of Louis XVIII contained many able and well-meaning men, but it was neither strong, coherent, nor properly organised. The three most prominent members, Talleyrand, Montaignon, and de Blacas, were none of them well-suited to deal with a situation of exceptional difficulty. Talleyrand had no taste for regular work, no parliamentary gifts, and little interest in the problems of domestic administration; consequently, when he went to Vienna to represent the interests of France at the Congress, he left a gap behind him. Montaignon, Minister of the Interior, was honourable and disinterested, and a fluent and clever speaker in the Chambers; but his temperament was light and inconsequent; and, being a strict royalist by conviction, he had accepted the Constitution with little faith in its virtues and much suspicion of its vices. De Blacas remained at the Tuilleries what he had been at Hartford, a favourite and an *adjuv*, devoted and laborious, a counsellor of moderation, out of fear that his master might be compromised by excess, but a stranger to France, and absolutely devoid of the knowledge of a statesman. Of the other ministers, Ferrand, Director-General of the Posts, the Chancellor Dandrey, and Dupont, Minister of War, were unfortunate selections. The dark shadow of the Capitulaton of Baylen still clung to the name of Dupont, and made him unpopular with the army; while the other two belonged to the familiar type which had for a quarter of a century learnt nothing. There was no Prime Minister, no collective responsibility; and the business of the Cabinet was transacted in a series of secret conferences held between the King, de Blacas, and the Ministers in turn. If the King had been a strenuous man with a coherent policy, this "government by departments" might not have been detrimental; but Louis debated work, was slow in signing his name, and liked his mind to be made up by others. "What is the good of making

reports to him!" said Baron Louis to Bragnot. "You might as well make them to a suit in a niche. I just simply give him ordonnances to sign, and he signs."

He with aptly described the system of government as "petrified anarchy"; and Wellington said truly that there was no Ministry, only Ministers. Every one, from the strict constitutionalism of Baron Louis to the reactionary royalism of Durbuy and Bernard, was represented among the Ministers. Side by side with them sat the Prince—*Monseigneur*, the abettors of the intractable royalists, who kept his own army, his own cabinet, his own police, and made no secret of his hankering for the Charter; Angoulême, narrow, ignorant, sleek, and awkward, but with some grains of good sense; and lastly Berry, passionate, spontaneous, and unjustified, a good fellow with a bad temper, who loved women and horses, and would interrupt serious councils with the language of the barnack or the stable.

Seldom has any Government been confronted with a less enviable situation. There was a financial deficit of from five to six hundred millions of francs; there was an immense diminution in the taxable area, owing to the loss of the Napoleonic conquests; and there was a terrible though temporary impoverishment of France herself. It was certain therefore that large reductions would have to be made in the naval and military establishments; and it was equally certain that such reductions could not be effected without occasioning widespread dissatisfaction and distress. Nor was it possible, with due regard to the economic situation of the country, to make any material remission of taxation, in spite of the general expectation that with peace the most onerous taxes would instantaneously disappear. Under such conditions, a Government of angels and sages could not have failed to make mistakes and to disappoint hopes. Yet the measure of unpopularity would depend upon the wisdom with which affairs were administered, and the loyalty with which the Charter was observed. In both respects the Government fell short of the standard which the country had a right to expect.

There was something vigorous and heroic about the finance of Baron Louis. He made provision for the liquidation of a debt amounting to 752,000,000 francs, and successfully resisted a dishonourable proposal, emanating from the extreme royalists of the Chamber, that the State should repudiate one-fourth of the debt contracted under Napoleon. He maintained the unpopular taxes of 1815 and 1816, though Monsieur and Angoulême had been profuse in promises of revulsion. In one year he diminished the naval, military, and civil expenditures to a third of its former amount, reducing the army from a war footing of 600,000 to a peace footing of 201,100, and discharging two or three thousand officers on half-pay, with the right, however, to succeed in order of seniority to two-thirds of the commissions as they became vacant. It was part of his design to make the Legislature an accomplice in his parsimony.

By a resolution in French financial methods he proposed the budget of revenue at the same time as the budget of expenses, and promised that the taxes should be assigned to the purposes voted by the Chambers. The policy was perhaps over-strict, over-pessimism. It might have been wiser to extend the promise of reduction over a longer period of years and to raise more money upon loans; for the goodwill of the army was worth the price. But no one will deny to Baron Louis the qualities of courage, skill, perseverance, and honesty; and the movement of the funds, which rose ten points upon the introduction, and then rose upon the passing, of the budget, was an indication of his services towards the restoration of French credit.

The situation was, however, seriously aggravated by several pieces of gratuitous folly. Before the arrival of the King, and despite the strong representations of Talleyrand, it had been decided to substitute the white cockade for the tricolour; and thus to discard the colours which in the mind of every French soldier were intimately associated with his own personal achievements and with all the military triumphs of the Empire. By the bad advice of the Finances, the Government consented to revive the old Household Corps, which had existed from the days of Louis XIV down to the eve of the French Revolution. The plan burdened the budget with the cost, exceeding \$1,000,000 *fr.*, of a small army of 6000 officers highly paid and expensively equipped; but expense was far from being the most objectionable feature in the new luxury. The establishment of the Household Corps was an intimation that the Imperial Guard could not be trusted to defend the throne. The starving half-pay officers—and the embarrassed Treasury could not always pay even the half-pay—motivated his army list with the affluent career then opened to the young noble who had never smelt powder, and to the old emigré whose sword had rusted in its scabbard for twenty years. The whole army realised that some of the money lavished on the favoured corps might have kept deserving officers upon the active list, or repaired the battered uniforms of the men. It might have been expected that the Government would have disbanded the seven foreign regiments which had formed part of the Imperial army; on the contrary, an eighth was added to the number. It would have been easy to exclude from the army *émigrés* who had fought against their country; but they were readmitted in large numbers, and in many cases promoted; and, when we remember that for every *émigré* who was felicitous as a regiment, one old officer was discharged on half-pay and another disappointed of promotion, we may imagine the jealousy aroused. Napoleon had advised the King to trust the Imperial Guard or to disband it. Louis did neither. It is true that the pay of the Guard was maintained, and that it was placed under the command of Ney and Oudinot; but the Royal Grenadiers of France, as they were now called, were removed from Paris and supplanted by the new Household troops. "You are about,"

said Pasquier to Deputé, "to place at the head of the army a most formidable centre of discontent."

The sacred silk of the Napoleonic army was the Legion of Honour; and the Government had the good sense to preserve it. But the prodigality with which the decoration was distributed to civilians seemed to inflame a desire to deprecate its value; and an insertion in the ministerial papers that the Order of St Louis would henceforth be the sole military Order caused deep resentment. To calm these passions, the King issued an ordinance on July 15, approving and confirming the Order. But the salaries were reduced and the decorations changed. The rank of Henry IV was substituted for that of Napoleon, the three lilies for the eagle; and an archbishop—the Abbé de Broglie—was named Chancellor of the Order. The intended suppression of certain schools for the daughters of legionaries with a view to effect an economy of 40,000 francs, the dismissal of 8000 veterans from the public institutions which had been burdened with their support, the suppression of the military schools of St Cyr and St Germain, the intended establishment of a royal military school "in order that the nobility of the Kingdom may enjoy the advantages accorded by the edict of 1751," and the changing of the numbers of almost all the regiments—all this added to the indignation of the soldiers. Stories too were circulated, telling how the Duc de Berry had struck a soldier on parade, torn off his epaulettes, and spoken of the wars of the Empire as "Five-and-twenty years of brigandage"; how the Duc d'Angoulême had entered Paris in an English uniform; how Monsieur had replied to General Labret of the dragons of the Guard, who had offered the services of his brave men, "Peace is made; we have no need of brave men." The Marshals had received high commands and good pensions from the monarchy; but they, and still more keenly their wives, were made to feel the difference which divided the parvenu from the noble. "*Je ne conviens pas avec les généraux*," said a great lady of the old régime; "*c'est une maréchale*."

For the army, then, the new dynasty was associated with a humiliating peace, a miserly economy, and diminished opportunities of promotion. Ragged, barefooted, without regular pay, the veterans of Napoleon watched with anger the distribution of the Legion of Honour to obscure civilians, the formation of the Household Brigade from foreigners, Germans, and *étrangers*, and the ordinance of May 15 which reserved two-thirds of the vacant promotions to the officers on half-pay and the remaining one-third to the King's nominees. The army had ceased to be a democratic profession, for no non-commissioned officer could ever now expect to be a sub-lieutenant. It is no wonder that the troops, especially the returned prisoners, cherished the memory of the great evils who had made them, as Ponsard said, "a nation apart," that they kept the tricolour as a sacred relic, mixed the ashes of their burnt eagles in wine and drank them down to save them from dishonour,

disturbed many a widow in their pious cries, and diffused the spirit of discontent through the villages of France.

It might have been expected that the Church, which had been so subservient to Napoleon, would not have received special favours from the new monarch. But the Courts d'Artois and the King, halting at the English Sunday, put pressure upon the director of police to remedy the lax notions which prevailed in France. Without consulting the Council or any of the ministers save Dumas, Bourget signed an ordinance (June 7) prohibiting under severe penalties all work and trade on Sundays and Festivals, and two days afterwards issued a decree enforcing respect to the processions of the *Fête-Dieu*. The first ordinance was universally blamed, "because it was too severe, because it deranged the habits of an infinite number of people, and because it menaced those who broke it with a heavy money fine, and was in fact a penal law which the King had no right to promulgate without the consent of the Chambers." The second was regarded as an infringement of the religious toleration granted by the Charter, as well as a violation of an as yet uncomposed law prohibiting out-of-door religious processions. Both together were taken as an indication that the Court was willing to violate the Charter in order to promote the predominance of the Roman Catholic Church. So general was the indignation that the Government was compelled to withdraw the two measures.

In the course of the summer, party feeling defined itself more clearly in Paris. A monarchy which accepted a bicameral Constitution, allowed Bonapartists and Jacobins to sit in the Legislature and even in the Ministry, retained the prefects and judges of the Empire, paid stipends to the senators, retained the Marshals' wives at Court, and declined to restore the royalists to their old homes, was not the kind of monarchy of which the exiles had dreamed. Men who had suffered years of banishment in the cause of the old France wished to see the old France once more—provinces instead of departments, parliaments instead of law-courts, attorney in place of constitutionalism, the old Order instead of the Legion of Honour. The more extreme cried for the deportation of the regicides and the repudiation of the Napoleonic debt; and their organ, *Le Quotidien*, raved against a monarch who did everything for his enemies and nothing for his friends.

While this kind of men, "more royalist than the King," were assailing the Government under the leadership of Mauguin, there was growing up on the other hand a constitutional party of opposition, formed of the most intelligent politicians in Paris. The *Esprit* of the movement was *Machina de Stahl*; its literary organ was *Le Commerce*, a grave and moderate journal edited by two young lawyers, Cochin and Thiers; its greatest reputation was *La Fayette*; its principal pamphleteer was Benjamin Constant, no longer the Tribune of the Councils, still less the Jacobin of the Directory, but a skeptic in religion and a constitutional

legitimist in politics. Constant still gambled at night, and was the slave of women: but his ardent and vain temperament was compatible with considerable intellectual ability and a real grasp of constitutional principles. In no small measure France owes her first lessons in the principles and practice of a constitutional monarchy to his mercurial pen.

The great topic of debate and source of ferment was the loyalty of the Government to the Charter. It arose in connexion with the press, in connexion with the land, in connexion with the Church, one might almost say in connexion with every branch of public policy. When the Government brought in a scheme for the censorship of the press, it was bitterly attacked as a distinct violation of the Charter. Talleyrand criticised the measure in the salons; Coeur de Lion, in the *Concorde*, a prominent Bourbon organ, the *Journal des Dilectés*, went into opposition; and, though the Government accepted important amendments, the censoring commission only passed the Press by one vote. The effect of the agitation on the Press Law—and it must be remembered that the question was before the Chambers for a period of three months—was profound and critical. "France," says Pasquier, "was inundated with artificial pamphlets, which represented the men in power as busy upon reeling the days of ignorance and darkness. The manner of these writings was great; and public opinion henceforth shared their heat and their anger."

Another heated discussion arose over a Bill to restore to the *dejected* such of their lands as had not yet been sold by the State. The measure was just, and might have passed without friction but for the injudicious speech of Farnand, the Minister who introduced it to the Chambers. "The *dejected* have followed the right line.....the King regrets that he cannot give to this measure all the latitude which in his heart of hearts he desires"—phrases such as these seemed to indicate that more was to be done for the *dejected* hereafter, and that the clause in the Charter which decreed the inviolability of all property was not safe from attack. The *apud de motifs* was unanimously condemned; and a resolution was prepared, filling four columns of the *Mémoires*. But, though the debate raged angrily for eight sittings, the law, with some amendments, was passed by a large majority. The liberal opposition in the Chambers kept within the bounds of moderation; but, in the country at large, Farnand's declaration was read in the light of the publications of two lawyers, Dard and Paléonnet, contending that sales of national property were legally invalid; and the inference was generally drawn that the Bourbons were about to embark upon a national scheme of eviction with a view to restoring the land to its former owners. The promotion of Farnand to the dignity of Count, a few days after his speech, confirmed the worst suspicions; and, when the Parliamentary session closed on December 30, 1814, the Government, despite many concessions and explanations, had fallen greatly in public esteem.

In order to bring strength to the Ministry, Louis, at the end of November, transferred the portfolio of war from Dupont to Soult. The new Minister was one of the most illustrious of the Marshals, a skilful general and a resolute administrator; and his appointment was at first received with satisfaction. But he had risen to favour with the Court by opening a subscription for the man who had fallen at Quiberon; and it was soon discovered that, in his desire to please his new masters, he was insensible to considerations of delicacy and tact. He began by ordering all half-pay officers out of Paris to their birthplaces, and adopted, if he did not suggest, the idea of giving pensions to the officers and soldiers of the royalist army of the west who had been wounded in defence of the throne. He sent a commission into Normandy and Brittany, one of whose members, a noted Chouan, was said to have committed the foulest crimes in the civil war. He recommended the *Comte de Bruges*, a royalist nobody, to be Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour. But perhaps no circumstance contributed to cast so much odium upon his administration and upon the Government as the affair of General Exelmans.

During the last week of November, a certain *Docteur*, physician to the Court of Naples, was arrested at Nismes by order of the prefect of police. Among his papers was found a letter from General Exelmans addressed to the King of Naples, and containing an assurance that, if things had not taken a favourable turn at Vienna, "a thousand brave officers instructed in the school and under the eyes of your Majesty" would have rushed to assist the Neapolitan throne. The letter did not pass the bounds of insinuation; and Dupont contented himself with a mild reproof. Soult, however, determined to treat the matter seriously, put Exelmans on half-pay, and ordered him at once to leave Paris for his birthplace. The general first pleaded delay, and then determined to resist. Upon the question of legal right Exelmans was clearly in error; for, though on half-pay, he was still in the service of the Crown and amenable to military discipline. But Soult and his agents contrived by their violence to make a hero out of a melodramatic and insolent soldier. All France learnt how the horses of Exelmans had been hocked late by night; how the general had bared his breast and cried, "I know that you have come to assassinate me. Make an end of it! I am ready"; how he had tried to blow out his brains; how he had wept by the garden; how his wife had fainted five times; how the ladies would not permit her doctor to enter. In a moment Exelmans became the hero of the army, of the *Chambre*, of all France. Madame de Stael wrote to him; Lantierais called twice a day; La Fayette offered him the asylum of his country residence. When, on January 25, 1815, he was acquitted at Lille, enthusiasm knew no bounds.

The state of tension in Paris and outside steadily increased during the months of January and February, 1815. The King had decided



that on January 21 the ashes of Louis XVI, Marie-Antoinette, and Madame Elizabeth should be borne to St Denis, and that on the same day the first statue should be laid of two monuments to commemorate the royal martyrs. Funeral services were to be celebrated in all the cathedrals and churches of the kingdom; and the day was to be further solemnized by the closing of the law-courts and the theatres. The desire was natural and pious; and no exception could reasonably be taken to the ceremonial devised for the occasion. But, when the nerves of a highly-excited people are strained, the least event may give rise to suspicion or panic. A dark rumour spread through the capital that the celebration of January 21 was to be marked by the massacre of all the Terrorists; that lists of proscription had been drawn up; that the Princes, and especially the Duchesse d'Angoulême, were backing the conspirators; that the King, who was opposed to it, had been induced to visit Trignon; and that it was to execute this nefarious project that all the chiefs of the Vendéens had collected in Paris. An incident connected with the burial of a famous actress, *Mathémielle Bannout*, whose corpse, as that of an excommunicate, was refused admission to the Church of St Roch, until the crowd, with shouts of "*le pègre a le levêve*," broke open the door, still farther exasperated the public mind. Nor was this nervousness entirely without foundation. There were undoubtedly desperate men and plotters among the royalists, whose passion, in denying that an amnesty had ever been promised to crimes, positively encouraged a campaign of vengeance. The extent of the alarm may be gauged by the fact that Carot sat up during the night of January 21 with his weapons handy.

Plots were met by counter-plots. At the end of October, 1834, about thirty half-pay officers had been arrested on suspicion of plotting the assassination of the King and the Princes. The excitement over the *Barricadeurs* rose, the affair of St Roch, and the celebration of January 21, seemed to show that Paris would rise if it could find anyone to give the lead. The brothers *Lafumand*, commanding respectively the department of the Aube and the artillery of La Fère, and *Ducrot*, the head of the 16th military division at Lille, were confident that they could march upon Paris, raze the faubourgs, and overthrow the monarchy. They sounded *Devereux*, who had been proscribed by the Bourbons, and entered into communications with *Lavilletré*, *Bannino*, and *Fouché*. The soul of the conspiracy was *Bonchal*, whose hopes of advancement under the monarchy had been dashed to the ground by the recent ministerial appointments, and who was clever enough to see that the *Salut* was unstable. But the conspirators, though agreed upon the necessity of overthrowing the Bourbons by an assault on the Tuilleries, were divided as to their future course. The vehement Bonapartists wished simply to proclaim the exiled Emperor; but this course was repugnant to the republicans and to those whom Bonaparte had alienated at the close of his

censor. The Duke of Orleans, the son of a regicide and himself once a soldier in the armies of the Revolution, "the only Bourbon who understood France," as both Alexander and La Fayette thought, seemed to offer better guarantees. He would unite the revolutionists and the moderate liberals, and realize the hopes of the man who wished for a constitutional monarchy. The Duke was discreetly approached by Talleyrand, but would have nothing to say to him.

Fouché, however, determined to proceed with the conspiracy. But La Fayette and the allies of the Gironde preferred to trust to the constitutional action of the new Chamber of Deputies, which was to meet in May; and in the middle of February, when all was ready, Duroc, the military chieftain of the intended insurrection, declared that he would have none of it, allying ignorance of Napoleon's wishes, in reality moved by distrust of Fouché. Meanwhile Fouché had entered into correspondence with Mathemich, who was glad to accommodate with so sensitive a barometer of the political weather. Since the regency of Marie-Louise was a possible outcome of the plot, it was necessary to secure the consent of the Powers whose representatives were then assembled at Vienna. But how could the Powers tolerate a regency for Marie-Louise, if her hostile husband were to remain within two days' sail of the French coast? If Napoleon could be put to death or banished to a distant Isle in the Atlantic, then indeed the idea might become a practical policy. Fouché wished it to be practical. One of his men suggested assassination to Louis XVIII, but the King rejected the proposal. It was necessary therefore to work for the deportation of Napoleon—a safe task, since the scheme was as agreeable to the Bourbons as to their secret Son. Hence Fouché agreed with Talleyrand.

But the signal for revolt did not come from Vienna. On Sunday, March 5, at 1 a.m., it was announced to Louis that Bonaparte had landed on the coast of France. Some hours afterwards Fouché learnt the news, and determined to precipitate the revolt. If his men marched on Paris they could overtake Louis, establish a Provisional Government, and resist or side with Napoleon according as the opinion of the country declared itself. But all misarrived. A handful under Labrousse Desnoettes marched as far as Compiègne, and then, finding the outlook cold and obscure, returned to their duty. Such was the sole outcome of all the plotting under the First Restoration.

Napoleon was not brought over from Elba by plot or conspiracy. His came because he had correctly divined the situation in France. His march to the capital is one of the miracles of history. He fought no battle; he shed no blood; he was greeted by the peasantry all along the route as a saviour and a friend; not a soldier would fire on him; his name was a talisman which drew all the nations of the kingdom to itself. He often rode before his troops unattended; yet no one offered him violence. He promised liberal reforms—not that liberal reforms mattered

to peasant or soldier, but to make his return sound pleasantly in the ears of the lawyers and politicians of Paris. Never had his inclinations for acting been more fruitful, his Government more exulting in its direct and spontaneous acts. "Route to death, rot carilles, Route to marriage à Napoleon," Mithels sang men, women, and children along his triumphal way. "La plus Flétrie" had come to touch the cart and the dagger a lesson, and to make secure every peasant-holding in France. On March 10 he was at Lyons, on the 17th at Annema, on the morning of the 20th at Fourmohlers. On the 14th he was joined by Ney, who had boasted that he would bring him back to Paris in an iron cage.

Louis had always said, in his own way, that the clouds would pass over and all would soon be well. He knew that he had given France peace and liberty, that he had no intention of violating the Charter, that he had not been stiff with the Chambers, that his Government had respected the material interests of the nation. Given time, the good sense of the nation would rally round him; fear would be quieted, suspicion allayed. The country might grant him, such, critics, but it could never be so mad as to upset his throne. But he had not calculated on Bonaparte. Though he had been warned in November that there was something stirring in Elba, he took no heed; and, even after the news of the landing, he was full of confidence that the Prince would be able to stop "the coupade." But on the night of March 9-10 news came that Lyons was untenable; and the assurance of the Court ceased any. The wildest counsels were suggested. De Blacas thought that the King should go in an open carriage, accompanied by the Chambers, to meet Napoleon; Monteban, that he should summon Fouche to the Council; Marmon, that he should fortify the Tuilleries and the Louvre, and prepare to stand a siege of two months, while Monteban and his own aided the province. Bourrienne advised a retirement to Lille; and Vitrolles proposed that the Chambers should be summoned to Rochelle, and that the King should throw himself on the loyalty of the Britons. With true perspicacity, Monteban objected that the King of La Vendée would never be the King of France.

Such was expected of treason and division; Bourrienne was made prefect of police. Monteban advised large concessions to liberal opinion, and carried the King with him. From the 25th to the 16th of March a series of announcements appeared in the *Messenger*, destined to satisfy the constitutionalists and to appease the resentments of the people. Half-pay officers were to be recalled to service and full pay. Annuaire due to the Legion of Honour were to be paid; privileged corps were to be formed of the old Imperial Guard; the utmost loyalty to the Charter was protested. On March 16 the King drove to the Palais Bourbon, wearing for the first time the sash of the Legion of Honour. "Here," he said to the assembled deputies and peers, "on 1st of sixty years before terminate my career than by dying in defence of my

country?" A crowd of deputies rose at his words, and stretching forth their arms, were to die for the King and the Charter. Even Monsieur protested on oath his fidelity to constitutional principles.

But on March 17 it was known that Marshal Ney had deserted to the enemy: and the Court made up its mind to flee. Very secretly, on the evening of Sunday, March 18, the King drove out of Paris; nor was it till the next morning that his ministers became aware of his flight. Then for the first time all was known—the desertion of Ney, the flight of the King, the arrival of Napoleon at Fontainebleau. Crowds collected in the squares and gardens awaiting the event; generals and officers drove out along the Boulevards to proffer their services. At 8 a.m. the traitor was lodged on the Tuilleries; but still he did not come. The night closed in; a fine rain began to fall, and the streets emptied. Then a carriage galloped into the town, with the torches of the Polish Lancers of the Guard on either side. It was Napoleon. Instantly a crowd surged round the Tuilleries, and he was borne through the press, a light smile upon his lips, his face deadly pale, up the great staircase to the throne-room, where a hundred huzzas shed their brilliance upon a gay crowd of men and women. But he was not deceived by the splendour of his reception. "Mon cher," he said to Mollien, "the time for compliments is passed; they have let me come, as they have let these people go."

To fall a Government of which Madame de Staël could say that it was guilty of no single act of arbitrary authority; a Government which respected public and private liberty and secured possibilities of quiet and comfortable living to its subjects. According to its own lights, it honestly served the interests of France both at home and abroad. It was not disloyal to the Charter, though it had no faith in it; and, thanks to the courage and adroitness of Talleyrand, it regained for France a place in the councils of Europe. Many as were its errors, it was nearly as good a Government as the circumstances permitted. But Paris, always remissive in its attitude and captious in its criticism, could make no allowance for the pygmy who had been called upon to fill the giant's throne. The grievances of the army were partly inevitable and partly trifling. The suspicions of the provinces were based, not upon injuries received, but upon fears entertained. A strong King, enthusiastically for the Constitution, might have allayed these terrors, kept the deluge in check, and soothed the susceptibilities of the army. But still he could not have been safe. To a man which had drunk so deeply of military and civil glory, his rule must have meant the beginning of the bonapartist age.

## CHAPTER XIX.

## THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. I.

On May 30, 1814, the treaties known collectively as the First Peace of Paris were signed by Talleyrand on behalf of the Most Christian King, and by the representatives of Austria, Russia, Great Britain, and Prussia. This Peace fixed the frontiers of France as they had stood on November 1, 1792, granting, however, certain augmentations of territory on the northern and eastern frontiers of France in return for her renunciation of any pretensions to sovereignty or control beyond them. On the middle Rhine the *Thalweg* (or mid-stream line) of the river was fixed as the boundary; while, to the south-east, the department of Mont Blanc was increased by the acquisition of Chambéry and Aoste. Moreover, France was guaranteed the retention of all the colonies within her territories of 1792—Arigona, Mauritius and a number of other districts. She thus gained territory comprising 180 square (geographical) miles, with 480,000 inhabitants, although Holland, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and the island of Malta now remained wholly detached from her rule or influence. Of the French colonies, Tobago, Santa Lucia, and Ile de France with its dependencies, were by the Peace of Paris ceded to Great Britain; and the Spanish portion of San Domingo was returned to Spain. On the other hand, Portugal gave French Guinea back to France.

It would be superfluous here to enter further into the provisions of the First Peace of Paris; for, in the treaties made by France with the other Great Powers, the thirty-second Article stipulated that a congress, to be held at Vienna by the Powers which had taken part in the recent war, should determine the arrangements for completing these provisions. This, of course, referred primarily to the changes made or to be made in the political map of Europe; and, in one of the secret articles of the Peace, France promised to recognise whatever distribution the Allied Powers should make of conquered or ceded territories. Another secret article, already agreed upon at Chaumont, which directed the signatory Powers to make provision for the independence of the German States,

and for their union by means of a federal bond, was also inserted in the Peace of Paris. With these topics the closing summary of the proceedings at the Congress of Vienna itself will be principally concerned.

It should be observed that the first Article in each of the Paris Treaties declared the intention of the High Contracting Powers to use every endeavour for maintaining, not only among themselves, but among all the States of Europe, the good accord and understanding necessary for her peace. Thus the Powers which at Paris agreed to address themselves to the task of definitely ordering the conditions of the pacification of Europe deliberately purposed by their present and future common action to secure permanency for the results of their endeavours. Hence they were only adhering to a system of procedure on which they had previously agreed among themselves. On March 1, 1814, Metternich, Neudorff, Castlereagh, and Hardenberg, had, as representatives of their respective Governments, signed the Treaty of Chaumont. The Allied Powers, it must be remembered, had entered into the decisive struggle against Napoleon each at its own time and under the conditions which seemed best to suit its own interests, and during its course had incurred no obligations with regard to their future policy except by means of separate treaties with one another, and of the declarations issued by them on December 1, 1805, when—as the victors of Austerlitz—they declared their alliance with France. But at Chaumont they agreed to an offensive and defensive alliance, of far wider scope than any of these previous agreements. Not only did they undertake, in the event of the terms of peace being refused by France, to unite their endeavours as to secure for Europe a general peace, but they further agreed that, in order to secure the continuance of a good understanding between them, meetings should periodically be held between the allied sovereigns in person or their representatives. Thus was founded the new system of congresses convened and conducted by the Great Powers, and implying, as Wellington said at Vienna, the exercise by these Powers of a right of protection over the peace of Europe. Among these congresses of the new model, that which met at Vienna in 1814 was not only the earliest, but by far the most important.

Europe was full of hopes in the summer months which preceded the meeting of this assembly. It seemed as if the States composing the European family, they once more to take counsel together on terms of independence, were also free to determine their own destinies. The pacifications of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic days had been concluded only in order to be strained and broken; the diplomatic haggings dignified by the name of congresses in this period—Bastani, Prager, Châtillon—had amounted to little more than pretences, even in the eyes of those who took part in them. The time of the duped ideologies seemed to have come at last. Görres, whose journal, the *Abendblatt*, records some of the wildest aspirations of this romantic age,

wrote in August, 1814, to his friends, the brothers Grimm: "It is wonderful how deep a root all our efforts, hitherto more or less suspended in the air, have now taken in all our hearts."

Moreover, public expectation was enhanced by a widespread impression, that the Allied Powers had already agreed on the principal territorial arrangements which the Congress would be invited to approve and guarantee. It was confidently expected that the distribution of the large mass of territories reconquered from France, and the readjustment of the political map of Europe, would proceed on principles ensuring a real and permanent equilibrium among its States, such as had not been established either at the close of the Thirty Years' War or of that of the Spanish Succession. But more than this. In many quarters the hope was cherished that, after promptly solving this part of its task, the great assembly would without loss of time enter upon an ulterior range of labours, equally important and, from a cosmopolitan point of view, more inspiring. It would assembly subjoined the settlement of the political system of Europe by the institution of an effective and enduring international tribunal. Further, by way of attesting its sincere desire of putting an end to the constant recurrence of war, the Congress would at least attempt to apply the remedy of a systematic, though at first inevitably partial, disarmament. It would encourage the growth of representative institutions, by which Napoleon himself had endeavored to appease resistance or to coöperate support. It would obey the dictates of humanity, already followed by Great Britain, by extinguishing the African slave-trade, while with the aid of the same Power it would sweep piracy out of the Mediterranean. To the transatlantic colonies of Spain the Congress might perhaps succeed in opening a future of independent life; and, consequently, freedom of traffic might be secured on the ocean itself, though, to be sure, Great Britain, then still at war with the United States on behalf of her navigation laws, was not likely to modify them in favour of neutrals.

Such expectations and visions as these the Congress was not destined to fulfil within the nine months—strictly speaking, they were hardly more than eight—of its existence; but, even if the return of Napoleon had not unexpectedly abridged its career, the leading minds of the assembly at no time shared this widespread conception of the scope of its activity. Indeed, at a comparatively early date in the course of its deliberations, Götze contrived, through his journalistic friend Flot, to make public a list of the subjects to be treated at the Congress, which, with the solitary exception of the measures against the Barbary pirates, consisted entirely of such as had been mentioned in the Paris treaties or in the supplements to them.

The primary task of the Congress, the redistribution of territories, was to be carried out in accordance with arrangements concerted by the Allied Powers without consulting France, and explicitly rooted in

certain articles of the Paris treaties, likewise kept secret, at Talleyrand's request, in order to spare the insensibility of the French nation. The most important of these arrangements concerned Upper Italy, the Netherlands, the territories on the left bank of the Rhine, and the Swiss Federal Constitution. These provisions, deriving in part from secret articles in the Treaty of Chaumont, or from earlier compacts between particular Powers, was unlikely to create serious difficulties for the Congress, having been settled in principle between the four Great Allied Powers, and accepted by France. The case was, however, altogether different with some other agreements concluded between certain of the Great Powers but unconfirmed by the rest—above all, with the Convention of Kalisch (February 28, 1813) between Russia and Prussia.

This Convention, while putting into the form of a concrete bargain the accord which even in the darkest days had never ceased to exist between these two Powers, clearly defined their relation to the general problem of the permanent reconstitution of Europe. Prussia surrendered to Russia a large part of her own Polish claims, in return for a guarantee of compensation in Germany which (excluding Hanover) would restore to her an extent of territory equal to that held by her before the war of 1806. The Treaty of Alliance between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, concluded at Reichenbach (June 27, 1813), stipulated that the grand-duchy of Warsaw should be partitioned between these three Powers; and a secret article of the Treaty of Toplitz (September 9), which concluded definitive the promised alliance between the three Eastern Powers, provided for an amicable settlement between them as to the future of this territory. But the spirit of the Kalisch Convention had not been quelled by this seeming resolution of the Russian side of the bargain; as to the other, it was becoming more and more apparent that the compensation promised to Prussia would be sought in the annexation of Saxony.

Here then was a stumbling-block threatening itself, as it were, across the very threshold of the Congress. Nor should the important fact be overlooked, that, at the time of the arrival of the plenipotentiaries at Vienna, the Allies remained in joint occupation of France, and severally held, or were on the point of holding, military control over those territories in the final settlement of whose future they respectively took a special interest. In the Low Countries the British forces predominated, while the armies of Austria were in command of the whole of Italy, with the exception of the Two Sicilies. Poland on the other hand was entirely under Russian occupation; and the control of Saxony was soon to be handed over to the Prussian authorities by the Russian Governor, Prince Repnin, who at present held sway there on behalf of the central administration of the Allies.

The beginning of the month of August had been originally fixed for the opening of the Congress at Vienna. But the event was postponed for two months, first, in order to enable Castlereagh to see out



the studies of Parliament: then, to allow the Tsar and the King of France a brief sojourn at home after their visit to England. By the middle of September several of the leading statesmen of Europe, Catherinagh, Hardenberg, and Neudorff among them, had found their way to the Austrian capital, where, on September 17, they were joined by Metternich and Gorts from the neighbouring watering-place of Baden. On the 22nd the French plenipotentiaries put in an appearance; and on the 23rd, amidst what Gorts half contemptuously calls a "tumult," the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia made their entry. Four days afterwards the plenipotentiaries held a conference, with which the business of the Congress may be said to have opened, and which was to prove the first coup manqué in its proceedings.

According to the *Monitor*, the sovereigns present at the Congress familiarly discussed among themselves every day, before dinner, the principal subjects that were occupying their plenipotentiaries, and arrived at their conclusions like private persons conducting a friendly bargain. No doubt some of the difficulties of the Congress were surmounted in this informal way, by means of a diplomacy whose manner than usual new because it dispensed as far as possible with precedent and etiquette, and which made full use of the social opportunities celebrated in the *Princes de Ligne's* famous wit, "*Le congrès dîner, mais il ne marche pas.*" But, though at critical moments appeal was made to the influence of great personages, above all to that of the Emperor Alexander, yet the substance of the work of the Congress was carried on by a select group of political experts. Whether Gorts's statement—that this group was composed of Wessenberg, Clancarty, Dalberg, Humboldt, Gorts, and La Bourdonnaye—is exhaustive or not, the historian of the Congress will not err in attributing to the labours of these men, and perhaps of a few others, most of what was constructive in its achievement.

Among the sovereigns present in person at the Congress, the Emperor Francis I of Austria played the part of host in no sense magnificently enough, if we are to believe that he lavished more than thirty millions of florins upon the entertainment of his guests, at a time when his Government had the greatest difficulty in meeting even its ordinary expenditures. The personality of the first Austrian Emperor corresponded very imperfectly to the demands of so great an occasion: but the long-established traditions as well as the actual interests of his dynasty were safe in his keeping, and his good-natured instincts and obedience to narrow conceptions of duty are caricatured when he is represented as moved alternately by simple docility and low cunning. A nature like his could have little in common with the geriatric intellectual tastes of his reigning (third) sonnet, the Emperor Lodovick, a princess of Modena, was regard without jealousy and suspicion the military laurels of the elder of his brothers, Archduke Charles, and the popular sympathies of the younger, Archduke John. The persistent refusal of the Emperor's

daughter, Marie-Louise, to play any part of her own in politics, made it all the easier for her father to uphold her interests.

Among the Imperial and royal guests lodged at the Hofburg, the most conspicuous figure was beyond all doubt that of the Emperor Alexander I of Russia. The part played by Russia and her allies in the overthrow of Napoleon, and the autocratic conditions of Alexander's own authority, must in any case have secured to him a wholly exceptional influence; and this was enhanced by his ambition to intervene, whenever he could, as a sort of universal Providence, and by his terrible desire to please. During the period of the Congress he kept up an intimate personal intercourse with Prince Adam Czartoryski, to whose inspiration his Polish policy was directly due. The recollections of La Harpe's teaching animated the Tsar's interest in the democratic development of Swiss institutions; Stein's lofty schemes for securing a national future to Germany found in him a willing listener; even the refugee Prince Ypsilanti's dreams of the emancipation of Greece were not valued with an undiscriminating attention. But he had around him other less single-minded counsellors; and the continuous tendencies of Russian Imperial expansion imposed their perennial conditions upon him. The political action of Russia in the immediate future hinged upon the revival of close cooperation between her and Prussia, to whose dynasty Alexander had long been attached by close personal ties; while the apprehensions of Austrian and British opposition were lessened by his personal grudge against Metternich, and perhaps by a feeling towards Great Britain made up of political jealousy and personal dislikement. At Vienna the Emperor Alexander was met by his neglected Empress, Elizabeth—who was chiefly interested in the future of the grand-daughter of Baden, of which she was a princess. Thither too came the Tsar's eldest brother, Grand Duke Constantine, quite ready to become Viceroy of Poland pending the foundation of the new Byzantine Empire; and his sisters the Grand Duchesses Mary and Catherine, of whom the latter was soon to marry the Crown Prince of Württemberg, a prince whose intelligence and high-mindedness, well matched with her own, exercised a strong attraction upon Alexander.

Quite unlike his brilliant ally, King Frederick William III of Prussia had, whether in prosperity or in adversity, habitually abstained from adopting an independent course of action except when slowly forced to it by an imperative sense of duty. In 1812 he had yielded to the strong current of national feeling, unshaken of the humiliations undergone by himself and his late beloved consort Queen Louise, whom his subjects adored as a martyr of patriotism; but, while he had taken care to safeguard the interests of his monarchy by the compact with Russia, he had but little sympathy with the projects of mind more or less dimly conscious of Prussia's future national task. At the Congress the military though to all appearances not uncomely King struck, according to

his want, from pompousness; but, notwithstanding his natural obstinacy, his statesmen in general found him willing to fall in with the compromises which they were so often obliged to adopt.

Among the minor crowned heads, King Frederick VI of Denmark appeared in person, with the purpose of bettering, so far as he could, the conditions of the Peace of Kiel (January 14, 1814), under which he had joined the coalition against his former ally, Napoleon. Although his indefatigable efforts were almost wholly unsuccessful, yet, but for them, his unfortunate kingdom might have fared even worse than it did in the general partition. On the other hand, the Crown Prince of Sweden (Bernadotte) took no personal part in the proceedings at Vienna, possibly because he had no wish to betray how greatly he had been disabused by the turn which events had taken in France.

Among the purely Napoleonic royalties, King Maximilian I Joseph of Bavaria and King Frederick I of Württemberg headed the list of members of the Confederation of the Rhine, whom something beside the real of concert had brought to the Congress. The latter potentate, a true but by no means an impotent exemplar of what State termed Napoleonic Sublimism, was at Vienna mainly intent upon effronting the patriotic hopes of his own restless Prussians, which, together with their constitutional traditions, had a warm friend in his sin and hair, the Crown Prince William. King Max Joseph was accompanied to the Hofburg by his Queen and the Crown Prince Louis, whose own aspirations, patriotic and other, so readily warmed out of reach; for himself, the Bavarian sovereign adhered to the policy of his able minister Montgelas, which constantly subordinated all other claims to the dynastic ambition of the House of Wittelsbach. Frederick Augustus I of Saxony, whose calculations at the eleventh hour had, unhappily for him, lagged behind those of his two fellow Kings, was as a matter of course excluded from the Congress, where however his brother, Prince (afterwards King) Anton, seems to have put in an appearance. The King of Saxony, in danger of something headless for ever, was still detained in custody at Friedrichsfelde near Berlin: nor was it till the beginning of March, 1814, that he reached Potsdam, whence communication with Vienna was comparatively easy.

Many other German Princes had been attracted to the Austrian capital—heads or members of sovereign families, or belonging to Houses that still claimed to be such or hoped to recover their sovereignty. The Grand Duke Charles of Baden had arrived, fearful of having to forfeit part at least of the territorial gains bestowed upon him by Napoleon. Here were also the Elector William of Hesse-Cassel, whose seven years of exile from the delights of Cassel had at last come to an end, and the Hereditary Grand Duke George of Hesse-Darmstadt, whose Austrian military uniform attested the traditions of his line. Here were the heads of the elder branch of the House of Brunswick, and these

of both the German branches of the House of Nassau; and among the Princes of the older Saxon branch, the Duke of Weimar, Karl August, still fresh in body as well as in mind, though a Silesian aping; and Duke Ernst of Coburg-Saalfeld, with his brother Prince Ferdinand (another Austrian general) and Leopold (the future King of the Belgians). Lastly, a peculiar position was occupied among the royalties by Eugene Bonaparte, Josephine's son, formerly Viceroy of Italy. Married to a Russian princess, he had still hopes of a provision in Germany.

At the Congress of Vienna no single plenipotentiary viewed an assembly such as at some other Congress before or since has been possessed by individual statesmen. Yet there can be no doubt that Prince Metternich, the Emperor of Austria's Minister of State and of Foreign Affairs and his first plenipotentiary at the Congress, was foremost to lay his right hand, and its president in fact as well as in name. However cautious an attitude Metternich might have observed towards Napoleon in 1805-6, and subsequently towards the Coalition, at the Congress he was resolutely intent upon a definite system of policy from which in his judgment Austria ought not to swerve. Hence his collision with the irresolute policy of Alexander, whose bitter dislike the loyal support of Francis enabled Metternich to meet with firmness as well as with tact. The low view of his intellectual capacity, set on foot by Talleyrand's malice, will not bear examination; nor can it be denied that Metternich well understood the first condition of successful success—that of placing trust in worthy subordinates. The second Austrian plenipotentiary, Baron John von Wessenberg, was an admirable practical diplomatist; and his labours proved of the highest importance to the general success of the Congress, of which he has been described as the "working bee." The Austrian Foreign Office at this time had many capable agents at command; Baron Binder was called in from Stuttgart to serve on the Barbets-Genoa Commission; Count Radetzky, whose reputation as a general had risen high at Leipzig, attended as military adviser; and Pilat instructed public opinion as editor of the *Oesterreichische Postbote*. But Metternich's second political self was Gentz, who, as he blandly informed Kinkel, knew everything, and who stirred Europe by appeals which were masterpieces of force and point. Metternich had treated Gentz with confidence at the abortive Congress of Prague; but it was not till early in 1814, when Gentz definitely settled down at Vienna, that the minister actually took counsel of the publicist in questions of high policy. After constant intercourse with him at Baden, Metternich obtained the assent of Castlereagh, Nesselrode, and the Prussians to the appointment of Gentz as Secretary of the Congress. Under his Privy-Councillor Watten and Martens acted as Second General Secretary and as Secretary of the German Committee respectively; and no official seems to have more fully enjoyed his confidence than State-Councillor Rodolphi.

Spain, which, as it proved, had nothing of substance to gain or lose from the deliberations of the Congress, was represented by a single plenipotentiary. Don Pedro Gomez Lalanda exhibited from first to last a stiffness which, when the Powers offered him a chance, became weakness. As a rule he, like the Italian plenipotentiary, joined with Talleyrand in the advocacy of Bourbon interests, especially in Italy; he was also commissioned, by Maria-Louise, Queen Dowager of the extinct kingdom of Etruria. "Lalanda," wrote Castlereagh to Wellington, "is a true Spaniard; he imitates Talleyrand's tergiversities."

The plenipotentiaries of Portugal, and with it of Brazil, were the Counts de Palmella and de Saldanha de Gama, with the Chevalier Lobo de Silveira.

The Prince de Talleyrand, who had got rid of his Italian principality at Bracciano, soon to be suppressed by the Congress, appeared as Foreign Minister and first plenipotentiary of the King of France. As such, he not only advanced very lofty pretensions on behalf both of France and of "legitimate" royalty, but was extraordinarily successful in quickly impressing these upon an assembly at first disposed to treat him and his colleagues with the utmost coldness. The influence which he had then established he increased by daring intrigues, and maintained to some extent to the last, in circumstances which would have depressed any intellectual energy inferior to his own. Thus he did brilliant service to the country which he represented as well as to the sovereign whom he served; nor was France again temporarily excluded from the supreme council of Europe till after his fall. The secret of his success probably lay as much in his cleanness of aim as in his calm audacity of action. With him came the Duc de Dalberg (whose kinship with the Prince Primas and share in the negotiations for Napoleon's second marriage do not seem to have interfered with his success as a hard-working and capable diplomatist), and the young Counts de La Tour du Pin and Alexis de Noailles. The Secretary of the Embassy, Le Boursier, an experienced official and a man of singular reserve, was accounted one of the most indefatigable and effective among the working statesmen of the Congress.

Only the wild blindness of prejudice could describe the diplomatic action of Great Britain at the Congress of Vienna as isolated, and out of touch with the main currents of European politics. Nevertheless, the efforts of her plenipotentiaries were, on this as on other occasions, unduly affected by apprehensions of parliamentary comment at home, while the choice of these agents themselves was not altogether determined by their diplomatic fitness. Castlereagh remained first plenipotentiary till it became necessary for him to return home, in order, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (February 12, 1818), to explain and defend by his unimpeded and unadorned story the ministerial policy; a fortnight earlier his successor had arrived in the person of the Duke

of Wellington, who continued at Vienna till March 26. Castlereagh's defects were no secret abroad, though they were not exaggerated there as they were afterwards at home; but at the Congress his tenacity of purpose, though derided by Talleyrand as founded in ignorance, was by no means laudable. Where his action was wanting in confidence, this may in general be ascribed to the absence of clear instructions; to his capacity not only Metternich, by whom still his own was largely dominated, but as candid an observer as Goyen, bear very distinct testimony. The return of Napoleon from Elba soon called away Wellington from the Congress to his last and most famous campaign; but in the share which he took at Vienna both in the immediate measures necessitated by that return and in other matters, such as the settlement of the Netherlands, he displayed his habitual charm and promptitude of decision. The other British plenipotentiaries were the Earl of Clancarty, also a member of the Cabinet, a politician and painstaking statesman; Earl Cathcart, British Minister at St. Petersburg, a good man of business as well as a military officer of commanding presence; and Castlereagh's younger brother, Lord Stewart (afterwards third Marquis of Londonderry), whose recent appointment to the Vienna embassy Talleyrand regarded as significant of a wish to support Britain against France. Stratford Canning, British Minister at Bern, was called in to assist in the Swiss Committee.

The first Prussian plenipotentiary, Prince von Hardenberg, Chancellor of State, had for his colleague Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, who was also accredited as Minister at Vienna: indeed, by reason of Hardenberg's deafness, Humboldt's presence could nearly be dispensed with. Although the differences between these two eminent statesmen interlarded with the course of their endeavours at the Congress, yet each of them was pre-eminent there by distinctive qualities of his own. Hardenberg's wide culture and untiring experience were combined with a singular elasticity of mind. Yet, even if we discount the severe judgment of State, with whose sense his own is so inseparably linked, we must allow that, at this critical moment, he betrayed an unfortunate indolence of purpose. Curiously enough, Humboldt, whom French critics spitefully called *le sphinx incarné*, and to whose politics, like all other subjects, formed part of a never-ending process of self-education, at times showed a notable readiness for compromise. The labours of the Prussian plenipotentiaries were materially forwarded by the services of Hardenberg's trusted advisers, more especially the high-minded Stägemann, Jordan, and the celebrated statistician Hoffmann. Among the diplomats called in to their assistance were Baron von Jacob-Kloster, for many years Prussian Minister in London, and Ester, who was accredited to the Courts of Bavaria and Würtemberg. General von dem Knesebeck, well known by his mission to St. Petersburg in 1808, was in attendance upon the King at Vienna: but his influence has probably been much

constituted. That of Stein, by which Prussia systematically *could* not fail to be specially impressed, was in part carried indirectly through the potent intervention of the Tsar.

The personality of the Russian ambassador would in any case have overshadowed the activity of his statesmen, whose importance in the work of the Congress was not always proportionate to their respective official rank. The first Russian plenipotentiary was Prince Andrei Razumovski, whose diplomatic career had begun in the capricious days of Catherine II. The second was Count Stodolberg, the Russian Minister at Vienna; but a more prominent figure was that of the third, Count Numbrods, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Fortunately for the progress of business, Metternich had long personally trusted Numbrods; and at Paris, when Alexander was still opposed to the restoration of the Bourbons, he found both this statesman and Pierre-Louis Borge Bonaparte to his support of that policy. This relations adversary of Napoleon was, much to the satisfaction of Louis XVIII, summoned to Vienna by Alexander in October, 1814. Another recent addition to the important personal influence surrounding the Tsar was the liberalizing but mature counsel of Count Capodistria, who from 1808 onwards had been chief of the diplomatic department at the Russian head-quarters, and at Vienna represented Russia in the Committee for Swiss affairs. During the late sittings of the Statistical Committee the Russian representative was Baron Arentz. Prince Repnin came to Vienna on the termination of his Swiss Governorship.

Finally, Sweden, and after the declaration of the Union in November, 1814, Norway, were represented by the Minister at Vienna, Count Loewenhielm; but his attendance, like that of his Spanish and Portuguese colleagues, was, except in special cases of rare occurrence, purely formal. It may be added that Denmark was, as a matter of course, represented by two Bernstorffs (Counts Christian Günther and Joachim Frederick), and the sovereign Prince of the Netherlands (the Prince of Orange) by Baron van Spaen, van Voorstonden and Baron Hans von Gagern, whose "share in European politics," detailed with so much complacent sincerity by himself, had begun after Rastatt with his mission to Paris as envoy for all the Nassau lines. The representatives of Italian Powers, governments, and municipalities may be passed by, with the exception of Cardinal Rinaldo Casali, who during nearly a quarter of a century conducted, as Secretary of State, the diplomatic affairs of the Papacy through a series of critical phases, and contrived to infuse a tincture of Iberian zeal repudiated by the Romans into a single-minded devotion to the interests of the Curia. At Vienna, Casali was charged by Pope Pius VII with the interests of his temporal sovereignty as well as those of the Catholic Church at large. The Swiss representation was naturally numerous, the Diet of the Confederation sending three deputies, headed by the Landammann Hans von Reichard, a patriotic

statesmen of high intelligence and integrity, although not always holding the balance quite evenly between opposing national interests. Nearly all the cantons sent one or more deputies. The active and successful efforts of La Harpe, who represented Ticin and Valais, were effectively supported by his compatriot General Jomini.

Among the German Governments, the Bavarian went to the Congress Field-Marshal von Wrede, who remained there till called away on April 24, 1814, to take part in the imminent war. At Vienna he made the most of his military laurels; but the influence he acquired through his negotiation of the Treaty of Rad (October 8, 1813) on terms highly favorable to Austria was not increased by his success. The Württemberg plenipotentiaries, on the other hand, had little or no liberty of action left to them by their despotic master. It was only towards the end of the Congress that the King of Saxony could be formally represented at the conference of its German Committee. His interests had previously been watched by Count Friedrich Albrecht von der Schulenburg, and by his subsequent plenipotentiary Globig; and a considerable influence was exercised at Vienna by General von Langens, who, when a Saxon officer, had actively courted himself for an alliance with Austria, and was now in her service. The electorate or, as it soon became, kingdom of Hanover was, as already stated, represented at Vienna by Count Münster, with whom was associated Count von Hardenberg, who had for several years previously filled the difficult post of Hanoverian Minister there; they had the services, as an expert in public law, of the older Martens, formerly professor at Göttingen. Although Münster had, at Castlereagh's request, directly represented the British Government at Paris, and still continued to possess the full confidence of the Prince Regent, his Ministers entertained a strong desire, in which Wellington concurred, to keep the interests of Great Britain quite distinct from those of Hanover: and, as a matter of fact, the Hanoverian policy proper was in several respects far from congenial to British statesmanship or public opinion. The Prince Primate (Dalberg), who had recently resigned his government of the Napoleonic grand-duchy of Frankfurt, was represented in his ecclesiastical capacity by the younger Wernberg (Henry), Vice-General of the see of Constance under Dalberg, and anxious to raise on account of his championship of the rights or claims of "The German Church." The warring German States all made a point of sending plenipotentiaries to Vienna, in order either to assert the sovereignty still retained by their dynasties, or, if possible, to recover the territorial control which, after the dissolution of the *Reichsfürstenthum*, they had refused to make over to the "Central Administration of reconquered territories" established by the Allied Powers. This administration, presided over by Stein, accordingly had under it, besides the kingdom of Saxony, only the former grand-duchy of Frankfurt and of Hess, and the territory of the Prince of Leiningen. The



plenipotentiaries of these German States included Baron von Flunck (Mecklenburg-Schwerin), whose personal weight at the Congress is said to have surpassed that of the plenipotentiaries of some of the eight Powers, and Senator Smith (Bremen), an acknowledged authority on questions of economy and trade. In addition to these, a large number of the German Princes and Counts formerly "immediate" were individually represented at the Congress, while their collective interests were in charge of Privy-Councillor von Quastern. The four corporations of the Knights of the Empire (those of Slesbia, Franconia, the Wettins, and the left bank of the Rhine) also each sent a deputy.

The above enumeration is very far from exhausting the list of interests personally represented at Vienna, which included those of former sovereigns, of pretensions to various thrones and dignities, of spiritual and temporal corporations, of countries, districts and towns, of commissions, associations, and bodies of men of many different sorts, and of private individuals. The Catholic Church of Germany was represented, not only by Henry von Wussenberg, but also by three orators, reinforced by twenty-five members of ecclesiastical and monastic foundations; the Catholics of Frankfurt sent a deputation of their own, as did the Jews of Frankfurt, Bremen, Strasburg, and Lübeck, trusting perhaps also to the influence exerted by the great Jewish financiers established in the Austrian capital. Even the interests of publishers and authors were effectively advocated, in particular by the great Augsburg publisher Cotta.

The first week of October passed without any indication of the expected opening of the Congress beyond reviews, manoeuvres, balls, volutes, promenades in the Prater and popular festivals in the Augarten. As a matter of fact, however, the first plenipotentiaries of the Four Great Allied Powers met from September 18 onwards: and on the 22nd they agreed upon the general method of procedure at the Congress. A committee consisting of representatives of the Four Powers, and of France and Spain, was to charge itself with the preparatory work connected with any matters of general European interest: while that concerning the proposed Germanic federal constitution was to be left to a committee of the five principal German States, Saxony being of course excluded. The non-German Great Powers had, at Spain's instigation, declared their intention to abstain from intervening. On the same date, however, the plenipotentiaries of the Four Allied Powers signed a protocol to the effect that they intended to settle among themselves the distribution of the Polish, German, and Italian territories placed at their disposal by the Peace of Paris; and that, until this had been done, they would not confer on this head with the representatives of France and Spain, or listen to any objections put forward by them. On the 22nd Castlereagh made a separate declaration, reserving to himself the right of communicating arrangements adopted by the Four Powers to others.

Talleyrand, who arrived at Vienna with his colleagues on the 8th, and was on the following day admitted, with the faithful Labrousse, to a sitting of the European Committee, at once took his stand. As to the distribution of the conquered territories, he simply disputed the assumption that, since the conclusion of peace, there still existed any alliance against France, or that she could be excluded from a concert of European Powers. He had no objection to the plan of a committee for the preparatory treatment of general European affairs (in those specifically German he disclaimed any desire of intervening), and agreed that it would appropriately consist of plenipotentiaries of the Powers which had signed the Peace of Paris, viz. France, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, with Sweden, Spain, and Portugal. But this committee, he argued, ought to be appointed by the Congress in place. Paris is clearly justified in saying that this convention inverted the system of procedure established at Châtillon: moreover, it involved obvious risks, and was naturally enough regarded as deeply insolent. After it had been rejected, the only practical question for the plenipotentiaries was the actual constitution of the Directing European Committee: and this was discussed at their meeting on September 30, which ended in a set battle of two hours' duration and a scene which, as Gents wrote, would never be effaced from his memory. Portugal and Sweden having heretofore claimed admission to the Directing Committee, two further stormy sittings ensued on October 2 and 3, and at the latter the plenipotentiaries of the Eight Powers formally constituted themselves the Preliminary Committee of the Congress—to be generally known as the "Committee of the Eight." The declaration published by them on October 18 forms the first official manifestation issued on behalf of the Congress, though still only in the name of the Powers that had signed the Peace of Paris. It postponed the formal opening of the Congress to November 1, by which time it was hoped that the questions at issue might by free and confidential discussion have matured in harmony with the principles of "public law," the provisions of the recent Peace, and the expectations of the age. Though Talleyrand was said to have called this declaration "*le manifeste papier*," it was commendably approved by the Paris Monitor (October 28). In Germany, where the first anniversary of the battle of Leipzig had been just celebrated amidst much popular excitement, Arnulf's and other popular expectations displayed a less contented temper.

No formal opening of the Congress, however, took place either on the appointed or on any subsequent day. The Committee of the Eight issued on November 1 a declaration to the effect that a Committee of three, appointed by them for the verification of the powers of the plenipotentiaries of the armed States, would enter upon its labours on November 5; and that, after the completion of these, the Committee of the Eight would formulate proposals for the regulation of the further progress of the Congress. Thus it may be said, in Gents' paradoxical

planned, that the Congress, as such, only came into existence by means of its Final Act; and even this was only the act of the Eight Powers, to which the rest were invited to adhere.

The working organ, then, which had assumed the responsibility of the general body, was the Committee of the Eight, although on certain occasions the plenipotentiaries of the Five Great Powers took it upon themselves to meet without the rest. But even the Committee of the Eight, which on October 30 unanimously elected Metternich as President and Götze as Secretary, of the Congress, held only infrequent meetings, especially in the earlier months of the session, its principal task being to formulate and place on record the decisions arrived at by the special Committee appointed by it. The Committee for the settlement of the Germanic Constitution had, as has been seen, been separately constituted from the outset; and its broken course will be most conveniently summarised apart, while the composition of some of the other Committees will be noticed in connexion with their proceedings.

Throughout the earlier period of the Congress, the statesmen assembled there were, in the main, though not as we shall see actively, engaged on the permanent rearrangement of the political map of Europe. This task, as well as the work of the Congress in general, depended for its successful accomplishment on the removal of certain difficulties which had from the outset obstructed its labours: and among these difficulties, as will speedily appear, two, so closely interwoven with one another as in reality to form a single problem, dominated, and for a brief official period seemed destined to swallow up, all the rest.

In the matter of the restitutions, compensations, and satisfactions to be arranged, it was of course necessary in the first instance to consider the interests of the Great Allied Powers: the smaller members of the recent Coalition came next. France stood in a position of isolation; though Talleyrand might continue to maintain at Vienna the pretension which he had set up at Paris, and to act as if the legitimate Government of France, having taken part with the Allies in overthrowing the usurper, had a just claim to share in the division of any proposal as to the territorial reconstruction of Europe. But the question of the French frontier had been settled at Paris, so far as its main lines were concerned; nor could there be any thought of reopening it now. France could not at Vienna seek to obtain more than certain small rectifications of frontier: on the other hand, she ran no present danger of a renewal of the proposal which Austria had brought forward in December, 1813, of restoring Alsace to Germany. As to the other Four Great Powers, nothing seemed simpler to the Emperor Alexander than that Russia should find her compensation in Poland, and Austria and Prussia theirs in Italy and northern Germany. This division implied that, in the Tsar's opinion, Great Britain would find her account, or rather had

already found it, in retaining most of her conquests beyond the seas, together with the important positions held by her in the Mediterranean. In regard to these conquests, she had at Paris shown a moderation which now stood her in good stead. For the Dutch, at whose expense the most considerable of her colonial acquisitions had been made, she exerted herself to obtain a compensation at home; but her own gains were not submitted to the approval of the Congress, which showed no disposition to touch her tenure of Malta, or to hand over the Ionian Islands to any of the claimants who would have anticipated the subsequent establishment of her protectorate. To Napoleon's characteristic remark, that the British Government was to blame for neglecting its opportunities at Vienna, it may be replied that the moderation shown by Great Britain enhanced her influence in respect of territorial settlements in which she had no direct interest.

Austria advanced no new claims except in Italy. By the Treaty of Schönbrunn (June, 1815) she had secured the recovery of her dominions on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, and by that of Rad (October, 1815) the retrocession of most of her former lands to Bavaria; she looked for a still more favourable adjustment of her claims in southern Germany, and also aimed at aggrandisement in Poland. On the other hand, she was rid for ever of those Austrian Netherlands which Thugut had described as a millstone hanging round her neck, and she could not expect in the long run to retain those Sardinian possessions which had ceased to be of value to the House of Habsburg. But the rulers of Austria had firmly resolved on permanently re-establishing her sway over all the Italian territories which she had forfeited in a long series of disastrous profligations (1777-1806), and on extending that sway over the whole of Lombardy and Venetia.

Russia entered the Congress in a position of great strength. Her recent successes in the war with Turkey had placed her in an advantageous position towards Austria, whose foreign policy had of late years shown want of decision in this direction; while, in the north, Sweden, so long Russia's bitterest foe, had, by reconquering Finland in order to acquire Norway, become a close ally. No opportunity, so it seemed, could have been more propitious for the accomplishment of Russia's designs of appropriating the whole grand-duchy of Warsaw, and thus, by a material advance of her western frontier, becoming at last, as one of her statesmen planned it to Talleyrand at Vienna, a European Power. Now, although even before the collapse of Napoleon's Russian expedition Alexander had become possessed with the idea of a retrocession of Poland under Russian supremacy, he could not expect that Austria would give up Galicia, as at one time she might perhaps have done in order to bring about the establishment of an independent Poland; and after Schönbrunn (June, 1815) he had agreed that the grand-duchy of Warsaw, which must form the nucleus of the intended dependent kingdom, should

be divided among the three partitioning Powers. As a matter of course, he meant to secure the Slav's share; and the question of Russia's Polish satisfaction, thus came more and more to turn upon the compensation to be assigned to Prussia. The counsels of Stein and Gorchakov were mingled in Alexander's mind with the promptings of Czartoryski; and, as it became patent that Prussia would seek her compensation in Saxony, the Russian compact lay like an incubus upon the deliberations of the Congress, where the Russo-Polish and Franco-Saxon questions were now inextricably interlarded.

The position of Prussia herself at the Congress was beset by many peculiar difficulties. In order that she should secure in the future the position as a Great Power which she had so rapidly reached and so precipitately forfeited, it was not enough for the Prussian ministry to be reduced to a territorial dominion equalling that possessed by it before the catastrophe of 1806. Moreover, in the distribution of the German territory recovered from France or taken over from her allies, Prussia was entitled to a recognition of the leading part she had played in the liberation of Germany. The negotiations on this head were complicated by many considerations. No great difficulty attended the transfer to Prussia of a stretch of territory on the left bank of the Rhine, with considerable accretions in Westphalia and on the right bank of the river, including the grand-duchy of Berg and some of the German dominions of the House of Nassau. On the other hand, Prussia could not hope to recover her hold on any part of the electorale of Hanover, towards which she had proved so unkind a neighbour from the Peace of Basel (1765) onward to the second French occupation of the electorate after Jena (1806). The claims of Hanover, after its many tribulations, were further commended by its dynastic connection with Great Britain. Prussia could not expect successfully to resist the Hanoverian claim for the restoration of East Frisia, which implied the loss to her of an important coast-line; and she could not even carry Havelberg's modest plea of a Göttingen "lethæra," to connect the western and eastern halves of her dominions. In lieu of the lost North Sea provinces, she contrived, by means of a complicated series of transactions, to add Swedish Pomerania (Rügenow) to her possessions on the Baltic coast. At the same time, she had to negotiate with a number of German States as to ransoms, compensations, and exchanges necessitated by her requirements or imposed on her by considerations of all kinds.

In the south, Bavaria remained in possession of the Franconian duchies formerly owned by the House of Brandenburg. But she was in want of further compensation than she had already secured for her treacheries to Austria; and Stein and those who thought with him were on the alert to anticipate Bavarian attempts to appropriate Mainz, the key of Germany's western frontier. The fact that the area of a reconstructed Prussia was thus practically limited to northern Germany checked

the desire of her statesmen to annex Saxony. That the kingdom of Frederick Augustus I was both technically, and as a matter of fact, entirely at their disposal, was not to be disputed, although his culpability consisted not in having supported Napoleon, but in having adhered to him too long. His kingdom had been conquered; and he was himself in fact a prisoner of war. But his real danger lay in the palpable gain which the annexation of his kingdom would bring to Prussia from every point of view—economic, military, and political; and in the further fact, that the traditions of Prussia's rise to the position of a Great Power coincided with aspirations as to the future awaiting her in northern Germany.

Had it been left to the Four Allied Powers to settle the Polish-Saxon difficulty among themselves, they might very probably have arrived at an early agreement. At the outset of the Congress, Austria, remembering what important interests of her own were at stake, made no sign of being prepared to carry out Metternich's earlier threat: that she would prefer rather than allow the establishment of a Russian Poland. The secret correspondence carried on by Castlereagh with the Tsar in the early part of October shows that the former had already abandoned any attempt at carrying out the first idea of the British Government—that of re-establishing Polish independence—and merely insisted on a partition of the grand-duchy of Warsaw which should leave to Austria and Prussia their military frontier. Thus there seemed every prospect that this part of the problem would resolve itself into a question of boundaries, as to which Alexander appeared quite prepared to listen to reason.

Again, in the earliest weeks of the Congress it seemed as if the absorption of Saxony in the Prussian monarchy would be accomplished without serious hindrance. The solenne of the rule of King Frederick Augustus and his dynasty had not indeed as yet been pronounced; but in two memoranda addressed to the Russian and Prussian sovereigns by Prince Repnin, the Governor of Saxony, the proposed annexation was treated as a settled affair. Before taking the preliminary step of transferring the administration of the kingdom to Prussia, it was thought desirable to obtain the concurrence of Great Britain and Austria. That of the former Power was readily signified by Castlereagh (October 11), who informed Hardenberg that Great Britain was prepared to acquiesce in the incorporation of the whole of Saxony in the Prussian monarchy, provided that it was not intended thereby to indemnify her for sacrifices which would make her dependent upon Russia. Metternich gave no answer, but implied (October 28) that this might be forthcoming, and that even to a permanent annexation of Saxony Austria might, under certain conditions, be found willing to agree. Thus no arguments either of principle or of policy seemed likely to prevail in favour of the unfortunate King Frederick Augustus. On November 8 Prince Repnin handed over the supreme administration of Saxony to the Prussians; proclaiming (on his own authority) the King of Prussia as the future

sovereign of Saxony; and Alexander promised his support to Bala's proposal, that Prince William of Prussia should be sent to Dresden as Governor of Saxony. It was not only Frederick William's natural repugnance to unpopulous haste which rendered this proposal objectionable, a new element had been introduced into the situation.

This was the influence of France. No money had Talleyrand made his way into the European Committee, than, as represented by him, the France of Louis XVIII once more began to pose before the smaller States of Europe, and those of Germany in particular, as the natural protectress of their interests. It would in any case have been in the regular order of things that France should espouse the cause of the King of Saxony, whose House, though he had lately been the faithful ally of Napoleon, had of old been so closely connected with the Bourbons. But his cause was also the cause of legitimacy, of whose rights, which conquest could not invalidate and no positive process could extinguish, the first plenipotentiary of Bourbon France now stood forth as the consistent champion. King Frederick Augustus' private accounts relating to this critical period were afterwards judiciously destroyed; but Talleyrand needed no incentive to stir up a conflict which might have results advantageous to France.

At first his measures had no effect but that of impelling Bala, the real author of the annexation project, to pursue it with increased determination; and Alexander proposed the removal of the King of Saxony from his throne castle at Friedrichsruhe to the safe distance of Elga. But it soon became apparent that one of those reluctant outbursts of popular sentiment had been evoked, with which, however mixed their origin, it is always necessary to reckon. On November 4 the King of Saxony issued, from Friedrichsruhe, a formal protest against the Prussian occupation of his kingdom, in which he declared that never and under no conditions would he consent either to renounce the dominions inherited by him or to accept an equivalent in their stead. In Saxony itself, a few of the nobility and higher officials had so far supported the temporary administration; and there was a small pro-Russian faction among the well-to-do members of the higher middle class. But among the Saxon population at large, notwithstanding the many tribulations through which it had passed under the House of Wettin, there was still much loyal attachment to the dynasty and no desire whatever for annexation to Prussia, while the bulk of the nobility and of the officials were utterly anti-Prussian. The sympathies of the German Governments which had accepted the fate of Saxony—the Russians in particular—were assured to her from the outset; and among the Saxon Princes of the Brunswick line who rallied round the head of the Altonian, even Karl August of Weimar at first upheld the claims of his unfortunate kinsman against the interests of his Prussian ally. With the aid of a free expenditure of money, every exertion was

used to influence public opinion in Saxony, in Germany, and elsewhere. Devoted officialism found a mouthpiece in Köhlbrünn; historic indignation in Sartorius; Bavarian envy in Arnitz. On the other side an antithesis of great gaze and soul—Nikula, Eichhorn, Amsh, J. G. Hoffmann, Karl Müller—discharged itself in support of the Prussian policy; while Gierke in the *Reinische Merkur* denounced the interference of France in an essentially German question. In Saxony the feeling of shame and indignation soon became intense, and communicated itself to the Saxon troops serving in the Rhine-land. These manifestations soon began to exercise an effect upon public opinion both in France and in England; strong journalistic comments made their appearance; Missions were pressed on the subject to the British Parliament; the Prince Regent was known to be personally anxious to serve the interests of King Frederick Augustus. So far, however, as can be discerned, Castlereagh's change of attitude in the Saxon question was due to the failure of his endeavours, which had at one time seemed promising, to mediate in regard to the Polish branch of the problem.

When Castlereagh agreed to the transfer of the Saxon administration to Prussian hands, he intended (as he afterwards explained to Wellington) by satisfying Prussia to confer with Austria in moderating Russian demands in Poland. The British mediation, which continued during all the latter part of October and the late November, was designed to induce the Tsar, instead of falling back upon his cherished scheme of reviving a Kingdom of Poland under Russian supremacy, to consent to a partition of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, which would leave both Austria and Prussia in possession of a frontier and of frontier-fortresses, necessary to their security and to that of Germany as the central Power of Europe. The success of this scheme was thwarted by Alexander's pronounced dislike of Metternich, and by the close attachment between the Russian and the Prussian sovereigns. Nor was Castlereagh possessed of the tact needed in circumstances so exceptional. In reply to his memorandum of October 12, the Tsar, on October 22, insisted on the equity of the Russian requirements, which with a frontier-line running from Thorn to Cracow and including both fortresses, amounted to nearly three-quarters of the grand-duchy (reduced by population) and two-thirds of its revenues. The struggle now became more acute. Early in November Metternich made an attempt to induce Prussian diplomacy to unite with him at all events in pressing upon Russia the line of the Vistula. But on the 6th of the month an end was put to Castlereagh's mediation, and to the endeavour to confer Prussia with united action on the part of the Three Powers. In an interview with Frederick William and Hardenberg, Alexander revealed as proposed to reveal to them an offer of recognition in Poland, which he declared to have been made to him by Metternich, on condition that he would in return cooperate in keeping Prussia out of Saxony. Frederick



William thereupon indignantly told Hardenberg come from any further negotiations with the Austrian and British plenipotentiaries.

Metternich lost no time in denying the charge: nor is there any evidence that it was he who had in this instance derived from the truth. But the Tsar was now virtually certain of his ally, and is consequently more determined to persist in his demands. In this spirit he sent a final note to Castlereagh (November 21). For a time, indeed, Hardenberg behaved as if the task of inducing Alexander to concede more satisfactory terms had passed from Castlereagh to himself. On November 17 he obtained from the Tsar a declaration expressing his willingness to consent to the two fortified cities of Cracow and Thorn, with a certain district around each, being declared independent and neutral. But this concession was to be conditional on the annexation of the whole of Saxony to Prussia, and on the garrisons of Mainz, whose future had become a burning question between the German Powers, being furnished conjointly by Prussia and Austria. Hardenberg passed on these proposals to Metternich on December 4, adding a suggestion that King Frederick Augustus should be compensated with a desirable little territory in Catholic Westphalia, and pathetically requesting the Austrian statesman to save Prussia from her present position. He was well aware that the danger of incorporating Saxony in the Prussian monarchy was in the most serious danger. Metternich's answer (December 10), while making direct reference to the opposition offered by Prussia to the annexation of the whole of Saxony, suggested that Prussia should annex a small portion of it, without coming into contact with the Austrian frontier; as to Poland, he declared himself ready to fall in with the last Russian proposal, provided, however, that Thorn and Cracow passed to Prussia and Austria respectively. The only result of this note was to draw the Rulick allies still more closely together: and when Metternich, who at this point seems to have overestimated himself, sought to sow discord between them by further manoeuvres, the Tsar declined any further personal transaction with him, and requested Hardenberg to draw up a final memorandum on the basis of direct discussion with the Emperor Francis. This memorandum (dated December 16) argued strenuously against the dismemberment of Saxony, and proposed that, since no other satisfaction but the whole of that Kingdom could be found for Prussia, King Frederick Augustus should be compensated for the loss of it by territories, with a population of nearly 700,000, on the left bank of the Rhine.

While this modifying struggle was in progress at Vienna, the news arrived that Grand Duke Constantine, who had been sent to Warsaw to organise a Polish army, had on December 11 issued a proclamation calling upon the Poles to unite for the defence of their common country and for the preservation of their political independence. This manifesto not being disavowed by the Tsar, he was judged to have taken his final

stead in the Polish question. A movement of Austrian troops towards the Gallician frontier and a partial mobilisation of the French army ensued. Both Metternich and Castlereagh—the latter probably stimulated by parliamentary intelligence from home—became more and more disposed to listen to the Saxon plan. Talleyrand now came to the front. In two rhetorical notes of December 19 and 20, he insisted on the restoration of Frederick Augustus; a cession of part of his dominions might be a politic act, but the principle of legitimacy must be upheld. He also readily succeeded in getting the whole body of representatives of the other German States in a collective note against the absorption of Saxony by Prussia, whose administrative anomalies were creating their usual effect.

When, therefore, on December 22, a last attempt was made to lay down the basis of an understanding in a special conference between representatives of the Four Allied Powers, Metternich at once proposed the admission of Talleyrand to the discussion; and, taking a leaf out of his book, urged that no final decision as to Saxony could be taken without the approval of its legitimate King. Castlereagh supported the proposal; but nothing came of it. The conference met again on January 3, when Metternich appeared to be well disposed towards the Russian basis of agreement drafted by Nesselrode. But in the midst of these amicable proceedings the rupture took place; and for a week, or thereabouts, Europe was in imminent peril of a general war. Metternich had, not unaccountably, been irritated by the personal hostility of the Tsar; while it would seem as if a menacing phrase of Hardenberg, indirectly very little disposed to dwell in extremes, had provoked Castlereagh, who with all his shortcomings had the peace of Europe at heart. Thus the wiles of Talleyrand, encouraged by the bluster of Wrede and the buzz of the smaller folk, prevailed; and, in a moment of what might almost be called infatuation, the Defensive Triple Alliance of January 8, 1815, was concluded between Great Britain, Austria, and France. It bound the three Powers to mutual support in the event of any one of them being attacked on account of the proposals on which they had jointly agreed for the completion of the arrangements of the Peace of Paris—Austria and France each providing an army of 150,000 men, while Great Britain (which on December 27 had concluded peace with the United States at Ghent) was to furnish equivalent aid either by subsidies or by necessary troops. An attack upon Hanover or the Netherlands was to be treated as one upon Great Britain. The accession to the treaty of the sovereigns of those two countries, and of Bavaria, was to be invited; Sardinia and Hesse-Darmstadt also afterwards acceded. A military commission was appointed to draw up a plan of operations, in the event of an advance of the Russian armies in the direction of Vienna. To the treaty itself a special article was added, providing for absolute secrecy; and this was vigorously

observed, though Stein seems to have had a shrewd notion of what was in progress. It was only by accident that, during the Hundred Days, Louis XVIII's copy of the treaty fell into the hands of Napoleon, by whom it was made known to Alexander before he left Vienna.

To whatever speculations and hopes this secret treaty might give rise, and however brilliant a diplomatic stroke its conclusion might seem on the part of Talleyrand, none of the Powers that were parties to it could on reflection fail to perceive its precipitancy. At Paris the Ministry of War could not undertake to place more than half the promised French force in the field within six weeks. Austria was unwilling to withdraw troops from Italy, where Murat needed constant watching. Europe in general was exhausted in men and money; the British Parliament could not be depended upon for an endless flow of subsidies; and a European war could not be waged by means of undertakings on paper. And, if war actually broke out, nothing had been done to prevent the Emperor in Elba from having a hand in it.

In a word, so soon as the controversy on the point of becoming an open quarrel, then both sides began to recede in order to avoid such a catastrophe. Fortunately, as has been seen, the negotiations had now been broken off; on January 8, 1814, the plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers resolved that their decision should be binding upon the King of Saxony; and on the 11th Talleyrand was admitted to their conference. The supreme tribunal of the Four Powers was thus incidentally changed into that of the Five; and henceforth nothing further was heard from the abdicating representative of France about an appeal to the Congress at large. For a time the prospects of peace remained clouded; and Alexander's wrath against Metternich seemed to wax hotter than ever. But, after a slight effort on the part of Castlereagh, Metternich, in the conference of January 28, at last took a decisive step towards mediation. He made it clear that Austria was prepared both to co-operate with Prussia in accepting an unsatisfactory military frontier to Poland, and, as condition that the greater portion of Saxony should be left to its King, to consent to the annihilation of the rest of it by France. Hardenberg's reception of these offers showed that Prussia was willing to compromise; and Castlereagh, whose pressure was required at home, wished if possible to return with the credit of success. Bargaining began; and, after at least one stormy passage, a settlement was reached which, on February 8, a sub-committee was appointed to reduce to the form of a preliminary convention.

Austria recovered all her Polish possessions; but Cracow was declared a free city. The Prussian share covered the larger part of her former Polish dominions, and comprised the fortress of Thorn, which Alexander at the last moment consented to yield. In return, Prussia contented herself with rather less than two-fifths of Saxony, including the fortress of Torgoe, but not the important city of Leipzig. On February 11 these

arrangements were approved by the Committee of the Five Powers; and, as far as they were concerned, the Polish-Saxon difficulty was at an end. The aspirations of Alexander, and the hopes cherished by his Polish subjects, were satisfied; and the three Powers, between whom Poland, with the exception of the fragment called the Republic of Cracow, had been as it were once more partitioned, were left to deal each on its own account with the national claims of its Polish subjects. On the other hand, the King of Saxony, who had so strenuously excited himself against the absorption of the whole of his kingdom by Prussia, still had to be persuaded to accept the compromise by which he was left in possession of a part of it. In order to bring him for this purpose within reach of the Congress, he was invited to take up his residence at Freesburg, where he arrived on March 4, 1815. Here, a few days afterwards, he was visited on by a deputation from the Committee of the Five Powers, consisting of Metternich, Talleyrand, and Wellington, Castlereagh's successor. The King refused to accept the conditions offered, and proposed to open a negotiation with them on his own account under the mediation of Austria. The deputation having returned to Vienna, the Committee on March 20 retired by empowering the Prussian Government to take immediate permanent possession of the part of Saxony assigned to it, while authorising provisionally to occupy the remainder. In the House of Commons, on March 20, Castlereagh resolutely upheld the agreement of the Powers; and on April 6 King Frederick Augustus at last gave a preliminary assent to the union imposed upon him. But it was not till May 16 that Saxony signed the definitive treaty.

This delay apart, the reaction which had ensued upon the crisis into which jealousy, suspicion, and design had precipitated the Great Powers had resulted in so amicable settlement before the tidings of Napoleon's return warned the Congress to hasten its deliberations. But in other directions, too, not a little had been accomplished by the early part of February, 1815; and the Final Declaration drafted about this time by Great Britain, probably at the instigation of the British Government, was not wholly unwarmed in its tone of self-satisfaction.

The first actual decision arrived at on behalf of the Congress was the incorporation of Genoa and her territory in the Kingdom of Sardinia, on which the Committee of the Eight agreed on November 18 and 17. In April, 1814, Lord William Bentinck had announced the establishment of a Provisional Government under British protection. But Austria, mindful of her own dominions over Venice, well disposed towards King Victor Emmanuel, and possibly not unwilling to suggest what might ultimately prove an Austrian inheritance, would not listen to the proposal of restoring Genoese autonomy. France and Spain raised a feeble protest against the annexation; and the efforts of the plenipotentiary of the Provisional Government of Genoa at Vienna, Marquis de Belgioioso,

found an echo in both Houses of the British Parliament. But the good fortune of the House of Savoy prevailed; and the fate of the proud and wealthy city was sealed.

The Swiss question, complicated in itself and surrounded by ancient enmities and jealousies, as well as by mischievous foreign intrigues, was likewise carried to a conclusion within the earlier period of the Congress, though nothing short of the apprehensions of immediate war excited by Napoleon's return could have brought it to an speedy issue. After the overthrow of the "Mediator of Switzerland", her future had depended upon the preservation of her neutrality, and upon her adherence in principle to the provisions of the Act of Mediation (1803), which had united an augmented number of cantons under a new though far from stringent Federal Constitution. But although, under the influence of La Harpe, Alexander was prepared to respect Swiss neutrality, Austria insisted on her troops entering the territory of the Confederation; and Bern, instigated by the more Power, summoned Vad and Aargau to acknowledge their relation of dependence towards herself. Fortunately, Zurich was at the time the directing centre (Fuerst); and the *Landammann*, Hans von Reichenard, was a statesman who combined patriotic feeling with diplomatic sagacity. The extraordinary Diet (Tagsatzung) summoned by him at Zurich, where it sat from December 1813 to August 1814, began by declaring the Act of Mediation abolished; but on the same day (December 20) the deputies of the old cantons (except Bern) laid the foundations of a fresh federal union, recognising the existence of the new cantons, and excluding dependent or subject territories from the Confederation. In March, 1814, Bern retorted by convoking a "legitimate Diet" of the old cantons, among whom, following her example, first Solothurn and Fribourg, then Zug, Uri, and Unterwalden, and finally (by means of a coup d'état) Lucern, restored their old Constitutions. After Napoleon's first abdication, disturbances broke out in many parts of Switzerland, which had in some instances to be suppressed by force of arms; and so late as February, 1815, Bern, together with Fribourg and Solothurn, was arming in order to force back Vad and Aargau into their former condition of dependence.

Thus the task of the special Committee appointed at Vienna for dealing with Swiss affairs was a thorny one—the more so that at the Congress not only the plenipotentiaries of the Zurich Diet, headed by Reichenard, made their appearance, but every one of the nineteen cantons, old and new, was likewise represented. While La Harpe, through the Diet, exercised a continuous influence upon Confederation, the ordinary Russian member of the Committee, Zuckow, the able deputy of the aggrieved "city and republic" of Bern, was strenuously supported by Stratford Canning. Numerous other claims were urged for restoration and reunion; and much time was spent on the conditions under which

Genoa, whose deputy Piastri displayed great activity, should be included in the Confederation so as to strengthen it against France. Ultimately, King Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia was by direct concessions induced to give up the requisite territory. It was further resolved to erect into another Wallis (Valais), mostly a French department, and Neuchâtel, which the King of Prussia had recovered out of the hands of Marshal Berthier, and which was then placed in a peculiar political condition. The Russian proposal to include in the Confederation the Valtellina, formerly incorporated in the Gaspine Republic in order to provide France with an easy entrance into Germany, was approved by the Committee. But the Valtellina dispute having proved too remote for reunion with Lombardy, this valuable territory, at all times coveted by the powers of the Milanese, was after some skilful management finally secured by Austria.

Dalberg having been admitted on November 30, 1814, to the sittings of the Swiss Committee as French plenipotentiary, the influence of France was generally thrown with that of Austria on the side of Bern and the *ancien régime* against that of France, on whose behalf Stein and Capodistria advocated liberal views. Thus it gradually became possible for Great Britain to hold the balance between the other Powers with more success than in the Saxe-Polish controversy. In the crucial question of the independence of Vaud and Aargau, Bern was not allowed to reserve the provisions of the Act of Mediation, but was compensated for her losses by the greater part of the Bishopric of Basel, with the town and district of Biel. Nevertheless, the general issue of the Committee's labours was not a vigorous federal State, but a loose union between twenty-two more or less sovereign cantons. The directorate was to rotate in biennial periods between Bern, Zurich, and Lucerne. When, on March 23, the proposed settlement was approved by the Committee of the Eight, it was still resisted in principle by certain of the cantons (*Schweyz, Unterwalden, Appenzell*), while others (including Bern) were still completing the reconstitution of their national constitutions. Two months intervened before the Declaration recognizing the twenty-two cantons was accepted by the Diet at Zurich; and more than two further months passed before the new constitution became law. But the guarantee of Swiss neutrality, which was accorded by the Five Great Powers on November 30, 1815, had been practically assured by the result of their preliminary deliberations. That such a result, incomplete and defective as it was, had been reached, was obviously due to the fact that, though each of the Powers was desirous of shaping the new Swiss Confederation in accordance with its own preferences, none of them in this instance sought any direct advantage for itself.

The case was very different with regard to Italy. Here it was understood that Austria was to find her main satisfaction; and her interests therefore dominated all territorial arrangements. The question

an Italian Confederation was not so much as raised at the Congress of Vienna; and Labrador's proposal, on November 18, to appoint a minister for the affairs of Italy in general, was successfully opposed.

Mettetrich, who urged that each Italian question should be dealt with separately. A beginning was, as we have seen, made with Genoa, at a small committee (consisting of Wintzenberg and Labrador, with allies, Nesselrode, and Clancarty) was charged with the affairs of many and those of Parma and the sister-duchies; but it does not seem to have been regularly summoned, and had to deal with unconnected facts. In Tuscany, the Grand Duke Ferdinand III, who was an Austrian Archduke, and whose rights rested on the Treaty of 1795 (1795), had been recognised by the Allied Powers; but against a Labrador urged the claims of the Bourbon Charles-Louis, son of the late of Parma and Marie-Louise, who as "King" and "Queen of Paris" had reigned over the country till, in 1807, it was incorporated into the French Empire. In putting forward the claims of the Infante Louis-Louis, and basing them on the Treaty of Madrid between Spain and Spain (1804), which had been undone by that of Fontainebleau (1807), the plenipotentiary of the Spanish Bourbons took up an unenviable position, which his interperate advocacy failed to improve, although having brusquely refused negotiation, Labrador, by Talleyrand's advice, desisted from any further challenge of Ferdinand's rights.

Parma had probably been the real object of Labrador's efforts; but this point the "Don Quixote" of Bourbon diplomacy was in conflict with the personal sentiments of the Emperor Francis I as well as with the policy of Austria. By the Treaty of Fontainebleau of April 11, 1814, the duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla were assigned to Empress Marie-Louise, with remainder to her son. Her claim was used by Labrador on behalf of the Infante Charles-Louis; but, though

this was good in itself, Talleyrand used his influence in favour of a compromise which would at once diminish the number of small Italian principalities and keep the son of Napoleon out of the peninsula. While the three duchies were to be allotted to the Bourbon claimant or to his father, the Queen of Etruria, and Lucca with part of Elba to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Empress Marie-Louise was to be compensated by giving up the revenues of the grand-duchy, and by certain "Bohemian lands" now owned by the Grand Duke, of which Reichstadt, in the Circle of Bohemia, was one. The Emperor Francis I however declared his willingness to consent to the abandonment by his daughter of her hereditary lands, in return for its compensation. But Mettetrich seems to have made it clear that Austria would insist on retaining a hold on Piacenza, the military importance of which was considerable; and Labrador lost opportunity by demanding the three duchies or an Italian equivalent, as an equivalent was only to be found in Lucca and the Legations;

See. Such was the situation when the return of Napoleon made it necessary for Austria to hold fast to the duchies, but to exclude his son from the succession. Lyons remained the only possible compensation for the Queen of Elmiria: and the conflict of money claims between the Lucchese and their former "Soveraini," Elia Boniccioli, had to stand over.

The duchies of Modena, Reggio, and Mirandola were claimed by Duke Francis IV, the son of Archduke Ferdinand and the grandson of Ercole III, the last Duke of the House of Este, from whom they had been wrested with more than the usual effrontery. His rights were secured of acceptance by the Powers, and in return he proved a faithful adherent of the Austrian regime. The duchy of Massa, with the principality of Carrara and certain Imperial fiefs in the Lunigiana, were not reunited with Modena till after the death (in 1858) of Duke Francis' mother, Archduchess Maria-Beaatrix of Este, to whom the Congress had assigned them in her own right.

So early as August, 1814, Cardinal Ercole Consalvi had called upon France, Great Britain, and Austria to reinstate the Holy See in its dominions, though the Legations (Ferrara, Bologna, and Ravenna) were actually occupied by Austrian troops. At the Congress, Consalvi was incessantly to demand the restitution of all territories in possession of the Holy See before 1791, when the National Assembly had decreed the incorporation of Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin. Accordingly, in the note which in October he addressed to the Committee of the Eight, he contended that the Treaty of Tolentino (1797), in which the Pope had ceded these territories to France, was null and void. Having not the slightest intention of relinquishing Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, France could afford to favour the restoration of the Legations to the Holy See. Such a restoration had been deprecated by Metternich just before the conclusion of the Peace of Paris. The balance of opinion at the Congress was in favour of treating the Legations as conquered territory and therefore at the disposal of the Powers; and at one time they were thought of as a suitable compensation for the King of Sicily. In the end, however, Consalvi's exertions proved so far successful that the Legations (excepting the Ferrarese districts on the left bank of the Po) were recovered by the Pope.

Finally, the affairs of the Two Sicilies were, when the Congress opened, in a condition full of difficulty for the Powers in general, and specially embarrassing for Austria. At Naples King Joachim Neapolen (Murat), although his rule had never taken root in popular feeling, still maintained himself upon the throne. Notwithstanding that he had actually been a combatant at Leipzig, the Allies might even after that date have concluded his post, had he entirely severed his fortunes from those of Napoleon; indeed, towards the end of 1813 they might possibly even have put him in possession of Sicily. As it was, Metternich made the



estate of concluding with Murat, on January 11, 1814, a treaty of peace and alliance, which guaranteed to him the throne of Naples, in return for Murat's guarantee of that of Sicily to Ferdinand IV. This treaty, with certain modifications suggested by Castlereagh, had received the approval of Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain; so that, at the opening of the Congress, most of the Allied Powers were pledged to leave Murat in possession of Naples, and find a compensation elsewhere for the legitimate claimant. In September, 1814, Queen Maria Carolina had died at Schœnbrunn; but her efforts were, with considerable prospect of success, continued by King Ferdinand's plenipotentiaries, who were warmly supported by both Spain and France. Indeed, Talleyrand used his best endeavours to make this question a second touchstone of his dogma of legitimacy; and this time the Tsar seemed to lend a willing ear. But the obligations incurred by Austria could not be ignored; and Castlereagh finally agreed with Metternich that the settlement of the Neapolitan question should be deferred to the close of the Congress. Intentionally or otherwise, they thus (as will be presently seen) enabled Murat to run his own chance.

The Order of St. John of Jerusalem (the Order of Malta), while wholly or in part depouled of its estates and revenues in France, Italy, Spain, and Germany, had in 1798 been driven from Malta itself. Though the Peace of Amiens had stipulated for its restoration to the Order, the island had by the Peace of Paris, without so much as the suggestion of an indemnity, been assigned to its actual ruler, Great Britain. In consequence of the refusal of Pope Pius VII., in deference to the wishes of Napoleon, to confirm the last election of Grand Master, this office was at present held vicariously; but the organisation of the Order, which had temporarily established itself at Catania in Sicily, remained intact. Its plenipotentiaries at the Congress, Salisf Michi and Commander Brignighieri, both of the Italian "language," were duly recognised by the Committee for the verification of powers; but they demurred to the association with them of a deputy representing the "language" of France. Several of the Great Powers were favourably disposed towards the Order, though the Emperor of Austria was thought to have designs upon its estates in Lombardy in the interests of the Order of Maria Theresa. Louis XVIII. was under a special obligation to the Order of St. John, dating from the calamitous days of his elder brother, and had instructed his plenipotentiary to ask for Corfu as a compensation to it for the loss of Malta. Great Britain, though she had no intention of relinquishing Malta, could not in principle have opposed the grant of a compensation; but, as to this, the agents of the Order appear to have been without definite instructions, and their plea for an indemnity came in any case too late (February 24, 1815). The renewed outbreak of war entailed fresh sorrows on the part of Great Britain, of so much importance to the interests of Europe, that, instead

of Corfu being assigned to the Order of Malta, or to any other claimant or aspirant, the Ionian Islands were ultimately placed under British protection.

Spain, notwithstanding the unreasonable self-confidence of her Court and Government, due to the facile accomplishment of their restoration in the midst of a people exhausted by its self-sacrificing efforts, had in the earlier months of the Congress accomplished very little by her advocacy of Brazilian pretensions in Italy. When her own immediate interests were concerned, Spain showed the utmost reserve, not only in all matters of colonial policy but, as will be seen, in that of the slave-trade in particular. In a minor question affecting her relations with Portugal she shewed the dictates of a powerful jealousy and ill-will. After the attack which France had compelled Spain to make upon Portugal, the Peace of Badajoz (June 6, 1801) had conceded to Spain the fortress of Olivença with the surrounding district, and certain strongholds on the Guadiana. The Prince Regent of Portugal (Don John of Brazil) now demanded its retrocession. This had been already promised upon King Ferdinand's; and the Powers were agreed in regarding it as equitable. Portugal however, still rather a dependency than mistress of her great American colony and residing in the goodwill of Great Britain, shewed herself unwilling to restore French Guiana to France, from which her arms had acquired it in 1689; consequently Spain, trusting to her alliance with France, continued to resist the demand.

Among the territorial settlements forwarded by the Congress in its earlier months, one of the most important was that of the Netherlands. After December 2 the Prince of Orange had held his entry into Amsterdam as Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands. The northern (Formerly Austrian) Provinces had speedily followed the example of the northern; and the plan of a political union of the entire Netherlands, which had already been considered at Chaumont (February, 1814), and of which the preliminaries had been arranged during the visit of the allied sovereigns to London (June), seemed now likely to be carried into execution. Undoubtedly, it accorded with British interests, while its success would, after a fashion, compensate Holland for her colonial losses to Great Britain, as recently settled by treaty (August 11). Moreover, to many vigorous political thinkers nothing seemed so itself more likely to ensure the peace of Europe than the creation of a strong State between northern Germany and France. The racial difference between the northern and southern Provinces seemed no insuperable obstacle; the difference in religion might be constitutionally met. The union between a mainly maritime or mercantile, and a mainly industrial or agricultural population, depending respectively on English and on French markets, ought in the end to redound to advantage; and the opening of the Scheldt, to which Holland would be obliged to assent, would remove one of the chief backships hitherto inflicted upon the

northern Provinces for the benefit of the southern. By the Peace of Paris the House of Orange had been assured a considerable increase of territory; but its nature and extent had not been fixed. Carlensburgh, therefore, in a memorandum transmitted to the Committee of the Five Powers on January 28, 1813, recalled the Government stipulation, that the boundary of the new State should be carried at least as far as the line of the Meuse; while the extent of further additions on the left bank of the Rhine was to be determined by the interests of both the Netherlands and Germany. The line of the Meuse was steadily upheld by the British plenipotentiaries throughout the negotiations. They kept a constant middle course between Goyen, who as representing the House of Orange asked too much, and Münster, who in the interests of Illovers sought to reduce the Dutch demands; while Metternich and Stille also shewed themselves jealous of an extensive extension of the Netherlands frontier in the direction of Cologne. Towards the end of January, 1813, the Netherlands problem was approaching solution. The new State was to include, with the duchy of Limburg and the wealthy and industrious dominions of the Prince-Bishop of Liège, whose former subjects desired this incorporation, the duchy (somewhat to be called the grand-duchy) of Luxembourg in exchange for certain German possessions of the House of Nassau. To the provision that the capital should become a federal fortress of the Germanic Confederation, the Sovereign Prince was only with difficulty induced to assent through the exertions of Lord Clancarty.

A separate committee or sub-committee was appointed to dispose of the sovereignty over so much of the duchy of Bouillon as had in the Peace of Paris not been transferred to France. Goyen, as representing Great Britain, worked hard to obtain the annexation of the sovereignty over Bouillon to that over Luxembourg.

The relatively slight attention paid by the Congress to the affairs of the Scandinavian North was primarily due to the fact that Russia had definitively become the chief Baltic Power, and that neither Sweden nor Denmark could any longer aspire to play a prominent part in the politics of Europe. When King Frederick VI. of Denmark, towards the end of 1812, joined the Allies, he made his peace with Great Britain by relinquishing Heligoland, and at the same time accommodated himself to the understanding between Sweden and Russia by consenting to cede to the former the kingdom of Norway, that as it was to Denmark by historical association, by community of language, and by enduring fidelity. In return he looked for a fulfilment of the promise held out to him in the Peace of Kiel (January 14, 1814), and confirmed by the so-called "Family Peace" of Berlin (August 25, 1814). His annexations were to be Swedish Pomerania and Rügen, with perhaps a further indemnity. Although the brief inscription, by which, under the leadership of the Danish Prince Christian, the Norwegians had

attested their repugnance to the personal union with Sweden, and in the repression of which British and Russian ships had cooperated, was ended on August 14 by the Convention of Moss, it was not till November 4 that King Charles XIII of Sweden, after accepting the new democratic constitution of Norway, was duly elected to its throne by the *Storting*. These delays provided the Crown Prince Bernadotte with a pretext for declining to hand over Western Pomerania (*Föhrmenen*) to Sweden's hereditary foe. When the Danish plenipotentiaries at Vienna, on November 19, 1814, presented a note calling upon the Powers to advise to King Frederick VI the promised indemnity for Norway, they were not invited to specify the quarter whence it was to be derived; nor was it till after Napoleon's return that a final arrangement, very unsatisfactory to Denmark, was made.

Sweden had shown her part in the European political system by successively sacrificing Finland and Pomerania in return for Norway. She had then, while entering into a union of most intricate value, which brought with it no promise of a future headship of the Scandinavian North, deliberately excluded herself from the political life of central Europe. This change was readily accepted by the Powers, whom the military prowess of the House of Vasa had so often forced to regard with Sweden as a dominant factor in European affairs; and the protest addressed to the Congress in November, 1816, by the ex-King Gustavus IV on behalf of the rights of his son, which he asserted to be unimpaired by his own forced abdication in 1809, fell upon deaf ears.

The Powers charged by the Peace of Paris with the responsibility of completing the territorial resettlement of Europe had, as has been seen, specially undertaken to establish a permanent system of constitutional solutions among the States which had formed part of the Germanic Empire before its dissolution. The recognition of this responsibility is, at all events primarily, not attributable to the widespread demand for constitutional charters, which Napoleon's own action in Poland, as well as that of his brother Joseph in Spain and that of the protesting British Powers in Sicily, had helped to excite, and to which the Charter granted to France by her Swedish King and the democratic Constitution by which Bernadotte purchased the submission of the Norwegians, alike bore testimony. In several of the principal German States, notably in Prussia and in the two Kingdoms of the south-west, this demand was not to be left without a response; and the promise of a Constitution to each State included in the Confederation was inserted in its Fundamental Act. But the sole point of view from which the Congress, or its leading Powers, could take up the problem of the future constitutional system of the Germanic body, as a whole, was the necessity to be derived from such a system for Europe at large. On the delegation of this subject to a German committee, it speedily

became evident that neither the two great German Powers, nor the rest of the German Governments, nor anything that deserved to be called public opinion or national feeling, had as yet evolved upon even the leading principles of a settlement. Thus the saying on which Frederick William IV of Prussia ventured in 1850, that the time had come for Germany to be as free from the control of Europe as were Great Britain or France, would in 1814-5 have seemed strangely premature to Germany herself.

For many years during the course of the Revolutionary Wars, and more especially since the ill-omened Peace of Basel (1795), jealousy and distrust had prevailed between the two great German Powers; while the political conduct of the other German States, either openly dependent upon a foreign protector or retaining the pretence of a sovereignty of their own, had been dictated by the instinct of self-preservation or by the egoistic impulse towards self-aggrandizement. When, after the collapse of the Russian expedition, Frederick William III's proclamation (March, 1807) called the Prussian people to arms, it was but gradually that the resolve to liberate Germany at large from the dominion of the alien comprised the whole of "the German's Fatherland"; and still more slowly that attention began to be given to the constitutional methods and forms that were to regulate the national life of emancipated Germany. As was inevitable, the first ideas on this subject were vague and indefinite; nor could it in any case be expected that hopes and aspirations for a new era of the national life should move in the same plane as the claims and designs of the *old* German Governments and dynasties. In the negotiations which combined Austria and Prussia against the falling emperors, those Powers publicly guaranteed to each other their restoration to a territorial dominion such as they had possessed before the wars of 1805 and 1806 respectively. But the two Governments made no attempt to discuss, in the interests of the nation as a whole, either the future constitutional settlement of Germany or the particular question of leadership; and, instead of asserting themselves as the natural guardians of those interests, they merely concerned in the undertaking as to independence and liberation, agreed upon at Chaumont and inserted in the Peace of Paris.

Thus, whatever Germany might think or say on the subject, the political action had been laid down that the future bond between the German States must be a federal bond; and, having accepted this conclusion, each of the two great German Powers was silent upon self-guarding itself against any attempt on the part of the other to establish an ascendancy which might develop into a hegemony over the Confederation. At the same time both had resolved to defeat any attempt on the part of the other German States to form by combination a third Power capable of holding the balance between the two great Powers, and thus the claim of Austria and Prussia to represent Germany

as a whole was about to be definitely asserted in the eyes of Europe. The earliest draft of a Germanic Constitution, submitted by Stein to Alexander, Hardenberg, and Münster on March 30, 1814, and probably in its composition largely due to Hardenberg, who had indeed Stein to oblige, for the purpose his dream of reviving the Empire, proposed a Confederation under the joint directorship of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and Hanover. In July, however, Stein and Hardenberg prepared at Frankfurt a second draft, which on September 18 was, apparently with some modifications, communicated by the latter to Metternich. From this document, consisting of sixty-one articles, the deliberations of the Congress took their start. It proposed that Austria and Prussia should enter into the new Confederation in respect to part of their dominions only; but that the directorship was to belong to the two Powers in common, the presidency over the Diet being assigned to Austria. This Diet was to consist of the Directory, the Council of the Heads of the Circles (with eleven votes distributed among the two great Powers and the secondary States), and the Council of the Princes and Estates (comprising the reigning Governments). Of representative assemblies in the several States, or of a popular representation at the Diet, the draft made no mention.

The Allied Powers addressed themselves with unshakable goodwill to the task imposed upon them. The Tsar had with the aid of Capotrain familiarized himself with the ideas of Stein, and was as a rule prepared to follow his advice as to the internal affairs of Germany; while on this head the British Government implicitly trusted Münster, whose Germanic patriotism was as sincere as Stein's, however much they might differ as to the part to be played in Germany by Prussia. Both Powers at once assented to the feasible proposal that the preliminary discussions on German affairs at the Congress should be carried on by the plenipotentiaries of German States only—a concession which effectually deprived France of any opportunity of intervening. The Committee formed for the preparation of a Germanic Federal Constitution consisted of representatives of the two great Powers—Metternich and Wartenberg for Austria, Hardenberg and Blunckholtz for Prussia; while Wrede sat for Bavaria, Wittingenrode and Linden for Württemberg, and Münster for Hanover. Saxony, soon and unrepresented. Baron Martens acted as secretary to the Committee, which held its first sitting on October 14. At the second, held on the 18th, Metternich submitted as the basis of discussion twelve articles, as to which the Austrian, Prussian, and Hanoverian Governments had arrived at a preliminary agreement, and which, with certain modifications, reproduced the proposals of Hardenberg's draft. Bavaria, however, seconded by Württemberg, not only took exception to the proposed distribution of voting power among the Heads of Circles, as securing a preponderance to Austria and Prussia, but raised a fundamental objection to the subordination of sovereign Princes

had probably begun to hope that the declared leadership, which Austria was loath to assume, might devolve on Prussia. But at the Congress very few shared this hope; there is no sign that it was cherished by Hanckelott; and, while no plan based upon it had been formed by King, Court, or Government at Berlin, it had not even become familiar as a speculation or aspiration either to the Prussians in particular or to the German nation at large. The solution could hardly lie in ingenuitous compromises—such as that Austria should hold the Imperial dignity for reasonable terms of five years, while to Prussia should be assigned a hereditary vicariate in northern Germany; that the King of Prussia should be Imperial commander-in-chief under an Austrian Emperor; or that Francis should be crowned Emperor, and Frederick William King of Germany. It was also proposed, in order that the ambition of Bavaria might not be denied its chance, that a couple of vicariates should be set up, of which that on the Danube should be held by the "Prussia of the south." The impracticable idea of a very little Germany found embodiment in the suggestion of the Göttingen historian Gerstenberg, that a Confederation should be formed from which both Austria and Prussia were excluded. We pass by other schemes and fantasies. A more practical instinct led Arnold and those who shared his views, without demanding the restoration of the Empire, to insist on the annual convention of an Assembly, freely elected by the nation at large, side by side with a permanent Diet of representatives of the Governments, as well as on the establishment of a national judicial tribunal and foreign office, and the creation of a national army. This, it may be remarked, is practically the present Constitution of the German Empire. Unhappily all this planning and scheming was perverted by diffidence and mutual suspicion. Jacob Grimm, writing from Vienna to Gervé, lamented a state of things in which little hope of patriotic action remained, and Heaven alone could unite Germany and avert the consequences of weakness and treachery in the councils of her Governments.

Thus, during the gloom of December, when the two chief German Powers were becoming involved in various antagonisms on other subjects, the question of the German Constitution, which could not be settled without an agreement between them, seemed breaking up into a chaos of conflicting schemes. As a matter of fact, however, the working members of the German Committee were far from idle. Before the year had ended or the Saxe-Polish difficulty reached its height, Wiesenberg prepared a draft entrusting the conduct of German affairs to a Federal Council or Diet, at which Austria was to preside and all the other Governments were to have either individual or collective votes. This draft, ultimately adopted as the main basis of the deliberations which led to the passing of the Federal Act, at first served no purpose but that of marking time. Early in February, 1813, when the Saxe-Polish crisis

had passed, Austria and Prussia took serious counsel with one another as to the resumption of the constitutional task. Metternich agreed with Hardenberg and Humboldt to submit to the resumed deliberations on the Germanic Constitution all the "Princely Estates" of Germany; and on February 19 two new and in the main identical drafts, profoundly tentative, were laid before him by the Prussian plenipotentiaries, which represent the furthest advance proposed at the Congress. These drafts insisted on the necessity of securing to Germany a strong military power and an effective judicial tribunal, with guaranteed Constitutions for the several States, and for all Germans a definite measure of fundamental rights (*Grundrechte*). They also proposed two distinct Councils—the smaller and executive to be composed of representatives of the five larger States, the other, with purely legislative functions, to include representatives of all the Governments. In the draft preferred by Humboldt, the division into Grades, as an intermediary link between the central power and the particular States, was retained. No matters stood until, when Napoleon's return had made a prompt solution indispensable, Metternich was, as will be seen, at last moved to action.

Among the miscellaneous subjects assigned for treatment to separate Committees was the business of the so-called Statistical Committee, composed of representatives of the Five Great Powers. Prussia, it is alleged, was to be believed, had been admitted to a share in its deliberations only after a threat that, if excluded, she would withdraw altogether from the Congress. Its task, which it carried through in six sittings, extending from December 24, 1804, to January 15, 1815, was merely preparatory to the final adjustment of the territorial restorations, acquisitions, cessions, and exchanges. Instead of calculating, by area and by wealth as well as by population, the statistical value of each of the territories concerned, the Committee applied the hitherto standard only, which from the military point of view was no doubt the most important. The total of "souls" at the disposal of the Congress, as representing the population of the territories, exclusive of France itself, reconquered from Napoleon and his allies, amounted to nearly thirty-two millions. It is stated that the only serious difference as to the calculation occurred in the case of the grand duchy of Warsaw; and that this was settled by the Committee taking the mean between two estimates differing from one another to the extent of about half-a-million.

Of a very different nature was the work of the Committee on the abolition of the slave-trade. Fox's famous resolution (*June, 1806*), followed by the Act of 1807, which Denmark had anticipated in 1803, had extinguished the slave-trade in all the British dominions. The example of Great Britain had been followed in the next year by the United States of North America; and, stimulated by Canning, the British navy had been in operation against the slave-trade,



to which the very immensity of its abolition had imported an unprecedented activity. Previously to 1808, as Castlereagh afterwards declared, Spain had been without any slave-trade of her own; and only a small proportion of the negroes imported by her after this date was intended for use in her own colonies. In the course of the war, during which Great Britain had become the mistress of the seas, the slave-trade had almost dwindled into a barebones smuggling traffic from the Portuguese settlements; but the approach of peace threatened to revive it. Its entire extinction had, however, now become a matter in which the honour and conscience of Great Britain seemed alike engaged; and in the First Peace of Paris she persuaded France to promise to unite with her at the coming Congress in securing the abolition of the trade by all the European Powers, and to put a stop to it in her own dominions within the next five years. The pressure exerted by Wilberforce and his friends was not relaxed; and there was no object which the British plenipotentiaries, and Castlereagh in particular, pushed with so persevering a determination.

On December 10, 1814, Talleyrand proposed the appointment of a committee of plenipotentiaries of the Eight Powers, to prepare the final abolition. Since this object recommended itself to the humanitarian aspirations of the Two, while Austria and Prussia could have no conceivable reason for resistance, British efforts seemed to be assured of success. Unfortunately, Spain and Portugal, unwilling to pledge themselves to immediate action in a matter directly affecting their own colonies in the New World, proposed that the committee should be limited to representatives of the colonial Powers, viz., Great Britain, France, and themselves; and, on Castlereagh's retorting that the subject was one of interest to humanity at large, Labrousse declared that at least eight years would be required before Spain could join in putting an end to the obnoxious trade. Finally, on Castlereagh's suggestion, it was agreed that, instead of a special committee being appointed on this subject, special sittings should be held of plenipotentiaries named for the purpose, one for each of the Powers represented on the Committee of the Eight. Five such sittings having been held, that committee was enabled on February 8, before Castlereagh's departure, to adopt a Declaration which, without prejudice to the date at which each Power might judge it most convenient to declare for itself the definitive abolition of the slave-trade, united all the Powers in the full moral responsibility of its condemnation, and thus practically secured its eventual extinction.

The Committee on the Navigation of Rivers, which was appointed by the Committee of the Eight on December 14, 1814, and held twelve sittings from February 2 to March 27, 1815, was designed for carrying out the provisions of the Peace of Paris as to the free navigation of the Rhine and the Scheldt, and for applying the same treatment to the

navigable portions of other rivers bounding or intersecting European States. The historic importance of the Rhine as a trade-route, and the difficulties which previously to 1792 had obstructed the opening of the Scheldt, stimulated the exertions of this Committee, which, composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria, admitted to its deliberations representatives of other States, as well as of important commercial towns. The very complicated business was managed with much address; and the report of the Committee, besides proposing an elaborate code for the navigation of the Rhine and briefer regulations for that of the Main, Moselle, Moselle, Meuse, and Scheldt, suggested a series of provisions for river navigation in general, which made an important advance towards its ultimate establishment.

We can but briefly refer to the labours of the Committee appointed on December 10 for settling the rank or order of precedence, with the various consequences dependent thereon, among the European Powers. At some previous European Congresses no subject had been discussed at greater length or with more volubleness: but at Vienna the presence of so many sovereigns and members of sovereign families contributed to repress the self-assertion of plumpotentiaries; and Metternich, like his master, was careless of formality for its own sake. In practice, the order of signatures to the various protocols was decided partly by the alphabetical sequence of the names of States, and partly by accident; and henceforth there was to be a precise distinction between those classes of diplomatic agents, within which there was to be no precedence in the signature of treaties except one determined by lot.

Thus, by the end of February, 1815, or thereabouts, considerable progress had been made with the business of the Congress. Russia had retained her Polish possessions; the new dominions of Prussia (including her share of Saxony) had been settled; Austria was established in the control of northern Italy; Great Britain had virtually secured satisfactory boundaries for the Netherlands, while those of Hanover had likewise been enlarged; a broad basis for the Swiss Confederation had been preserved; the kingdom of Sardinia had been materially strengthened; and the final abolition of the slave-trade had been brought within sight. When, on January 4, Castlereagh had repeated that, as a matter of convenience, his road to England might be postponed a little longer, he had expressed the opinion that "in the course of four or five weeks he would be enabled to bring all the territorial arrangements of Europe to a close." But on March 4 the news arrived at Vienna that Napoleon had quitted Elba on February 26; and on March 6 he landed at Cannes. His first words on landing—so it was afterwards said—were "*Le Congrès est dissous.*"

## CHAPTER XX.

## THE HUNDRED DAYS (1815).

On the very night of his arrival at the Tuileries, Napoleon found himself able to reconstitute the official machinery of the Imperial régime. Most of his former ministers hastened to place themselves at his disposal. Maret took up again the post of Secretary of State; Darcis returned to the ministry of Marine; Gaudin to the ministry of Finance. Cambacérès was put in temporary charge of the department of Justice; Caulaincourt, with some show of reluctance, consented to become once more Minister for Foreign Affairs. There were, however, two new appointments of first-rate importance. Duroc was placed at the War Office, where it was hoped that the talent for organisation which he had shown during his proconsulate at Strasbourg would display itself once more. Carnot became Minister of the Interior; Napoleon had not forgotten the patriotism which the old republican had evinced in 1804, and saw that it would help him to rally the Liberals to his side, if he could once more exhibit their strongest man taking service under the Empire because France was in danger. Carnot in office was a surprise; but it was still more surprising to see Fouché once more Minister of Police. He had presented himself, with his usual cynical impudence, at the reception held at the Tuileries on March 20; and, ignoring his former disgrace, had offered himself as the only man capable of satisfactorily filling the post from which he had been degraded in 1809. Remembering how inadequately Savary had worked the machine after the removal of the Duke of Otranto, Napoleon gave the old intriguer the place, though he had no confidence in his honesty or his good intentions.

The Emperor had reconstituted his government before he had been two days in Paris; it only remained that he should force France to recognise it. Except in the south, no serious opposition was made to the restoration of the Empire; the whole of northern, eastern, and central France adhered to the new régime. But things went otherwise on the banks of the Rhone and the Gironde. In those districts the royalist party was in a clear majority among the civil population; and, though the regular troops were known to be disaffected, the partisans

of the Bourbons hoped to hold their own. At Toulouse the prefect, the Baron de Vitrolles, kept the white flag flying till April 4, when he was seized and imprisoned by General Dubouché, his hero refusing, at the critical moment, to fire upon the troops of the line. At Bordeaux the Duchess d'Angoulême and Lynch, the man who had opened the gates to Bessières in 1814, gathered several thousand men and defended the passage of the Dordogne against General Clauzel (March 23). Civil war would have begun, had not the garrison of the city declared, in unmistakable terms, that it would join Clauzel and attack the volunteers if matters went further. The Duchess rode from barracks to barracks, making desperate appeals to the line-men; they received her with calm attention, and their officers brought her to fly while there was yet time. Convinced that it was hopeless to resist, she bade her army disband, and called for England (April 2).

Only on the Rhone was there any serious fighting. Prussia was wholly loyalist in feeling; and the Duc d'Angoulême had gathered more than 100,000 volunteers and National Guards at Niame, a force which amounted the few regular battalions which remained in the district. Having boldly resolved to march on Lyons, he lost two small forces of imperialists at Montferrand and Lorient (April 1, 2), and reached Valence; but here his expedition came to an inglorious close. He found General Grouchy in front of him, while news reached him that the regular troops, whom he had left behind, had proclaimed the Emperor at Arignon, Montpellier, and Niame. His men began to melt away; and on April 8 he signed the Convention of La Palud, by which he and his officers were granted a free departure, and his volunteers were to be paid on laying down their arms. Thus ended, for the moment, the resistance of the royalists to the restoration of the Empire. The Vendée remained quiet for a while, though the old leaders were doing their best to stir up the peasantry; and the Ministers at Paris divided themselves with the idea that the worst, so long as the north, was passed. It was not till May 12 that the Vendean insurrection broke out in force.

But, though Napoleon seemed master of all France on April 10, it was not in France but at Vienna that his fate was to be settled. On the news of his landing, the plenipotentiaries of the Eight Powers had signed a declaration, by which they bound themselves to aid Louis XVIII with all their strength, and announced that Bonaparte, having broken the convention signed by him on April 2, 1814, had placed himself in the position of an outlaw, and, "as the enemy and disturber of the peace of the world," was given up to the vengeance of Europe (March 12). Four days later, a practical truce was given to this rather tangled piece of declaration, by a treaty in which Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia bound themselves each to put 150,000 men in the field, and to keep them under arms "till Bonaparte should have been rendered

absolutely incapable of stirring up further troubles." By a supplementary clause, the British Ministry engaged to place £5,000,000 at the disposal of her Continental allies, in order to aid them in the rapid mobilisation of their armies.

The Emperor had some hope that these warlike intentions would be affected by his having recovered possession of France with such rapidity and ease. His first care, therefore, was to address pacific overtures to Austria and Great Britain, the two Powers which he had some hopes of detaching from the Coalition. He declared that he adhered to the terms of the Treaty of Paris, wished for nothing but peace, and was anxious to give every guarantee of his good intentions. But Metternich dismissed his agent Mouton with a blank refusal; and the Prince Regent sent back unopened a letter addressed to him in Napoleon's own illegible handwriting. The temper of Great Britain was shown by the fact that, when Whitbread and other leading Whigs raised a protest against war in the House of Commons, only 72 votes were given in favour of their resolution, while 273 were against it.

Before April was out, Napoleon had to acknowledge to himself that war against united Europe was the only course open to him. Even while he was sending out the olive-branch to Vienna and London, he had been hurrying forward his military preparations. He was quite aware that he could not face his enemies with an army such as that which had won Austerlitz and Jena, still less with a force so great as that which had invaded Russia in 1812, or defended Smolny in 1812. He was short of the numerous auxiliary corps which had been sent to double the strength of his hosts. Was it possible to raise, within the boundaries of France alone, men enough to withstand the victors of 1814? Napoleon could count on the aid of a mass of veterans who had been shut up in the prisons of England and Russia during his last two campaigns, and had not witnessed the disaster of Leipzig or the fall of Paris. But, of the levies of 1813 and 1814, an enormous proportion had perished during the campaigns in Saxony and France; and those who remained had little cause for zeal. The actual army which Napoleon took over from Louis XVIII numbered not more than 200,000 men under arms. Of the 114 infantry regiments, some were reduced to one, some to two battalions, and all were weak. Officers to train new units could be found in plenty, among the thousands of veterans on half-pay who were offering themselves; but time to collect, embody, and arm the men would be wanting, if the Allies struck quickly. Moreover—and this shows how the position of Napoleon in 1815 differed from that which he had enjoyed in earlier years—the Emperor hesitated long before he dared let fall the odious word conscription; the new popular act of the restored monarchy had been its abolition. In April and May the veterans and the men at least were called back to their standards, but no call for conscripts was made.

It was only a few days before fighting actually commenced that the Emperor ventured to take the step of calling out the class of 1813. This is the reason why, in spite of all his efforts for three months, the regular troops, who had numbered 300,000 in March, had only risen to 284,000 in June. It was the finest army that Napoleon had commanded since Friedland, for it was purely French, and was composed almost entirely of veterans; but it was too small for its purpose.

The Emperor was well aware of this, and endeavored to supplement it by auxiliary troops of a different kind. The organization of the National Guard gained all over France; and, theoretically, all citizens from twenty to sixty years of age were liable to service in it. By a series of decrees, issued in April, it was directed that 886 battalions of this levy should be mobilized and sent to the frontier fortresses. But it was only in the east and the centre of France that the Emperor could carry out this plan; in the north and west the men refused to come forward. The decree had contemplated the placing in the field of 884,000 National Guards; on June 13 only 184,000 had been collected. In many departments, the prefects reported that an attempt to enforce the levy would lead to open insurrection. Napoleon had devised some other units of secondary value, by embodying, as battalions for land service, the greater part of the men of his navy, by enrolling 25,000 gunsmiths and shoemakers, and by arming, under the name of *Volontés*, some thousands of the workmen of Paris and Lyons. But in June the total of his auxiliary forces did not exceed 220,000 men; and very few of the corps could have been relied upon for efficient service.

The whole army indeed, line and National Guard, was not numerous enough for the task of resisting the united hosts of Europe. Napoleon calculated that, if he had been left alone till October, he might have raised 600,000 or even 800,000 men. But he was well aware that this leisure would not be granted him. It was useless to demonstrate that, in October, by the aid of conscription, the regular army might have almost 400,000 men under arms, and the force of the National Guard might have been doubled. Time was everything; and of this his enemies were as well aware as himself.

But military problems formed only part of the cloud of men which beset Napoleon in April and May, 1813. He saw that, if he was to obtain solid support from France, he must abandon his old autocratic methods and pose as a liberal sovereign, ready to consult his people and to meet their desires. Even Louis XVIII had granted the country a Charter and a Constitution. The warmth with which the Emperor had been at first received cooled down unmistakably when it became known that his return meant war with all Europe. He saw that he must put forth some programme which would rouse enthusiasm; and he determined with small hesitation that this programme must take the form of an appeal to the Liberal feeling of the nation. He must try to rouse the

old Jacobin and for the rights of man and the liberty of France, to raise the cry of "the country in danger," to present himself as a dictator elected to save the republic, no longer as the successor of Charlemagne or the assistant of the Pope. Hence the grants of the *acte additionnel*, a supplement to the former Imperial Constitution, which gave France a Parliament of two Houses—a nominated Chamber of Peers and an elected Chamber of Representatives. It also proclaimed the liberty of the press, and announced that the Ministers would, in some degree at least, be responsible to the Chambers. The Representatives were not to be chosen directly by the people, but by small boards of electors previously nominated by the constituencies.

The *acte additionnel* was laid before the people for acceptance by means of a plebiscite. Raptures were opened in every commune; but only 1,680,000 citizens took the trouble to record their suffrages. The number of votes was less than half of those recorded when the project for the Life Consulate was laid before the nation in 1802. Such as they were, however, they sufficed; and on June 1 the new Constitution was proclaimed, at a ceremony which the Emperor designated as the *Champ de Mai*, a term borrowed from Maximilian philology. It was a gorgeous, interminable, and hollow affair. The Emperor swore to obey the Constitution; the newly-elected Chambers and the army vowed fidelity to the Emperor. To one of his confidants Napoleon (at a later date) confessed that his intention had been to abolish the House of Representatives as soon as this could safely be done.

Meanwhile he found himself, to his disgust, saddled with a Lower House of the temper which he least desired. Among 689 deputies there were some 40 Republicans, 80 pure Bonapartists, ready to receive any-thing when the Bonapartist time should come, and about 560 Liberals of all sorts, whose main desire was to prevent that time from coming. At the first sitting of the new legislature, two days after the *Champ de Mai*, Louis Bonaparte was suggested for election as President of the Chamber; but the representatives ignored the official list, and chose by an enormous majority Langlois, one of the deputies for the Seine, a confirmed Liberal. The constitutionalists were clearly determined that the old administrative system should never be restored.

But domestic politics were not the worst problem in June, 1815. It was necessary to beat back the approaching armies of Europe, if the Constitution was to have even a chance of trial. Every man in France who looked at the military situation with unbiased judgment felt himself constrained to doubt whether the breathing-space would be obtained. This was not the view of the soldiery; the rank and file started for the frontier in a state of fierce enthusiasm, such as had not been seen since the days of the Republic. It was the same with the lower ranks of the officers; the thousands who had been eating the bitter bread of half-pay during the reign of Louis XVIII had hastened back

to their regiments with a firm determination that they would never again be reduced to such a life. The memory of the slight and the poverty which they had endured made them fanatical adherents of their old master. No army that the Emperor had ever led fought with such transcendent glory as that of 1815. But the spirit of the marshals and generals was very different; they knew enough of the strength of the Coalition to make them down-hearted as to the result of the coming campaign. They had thrown in their lot with Napoleon, but doubted their own wisdom, when they saw old comrades like MacDonald and Victor adhering to the Bourbons; and even Berthier refusing to return to France to join the master whose chief of the staff he had been for so many glorious years. Many took the field with a premonition of disaster: a few who, like Ney, had totally compromised themselves with the Bourbons, went forth like men possessed, with the vision of the hangman's rope before them in the event of defeat. Such a prospect might render them capable of acts of desperate courage, but did not strengthen their judgment.

The weakest point in Napoleon's situation was that he found himself—what he had never been before, even in 1814—destitute of allies. When he returned from Elba, he had possessed one single supporter—his brother-in-law of Naples. King Joachim felt sure that he would be elected from his realm before the Congress of Vienna concluded its sessions, and had resolved to link his fortunes with those of the Emperor. By good service in 1815 he might wipe out the memory of his treachery in the preceding year. His plan was to throw himself into the Emilia and Lombardy, hoping to come to arms the numerous partisans of the Imperial régime, who detested the restoration of Francis Joseph and Pius VII. to their former dominions. Murat took no counsel with his brother-in-law, but rushed forward with mad haste, and commenced the war while Napoleon was still hoping to lure Austria and Great Britain out of the league of the Continental Powers. The reorganization of the French army had hardly begun, when news reached Paris that Joachim had issued a proclamation calling the Romans to revolt, and had invaded the Papal States at the head of 80,000 men. He occupied Rome, Florence, and Bologna, before the Austrians had collected an army to drive him back; and he was able to push on to the line of the Po. But on April 10 serious fighting began. The Austrians were far inferior in numbers, but Murat's troops were worthless. Their old sovereign, King Ferdinand, once observed of the Neapolitan army, "You may dress it in blue, or in green, or in red; but, whichever you do, it will run." Checked at a series of combats in the Emilia, the invaders were pressed back to Tolentino, where Joachim was forced to deliver a pitched battle. The result was that he lost all his artillery and 4000 prisoners; the rest of his army dispersed (May 8). He could not rally even 10,000 men to defend Naples; and, when the Austrians pressed forward, he was forced to throw up the game and fly to Capri by sea (May 19). A few days



afterwards he arrived at Toulon, a penniless refugee. Napoleon refused to see him; he was enraged at the levity with which his brother-in-law had precipitated the war without asking his advice. He even believed (but wrongly) that, if Massé had restrained himself, Francis I. might have remained neutral; under this impression he repeatedly declared that the Italian campaign had been one of the main causes of his ruin.

Since, therefore, there could be no subsidiary operations in northern Italy, Napoleon had to cast his eyes along the long eastern frontier of France, from Dunkirk to the Var, with a full knowledge that the enemy might break in at any point; there was no neutral border for a single mile, for even Switzerland had declared its adhesion to the General Alliance. Nor could Spain be forgotten; Ferdinand VII. was busily collecting corps of observation behind the Bidasoa and the Maya. It was fortunate for the Emperor that, except on one very short front of forty miles about Strasbourg and Trier, France was surrounded by States of inferior rank—the kingdom of the Netherlands, Bavaria, Baden, Switzerland, and Saxony. None of these could deliver an immediate attack with its own unaided resources; and the main hostile armies had to be brought from afar, from Hungary and Bohemia, from Brandenburg and Silesia, from the distant depths of Russia.

There were only two bodies of troops belonging to any of the Great Powers which lay in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier. In Belgium, at the moment of the Emperor's return from Elba, there was a British force of some 10,000 men—the regiments which had served under Gombourc in Holland during the preceding year. In their company were two or three Hanoverian brigades. Out of this nucleus the British Government proposed to construct an army of 100,000 men. They ordered Wellington to Brussels, where he arrived on April 8, and began sending to him in twos and threes every corps on the home establishment that could be equipped for service. Unfortunately, the larger part of the old Peninsular army had been shipped to America; and, though the Peace of Ghent had been signed, those troops were still beyond the Atlantic. Very few battalions of the veterans of Spain could be put at Wellington's disposition. But, week by week, his British force was growing; by the middle of June it reached 80,000 men. In addition, a quantity of Hanoverian *Landwehr* had marched up to the Meuse and the Scheldt. The rest of Wellington's miscellaneous host was composed of the contingents of Brunswick and Nassau, whose sovereigns, from jealousy of Prussia, had placed their 21st armies at the disposal of Great Britain, and of the levies of the Netherlands. The Government of the new kingdom which had been created for the Prince of Orange had been suspended by the return of Napoleon at a moment when its army was still in the making. Its whole regular force amounted on March 1 to only 10,000 men. Since then it had raised and equipped 20,000 more, nearly all of the newest sort. The Dutch-Belgian

troops were the weakest element in Wellington's army; all the old soldiers were men who had served as conscripts under Napoleon; the rest were untrained recruits. There had always been a considerable French party in Belgium; and most of the Flemings and Walloons disliked their enforced union with Holland. The officers of the Netherlands army were loyal; but too many of the rank and file, partly coerced by the reputation of their former master, partly attracted towards him by old memories, could not be trusted to give a good account of themselves. British, German, and Dutch included, Wellington had 105,000 men under him in June; but, of these, 60,000 were detached to form the garrisons of Antwerp, Ostend, and other Belgian fortresses.

The other army at hand was a Prussian force under General Kleib, quartered partly in the newly-formed Rhine Province, which the Congress of Vienna had given to Frederick William III, partly in eastern Belgium, about Namur and Luxembourg. It numbered only some 50,000 men in March; but the Berlin Government, acting with zeal and rapidly, had sent up three more army-corps from the east in April and May, and given the command to the indomitable Blücher. Early in June, Blücher had 117,000 men in line, four-sevenths of whom were line troops, the remainder *Landwehr* battalions. The weak part of this army consisted in the newly-raised regiments of Westphalia, Berg, and Rhineland men, who had formerly served either Napoleon or his brother Jerome as conscripts. But the preponderance of the old Prussian regiments in the whole force gave it a homogeneity which Wellington's host was far from possessing.

It was on the Prussian and Anglo-Dutch armies in Belgium that Napoleon concentrated his main attention; they were close at hand, while the Austrians had far to come, and the Russians had hardly yet crossed their own frontier. Reasoning correctly from the character of the two generals opposed to him, he concluded that, if he waited much longer, they would attack him. His information from Belgian sympathisers, however, was to the effect that their mobilisation was not yet complete, and that both were awaiting reinforcements. Meanwhile their troops were scattered, the line of their advanced posts covering the whole frontier from the Scheldt to the Moselle. The Prussian outposts extended from Liège to Charleroi, the Anglo-Dutch from Mons to Ghent. It would probably take three days for either army to mass on the common centre, the line Mons-Charleroi; while six could be required to concentrate there, if the British right or the Prussian left were the point selected for attack.

The Emperor's whole plan of campaign was based on these facts. He resolved to collect every available man, and to throw himself upon the junction-point of the two hostile armies before they were expecting his approach. Seizure was all-important, since with three days' notice the enemy would have time to draw together. But, if only

they failed to get wind of his approach, or to discover the exact line of his advance, he might hope to catch them in the midst of their process of concentration, and to deal with each separately. To meet them united would be almost certainly fatal, for they outnumbered his own available force almost in the proportion of two to one. It was a risky game; but in the Emperor's present situation every move was hazardous, and this was the only one which promised great results. If the British and Prussians were crushed, he could hasten down to the Rhine to meet the Austrians and smite them before the Russians began to arrive. If he could but prolong the game till September, his new levies would give him 400,000 more men; and with such a force anything might be possible. A crushing defeat administered to Wellington might cause the fall of the British Ministry; a second Ulm might break the spirit of Francis II. and cause him to make peace. Prussia would be irreconcilable, but she might be destroyed. Looking forward, the Emperor did not wholly despair; but he knew that he was staking his crown on the chance of gaining the three days that he required.

The total force which the Emperor could employ against Belgium was about 115,000 men. It was 10,000 men weaker than he had intended, for, at the last moment, he had been forced to despatch against the Venetians, which had broken out in open insurrection on May 13, two divisions with a brigade of the Imperial Guard. The Venetians were beaten; and their general, La Marmora, was killed at the combat of St. Gilius, near Mantua, on June 4. But it was impossible to recall the winning divisions in time to take part in the invasion of Belgium. The whole force which the Emperor had collected under his own hand was composed of veterans of the regular army. For the defence of the eastern and southern frontiers he had told off comparatively small forces of the line, backed by masses of the National Guard. Only Rapp, who was sent to command the army of the Rhine, had a solid corps of 80,000 regulars and but few of the new levies. In the other divisions—those of the Alps under Suchet, of the eastern Pyrenees under Drouot, of the western Pyrenees under Clauzel, of the Var under Brune, of the Jura under Lannes—the National Guards formed half, or more than half, of the total force under arms. All these six armies together numbered only 75,000 men. Of the rest of the Emperor's available troops, about 150,000, mostly National Guards, had been thrown into the fortresses of the east and north.

Napoleon started for the front on June 19. His first and in some ways most important move was carried out with complete success. The five army-corps which were to form the bulk of his army were drawn in from their scattered cantonnements, extending from Valenciennes to Thionville, without alarming the enemy. On June 24 the whole force was concentrated on a front of not more than thirty-five miles, just where the French frontier (as it then was) projected most deeply into Belgium.

Meanwhile nothing was the vaguest rumors had reached Wellington and Blücher. On June 15 the former wrote to his friend Graham: "We have reports of Bonaparte joining the army and attacking us. But I judge from his speech to his Legislature that his departure is not likely to be immediate, and I think we are now too strong for him here." When the Duke was writing these words, the Emperor's carriage was driving rapidly forward from Laon to Arras; that night he slept within ten miles of the Belgian frontier. Blücher was of course the same opinion as Wellington: he was busily engaged in drawing out his plans for an advance into France, when the enemy burst across the frontier.

The Emperor had thus secured the three days' start over the Allies in the matter of concentration which was the necessary preliminary to a successful campaign in Belgium. He had his 125,000 men massed for the stroke, while their 119,000 were strung out on a front of a hundred miles. It remained to be seen how he would utilize this tremendous advantage. His five corps were commanded by d'Erlon and Reille—veterans of the army of Spain—Vandamme, Gérard, and Lobau. Of the marshals, only three were with the army. Soult acted as chief of the staff, a post which he had never before filled, and in which he showed himself, from lack of experience, markedly inferior to Berthier. Ney, who owing to his conduct in March had been kept in a sort of half-idleness during the last three months, had been called up at the last moment and placed in command of the left wing—the corps of Reille and d'Erlon. Grouchy, whose reputation had been won as a leader of horse, took charge of the great cavalry reserve.

At dawn on the morning of June 15 the French army passed the frontier and threw itself upon the outposts of the Allies. The blow was delivered on the extreme right of the Prussian army, in and about Charleroi, and just failed to touch Wellington's extreme left at Mous. On the first day, only the corps of Ziethen was engaged on the side of the Allies; and this force, caught before it could concentrate, and weakened by superior numbers, was driven northward and inward with considerable loss. By eight o'clock the Emperor was in possession of Charleroi and the bridges of the Sambre; and Ziethen had fallen back behind Fleurus. Blücher, on hearing of this first assault, had set his whole army on the march westward. At noon on June 16 Ziethen was joined by Frob's corps from Namur, and Thielmann's from Dinant and Huy; Blücher had thus 90,000 men in hand. His fourth corps, that of Bülow, had not arrived. It had lain at Liège, forty miles from Charleroi, and was still a day's march from the main army. Blücher, however, had made up his mind to fight without waiting for Bülow, and drew up his host on the hill-sides behind Ligay and St. Amand, looking down into the valley where Fleurus lies.

If the position of Blücher was not quite satisfactory at this moment, that of Wellington was much less so. The Duke had received definite

details of the enemy's movements many hours later than ought to have been the case. Zieten had sent him news that his outposts were attacked early on the 15th, before anything decisive had happened. After this, engrossed in the details of fighting, the Prussian general forgot to keep the British head-quarters informed of the developments of the French advance. It was only about 4 p.m. that Wellington received intelligence from several quarters which showed that the attack in the direction of Charleroi was being made by several army-corps, and was evidently part of a general advance. The Duke immediately ordered all his divisions to concentrate at their head-quarters and to be ready to march at a moment's notice. But he was still uncertain whether the movement on Charleroi was being carried out by the whole of the Emperor's army, or whether a second column might not be advancing on the other high-road which leads to Brussels by way of Mons. His ignorance was due to the negligence of Dörning, the officer commanding the British cavalry-screen on the line Mons-Tournay, who failed to send any report as to matters in his front till night. The Duke had been of opinion that the Mons road presented advantages for the enemy which the Charleroi road did not, and refused to commit himself to a concentration on his extreme left till he was sure that his left-centre was safe. Hence it was only late in the evening that, reassured on this point, he directed his scattered divisions to concentrate on Ninelles, Braine-la-Comte, and Hal. As they could not move till daylight on the 16th, he was in the unfortunate position of having no troops on the Brussels-Charleroi road next morning save one Dutch and one Nassau brigade, at Quatre-Bras and Ninelles; while within supporting distance there were only the reserves from Brussels—some 35,000 British, Hanoverian, and Brunswick troops—and one or two brigades at Enghein and Braine-la-Comte. The Duke clearly underestimated the rapidity with which Napoleon would push forward when his crown was at stake. That night Wellington remained at Brussels, and attended the *Trêves* of Richmond's famous ball. At daylight he rode out to visit his outposts, and then to confer with Blücher.

Actual contact between the British and French outposts had been established late in the afternoon of the 15th, when the cavalry of the head of the Emperor's left column struck the pickets of the Nassau brigade under Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar at Frensen, and drove them back to Quatre-Bras, where the Prince showed fight. Nap., who was in command of this part of the French army, reported the fact to the Emperor, and encamped opposite Quatre-Bras, waiting for his infantry to come up. There were only 4000 men in front of him; and it would be many hours before the Brussels troops, which only started at daylight on the 16th, could arrive to support Prince Bernard. But of this the Marshal was necessarily ignorant; he could only report that he was in touch with the enemy, who seemed inclined to stand.

Thus, on the morning of the second day of the campaign, the position of the French army was excellent. Blücher had not collected even three-fourths of his army at Ligny till noon; Wellington would not, till twelve hours were passed, be able to concentrate more than a third of his at Quatre-Bras. The Emperor, however, seems to have overrated his advantage, great as it was. His orders for the 18th directed Ney to drive away whatever lay in front of him at Quatre-Bras, and then to fall upon the flank of the Prussian force at Ligny. This says Napoleon, in his earliest despatches, seems to have estimated at a single corps only. But, as the day wore on, he discovered it to be much stronger than he had supposed, and deferred his attack till his whole right wing had come up. Ney, with less justification, behaved in a similar fashion in front of Quatre-Bras, and, before smothering Prince Bernard's brigade, waited till he had the whole of the infantry of Reille's corps under his hand. Thus nothing happened on either field of battle till noon was well passed. Wellington, after visiting his force at Quatre-Bras, rode over to Ligny, interviewed Blücher, and told him that he would bring him aid if he was not himself attacked and defeated by the French left. The promise was conditional, and could never be carried out, as Ney found full occupation for all the British divisions, as they successively reached Quatre-Bras during the afternoon. The Duke then returned to his own advance-guard, just in time to meet Ney's attack, which was delivered a few minutes before his arrival.

Between 2 and 3 p.m. on June 16 the Emperor, having massed in front of the Prussian position the Guard, the corps of Vandamme and Gérard, and all his reserve cavalry, thought himself strong enough to begin. As a matter of fact, he had 50,000 men less than Blücher on the field, and even when Lobau's corps came up late in the afternoon, was still in a grave numerical inferiority. But, not fully aware of this, he commenced a vigorous attack upon the line of villages which covered the right and centre of the Prussian position: their left wing he merely "contained" with the numerous cavalry of Grouchy. This was the commencement of a long and obstinate struggle. The French repeatedly stormed Ligny and the three villages of St Amand; Blücher, perpetually feeding his fighting-line from his reserve, always won them back again. But the Prussians suffered more heavily than their opponents, because their troops were exposed to the preponderating artillery fire of the French, whenever they descended the bare slopes above the village in their counter-attacks. This was not the sort of battle that the Emperor desired; he had been for some time expecting Ney to appear, in accordance with his orders, behind the Prussian right wing. But no French troops showed in this direction, the Marshal being engaged in a bitter struggle with Wellington at Quatre-Bras, and finding himself unable to spare a man for the turning movement.

The Emperor, however, cared little for the subsidiary action far to

his left: he sent orders directly to d'Elion, the commander of the 1st corps, which formed Ney's reserve and was just approaching Quatre-Bras at the moment, bidding him draw off outward and march towards Liège, so as to fall upon the Prussian flank and rear. d'Elion obeyed, but, by a slight misdirection in his march, headed for Florence rather than Liège, and therefore came upon Napoleon's battlefield in such a way as to join the Emperor's left, rather than to flank the Prussian right. Napoleon was for a moment puzzled by the appearance of troops in this direction, and slackened in his attacks on St Amand and Liège. But, learning that the new-comers were his own missing corps, he recommenced the assault on Blücher's line. This final attack, however, obtained no support from d'Elion, who at this juncture received pressing orders from Ney, bidding him return and save him from Wellington's overpowering numbers. Though he was now in a position to manoeuvre with splendid effect against the Prussian right, d'Elion turned back and started for Quatre-Bras.

Thus Napoleon had to fight out his battle with no aid from the west. He brought it, however, to a successful conclusion, by dashng the Imperial Guard against the Prussian centre just as night fell. Blücher had used up his reserves, and was unable to withstand the tremendous impact of this mass of veteran troops. He himself charged at the head of his last remaining cavalry brigade, but was repulsed, thrown from his horse, and nearly taken prisoner. He was dragged off the field almost insensible from his fall; and his army at the same moment abandoned all its positions, and rolled back to the village two miles to the rear of its original position. Blücher had lost more than 20,000 men, including many stragglers from the Rhine and Westphalian Landwehr, who ran away and did not stop till they reached Aix-la-Chapelle. The Emperor had also suffered heavily; his losses must have amounted to about 11,000 men, and he had taken five prisoners and only twenty-one guns. Thus Napoleon had won a victory, but not a decisive one. The Prussians shook themselves together at dawn, and retired unharmed in the direction of Werra, the point at which they could most easily put themselves in connection with Wellington's army. This was quite contrary to the expectations of the Emperor, who imagined the Prussians to be far more disorganised than they were, and thought it probable that they had retired due east, towards their own base at Liège, while really they had marched north. This false hypothesis had nearly fatal to its danger on the next day but one.

Liège, however, in spite of d'Elion's mistake, was distinctly a victory; at Quatre-Bras neither party could claim as well-merited a success. Ney, as we have already mentioned, delivered his attack on Wellington's advance-guard at about 2 a.m., with the whole corps of Reille. The line of the Allies was at once crumpled up; but, just as it gave way there arrived on the field Picton's British division, the first of the

Drouot's reserves to reach the front, and, shortly after, the Duke of Brunswick and his corps. At the same moment Wellington himself rode up. He had just time to deploy his fresh troops, when the French attack pressed up against them. After a fierce struggle, in which the Duke of Brunswick fell, it was beaten off. Soon afterwards both sides received reinforcements, Kellermann's columns joining Ney, while the Duke was strengthened by Alten's British division from *Braunsberg*. Ney resumed the attack, driving his cavalry ferociously against the allied centre. More than one British battalion was broken, and the columns penetrated as far as the houses of *Quatre-Bras*. But they were finally driven off, and the allied line reformed itself. Ney, who had now learnt that his master had called off the corps of d'Ellon, his sole reserve, was in a state of desperate fury. Napoleon, by stripping him of half his infantry force, had condemned him to defeat; in his rage, Ney went to recall d'Ellon, despite the Imperial orders, and so ruined Napoleon's plan for making *Ligny* a decisive battle. But the riding corps was too late in its return to *Quatre-Bras* to save the day in that direction. Long ere its arrival, Wellington assumed the offensive; he had just received Cooke's division, the British Guards, and with the aid of this reinforcement attacked the French along the whole line. His superiority in numbers was now very marked: he had 30,000 men in hand to Ney's 22,000, and could not be held back. The enemy, still fighting fiercely, had been forced to return to their original positions when darkness brought the battle to an end. The losses were equally distributed; each side had suffered about 4000 or 4500 men.

Looked at from the tactical point of view, *Quatre-Bras* was a severe check to Ney. But from the strategical point of view the action had served Napoleon's purpose fairly well, since the Marshal had prevented Wellington from sending a single man to Blücher's aid. *Ligny* would have had very different results, if the Duke had been able to crush the containing corps in front of him early in the day, and had then marched for *St. Amand*. The reason why he failed to do so was the lateness of his concentration; he had to fight Ney with the Brunswicks almost unaided. If his troops from Olmütz, Gademarde, and Aich had started twelve hours earlier, Ney must have been destroyed. During the night, the belated divisions poured in, till nearly the whole army was concentrated on the morning of the 17th. But it was now too late. The news of *Ligny* had arrived; and the Duke saw that the Emperor would inevitably join Ney before the day was out. He resolved to draw back at once from his advanced position, and to seek a junction with Blücher before he again gave battle. Early in the morning he sent word to the Prussian head-quarters that he would stand on the position of *Mont St. Jean*, if he were promised the help of one of Blücher's army-corps.

Napoleon was slow to move during the morning of June 17. He was fatigued by the long running fight on the Thursday and by the battle



on the Friday; but this fact does not wholly account for the strange lethargy that seems to have seized him on this day. He spent the morning in talking politics with his generals, in driving round the battlefield of the previous day, and in reviewing his victorious troops. Every moment was of importance to him, yet he squandered some precious hours before he made a move. Not till about noon did he issue the orders which were to govern the rest of the campaign. He directed Grouchy to take charge of the corps of Vandamme and Gérard and hold the reserve cavalry—some 28,000 men, when the losses of Ligny were deducted—and to follow the Prussians in whatever direction they had retreated. He was to keep in touch with them at all costs, and to discover whether they were retreating towards their base, or showing any signs of moving towards Wellington. Napoleon himself intended to join Ney with the Imperial Guard, the rest of the reserve cavalry, and the corps of Lobau. Owing to the late hour at which the orders were given, neither of the columns got away till 8 or 8 a.m.

Meanwhile, owing to the Emperor's tardy start, the whole Prussian army had slipped away unmolested; and the French cavalry had not even discovered the route which it had taken. Much that was lost in seeking for Blücher on the road to Namur. At nightfall, Grouchy knew that some of the Prussians must be moving on Wavre, which would bring them in the direction of the British, but was still uncertain whether their main body was or was not retreating onward in the direction of Liège. For this he cannot be seriously blamed; the responsibility lies partly with the Emperor for losing time in the morning, partly with the two cavalry generals, Pajol and Exelmans, who had shown gross carelessness in letting the enemy slip away and failing to find him again. Delayed by heavy rain, which fell all through the afternoon and evening, Grouchy's infantry did not reach Quallonne till nightfall. They had covered less than ten miles in the day; the Prussians had covered twenty, and were safely concentrated at Wavre, where they were joined by Blücher's latest corps, which had at last got up from Liège to the front.

In this part of the field Napoleon had practically lost twenty-four hours—one of the three precious days which he had gained by his rapid concentration and his vigorous advance. Things went almost as badly for him in its western portion. Wellington had begun to withdraw his army from Quatre-Bras at 10 a.m. on June 17. Owing to his late start from Liège, Napoleon came on the ground only when the last of Wellington's infantry was far advanced on the route to Mont St Jean: a mere cavalry screen under Lord Uxbridge remained in his front. Recovering his energy when it was too late, the Emperor drove in the British cavalry, and pursued it fiercely throughout the late afternoon. But he could neither catch it nor do it any serious harm; at the docks of Genappe, indeed, Uxbridge turned back and broke the leading brigade of the Imperial horsemen by a downhill charge of the Life Guards.

After this he was not so severely pressed; the same heavy thunderstorm which had delayed Grouchy did much to check the Emperor's pursuit. It was nearly 7 p.m. on the 17th before the head of the French army reached the front of the position of Mont St Jean, where Wellington had been arranging his army as it came up. A reconnoissance in the rain showed the Emperor that his army was standing ready to receive him; and he halted to allow the rest of his troops to arrive. So long was his return that much of the infantry did not reach the front till after midnight, and at least one division only on the following morning. The troops were much fatigued by their long tramp in the rain, and had outmarched their commander; there was no proper distribution of rations either that night or the next day. They bivouacked in the mud of the fields, drenched through, frozen, and half-starved.

Wellington's position on that night was an anxious one, in spite of the fact that he had carried out his retreat without loss or disorder. All now depended on the Prussians; he had sent them, early in the morning, his offer to fight on the battle-ground he had chosen, if he were promised the aid of a single army-corps. If they replied that this was impossible, he would have to retire again, and to involve Brussels, which lay some eleven miles to his rear. It was only after midnight that he received the all-important answer to his proposal. Blücher had been *hors de combat* on the 17th, owing to the contusions he had suffered at Ligny; and the details of the Prussian movements during that day had been regulated by Gneisenau, his chief of the staff. But at night the indomitable old man had recovered sufficiently to resume command; it was he who received the Duke's offer, and he promptly accepted it. Certain objections were made by Gneisenau and other generals, who thought that a flank march so near the enemy was full of dangers, and that it was wrong to throw up the safe line of retreat on Maestricht which the army now possessed. This was true enough; but the chance of striking Napoleon in flank and overwhelming him with superior numbers was too good to be lost. Blücher wrote that he would dispatch Bülow's corps to join the English at daybreak, and send after it that of Pirch. His other two corps should follow if not prevented. He knew Grouchy's exact position, and thought it might be necessary to detach Thielemann and Zieten to hold him back. Blücher had risen to the full height of the situation: and those orders, once given, decided the fate of the campaign. If they had been carried out with celerity, they would have ended it with far less expenditure of blood than was actually incurred on June 18. The execution, however, was not equal to the conception; the plan worked, but it worked over slowly and over late.

Reassured as to the cooperation of the Prussians, Wellington drew up his army on the hill-side of Mont St Jean, across the two high-roads Nivelles-Brussels and Charleroi-Brussels, which there meet. The position does not at the first sight appear very strong; the slopes are gentle, and

do not rise more than 180 or 200 feet above the level of the valley which divides them from the French line. There was no cover in front, save at three isolated points. Before the British right lay the farm, orchard, and copse of Hougoumont, surrounded with hedges and walls; in front of the exact centre, on the Charleroi high-road, is the smaller farm of La Haye Sainte; far away on the extreme left lie two other farms, close together, Trepassey and La Haye. All these were occupied: Hougoumont by a brigade of the British Guards; La Haye Sainte by a picked detachment of the German Legion; the other two by Bernadotte of Saxe-Weimar's Nassau brigade. The enemy would have to storm them, before he could make any solid lodgement in the British position. But the feature which Wellington regarded as most advantageous in his field of battle was that behind his fighting line the ground stretched away in a broad plateau falling slightly toward the north. Here he could array his reserves completely out of sight of the enemy, and bring them to the front without exposing them to view till the onset was reached. It was the great converse of the Ligey position, where all the Prussian reserves had been exposed to Napoleon's eye, and many of them to his artillery, before they were brought into action. Wellington had 67,000 men on the ground. Of these, 54,000 were British: 2800 belonged to the King's German Legion, of Prussian line; 51,000 were Hanoverians. There was the Denawick camp, reduced to 5000 men by its losses at Quatre-Bras; two Nassau brigades (Kreuz and Saxe-Weimar) over 6000 strong; and finally 14,000 Dutch-Belgians. These last were the weak point in the line; horse and foot had behaved feebly at Quatre-Bras, and did not restore their reputation at Waterloo. It was a motley array at best, but, with Blücher due before noon, all seemed safe; the Duke knew it would be more than a mere morning's work to wear down his stubborn British and German infantry. It was probably in reliance on the early arrival of his ally that Wellington had left, far out on his right, a day's march from Mont St Jean, a force consisting of a strong Dutch-Belgian division, with one British and one Hanoverian brigade, under General Colville and Prince Frederick of Orange. They lay at Hal, on the Maastricht road, nearly 14,000 strong, intended apparently to guard against a turning movement of the French. But it had long been ascertained that Napoleon had no detached corps to the west; it was a mistake not to call Colville in.

On the low ridge opposite Mont St Jean, Napoleon had arrayed some 74,000 veteran troops, on each side of the farm of La Belle Alliance and the high-road from Charleroi to Brussels. He showed no hurry to begin the battle on the morning of that eventful Sunday, June 18, 1815. Indeed, the use of his infantry only reached the field after daylight, and required some hours of rest. Wellington lay quietly in his front, biding attack: Blücher, so Napoleon supposed, was out of

the game. He had news from Grouchy, dated from Genappe at 10 a.m. on the 17th, to the effect that one Prussian corps had retired on Wavre, but that the rest of the troops defeated at Ligny were heading for Prussia, on the road to Liège, i.e. were falling back towards their base, and leaving Wellington to his fate. The Marshal added that he intended to follow the force that had moved on Wavre, in order to head it off from Brussels and separate it from the British army. This information seemed to guarantee the Emperor against any interference on the part of the Prussians. Grouchy, it is true, learnt more of the facts of the situation on the following morning, and wrote at 6 a.m. to inform his master that the bulk of Blücher's men had gone to Wavre, not to Prussia. But this despatch did not reach La Belle Alliance till after Napoleon had made his arrangements; and, even if it had arrived earlier, it contained no hint that the Prussians were moving on Mont St Jean.

Napoleon, therefore, gave his weary army a long rest after daylight, and put off the hour of attack, so that the sodden ground might grow drier and permit of the free movement of his artillery across the fields. It was only about 11 a.m. that his forces were deployed for action. Their array was very simple, as simple as the Emperor's own plan of battle, which contemplated nothing more nor less than the smashing in of the British centre by a tremendous frontal attack. His army was formed in three lines: in front were Reille's corps on the left, d'Erlon's on the right, each with cavalry on the outer wing. The second line was formed of Lobau's incomplete infantry corps (only 7000 men), with the reserve cavalry, no less than six divisions, deployed on its wings. Last of all came the Imperial Guard, 80,000 strong, the infantry in column on the high-road, the cavalry in line to right and left. It was a magnificent array, and every man was visible from the British position. The Emperor, on the other hand, could not make out much of Wellington's arrangements. There were visible to him only the four isolated farms on the slope, and above them a line of infantry and guns along the crest; the reserves were out of sight. The Duke had formed a front line of twelve infantry brigades, six British, four Hanoverian, one Nassau, and one Dutch, with two British cavalry brigades on his extreme left, in the direction from which the Prussians were expected to appear. In second line, behind his centre, was the rest of his horse, British and Dutch. The infantry reserve was massed for the most part behind the right wing, because the Prussian aid was expected on the left. Blücher, according to the arrangements made on the preceding night, would form the true reserve of the Duke's left wing.

Now, in any of his earlier fights, had Napoleon massed such numbers on so short a front; the whole French line was less than three miles long, including the cavalry on its extreme wings. In the tactical disposition the infantry was used in heavy columns of unprecedented solidity. They were to push their way through the British line by

mere force of impact. This arrangement did not please those of the Emperor's lieutenants who had seen the wars of Spain, and remembered the poor exhibition that column-tactics had always made against the English two-deep formation. Such urged caution; but Napoleon replied in an inspiring outburst, "You were beaten by Wellington, and so you think he is a great general. But I tell you that Wellington is a bad general, and the English are bad troops; they will surely be a breakfast for us!" A little later, Reille was asked his opinion of the British infantry; he replied that he thought that, in a good defensive position, they could repel any frontal attack. He hoped that his master would manoeuvre and try flank movements; front-to-front action would be costly and unsuccessful. The Emperor paid no attention; he was determined to try the effect of assaults by massive columns upon the long red line that crowned the opposite hill-side.

About 11.30 a.m. the French army was at last on the move. After some manoeuvring, a division of Reille's infantry pressed in upon the farm of Hougoumont. After some fighting, the copse and orchard were carried; but in the farm-buildings and the garden two battalions of the British Guards held their own, and lost off regiment after regiment as it surged in upon them. This, however, was but a side-issue; the Emperor's real attack was to be delivered on the other side of the high-road, half a mile further to the east. Here, under cover of the fire of a long row of batteries, eighty pieces in all, d'Erlon's corps was waiting the order to attack the British left-centre. It was formed in four great columns, each a species of phalanx containing eight battalions, ranged one behind another. This order of battle was extremely unwieldy; but, in many a fight, Continental troops had broken up in pairs at the mere approach of such a moving multitude. Just as Napoleon was about to order d'Erlon to attack, he received an unpleasant surprise. It was pointed out to him that masses of troops were coming into sight far to the north-west, on the heights of Chapelle St Lambert, some six miles away. A few hours earlier, the Emperor would have been puzzled to guess what this force could be; but he had received, some little time back, Grouchy's despatch of the early morning, informing him that Blücher, far from retiring towards Liège, was massed at Wavre. The force in the distance must, then, be some fraction of the Prussian army. Soon afterwards a prisoner was brought in, a former of Bülow's corps, who, when questioned, divulged the fact that his general was marching to join Wellington. The Emperor reflected for a moment; then he gave d'Erlon orders to proceed with his attack. Bülow was still far away; Grouchy was probably in pursuit of him; the battle might be won before the Prussians could intervene.

Accordingly, at about 1.30 p.m., the four vast columns forming the 1st corps crossed the little valley that separated them from the British position, and began to climb the opposite hill. One brigade diverged

to storm the farm of La Haye Sainte: the next advanced straight against Wellington's left-centre. At the head of the slope they came under a hot musketry fire, but continued to press forward. The first troops that they encountered were Sylvestre's Dutch-Belgian brigade, which led to the rear in disorder. A moment later they came upon Picotés's two British brigades, reduced to little more than half their strength by the losses of Quatre-Bras, but steady as ever. A furious musketry engagement began: the French were five times more numerous, but, owing to their vicious formation, could bring no more muskets to bear than could their opponents. While both sides were blazing into each other at close quarters, and the smoke lay thick around them, there was a sudden rush from the rear; and two brigades of British heavy cavalry—Somerset's Horse Guards and Life Guards, and Ponsonby's Union Brigade—charged into the thick of the French columns. D'Erlon's men were caught unprepared, while closely engaged with Picotés's infantry. The unwieldy masses were driven to pieces, hurled down the slope, and chased back to their old position with the loss of two regiments, 5000 prisoners, and several thousands more of killed and wounded. Unfortunately, the British horse, drunk with the exhilaration of success, failed to check their career, and rode straight into the French lines, aiding the fugitives, till Napoleon dug upon them cavalry from right and left, and swept them home again with fearful loss. Of the 5000 who had charged, a full thousand were left behind dead or disabled. Ponsonby, the commander of the Union Brigade, was killed in cold blood after he had been made prisoner. Picotés, too, had fallen in the very moment of victory.

Prudence would now have counselled Napoleon to break off the battle. Blücher had become visible in the nearer distance, advancing slowly towards the French right flank. Lützen's small 6th corps and two brigades of reserve cavalry had to be detached to the east to intercept him. This reduced by 10,000 men the number available for the attack on Wellington. Moreover, a new despatch was received from Grouchy, alarming because it showed that at 11 a.m. he was still far from Wavre and had no conception of Blücher's having marched to join Wellington. But Napoleon had no idea of ordering a retreat; he knew that he was ruined if he failed to beat Wellington that afternoon. The British must be crushed at all costs before the Prussians came up in force.

Accordingly, at 3.30 p.m. the Emperor directed Ney to take charge of his front line and resume the attack. The least injured regiments of d'Erlon's corps marched against La Haye Sainte; a fresh brigade of British corps went forward to reinforce the hallooed assailants of Heugemont. Little or no progress was made at either point; and the Marshal resolved to have recourse to a new expedient—a great cavalry charge against the front of the British line between the two farms. At about 4 p.m. Ney ordered Mikow's two divisions of cuirassiers to charge;

they moved up, supported by the light cavalry of the Imperial Guard, forming in all a mass of 8000 veteran horsemen. At the sight of their approach, the fifteen British and Hanoverian battalions forming Wellington's right-centre fell into squares, and prepared to withstand the shock. The transcendent episode which filled the next two hours was the part of the battle of Waterloo which impressed itself most strongly on the memory of the survivors on the British side. Never, in all the Napoleonic wars, was there so prolonged a whirlwind of cavalry charges as those which filled the late hours of that afternoon. Milhaud's first onslaught was only the beginning; he breasted the slope, drove the allied gunners from their batteries, and then dashed at the squares. They did not flinch, and their fire blew the squadrons to pieces; then Wellington ordered his own cavalry reserves to advance, and drove the enemy down the slope. But the attacks were renewed again and again; and, in the intervals, the French artillery played upon the British squares with deadly effect. It was their round-shot, and not the swords of the cuirassiers, which made such havoc among the battalions of Wellington's centre.

When Milhaud had failed to break a single British square, and his corps was hopelessly disorganised, Ney called up the rest of the reserve cavalry from the second line, Kellermann's two divisions of cuirassiers; they were followed by the heavy squadrons of the Guard. This splendid veteran cavalry, 8000 strong, fell upon the crippled squares; Milhaud's scattered brigades reformed themselves, and fell in/as supports to the new attacking force. There followed an hour of confused strife; the horsemen rode through the line of squares and two to the very ear of the British position, charging every face of the dwindling blocks of British and German infantry, but always failing to break in. Yet the storm was so great that Wellington used up all his cavalry, even those of the extreme left wing, in the struggle, and gradually pushed forward into the fighting line the whole of his infantry reserve, even one Dutch-Belgian division, which showed such unequivocal signs of demoralisation that the Duke dared not risk it in the front. The slaughter in the ranks of the squares was fearful; they were dreadfully mangled by the French artillery during the intervals of the charges, and harassed by the fire of dragoons, who crept up close to them and could not be driven off, for to open out into line would have meant utter destruction at the hands of the cavalry. One battalion of the German Legion, ordered by the Prince of Orange to deploy, was absolutely exterminated by the cuirassiers before it could resume its formation.

What, meanwhile, were the Prussians doing? Wellington had expected to be attacked before noon, and had only consented to fight on that understanding. Yet six o'clock had arrived, and no relief due to the Prussian operations was yet perceptible. It is impossible to explain the delay, as has often been done, by the bad state of the roads alone.

The roads were much cut up, it is true; but Wavre is only thirteen miles from Mont St Jean, and it does not take from dawn (5.00 a.m. at that season of the year) till 4 p.m. to cover such a distance. The fact was that there had been but scanty work and also a certain amount of hesitation at the Prussian head-quarters. If Blücher had ordered his reserve corps, that of Thielmann, to march for the French flank at dawn, it would have been in contact with the enemy at 10 or 11 a.m. What Napoleon would have done in this case it is idle to guess; he had not at that time committed himself to the battle with Wellington. But Blücher's corps, which had two miles farther to march than the others, was chosen to lead the column, because it had not suffered at Liège. It did not start till 4 a.m., was stopped in the streets of Wavre—which it ought not to have passed through—by an accidental fire, and then crossed the march of Pirch's corps. Both columns were blocked; and it was 1.00 p.m. before Blücher's leading division finally reached Chapelle St Lambert, where, as we have already seen, it at once attracted Napoleon's attention. It was 4 p.m. before it got into actual contact with the French. This amazing delay, of nearly two hours, was due not to Blücher, but to Gerdessen, his chief of the staff, who feared that Wellington might retreat, after receiving the Prussian army to the dangerous flank march. So late as 10.30 a.m. Gerdessen wrote to Muffling, the Prussian attack at the British head-quarters, advising him to find out if the Duke really intended to fight; and it was not, in fact, till the cannonade of Waterloo was making itself heard all over England, that the Prussian advance was urged on with genuine energy. Then, at last, Blücher had reached the front; and he rode up and down the line of march, calling to his men that "they must not make him break his word," and encouraging the infantry to help in dragging the embagged caissons across the miry meadows along the Sambre.

It was only about 4 p.m., just as the great French cavalry charge was beginning, that Blücher's corps reached the wood of Paris, some two miles from Napoleon's right flank, and began to interchange shots with the French voltigeurs. The Emperor, as we have seen, had told off Lobau to "contain" them, which he did in the most skilful fashion. Drawing out his troops at right angles to the main French line, he established himself in a good position, with the village of Planchenoit covering his right, and there fought bravely for two hours against threshold numbers, for Blücher had over 30,000 men. At last, despite all his efforts, Planchenoit was lost; but the Emperor, who had now turned his attention for a space to this corner of the field, sent the four regiments of the Young Guard to retake it. These fresh troops, coming up with a sudden rush, completely cleared the village. It was now 8 o'clock; Blücher's last reserves had been used up; and it could not be said that he had turned the fate of the battle. The only positive difference that his presence had made was that it had compelled the Emperor to divert



against him, first and last, some 14,000 men of his reserves, who might otherwise have been used against Wellington. This was far from the support that the Duke had expected when he offered battle. Fortunately, however, at this moment, more Prussian troops drew near. The corps of Zieten and Pirch, which had started later and moved even more slowly than Bülow, were at last at hand.

But, long before their arrival began to produce effect, Napoleon's last offensive move had been made. Seeing that the cavalry attacks had achieved no definite success, and that the British line was still unbroken, Ney made a final attempt to force it with his infantry. While the works of d'Erlach's corps made one more stand on La Haye Sainte, the infantry of the left-center—the divisions of Foy and Bachelin, belonging to Reille's corps—pushed forward, to the east of Hougoumont, to assail the much-tired brigades which had just beaten off the cavalry. Though these divisions were fresh troops, engaging battalions wasted by three hours' desperate fighting, they were repulsed, once more the columns withered away before the deadly discharge of the two-deep line. "*C'est une grande déroute*" wrote Foy in his diary a few days later. But, a little further to the right, the French achieved at this moment the first real success that they had won against Wellington that day. d'Erlach's men carried La Haye Sainte at about 6.30 p.m. The buildings had been well-nigh pounded to pieces by the French guns; the gallant battalion of the German Legion which held them had exhausted all its cartridges; and the enemy at last burst in. This was the most dangerous moment of the battle for the allied army. A breach had been made in its front line; and the troops on each side of the gap were utterly exhausted and unable to fill it up. Fortunately for Wellington, d'Erlach's and Reille's corps were also at the end of their strength; they were unable to push forward. Ney begged the Emperor to send more infantry; but the moment was not propitious for such a request. Napoleon had nothing left in reserve save the élites battalions of his Old and Middle Guard; and he grudged spending them. Moreover he was watching a new and dangerous attack of the Prussians on Planchenoit which was just impending. "You want more infantry?" he exclaimed, "*Où voulez-vous que j'en prenne? Poulez-vous que j'en aie?*" And for a critical forty minutes he refused to succour Ney. The only movement that he made was to send two of his previous battalions of the Old Guard to feed the defence of Planchenoit, where Bülow, now supported by Pirch's corps, had made a third incursion into the village. Like the previous assaults, it was defeated; the Old Guard swept the street and the churchyard free once more.

But, during this short moment of hesitation on the Emperor's part, Wellington had found means to repair the damage in the neighbourhood of La Haye Sainte. Zieten's corps had at length arrived, and had come into touch with his extreme left. He drew from that quarter his

last two brigades of British cavalry, those of Vivian and Vandeleur, and ranged them in the rear of his depleted centre. The much-tried brigades between La Haye Sainte and Haeghemont were drawn in together, and strengthened by other regiments called up from the right. A solid front was once more displayed to the enemy.

It was at this moment that the Emperor made up his mind to deliver his last blow, and to throw the Guard into the thick of the battle. The alternative of retreat was still open to him; and there were good military reasons for accepting it. But the political reasons against taking this line were too cogent to be resisted. As one of his own generals wrote a few days later, "The Emperor might have refrained from making his last attack, and could have gone off in good order, without leaving a gun behind. But then he must have separated the Sambre, after having lost 30,000 of the men with whom he had crossed it two days before. How could he have hoped to take up the campaign against the Russians, the Austrians, and the rest of the Allies, after having been forced to retire with loss from before the English army alone?" In spite of the fearful result I cannot blame Napoleon. Though a retreat might save the army for a few days, it could only mean ultimate disaster. The Emperor, then, was right to attack; his mistake was that he did not send the Guard to the front *en masse*, the moment that La Haye Sainte fell.

It was past seven when Ney led out from the French position the last column of assault. It was composed of six battalions of the Middle Guard, arrayed in hollow squares—a curious formation for attack, dictated probably by the fear that Wellington might have cavalry waiting to receive them. Two battalions of the Old Guard followed some distance behind, to act as supports. The remaining five were still held back in reserve near or behind La Belle Alliance. The attack was delivered *en* directly up the high-road towards La Haye Sainte, but half a mile farther west and near to Haeghemont. By chance or design the battalions took a formation *en echelon*, with the right in advance and the left somewhat reformed. The leading square, that farthest to the east, came up the slope opposite Halkett's British brigade; the others were making for the ground held by Maitland's brigade of the Guard. The moment that they began to ascend the heights, all came under a heavy fire of artillery, for Wellington's guns, though often driven from their places by the cavalry charges, were still holding their positions. The smoke was dense; and the different units seem to have lost sight of each other and to have fought each its own battle.

The shock was short and decisive. The right-hand echelon first reached the crest, engaged in a close and murderous musketry fight with Halkett's brigade, and then recoiled. A little later the central force, apparently three battalions, came up against Maitland's Guards and the British battery beside them. When they were seen looming through the smoke,

Wellington, who was present himself at this point, bade the Guards rise to their feet—they had been lying down to escape the fire of the French artillery—and give one volley, after which they were to advance firing. Now, as so often in Prussian battles, the first point-blank discharge of a well-formed British line was irresistible. The ranks of the French squares went down in one valtering mass; then, when their enemy marched on them, still pouring its death-dealing volleys, the vanquished broke and fled downhill. The advance of Maitland's brigade was only checked by the appearance of the last French *chasseurs*, two battalions strong, somewhat on their flank. But, while the Guards were reforming to meet this new attack, another force came on the scene. Colonel Colborne of the 68th, whose corps belonged to Adam's brigade, the unit next to the right of Maitland, had wheeled his battalion out of the main line, so as to place it at right angles to the advancing French and parallel to their flank. His fire now away the whole left flank of these two battalions, which broke in hapless disorder and rolled down the slope after their broken comrades. Their retreat carried with it the two battalions of the Old Guard which were crossing the valley in their support, as well as the half-formed and depleted masses of Reille's corps which were lingering under the lee of Hougoumont.

The cry, "*à l'ennemi recule!*" was already running along the whole French line, when Wellington let loose upon the wavering masses before him his last British reserves, the two cavalry brigades of Vint and Vandenberg. They crashed down the hill-side east of Hougoumont, across the debris of the fight, and fell upon the retreating Imperial Guard and the exhausted and disordered remnants of Kellermann's and Milledore's cavalry. All gave way, almost without resistance; and the French centre was transformed in a minute into a panic-stricken crowd. Wellington had hidden his whole front line to advance in support of the cavalry, but it found no enemy to fight; after ascending to the crest of the French position it halted, and left the pursuit to the Prussians. There was no strength to march left in the remnants of the shattered battalions which had borne the heaviest and hottest of the day.

At the moment when Napoleon's last attack was repulsed by Maitland and Colborne, Nathan's Prussian corps had broken in between d'Erlon's and Lobau's troops at the north-eastern point of the French front. The right angle formed by the enemy's line gave way towards, and the Prussian cavalry arrived near La Belle Alliance, driving their immediate opponents before them, at the same moment that the brigades of Vint and Vandenberg reached the same point from the other side.

The last resistance made to the Allies was offered by three squares of the Old Guard near the high-road; they held out for some time, in order to protect the retreat of the Emperor, who had lingered with them while there was any hope of rallying his centre. Charged without success by both British and Prussian cavalry, these veterans at last

retired, and mingled with the flying masses in their rear. The Young Guard, in Planchenoët held out almost as long; but they given way earlier, the Prussians would have reached the highest point of the French position, and cut off the whole army. But this was prevented by the admirable steadiness of Lobach's men, who held their own till night fell, and the main battle had long been lost.

The Emperor's army, now no more than a hapless band of fugitives, was chased all night by the Prussian cavalry, and never offered a moment to rally. After being driven out of seven successive bivouacs, which it had attempted to form, it fled over the Sambre next morning, and around the frontier in isolated bands. In the last great battle it had lost all its artillery, more than 800 guns, and about 30,000 men killed and wounded alone. The prisoners were comparatively few, probably not more than 6000 or 7000; but, in every unit of the Imperial army, the actual casualties exceeded 50 per cent. of the men present. Wellington's army had lost over 15,000 men, of whom 7000 were British. The Prussians reported a loss of over 6000.

It has often been endeavored to fix the responsibility for the loss of Waterloo upon Grouchy; Napoleon himself, and numerous later writers on the French side, have alleged that he had it in his power to intervene effectively in the battle and failed to do so. The answer to this accusation is that the Marshal, like Napoleon himself, had not forgotten Blücher's bold flank march to join Wellington, and acted in strict accordance with his master's orders. In the first despatch that he received on the 18th, written from the field of Mont St Jean at 10 a.m., the Emperor told him to march on Wavre, pushing before him the Prussians in his front, and at the same time to keep up his communications with the main army and send frequent reports. This was exactly what Grouchy, long before he received the despatch, had determined to do. His troops were already on the march for Wavre, when the opening guns of Waterloo were heard. Some of his officers urged him to march toward the *ennemi*; but he refused, saying that his duty was to look after the Prussians. As soon as his advanced cavalry reported the enemy in strength beyond the river Dyle—it was Thiersman's corps, left behind to detain him—he made preparations to attack them. When the Emperor's despatch reached him, he congratulated himself on having foreseen and carried out his master's orders. The critical hour of Waterloo passed while Grouchy was saving the ferds and bridges of the Dyle, slowly driving back Thiersman, who fought desperately to gain time for his commander-in-chief to reach Wellington. Not till 3 p.m. did the Marshal receive Napoleon's last despatch, telling him that Blücher had been sighted on the heights of Chapelle St Lambert, and ordering him to turn westward and crush this Prussian corps, which he would catch "on fligraunt chât." It was far too late for Grouchy to do anything of the kind; at that hour Blücher was attacking Planchenoët;

and, even if the Marshal had at 4 o'clock despatched towards the field of Mont St. Jean such of his troops as were not already engaged at Wavre, they would not have reached it till long after the close of the battle had been decided. By 8 a.m. the main struggle was over; and there was much more than a three hours' march (as the Prussians proved) between the Dyle and Flinchemish. Had Gravelly detached troops in that direction, they would have found the Emperor already routed.

Gravelly fought his way across the Dyle on the 18th, but received no news of the great battle that night. He therefore renewed his march on Thielmann next morning, lost him by sheer force of numbers, and was about to pursue him northward, when he at last heard of the results at Waterloo. Promptly perceiving the danger that Blücher might cut him off, Gravelly ordered an instant retreat. He executed it in very skilful style, reached Namur just in time to avoid being intercepted, defended that town by a rearguard action till his main body had got clear away, and escaped to France up the valley of the Meuse. He returned with his 35,000 men intact, thinking that he had deserved well of his country, but found that he was to be made the Emperor's scapegoat and to have the loss of Waterloo imputed to his stupidity or treason. It was a hard fate; his only crime was that, like Napoleon, he had failed to foresee Blücher's great flank march.

Napoleon, after ordering the wreck of his army to rally at Laon, set out for Paris at once, and arrived there in a state of great mental and bodily prostration on June 31. The news of his disaster had reached the capital on the preceding night, and was not generally known till a few hours before his arrival. He did not at first grasp the completeness of his own ruin, and spoke to his Ministers of his intention to continue the war, raise a *levée en masse*, and defend Paris. He had to be reminded that he was no longer the autocrat that he had been when he returned from Moscow or from Leipzig; and that he would have to reckon not only with the enemy in the field, but with the Chambers at home. The Moscovites had allowed him to appeal to the arbitrament of the sword; but, after his disaster, it was unlikely that they would continue the struggle against united Europe, ready in order to keep him on the throne. The Allies had proclaimed that they were attacking not France but the Emperor; peace, then, might be secured by his abdication. Napoleon had no intention of throwing up the game; and, for a moment, he contemplated dissolving the Chambers and declaring himself absolute. Deterred apparently by treacherous assurances from Fouché, to the effect that the spirit of the dispute was not so hostile as he supposed, he took no decisive measures on the morning of his arrival. In a few hours it was too late for him to act. The Chambers no sooner met than, at the suggestion of La Fayette, they declared themselves in permanent session, and voted that anyone who attempted to dissolve them would be guilty of high treason. To defend

themselves, they called out the National Guard, on whose loyalty they could rely. This move struck the Emperor's counsellors with terror. Lucien Bonaparte alone dared to advise his brother to collect the few regular troops which were in Paris, appeal to the *gendarmes*, and disperse the Chambers. But Napoleon's spirit was broken. He declared that he "would never lead a *Jaquette*"; the idea of conducting a civil war at the head of the rabble was hateful to him. That night he made up his mind to abdicate; and when, on June 21, the Chambers sent him word that his choice lay between resignation and deposition, he bowed before the storm, and signed a declaration by which he abdicated in favour of his son. On June 22 he retired to Malmaison.

The Chambers believed that it was now in their power to decree a new Constitution for France, though they were much divided as to its form. They appointed a Provisional Government, of which Fouché and Carnot were the leading members. But already it had been practically settled that the Bourbons should be restored. Immediately after Waterloo, Wellington wrote to Louis XVIII at Ghent, advising him to cross the frontier in the wake of the allied armies. The old King saw the wisdom of this counsel, and, on entering France and at Caen on Cambrésis (June 25), published a proclamation in which he announced that he came to renounce his rights, that he should adhere to the Constitution of 1814, repair the horrors of war, reward his faithful subjects, and punish the guilty in accordance with the forms of law. Next day he made a triumphal entry into Caen, which, after a feeble resistance, had been stormed by the British on the 22th. Within the next few days, all the towns north of the Somme which were not held down by regular troops hoisted the white flag; and a "royal army" of 5000 or 6000 irregulars assembled at Arras. The movement spread to Normandy, where the Imperialists were forced to shut themselves up in the larger towns; and the whole country rose to join them in. When Louis XVIII had been recognised as legitimate King by the greater part of northern France, it was too late for the Chambers to debate on what form of government they would inaugurate, too late also for the Allies to take into consideration any other plan for dealing with France than that of restoring the *status quo* of 1814. Several of the Powers were not too well pleased. Prussia, in particular, had intended to extract many things before allowing the King to be restored; and her Ministers were indignant with Wellington for having permitted or rather encouraged Louis to take possession of his kingdom again.

Meanwhile the British and Prussian armies were advancing against Paris with all speed. Their leaders had agreed that the enemy must not be allowed time to rally. On their approach, the wrecks of Napoleon's army at Laon, and Grouchy's corps also, retired into Paris. On June 24 the hush of the Prussian columns appeared on the heights to the north of the capital; Wellington's army was about a day further

off, but within good supporting distance. The Provisional Government sent messengers after messengers to the Allies, requesting them to grant an armistice and stay their advance, now that Napoleon had abdicated. Blücher and Wellington wisely refused; there was no knowing what might happen if the enemy were allowed to rally, and to bring up reserves from the south. Napoleon, from his retreat at Malmaison, was already offering to take command of the army in Paris; and, though this was the last thing that Fouché and his colleagues desired, they were well aware that many regiments would have gone over to their old master if he had invited them to follow him against the Allies. The four days, June 21-25, which Napoleon spent at Malmaison were full of possibilities of danger. The Provisional Government, however, at last succeeded in inducing him to depart; had he stayed a day longer, they would have had either to arrest him or to suffer him to fall into the hands of the Prussians. Blücher had sent off a flying column with orders to seize him, dead or alive, and had expressed his intention of shooting him offhand, as an outlaw, if he were captured. The Prussian cavalry reached Malmaison only a few hours after Napoleon had driven off on the road to the south. His last idea had been to quit Europe and betake himself to the United States; the Provisional Government had eagerly fallen in with the idea, and presented him the use of two frigates then lying at Rochefort. On June 23, therefore, Napoleon disappeared; and several days passed before the Allies surmised his whereabouts. It was only discovered on July 10, when he sent a message to Captain Maitland, commanding the blockading squadron off Rochefort, in which he asked whether he would be allowed to put to sea and sail for America.

Meanwhile, after Napoleon's departure from Malmaison, the Provisional Government was left face to face with Wellington and Blücher; and no suspension of hostilities had yet been arranged. Indeed, there was sharp fighting in front of Paris on July 1. The allied generals, after reconnoitering the strong line of fortifications along the northern front of the city, had determined to cross the Seine, with the object of presenting themselves before its undefended southern side. The brigade of cavalry which formed Blücher's advance-guard was routed near Vanvres by a superior force of French horse; but this did not prevent the Prince from taking up his position on the heights which command Paris on the south. At the same time Wellington occupied positions covering the northern front of the city.

The Provisional Government had now to make its choice whether it would fight or capitulate. There were some 50,000 men of the regular troops within the city, besides the National Guards. Blücher's and Wellington's armies united did not much exceed 100,000 men and bayonets. But the British and Prussians were only the van of the advancing hosts; it was known in Paris that the Austrians had crossed

the eastern frontier on June 28, had beaten Napp and his small army of the Rhine on June 28, and had shut him up in Strasbourg. Their columns were already advancing across Lorraine unopposed. At the same time, the Austro-Sardinian army of Italy had crossed the Alps and attacked Bachelot, who, on hearing the news of Waterloo, asked for and obtained an armistice (June 28). If there had been any great national cause to defend, if any appeal to loyalty could have been made, it might have been worth while to fight. But no one knew whether the Chambers and the Provisional Government intended to acknowledge Napoleon II, to proclaim a Republic, to recall Louis XVIII, or to choose some new ruler—for example, the Duke of Orleans. The only persons who knew their own mind were Fouché and a few others, who had determined that the best thing for France and for themselves was to make a prompt submission to Louis XVIII. Further resistance would be useless; it would only irritate the Allies, and lead to the dismemberment of the nation. It was by arguments of this kind that Fouché won over Davout, who combined the functions of Minister of War and commander of the army in Paris, to face the unpleasant prospect of concluding a capitulation and admitting the King. The two acts must be done simultaneously: for, if the city surrendered before the King was recognized, it would be treated as a conquered place. Blicher was for some time inclined to press matters to extremity, and to offer the Provisional Government nothing save the alternatives of unconditional surrender and a storm; but he was induced by Wellington to accept a capitulation. The French army was to retire beyond the Loire; the allied troops were to enter the city, but to respect all private and public property, except military stores and the works of art which Napoleon had plundered from Italy, Germany, and Spain. The allied generals undertook to make no attempt to arrest or punish any French subject for having borne arms under Napoleon (July 3).

Fouché and Davout had considerable difficulty in inducing the army and the Chambers to accept these terms. But all the military authorities agreed that Paris was indefensible on the northern side, and that the army was too dispirited to make a successful resistance. In face of such statements it was necessary to yield; and on July 5-6 the French troops marched for the Loire. On July 7 the Allies made a triumphal entry, and on the 8th Louis XVIII returned to the Tuilleries. Fouché and Davout had already settled with him the terms on which he was to be received. As soon as the army had left Paris, the Provisional Government recognized Louis as King, and the Chambers dissolved themselves. New Houses, duly summoned by royal writ, were to meet within two months. They actually commenced their session before August was out, and showed themselves "more royalist than the King."



## CHAPTER XXI.

## THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. II.

While Napoleon was meditating his return to France, he had been well served by the agents whom he maintained at Vienna, but not especially well. Before the middle of February the moment had passed away when his advent would have found his adversaries on the brink of a conflict with one another. As it was, the news of his departure from Elba did not for some days give rise to any overt sign of apprehension on the part of the sovereigns and statesmen assembled at the Congress. Metternich, however, showed promptitude of action as well as presence of mind; and, within an hour after the receipt of the news, the Four Allied Powers had resolved on sending their troops back upon France, while the necessary dispositions were at once made for the movements of the Austrian forces. During their journey to Pressburg, Metternich and his companions discussed the terms of the Declaration to be addressed to the French nation and army. On their return, the news having arrived of Napoleon's landing at Cannes, it was agreed at a meeting of the Committee of the Eight Powers, on the proposal of Metternich, to issue in their name the Declaration which was actually promulgated on the following day (March 13, 1815). Göttern's suggestion that the Declaration should be issued by the entire Congress had been valued aside; but, after an almost continuous series of political and military conferences, a further step, the expediency of which had from the first been urged by Wellington, was on March 23 taken by the Four Powers, in the conclusion of a solemn treaty of alliance. This treaty expressly applied to the new situation the principles of the Treaty of Chaumont, and invited the adherence of all the Governments of Europe. The King of France was specially invited to join the alliance, and to specify the measures required by him in accordance with its provisions. In notifying its acceptance of the treaty, the Government of Great Britain, of whose loyalty towards the Alliance her new and scrupulous subsidence furnished the most convincing proof, refused to bind itself to continue the war with the intent of obliging France to adopt any particular form of government; and the Tsar was at this time by no means favorable to

the older branch of the Bourbons. The tact and skill with which, in these circumstances, Talleyrand maintained his position and that of his Government at Vienna certainly call for admiration. The smaller States of Europe, almost without exception, gave in their adhesion to the treaty. The German States, in accord on April 27, agreed that all their efforts should be directed towards maintaining the provisions of the First Peace of Paris; Göttern's refusal to sign seems to have been due to his dissatisfaction with the frontier assigned to the Netherlands. His Dutch colleagues signed, but Münster also held back; and the allyship of the King of Denmark, who it must be allowed had reason enough for delay, did not come in till all was over (August). Spain and Sweden persisted in their refusal; but their abstention, caused in the former case by national pride, and in the latter by the withholding of a British subsidy, counted for very little.

At Vienna, though all eyes were turned towards the theatre of the impending struggle, there was at the same time a general wish to prevent the threads of the diplomatic transactions from being scattered while it was still possible to gather them up; and the settlement by the sword for which Europe was soon more willing might be hastened by removing all doubt as to conclusions already settled in principle. Then, on April 3, the Emperor of Austria proclaimed the union of the Italian States now subjected to his rule, under the designation of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom. A few days earlier (April 21) he had provisionally taken over from his daughter the administration of the duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla. The affairs of the Helvetic Confederation were hastened by the Declaration adopted by the Eight Powers on March 20, which was solemnly accepted by the Diet on May 20 following. The arrangements as to Poland were rapidly formulated in two treaties, concluded on May 3 between Austria and Russia, and between Russia and Prussia, respectively; and on the same day the plenipotentiaries of the three Eastern Powers signed a further treaty as to the Republic of Cracow. This treaty remained voided, as if by way of compensation for the incorporation in Prussia of the free city of Danzig, a guarantee of its independence and neutrality, together with a Constitution. To the Poles who were subjects of any one of the Three Powers the treaties promised the grant, at such time as might seem expedient to such Government, of institutions preservative of their nationality; and, before the Tsar quitted Vienna, he proclaimed the basis of the Constitution intended by him for his Kingdom of Poland, which were immediately to regulate its provisional administration, and included an indissoluble union with the Russian Empire. The Seven difficulty ended with the conclusion of a treaty of peace on May 18 between Prussia, Russia, and Austria, and King Frederick Augustus, who had at last been made to see the wisdom of yielding to necessity.

Only two problems of first-rate importance still remained unsolved.

These were the two questions which, as has been seen, Castelnagh had before his departure from Vienna speedily to Liverpool—viz. the Neapolitan, and that concerning the future Germanic Constitution. The former necessarily entered into a new phase with Napoleon's return, though already Murat's action had been influenced by the hopes which he founded on that event. By acting blindly on the assumption that Austria was in complete accord with those who sought his ruin, Murat relieved her from the diffidence in which she had involved herself by guaranteeing Naples to him in the treaty of January 11, 1804. He now called upon Italy to arm on behalf of her independence; whereupon, on April 18, the Austrian Government published a manifesto which, while exposing the duplicity of Murat's conduct, declared him to be (as *de facto* he had been for weeks) at war with Austria. A British declaration of war against him speedily followed. Early in May the Austrian Government signed a treaty of alliance with King Ferdinand IV, and on the 15th of the month the Austrian troops entered Naples. Yet no event out of the Congress or of any of the Powers had declared King "Joachim Napoleon" to have forfeited his throne; and in the British Parliament Castelnagh had to argue that their engagements towards him lapsed with his attack upon Austria. Even now, had he shaped his conduct with more circumspection, some compensation might have been allotted him. His end is told elsewhere; his consort Queen Caroline, whom a revolt of the Imperial had forced to make terms for herself, was treated very considerably by the Emperor of Austria.

After the collapse of the endeavours of the "Pentarchy," the question of the future Germanic Constitution had, it will be remembered, been kept alive by the efforts of the minor States and by the importunate assiduity of Hardenberg. On Napoleon's return, it became clear that the choice lay between two courses. Either the whole subject must be deferred till a more favourable season—and, as a matter of fact, Hardenberg would have been content with the mere laying of foundations till the war was over—or, if the Congress was to offer something beyond this to the German nation, then what had to be done must be done quickly, even though inadequately. After two further drafts had been brought forward by the Prussian plenipotentiaries, Metternich at last, early in May, took action by laying before them, in a slightly revised form, Wessenberg's draft of the previous December. In a series of conferences, at which this draft served as basis, he and Hardenberg evolved a final draft—the sixth of the series—which Metternich in the name of both the Austrian and the Prussian Governments submitted to those of all the German States.

This draft proposed a Federal Diet, in which, out of fifteen votes Austria and Prussia should have but one each, the former Power holding the presidency, but without a casting vote. There was to be no smaller council, committee, or other executive body; and the members of the

Confederation were to be possessed of equal rights. They were prohibited from entering into any alliance with foreign Governments against the Confederation or against any members of it. The provision of a judicial tribunal, which should in accordance with the laws of the Confederation determine differences between it and them, or between any of them, was reserved for the Diet. Nothing could have been briefer than the article declaring that in every German State a Constitution of Estates (*Landstände*) should be set up; and the conservation of the fundamental rights of German citizenship was indisputably assured. On the other hand, the article as to the rights of the so-called "Mediatized" was long and elaborate. It is to the credit of Wittenberg, the author of the draft, no doubt inspired on this head by his brother Henry, who at this time (April, 1815) published anonymously some notable proposals on the subject, that it contained a stipulation for the grant of a Constitution to the entire Catholic Church in Germany, safeguarding its national rights as well as providing for its needs.

The conference which out of this draft elaborated the Federal Act, was eleven in number, and lasted from May 23 to June 10. In the first two the associated minor States were represented by the ministers only; not was it till the third sitting that the entire body of plenipotentiaries found admission. Wittenberg took no part in any of these conferences; and Baden withdrew at the sixth sitting. For the rest, Metternich, in his opening remarks on May 23, while pointing out that the Congress could not be ended until the bones of the German Confederation had been laid down, stated that the development of these in detail must be left to the Diet. The statesmen whom Metternich thus instructed took him at his word, and frankly declined to address themselves to their task in any such thoroughgoing spirit as that, for instance, which animated the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848. Accordingly the Federal Act assigns to the Diet the drawing-up of the fundamental laws of the Confederation, and of the organic institutions concerned with its foreign, military, and internal affairs.

After, at the sitting of May 26, much time was wasted on venal questions of precedence, the discussion turned on the distribution of votes at the Diet, and a proposal was made to reserve one "coral" (or equally heavy) vote for the "Mediatized." On the other hand little opposition was now offered to the prohibition of the conclusion of separate alliances by members of the Confederation. Hardenberg and Humboldt, whether reasonably or not, were so much discouraged by the slow progress made that about this time they urged Metternich to join in a kind of ultimatum, refusing any further amendments to the draft. As a matter of fact, no addition of importance was made to it except that besides the ordinary body of the Diet, now extended to seventeen votes, there was instituted for the discussion of organic changes in its fundamental laws and Constituent Act, and for other questions affecting the

active Confederation, a larger assembly or *plénum* with sixty-nine votes, proportionately distributed among the States, but so as to give at least one vote to each (June 2). The final discussions produced one other important change. Already on May 28 Bismarck, on the plea that the Government had already resolved on granting a Constitution, had made a proposal for a significant change in the text of the much-quoted article as to each grant. On May 28 King Frederick William had signed the edictance promising representative institutions in the whole of the Prussian monarchy; and the article now ran that, in each State, Constitutions "will be granted," instead of "shall be granted."

At the sitting on June 3, Metternich (who was just about to quit Vienna) announced that before the close of the Congress the German Federal Act must be placed under the protection of the European Powers; and, while proposing that the twenty articles, which had been pushed through committee, should be accepted as the requisite foundation for the Germanic Federal Constitution, he declared that they were so accepted by the Emperor of Austria. At the same time he disclaimed all intention of putting pressure upon any Government, thus exhibiting a characteristic deference to the pretensions of the minor States, instead of adopting the Prussian way of offering them the proposed Federal Constitution as a thing to be taken or left, or Minister's contention that Europe had a right to insist on all the German Governments entering the new Confederation, whether they liked it or not. Hereupon the Federal Act of twenty articles was unreservedly accepted by Prussia and Hanover (on the ground that it seemed better to agree upon an imperfect Confederation than upon none at all), by Holstein (Denmark), and with certain reservations by several of the minor States; Luxembourg (Netherlands) assented only on condition that all the other German States become members of the Confederation. For the present, the Saxons and Bavarians plenipotentiaries declared themselves obliged to await official instructions, but on June 5 Metternich met the remaining Bavarian objections by carrying certain modifications of the Act.

The most important of these submitted for the Federal judicial tribunal, as the means of settling disputes between members of the Confederation, the absolute *Austrégulation*—i.e., the appointment of special Courts nominated ad hoc by particular States. Bavaria, too, now obtained the omission (proposed by Austria already on June 1) of Wessenberg's article promising a common Constitution to the Catholic Church in Germany, which at first Cardinal Consalvi had in his intention was seemed disposed to sever. The claims of the Jews had been actively urged at the Congress by the agents of the Jewish communities of Frankfurt and of the three Hanseatic free cities, and strongly supported by the Viennese banking interest; but notwithstanding the goodwill of the Austrian, Prussian, and Hanoverian Governments, they were unable to secure the insertion in the Federal

Act of more than a guarantee of the rights already possessed by them in particular States of the Confederation. For the Diet was also reserved the drawing-up of uniform regulations concerning the liberty of the press, and the protection of authors and publishers against piracy.

Thus, then, consensus carried to an extreme had made it possible for the Federal Act in its entirety to be signed and sealed (June 8, 1815) by the plenipotentiaries of thirty-six German Governments. The signatures of Würtemberg and Baden were still wanting, an offer on the part of the plenipotentiaries of the former to sign the first eleven articles only of the Act having been declined. They did not come into the Confederation till July 26 and September 1 respectively. Louisgust Frederick VI of Hesse-Homburg, whose military services and connection with the royal family of Great Britain secured him special consideration, was, by a protocol drawn up during the conferences on the Second Peace of Paris, included in the Confederation as a sovereign prince.

After the Federal Act had been signed, there was just time enough for inserting its first eleven articles in the Final Act of the Congress, and adding a further clause giving to the remaining articles the same force as if they had likewise found a place there. Thus, the Germanic Constitution was—like the Helvetic and that of the Republic of Geneva—to be placed under a European guarantee; *per contra*, an inevitably complicated, manifestly artificial, and severely imperfect constitutional fabric depended for its endurance upon the interested goodwill or the indifference of the Powers at large. In any case, as Metternich had himself in the first instance hinted, the vitality of the constitutional settlement depended upon the endurance of the territorial changes which had so materially altered the size and power of the several German States and their mutual relations; while each of the two Great Powers on whose cooperation the whole structure hinged was placed in a position towards the other which, without constant loyalty and prudence on both sides, could not fail to end in jealous rivalry.

On the day after that on which the German Federal Act at last passed through committee, the Final Act of the Congress itself was formally adopted. So early as March 18, at the sitting of the Committee of the Eight which had agreed upon the Joint Declaration against Napoleon as the disturber of the peace of Europe, a Special Committee, composed of one plenipotentiary of each of these Powers and of three secretaries, had been appointed to draft in a definitive form a General Act of the Congress, summarising its results. Before the labours of this Committee were completed, the Tsar, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria left Vienna. On June 9 the plenipotentiaries of seven out of the eight Powers signed the Final Act, the Swedish plenipotentiary alone recording certain reservations, as to no intimation having been provided for the deprived "Grand Duchess of

Tuscany" (Napoleon's sister Élie), or for the Crown Prince (Barnaudine) in consideration of the restoration of his former principality of Parma-Corso to the Holy See. Spain refused altogether to sign, Labrador reserving to the complaint by which he had answered a previous invitation to agree to the settlement about Parma and the restoration of Olivença to Portugal. Only a small proportion of the subjects doubt with in the Final Act had, he urged, been reported in the sittings of the Committee of the Eight; and a fraction of those Powers ought not to be permitted to settle the affairs of all Europe, merely resuming the rest to succeed or refuse their signature. The Spanish protest was at bottom much the same as that of Gagern, who, when dissatisfied with the conditions of the Netherlands settlement and informed by Wellington that it had been made by the Great Powers, "very much as was the case with the Treaty of Chaumont," retorted that of this newly-invented term "the Great Powers" he knew neither the precise import nor the intention. The Congress of Vienna by its procedure set the seal upon the principle that the settlement of the affairs of Europe appertained to the Great Powers, and that the other States had merely to decide whether they would accede to such settlement or not.

Whether we review the provisions of the Final Act of the Congress in detail, or as a whole, it is not easy to keep aside the two questions as to what it actually accomplished and as to what it left undone. First and foremost, the Congress had sought to secure to the political system of Europe a stability which it had not enjoyed since the First Partition of Poland. The fulfilment of this purpose was not easily reconcilable with the "satisfaction" of those Powers who were desirous either of recovering or extending their former limits, or of sacrificing as few as possible of their recent gains; nor again could it consistently be combined with deference to the principle of legitimacy, as cherished by many of the sovereigns and statesmen assembled at Vienna, and put forward, by the Bourbon interest in general and by the sagacity of Talleyrand in particular, as of paramount importance for the Governments of Europe. In seeking to restore the balance which the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era had upset, the Congress of Vienna was not content, like that of Westphalia, with more or less localising the range of its efforts, or, like that of Utrecht, with directing them actively against the danger of the preponderance of a single Power. France, while recovering the greater part of her colonial possessions, had been virtually restricted to her boundaries of 1792; and by means of new territorial dispositions along her eastern borders securities had been provided against a new intrusion of the peace of Europe. But the Congress had at the same time shown itself sensitive to an excessive increase of the territorial strength of Russia, whose partnership Napoleon had formerly been prepared to accept in his vastest schemes of dominion. To the question of the balance of maritime power the

Congress shut its eyes: for Great Britain, from the first, the realstay of the defensive alliance of Europe, was still its paymaster.

With regard, then, to France, the Final Act added nothing of moment to the provisions of the First Peace of Paris. Talleyrand's attempts to obtain for France at least those portions of the Belgic lands which were occupied in the grand-duchy of Luxembourg and the woe of Liège, as well as Geneva and Savoy, had ended only in the confirmation of certain extensions in the latter quarter already settled in that Peace. Belgium, as Louis-Philippe said a quarter of a century afterwards, was, to the Gallicophile statesmen at Vienna, "the stumbling-block of Europe." Of the colonial restatements not effected before the opening of the Congress, the Final Act specifies only that by Portugal of French Guinea, whose climatic conditions were afterwards persecuted with even for a continuance of the penal settlement into which it had sunk. Both Guadeloupe and Martinique were restored to France by Great Britain before the adoption of the Act, as the last remnants of a dominion which France had administered with as conspicuous a success.

The moderation exhibited by the Allied Powers in their treatment of France was the result partly of a recognition of her return to civilisation, partly of deliberate judgment. At Paris and Vienna it was not held to be in the interest of Europe to leave France in a condition of weakness which would be a source of disquiet to herself and therefore to her neighbours. The return of Napoleon, however, once more revived the thought of securing a better western frontier for Germany. This was recognised in England as opportune; and Stein, Hardenberg, and Metternich agreed in June that France ought to be deprived of Alsace and Lorraine as well as of French Flanders. But even then it was held certain that the Tsar would intervene in favour of France. Castlereagh and Wellington were opposed to any serious diminution of her territory; and the German demand was not formulated so as to allow of its being pressed in the subsequent negotiations for peace. As it was, France had preserved at Vienna what constituted her chief source of strength, namely, the compactness and unity of her territory; indeed, she was in this respect stronger than she had been in 1792, inasmuch as all the encroaches which had at that time remained within the boundaries of France were now incorporated in it; nor were any of those except certain German districts taken back at the Second Peace of Paris. As for the government of France, her throne was at the time of the dissolution of the Congress of Vienna left in the nominal possession of the House of Bourbon; and the plenipotentiaries of King Louis XVIII were among those who signed the Final Act. There was nothing to cause apprehension in the disclaimer by Great Britain of any intention to impose any particular form of government upon the French nation; for Louis XVIII had himself acknowledged that to the British Government he alone all owed his restoration. The warning of Alexander I



from the Bourbons was very soon to give way to reactionary influences. The Austrian Emperor's goodwill to Napoleon was an audacious fiction. Nothing would prevent a second recovery of the throne of France by the Bourbons but a manifestation, such as now seemed wholly improbable, of the national will; and nothing was likely again to cut short their tenure of that throne but disloyalty to their own position, or a few wars of common-sense in themselves.

While the Final Act thus avoids such direct reference to France, it records even slighter mention to the Power on the rock of whom resistance the wave of her disturbing action had broken. Great Britain's maritime supremacy was tacitly allowed by the European Concert; we did the Congress so much as consider the propriety of submitting to international discussion the pretensions and claims which that supremacy involved. Her colonial conquests in part were retained and in part removed, according to her own decisions. Of her own free choice she returned portions of her conquests to France, which in 1804 had been left without a single colony. To the Dutch, whose entire East Indian possessions had been in her grasp before the close of the war, she now returned them all except Ceylon: on the other hand, she retained Demerara and Cape Colony. No notice was taken in the Act of the final cession to Great Britain of Denmark of the island of Heligoland, the occupation of which had proved highly profitable during the War. The influence of Great Britain was, naturally enough, thought measurable in the considerable increase of territory granted at the Congress to the new Kingdom of Hanover, and in the exclusion, by the restoration of East Prussia to that State, of Prussia from the coast-line of the German Ocean. Nothing had come of the feeble attempt to amend the provision of the Peace of Paris which had finally established British rule in Malta. The return of Napoleon frustrated any scheme for providing the Order of St John with an indemnity in Corsica, or elsewhere. Elba was now transferred to the Grand Duke of Tuscany: while Corsica (where Bonaparte would have liked to settle Eugene Buonaparte) was with the other Ionian Islands now afterwards placed under the British protectorate. Vpilianti and his fellow Hetmans, incessantly endeavoring to engage the sympathies of the Tsar on behalf of the liberation of Holm, were checked by the unwillingness of the other Great Powers to open the Eastern Question, of which the Greek problem formed an integral part: and the Tsar himself had no wish again to revive a jealousy also that prevailed by his attitude of friendship to Poland.

Great Britain had throughout taken the most active interest in the negotiations concerning the newly-established Kingdom of the Netherlands. The treaty which placed Belgium and Luxembourg under the Prince of Orange, now King of the Netherlands, was not concluded between him and the Four Allied Powers till May 31, 1815: but his acceptance of the sovereignty of the Belgic Provinces had been signified

by him, in accordance with the invitation of these Powers, on the 16th of July 1814. The question had therefore become one of boundaries; and the article of the Final Act incorporating Belgium with Holland, the hereditary sovereignty of which was vested in the House of Orange, was accordingly a long and elaborate one. Luxembourg, while included as a grand-duchy in the Germanic Confederation, was assigned to the King of the Netherlands in compensation for the German principalities formerly belonging to him as head of the Orange-Dutch branch of the House of Nassau, and now ceded by him to Prussia. The city of Luxembourg, occupying a position which nature rendered all but impregnable, became a German federal fortress. With the grand-duchy was united the portion of the contested duchy of Bouillon not joined to France by the Peace of Paris.

Thus was introduced into the European family of States a Power of considerable strength, though of secondary rank, deliberately intended to serve as a barrier against France, in the interests more especially of the Low Countries themselves, of Germany and of Great Britain. Holland was at the same time compensated for important colonial losses by a great augmentation of its importance as a European State. No serious doubts as to the endurance of the union seem to have suggested themselves to its authors and abettors. Yet serious were the reasons for such doubts more manifold and deep-seated, and more abundantly illustrated by the history of the past.

The first fourteen articles of the Final Act were concerned with the Polish question, and the following nine with the Saxon, which together had occupied the attention of the Congress during its earlier period. In accordance with the treaty of May 3, 1814, between the three Eastern Powers, the greater part of the grand-duchy of Warsaw was secured to Russia under the title of the kingdom of Poland, to be perpetually bound to the Russian Empire. Like the portions of Poland assigned to Prussia and Austria, the kingdom was to receive such representative national institutions as the Russian Government might determine. Before leaving Vienna, the Tsar carried out his promise by solemnly laying down on May 31, 1814, the basis of its future Constitution; and this was actually proclaimed on November 4<sup>th</sup>. Prussia's share of the grand-duchy of Warsaw included, together with her Polish acquisitions of 1776, the fortress of Thorn with the surrounding district, and portions of what had hitherto been the departments of Posen and Kalisz. Austria remained in possession of the parts of Eastern Galicia assigned to her at the Peace of Vienna (1806), together with the salt mines of Włocławek and their vicinity. Cracow was declared a free city, with a Constitution and an episcopal see of its own, whose independence and neutrality were placed under the joint protection of the three partitioning Powers.

The Polish question had thus, though within a more limited range

and at the cost of considerable concessions to the two other participating Powers, been settled on the lines to which Russia had from the first adhered; and the alternative of an independent Poland, after being momentarily entertained at Vienna and London, with the certainty of its fading forever at Paris, had been finally disavowed. A reasonable limit had been set to the advance of Russia's western frontier; and, since she had already established her predominance in the northern Baltic, the natural process of expansion would henceforth have to take other directions. Meanwhile, the agreement of the three Eastern Powers, effected at Vienna in the face of difficulties for which they were originally alike responsible, now served to establish an enduring community of interests between them.

The other partner in the Silesian compact was likewise obliged to content himself with a partial satisfaction of his expectations. The Treaty of May 18 and the articles of the Final Act founded upon it, which transferred to Prussia, under the title of the duchy of Saxony, a portion of the former Saxon kingdom, represented a solution full of hazard. Whatever importance might attach to the feeling of historical right which had survived the disastrous experiences of the German nation under the Holy Roman Empire and since its extinction, there can be no doubt that, in the eyes of a large proportion of that nation (to say nothing of foreign peoples), Prussia, whose conduct towards Hanover in the Revolutionary period was unforgotten, was morally discredited by this transaction. On the other hand, while what remained of the kingdom of Saxony could not suffer as a barrier in the case of a conflict between the two Great Powers of Germany, a State had been preserved of sufficient importance to add considerably at a critical moment to the balance against Prussia. Austria renounced the Bohemian rights of overlordship over the portions of the two Lusatias now ceded to Prussia, except in case of the extinction of the House of Brandenburg.

Passing over the treaties by which Prussia regulated her territorial arrangements with other Governments, we come to her treaties of June 3 and 7 with Denmark and Sweden respectively, by which the former ceded to Prussia Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rügen (acquired by the Treaty of Kiel) in return for part of the duchy of Lauenburg (previously ceded to Prussia by Hanover) and a sum of two million dollars.

The general provisions of the Final Act as to the reconstituted and expanded Prussian monarchy were contained in those articles, of which the first enumerated the territories recovered by it, viz., those which had been formerly under Polish sovereignty, including the city of Danzig and its district; the state of Culmburg (retroceded by Saxony) and the Old Mark (formerly part of the kingdom of Westphalia); all the former Prussian dominions between Elbe, Weser, and Rhine, but not the former Brandenburg principalities of Ansbach and Bayreuth; the portion of the duchy of Geron on the left bank of the Rhine, and Neuchâtel and

Valençay. The second of these articles recounted the new acquisitions of Prussia east of the Rhine, comprising, besides the duchy of Saxe and part of Lauenburg, part of the Westphalian department of Paderb, including the former abbacy of Corvey; the free town of Wetzlar, the east of the *Archiducenmarkgraviat*; the grand-duchy of Berg, including the city of Dortmund, and parts of the former dominions of the Archbishop of Cologne; the duchy of Westphalia, as assigned at Lunéville to the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt; a large number of principalities, countships and lordships formerly "immediate" and belonging to the Westphalian Circle; and those portions of the former dominions of the Nassau-Dietz line, ceded to Prussia by the King of the Netherlands, which she had not again exchanged with the Duke of Nassau. Finally, a third article defined the districts assigned to Prussia on the left bank of the Rhine, which followed a long line beginning at Bingen, including nearly the whole of the former electorate of Trier and so much of the electorate of Cologne as had lain on the left bank, and terminated by the old Dutch frontier between Rhine and Meuse.

As a result of all these acquisitions and exchanges, the Prussian monarchy gained in population not more than half a million of inhabitants, while, as compared with her extent in 1805, she suffered an actual loss in area. More disappointing, however, to Prussian statesmanship was the failure to secure to the monarchy the territorial continuity and cohesion for which two military roads connecting its halves afforded no equivalent; nor did the rights of trade and navigation that Prussia had reserved to herself on the Ems make up for her being cut off by Hanover from the North Sea. Prussia's greatest gain, as has been truly pointed out, lay in the fact that the reconstitution of her territories had not only made the German element in her population more decidedly predominant than it had been in 1805, but had brought her into cooperation or contact with almost every German interest, and had marked her out as henceforth the principal guardian of the national security on the Rhine. Loyal attachment towards the Prussian throne was certain to be a plant of slow growth in the Catholic Rhine-ruddy and in ultra-conservative Westphalia; but all these difficulties must in the end be overcome by Prussia, if her statesmen were resolved to achieve what Austria dared not contemplate.

Among the remaining German States a material increase of strength had been gained, with a rise in dignity, by the new kingdom of Hanover; thanks perhaps partly to her close connexion with Great Britain and partly to the remembrance of the exceptional severity of her recent experience, but chiefly to the sagacity and vigilance of her representative, Count Münster, and to the peculiar influence which he had so long enjoyed with some of the chief princes and statesmen of Europe. Besides recovering her former province of East Frisia, Hanover acquired

the principality of Hildesheim, with the ancient Imperial city of Goslar, and several other additions.

The transactions at the Congress had given more trouble than the arrangement of the compensation which the Treaty of Kiel (October 8, 1808) and the supplementary treaty concluded at Paris (June 8, 1814) between the two Governments promised to Bavaria in return for her cession to Austria. Bavaria was strongly suspected of an ambition to play the part of a Great Power; and, while distrust of Metternich combined with dislike of Wrede and his Minister to thwart such schemes, a strong current of patriotic jealousy opposed the scheme of placing Mainz, the key of western Germany, in the hands of a Power so long an eager ally of France. Metternich had, however, very skillfully succeeded in changing the traditional hostility of Bavaria to Austria into an attitude of respectful friendliness. Before the opening of the Congress the two States had advanced a large part of the way towards a settlement by taking possession, Austria of Tyrol and Vorarlberg, and Bavaria of Würzburg and Aschaffenburg. On April 22, 1813, a treaty was concluded between them, and approved by Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain, which, in return for the cession to Austria of the Hausrath and part of the Inn Quarter (old divisions of Upper Austria), with the bulk of the former archiepiscopal territory of Salzburg, assigned to Bavaria an ample series of cessions and reversions which would have secured to her an acceptable frontier. But this treaty, which would have necessitated further exchanges, remained unratified; and the Final Act secured no acquisition to Bavaria beyond that of Würzburg and Aschaffenburg. At Paris, on November 5, a supplementary treaty approved by the Allied Powers secured an exchange to Bavaria by which she received districts in the former French departments of Donnersberg, the Lower Rhine, and the Lahn, including the sovereignty of the federal fortress of Lander, with a total population of not far from half-a-million, besides the reversion of the Fodden thorn of the Palatinate; and to this Bavaria at last assented in the Treaty of Munich (April 17, 1816).

The Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt was compensated for the dukedom of Westphalia and for some other cessions by a considerable territory on the left bank of the Rhine, which had been included in the French department of Donnersberg, and by a smaller territory on the right bank, formerly under the sovereignty of the Prince of Isenburg. The remaining lands on the left bank at the disposal of the Powers were ultimately distributed among several minor German potentates.

The grand-duchy of Frankfurt had in December, 1813, been broken up by the Allies, who had at the same time restored to the city of Frankfurt its ancient status as a free Imperial city. This recognition of its historic past, as well as of its future political distinction, found full expression in the Final Act, where, in brief commemoration of

DeBourgh's enlightened tolerance, an equality of rights for the several Christian confessions was declared to be established in the city, the care of whose Constitution was committed to the Germanic Diet.

The Germanic Confederation established by the Federal Act, comprised thirty-eight States, among which a total population of between twenty-nine and thirty millions was distributed with the utmost unevenness. Austria and Prussia joined for those only of their provinces which had formerly belonged, respectively to the German Empire, Denmark for Holstein and Lauenburg, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for Luxembourg only. Though the Federal Act had undoubtedly been concluded in haste, its imperfections were not due to any declared fundamental discerning as to its provisions between the two great German Powers; and its failure, if such was to come, would only declare itself gradually. To the claims of the Princes and Counts formerly "immediate" to the Empire, the Emperor of Austria had listened leniently, and the Prussian Government, in the royal ordinance of June 26, 1803, had shown much consideration; but their example was not followed by Bavaria and Württemberg, and by some of the minor States. It must be allowed that, while some of these former petty potentates had entered into compromising relations with the French Empire, others had, without any fault of their own, lost not only their rights of sovereignty, but in some instances rights of property likewise, besides suffering personal ill-treatment. The provisions of the Federal Act secured to the "mediatized" Princes and in a modified measure to former members of the "immediate" nobility of the Empire, the maintenance of former family compounds, exemption for themselves and their families from unsuitability to any but superior judicial tribunals and from military service, and the exercise of criminal jurisdiction at certain definite stages. Their demand of a equal (collective) share in the voting of the plenums of the Diet was reserved for decision by the Diet; so that the protest in which the "Mediatized" placed on record the maintenance of their claims, had received distinct encouragement. In the end, however, it proved futile.

Notwithstanding the labours of the special Military Committee, no provision of a satisfactory military frontier for Germany had been introduced into the Federal Act; and the deficiency was only partially supplied in the Final. Though, in the latter, Luxembourg was named as a federal fortress, no such mention was made of Mainz, notwithstanding the pressure put upon Austria and Prussia first by some of the minor German States, and then by Russia, no doubt instigated by Stein. Of the other intended federal fortresses some had been practically demolished by the French; the reconstruction of Ehrenbreitstein was committed to Prussia. On November 3, at Paris, the plenipotentiaries of the Four Allied Powers drew up a final agreement, constituting Luxembourg, London, and Mainz federal fortresses—the last named to be garrisoned,

as hitherto, by Austrian and Prussian troops conjointly, with an Austrian governor and a Prussian commander.

If Austria, in the negotiations concerning the Germanic Confederation, displayed a persistent reluctance to assume Imperial responsibilities towards the nation at large, this was not due to any want of dynastic ambition in the House of Habsburg. Indeed, at the Congress, the power of that House was raised to a height which it had not reached since the age of the Counter-reformation. Adhering to a policy which she had long pursued, Austria had declined to restore the former "Austrian Netherlands" with her dominions; and any lands recovered or acquired by her on the left bank of the Rhine she merely meant to utilize for labor arrangements; but she made up for this self-denial in other quarters. Throughout, she kept a firm hold on the portions of Upper Austria and Salzburg, which Bavaria had consented to give up in addition to Tyrol and Vorarlberg. The Final Act set the seal upon her recovery of all the losses to which a succession of disastrous treaties had subjected her in Italy, and upon the union of all her Italian dominions under the name of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, proclaimed by her two months earlier. The Valtellina, with Chiavenna and Bormio, which had been reunited with Italy by France, formed part of Austria's new Italian kingdom; she regained Trent, Aquileia, and Trieste. Carinthia, Carniola, and Tyrol (Austria), were likewise recovered, and henceforth named the kingdom of Illyria. Dalmatia fell back to her, and, enlarged by the territory of the former Republic of Ragusa, and by the Montenegrin support of Cattaro, was henceforth also designated a kingdom. Though the reckoning is not easily run up, it has been estimated that Austria issued from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars with an increase in population amounting to between four and five millions over that of the Habsburg dominions in 1793; she had, moreover, by the large extension of her Adriatic coast-line, become a maritime Power of considerable importance.

Austria might perhaps have been inclined to retain a permanent hold of the Legations; these, however, had been restored to the Holy See with the exception of certain Ferrarese districts on the left bank of the Po, Austria also obtaining the right of garrisoning the fortresses of Ferrara and Comacine. The duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla were definitively assigned to the "Empress" Marie-Louise, but for her own life only; the succession to be determined by the Five Powers and Spain in common, subject to the eventuality rights of the King of Sardinia. The Final Act defined the enlarged limits of the Sardinian kingdom, and confirmed its possession of Genoa; to the north it made certain cessions to the duchy of Genoa; and the Sardinian provinces of Chiable and Fandiary were admitted to a participation in the Swiss neutrality. The Act confirmed Grand Duke (Archduke) Ferdinand in his possession of Tuscany, to which the *Stati degli*

Fosoli and part of Elbe were added, the rights of Prince Ludovico Boncompagni being however reserved both in that island and in the principalities of Pontino. Lunig was assigned as a duchy to the Infanta Marie-Louise (late Queen of Etruria), with an income of income payable by the Emperor of Austria and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, to whom the duchy was to revert in the event of the demise of the Duchess and her son Don Carlos, or of their respective daughters. Finally, King Ferdinand IV was recognised by the Powers as King of the Two Sicilies.

The above, together with the stipulations already noticed concerning the Helvetic Constitution, make up the main provisions contained in the Final Act as to the territorial limits of the several European States, and the internal institutions of some of them. With the exception of a reference to the restoration of Olivença as a desirable act of justice to Portugal, the Act was, for the best of reasons, quite silent as to Spain; and it also contained nothing respecting Brazilianian affairs proper. The Swedish plenipotentiary, Count Lewenhöf, had, in the Committee of the Eight, played a more or less passive part, reflecting both the disappointment of Bernadotte's ulterior ambitions and his desire to adhere to his bargain with Russia, to whose power in the Baltic that of Sweden was now altogether inferior. The King of Denmark's hopes of a compensation for the cession of Norway had been grievously disappointed: Denmark had to content herself with Lauenburg and the sum of two million dollars, while another sum of three and a half million was paid by Prussia to Sweden. These arrangements, made by treaty on June 4 and 7, found, however, no expression in the Final Act; and indeed Denmark hung back from joining the coalition against Napoleon on his return till some time after the dissolution of the Congress (August, 1813). Denmark had to pay a severe penalty for her ill-luck; and this may help to explain the fact, otherwise surprising, that no protest was raised by the Powers against her retention of the very profitable right of levying the Sound Dues on European commerce.

A vast number of other claims were left unsatisfied in the final settlement adopted by the Congress—from the persistent prayer of the Greeks for liberation from the Turkish yoke and the demand of the Papacy for the restoration of Anagnin, down to the grievance of the French military recipients of Napoleonic donations in Germany and in Italy, where a special fund had been reserved at Milan for the purpose.

If the Congress lacked time for completing these territorial changes and adjustments which formed its primary purpose, it necessarily failed to satisfy expectations as to the settlement of ulterior questions of European interest. With regard to river navigation, the Final Act recited certain bases of agreement settled by the Committee appointed on the subject, providing for the constitution of another Commission to be charged with elaborating these in the form of regulations. Absolute freedom of navigation, in the case of rivers traversing several States or



dividing them from one another, was declined, on a uniform system, subject to special regulations in each case; and moderate duties, not variable unless with the consent of all the States concerned, were prescribed. The distinct advantage handsly secured for continental commerce was of the highest importance at a time when slaves still afforded the principal means for the transport of heavy goods; and it was not unaccountably regretted that the Congress should not have proceeded further, and essayed the more difficult task of facilitating on similar lines the commercial intercourse between States on the coasts of the internal seas of Europe, especially the Mediterranean and the Baltic.

The Declaration of February 8, 1815, concerning the African slave-trade, had announced the intention of the Eight Powers to carry out its universal abolition as promptly and effectually as possible by all the means at their disposal. But, as this Declaration left to each Power the choice of the date which it might consider most suitable for carrying out the definitive abolition in its own case, the universal accomplishment of the great reform remained a matter of negotiation among the Powers. The document was printed among the annexes to the Final Act, the text of which contained no reference to the subject. An important step forward was taken when Napoleon, anxious to conciliate British public opinion on his return from Elba, decreed the immediate abolition of the slave-trade throughout the French Empire; and, Louis XVIII having been prevailed upon by British diplomacy to follow the emperor's example, Talleyrand could on July 26 inform the representatives of the Allied Powers that, so far as France was concerned, the slave-trade was for ever at an end. The reproach deliberately cast upon Great Britain by one of the sittings of the Slave-trade Committee (January 30) was afterwards repeated by Cardinal Consalvi—that, while as ardent in his condemnation of the African slave-trade, she had displayed culpable indifference as to the aids of violence committed against the personal liberty of Christians by the Barbary pirates. The subject had been brought and kept before the Congress by the exultant energy of Sir Sidney Smith; but, although Great Britain seemed more than ever called upon to set it at rest since she had taken possession of Malta, whose knights had been the appointed protectors of Mediterranean Christendom, it was only by the Alger expedition of 1816 that she effectually met this responsibility.

The last of the annexes to the Final Act of the Congress was that which, as already mentioned, classified the diplomatic agents of the several Powers. These regulations expressly abstained from introducing any change as to the legates and nuncios of the Pope, who as a matter of course were ranked in the first class with ambassadors. But the official ranks of the Nations, at much that the Congress had done, as registered in *do*, was not thus to be ignored. On June 16 Consalvi addressed to the Signatory Powers of the Peace of Paris, with an

uncompromising rule, a protest which once more adopted the attitude observed by the Papacy at Münster and at Nymegen. But, in an allocation addressed not long afterwards to the Secret Consistory, Pius VII adopted a more conciliatory tone; and in truth, while his complaint as to the incomplete restoration of his temporal dominions was inevitable, his lament over the extinction of the Holy Roman Empire was little more than a rhetorical flourish. The really important facts for the Church of Rome, though not of a nature to be dealt with either in protests or in allocations, were that, while the rule of Protestant princes had been rarely established over large bodies of Catholic subjects—scarcely so in Prussia and the Netherlands—the greater part of Poland, whose ecclesiastical allegiance was likewise due to Rome, had been permanently subjected to the dominion of Russia, the representative Power of Eastern Christianity. For Rome and her agents new methods of policy had once more become necessary; and a new period in the history of the Western Church began.

With the exception of the Papacy and Spain, all the Governments of Europe successively sent in their adhesion to the Final Act and joined in the ratification which involved a general, complete, and reciprocal guarantee of all its articles. The large majority of the provisions contained in the Act and elaborated in its process, in so far as they had not been already carried out before the close of the Congress, were executed immediately afterwards. Thus the perpetual neutrality of the Swiss Confederation and the inviolability of its territory were solemnly recognised by the Four Allied Powers and by France at Paris on November 25, 1815. After the conclusion of a series of conventions between the several German Governments, and the promise, in one form or another, of representative Constitutions to their respective subjects by all of them except Austria, the Diet of the Germanic Confederation was opened on November 5, 1815.

When the Hundred Days were over, and Paris was once more occupied by the Allies, it became necessary to negotiate another peace with France. The protests of Louis XVIII, who had adhered to the coalition against Napoleon, and had now returned to Paris (July 8), were quite logical, but the Great Powers were unanimous in concluding that a rupture had once more taken place between France and Europe, and that the closing of it must be marked by a general pacification. To the negotiations concerning this it was determined by the Four Powers on August 10 not to admit representatives of the other Governments till after the main issues had been decided. In the previous conferences, held from the middle of July onwards between the leading ministers of the Four Powers, a disagreement had already manifested itself as to the securities to be taken against another disturbance of the peace of Europe. On July 29 Hardenberg laid before the Committee of the Four Powers the Prussian

proposals, which included the strengthening of the Belgian frontier by the cession of a series of French fortresses, and of the German by the cession of Alsace, whose fortresses were to be garrisoned by Austria, and by the transfer to Prussia of those on the Saar and Upper Moselle; while some of the strong places in the Jura were to be included within the Swiss frontier, and Piedmont was to be placed in possession of the whole of Savoy. It was well known that these views were shared by several of the smaller German Governments, and enthusiastically advocated by the Crown Princes of Bavaria and Württemberg. During the discussion which ensued, Metternich appears to have argued that a territorial union might fairly be demanded from France, together with a permanent guarantee consisting in the surrender of the outcome of her three lines of fortresses: and Humboldt finally insisted on such the same minimum. But Austria and Prussia, before entering upon the new war, agreed upon the demands which they would make as its termination, they might possibly have succeeded in carrying their proposals: but it is open to doubt whether it would have suited Metternich, as it assuredly would have been repugnant to Goethe, the confident of his policy at the Congress of Vienna, to make any radical alteration in its conclusions. The problem was decided by the unwillingness of Great Britain materially to modify, and of Russia to disturb at all, the arrangements of the First Peace of Paris as elaborated at Vienna. Wellington, though unwilling to impose important cessions upon France—a policy which Castlereagh upheld with remarkable moderation—allowed that this First Peace had left her in a position of relatively enormous strength; while Capotrain agreed that, since the war had been undertaken to maintain the conditions then settled, no alteration of them could be expected at its close.

The controversy ended by a rearrangement which cannot be called a compromise. A new line of demarcation was drawn in the north-east, separating from France the whole of the duchy of Silesia and a portion of the department of the Ardennes; the fortresses of Thionville and Landau were transferred to Germany, and Fort Joux to the Swiss Confederation, while the fortifications of Huningue were to be raised. Part of the heavy pecuniary indemnity to be imposed on France was meant to enable her neighbours to complete their defensive system against her. This determination having been communicated to the French ministry by the plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers in the conference held on September 20, Talleyrand resisted it with so much vehemence and bitterness, and with so important a reference to first principles, as to convey the impression that in his own opinion the situation would best be served by his making himself impossible. His speedy resignation of his ministerial office, in which he was succeeded by the Duke of Richelieu, facilitated the conclusion of peace. Thanks to the efforts of the Tsar, easier terms were granted to France, so far as the pecuniary indemnity was concerned.

On September 25, 1812, the Emperors of Russia and Austria and

the King of Prussia signed the manifesto known as the Holy Alliance, which proclaimed that, alike in the government of their own monarchies and in their political relations with other States, their conduct would be absolutely regulated by the principles of the Christian religion, and invited the attention of all the Christian sovereigns and Powers of Europe, including the Most Christian King. This document, which had been reluctantly signed by the Emperor Francis and King Frederick William without being communicated to their Cabinets, though Metternich had seen and disliked it and suggested certain changes of wording, was not of a nature to be fitted into the peace negotiations: but the Tsar, the author of this "diplomatic squallor," was undoubtedly anxious that the Peace concluded under his predominant influence should be accounted its first-fruit. Nor would it be difficult to show that, though the Holy Alliance had no direct or formal connection with the Second Peace of Paris, the train of ideas which led Alexander to conceive the one strongly influenced his policy with regard to the other, more especially as to the treatment of France. Under the guidance of Richelieu, the friend of Madame de Staël, France would, the Tsar hoped, support him in the execution of his Eastern designs, counterbalancing Great Britain, as his faithful ally Prussia would counterbalance Austria. Yet he did not mean the establishment of the Protectorate of Great Britain over the "United States" of the seven Ionian Islands, which was recognised by the Four Allied Powers on November 5, 1815, though it implied the practical recognition of British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean.

The treaties known collectively as the Second Peace of Paris were concluded on November 20, 1815, the basis of these agreements, afterwards elaborated by Wessenberg, Capodistria, and Metternich, and put into their final shape by La Bourdonnaye and Götze, having been settled some weeks previously by the representatives of the Great Powers. These treaties provided that the frontiers of France should be those of 1792, with the modifications already indicated, and a few others, including the stipulation between France and Baden of the bridge between Strasbourg and Kehl: while certain further extensions of the French frontier, both towards Switzerland and Savoy and towards the Netherlands, were successfully opposed by Richelieu. No other changes of significance were made in the permanent provisions of the First Peace of Paris and of the Vienna Final Act; and it was stipulated that, in all cases where these provisions were not expressly altered by the present treaty, they were to be regarded as confirmed and maintained by it. The Second Peace of Paris made no attempt to supplement the Final Act where (as in the case of the Bavarian compensation) the Vienna settlement had remained incomplete. Metternich was therefore very near the mark in observing that the only difference between the First and the Second Peace of Paris, apart from the transfer of a few border-places, and the provision as to the

was indemnity payable by France and the occupation of her soil by the Allies, lay in the wholly justifiable restitution of the artistic spoils brought to Paris by Napoleon.

The stipulations, intrinsically more important, as to the continued occupation of French soil by the Allied troops were devised with studied moderation. The total of troops distributed among the northern and eastern fortresses of the kingdom was not to exceed 150,000 men; and the duration of their presence was not to extend beyond five years. The indemnity payable by France was fixed at 700,000,000 francs, to be handed over within five years; and exchange bonds to the amount of 140,000,000 more were issued, to cover the debts due from France to other countries, which in reality reached a much larger total.

On the same day or that on which this Peace was signed (November 20), the Four Allied Powers agreed to a joint guarantee for its maintenance, thus carrying out the intention of alliances concluded at Vienna on March 25, 1813, and at Chaumont on March 1, 1814. In this convention, while maintaining the exclusion of Napoleon and his family from the French throne, and renewing their mutual promise to unite if necessary in common measures of war, they undertook to renew at stated intervals meetings between the sovereigns and their plenipotentiaries on subjects of common interest, and for the discussion of measures conducive to the tranquillity and prosperity of their peoples, and to the preservation of the peace of Europe. Thus, while the Holy Alliance was distinctly regarded by the statesmanship of Europe as a declaration of principle leading to no direct results, the agreement between the Four Powers based upon the Treaty of Chaumont meant not only the renewal of an offensive and defensive Quadruple Alliance of the strictest moment, but also the actual beginning of the congressional epoch of European politics. It was left to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) to complete the system of the Five Powers acting in conference by the admission of France into what it declared to be a union animated by the fraternal principles of the Holy Alliance. Certain territorial questions left open at Vienna were here set at rest; others (including those of the Russian compensation and the garrisoning of Mainz) were settled by a Committee of representatives of the Four Allied Powers at Frankfurt (July, 1818).

§ 6 The Congress of Vienna was in its earlier days accused by critics, judging near at hand like the *Princes de Ligne*, or at a distance like Goethe, of wasting time. But the assembly which in June, 1815, barely brought its labours to a conclusion was not justly chargeable with idleness. Its task had been, not to make peace in Europe—for, where this had not been accomplished before the meeting of the Congress it had no chance of being it done—but to elaborate out of the conditions laid down by the First Peace of Paris a political system which should ensure to Europe an endurance of peaceful relations among her States. Within the nine months during which the Congress remained

assembled, it was called upon to repair the consequences of a quarter of a century of upheaval. It was therefore incumbent upon the Congress, after safeguarding Europe against a recurrence of the same peril from the same quarter by strengthening the frontier against France from the Low Countries to Italy, to redistrIBUTE the territories which had been directly or indirectly subject to French rule. This had to be done with a regard to the security and balance of Europe on the one hand, and on the other to just and reasonable claims of former possessors. The Congress accomplished its twofold task by excluding France within limits virtually the same as those which had bounded her territory before the Revolutionary Wars, including all her acquisitions under Louis XIV.; by constructing on her north-eastern boundary an important secondary State, the Netherlands; by reconstructing Prussia as a Great Power, materially strengthened on the Middle and Lower Rhine, and by the transfer to her of part of Saxony; by establishing in the centre of Europe the Germanic Confederation as a permanent political organization, and restoring, likewise under European guarantee, the Confederation of the Swiss Cantons; by supporting Poland among the three Eastern Powers in such a way as to increase the Russian share; and by enlarging the conservative Austrian Empire, while at the same time belabouring its control over northern Italy through the re-establishment of the throne of Sardinia (with increased territorial power) and of the Bourbon throne of the Two Sicilies.

Among the criticisms to which these results were open, the most obvious was that of their *heterogeneity*, as measured not *only* by the expectations of the European public, but also by the designs of those who took a prominent part in its history. The scheme described, according to Talleyrand, by himself, Castlereagh, and others—that of establishing, in lieu of mere temporary alliances, a permanent system of general and reciprocal guarantee and international adjustment—was broken off by the return of Napoleon. There was some question of declaring the resolution of the Congress until it should have been completed on these broader lines, and Talleyrand took credit for having perceived the necessity of pressing on the Final Act without waiting for such a consummation. The scheme, had it been carried out, would have amounted to the substitution of a body representing all the European Governments for the self-appointed Committee of the Four Powers which took action at Châtoumout and Paris, and into which France was not admitted till 1818.

There is, however, no reason for concluding that the establishment of the former kind of tribunal seriously entered into the conceptions of the leading statesmen of the Congress. The adherence to the Final Act of all the European Governments, its express confirmation by the Second Peace of Paris, and the assumption by the Four Allied Powers of the task of watching over the peace of Europe on the basis then

agreed upon, might fairly be regarded as together offering as complete a security as to the existing condition of things could be obtained. At the same time, it cannot be said that in its territorial arrangements the Congress consistently followed either the principle of boundary or any other single principle; indeed, as was more or less inevitable, it largely followed Napoleonic precedent. This applied to the establishment of secondary States of the Orders of States of the first class ("buffer-states" in more recent phraseology), as in the instance of the Netherlands and of Savoy; and to the collection, where possible, of republican Governments (though, paradoxically, Neuchâtel was forced into the Swiss Confederation), as well as of aristocratic political corporations. Nor did the Congress, though it might shrink from ruthless disregard of historic usage or tradition, show itself as lacking more readily moved than Napoleon had really been by considerations of nationality. The great historic wrong done to that principle by the partition of Poland was not undone at Vienna. Austria was allowed to consolidate her sway over a large part of Italy; Finland was left under the Russian dominion; Norway was severed from Denmark, to which it was bound by ties of language as well as by other associations. Historic sympathies and antipathies were treated with as much regard as were claims of nationality; Catholic Belgium was united with Protestant Holland; Genoa was subjected to her ancient foe the House of Savoy, and Sicily which, when in reluctant union with Naples, had possessed a separate Constitution, was now once more joined to her under a single despotic Government. But on the whole, a business-like spirit predominated in the territorial dispositions of the Congress; violent transference of sovereign authority were avoided so far as possible; and there was little of that juggling with thrones and principalities which had been habitual with Napoleon. There was, however, a good deal of favoritism in the distribution to the advantage of petty potentates whom the great sovereigns, for reasons of state or of family, desired to oblige; and little appreciation of the claims of nationalities.

The Eastern Question is its various branches, among which the future of Greece, of the Danubian Principalities, and of Egypt had already become prominent—was, with the consensus consent of the Great Powers, passed by. From want of thought, probably, rather than of courage, British statesmanship lost an admirable opportunity of impressing upon the Porte the necessity of reforming its internal administration, and adhering to treaty engagements with the European Powers; and the inclination which had hitherto characterized Metternich's Oriental policy likewise operated in favour of inaction. But this was not the only important political question, sooner or later certain to become one of burning interest, which the Congress left untouched. The future of Spanish America likewise remained undecided, although British statesmen, and Castlereagh in particular, were fully aware that the old system,

which had been retained in the Pyrenean peninsula, could not be revived in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies; and although it was manifest that an independent Spanish America would supply Great Britain, whose own colonial possessions had been so largely augmented, with a market such as had never before been opened to her in the New World. The repulsive policy of the Spanish Government was sure to hasten a crisis; as for Portugal, the incorporation with it of Brazil into a single country had been announced, but the Prince Regent presently remained at Rio. None of the Great Powers besides Great Britain cared to meddle with the Spanish American colonies, Russia wishing to play the part of trusted counsellor at Madrid in Great Britain's place, and France exposing the interests of the Spanish Bourbons.

Of special methods ensuring the peace and tranquillity of the European family of States, or the good government on which the general peace so largely depended, the Congress was not regarding; but it took the time and preparation for profitable discussion. Kant's Project of a Perpetual Peace had been just nine years before the world; but it had not yet won the deference which the principles vested in it, rather than the accompanying proposals for their application, deserved; and the London Peace Society was not founded till 1816. The conference agreed upon at Chaumont and reaffirmed on the conclusion of the Second Peace of Paris had to suffice—strictly that of periodical meetings of representatives of the chief European Powers, to whose decisions the other States were to be invited to accede. No proposal for instituting a permanent tribunal of arbitration, or any similar authority for the settling of disputes between the States of Europe, could at present be expected to find serious support; the principles of the public Law of Nations, as interpreted by a preponderance of learning, had in the last resort to be enforced by the joint action of what Metternich called "moral Pentarchy," approved and supported by the remaining Governments. When the Congress assembled, there were no doubt many hopes that the dawn of a long if not perpetual era of peace might itself be heralded by a general disarmament. The Congress gave no sign of the willingness of the European Governments, or of the Great Powers in particular, to entertain any such proposal. But a reduction of the military forces of the individual Powers had been actually begun on a considerable scale when the return of Napoleon put a stop to the process. It was something that a brightening, however short-lived, should have been made; and the negotiations for the termination of the second occupation of France probably benefited by the precedent. The conception of a permanent armed camp in each of the European States was foreign to the generation which had undergone the experience of a vast military tyranny.

The belief, in the main sincere, that the good government of the several States of Europe, and consequently its general peace, would



be greatly aided by the grant of popular representative Constitutions, was encouraged by many influences. Among these were the enthusiastic sympathy of the Emperor Alexander for the liberal ideas presented to him by some of his chosen associates, a widespread conviction of the wisdom of the British Constitution, and the extraordinary prestige that had accrued to the constitutional form of government from the stability of the British State and its policy. Yet the process was opposed to nearly all phases of continental conservatism, and most of all to the dynasty and status quo of the Austrian Empire. Even Austria, however, made no objection to Constitutions outside her own dominions; and, in more cases than one, the statesmanship of the Congress, like that of Napoleon, was prepared to treat the grant of Constitutions as much less hazardous than their growth. The Final Act itself guaranteed the Germanic Constitution, which in one of its clauses announced that representative Constitutions would be granted in each of the States of the Confederation. It also declared the participation of the Belgic Provinces of the Netherlands in the constitutional rights of the Dutch, while it protected the national institutions of the Poles who had become subjects of the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian Governments respectively, conferred a Constitution on the republic of Cracow, and secured representative rights to Greece on its accession to Sardinia. Elsewhere, in Norway, in Spain, and in France itself, the Great Powers were understood to approve the grants of Constitutions which they and the Congress were not bound to guarantee.

That the Congress of Vienna was chargeable with shortcomings, mistakes, and failures; that some of its creations, like the Kingdom of Belgium and Holland, proved of very brief duration, while others, like the Germanic Confederation, were more and more badly treated; that the aspirations which its settlement failed to satisfy found force in reality, its composition, its arrangements, those which as part of the period ending with the revolutionary outbreak of 1848, remained wholly free—all this is as true as it was inevitable. But to make the Congress of Vienna the scapegoat of the troubles which marked the general peace and prosperity of the next thirty years is to overlook several considerations. In the first place, the task of the Congress was limited by the terms of its commission, while it must be allowed to have produced substantial services to the extension of intercourse between European States and to the progress of human civilization. Secondly, if the commission of the Congress was restricted, so was its real power. Amid the clash of divergent interests, compromise was the only alternative to complete stagnation; and this was clearly seen by the representatives of the Great Powers who virtually controlled the situation. It was indeed no secret; Spain openly defied the Great Powers, of whom she would have felt born amongst one, to deprive her of Olivença; Sardinia at one time declared that there alone

should compel her to return to subjection under them. How near the Great Powers came to an armed conflict among themselves has been seen from the brief account given above of the Saxe-Polish difficulty. The results actually attained by the Congress, or the Committee of the Great Powers which acted on its behalf, could only have been accomplished by means of patient argument, resourceful diplomacy, and a judicious display of firmness. Thus, while much of its success was due to the toil of the Hardenbergs and the Wessenbergs and of their indistinguishable subordinates, none of the credit should in equity also be given to the magnanimous impulses of Alexander, the firmness of the British plenipotentiaries, and above all to the tact of Metternich and his confidential adviser Gastei.

What the Congress, within such limits and restrictions, actually did achieve, was not only to restore a balance of power in the European broadly held by themselves or their dynasty, and to revive the independent existence of a number of States which had been subjected to an alien yoke; to furnish new security for the recognized political system of Europe, by instituting a federal union of the States of Germany, strengthening that of the cantons of Switzerland, and creating a project of constitutional life for a number of European peoples; to rescue a large and unfortunate section of humanity from the indefinite maintenance of a cruel and wicked slave; and to add not a few further provisions favorable to the principle of tolerance and to that of free and equal reciprocal intercourse between the nations. The Congress did more than this. It laid up for Europe a territorial system, which had some doubtful points and some considerable defects, and for which permanency could not be hoped any more than for any other set of human affairs. But the system itself was neither accidental in its main principles, nor altogether transitory in its main conditions. It re-established a real balance of power in Europe, if this expression be understood to mean that every security was provided against the violent disturbances of the peace of Europe by any one Power, or by any actually existing or probable combination of Powers. An augmented Austria, Prussia, a stronger and more thoroughly German France, and a Germanic Confederation whose conditions showed in some respects an unmistakable advance on those of the old Empire, furnished guarantees for the security of continental Europe against Russia as well as against France. The results achieved by the Congress may fairly be described as a settlement which, though open to many criticisms, and in many respects inadequate, on the whole fairly met both the commission that it had received, and the demands that could reasonably be made upon its efforts. The method which it exemplified in dealing with the affairs of Europe, though likewise full of imperfections, yet deserved to be called the best and most expeditious *liberum* devised by her statesmen in the common interest of her peace.

## CHAPTER XXII.

## GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND (1789-1815).

THE year 1789 forms the dividing line between the earlier and later periods of Pitt's career. That France was in convulsions and Europe in commotion seemed to Pitt no reason why he should cease adding to the riches of financial reform and commercial prosperity at which he had toiled uninterceptedly for the last decade. In introducing the Budget he found himself able to unite the Sinking Fund and to discontinue taxation; and, in the conviction that fifteen years of peace might be reasonably expected, he reduced the rate for warren, and allowed the scholastic treaty with Hesse-Cassel to expire. That his compromise was undisturbed was further shown by his warm support of the Liberal Bill. Erskine's plan that the jury had to determine the question of libel no less than the fact of publication had been adopted by Keppel in 1789; and in 1791 Fox proposed to make this principle part of the law of the land. Considerable opposition was offered by Thurlow; but in 1792 the measure again passed the House of Commons unopposed, and was accepted by the Lords. Events in France had nevertheless begun to modify the grouping of parties. Many who were ready enough to support or support measures of political or religious emancipation in ordinary times deemed it wiser, in Windham's phrase, to repair their houses in the hurricane season; while in other quarters the Revolution was interpreted as a warning of the perils that attended the delay of reform. Early in 1792 the more liberal element in the Opposition formed the Society of the Friends of the People, from which Fox, who cared little for parliamentary reform, stood aloof, though it was joined by his chief lieutenants. Grey was deputed to introduce the question of reform in the following year; but, when he gave notice of his intention, Pitt rose to express his belief that such an attempt could not wisely be made at the present time. This declaration, uttered on the last day of April, 1792, may be taken to mark the transition from the remedial to the repressive period of Pitt's ministerial career.

The ultimate cause of this change was the Revolution in France;

but its predominant cause was the rapid growth of Radical opinion at home. The Corresponding Society, founded at the end of 1791, was sending large numbers of petitions; and the immense circulation of Paine's *Rights of Man* caused the greatest apprehension. Pitt made himself the interpreter of the governing anxiety by a royal proclamation on May 21, 1793, against "disseminated and seditious writings." The proclamation was supported by Windham and some less prominent Whigs in the Lower House, and by the Princes of Wales, Portland, and Spencer in the Upper; and so strong was the feeling of alarm that in neither House did its opponents hazard a division. The debate on the proclamation revealed to the world the difference of the Whigs. Lord Malmesbury, arriving in England at this moment from service abroad, at once set to work to consolidate the position of the union which disagreed with Pitt; and the conferences that took place almost daily throughout June and July are described with incomparable vividness in the pages of his Diary. The moving spirits were Loughborough, Fitzwilliam, Portland, Windham, and Gilbert Elliot; while Burke, who alone had openly quarrelled with Pitt, strove by tongue and pen to encourage the dissentients. The situation developed when, on June 12, Dundas was dismissed by Pitt in consequence of repeated acts of ministerial insubordination. Dundas called on Loughborough, and on behalf of Pitt offered the Chancellorship and three seats in the Cabinet as the price of a coalition. Pitt had no belief in Pitt's sincerity, and declared that the union must not be a mere addition of members to the existing Ministry, but a fair and equal division of power and patronage. Portland refused to join without Pitt, and declared for a neutral Frenchist such as the Duke of Leeds. Malmesbury and Loughborough, on the other hand, felt that Pitt ought not to be asked to surrender the Treasury. The publication of the memoranda of the Duke of Leeds has made it clear that Pitt was not at this time really anxious for a coalition; and it soon became obvious that the disintegration of the Whig party had not proceeded far enough to admit of such a step.

The fall of the French monarchy, the September massacres, and the offer of aid to insurgent people increased the alarm of the country to fever point. Part of the militia was called out by proclamation on December 1, though such a step was only legal when intervention could be alleged. Parliament met on December 13; and the King's Speech pointed to designs to subvert the Constitution and social order. Pitt replied that the duty of the Government was to redress grievances. His proposal to acknowledge the French Republic led to the renewal of the negotiations which had been broken off in the summer, though there was no longer any thought of including him in the coalition. The dissentient Whigs looked to Portland as their leader, because of his high rank, his wealth, and his long political career. But Portland was among the least efficient politicians of his age. He undertook to

repealists Fox; but, when Lansdowne and Lansdowne gave utterance to the opinions which he abhorred, he remained silent. *Malmesbury*, who sat by him, urged him repeatedly to speak. "He said he really could not; Loughborough had said all that could be said. I pressed him to say those very words and nothing more, but without effect." This mischievous note was afterwards attributed by Portland himself—a man who had been Prime Minister—to "want of habit in speaking in public." Its real explanation was that Fox's influence was still powerful, and that Portland was at the mercy of the last visitor at Ballingham House. After a few more meetings the task was abandoned as hopeless, and Loughborough accepted the Chancellorship.

Fearing that the advent of equalist refugees might, if Fox fell, be followed by an inroad of Jacobin fugitives, Pitt introduced an Alien Bill (Jan. 1793) providing that foreigners must state the object of their visit, register their names, and procure passports. The Treasonous Correspondence Bill quickly followed (March), extending the law of treason to the supply of arms or military and naval stores to the enemy, and to the purchase of lands in France; and intercourse with France was forbidden except by special license under the Great Seal. When Grey brought forward the motion of which he had given notice in the previous session, he presented a striking report on the abuses and anomalies of parliamentary representation. But, though he only begged for a commission, not more than thirty members supported him; and the Opposition remained approximately at this strength till the resignation of Pitt. A year later, on July 11, 1794, a coalition with the dissident Whigs was formally announced. Portland accepted the Home Office, Fitzwilliam became Lord President, Windham Secretary for War, and Spencer Privy Seal, which office he quickly exchanged for the Admiralty. A passage was offered to Burke, but the death of his son led him to refuse it; and the heartbroken old man retired from Parliament and public life at the moment when the concentration of which he was the prime author was accomplished. When the Speaker asked Pitt if he did not fear being outvoted in his own Cabinet, he replied that he placed much dependence on his new colleagues, and still more on himself. While Pitt's dictatorship was in no way impeded, the brilliant mastery of Windham, the admirable administrative work of Spencer, and the great social influence of Portland immensely strengthened the Ministry.

The position of the Peelite Whigs was now a lonely one. All was opposed to a title or to protection in the Church or the Law found it wise to profess Tory opinions. The country gentlemen were Tory almost to a man; and the monetary classes had rallied to Pitt long before the outbreak of the Revolution. The *Liberator*, which advocated a moderate measure of parliamentary reform and opposed coercion, was involved in a common condemnation with the *Radical*, which demanded universal

alliance and annual parliaments. Yet the little band, though powerless in the division lobby and unassisted by the country, kept alive the spirit of freedom, and preserved the nucleus of a party to which men could rally when the war and the people should be over.

In the spring of 1789 the affairs of the Prince of Wales were once more forced on the attention of the country. He was again deeply in debt, and had no choice but to extract money from Parliament by a promise to marry. The Duke of York, while campaigning, had met his cousin Caroline, the daughter of the Duke of Brunswick, and spoke highly of her to his brother. The King approved the suggestion, and despatched Malborough to the Court of Brunswick to ask her hand. Malborough reported that the Princess was spoiled by a bad education and bad examples, though with a good husband he believed she might turn out well. When the Prince met his future wife, he was unable to conceal his doubts for her. The mutual dislike of the royal couple was fostered by Lady Jersey, whom the Prince, with regular bad-taste, appointed to be lady-in-waiting to his wife; and, after the birth of a daughter in the following year, a formal separation was effected.

By the autumn of 1790 the burdens imposed by the war and the operations of the press-gang began to be heavily felt. The numerous special meetings organized by the Corresponding Society at alarmed Pitt that he resented to Wetherstone that, if he were to resign, his head would be off in six months. The King, on his way to open Parliament, was greeted with cries of "Bread! No War! No Excise!" and a pistol, or a bullet from an air-gun, broke the glass of his carriage. Pitt replied to the challenge by declaring illegal almost every form of agitation. A Treason Bill was introduced, imposing penalties on attacks intended bodily harm to the King; while to excite hatred of the King or the Constitution by writing or speaking was made punishable on a second conviction by transportation for seven years. A second measure, known as the Sedition Bill, forbade meetings of more than fifty persons without notice to a magistrate, who was ordered to apprehend the speakers if the Government or the Constitution were brought into contempt. Every public meeting was to be advertised by a paper signed by resident householders; and a license was made necessary for houses, rooms, and fields where money was taken to hear lectures or speeches. Fox justly observed that this Parliament had taken more from the liberties and added more to the burdens of the people than any of its predecessors.

The currency question gave rise to much anxiety throughout the war. The rapid advance of prosperity had led to the issue of notes far beyond the gold reserves; and a crisis began shortly before the outbreak of hostilities. The situation was rendered worse by the action of the Bank of England, which, in the expectation of being required to supply a quantity of bullion for the expenses of the war, restricted its note issues. Pitt knew the country to be adverse, and authorized the

issue of Exchequer Bills for five millions to merchants against securities or goods (1796). The advances were quickly repaid, and the panic ceased. But the means which produced the shortage of bullion, arising from the practice of advancing cash to the Ministry in payment of Bills of Exchange, continued to operate. When, in December, 1795, the French fleet reached Ireland, a panic ensued: and deposits were withdrawn from country banks, which in turn withdrew their deposits from the Bank of England. In February, 1797, the alarmed Directors applied for advice to Pitt, who promptly issued an Order in Council forbidding the Bank to pay in cash till Parliament could be assembled. The merchants of London agreed to accept and to tender bank-notes; and the Bank Restriction Act forbade the resumption of cash payments exceeding £1 until six months after the conclusion of peace. Suspension was on the whole a wise policy. It aided the raising of the great loans, and sustained commercial credit by enabling the Bank to increase the circulation without regard to the demands of Government. The Opposition scolded for the irreconvertible paper the issue of assignats; but the Directors of the Bank acted with caution, and the difference between the value of gold and that of notes in the early years of suspension was slight.

If the currency crisis and the Meeting of the Nine rendered the year 1796 one of unusual anxiety, the parliamentary difficulties of the Ministry were lightened by the cessation of the leading members of the Opposition. A Reform Bill was introduced by Grey; but its supporters were aware that the measure had no chance of passing, and answered that they would cease to take an active part in Parliament. The retirement of Fox was for some years almost complete. He had lost the drive for office, and was never so happy as at St Ann's Hill, surrounded by his flowers and his books. The soliers of Greece, Italy, France, and Spain were his daily companions, and his letters to Gilbert Wakefield and to his adored nephew, Lord Holland, reveal his intense delight in literature. Grey's northern house was equally attractive, and his retirement was scarcely less complete. Erskine gladly seized the opportunity of retirement from an arena where he added nothing to his fame. These withdrawals left the stage free for the silent actors; and Towney, whose financial ability rendered him a formidable opponent of Pitt, became the working head of the Opposition. The retirement of the leaders was a tactical blunder, due chiefly to Grey, in which, according to Lord Holland, Fox acquiesced rather from indifference than judgment. The step was condemned by Lambton, Sheridan, and other influential Whigs; and its effect was neutralised by its incompleteness.

After the failure of Pitt's negotiations with the Ministry in 1797, the question of ways and means became acute. He had so confidently expected a speedy pacification that he met the expenses of the early years almost entirely with loans. It was only slowly that he perceived that he had entered on a long struggle, demanding not only loans but

heavy war taxation. During his first ministry the National Debt was increased by £304,000,000. Of this sum he only raised about £104,000,000 in cash, as he borrowed in a low stock. He has been sharply blamed for not raising his loans in stock of a higher denomination; but he was more eager to do so, and his failure was due to the absence of public competition. The burden was reduced during the same period by more than £80,000,000 through the operation of the Sinking Fund. Pitt's scheme of war taxation has been less successful; and is it his desire to spare the poor may be fairly taxed. In 1796 he introduced a graduated Legacy Duty, incorporating the proposal in two Bills, one relating to personal, the other to real property. The former passed without difficulty; but the latter incurred so much hostility that it was deferred, the anomaly remaining till 1853. The Budget of 1797 tripled the assessed taxes, a few abatements being made for the poorer classes. A suggestion by Addington that wealthy men should be invited to make voluntary contributions was next adopted, and brought in £2,680,000 within the year. In the following year the triple assessment and the voluntary subscriptions were superseded by the Income Tax. Pitt estimated the taxable income of the country at £300,000,000, and proposed a levy of 10 per cent. Income under £25 a year was to escape, and those under £500 to pay at a graduated rate. Pitt reduced the yield at about £1,000,000; but the tax brought in nearly more than £8,000,000. His other taxes are too numerous to be mentioned here. They extended to every kind of food and drink, to the necessities not less than to the luxuries of daily life, to every item of property and every operation of trade and business. Yet, despite the suffering they involved, exports and imports steadily increased throughout the war, while English shipping gained the place which it has never lost.

The penal code received its coping-stone in 1793. The political societies were not quite illegal; and the Irish rebellion impelled Pitt to frame the Corresponding Societies Bill. The Corresponding Society was suppressed by name; and all associations were declared unlawful whose members were required to take an oath not recognised by law, or which included members or committees not known to the whole society. Unlicensed debating clubs and reading-rooms were to be regarded as disorderly houses; printing-presses and type-foundries were to be registered; and the printer's name was to appear on every publication. Thereafter the democratic movement ceased for a number of years.

The passing of the Union scarcely ruffled the surface of English politics; but Pitt had more than one ground for uneasiness in the summer of 1800. When Napoleon became First Consul, Pitt believed that another effort for peace should be made, though wide differences of opinion existed within the Cabinet. He was even more concerned at the economic condition of the country, declaring that the problem of peace or war was not half so serious as that of the scarcity. There



was a third question, the complications of which Pitt did not at the time fully realize. He had always fostered far-reaching overtures to the Irish Catholics; and, though he was dissuaded by Clare from incorporating these concessions in the Act of Union, he was resolved that they should immediately follow it. Cornwallis had been empowered to invite Catholic support for the Union; and it was with confidence that Pitt summoned his colleagues to a Cabinet meeting. He informed Loughborough, who was at Weymouth with the King, that he desired to discuss the general state of the Catholics, tithes, and a provision for the Catholics and dissenting clergy. Loughborough showed the King Pitt's letter, and learned his strong objection to the proposals. At the meeting of the Cabinet on Sept. 26, 1800, when Pitt advanced the substitution of a political for a moral test for office, and the commutation of tithes, Loughborough caused general surprise by declaring that he was opposed to the admission of Catholics to Parliament or office, though he approved the settlement of the tithes question. Pitt had no choice but to adjourn the discussion. The plot now matured rapidly. At the time of the Fitzwilliam episode, the King had asked the opinion of Chief Justice Kenyon and the Attorney-General, Sir John Scott, as to whether his assent to the admission of Catholics to Parliament would be contrary to his Coronation Oath, and had received a reply in the negative. He had then applied to Loughborough, who returned an ambiguous answer; and the King's own feelings were strengthened by a document drawn up by Lord Clare asserting that the Coronation Oath was a bar to any such measure. The Archbishop of Canterbury was now invited to write a strong letter to the King; and a similar communication issued from the Primate of Ireland.

Pitt was entirely unaware of the conspiracy, but he knew that his proposal had opponents besides the Chancellor. Portland, Westmoreland, Liverpool, and Chatham were hostile; but Greyville, Dundas, Gordon, Windham, and Spencer supported the plan. Pitt made up his mind to go forward, and in January, 1801, wrote to Castlereagh that he was firm. The King was equally determined, and on January 28 he remarked to Dundas at the levee, "What is it this young Lord (Castlereagh) has brought over which they are going to throw at my head? The most Jacobinical thing I ever heard of!" Next day he requested Addington to see Pitt and "prevent him ever speaking on a subject on which he could scarcely keep his temper." Pitt wrote to the King, explaining the proposal and begging leave to resign if he was not allowed to bring it forward. The King suggested that neither should recur to the subject. Pitt answered that he could not remain on those terms; and on February 3 his resignation was accepted. Thus the King and his Minister parted without an interview.

It is easy to understand the King's indignation that a measure of such importance had been discussed by his ministers for months without

any official intimation to him; but the motive that led Pitt to withhold such intimations is clear. If he had informed the King of his intention to discuss the Catholic Question with his colleagues, the project might have been nipped in the bud by a presumptory veto. On the other hand the waiting course incurred two very grave dangers. There was nothing but Cabinet loyalty—in those days a broken reed—to prevent his colleagues from informing the King of what was going on; and, secondly, it was inevitable that the King should betwixt secret being left without information. Pitt afterwards expressed regret that he had not informed the King at an earlier stage; but his original judgment is not necessarily invalidated by one formed subsequently at a period of painful agitation. Both courses were beset with difficulties. That which he pursued failed; but it is not clear that the other would have succeeded.

On the approach of the crisis, the King's thoughts had at once turned to Addington; and, when Pitt resigned, the Speaker was invited to form an administration. Addington's reply depended on the attitude of Pitt; but, having promised the King his support, he could not decline his invitation. Addington used in later life to declare that his resolution was taken when Pitt declared that hesitation meant ruin. Though the most pressing matter was thus easily settled, the excitement was too much for the King. After reading the Coronation Oath in his family, he remarked, "If I violate it I am no longer sovereign of this country, but it falls to the House of Lords." By the middle of February he was thoroughly ill. No business could be transacted during the King's madness. Pitt had resigned, but was still in control. Addington had been appointed, but had not received the seals of office. The anomalous situation was only averted from danger by the affectionate relations between the actual and the prospective Minister.

When the King regained his senses, his thoughts still ran on the Catholic Question. He sent a message to Pitt through the doctor, "Tell him I am now quite recovered; but what has he not to answer for who is the cause of my having been ill at all?" Pitt was so affected that he immediately replied that he could never again bring forward the question during the King's lifetime. This momentous communication set all men asking why he had resigned; and Pitt himself had begun to doubt whether he had acted rightly. On the evening of his Budget speech, February 15, he had talked for three hours with his friend Haize, Secretary to the Treasury, who relates that there were painful workings in his mind, and most of the time tears in his eyes. The dangerous illness of the King agitated him still more; and, when the reproachful message reached him, his resolution was taken. Some of his intimate friends had already urged him to resume office, and their efforts were now reinforced. Pitt favoured the idea, but refused to take the first step. Dundas begged the Duke of York to urge the King to restore Pitt; and, when the Duke, though sympathising with the project,

refused, Portland offered to approach Addington. Pitt forbade the mission; but his friends were determined, and urged Addington to retire. Addington replied that they might speak to the King, but they ought first to ask the doctors if such an interview was likely to be dangerous. At this point Pitt definitely declared his intention of supporting Addington, and on March 14, 1801, surrendered office.

The sudden resignation of Pitt gave rise to the belief that it was not exclusively due to the Catholic difficulty. There was in truth no ground for the suspicion that the chief or even a contributing cause of the resignation was a desire to escape the responsibility of making peace. The fear lest it should necessitate a reconstruction of his Cabinet might have influenced a weaker man; but Pitt's confidence in himself was hereditary. The subject of the peace was never mentioned in the long and confidential discussions held between Pitt and his intimate friends during the crisis; and when the charge was made, it was indignantly and repeatedly repudiated by him. Nor is there any reference to it in the letters of Lord Grenville to his brother. Secondly, Pitt was willing, and indeed eager, to return to office a few days after his resignation, and was only prevented from doing so by Addington's refusal to withdraw. In the next place, he asked Addington to republish the peace, discussed and approved every article with him, and defended it in public and in private. Again, why should it be supposed that the French would prove more accommodating in dealing with a weak than with a strong Cabinet? It is true that Malabrou records a conversation in which Dundas spoke strongly in favour of Pitt's return, and added that, if it was not feasible, the fact that the new Ministers would make peace would only smooth the way for his recall. But this was obviously an after-thought, not an efficient cause of what had taken place.

Peace having been made (March, 1801), Pitt continued to give Addington a sincere and disinterested support on the tacit understanding that the latter would not depart from his policy. The statements that Addington declared himself to be merely a *lameur* *lameur* for Pitt, and that Pitt gave his successor a solemn pledge of support unshakable by any lapse of time, rest on no first-hand authority and are inherently improbable. The Minister's usual pillar of support was the throne. He had long been a favourite at Court; and the King once paid him what was intended to be a compliment by saying, "What I converse with you, I think aloud." As Pitt had gone to the extreme of ministerial independence, so Addington went to the extreme of ministerial subservience. He consulted his master's wishes in every detail, and was rewarded by letters of almost ecstatic satisfaction at his arrangements. Of all the Ministers who served George III., Addington was the one most completely dedicated to the royal will. The King was perfectly contented, and at the first interview after the change he drew Pitt and Addington aside and said, "If we three do but keep together, all will

go well." Sharing such powerful allies, Addington could dispense with a strong Ministry. The King had made use of Loughborough's intrigues; but he had lost his character, and replaced him in the Chancellorship by Eldon. Chatham, Portland, and Westmoreland remained in the Cabinet; Hawkebury went to the Foreign Office, Lord St Vincent to the Admiralty; and Foxcroft became Solicitor-General. The first business of the new Ministry was the case of Maria Thoin, the veteran agitator, who had been returned for Old Sarum. Tucker declared that he had thrown off all clerical functions and had undergone a quarantine of thirty years; but Addington, who felt that the law was uncertain, proposed and carried a measure definitely forbidding the clergy to enter Parliament. The main business of the new Ministry, however, was the peace. The signature of the preliminaries in October was the signal for a great outbreak of popular enthusiasm, but was received in higher circles with mixed feelings. The King called it experimental, but overridable. Fox applauded it as ending a war which he had consistently opposed. Sheridan defined it as a peace of which all men were glad and none were proud. The only pronounced opposition came from the small section which followed George, Spencer, and Windham.

Pitt's support of the Prime Minister was disapproved by almost all his friends; and, when he paid a visit to the Bishop of Lincoln shortly before Christmas, his old tutor openly remonstrated with him. This interview was soon followed by a delicate case of office. When Turley accused Pitt of holding back charges which fell on his successor, Addington criticised himself with a single sentence in denial. Pitt was pained at his friend's silence, but professed himself satisfied with Addington's explanation; and the Budget, repealing the Income Tax, was framed with his full approval. The late Minister's fame indeed had many champions. Burdett moved for an enquiry into the conduct of the late Government, "in order that punishment should follow guilt." This unprovoked attack was met by an expression of the thanks of the House to Pitt "for his great and important services to his country"—a tribute without parallel; and a few days later Canning's magnificent ode, "The Plot that smothered the Storm," was recited at a crowded banquet to celebrate Pitt's birthday. The speech from the throne closing the session in June was approved by Pitt, who shortly afterwards pressed Gathrough to accept the offer of a seat in the Cabinet.

These pleasant relations were, however, soon disturbed by the renewed importunity of Pitt's friends. After a sharp attack of illness in September, 1802, Pitt was ordered to Bath. Malherbury reported that he had spoken during the summer to many leading men, who recognised the necessity of Pitt's resumption of power. Canning, ever the most forward of the band, formed a plan for an address to Addington, urging him to replace the government in the hands of Pitt; and at his wish Malherbury saw the Duke of York, who suggested that Addington

should be approached through a friend or colleague. A memorandum was accordingly drawn up and presented to Eldon. At the same time Canning pursued his plan of collecting signatures for an address to Addington; but, on hearing what was on foot, Pitt immediately forbade it. The agitation had not been wholly fruitless, for Pitt undertook to give the Government no further advice.

When Parliament met at the end of November, 1800, the return of Pitt was for the first time openly demanded. Grenville declared that he was the only possible *châtelain*; and Canning contended that, as France was made powerful by Napoleon, there was need of "one commanding spirit" to cope with him. On leaving Bath, Pitt went to spend Christmas with Rose. They studied the Budget together, and found a grave misapprehension. On December 29 Pitt wrote to Addington, who had asked him for an interview, that he feared there were many points to which he could not help looking forward with regret and anxiety. When the two men met in January, 1801, Addington hinted in an embarrassed manner at Pitt's return; Pitt merely replied that he would consider the matter. Addington then discussed with Dundas, whom he had lately created Lord Melville, the plan of a coalition. Addington and Pitt were to be Secretaries of State under the nominal leadership of Lord Chatham, and Melville was to replace St Vincent at the Admiralty. Melville entered warmly into the project, and set off for Walmer. Pitt replied that he would only move forward as the undisputed head of the Administration. Addington was pained and surprised, but said that he hoped Pitt would not insist on Grenville and his friends reviving phantoms. Pitt replied that he could not bind himself, and proposed an arrangement by which Addington should become Speaker of the House of Lords. Addington, after consulting his colleagues, refused. Pitt replied that the negotiation was "finally and absolutely closed"; and the letters of the old friends became stiff and formal.

The renewal of war in May, 1803, impelled Pitt to return to Westminster, where he at once delivered one of his greatest speeches, supporting the war but ignoring the Ministers. The militia were re-embodied; and a reserve army of 80,000 men, raised by ballot for four years, was voted. The Military Service Bill provided for the enrolment of Volunteers; and before the end of the summer 508,000 responded to the call. Pitt entered with enthusiasm into the movement, and, as Warden of the Cinque Ports, raised 3000 Volunteers. But the issue of arms was slow, and no adequate response was made to local offers of help. The storm that had threatened during the winter broke out after its close. A paper was begun with a pamphlet written from materials provided by Brough, brother-in-law of the Prime Minister, though without the knowledge of the latter. Pitt was deeply indignant, and supplied the facts for a reply. Other pamphlets followed, and both parties steadily grew more embittered. In January, 1804, Pitt refused

an invitation of Grenville to join the regular Opposition; but he vigorously attacked naval mismanagement. By the end of March he had made up his mind to suggest to the King the formation of a broad Administration. When the Government majority fell to 23, Addington wrote to ask Pitt for his views. On Pitt's reply that he would only communicate them to the King or someone selected by him, Addington asked permission to authorize Eldon to meet him. On April 26, after an attack by Pitt on the whole system of defence, Addington determined to resign; and Eldon informed Pitt that the King would be glad to have a written plan of a new Administration. Addington's greatness had been thrust upon him; and he had played his part as well as anyone had a right to expect. But everyone except the Minister himself recognised the truth of Canning's merciless epigram, "Pitt is to Addington as London to Paddington." He was vain and mediocre; but his conduct is free from any personal imputation.

Pitt's reply to the King's invitation was to frame a Ministry drawn from all parties except the immediate followers of Addington. A sharp letter expressed the royal indignation at the isolation of the rooms of Fox and Grenville. Pitt again explained the need for a national Ministry, and begged for an audience. The King agreed to accept Grenville and any friends of Fox, but not Fox himself. Fox suggested, merely to get Grenville to accept office, adding that he was too old to care about it; but his friends refused to enter the Ministry without him. Pitt made no complaint of the conduct of the Premier; but he was deeply hurt at the refusal of his cousin, who in the previous year had urged upon him the formation of a cabinet in which Fox would have no part. He has been severely blamed for wincing in the exclusion of Fox; but he was apprehensive of another outbreak of madness. Then nearly all Addington's colleagues remained. Pitt rapidly regained his usual buoyancy of spirits; but his health inspired grave apprehensions among his friends. He had never been really strong since 1787; and, though the Bath water and his open-air life at Walmer had done him good, he had lost his former elasticity. The King was polite, but not cordial. Pitt stood alone, and the burden proved too heavy for him.

His first task was to strengthen the national defences. At no time during the war was it an easy task to obtain soldiers; for the privates were subject to average punishments; and their comfort and well-being were shamefully neglected. To procure a more regular supply, Pitt introduced his Additional Forces Bill. Each parish was assessed at so many men, the time for deficiency being used for the recruiting fund. As the Bill introduced an element of compulsion, it was violently attacked and narrowly escaped defeat. The Statute created Pitt's weakness; and in the autumn Addington was invited to enter the Cabinet. When the two men met, they at once yielded to the force of old enmities. "I am sure you are glad to learn Addington and I are

at one again," said Pitt to Wilberforce. "And then he added, with a sweetness of manner I shall never forget, 'I think they are a little hard on us in finding fault with our making it up again, when we have been driven from our childhood and our fathers were as before us.'" Addington accepted a passage as Lord Sidmouth, and became President of the Council. Sidmouth's accession strengthened the Ministry in voting power alone; and he proved a troublesome colleague.

In the session of 1805 an event occurred which darkened the close of Pitt's life. Though Dundas, now Lord Melville, had undertaken the ill-considered mission to Walmer, Pitt retained something of his old affection for him and had sent him to the Admiralty. Among St Vincent's measures, when at the Admiralty, had been the appointment of a Commission of Naval Enquiry. The first nine reports were technical; but the tenth related to Melville's conduct as Treasurer of the Navy in Pitt's previous Ministry. Wilberforce was with Pitt when the report was brought to him, and could never forget how eagerly he looked into its leaves without waiting to cut them open. The report showed that Dundas, who had been made Paymaster by Melville, had paid national money in to his own account; and that a large sum, which Melville declared to have been used for secret service, was not accounted for. Pitt was only dissuaded from denouncing his friend at all costs by a threat of resignation from Sidmouth. When Whitbread's resolutions were introduced, Wilberforce supported the censure and was over the independent members. The voting resulted in a tie, on which the Speaker gave his casting vote against Melville. Pitt put on the little cocked hat that he was in the habit of wearing when dressed for the evening, and jammed it largely over his forehead to conceal the tears trickling down his cheeks. The same day Melville resigned his office, which was given to an admiral. Sidmouth had urged the appointment of one of the Ministers, with a view to creating a post for an adherent of his own. He now resigned, as Pitt could not afford to lose him; and it was arranged that, in regard to Melville's case, Sidmouth's friends should vote as they pleased. They Addington, however, and other followers of Sidmouth joined so early in the attack that Pitt declared they had rendered themselves ineligible for office. Sidmouth once more resigned, and his resignation was this time accepted. But the loss was so serious that Pitt again implored the King to allow him to strengthen the Ministry. On the King's refusal, he determined to introduce Canning into the Cabinet.

Pitt once more stood alone, and he knew that his strength was ebbing. Then on November 5—a fortnight after Trafalgar—the Lord Mayor gave the toast of "the saviour of Europe," Pitt rose and said, "Europe is not to be saved by any single man. England has saved herself by her actions, and will, I trust, save Europe by her example." It was his last speech. A month later he went to Bath to prepare himself for the winter, but the news of Austria's (December 8) drove the guest to the

vital parts, and he left for Paken a dying man. He had paid little attention to religious observances, but he derived comfort from reflecting on the immortality of his life. On January 22, 1806, he died.

Pitt's instincts were for freedom, for the peaceful development of national resources, for pushing forward the frontiers of political and religious liberty; but the period of his life covered in this chapter was one of almost unbroken failure. That he accomplished little which he regarded as necessary was due partly to the character of the King, partly to the French Revolution, but partly also to himself. No Minister has possessed greater self-confidence: but Pitt lacked persistence in domestic affairs. He deliberately put aside parliamentary reform; but he permitted his colleagues and supporters to maintain the slave-trade, and he allowed his wise intention of combining Catholic relief with the Union to be overruled. Of his foreign policy this is not the place to speak. His repressive measures were the offspring of panic, and created more danger than they averted. As a speaker he stands beside Walpole, Peel, and Gladstone. As a leader of the House of Commons he has perhaps been equaled by Peel alone. As an orator he excelled in pointed and lofty declamation, though rarely rising to impassioned eloquence and lacking variety. Inferior to his father in dramatic power, to Fox in warmth and passion, to Sheridan and Canning in sparkling brilliancy, he rivaled them all in logical statement and purity of diction. His private character was singularly attractive. Reserved and unobtrusive in public, in congenial society he was easy, buoyant, and companionable. He was loved like a father by his niece, Eliza Sturges, to whom he gave a home; and the passionate devotion of Canning is unique in the history of political friendships.

On Pitt's death the Ministry resigned; and the King sent for Grenville. On his saying that he should first consult Fox, the King, who saw that there was no alternative, replied, "I thought so, and I meant it so." Fox became Foreign Secretary, Spencer and Windham Secretaries for the Home Department and for War respectively; Grey went to the Admiralty; Lord Henry Petty commenced his long official career as Chancellor of the Exchequer; Erskine became Lord Chancellor, and Romilly Solicitor-General. FitzGibbon, Maize, and Sir Gilbert Elliot received subordinate places. Sheridan, whose habitual excess in drinking prevented his inclusion in the Cabinet, was made Treasurer of the Navy. Selwyn, became Privy Seal, and insisted on the admission of a friend. Lord Ellenborough, the Chief Justice, was accordingly admitted to the Cabinet, criticism being met by reference to the precedent of Mansfield, and by the theory (followed under Lord North) that each member of the Cabinet is responsible only for his own department.

The new Ministry first directed their attention to the slave-trade. Fox had always felt strongly on the subject, and, after slight opposition, he pledged the House to take measures for its prohibition. In the



Lords the resistance was so slight that he determined on a Bill to forbid the traffic in slaves after January 1, 1808, declaring that, if he had done nothing else in his forty years of public service, he would be content. The Bill was brought in by Grey and carried in the following year (March, 1807); but Fox did not live to see his measure become law. His health was bad when he entered office; and its fatigues told heavily on him. Drury appeared, and he died after a short illness in September, 1806. The King had yielded to the spell of his winning personality, and remarked that he had never thought he should live to regret Mr Fox. He had been deterred from office in his earlier years partly by his own errors, and in later years by the French Revolution. He lives as the greatest of debaters, the undoubted champion of Liberty in an age of reaction, the most lovable of English statesmen.

On the formation of the Ministry, the Catholic Question had not been mentioned by the King or Grenville; but it was thought possible to remove one glaring anomaly. The Irish law of 1793 had opened to Catholics all parts in the army up to and including the rank of colonel; but, though the Union made the armies one, officers in Irish regiments could not hold rank when their regiments came to England. The King consented to the removal of this injustice, while declaring he would go no farther. At this point the question was raised whether the existing certificates as to rank were to remain in English regiments. The Cabinet decided that they should be removed; and Grey believed himself to have obtained the royal approval. But Portland wrote offering to form a Ministry; and on the day after the second reading the King informed the Cabinet that he could not accept the Bill. Ministers resigned, but drew up a Cabinet minute asserting the right of offering whatever advice relating to Ireland they might regard as necessary. The King replied by demanding a written declaration that they would never again recommend concessions to the Catholics. The demand was refused; and the "Ministry of All the Talents" was dissolved. Its lack of homogeneity is vividly portrayed in Lord Holland's memoirs; but its fall was due to two tactical errors. It was seeking disaster to extend the Catholic measure without gaining the King's express consent; and the Cabinet minute could serve no useful purpose. Grenville was a man of high character and ability, of wide culture, and great experience; but he was lacking in tact, and his fall was unregretted.

After a year's exclusion, the Tories returned to office (March, 1807), nominally under the Duke of Portland, really under Perceval, and entered on a spell of power which lasted twenty-three years. Throughout this period there were two schools of Tory thought. The one, led by Castlereagh, drew its inspiration from Pitt, championed the Catholic claims, and was willing to consider any change except parliamentary reform; the other, which asserted the dominant influence, was represented if not formed by Eldon, whose philosophy was summarized by Sydney Smith

in *Woolfe's Orations*, and disappeared with the Reform Bill. The prolonged exclusion of the Whigs was due to a variety of causes. In the first place, they suffered from the lack of a leader. Their titular chief, Lord Greyville, preferred the graces and flattery of Dissenters to the animosities of Westminster. Nor was there any one in the Commons to whom they could look for guidance. When, in 1807, Grey went to the Upper House, George Ponsonby, who had played a leading part in Ireland, was chosen as leader, mostly because he divided the party the least. Whitbread was distrusted by the pure Whigs. Brougham entered Parliament in 1810, and at once became the most formidable opponent of the Government; but his character inspired no confidence. The second main cause of the impotence of the Opposition was that it was sharply divided into two sections: one, led by Greyville and Grey, representing the great families; the other, following Whitbread and Burdett, speaking for the middle and commercial classes, and pledged to a more advanced programme. The latter fought hotly against abuses and privileges, disapproved of the war, and led the onslaught on the Duke of York; and, when the Regent deserted his old associates, they retaliated by denouncing the means of the Princess of Wales. Scarcely less detrimental to the party were the personal jealousies which divided the leaders. The publication of the *Coringey Papers* has gone far to explain why so many able men formed so feeble an Opposition.

While the Whigs were almost powerless in Parliament, their ideas steadily gained ground beyond its walls. In Holland House the men who cherished the memory of Fox found a rallying-point. But the most powerful factor in the revival of liberal ideas was the *Edinburgh Review*. During the long reign of reaction, Scotland had laid protests at the feet of Dundas. Freedom of thought survived in the Universities alone; and it was among the Edinburgh students that the flag of rebellion was raised. The idea of a Review occurred to Sydney Smith during a residence in the northern capital, and was discussed by him with a number of young Whigs who met in the rooms of Francis Jeffrey in the spring of 1802. Smith was just over thirty; Jeffrey, who edited the *Review* till 1822, was a few months younger; Harmer, the economist of the group, was twenty-four, and Brougham only twenty-three. The first number appeared in the autumn of 1802; and its effect was described by Lord Cockburn as electrical. Scott and other Tories contributed articles on non-political topics; but an article written on the Spanish War by Jeffrey in 1803 disgusted the nation of its supporters. The idea of a rival organ had been suggested by John Murray to Canning in 1807 and was discussed by him with Scott in 1808. On the publication of the Spanish article in the *Edinburgh*, the plan was carried into execution by Canning, George Ellis, Southey, Erskine, and other Tories, an editor being found in Gifford and a publisher in Murray; and the first number of the *Quarterly Review* appeared in 1809.

Bagehot has aptly characterized the first thirty years of the last century as a species of duel between the *Edinburgh Review* and Lord Eddon. But, in the assault on an effete Toryism, the Whig champions received valuable aid from two groups of men whose opinions by no means coincided with their own. Bentham had come to believe that the legal and other reforms which he advocated were only to be accomplished by an altogether different kind of Legislature; and in 1809 he wrote a *Catechism of Parliamentary Reform* demanding annual parliaments, the ballot, and universal suffrage. Though the influence of the Benthamites was confined to a comparatively small circle, their ability and their far-reaching proposals made them formidable opponents of the reigning philosophy. The second group consisted chiefly of the survivors of the Radical movement which Pitt had for a time suppressed. Though it was represented in Parliament by Burdett and Cockburn, its main work was carried on outside by Major Cartwright, Paine, Henry Hunt, and other democrats. But its real leader was Cobbett, whose *Political Register* obtained an influence over the lower middle classes rivalling that of the *Edinburgh Review* in more cultivated circles.

On the fall of Grenville, Pitt's old followers returned to office. Perceval was from the first a shadow in his own Cabinet, which was dominated by Canning and Castlereagh. The former had made his mark under Addington and Pitt as a powerful debater and a man of great parliamentary capacity. In private life he was genial and affectionate; but he was ignorant and unambitious, and shared Eddon's belief that every change was a step towards revolution. Canning possessed the qualities which Perceval lacked; he had wit, fancy, scholarship, genius; but he declared that his political allegiance was sworn to the grave of Pitt, and he was never trusted by the orthodox Tories. The chief episode in the domestic history of the Portland Cabinet was a royal scandal. The Duke of York was the King's favourite son, and warmly returned his father's affection. In January, 1809, a colonel of militia, named Wardle, informed the House that commissioners in the army were being sold by Mrs. Clarke, the Duke's mistress, and aroused his belief that the Commissioners-in-Chief shared the money. When the evidence had been taken, the Duke wrote to the Speaker regretting his connexion with Mrs. Clarke, but maintaining his ignorance of her practices. A motion was carried declaring him ignorant of the traffic; but, before an address to the Queen for his dismissal could be moved, the Duke resigned. Parliament refused to decree his permanent exclusion from office; and he returned to his post in 1811.

The inorganic character of the Cabinet was soon illustrated by the Walcheren expedition (1809), which was arranged by Castlereagh. Canning, as Foreign Minister, declared that he could not share in the responsibility, and would resign if Castlereagh remained in the Cabinet. When the preparations became generally known, he repeated his demand.

The King implored him not to resign; and Portland told him the change would be made. On the failure of the expedition, Canning at once left the Cabinet. Castlereagh, whose position had been undermined by charges of corruption, and had till now known nothing of the agitation for his removal, also resigned. When Portland wisely followed their example, Wellesley was summoned from Spain to fill the post of Canning; Liverpool succeeded Castlereagh at the War Office; and Peel became Premier.

The condition of the currency again claimed attention. Towards the close of 1838 the price of gold had risen to more than 12 per cent. above the Mint price; and the rate of exchange with Hamburg and Paris fell heavily. Ricardo called attention to the matter in a masterly pamphlet; but the Bank denied depreciation, declaring that gold had risen in value owing to the subsidies, the needs of the armies, and the disposition to hoard. A committee appointed at the instance of Horner reported that there had been an over-issue of notes, and urged that the Bank should resume cash payments within two years. But, when Horner and Hamilton asked for legislation, the House voted that bank-notes were equivalent to gold, though £100 of paper was only worth £85. 10s. 6d., and declared the refusal to accept notes at their face value a misadventure. The paper currency therefore remained; and cash payments were not resumed until 1849.

A large share of public attention in 1839 was claimed by the contest between Sir Francis Baring and the House of Commons. The exclusion of strangers from the House in the Walcheren enquiry was chosen as the topic of discussion in a debating society; and placards announcing the debate and denouncing the proposal were placed on the walls. Thereupon the House declared the chairman of the society guilty of a breach of the privileges of Parliament, and ordered him to Newgate. The sentence was challenged by Baring, who had been absent owing to illness. Finding only twelve supporters, he published a "Letter to his constituents denying the right of the House of Commons to imprison the people of England." The House declared the letter a scandalous libel, and committed its author to the Tower. Baring replied by haranguing his house in Piccadilly, in front of which a large mob assembled. When the house was forced, Baring was discovered explaining *Magna Carta* to his little son, and was removed to the Tower. The affair ended with the prerogative of Parliament; but the vast crowds gathered to celebrate Baring's release were grievously disappointed on learning that their hero had returned home by water; and Baring's reputation as a champion of the people never entirely recovered the blow.

The old King's Jubilee (October, 1810) had scarcely been celebrated when the death finally gathered round him. The exposure of the Duke of York, the failure of the Walcheren expedition, and the fatal illness of his fondly-loved daughter Amelia combined to overthrow his unity; and

Perceval carried resolutions in December establishing a Regency for a year on the model of that of 1788. The Prince shied at the limitations, and asked Greyville and Grey to suggest a reply to the forthcoming address (January, 1811) requesting him to assume the Regency. The Prince sharply criticised their suggestions, and summoned Sheridan, the only Whig with whom he had remained intimate, to draw up another reply. The Whig Lords were indignant; and the breach rapidly widened. The doctors doubted the King's speedy restoration; and the Queen asserted that his recovery would be jeopardised if he found new Ministers in office. Yielding to the pressure, the Prince announced that he should make no change; but at the end of the year he determined to strengthen the Government. Greyville and Grey replied with the inadmissible stipulation that they should be allowed to grant Catholic emancipation to Ireland. At this moment Wellesley resigned in disgust at the lack of support for the Peninsular War, and was succeeded by Castlereagh; and within a few days he re-entered the Cabinet. Perceval had hardly time to congratulate himself on his retention of office when he was assailed by a lunatic. Negotiations were at once resumed. Wellesley and Castling refused to serve with Castlereagh, and failed to arrange terms with Greyville and Grey. The Whig Lords then attempted to form a Ministry, but alienated Moles, the friend and counsellor of the Prince, by claiming entire control of the Household appointments. In face of these difficulties, the Regent retained the Ministry and appointed Liverpool Prime Minister. He had had long official experience and possessed considerable tact; but he was chosen merely because he seemed least likely to divide the party; and the real head of the Cabinet was Castlereagh, who led the House of Commons. The Catholic Question was expressly left open; but, though *Peter Pyming's* Letters had set the country thinking, they had made but few converts at Westminster.

The Regent disliked business, and intervened little in purely political affairs; but his incapacity was great, and he was denounced as a Heretic by Leigh Hunt and lashed in Moore's stinging lampoons. His elevation to the Regency brought into greater prominence the quarrel with his wife. When the King became insane she lost her only protector; and her intercourse with her daughter was still more narrowly restricted. The Regent was not kinder to his daughter than to his wife; and when, in 1814, the Princess Charlotte broke off her engagement to the Prince of Orange, her household was diminished, and she became a virtual prisoner in a lodge in Windsor Forest. The royal visit of 1814 made the exclusion of the Princess of Wales still more painful; and in the autumn she went abroad. Her daughter was soon to find romance in a marriage of brief happiness.

The economic condition of the working-classes throughout the great war gave rise to the most anxious reflections. There was an almost unbroken succession of bad harvests from 1789 till the Peace of Amiens.

The attack on the King in 1725 made Pitt aware of the urgency of the problem, and led him to appoint a committee of enquiry. The report did not satisfy Wiltshire, who proposed to revive the old practice of setting wages at Quarter Sessions. Pitt opposed the demand, but undertook to introduce a comprehensive measure. His Bill advocated Schools of Industry for the destitute poor—the materials to be bought, the products to be sold, and the wages to be fixed by the local authorities. Land was to be bought or hired; and resources might be reckoned. Persons having more than two children were entitled to relief, and money for the purchase of a cow or some other animal might be advanced in deserving cases. The Bill was so sharply criticised in Parliament and subjected to so ruthless an analysis by Bentham that it was withdrawn. But the measures actually adopted were no less drastic. In 1795 the Berkshire Justice met at Spenshurst, and granted allowances from the rates according to the price of corn to supplement wages. Though this step was taken only in order to meet a local and temporary crisis, the allowance system was widely adopted. It largely contributed to reduce marriages, the raising of the rates, and the fall of wages. A second potent cause of suffering was the rapid increase of enclosures. Bakewell had improved the breeding of stock; but there was a great want of cereals. The problem of the food-supply became urgent with the expansion of population and the interruption of foreign trade. To develop the food-supply of England was the life-work of Arthur Young, and the object of the Agricultural Board of which he was the chief founder. A General Enclosure Act was passed in 1801; and over five million acres were added to the cultivated area of England and Wales during the war. But, though the change was economically profitable, it brought with it considerable hardships. The small farmers disappeared; pasture-rights were lost; and the labourer became entirely dependent on his wages. Village industries were gradually extinguished by the industrial revolution, and the high price of corn benefited the landlord and the farmer rather than the labourer.

The sufferings of the towns were still greater. The new conditions created by the industrial revolution, the rapid growth of population, heavy taxation, the closing of foreign markets, currency difficulties, fluctuations of trade, and the decreased purchasing power of the community, led to widespread distress. In the belief that action might be taken behind labour meetings, and in consequence of the rapid growth of unions among the textile workers of Yorkshire and Lancashire, a new Combination Act was passed in 1799. Though the law equally prohibited combinations of employers, its infringement on that side went unpenalised; and it was used to stifle the interests of labour in every possible way. In only one direction did the Legislature recognise the duty of protecting labour. The first Factory Act was passed in 1802 at the instance of the elder Sir Robert Peel, for the protection of

apparatus in cotton and other factories. But no adequate machinery was provided for its enforcement; and the Act is only important as the first step in the modern system of industrial regulation. If improvements were made, they were due to humane employers such as Robert Owen at New Lanark. The working-classes demanded fir protection against employers; but opinion in Parliament ran strongly in the contrary direction, and no alleviating measures were introduced.

Distress reached its climax in 1811-2, when the harvest failed all over Europe. The sufferings of the workers in certain trades were intensified by the introduction of machinery. In 1811 the looms of Nottingham were enabled to discharge a large number of workmen. An attack on the factories followed; and new machinery was destroyed before it reached the towns. The frame-breakers were called Luddites, after an ironworker who had formerly broken some stocking-frames. A law was hurried through Parliament, rendering the destruction of machinery a capital offence; but the movement spread rapidly through the Midlands. The most glorious period of British arms showed the time of the greatest misery at home.

The only way in which effective aid was rendered to the people during the reaction was in regard to education. In 1768 a young Quaker named Lancaster began to teach a few poor boys in a shed in south London. He soon had so many pupils that he adopted a system which had been applied by Dr Bell in Madras, by which children were set to teach one another. He formed a plan for spreading England with schools, and in 1810 his friends and supporters, including James Mill, Brougham, Platts, Rogers, and several Nonconformists, created the Royal Lancasterian Association, which in 1818 became the British and Foreign School Society. The movement, which was unsectarian, grew so rapidly that in 1811 a number of Churchmen, under the leadership of Joshua Watson, formed the National Society for the education of the poor in the principles of the Established Church. By these first organizations elementary education in England was carried on till the introduction of a national system in 1870.

In one other direction there was progress to be recorded. The criminal law was condemned by nearly all English opinion. Compassionate juries acquitted prisoners; and extreme sentences were rarely carried out. But Eddon and Ekeborough saw nothing to change; and it was with the utmost difficulty that Hurdly secured a reduction in the number of capital offences. Of greater importance was the abolition of imprisonment for debt. The noble efforts of the Thatched House Society had succeeded in buying out thousands of victims; but it was not till the evils were fully exposed in a report drawn up by Grey that action was determined on. The distinction between poverty and crime was at last recognised by the Act of 1825, which discharged debtors on rendering a true account of their debts and property, and

placed them under the jurisdiction of a Court. It was in the same year that Elizabeth Fry resolved to continue Howard's work, and paid her first visit to Newgate.

We turn now to the affairs of Ireland, with which, for the sake of clearness, it has been thought better to deal separately. The Regency question had thrown Irish politics into confusion: but, with the recovery of the King in February, 1789, the Administration resumed its power. Fitzgibbon, the Attorney-General, who had borne the brunt of the struggle, received a peerage, and shortly after succeeded to the Chancellorship. Pitt hoped that the termination of the dispute and the withdrawal of Buckingham would lead to quieter times; but, within a few days of the Viceroy's departure, the Whig Club was founded to maintain the principles enunciated in the Regency debates. Among its members were Charles Fox, the Duke of Leicester, Greville, Parsons, and George and William Pomeroy. Though not a few were individually in favour of parliamentary reform and Catholic emancipation, the club in its corporate capacity was a defensive rather than aggressive organisation, demanding nothing more revolutionary than Place and Parnock Bells and the reduction of sinecures. The crying needs of Ireland found no place in its programme, and it was to those needs that the more advanced members called attention when, in January, 1790, the new Viceroy, Lord Waterford, arrived, and Parliament assembled.

The interest in political discussion that had been kindled by the Regency debates was further stimulated by the events that were taking place in France. Religious disabilities and the tithe system—the two most acutely felt grievances under which Irish Catholics laboured—were mitigated by the first breaths of the Revolution: and the revolt of a people against misgovernment was viewed by the Presbyterians with the same approval that they had extended to the uprising of the American colonies. The Volunteers were urged to sell their arms; and resolutions were passed adopting the measures of the French reformers. When Parliament met in January, 1791, everyone was conscious that opinion was changing; but motions for enquiry were defeated, and a short session terminated without additions to the statute-book. The obvious failure of direct parliamentary attack set earnest reformers searching for other modes of influencing the Government. The Volunteer movement had been purely and even militantly Protestant; but the steady decline of religious bigotry among the educated classes, reflected in men as eminent as the Bishop of Derry, Holy Scriptures, and Elrwan, facilitated co-operation. In July the Belfast celebration of the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille was signalled by the demand for emancipation as well as reform. The acknowledgement by some Catholic bodies of a revolution in favour of the abolition of religious disabilities marks the first step towards the union of Presbyterians and Catholics.



The idea of cooperation that was stirring in many minds was set forth with convincing force in an anonymous pamphlet which appeared in September. Its author, who called himself a Northern Whig, was Wolfe Tone, a young Protestant lawyer already known to a wide circle of friends as a man of advanced views and unusual ability. The reforming Whig desired to extend and purify the existing Constitution; Tone boldly brushed aside the whole system of 1782. Three-fourths of the people were without political rights. The paralyzing influence of English domination could only be removed by the efforts of a united nation; so long as the sects were at war, the Administration could defy them both. The pamphlet circulated by thousands; and within a month the Society of United Irishmen was founded in Belfast to carry its ideas into practice. Communications were opened with the Catholic Committee; and a branch was speedily formed in the capital. Members of the United Irish Society pledged themselves to nothing more than Catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform; but the ultimate programme of some at least of the leaders indicated a standpoint that was new in Irish politics. In a letter written in the summer of 1791 Tone declared his opinion that separation from England would be the regeneration of Ireland; and the attitude of the Society as a whole towards England was from the beginning one of indifference verging on disaffection. In the second place, the United Irishmen frankly rejected the Whig philosophy. While Grattan declared an Upper Chamber indispensable and believed that a democratic franchise would lead to an attack on property, Tone pleaded for equal electoral districts, manhood suffrage, and annual parliaments. Finally, while Grattan was resolutely opposed to the use of force, Tone was prepared to employ whatever means were necessary to nationalise the government of Ireland.

While the Fourtyfivers and the advanced Protestant reformers were championing Catholic claims for their own purposes, the Catholics themselves were awakening from their slumbers. The Catholic Committee carried so little weight that in 1790 they could not induce any member of Parliament to present a petition. But the partial removal of restrictions had led to the growth of a prosperous middle class; and in John Keogh, a wealthy Dublin tradesman, the advocate of a more active policy found a leader. Frightened by schemes for political union with the Dominions, the conservative or country workers, led by Lord Kenmare and Piquet, recoiled. The control of the Committee passed into the hands of Keogh; and addresses from most of the towns approved the policy of the first plebeian leader of Irish Catholicism. In October, 1791, the Committee issued a strongly-worded demand for the abolition of the penal code, invited Richard Burke to be their agent, and determined to send a deputation to England.

Fitt and his principal colleagues were without the slightest taint of religious bigotry, and were convinced that the Catholics might be made

one of the most effective bulwarks against the onrush of the revolutionary flood—a constitution at fault with untold power by Burke in his *Letter to Sir Hercules Langrisht*. Before the deputation reached London, the Cabinet had occupied itself with the matter; and in December, 1791, Westminster was informed that far-reaching concession was considered indispensable. The Viceroy replied angrily that his advisers were unanimously opposed to such a departure, since the connexion of England with Ireland rested on the unimpaired maintenance of the Protestant ascendancy. Pitt attempted to postpone his larger schemes, but influenced the Viceroy that they were not abandoned. The introduction of a modest Relief Bill in the session of 1792 gave rise to little direct opposition. The measure opened to Catholics the lower branches of the legal profession, repealed the laws limiting the number of apprentices and relating to marriages with Protestants, and removed the absolute prohibition against educating their children abroad.

The Viceroy informed the Cabinet that the Catholics were grateful and satisfied, and that the country was tranquil; but the events that occurred during the same period led to a less sanguine conclusion. The Volunteers of Belfast sent an address to the French nation on the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. In Dublin, a military association, modelled on the National Guards, adopted as their emblem the harp without a cross, accompanied by the cry of liberty. This overt manifestation of republicanism was followed by the spread of French fashions; and Charlemont lamented that the Volunteers had long ceased to ask his advice. The Catholic Committee replaced Richard Burke by Tonn, who at once issued invitations to every priest to elect delegates to a Catholic Convention. In December, 1792, the Dublin United Irishmen invited the Volunteers to renounce their arms and resolved that a deputation should be sent to the forthcoming Convention. So threatening was the outlook that Grattan formed a society called the Friends of the Constitution, with the dual purpose of working for reforms which the Whig clubs would not officially recommend, and resisting republican tendencies. There was however at present little real dissension among the Catholics outside Dublin. The peasantry, the priests, the gentry, and the parsonage were almost unanimous; and, when the Catholic Convention met in December, even the Viceroy admitted the loyalty and moderation of its members. A petition to the King for the removal of Catholic disabilities was drawn up; and Keogh and four of his colleagues were deputed to present it. Pitt and Dundas at this point informed the Viceroy that the concessions which they had postponed must now be granted. The deputation was graciously received at Court; and in the King's Speech at the opening of the Irish Parliament in January, 1793, the condition of "His Majesty's Catholic subjects," no longer "Papists," was commended to the attention of members.

The Executive was the mouthpiece of the English Cabinet; and the

Chief Secretary introduced and carried a Relief Bill which the Irish Government had in the previous year assured Pitt would have no chance of passing. It gave the franchise to Catholics on exactly the same terms as to Protestants, swept away the remaining disabilities relating to property, admitted them to grand juries, allowed them to become magistrates, threw open to them degrees in Dublin University, permitted them, subject to a property qualification, to carry arms, and rendered them eligible to receive commissions in the army and navy, and to hold, with a few exceptions, any civil office. Grattan vehemently urged the Government to complete their work by admitting Catholics to Parliament, pointing out that to give power to the peasantry and withhold political influence from the gentry was to risk detaching the people from their natural leaders, whose loyalty was above suspicion; but Pitt had no mind to renew his struggle with the Irish Executive. Even without this addition, the Catholics gained a position superior to that occupied by them or by Protestant Nonconformists in England. It has been estimated that the number of electors in Ireland was tripled; and Catholic voters obtained a clear majority of votes in the rural constituencies outside Ulster and in many of the open towns. On the other hand, the private borough system was unaffected; and the Protestant ascendancy remained imperceptibly strengthened behind the association members, who formed a majority of the House of Commons.

During the same session the Government accepted a Place Bill, excluding revenue officers and holders of offices created after the passing of the Bill from sitting in Parliament, and made re-election necessary in the case of members accepting places of profit already in existence. The English Libel Act was adopted; an Appropriation Bill on the English model became law; and the East India trade was thrown open to Ireland. The Volunteer were suppressed in March, and a Corrupt Practices Act was passed to check the practice which had grown up of summoning large assemblies independent of Parliament; for, though the Catholic Convention had dissolved itself on the passage of the Relief Bill, the United Irishmen were planning a similar gathering. The longest, most eventful, and most profitable session since 1788 closed in August, 1793.

Outside Parliament, however, the horizon was overcast. Grattan's support of the war completed the breach between the Whigs and the radical reformers. The annual Synod of Ulster Presbyterians expressed its approval of the Relief Bill and its dislike of the war. Equally threatening was the attitude of the Catholic peasantry in certain districts. The quarrels of the Peep-of-Day Boys and the Defenders had originated about 1785 in Armagh, where the poorer Presbyterians wrecked the houses and chapels of Catholics. In 1791-4 the disturbances became so general that early in 1793 a Committee of the House of Lords was appointed to investigate the matter. The report showed that the Defenders had become a secret organisation, whose chief object was

the abolition of tithes; and that through this shared many of the Catholic peasantry were passing into the ranks of dissension.

The chief feature of the motion of 1794 was a Reform Bill, introduced by George Ponsonby and supported by Grattan. Each county, and the cities of Dublin and Cork, were to have a third member; and large tracts of the surrounding country were to be thrown into the small borough constituencies, the franchises being extended to ten pound freeholders. But the measure aroused little interest, and was rejected by a majority of three to one. Parliament was prorogued in March; and the situation of the Government was at once called to the United Irishmen. An Anglican dogmatist of low character, named Jackson, who had long resided in Paris, was sent by the French Government to discover what support the English democrats were likely to render in case of an invasion. Finding no encouragement in England, Jackson crossed to Dublin, taking with him an acquaintance who secretly reported his doings to the Government. At Jackson's request, Tone drew up a paper on the state of Ireland; but the document which was destined for Paris found its way to the Castle. Jackson was imprisoned; and the United Irishmen were in commotion. Tone was allowed to go into exile in the United States, but was compelled to leave behind him an account of his relations with Jackson, which would serve to convict him of treason if he returned. The Dublin Society of United Irish was broken up, and its papers were seized.

The junction of the dissentient Whigs with Pitt in 1794 ushered in one of the most important episodes in Irish history. The Whigs understood that Portland, the Home Secretary, was to have the chief direction of Irish affairs; and the vicereignty was offered to and accepted by Fitzwilliam, on the understanding that the appointment should not take effect till Westmoreland received some other post. Fitzwilliam at once began to make arrangements for taking office, and told Grattan that he looked to him and the Ponsonbys for counsel and support. The appointment, and the change of policy that it appeared to foreshadow, soon became known in Ireland. Pitt and Grenville, on learning from their Irish friends that there was open talk of a change in men and measures, were deeply annoyed; and, when Portland urged that Fitzwilliam's appointment should take effect, the relations between Pitt and his Whig colleagues became seriously strained. Pitt expected that nothing could be done till a place had been found for Westmoreland, and that the removal of Fitzwilliam, which was demanded by Grattan, was not to be entertained. It would be less, he wrote in a memorandum, that Fitzwilliam should not go to Ireland; but, in any case, his appointment must be on the understanding that all the *idea* of a change of system should be given up, and that no supporters of the Government should be displaced.

After some weeks of severe strain, Fitzwilliam was formally appointed.

The powers of the new Viceroy were not defined in writing; but, shortly before his departure, Pitt and Grenville met Portland, Spencer, Windham, and Fitzwilliam. No notes of the meeting were made at the time; but in March, 1793, after the quarrel had taken place, a memorandum was drawn up, probably by Grenville, and approved by the other Ministers present with the exception of Fitzwilliam. According to this, the new Viceroy said that he desired to admit the Purse-bills to places in the Government, and that he intended to reform the Revenue Board. Pitt assented to the former request; but, with respect to the latter, Fitzwilliam was to consult him before any step was taken. Besselford's name, according to the memorandum, was not mentioned. As regards emancipation, which was only briefly discussed, it was arranged that Fitzwilliam should endeavour to prevent its agitation; but, if it were strongly pressed, he was not to oppose it, though he was not to commit the Government without further instructions. It is thus clear that Fitzwilliam left England bound by definite though negative instructions.

The Viceroy landed in Dublin on January 4, 1793, and two days later dismissed several members of the Administration with prejudice. The most notable, John Besselford, though holding the subordinate office of Comptroller of the Revenue, possessed enormous borough influence, and occupied a position second only to that of Fitzgibbon, being often spoken of as the King of Ireland. Fitzwilliam afterwards stated that he had distinctly told Pitt that he might find it necessary to remove Besselford, and that the Premier had acquiesced by his silence. Pitt replied that he had no recollection of such an incident. In any case, a man of such importance should not have been removed without communicating with the Home Government; and Pitt was justified in declaring the step to be an open breach of a solemn engagement.

The Viceroy's attention had also been claimed by the Catholic Question from the moment of his arrival. Four days after landing, he informed Portland that it would be exceedingly impolitic and even dangerous not to grant cheerfully what the Catholics demanded, and that nothing could prevent the matter being brought before Parliament. On January 13 he wrote that he was endeavouring not to commit the Government, but that, if he received no orders to the contrary, he should acquiesce in the demand for the admission of Catholics to Parliament. The session of 1793 opened on January 26; and Fitzwilliam informed Portland of the unanimity of the Catholics and the readiness of the Protestants. No mention of concessions was made in the King's Speech; but the Viceroy acquiesced in Gutlin's giving notice of an emancipating measure. Despite the pressing communications of Fitzwilliam, Portland made no reference to the matter till February 2, when he urged the Viceroy not to commit himself. On the following day Pitt wrote censuring the removal of Besselford, but without mentioning the Catholic Question. Fitzwilliam replied that Pitt must choose between him and

Barnford; and to Portland he wrote that he would not risk a rebellion by deferring the measure. These letters crossed two from Portland, opposing the whole policy of emancipation. Without waiting for a reply, Portland wrote on February 18 in peremptory terms that Grattan's measure must go no further; and on February 19 the Cabinet agreed to Fitzwilliam's recall.

In the letter to Lord Castlereagh, in which Fitzwilliam defended his conduct, he asserted that the cause of his removal was not the Catholic Question but the dismissal of Barnford and the intrigues of Barnford's friends in England. In this opinion Grattan, Burke, and other friends of the Viceroy concurred. Westmoreland and Buckingham were indignant at the reversal of their policy; and Auckland, who was misled by Barnford, led Pitt to believe that the whole patronage of the Irish Government was passing into the hands of the *Protestants*. That Fitzwilliam's dismissals were a contravention of the understanding on which his appointment rested is beyond doubt. On the other hand, the House Government were not less to blame for their conduct in regard to the Catholic Question than was Fitzwilliam in respect of the dismissals. The silence of Pitt may be explained by the assumption that Portland did not show him the Irish despatches; but Portland's silence was utterly inexcusable. The most probable explanation seems to be that the Home Secretary, to whom all decisions were referred, had not made up his mind and allowed matters to drift. Meanwhile the King shared Fitzgibbon's view that the admission of Catholics to Parliament would involve a violation of his Coronation Oath, and drew up a memorandum, dated February 6, vetoing emancipation. The Cabinet met next day, apparently for the first time since Fitzwilliam's arrival in Dublin, and determined to resume and disavow the Viceroy. Portland received his cue, and wrote the letter to which reference has been made. Fitzwilliam was a warm-hearted and generous man, who saw clearly that the system of Irish government was a thoroughly vicious one; and that, if a policy of conciliation and reform was to be undertaken, it could not be carried out by men who were opposed to it. It would therefore have been best if he had refused to undertake the viceroyalty on the conditions imposed by Pitt; but, having accepted the terms, he ought to have observed them. The fact that his Whig friends and colleagues, Portland, Spencer, and Windham, approved his recall is conclusive evidence that he broke the agreement. It is possible, however, to blame Fitzwilliam's conduct, and yet to believe that his policy was sound. Pitt was in favour of admitting Catholics to Parliament; but the strong protests that reached him from Ireland determined him to defer emancipation till a Union had been accomplished. His conduct is intelligible; but his vacillation is more responsible for the tragic occurrences of the succeeding years than is the generous weakness of Fitzwilliam.

The news of Fitzwilliam's recall was received at Dublin Castle with

delight and disfigure with conformation. It was taken as a definite rejection of the Catholic claims; and large numbers of men hereafter despairing of achieving reform by peaceable means. The United Irish Society was already to a large extent a tremendous body; and the recall of Fitzwilliam gave an impetus to violent counsels and attracted many recruits. Fitzwilliam's recall was not the cause of the rebellion of 1796, but it intensified the bitterness and despair which were the principal factors in that event. The new Viceroy, Camden, son of the great judge, reached Ireland at the end of March, 1796. The promotion of Fitzgibbon to the earldom of Clare and the establishment of Maynooth College for the education of priests revealed the dual tendency of his policy. But Camden was a calculating personality; and Irish politics quickly relapsed into their chronic condition of conflict and repression. The Defenders became increasingly aggressive; and in September a sharp conflict occurred at the village of the Diamond in Arragh. Though the Catholics had the larger force, and were on this occasion the aggressors, they were defeated with considerable loss. The following day the first Orange Society was founded. For a time the new organisation was nothing more than a league of defence, almost confined to the Protestant peasantry of Ulster. But the Pop-of-Day Boys rapidly became merged in the Orangemen, and a terrible persecution followed. Houses and chapels were burned or wrecked; and hundreds of Ulster Catholics fled destitute into Connaught. The revival of fierce sectarian passions struck right at the heart of the scheme of the United Irishmen. Though it furthered their plans in so far as it frightened multitudes of the Catholic peasantry into their ranks, it put an end to their dream of a rebellion in which the two religions would fight side by side.

The union of 1796 was short and uneventful save for the passage of the Insurrection Act, inflicting crushing penalties on the taking of a seditious oath, authorising the search for arms, and empowering Justice to send men to the fleet without trial. The United Irishmen replied by forming a military organisation and ordering their members to procure arms. Arthur O'Connor, an able man of high birth, Thomas Emmet, a lawyer, and William James MacNevin, a physician, and a cultivated Catholic, joined the Society in the autumn; and the control of its policy passed into their hands. In December a French fleet sailed into Bantry Bay; but Bluster was far from Dublin, and its loyalty had not been affected. In March, 1797, General Lake, by order of the Viceroy, issued a proclamation which came near to a declaration of martial law in Ulster; and the march for arms led to horrible outrages by the yeomanry. A final attempt at conciliation was made by Gascoigne, who proposed a far-reaching Reform Bill, admitting Catholics to Parliament and the great offices of state, and introducing household franchise; but only thirty members supported him. Inside and outside the House his influence was gone. Together with George Ponsonby, Curran, and a

for others, he retired from Parliament. He disapproved both the conduct of the United Irishmen and that of the Government, and refused to encourage the one by attacking the other.

Sir Ralph Abercromby arrived in Ireland as Commander-in-Chief in December, 1795. Strongly disapproving the system of pure repression, he issued a General Order relating to the honor of the troops, and forbidding them to act, unless attacked, without the orders of a civil magistrate. The proclamation was a direct rebuke of the Government; and Abercromby was compelled to resign. Vain attempts to impose a check on military violence were made by Parsons, Blake, and Plunket, the last of whom was at this time brought into Parliament by Charlesworth. The United Irish movement was weakened by the confusion of arms, and by its want of skill, discipline, and unity. But the Executive believed that they had half a million members, and could count on 200,000 men to appear in the field. The insurrection, however, was deprived of much of its danger by the betrayal of its leaders. Arthur O'Connor was seized at Margate on his way to France on February 28, 1796. The Leinster Committee were seized in Rodd's house in Dublin on March 17; and Emmet and MacNeven were captured in other parts of the city. On March 20 martial law and free quarters were proclaimed; and the following weeks witnessed scenes of ferocity and horror. The result was to be treated by Lord Edward Fitzgerald, who had served in the American War and had been expelled from the army for attending a dinner given in Paris in 1792 to celebrate French victories. He had subsequently thrown himself frankly into the revolutionary movement, his noble birth and winning nature rendering him a formidable popular leader. Once was anxious that he should leave the country, but he refused to go; and on May 18 he was betrayed and seized after a desperate resistance, in which he received wounds of which he died. Two days later Henry and John Sheehy, who had assumed the direction after the arrest of the Leinster Committee, were captured.

The rebels were as sheep without a shepherd; but, since there were not more than 15,000 British troops in the island, they were not without hope. The mails on the roads round Dublin were stopped on the night of May 28; and next day the peasants gathered in arms in the counties of Wicklow, Dublin, and Meath, the rebels spreading rapidly into Carlow and Queen's County. The rising in the north was speedily quelled; but it flamed out in the south of Leinster, where it was not expected. In Wickford the rebels found leaders in Father Murphy, Father Roche, and Hall. After some successful skirmishes, Murphy entered Wickford with a force of 16,000 men, which rapidly swelled to 50,000. The rebels elected a Protestant, General Harvey, to command "the Army of the People," and with Wickford as a base began to march north. But reinforcements were reaching the Government; and Lake took the rebel



uncompromising on Vinegar Hill, and entered Wexford. The rebellion failed because there was no real harmony of aim between the Protestant and Catholic insurgents. The Protestants realised that, if it succeeded, they would become an inconsiderable minority in a Catholic and independent Ireland; and the success of the rebels gave the rising the character of a religious war. Thus the greater part of Ulster stood aloof. Connaught and Munster remained tranquil; and the priests, with some notable exceptions, took no share in the rebellion.

On the outbreak of the revolt, Cornwallis was induced to accept the viceroyalty, combined with military control. When he landed on June 30, the rebellion was almost over, but passion was running high. His letters lessen the ferocity of the troops; and he describes the conversation at his table as turning on hanging, shooting, and burning. He stood out boldly for clemency, and succeeded in some degree in stemming the tide of vengeance. A few of the rebels were executed and a few transported; but the majority were allowed to return to their homes. The rebels were defended by Carron, but were hanged on July 14. Thomas Emmet, Arthur O'Connor, and MacNeven consented to give information as to the movement, on condition of being allowed to go into exile. Severely was the insurrection over when Humbert, with a French force, landed in Kildare; but he soon surrendered to overwhelming forces. A large French expedition started in October, which also failed. Tone, who had accompanied it, was taken prisoner and condemned by court-martial, but committed suicide in prison. Till the Reader of the United Irishmen, the ablest foe of the English connexion, was dead, the danger could not be said to be past.

The rebellion and the invasion turned men's thoughts once more to the idea of a Union. The legislature had been combined by Cornwallis; and a Union was demanded by both Irish Houses under Queen Anne. Adam Smith advocated it in conjunction with free trade; and Montagu expressed to Castlereagh his approval of the idea. Every living ex-Yanney except Fitzwilliam had long wished for it. On the other hand, the growth of national sentiment had changed the opinion of Irishmen. Arthur Young found the project highly unpopular; and the debates on the commercial propositions and the Regency proved that the Parliament was jealous of the slightest infringement of the settlement of 1782. It was not till the Relief Bill of 1798 that the idea began to find support with the champions of the English connexion. The dispute with Fitzwilliam strengthened Pitt's inclination for a Union; but it was not till after the rebellion that he came to regard it as essential to the preservation of the Empire. So early as June, 1798, he was studying the Scottish Act of Union with Grenville; and Auckland's advice was asked in regard to the commercial and financial settlement. Cornwallis approved the proposal; and Castlereagh, who had lately been appointed Chief Secretary, became its strongest advocate.

It is not difficult to understand the considerations that appeared with varying force to different sections of Irish opinion. The Protestants were alarmed for their lives, their property, and their Church, and may well have felt the need of closer connexion with England. Even many who were animated by friendly sentiments towards the Catholics believed that to open Parliament to them would endanger the Protestant ascendancy; while to retain the disqualifying laws seemed to ensure the permanence of discontent. On the other hand, the lawyers perceived that their professional opportunities would be diminished; the official classes feared the loss of their posts; and the borough-corpors feared the disappearance of their political influence. There was also a class, weak in numbers but strong in character and ability, to whom the maintenance of a separate national life outweighed in importance any dangers which the continuance of the Irish Legislature might involve. The Catholics were less divided; and Curran's pertinently remarked that they considered any change better than the present system. If emancipation had been included, Catholic Ireland would have unflinchingly supported the scheme. The opposition of the capital may be largely explained on commercial grounds.

In the autumn of 1798 the Government employed Cooke, the Under-Secretary, to state the arguments for a Union. He dwelt on the benefits of the Union with Scotland and the desperate preponderance of France in Europe, and held out hope of a provision for the priests. With the appearance of Cooke's pamphlet the great debate fairly commenced. Meetings of the Dublin San, the Dublin corporation, and the bankers and merchants condemned the plan, the speakers dwelling on the certain increase of absenteeism, and the probable sweeping of the National Debt, and denoting the Scottish analogy on the ground that Scotland had been poor and Ireland was flourishing. But the Government was not to be deterred from its course. Parnell was dismissed from the Exchequer; anti-Unionists' officials were replaced by Unionists. When Parliament met in January, 1799, the project was attacked by Foxmaul, Parsons, Parnell, Joseph Harrington, Burke, and Puckett, Castlereagh standing almost alone in its support. An amendment to the Address condemning a Union was only defeated by one vote; and a second amendment to expunge the paragraphs of the Address relating to a Union was carried by five; but, when Foxmaul tried to pledge the House against future consideration of a Union, several anti-Unionists protested, and the motion was withdrawn. In the Lords the Address was carried by 38 to 17. A speech delivered by Pitt was at this stage widely distributed by the Government. He declared that a Union would give Ireland security and wealth, and he promised to keep the debts separate and to resist the increase of taxation. The problems that confronted Ireland (he said) could only be settled by a Legislature free from local prejudices: a voluntary association of the two countries was not objection but

partnership. The Irish Opposition started by forcing a Recess Bill to debate the repetition of the crisis of 1789; but Castlereagh pointed out that it did not provide for such dangers as the refusal of supplies for war or the imposition of commercial restrictions on English goods. In this debate, the Speaker, Foster, delivered a speech which contains the most powerful presentation of the case of the anti-Unionists. He had supported the Government in its opposition to the Catholics and its struggle with anarchy; and he was considered the greatest living authority on Irish measures and issues. He asserted that taxation would increase, and that the material progress of the last two decades would be jeopardised; he reviewed the circumstances and probable fortunes of the leading industries, and pointed out that the Irish members would be a powerless minority in an ignorant and indifferent Parliament.

The matter, however, was not to be settled by argument. The work of the union is portrayed in the letters of the High-minded Viscount: "My occupation is most unpleasant, negotiating and juggling with the most corrupt people under heaven. How I long to kick those whom my public duty obliges me to court!" Nearly all the great borough-owners were willing to consent to a Union if they received compensation for the loss of their influence. Pitt had adopted this principle in his Reform Bill of 1796; and even the United Irishmen included compensation of borough-owners in their scheme. Eighty boroughs, about a third of which belonged to opponents of the Union, were bought at the market price of £115,000 apiece; and the sum was added to the National Debt. In the case of boroughs which came to send one member to the joint Parliament, no compensation was given for the suppression of a second seat. In some cases, where a borough-owner was doubtful, the promise of a postage was employed to turn the scale. During the same sixty-three seats were vacated. A few of the vacancies were caused by the dismissal of officials who opposed the Union, but the greater number by the resignation of nominees. Finally, government patronage was steadily carried in the same direction. One hundred and seventy members who held places or pensions knew that their promotion and even their tenure depended on their support of the Union. Direct money bribes were almost unknown, for they were scarcely needed. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that during the later months of 1799 the action of a Union gained ground independently of corruption. A general idea of the measure projected was given to leading men; and Curran's declaration that outside Dublin the feeling of the masses was indifferent. The active opposition was almost confined to Ulster, to those who were interested in maintaining the existing system, and to the little band of Nationalists who followed Grattan.

The Irish Parliament met for the last time in January, 1800. Dublin was as hostile as ever, and the Orange lodges sent numerous resolutions against the project; but the parliamentary majority was now secured,

and Castlereagh explained the details of the proposal. The debts and taxation were to remain separate, and Ireland was to pay two-sevenths towards its Imperial expenditure. The commercial clauses were modelled on those of 1783. Though nothing was promised, the Chief Secretary hinted that an arrangement for both Catholics and dissenting clergy was under consideration. Two hundred seats were to be extinguished, and Ireland was to be represented by one hundred members—the counties to return sixty-four, Dublin and Cork two each, thirty-one other towns and Dublin University one each; while four spiritual peers were to sit in rotation, and twenty-eight representative peers to be elected for life. Foster delivered another powerful speech, demonstrating that, in offering the Union as an alternative to bankruptcy, Castlereagh was guilty of gross exaggeration, the financial distress being due to specific causes. Foster, who had lately sought re-election, took higher ground. He predicted that the Union would be one of parliaments, not of peoples. To destroy the Parliament was to destroy an organ of national intelligence, a source and symbol of healthy national life. Ireland would become subordinate without ceasing to be separate.

The fundamental weakness of the settlement of 1801 was that the Irish Administration was responsible not to the Irish but to the English Parliament. Friction between the Legislature and the Executive was thus almost inevitable, and was likely to increase with the growth of a vigorous national consciousness. The opponents of the Union pointed to the loyal record of Parliament, but did not deny that it was within its power to thwart the policy of England. The second weakness of the settlement was that Parliament represented only one of the three religious bodies into which Ireland was divided; and that a precise representation might overthrow the Protestant ascendancy and thereby endanger the connection with England. Whether national sentiment would have proved strong enough to overcome sectarian animosities and to weld the Churches and the mass into a loyal and homogeneous community, is a question which can never be answered with certainty. Grattan believed there would not be a Catholic majority, and that in any case the loyalty of the Catholics was secure; but he underestimated the risk to the Protestant ascendancy, of which he was a professed supporter. Thus the Union cannot be judged as a separate event. It was brought about by a number of circumstances, some of which were inherent in the Irish problem, while others were due to the selfishness and malice of the English and Irish Governments. Its defence must rest on the dual ground that, at least after 1788, the continuance of the Irish Legislature seemed likely to prove a source of weakness to Great Britain in her deadly struggle with France, and that it was the necessary preliminary to complete Catholic emancipation. If these grounds are accepted as conclusive, they must be borne in mind in judging of the means by which the Union was accomplished. If a Union was necessary,

these means were necessary; for in no other way could it have been achieved. But it was a settlement by compulsion, not by consent; and the penalty of such methods is that the instrument possesses no moral validity for those who do not accept the grounds on which it was adopted. Pitt had hoped that Ireland would become a partner in the Empire; but she found herself a dependency, her true position being revealed by the presence of a hundred members at St. Stephen's. It was also Pitt's intention that the Union should be followed by concessions to the Catholics. Their most pressing needs were the commutation of tithes, the endowment of the priests, and the admission of Catholics to Parliament. The first and second were approved by many who realised the chief; but with the fall of Pitt the opportunity was lost. Emancipation and the commutation of tithes had to wait till their concessions started no healing influence, and the endowment of the clergy had become impossible. The Union, as Pitt designed it, might have proved a blessing for Ireland; as it was accomplished, it merely added to the store of bitter memories which constitutes the Irish problem.

The Union once carried, Ireland became quiet and almost indifferent. The brilliant society of the capital broke up, and the country sank back into the lethargy and provincialism from which Flood and the Volunteers had aroused it. But the fall of Pitt, bringing with it the resignation of Cornwallis and Castlereagh, was a bitter disappointment to the Catholics. The new Treasury, Hardwicke, the Chief Secretary, Abbot, and Belsham, who succeeded Clare as Chancellor in 1801, were openly anti-Catholic. On the other hand, the Administration was mild and honest. Catholic chapels which had been burned or wrecked were rebuilt at public expense. The Prince of Antrim extinguished the hope of French aid; and a reaction followed the excitement of the Union. The harvest of 1801 was good; and increased expenditure was covered by loans.

In the summer of 1802 Belsham wrote to Addington that the satisfaction he had previously expressed had been premature, and that nothing but the fear of consequences prevented a rebellion. The chief danger was to be apprehended from the survivors of the United Irishmen, who found a leader in Robert Emmet, younger brother of Thomas Addis Emmet, and a comrade and fellow-student of Thomas Moore at Trinity College. Robert Emmet left Ireland in 1801 for Paris, where he met his brother and Russell, the friend and colleague of Tone; but Napoleon gave him so little encouragement that he returned to Ireland next year. The elder brother remained as the accredited agent of the executive, and his diary shows that French aid was still expected; but Robert, contrary to the advice of Arthur O'Connor and other allies, determined not to wait for help which might never come. Arms were accumulated in Dublin; Russell was sent to organise a revolt of Ulster; and Emmet spent a capable and daring campaign in Miss Byrne. But treasury was at work; and the Government received frequent reports as to the

progress of the plot. On July 16, 1805, the city was startled by an explosion of gunpowder in Emmet's depot; but the Fliccos thought it best to take no action. A week later, at ten o'clock in the evening, a rocket gave the signal, and a few hundred men hurried to hotel-quarters. Fliccos were hurried out, and Emmet found himself at the head of an undisciplined rabble. But his followers, though he incited them to the Castle, lacked determination. While they hesitated, the carriage of Lord Kilwarden, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, approached. The horses were stopped; Kilwarden and his nephew were seized by force; and his daughter, escaping in the confusion, carried the news to the Castle. Emmet had been powerless to stop the slaughter; and the appearance of a body of troops quickly nullified the crowd. Next day the insurrection broke out in Ulster; but it was at once suppressed, and Russell was captured and hanged. Emmet took refuge in the Wicklow Hills and might have escaped to France; but he wished, before he fled, to see Sarah Curran, the great advocate's daughter, to whom he was attached. He visited Dublin, was betrayed, arrested, and hanged. The rising caused the greatest alarm. The British Corps Act was suspended, and martial law was proclaimed. Suspects were arrested and kept in prison without trial. The system of coercion thus introduced continued, except during the short interval of the George Canning Ministry, throughout the war.

On the news of Emmet's rising, Lord Ringal armed his treasury and placed them at the disposal of the Government. As a mark of recognition he was appointed a magistrate; but the Chancellor, in transmitting the warrant, took occasion to accuse Catholics of want of loyalty. His letter aroused great indignation, and it was determined to petition Parliament. Accordingly, when Pitt returned to office, Ringal and other prominent Catholics pressed their claims. Pitt regretfully replied that he could do nothing during the lifetime of the King. The matter was debated in 1808, when Gifford made the first and perhaps the greatest of his few speeches in the Imperial Parliament. On the death of Pitt, the Duke of Bedford became Lord-Lieutenant; and the aspects of the Emmet rising were liberalized. For a brief interval Ireland was governed by the military law of the land; but, on the fall of the Whigs, the Duke of Richmond, a man of unswerving Orange sympathies, became Lord-Lieutenant; and Lord Mansfield, an equally strong anti-Catholic, began his twenty years' chanceryship. Baines, an able lawyer of high character but narrow views, became Attorney-General, and virtually governed Ireland till the arrival of Peel.

The Catholic Committee gave scarcely a sign of life for some years after the Union; but in 1808 an energetic protest against its illegality was made by a lawyer well known in the Courts though as yet unknown beyond them. Baines in 1813, and adjusted in France, Daniel O'Connell

had derived from the banner of the Revolution an abiding attachment to democracy and a hatred of slavery. He was one of the few Catholics who openly denounced the Union; but he did not speak again on political matters till 1806, when he presided the Convention in person. He continued to urge greater activity, and in 1809 he was unanimously elected chairman. Hereafterward the history of the Catholic movement in Ireland, to be described in a subsequent volume, is the history of O'Connell.

O'Connell had never concealed his opinion that the repeal of the Union was essential to the restoration of the national life. Foxley, Keble, Keble, and other opponents of the Union had come to accept it. Grattan announced in 1810 that he would only work for repeal if the country unambiguously desired it; and he afterwards declared that, as the marriage had taken place, it was his duty to make it fruitful. But in 1808 there had been symptoms of discontent among the merchants of Dublin; and in 1810 a meeting was held in the Exchange, at which resolutions in favour of repeal were carried. O'Connell declared that Ireland was governed by foreigners, but the Catholics had nothing to hope from repeal, and their attitude was one of indifference. In Ulster anti-Union sentiment had almost disappeared by 1812. The *Anglo-Irish* had been increased; Orange lodges had multiplied; anti-Catholic sentiment had revived. The linen trade, almost alone among the industries of Ireland, improved; and Belfast was growing into a prosperous port. On the other hand, the economic condition of the Catholic peasantry was not improved by the Union. The Irish Cattle Laws of 1784 had led to a great increase of tillage; and because as the export of corn and the growing English demand led to excessive subdivision of farms, there rose with the competition for land, and wages fell. Disturbances spread; and Threshers and Bilkmen appeared in protest against tithes and high rents. Taxation was nearly doubled, and Ireland was compelled to borrow. By the end of the war her debt had risen from £16,800,000 to £118,000,000; and the time contemplated by Pitt and Castlereagh when the debts and contributions of the two countries should be in the same ratio had arrived. In 1815 a Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to consider the financial relations, and reported in favour of the consolidation of the Exchequers.

Though the closing years of the great struggle with France were not marked by the terrible distress which threw a dark shadow over England, the outlook for Catholic Ireland was exceedingly gloomy. In England it was possible, beneath the thick crust of Tory rule, to detect the germ of a new life. In Ireland it seemed as if the soul of the people was dead. There have been periods of far greater conscious suffering and material hardship; but at no time since the Union has there been witnessed such apathy, such hopelessness, such spiritual degeneration.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

## THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

## I.—INDIA AND CYPRUS (1782-1812).

When Warren Hastings sailed from Calcutta on February 8, 1785, he left behind him established authority and ideas of government and policy such as no British representative before him had set forth in India. He had made it impossible for England to be content with a trading interest, to hold herself apart from the intricacies and passions of native politics, or to disdain a knowledge of Oriental literature and philosophy, and the geographical and historical conditions of Eastern life. For good or ill, England, in the guise of the East India Company, had become a partner in the development of the vast Indian peninsula. Would she remain content with a merely boundary concern in the struggle of dynasty and adventurer, and in the welfare or distress of millions of real inhabitants; or would her agents, by ambition or by the sheer force of circumstances, be led to fight for supremacy, diplomatic, political, and eventually territorial? The next twenty years were to give a final answer to this question.

A year of lunatic success in the British administration the vigorous rule of Hastings. John Macpherson, an officer in the Corsica, succeeded to the post of Governor-General. Though he had only since 1788 been prominent in Calcutta, he had long been concerned in Indian affairs. But his association with the financial transactions of the Nawab of Arcot (or the Carnatic) had not been free from suspicion; and there was little confidence in his capacity as a statesman. In the hope of holding his high position for a term of years, he began by an attempt at revenue reform; but in this his successor could not find that he had achieved any success. Macpherson's government, wrote Lord Cornwallis in the next year, for the private information of Dundas and Pitt, "had no authority, and the greatest frauds were daily committed before their faces; their whole conduct, and all their pretensions to economy, except in the reduction of salaries, were a series of delusions."

In the familiar business of the Nawab of Arcot's debts, Macpherson



inherited the difficulties of Hastings and the troublesome assistance of Lord Macartney, the Governor of Madras. This vigorous and independent official had pursued a policy of his own at Madras, which was, perhaps too harshly, terminated by his resignation, on the news of the appointment of John Halliday as his successor; but he visited Calcutta in the summer of 1788 in order to impress his views on Macpherson; and he was not without hope of returning to India as Governor-General.

It was a period when popular interest in Indian affairs had for the first time been aroused, when the excitement caused by the India Bills had not yet subsided, and when Great Britain first showed a sense of her growing responsibilities in the East. But there was no agreement among either statesmen at home, or those in India, as to the right course to be adopted in that country. The difficulties were appreciated by Pitt and Dundas, and they determined to inaugurate a new system by sending out to India a statesman of distinction, unfettered by past experience or local ties. Lord Macartney seemed to them inadmissible, not only because of his close association with Anglo-Indian party feeling, but because he insisted upon receiving an English passport as a preliminary to his appointment as Governor-General. In 1784 Lord Shelburne had offered the post to Charles, Earl Cornwallis, to whom James had referred as a young man whose spirited conduct might atone for the delicacy of his understanding, but whose military abilities were somewhat discredited by his surrender at Yorktown in 1781. In 1788 the offer was repeated by Pitt; and, now that the East India Act had largely increased the power of the office, it was accepted. A Supplementary Act (1788) conferred still greater powers upon the Governor-General and the Governors of the different Presidencies; and in 1789 the Declaratory Act gave the Board of Control power to send troops to India without having regard to the wishes of the Directors.

Cornwallis sailed for India on May 8, 1788. He touched at Madras on August 24, and reached Calcutta on September 14. From the moment of his arrival he found himself beset with difficulties, which the outgoing incompetence of Macpherson had rendered acute. The most serious of these was the entanglement proceeding from the war of 1782, waged by Tipu, the Sultan of Mysore, against the Marathas and the Nizam. Nizam Ferozshah, the guardian and minister of the sixth Maratha Peshwa, had applied to Boscawen for assistance, and, referred to Calcutta, had been informed by Macpherson that the Treaty of Salbai (1763) stipulated, not that the friends and enemies of the two States should be equal, but that neither party should afford assistance to the enemies of the other, while the Treaty of Mangalore forbade the English to assist the enemies of Tipu. Nizam then applied to the Portuguese. Macpherson scented a new danger, and sent Charles Warren Skelton as resident to Poona; and an offer of troops from Boscawen was authorized. Cornwallis immediately repudiated the transaction as contrary

to treaty. But the difficulties were even more pressing in internal than in external affairs; and it was as a reformer of British administration that the new Governor-General was chiefly to be feared. A man of sensitive honour and devoted to duty, he had taken office only on the grant of full powers in both civil and military matters; and, empowered as he was by the Supplementary Act of 1793 to act on occasion even against the votes of the majority of his Council, he regarded the authority placed in his hands as the only chance of "saving this country." "Mr Fox's plan," said he, "would have ruined all." He proceeded to act with decisive vigour in regard to the scandals above which still clung to the British administration.

Maiphume had spoken of "the relaxed habits" of the public service in India. This meant the system of small salaries and large perquisites, and the numerous number of half-recognised methods of obtaining money to which British officials had resort—embezzlement, offices at native Courts, jobbing agencies, vicarious of many different kinds; to which must be added the abuse of the Directors' patronage, and of the influence of powerful persons at home, among whom the Prince of Wales was conspicuous. For these years Cornwallis devoted himself to the suppression of such abuses; and his determination, dignity, and untainted personal honour enabled him to succeed. He persuaded the Court of Directors to augment salaries, on the principle that good pay is the parent of good work; and he left behind him a purified and energetic public service.

No less vitally did his work affect the nature of British rule in India when he took in hand the reform of the police system and the revenue settlement of Bengal. Hitherto the Company's collectors had enjoyed certain powers of civil jurisdiction, while the criminal law had been administered by the *Nazib Nizam* and his native assistant, from whose there was appeal to the *Sadr Divali Adalat* (supreme civil Court) and the *Nizamat Adalat* (supreme criminal Court) respectively. This system resulted in both uncertainty of jurisdiction and diversity of practice; punishments were irrationally severe or absurdly len. Over all the districts of the Bengal territory Cornwallis placed British judges and magistrates; and above these he established Provincial Courts of Appeal at Calcutta, Patna, Dacca, and Munshisabad. Under the magistrates were placed *daroghas*, or heads of police, who had authority to arrest and to take bail. The Mohammedan Code was followed in criminal cases, the barbarity of its punishments being mitigated, and its rules of evidence relaxed, in accordance with English principles. In civil cases Hindu or Mohammedan usages assisted the British magistrate to deal with the intricacies of religious and social custom. The changes introduced by Cornwallis marked an era in the British occupation; they defined jurisdiction and created procedure; and the Regulations of 1793 practically formed a new Code, which has been the basis of all subsequent legislation. They bear the marks of an anxious regard for civil and

religious feeling among different classes and creeds, and of a clear and orderly method, which replaced the inconsistent and arbitrary arrangement of the earlier days of British occupation. It was their great aim to replace the privilege of the conquerors by a full recognition of ground rights. Government, in its own words, "directed itself of the power of infringing in its executive capacity on the rights and privileges" which it had rendered upon the landholders. The judicial reforms were, indeed, intimately connected with the central fact of Cornwallis' administration, the Permanent Settlement of Bengal (1793).

The difficulties connected with the land revenue demanded the attention of the Governor-General from the moment of his arrival in India. Hastings had dealt with them by way of enquiry and of tentative reference to reach a standard rate of assessment; but his determined rival, Philip Francis, had opposed the view that the *zamindars*, who were the farmers of the revenue and collected it from the *raiyats*, had individual, if restricted, proprietary rights; and the Directors had concluded that it was with them that a permanent settlement must be made. They condemned the frequent changes of system, the failure of all attempts to increase the revenue, and the accumulating arrears; and they had assumed that there was already sufficient information in the possession of the Government in India to justify a coherent and permanent reform. They regarded the settlement of the revenue as part of the reorganisation of the Government at Calcutta, which they directed in a letter from the Court at the end of 1789. The Bengal Government was to consist of four branches—a Board of Council, a Military Board, a Board of Revenue, and a Board of Trade, each with definite duties. The Revenue Board was to order an assessment of the revenue, to last for ten years, and then, if satisfactory, to become permanent. The plan of the Directors was made; Cornwallis was to carry it out.

The Governor-General was thus in no sense the originator of the Permanent Settlement; nor was he personally responsible for any theory of Indian ownership which assimilated their position to that of English landholders. Though he came with instructions, he came with an open mind; and he was soon convinced that there was not as yet enough information to justify a permanent arrangement. He entrusted to John Shore the preparation of an exhaustive paper on the proposed settlement. The point of most critical importance was the position of the Bengal *zamindars*—were they merely the government agents for the collection of taxes, or were they the hereditary owners of the land, subject only to the tax due to the Government? Shore held that the proprietary right belonged to the *zamindars*; the position of the *talukdars*, or intermediate owners, was left more vague; and there were many other classes whom it was difficult to bring into a consistent scheme. Shore's view, however, was clear; he summed it up in an

ancient saying, that "the land belonged to the *zemindars* and the rest to the King"; and this view was on the whole accepted.

All the end of 1789 plans were matured for the settlement of the revenue; and these plans involved the substitution of uniform statutory titles among the *landholders* for uncertain and fluctuating customary rights. While these legal rights were given to a large class of *landlords*, the position of the cultivators was to be secured by a universal system of declaratory leases. Hence, as it proved, lay the weak point of the settlement. The settlement with the *zemindars* was unassailable; but the rights of the cultivators were not sufficiently secured. The *zemindars* were recognised as the owners of the soil on the payment of a fixed *land-tax*, which was not to be increased; the rents of the independent cultivator were not to be raised; registers of tenants were to be kept; and the cultivators were to receive leases (*pattas*), and to have the remedy of civil action if these were infringed.

Was this settlement, which was designed at first to be for ten years, to be made permanent? Cornwallis wished this; but Shore, with fuller knowledge of local conditions, deprecated it. The Directors at home deliberated for ten years, having before them elaborate arguments on both sides; but at last they accepted the view of Cornwallis. On March 22, 1792, the Governor-General declared the settlement to be permanent. This act, the most important that had affected native society under British government, had undoubtedly the effect of creating a feeling of security in the native mind with regard to British rule. It showed that the Company intended to be honest, and to be just. But it caused very grave evils. Defective statistics of area and value led to enormous hardships. It was impossible to create a uniform system by a stroke of the pen; and an agrarian and social revolution was the result, in which the old landed class of Bengal was broken up. A strain of practicality, legality, exactness, was placed upon the ancient *rigas*, which they were unable to bear; and a large part of Bengal changed hands. Middlemen ousted the old families and oppressed the cultivators. A new class of *zamindars* was soon called into existence, who managed their estates on purely business principles. The cultivators were the sufferers; the legal protections proved nugatory; and twenty years later a Governor-General found their position "desperate." It was not till 1859 that they were legally secured in the right of which it had never been intended to deprive them.

Though Cornwallis was not the originator of the Permanent Settlement, it is with his name that the act is indelibly associated. He was the statesman who carried it through; he brought together divergent opinions, worked out a coherent policy, and embodied it in a permanent enactment. British authority showed itself content with much less than the ancient conquerors of Bengal had wanted, willing to make sacrifices for the benefit of its subjects, and desirous of building a fabric

of good government as the security and happiness of the people. It may be that the results were not equal to the expectations; but the principles embodied in the Settlement were of the first importance in the history of a great experiment—that of governing a vast Eastern territory by the methods and means of the West.

In the external relations of the East India Company within the Indian peninsula Cornwallis did important work, but nothing which takes rank with the police or the revenue reforms. He was divided, but not bigoted, in his view of the wisdom of non-intervention; but events were too strong for him. His action may be briefly summarised. The long-standing difficulty with Oudh became for a moment acute. The maintenance of two brigades of British trained troops caused a heavy drain; and the other pecuniary burdens were no less oppressive. Discontent grew dangerous. Cornwallis believed Oudh to be in need of military defence. British force at the moment, he thought, did not stand high; Colonel Baillie's defeat at Peshawar (1793) was known all over India; Sindia and the Sikhs were growing in power; the British troops could not be reduced. But Cornwallis diminished the demand on the treasure of the Nawab Wazir from 84 to 50 lacs, and he drove from the oppressed country as many of the pilfering European adventurers, agents, and jobbers, as he could. In northern India the British position was hampered by the projects, shared often without reason, of the French. Before the Revolution, isolated adventurers were believed to receive support from Versailles; a little later the East became prominent in the vast schemes of Bonaparte. In 1798 French-India and all the French settlements were easily taken; but the danger came from Europe.

In 1798 British relations with the Nizam reached one of the recurrent crises which disturbed the politics of the Madras Presidency. The Nizam, placed between the Peshwa of Poona, and Tipu Sultan of Mysore, intrigued and shuffled; only on the proposal of a matrimonial alliance from the latter did he turn towards the English. Cornwallis found himself in a difficulty which the framers of the Regulating Act (1773) ought to have foreseen. Danger from Tipu was evidently growing; alliance with native Princes without leave from home was forbidden; but time pressed. The Governor-General kept the Act's letter but broke it in spirit by writing a letter to the Nizam, which he declared to be of force as binding as a treaty. He promised to supply the troops which the Nizam declared to be essential to his safety; he stipulated that they were not to be used against the allies of the British; and, when he enumerated these allies, he omitted the name of Tipu. A mass of rectification clauses in the documents of the day round this somewhat shifty series of a high-principled man. Tipu intended war; and it is doubtful whether Cornwallis accelerated it.

On December 22, 1798, Tipu attacked Travancore. Cornwallis,

who had previously instructed Holkar, the Governor of Madras, to promise assistance—an instruction which had not been carried out—determined to defend the Bijja. He made a truce league with the Marathas (June 1) and the Nizam (June 4, 1781); and three campaigns against Mysore followed. Into the details of these campaigns it is unnecessary to enter; but they presented features which give them special importance. The Governor-General himself took command in 1781: there was a pomp and magnificence in the proceedings which impressed on the people the fact that British rule was Imperial, like the rule of the Moghuls before it. But, on the other hand, the inadequacy of British preparations was soon evident. Supplies were insufficient; the country was almost unknown; native allies proved of little assistance. British officers themselves were forced to admit the failure of their equipments; and Cornwallis' first campaign ended in retreat. At the end of February, 1782, however, peace was won at the gates of Seringapatam. One-third of Tipu's dominions was surrendered to the allies; and an indemnity of £3,000,000 was exacted. The gallant little State of Coorg, long oppressed by Tipu, was freed from his grasp; and in despatches it was plainly hinted that, if the Mohammedan Prince proved refractory, the old Hindu dynasty might be restored in Mysore itself.

Whatever may be thought of the wisdom of Cornwallis' action as regards Mysore, it can hardly be doubted that in the Carnatic his action was disastrous. He undertook the management of the country for a time in such a way as to destroy all chance of an efficient native administration. The treaties of 1782 and 1783, the latter of which placed the Carnatic under the administration of Madras, were ineffective and inadequate solutions of a difficulty which demanded a decisive solution. In October, 1793, Cornwallis sailed for England. He left behind him the reputation of a just and honorable administrator; and his creative work was the most enduring that Englishmen had, so far, accomplished in India.

Still greater interest was aroused by the impeachment of Warren Hastings. While exiles in Paris were representing the Governor as a villain as well as a traitor to St. James' for his ill-gained wealth, Burke was denouncing him as the plunderer of Bengal and the murderer of Nusrat-un-Nissa. On April 23, 1788, the charges were preferred; on February 18, 1789, the trial began in Westminster Hall. As a ceremonial display, it was equal to anything that London had seen in the century; and in eloquence Sheridan and Burke had never been surpassed. Great interest and party passion were alike aroused; politics and fashion combined to make the trial of the great man who had saved the British possessions in India a scene of excitement and emotion unsurpassed even in that historic place. Of the charges it is here enough to say that hardly a single act of Hastings' administration was left un criticised; but, while they dealt with details, it soon became plain enough that the true reason for the

impediment were, first, the private animosity of Philip Francis, and, secondly, the public policy of the party of Pitt. These were blended by the fiery genius of Burke, who took up the cause as far the possibility of a great malfeasance, when unprejudiced study might have led him rather to champion a great ruler who was the victim of ignorance and passion. The charges, in the end, centred round the execution of Nussanwar, the treatment of Chait Singh, and the pecuniary transactions from the Begums of Oude; in Burke these were "the damned and damnable proceedings of a judge in hell; and such a judge was Warren Hastings." But within two years, while the slow course of the trial dragged on, illuminated only by the flashes of Burke's gorgeous invective, the public interest in the whole question declined. That Hastings was not selfish, cruel, or unprincipled, was becoming apparent to all who could judge; and, what was more important, the policy of Pitt's party in regard to Bengal was losing interest as compared with their attitude towards the French Revolution. Tragic events in France, in England the King's illness, the Regency Bill, and the *Agitation of Burke*, absorbed public attention. Days and weeks passed into years; yet the trial seemed no nearer a conclusion. If a temporary excitement was aroused when Cornwallis came forward to give evidence on behalf of his great predecessor, the proceedings were for the most part carried on with laborious prolixity and followed with unbecoming weariness. Before the trial was over, of the hundred and seventy persons who had sat on the opening day sixty were no longer living; and, when at last the decision was called for, only twenty-nine recorded a vote. On April 22, 1785, the judgment was delivered: and by a large majority Hastings was honorably acquitted.

The trial of Hastings belongs chiefly to the history of English parties. In India few knew or cared much about it: the magnificent services of the great ruler were fully recognised in the lands he had governed, and it was regarded as inconceivable that his merits should not be known in his own country. But the trial, and the mass of literature and controversy which gathered about it, afforded decisive evidence that the affairs of the East India Company had become a national concern. From those to time the public interest flowered; but notwithstanding it was never doubtful that the British Government and the British people regarded the settlements in India as a national possession in which the honour as well as the profit of the nation was involved. The East India Company was no longer a semi-independent association of commercial gentlemen, but a vigorous adjunct of the British power. Dundas, who was President of the Board of Control, however, largely through his Indian connexion, a personage of great political importance: and it was a significant mark of the progress of public opinion that in February, 1786, he carried, in the House of Commons, without a division, resolutions asserting that Tipu had broken

No treaty with the English by the attack on Trincomalee, and that Cornwallis deserved approbation for his action in meeting it.

When the privilege of the Company expired in 1780, British interest was too deeply concerned in European affairs to enter fully into the important economic questions involved. Questions of free trade, restriction, monopoly, were argued perfectly: but it was something that they were raised. Dundas, however, was practically unopposed; and petitions from many important trading centres were disregarded. For once, the Company did not appear before Parliament in formal prosperity: Cornwallis' various reforms had made financial matters, for the moment, smooth. The Act of 1784 was therefore renewed, practically without alteration; and the Company's privileges were continued for twenty years. One slight concession to free trade was made—the Company were to allow annually not less than three hundred tons of shipping for the trade of private persons.

In September, 1782, Pitt and Dundas proved upon Sir John Shore, who had become a baronet in that year, and was now residing in England in rural privacy, the succession to the Governor-Generalship of India. He accepted it with great reluctance: that it was offered him was largely due to the influence of the noble character and wide Indian experience of his friend, Charles Grant, who for thirty years resided in England as an influence on Indian affairs as beneficial as it was powerful. Burke protested that he was concerned in the crime of Hastings; but the Court of Directors replied that their instrument for selecting him was that he had proved one of their ablest and most upright servants in India.

Sir John Shore held the post of Governor-General till the beginning of 1783, when he received an Irish peerage as Lord Teignmouth and returned to England. The five years of his rule were not, as regards action on the part of the British power, eventful: but the development of native politics during the period brought affairs to a crisis, which became acute immediately after he left the country. The chief factors in Indian politics, whose action extended over a vast area, were the Great Moghul himself, Shah Alam, who had been nominally restored by the Marathas in 1771 and had since then been in the power of Shuja; the Mirmir of Hyderabad, whose power, between the Marathas and Tipu, was becoming almost a negligible quantity, but who possessed a French-trained force which might prove dangerous to the British; the Marathas, that is the Purna regency, Scindia, Holkar, and Bhonsla; and Tipu, the usurping Mohammedan Sultan of Mysore. The French in the peninsula were rendered practically impotent by the Revolution at home: the Dutch were almost equally affected by domestic politics, and their hold on Ceylon was far from secure. The Portuguese at Goa had endeavoured to keep out of native politics, for fear of endangering the traditional British alliance. They had been asked in



1786 to join the Marathas in military action, but had refused. Against Tipu they furnished a strong assistance, due to his terrible persecutions of thirty thousand native Catholics, of whom they were the natural protectors. In 1781 they had rounded off their own territories by the capture of Raichur and Pira, after an arrangement with the Raja of Sanda, by which he had given them all his rights in the territories of Poenda, Zambrin, and Pandhargal. With these several Powers, during the administration of Sir John Shore, British interests were in the main concerned. It may be added, as evidence of the extension of Oriental relations, that in 1793-4 Lord Minto had undertaken a special embassy to China, which was productive only of a somewhat better acquaintance between the two Powers, and an increased knowledge on the part of British sailors of the disposition of Chinese matters; that a commercial treaty was made in 1788 with the Gurkhas, the Hindu race which had ruled Nepal for some fifteen years; and that, on their request for aid against the Chinese, Colonel Kirkpatrick was sent in a special mission to Nepal.

The domestic politics of India during the essential period which synchronised with the administration of Cornwallis and Shore may best be grouped round the remarkable personality of Madhoji Râo Sindhië. In 1788 this able and adventurous chieftain was the most important personage in central India. He had seized Agre, secured the person of the Maghal, and forced him to declare the Peshwa, the nominal ruler of the Marathas (though strictly he too was but a deputy of the Raja of Satara), his viceroy for his whole empire. But it was Sindhië who ruled the viceroy himself, the Purna regency, and Niss Farnakh, the guardian and minister of the Peshwa, whose authority was now practically confined to the district immediately round Poona. Then it came about that, in the words of a contemporary observer, all the legal sovereignty of India was consolidated in the hands of the Marathas. Sindhië's military power was built up by Besset de Baigne, a clever French officer, who had served also in the British and the Russian armies, and a Syoness named Bengtson. By their assistance a powerful army was organised, drilled, and served on European models. A large train of artillery was provided; and regular infantry, unknown before to the Maratha system, was introduced. Of the immediate success of these changes there could be no question; but it was doubted, even at the time, whether the accompanying neglect of cavalry was not a fatal error. The Marathas were, after all, a predatory horsemanship; without was his strength: "his fortune was on the saddle of his horse." When the other Maratha States followed the example of Sindhië, and developed the artillery and infantry arms at the expense of the horsemanship, the decay of their military power began. They could not stand against European foot, and they threw away the advantages which celebrity and knowledge of the country

conferred. The greatest British general of the age, after full experience of Indian warfare, expressed his view that the blunders introduced by Sindhiya were a great mistake, and that the Marathas would have "been more formidable if they had never had a European or an infantry soldier in their service." The opinion has been criticised, but the facts of the next few years prove its truth.

At the end of 1784 Sindhiya was supreme in Hindustan. Not only were the Peshwa and his adviser impotent, and the dynasty of Sagar inactive, but Tukoji Holkar, the military commander of Madhoji Sindhiya, was content to follow his progress to power with acquiescence. But within a year his authority was gravely threatened. The Mohammedan levies of the Moghul, which had been under Sindhiya's control, refused to obey: they were joined by the Rajpūt chieftains, Rāja Partab Singh of Jaipur, the Rānā of Udaipur, and Maharaja Bijai Singh of Jodhpur; and in May, 1787, Sindhiya was defeated at Lalot, about forty miles south of Jaipur. In vain did he appeal for aid to Nānā Pharsoti, Ghulam Kadir, an hereditary official at Delhi, crowned the Moghul, and joined the forces which were endeavouring to wrest Agra from Sindhiya. But the forces of Mohammedan and Hindu opposition were disunited; they pursued their own interests; and Sindhiya, with exuberant spirit, preserved his position in spite of constant defeat.

On June 18, 1788, he vanquished the Mohammedan leader, Ismail Beg, on the site of the famous city of Akbar, Patichpur-Sikri, already deserted and now a magnificent ruin. But the victory was not followed up. The defeated Mohammedans marched to Delhi; Ghulam Kadir and Ismail Beg made themselves masters of the city, plundered the palace, and blinded the Moghul Emperor, Shah Alam. The horror of this Pathan occupation, in which no indignity was spared the imperial family, and dire privation was experienced by the whole city, brought inevitable retribution. Ismail Beg joined the Rajpūts, and both determined to reconquer the Moghul; the Poona regency gave the command of its troops to Tukoji Holkar; Ghulam Kadir was captured at Meerut and put to death; and Sindhiya entered Delhi in triumph as the author of the rightful sovereignty.

In 1790 the authority of Sindhiya, as effective ruler of the strongest native power in India, seemed consolidated. He was still in theory only the deputy of a deputy's deputy; but the Peshwa, with whom, as the head of the Marathas, the English always negotiated, was far inferior to him in power. Assured humility only veiled Sindhiya's ambition. In 1788 and 1791 he crushed the Rajpūts of Jaipur and Jodhpur and the ruthless Ismail Beg, who were hoping for help from the Afghans of Kabul. In June, 1792, he marched to Poona, and paid a ceremonial visit to the Peshwa, acting with an exaggerated affectation of subservience which deceived no one. This was the culmination of his career. Sir John Malcolm records it as a common saying in India that "Madhoji

Shudhā made himself the sovereign of an empire by calling himself the headman of a village." In spite of resistance from Holkar and Nāga Pannāra, there can be little doubt that Shudhā, had he lived, would have established his power over the Marāṭhās and throughout Hindustān, and either by alliance with Tipu or after his fall, would have become the most formidable rival of the English in the new movement of advance at the end of the eighteenth century. But on February 12, 1784, he died at Poona, not without suspicion of foul play. The city was famous for its intrigues, and this was not the last, though it may have been, but the tragedy of inopportune confusion. Daulat Rāo Shudhā, a boy of fifteen, could not maintain the great position of his dead uncle; and, after a few years of strangely confused intrigues, the English found that they had no more serious rival in all India than the Mohammedan ruler of Mysore.

The death of Shudhājī Rāo left the Marāṭhās with no solid foundation to combine their forces or their interests. Yet it seemed for the moment as if union had come. A war with the Nizām, on the vexing subject of dāstār (tribute of one-fourth), found all their forces fighting together under the leadership of the Peshwā. But it was for the last time. From this war, which began in 1785, the English, under the cautious direction of Sir John Shore, held aloof. The Governor-General obeyed the Act of Parliament so scrupulously as to refuse assistance to the Nizām when he was attacked by the Marāṭhā host, and left it to the French corps of Raymond to oppose the only solid resistance to the allied armies, among whom the corps of Poona, lieutenant and successor to de Bologne, was conspicuous. On March 11, 1788, the Nāgabhūmā as they were still familiarly called—were routed at Kurlā by the Marāṭhās. The treaty which followed marked the highest point of the power of the Brahmin oligarchy at Poona directed by Nāga Pannāra. Within a few months it passed into the hands of the shabby young Peshwā. He committed suicide on October 25, 1790; and Marāṭhā affairs were again thrown into confusion. Intrigues and complications ensued; and it was long doubted whether any coherent power would emerge. Daulat Rāo Shudhā and the Nizām played fast and loose with each other. The Nizām at last recovered control by an arrangement with the Nizām (Treaty of Māls, October, 1793); and at the end of the year, by the influence of Shudhā, Bājī Rāo, son of the quondam Bombay candidate Rājāwā, was accepted as Peshwā. But a little later the Nizām was reduced to impotence; and at the same time Tukājī Holkar died. Bājī was practically the successor of Shudhā; and, if Madhājī had been still alive, the State of Guwāler might have again ruled the Marāṭhās.

From all these conflicts Sir John Shore had stood apart. The Company's interests seemed to be again restricted to commercial concerns, justly and humanely administered. While Tipu's power remained

intended, that of the Nizam, under his astute and unscrupulous minister the Asim ul-Cisak, and with a French force established under Raymond at Hyderabad, seemed to be re-established on a firm basis. In 1801 Sir John Shore established a new War, raised 111, and forced him, under dread of invasion from Afghanistan, to pay seventy-six lacs of rupees a year for the support of 12,000 British troops—an act of somewhat unusual freedom on the part of the Governor-General, for which he was threatened with impeachment. In the Cornish affairs were going from bad to worse. The growth of the Nizam's debts placed him and his country in the hands of unprincipled European money-lenders. Lord Hobart, Governor of Madras, proposed to interfere by assuming control of the administration; but little came of the proposed beyond disagreement with the Governor-General. After the utmost allowance has been made for the difficulties of Sir John Shore's position, measured as he was by Acts of Parliament, a Board of Control, and a Council of Directors, no very great praise can be bestowed upon his conduct of affairs. When his term of office came to an end, the East India Company occupied in India a position hardly higher than when the Regulating Act first manifested England's supervising concern in her Eastern settlements.

On April 30, 1798, Shore was succeeded by a man of very different temper, the impetuous, dignified, energetic, and determined Earl of Macclesfield, an Irish peer, the friend of Pitt and Wilberforce, of Grafton and Canning. Richard Colley Wellesley, before whom lay a great career, but one not so great as his brilliant qualities seemed to promise, was a figure at once commanding and picturesque in the society of the day. He was a distinguished classical scholar, a writer of impressive if somewhat ungraceful English, a singularly keen judge of political tendencies, a statesman unfettered by parties or family prejudice. No man of equal ability, except Hastings, had upheld British rule in India; and Pitt, like his father, had a genius for the choice of great men to fill great posts. Before Wellesley arrived in India, he had shown how deeply he had studied the problems with which he would be confronted, and how trenchantly he was prepared to deal with them. Speaker Addington had said to him some while before, "You want a wider sphere; you are dying of the camp." The sphere was now open; and Wellesley determined that his powers should be cramped no more.

A paper written by the Duke of Wellington some years afterwards explains the situation with which his brother had to deal on his arrival in India. The French interest seemed to be paramount at the Courts of Tipu and the Marathas. A body of Frenchmen had already landed at Mangalore. Tipu was engaged in negotiations with France, had sent troops to the Mauritius, and was said to have ridiculously offered Napoleonism and called himself "citizen Tipu." Now his more ambitious designs were ripe for execution. A strong French

fact was established at Hyderabad. The civil administration of the Carnatic had collapsed; and the revenue, even in times of peace, was inadequate to the demands upon it. The Raja of Mysore was hostile; Poona was at the mercy of British; and Orissa was agitated and insecure. Cornwallis had aimed at securing a balance of power in the Deccan; and his method had consisted chiefly in doing nothing. The policy had been continued by Sir John Shore, with the result of reducing the power of the Peshwa almost to vanishing point. There was pressing danger from Mysore; and hardly less serious was that from Hyderabad.

Lord Mornington dealt first with the Nizam. "A French State in the peninsula," as Mr Wellington's phrase, was growing up in the territories of Hyderabad; and it was the Governor-General's first aim to destroy it. The Nizam's minister, the Asim-ul-Uloom, was favourable to a British alliance, as a counterpoise to the Maratha power. In September, 1768, a treaty was drawn up, largely through his influence, by which the Nizam was to receive a British-allowed force of 50,000 and to furnish his French allies, disbanding their troops; further, the British Government was to mediate between the Nizam and the Peshwa, that is practically to protect the former against the Marathas. Mornington had able agents. One was a very clever young officer, John Malcolm; another was the British resident, Major James Archibald Krieger; a third was Colonel Roberts, who led the British troops to Hyderabad. Raymond was dead. His successor, General Foran, was unable to resist; and the disarmament of the French troops took place without a blow. Well might Dundas write that the policy and its execution were alike masterly and effectual. In October, 1768, a defensive alliance guaranteed the position of the Nizam, and gave him the support of 10,000 of the Company's troops. The alliance with the Nizam marked an important stage in the settlement of southern India. Lord Mornington had no idea of leaving the direction of policy to the local authorities; he made it clear that the direction of policy in Madras and Bombay, as well as in Bengal, was his peculiar province; and he refused the Presidency of the west and south to submit to his will. But the most important step in the settlement of the south was the conquest of Mysore.

In Tipu Mornington saw the chief danger to the power of India. Mysore seemed a centre of anti-British intrigue which might culminate in alliances from Cape Comorin to Afghanistan. The public announcement of Tipu's confederacy to the French in Mauritius and the alliance offered by General Mahrat to the French in Mauritius determined the Governor-General to act at once. He sketched with masterly precision a course of action which should reduce the ruler of Mysore to impotence; and, when he heard of Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition, he prepared for immediate war. The British alliance with the Sultan of Turkey did not affect this bigoted Mohammedan; he counted on the French, and left confident of success. On February 28, 1769, Mornington, who had himself come to Madras to direct operations, issued a declaration setting forth the reasons of

the war; and the troops, under General Harris, were set in motion. The circumstances were very different from those of Cornwallis' campaign. British officers now knew the ground; the correspondence was admirably organized; the alliance of the Nizam and the Peshwa was secured; and the object of the war was "single, distinct, and definite."

On March 2 the British troops entered Mysore; and after a series of defeats, Tipu was unable to prevent the investment of Seringapatam. On April 4 the town was carried by assault; and Tipu fell in the thick of the fight. When the Sultan was killed, the French troops fired a few volleys but made no further resistance. The British victory was complete; and the subsequent settlement of the country was just and effective. By the Muslims Tipu was regarded as a hero and a martyr. It had been his delight to reform on his subjects and his unquenchable foe "the honour of Islam"; and he had at first appealed to Sultan III, as the head of the Muslim world, to protect him. But he was a stern and savage ruler; and the subject Muslims rejoiced at their deliverance from Mohammedan tyranny. No action of Hoorvington's was more palatable than the restoration of the race of the Hindu Rajas from whom Haidar had withstood even the appearance of power. The State was enriched but respected; and prosperity rapidly returned. "The country is becoming a garden," said Arthur Wellesley in 1801; and the Government, over which the British retained a light but effective control, remained a firm ally of the East India Company. Part of the territory previously ruled by Tipu was offered to the Marathas, on their refusal, the contested provinces were divided between the English and the Nizam. The Company secured an uninterrupted frontier from the east to the west of the peninsula, as well as the seaward and the forts commanding the passes over the hills into the Mysore kingdom. As a military, financial, and political settlement, the conquest of Mysore was the most brilliant success of the British power since the days of Clive. It left no serious opponent of British influence in the whole peninsula save the scattered and divided confederacy of the Marathas.

The Government at home recognized the greatness of the achievement. Honours were distributed with unusual liberality; but Lord Mordaunt was not pleased to find that he was himself only to be a marquis in the peerage of Ireland as Marquess Wellesley; he called the distinction a "cabbage-gilt potato." But his anonymity led to no relaxation of his rigorous activity. He turned at once to review the whole course of Indian politics. The State already tributary was fast drifting with, then the external power. The most pressing questions were those connected with the Carnatic. The system established there, to adopt the language of Wellington in 1806, "not only tended to the oppression of the inhabitants of the country, to the impoverishment of the Marath, and to the destruction of the revenues of the Carnatic, but was carried into execution by the Company's civil and military servants,

and by British subjects." By a series of treaties, the Nawab, while left free in his internal government, had been placed under control in his external relations; he was shackled by guaranteed debts to the Company and recognised loans from private persons; his whole position was insecure, discreditable, and dishonest. At Seringapatam were discovered letters to Haidar Ali and Tipu, which proved that the Nawab had been eager to extinguish their liabilities by joining with Mysore in shaking off the British yoke; and a careful enquiry established the fact of this connexion. The death of the Nawab, Mohammed Ali, opened the way for a new settlement. On July 31, 1801, Asim-ud-Daulah was set up as Nawab with an income of one-fifth of the net revenues; the debts were provided for; and the administration, civil and military, was handed over to the Company's officers.

Similar arrangements were made in Surat and Tanjore. Surat was at the time one of the greatest ports in India, exceeding Bombay in importance. The British community in Surat was struggling, as usual, for privileges or rights; and the native officials strove to retain the power of unlimited taxation. Wellesley stepped in as a viceroy in the sovereign power, and entered with the new ruler an arrangement like that with the Carnatic. British interests were thus secured from Gujarat to Goa. In the south, the State of Tanjore came into a similar connexion with the Company. Its Raja, Serfoji, who had been educated by the famous Danish missionary, Schwartz, was glad to yield, in confidence and honour, the entire civil and military administration of his country to the Company's officers.

In Oudh a similar arrangement put an end to other difficulties. There was the perpetual danger of the Doab frontier, of Rohilkhand, of increasing Marathas, Sikhs, and Afghans. Even while he was planning the war against Tipu, Wellesley was dealing with Oudh. On this occasion he received support from home. Dundas was alarmed by the prospect of an invasion by the Afghan leader, Zaman Shah, and forged alliances with Sikhs and Rajputs, and even with Marathas, in order to protect Oudh and Bengal. Wellesley saw that Oudh in its present state, was indefensible. The Nawab Wazir's troops were no better than an armed rabble; and the administration, infected by corrupt officials and European money-lenders, was hopelessly inept. Wellesley determined to exclude every European except the Company's officials, and to depend on the native force. The Nawab threatened to resign; he was advised to surrender the administration to the Company, but refused. In 1801 the Governor-General sent his brother, Henry Wellesley (afterwards Lord Cowley) to Lucknow, and was prepared to follow himself, when the Nawab ceded, in perpetuity and in full sovereignty, a large frontier district, sufficient to protect his territory and to defray the expense of maintaining a guard of British troops. The treaty of 1801 was severely criticised at home as unauthorized and unjust; and the

appointment of Henry Wellesley to preside over a provisional government of the ceded district was attacked as a flagrant "job." The Directors were alienated from their Governor-General by this apparent infringement of their right of patronage as well as by his "Forward policy." To later students the wonder is that, when Wellesley assumed part of Oudh, he did not assume the whole.

The policy of "satellite" alliances (that is, alliances involving the support of British troops paid for by the receiver of such support) culminated in Wellesley's dealings with the Marathas. The desecration of that disorderly confederacy offered an opportunity and a justification for intervention. He determined to act boldly and decisively. His action was bold, but it was not decisive. Perhaps he played the fruit too soon; more probably it was the home authorities who prevented the satisfactory completion of a policy which could only succeed if pressed to a conclusion. The factors in the problem were the Peshwa, the aged Nizam Ferozshah, now again chief minister at Poona, the families of Scindia, Bhatia, and Holkar. Among their constantly changing relations Wellesley moved with confidence if not with security. He turned first to the Peshwa, Rājā Rāo; and, as he moved, the Nizam, who had ever regarded the English with jealousy and shame, expired. An opponent was gone; but the Maratha Government was left without a ruler. "With him," wrote the British resident, "has departed all the wisdom and moderation of their Government."

Rājā now became a mere shuttlecock between the two great houses of Scindia and Holkar. Dadasaheb Rāo Scindia was busy fighting with his father's widow; Jessoob Rāo Holkar, with his brothers. At last, on October 22, 1803, Holkar defeated the Peshwa and Scindia under the walls of Poona, and set up a pretender in the Peshwa's place. In December, Rājā, in safety at Bhatia, close to Bombay, agreed to make no treaties save with British consent, and to receive a large British force, for which he assigned districts to provide the payment. The Treaty of Bhatia made the Peshwa, hitherto regarded by the Company as the head of the Maratha confederacy, little better than a servant in their hands. The arrangement was severely criticised at home. Cuthbert, now President of the Board of Control, thought it was certain to involve us in further complications; the Directors deprecated all action which could lead to war. Wellesley, in defending his policy, strung the whole of the Company's relations. The first danger he foresaw was from France. France had, with Scindia's aid, established a great territorial dominion, embracing the Panjab, Agra, Delhi, and a large portion of the Deccan, nearly from the left bank of the Indus to the Jaamu and the Ganges. It was the most vulnerable part of our north-west frontier; and the name of the unhappy Mahad, Shah Alam, would always be used to rally forces against us. So long as the Peshwa was bound to make war and peace



only by the Company's advice, there was some severity for peace in India—such was the view of Arthur Wellesley, the able soldier who had already distinguished himself in Mysore. But the real question was of the existence of the "subsidiary" system itself; in truth it could not be permanent, and must end in withdrawal or annexation.

On May 23, 1803, Bajī Rāo re-entered Poona as Peshwa, with General Arthur Wellesley as his guard. On August 3 war broke out with Sindbia; he had not been long in seeing that his independence would be threatened next. The greatest of Lord Wellesley's struggles began. He planned at once to destroy the French force, to conquer the whole of the land between the Ganges and the Jamma, to seize Delhi and Agra, and to extend his control from Katak to Bhooch. At the outset, British arms were successful over a large part of the field. In 1780 Bajī had given a lease of all the Peshwa's rights in Gujarat to General Rāo; but Kishorji Gokhale, supported by his Arab guards, had held the capital, Raundla. Wellesley saw the importance of securing this commercial and military port; and the British troops took it by storm. In April, 1803, a treaty established a satisfactory settlement. Katak was still more easily secured. In Hindustan and the Deccan the work was much more serious.

In the Deccan Arthur Wellesley was in retirement. He had to meet both Sindbia and Bhorla. He took Ahmednagar and Arrangahad, and on September 26, 1803, fought the famous battle of Aranga. An infantry attack was followed by a cavalry charge; and Sindbia's French troops, as well as his own newly-organized infantry, were put to flight. Two months later Bhorla was defeated at Arjion; and on December 16 the capture of Gaidghat practically ended the war with the Raja of Bhor. Bhorla on December 22, 1803, signed the Treaty of Deoghar, agreeing to dismiss all foreigners whose countries were at war with England, to receive a resident, and to give up Katak. In Hindustan General Lake gained some brilliant successes. Perton gave up his post with Sindbia; Bhorla was defeated outside Delhi; and the aged Shah Alam was raised again to semi-independent power. Agra was taken; and Sindbia's army, after hard fighting, was confined to the banks at Laneset. The Treaty of Surj Arjanghan took from Sindbia all the land between the Jamma and the Ganges, and all north of Jalpur, Jodhpur, and Gohad.

A difficult point was the rock fortress of Gwalior, which Hastings had long ago called the key of Hindustan, and which had been seized by Sindbia from the Raja of Gohad. Sindbia was anxious to retain it; but Lord Wellesley demanded its surrender, in order that the Company might restore it to their faithful ally, the Raja of Gohad. Arthur Wellesley said he would surrender it and every other frontier town we then own "to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith"; and John Malcolm supported him strongly. But Lord Wellesley replied,

"Major Mahadik's business is to obey my orders and enforce my instructions; I will look after the public interest"; and Gwalior was surrendered. Soon afterwards Madhik accepted a modified "subsidiary" treaty; but in 1805 he regained the territory of Gwalior and the fort of Gwalior. Three out of the four chief Maratha States were now subdued; and there was no French centre of influence left in India. But there was still a power to reckon with, more dangerous and acute than any other.

James R. Holkar had emerged from a confused series of battles and intrigues as the strongest member of the family of Talaji, of whom he was an illegitimate son; and he now made himself the ruler of the territory which had been so wisely administered by his father and by the great Ahilya Bai. He and Madhik in turn sacked each other's capitals; and it was the capture of Poona by his troops in 1802 which led to the epoch-making Treaty of Poona. During the recent war he had stood aloof; now he seemed suddenly to perceive his danger, and proposed for war. Diplomacy negotiations were for a time carried on; but on April 16, 1804, the Governor-General gave orders to Lake, the commander-in-chief, and to Major-General Arthur Wellesley, to commence hostile operations. Lake was to move from Delhi; Colonel Murray, starting from Gujarat, was to release Holkar's possessions in Malwa. Bhampran was taken on May 16; but an advance by Colonel Monson into Malwa met with other disaster. He had hoped to meet Murray, but the latter had turned back; and, when Monson, misled by the treacherous advice of Sindhi's general, nominally his ally, moved down the Malwa river, he found that Murray could not join him. He therefore determined to retreat, leaving Lucas with the cavalry to protect his rear. Lucas was surprised, and his force cut to pieces, by Holkar, who thenupon pursued Monson, and attacked him on all sides. The retreat became a disordered flight; and Zilim Singh, Regent of Kota, refused to allow the British forces to find shelter within his city. A demoralized rabble, the only remains of the five battalions of infantry, 4000 horse, and artillery, which had formed the force at the outset, eventually found refuge within the fort of Agra.

The defeat of Monson was a blow to northern India which recalled the disasters of Buell's and Buxtehude's in the north. Native halloo-campes made the most of it; and native Princes again took courage to resist the mighty foreigners. Holkar gathered a large army, and entered Hindustan as a conqueror; but he remained there only seven months. Murray seized his capital, Indore. Laying siege to Delhi, Holkar was kept at bay by a mere handful of men, and eventually withdrew southward, occupying himself with managing the Delhi. Of the horrors of native rule contemporary observers have left vivid pictures. One is that of Colonel James Tod, British representative among the Rajpoots, who says, "wherever the Mariths tramped, annihilation was ensured; and twenty-four hours sufficed to give to the most flourishing spot the

aspect of a desert." He spoke from his own observation; and Haldar was the most savage freebooter of his time. But his career was not short by General Fraser, who won a brilliant victory at Dig on Nov. 24, 1804; and Haldar's cruelty was cut up three days later by Lake at Farvakhaid. On December 24 Dig, in the Banaspur country, fell before the British arms; and the Raja of Banaspur, after keeping Lake at bay for many months, at last consented to a treaty.

It was at this point, when success was within his grasp, that Wellesley's government came to an end. For this abrupt conclusion there were other causes besides Monson's defeat. The Directors had viewed with increasing alarm the expansion of their territory under the forward policy of their brilliant Governor-General. They were quite unprepared to undertake Imperial responsibilities. Lord Wellesley saw that once our government must weld the different nations and races of the east peninsula into a single whole; the Directors, of whom Charles Grant was an able spokesman, regarded the idea as a scheme of ambition and aggrandisement, contrary to the Act of 1784, and in principle wholly unjustifiable. But it was not only the rapid advance of empire, involving what seemed like an attempt to rival in India the aggressions of Napoleon in Europe, against which the Directors protested. At every point of administration Wellesley had nurtured plans for improvement. Some of these he had carried into effect; others waited for sanction; and the sanction was refused. He reconstituted the civil and criminal Courts, the Side District Adalat and the Native Adalat, no longer retaining for the Governor-General in Council those judicial duties which it was impossible for him, in the pressure of other business, adequately to perform. He planned a reorganisation of the whole system of government. The scheme exists in manuscript, but it never approached acceptance. The Governor-General proposed that there should in future be only two divisions of British India—Bengal, and Madras with Bombay and Ceylon. The Governor-General was to be over both, with a Council and a Vice-President for each. In view of the Company's growing responsibilities, it was not surprising that such a scheme failed to obtain consideration.

Closer to the Governor-General's heart was the training of the Company's civil servants. The ignorance of the local officials led too often, said Wellesley, to sloth, indolence, and low demeanour. The young men who were sent out had no previous training; and the training they received in India was inadequate to enable them successfully to act as judges, financiers, administrators, and rulers. Wellesley determined to supply the training by a college to be erected at Fort William, for which he planned the government, discipline, and course of study. His foundation received the warm approval of Warren Hastings, who had had a similar scheme in mind thirty-five years before; but the Directors took alarm, and the college speedily disappeared.

In favour Wellesley made great advances; the commercial classes acquired new confidence from his firm rule; and public credit became much more secure. In regard to the inevitable breakdown of the Company's monopoly, Wellesley was prepared to make advances towards free trade, and Dundas at home was ready to support his action; but the Directors raised shrill cries of alarm. Not only would their trade be destroyed, but England would be depopulated. "Free trade," they asserted, "cannot be permitted without being followed by a general interference, not that without hazard to our political power in the East." Wellesley, like his friend Pitt, knew *The Wealth of Nations* too well to take such a view. He suggested the employment of ships built in India, and a considerable increase of freedom for private trade. In a letter to the Court of Directors, dated September 30, 1800, he forecast a vast expansion of trade. This trade (he said) must, if possible, be kept in British hands; and this could best be done by giving liberty to British merchants to provide their own tonnage as they needed it, hiring ships under regulations framed by the Company. In this attempt to introduce free trade, Wellesley was warmly supported not only by the mercantile interest in England, but by Calcutta and Dundas; the Company's opposition was, however, determined. Charles Grant observed that the Governor-General's letter, advocating the enlargement of private trade, arrived when his educational scheme was being considered; and this coincidence worked them both. "It would lead," said Grant, "to the supersession of the Company, the opening of trade, and ultimately the endangering of our Indian Empire." Grant's opposition was particularly unfortunate for Lord Wellesley, as in May, 1804, he was made Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors, and next year Chairman; he became, said those who knew, not merely a Director but the Director.

There was, unfortunately, another bone of contention between the Governor-General and his masters. As Sir John Macpherson admitted, "craft and capacity to serve" were the only qualifications which he considered in the appointments he made; but the Directors wished to have more than a finger in the pie, and recalled the appointments of amiable men with something like personal resentment. The records of the India Office are full of denunciations and criticisms. Wellesley had long felt the inconvenience of his position; and it was only by repeated requests from the Government that he was induced to remain. When, early in 1808, the Court censured his appointments, his expenditures, his disobedience to their orders, he resolved to abandon his post; and on August 18 he sailed for England, with his work still incomplete, but having accomplished more than any of his predecessors, and established throughout India the ascendancy of the British power.

The one superior power left in India was such only in name; but it had been an important part of Wellesley's policy to preserve and utilize this nominal superiority. The Moghul, Shah Alim, by an agreement

made early in 1805, was established at Delhi under British protection, with a considerable payment and provision for his dignity. The object of this was as little understood in England as Wellesley's general policy of "subsidiary" alliances. Even Pitt is reported by Castlereagh to have said that the Governor-General had acted most imprudently and illegally; and it was on this understanding, and with the object of reversing all that could be reversed, that Lord Cornwallis again accepted the Governor-Generalship. He entered on his duties on July 26, 1805. He immediately began negotiations with Holkar with the view of concluding peace. His view was that the line of the Jumna should be taken as a military frontier, that all the country west of that line should be given up; and that the territories south and east of Delhi should be granted to the smaller Râjâs, who were to be pledged to relinquish all claims to British aid. Either they would unite against Sindhiâ, or he would have enough to do to reduce them. The British rule was to depend, not on its own power, but on the intestine strife of its rivals. So much was clearly decided; and something, in spite of the bitter opposition of Lord Lake, was accomplished, when Cornwallis died on October 5, having held office little more than two months.

Sir George Barlow, a civil servant of the Company, senior member of the Council, succeeded provisionally to the post, and was immediately confirmed in it by the Court of Directors. A conscientious and strong-minded man, Sir George Barlow felt himself bound to carry out the known wishes of the Directors, and to endure the obloquy which was sure to fall upon him for repudiation of honourable obligations. The treaty made with Sindhiâ meant the abandoning of many allies, and the practical renunciation of the Râjâs' chieftains to his attacks. Holkar was pursued by Lord Lake across the *Satlej* into the territory of the great Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh. The attitude of the Sikhs was long undecided; but early in 1806 Ranjit Singh came over decidedly to the British side. A series of treaties left a number of minor chieftains to the vengeance of Holkar, and allowed him to recover the greater part of his lost dominions. Mided perhaps by the fears disseminated by returned civil and military servants, who told them that he was now the only strong power in India, and that they must court his friendship, the Board of Control sanctioned a treaty by which Holkar, who had taken refuge in the Panjâb in his dishonourable flight before the British army, was permitted to return to his dominions, and was established in a greater position than he had ever held before. Moreover, in April, 1806, a treaty was made with Ranjit Singh by which the Sikh power was restricted to the north of the *Satlej*. But Jaipur was abandoned; and the Sikhs were left free to subdue the districts of Multân, Kachwâ, Pushawar, and the Derâjât.

The administration of Sir George Barlow marked the practical abandonment of central India to rapine and anarchy. Udaipur was

the pay of average pretensions to the hand of its Raja's daughter, who was at last driven to suicide to save her father from entire subjugation. The power which it was hoped the British power could uphold was lost; and the influence of the Company was maintained only at the Courts of Malabar and Ponné. Anxious to please the Directors, Sir George Barlow failed to satisfy the British Government. Consequently, although he had been practically promised the Governor-Generalship, he was superseded by the Crown under the power given by the Act of 1794; and Lord Minto, who had for some time held office at the Board of Control, was appointed in his place. Lord Minto assumed the government at Calcutta on July 2, 1807. The disagreement between the Company and public feeling was evident also in the fact that, while the Court of Proprietors in 1806 strongly condemned Lord Wellesley's policy, the attempts to impeach or to censure him in Parliament were decisively rejected.

The condition of India when Lord Minto arrived was highly disturbed, not only through the disastrous policy of leaving the native States to devour one another, and the disorder in Benalikhond, but also by a new and most alarming symptom of the insecurity of the British power. This was the mutiny of the Madras regiments at Follere, in which a large number of British officers and men were slain. The cause was mainly national, or racial; and the sons of Tipu Sultan were at least nominally its leaders. Recent military regulations, strictly applied to native troops, had caused bitter discontent among the soldiers; and by some it was supposed that there was an intention to convert them to Christianity, a suspicion which the attentions directed of that religion by the officials at Madras might have served to discredit. Lord William Bentinck, the Governor, who was in no way to blame, was removed from his office, and was replaced by Sir George Barlow, one of whose first duties was to deal with a serious mutiny among the European officers in the Madras army. Efforts to reduce expenditure had led to the cutting off of several unsatisfactory methods of raising money; and investigations, semi-martial, orders of suspension and dismissal, led to an open outbreak against the Government, which diminished civil war. In these difficult circumstances, Sir George Barlow showed that he possessed distinguished courage and determination. Aware that a large proportion of the Company's troops in the north were banded together to avenge the wrongs of grievance, he suppressed the mutiny by calling the regiments to the aid of the Government. At Seringapatam this actually led to a conflict between the King's troops and the Company's; but eventually peace was secured by concessions which accompanied the restoration of authority.

Lord Minto's term of office was marked by the temporary occupation of Goa, by an abortive expedition to Macko in 1808—a consequence of Napoleon's invasion of Portugal—by the capture in 1810 of the Il

de Bourbon and the Île de France (Mauritius), and by the occupation of Java in 1811, by which time every position held by France as her dependencies in the East, had passed into English hands. During this period we should also note the beginning, or at least the extension, of a policy, of which slight indications had been given both by Warren Hastings and by Wellesley, of entering into friendly relations with the great States outside the limits of direct British influence. Mountstuart Elphinstone had a mission to the Amir of Afghanistan, who promised to prevent any attack on India through his territory; but the Amir, Shah Dost, was himself deposed immediately afterwards, so that nothing came of the mission. Sir John Malcolm, who so early as 1800 had been called "Lord Wellesley's historian and the greatest man in Calcutta," and whom Wellesley had sent in 1799 to Tehran, went in 1807 on a mission to the Persian Gulf, and in 1810 again visited the Persian sovereign and obtained an assurance of friendship. In 1809 Charles Metcalfe negotiated an alliance with Ranjit Singh, which brought British power to the backs of the Sikhs. Each of these three distinguished public servants had been trained in the school of Wellesley; and, if the results of their embassies were not great, they served at least to explain the wide interests of the British power. The treaty with Persia, which was not definitely completed till 1814, is notable as showing that the British Government was already apprehensive of Russian influence in the East, the security of Persia being guaranteed against any attack from that quarter.

The Governor-Generals who succeeded Wellesley possessed none of his fire, even if they had his opportunities; and the work of Lord Minto was rather one of consolidation than of fresh advances. Legal changes, some attempts to reform the system of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal, and to reform the rural system of the Madras Presidency (a great public service for ever associated with the name of Sir Thomas Munro), and a vigorous effort to organise a police force and local criminal jurisdiction, marked the period which ended in 1813. In 1804 a new advance was made by the Earl of Minto (afterwards Marquis of Hastings), whom the Prince Regent, his personal friend, sent out to replace Lord Minto. The most important work of Hastings and his successor belongs to a later time; it was concerned mainly with the destruction of the Pindaris, the armed freebooters of central India, and with the final suppression of the Maratha power at Poona. Of earlier date, and significant as marking the direction in which British enterprise was advancing, was the war against the Gurkhas of Nepal (1814-6). This expedition was at first unsuccessful, largely through the unpopularity and rigour of the officers, whom the troops refused to follow. Things went better when the command was taken over by Ochterlony, who captured many hill forts, advanced into the valley of Kathmandu, and from Muktadwar might have pressed on to

the capital itself. But Hastings was content with a treaty which restricted the Gurkhas in their power over Sikkim, and, after a renewal of the war in 1806, compelled them to cede a large tract of territory along the outer ranges of the Himalayas.

In 1813, after prolonged debate, the Charter of the Company was renewed for twenty years. Castlereagh, who introduced the Bill into the Commons, proposed to establish free trade, both import and export, for all British ships not above four hundred tons. This liberal approach towards complete freedom was hotly contested. The Company brought up some of its most distinguished servants to plead for its privileges. Warren Hastings, the Marquess Wellesley, Lord Teignmouth (Shrew), Sir John Malcolm, Charles Grant, spoke, but spoke in vain. The renewal of the Charter in 1813 was, in fact, a decisive mark of the extended interest which England as a whole was beginning to meet in Indian affairs. A vast number of pamphlets, papers, reports, protestations of every kind, manifested the public concern. The settlement of the trade question was complicated by a passionate religious controversy. A number of timid traders, and at least as many persons of narrow political views, displayed great alarm as to the prospects of Christian missions in India. Wilberforce, who powerfully supported the attempt to win freedom for Englishmen to teach their own religion, declared definitely "that the missionaries should be clearly understood to be armed with no authority, furnished with no commission, from the governing power of the country." The distinction was explained by Lord Wellesley, who had definitely asserted the Christianity of the Government when he was in India, and strongly favoured the increase of the Church establishment; while able civil servants like Malcolm warmly urged a considerable extension of the educational work of the Company. Several missions had already been started; some progress had been made, and further advance was retarded only by the hesitation of the Government to permit the appointment of a bishop.

Somewhat apart from the general progress of the British power during the period under survey stands the history of Ceylon. At the beginning of 1795 the island, long held by the Dutch, was seized by an expedition from Madras, and on February 18 the Dutch Government surrendered its authority to Colonel Stuart and Captain Gardiner, R.N. The end of the severe and unpopathetic Dutch rule was universally welcomed in Ceylon. In spite of the most careful regulations for preserving the rights of the Dutch religious establishment, it soon disappeared; and no other influence, except in the region of law, remained to testify to their long occupation. During 1797 there were proposals for the retrocession of Ceylon to the Batavian Republic; and some injudicious action on the part of the representative of the Madras Presidency, under which the island was placed, led to a revolt, which caused Pitt to see the wisdom of placing it directly under the



Crown. In October, 1780, Frederick North became first Governor. Lord Wellesley regarded Ceylon as an important part of the Indian Empire, essential to its defence; and he proposed that it should be definitely placed under the control of the Governor-General. While the English held the coast, the mountain kingdom of Kandy remained independent; and with its ruler North engaged in negotiations which bore the appearance of a discreditable intrigue. In 1800 British troops took possession of Kandy, but the bulk of the force was soon withdrawn, whereupon the remainder were massacred by the natives. It was not till 1815 that satisfaction for this act was obtained. The King of Kandy for twelve years ruled without interference as a successful and average tyrant. At length an outrage committed on British subjects led to a declaration of war on January 18, 1815. The Governor, General Brownrigg, acted against the advice of his Council, but was completely successful; and on March 8, 1816, the tyrant was deposed. In 1807 an insurrection broke out, but it was speedily suppressed; and the island has since then remained tranquil under the British Crown.

The echoes of the great European conflict were heard in India only like the sound of distant thunder. But there was one occasion on which the East sent its aid to repel in a far distant land the encroachments of the West. At the end of December, 1800, an expedition started from Bombay to intervene in the Egyptian campaign. It consisted of 6000 British and native troops, commanded by Sir David Baird. The force landed at Kosseir on June 3, 1801, whence, after a march of 140 miles across the desert, it reached Cairo on August 10. From Cairo it marched with the rest of the British army to Alexandria; and three weeks later the French capitulated.

This expedition, insignificant as were its immediate results, is remarkable as illustrating the position which British rule in India had, through the struggles of the years 1785-1818, definitely attained. The innumerable diaries, memoirs, letters of travellers, and state papers, in which the inner social history of this period may laboriously be read, leave an impression of narrow commercial views, of personal interests selfishly pursued, of a lack of sympathy with other races, of difficulties of education and environment awkwardly enumerated, of petty aims and trivial incidents. But to conclude that this was all would be to take a very superficial view. The Governors who from time to time guided the policy of the Company in India, much though they differed in width of view, in knowledge, in statesmanship, were yet, every one of them, inspired with an earnest desire for righteousness and justice in their rule. The experiment of governing millions of Asiatics in accordance with the dictates of Western ideas was being tried, amid many difficulties, but with unflinching determination. The greatest of the Governors felt the stupendous nature of their task. They did not undertake it lightly, whether it was Cornwallis in his revenue and police

refuses, or Wellesley in his officers and his sons. It was an ideal sort of conquest but of empire which they set before; and from that ideal the deep thought of moral responsibility was never absent. They had their reward in the pervasiveness of their work. It is this that makes the growth of British power in the East during the thirty years that followed the rule of Warren Hastings a unique phenomenon in the history of the Napoleonic age.

#### II.—THE COLONIES (1763-1815).

Although the French War, which closed with the Battle of Waterloo, was the last episode in the long contest for colonial and commercial pre-eminence, the colonial character was less apparent than in the case of earlier wars. The British colonial empire of the time was of a singularly anomalous structure—in the East, vast and wealthy territories under the ill-defined authority of a trading company, moving, under irresistible impulses, in a direction from which its natural instinct recoiled; in the West, a conquered French possession, some island colonies hitherto unprogressive, and a wilderness sparsely peopled by "United Empire Loyalists." A convict colony in the southern seas could not arouse enthusiasm; and the West Indian Islands alone seemed to realize the idea of the old colonial system. But, such as they were, the colonies and the nascent Indian Empire were alike protected by the dominant sea-power of Great Britain. Then it came about that, though the French Revolution and the personality of Napoleon dominated the general history of the period, there were distant regions, of great future importance, which scarcely felt their influence.

In Australia and in Canada the seed, sown in *deliberance* or in *circumstance*, of a self-governing colonial empire was struggling into life. That this empire was due to no conscious aim of British statesmen is manifest. The declaration of American independence cast its shadow over the years which followed. When, in 1793, Great Britain was involved in war with France, colonies became pawns in the game; but even then there was no deliberate aim to secure colonial ascendancy by means of sea-power. The conquered West Indian Islands were, with the exception of Trinidad, readily restored at the Peace of Amiens. The ultimate decision to retain Cape Colony and Mauritius was based on military, not colonial, considerations. At the final peace British statesmen felt an hesitancy in restoring to Holland that "other India," Java; and, in justifying the action of the Government with regard to the French colonies, Lord Castlereagh deliberately maintained that it was not the interest of England to make France a more military, instead of a commercial, nation. The final outcome of the great war

was the colonial necessity of Great Britain; but such was not the common aim of those who carried through the struggle.

It would be easy to imagine that the foundation of New South Wales, almost immediately after the loss of the American colonies, was intended to call a new colonial empire into existence to take the place of the old; but, in point of fact, the first movers in the matter were careful to explain that they intended no repetition of the past. In view of the general disapproval of emigration, they laboured to refute the notion that their project would in any way depopulate the parent State. The settlers of New South Wales (they asserted) would principally be collected from the Friendly Islands and China; and only a few skilled workmen, with the ships' crews, would be required from England. James Martin Maine, who was, next to Sir Joseph Banks, chief author of the proposal, while advocating the colony as an asylum for the American loyalists, still held that the bulk of the immigrants might come from China. Part of New South Wales lay in the same latitude as the Spice Islands; and spices and other tropical or semi-tropical products would be the main wealth of the colony. The whole expense to the British Government need not exceed £15,000. Lord Sydney, the Home Secretary, whose department had at the time the control of colonial affairs, saw no vision of a Greater Britain in the southern seas; but he was seriously exercised over the question how to dispose of the convicts who were crowding the English prisons, and he recognised in the proposal a way of escape. From the time of George I. a regular system of transportation to the American colonies had been in force; and it was necessary to find a substitute for this outlet. In 1784 an Act of Parliament was therefore passed enabling the Government, by an Order in Council, to indicate places to which convicts might be transported; and in 1786 "the eastern coast of New South Wales" was declared to be such a place.

The new colony extended, on paper, from Cape York, 16° 57' north latitude, to South Cape, 46° 58' north latitude, and inland as far as 155° west longitude. It included all the islands adjacent in the Pacific Ocean within the aforesaid latitude. These spacious limits were doubtless due to forecast competition by other Powers. The Governor's commission might follow the sonorous precedents of more hopeful times; but there is no reason to suppose that the Government had in view more than a mere convict colony. Even so, it was started with soaring weaknesses. The coast of New South Wales was practically unknown. The projections were ignorant of the physical conditions, which subsequently proved as great a hindrance to agriculture. The system under which transportation to the American colonies had taken place had soured the efficiency of convict labour; but it was a wholly different matter in Australia, where an attempt was made to select those convicts who were most reliable for agriculture, and skilled workmen were

not provided. The wonder is, not that the colonists suffered hardships and want for several years, but that New South Wales ever successfully emerged from its period of beginnings.

For this result the credit is mainly due to its first governor, Captain Phillip. His appointment evoked surprise from Lord Howe, First Lord of the Admiralty; but he proved himself undeniably the right man for the place. The arrangements made for the voyage were by no means adequate, but they would have been far more defective without Phillip's resourceful courtesies. The first fleet, with 150 convicts on board, started on May 18, 1787, and arrived at Botany Bay on January 26, 1788. Finding Botany Bay unsuitable for settlement, Phillip proceeded to examine Port Jackson, where he found "the finest harbours in the world"; and he selected Sydney as the site of the new colony. Owing to the lack of the trees, the labour of clearing the ground proved almost too severe for undisciplined convict labour. In this state of things, Phillip recognized the necessity of a regular supply of provisions for four or five years. The home authorities took little interest in the emigrants; and, when to this difficulty was added the loss of ships with stores, supplies itself were perilously close. Other troubles beset the newly-arrived Germans. Major Ross, who commanded the Marines, was a rivalist there in his side. The dignity of the service forbade that officers should hold any intercourse with the convicts when not directly compelled. A further cause of anxiety arose from the disproportion of the sexes in the colony. The first intention had been that the convicts should receive wives from the South Sea Islands; and, even when this idea was abandoned, the proportion of women to men sent out in the years during which the system of transportation prevailed was seldom higher than one in three, and often much lower. The first settlement might well have consisted only of skin-buffed men who might have received wives after carrying out the preliminary work; in the course actually adopted there was neither method nor convenience.

Nevertheless, through all his trials, Phillip maintained his faith in the future of the country. He never wavered in the belief that the colony would "prove the most valuable acquisition Great Britain ever made," although he recognized that no country offered less assistance to the first settlers, or "could be more disadvantageously placed with respect to support from the mother-country, on which for a few years we must entirely depend." Before starting he had written: "as I could not wish convicts to lay the foundation of an Empire, I think they should ever remain separated from the garrison and other settlers that may come from Europe." Experience now proved that fifty freemen sent out with their families would do more in one year to render the colony self-dependent than a thousand convicts. The "emigration" system, under which alone convict labour could be made economically profitable, was suggested by Phillip. Free emigrants should have the

labour of a certain number of convicts for two or three years, after which they should be able to support themselves, and pay, in return for convict labour, the cost of the passage out of such convicts. The first free settlers arrived in New South Wales in 1793, after Phillip had left the colony; but their arrival was due to his despatch. The work committed to Phillip was in some ways squalid; nevertheless, he has rightly taken rank among "the builders of Greater Britain."

The success or failure of one-man government will always depend upon the efficiency of the directing mind. So regardless, however, was the home authorities of this elementary truth, that a considerable interval took place between the departure of Phillip and the arrival of his successor. Phillip left Sydney in December, 1792; Hunter did not reach that place till September, 1793. This interregnum proved calamitous to the colony. The military Acting-Governor suspended the civil Courts; the restrictions against the supply of spirits to convicts were relaxed; and, when Hunter at last arrived, he proved unable to shake the evils which had arisen. In 1799 he was recalled. While the colony was suffering evil days, a discovery was made, which, more than anything else, rendered possible a different and happier Australia. Phillip had reported that sheep would not thrive in New South Wales; but in 1794 Captain MacArthur, who had gone out as an officer in the New South Wales Corps, began his efforts in the direction of producing fine wool; and two years later he obtained some sheep of the pure merino breed from the Cape. It was from these beginnings that the great pastoral industry of Australia took its rise.

The appointment of Hunter's successor, King, was made, though late, on the advice of Phillip, who had recommended him for the post. The task which awaited the new Governor was very difficult. The unrestricted importation of spirits had proved the curse of the colony; and to check this evil was to come in conflict with vested interests and to lose popularity. Nevertheless, the landing of spirits without a written permit for the specific quantity was forbidden; and in no circumstances was drink recognised as an object of traffic. We are told that nearly 70,000 gallons of spirits and over 31,000 gallons of wine were refused a landing during King's government. Moreover, the fixing of reasonable prices made the trade less tempting. The improvement in the morals of the colony during King's period of government was attested by those best able to pronounce an opinion.

In 1800 a considerable stirrer was caused in the little community by the appearance of two French vessels under Captain Baudin. The avowed object of the expedition was scientific; and it received a friendly welcome, even before the announcement of the Peace of Amiens. It was rumored, however, that the real object was to found French colonies in the southern sea. In any case, without the command of the sea, such colonies must have succumbed to the English. After the death of the gallant

Basin, the French authorities at Mauritius, having captured and impounded the explorer Flinders on his passage to England, attempted, by the use of his papers, to appropriate for their ships the credit of his discoveries along the south coast of Australia.

Bligh's successor, Bligh, arrived in Sydney in August, 1800; and a change of scene took place in the aspect of affairs. In putting down the liquor-traffic, he acted with such violence and illegality that Major Johnston, who commanded the forces at Sydney, took the strong step of deposing and imprisoning the Governor. That such an event could occur, shows a startling state of things; but it is doubtful whether, in the circumstances, the action of Major Johnston and his associates was not justified. The impotent conclusion of Johnston's court-martial in England, which, while finding him guilty, contested itself with exonerating him, virtually admitted the provocation under which the colony laboured. "My will is the law" was Bligh's motto; and it is easy to see how, on such principles, the Governor's power might be abused.

Of the form of government which prevailed throughout this period it is difficult to form a clear notion. The first three Governors were soldiers, accustomed to the discipline of a man-of-war. No rule, Bligh explained, was issued without the written order of the Governor. The soldiers and free labourers were compelled to attend at stated meetings. Strict regulations enforced the observance of Sunday; and all persons found strolling about the towns of Sydney and Parramatta during the time of divine service were summarily locked up. A paternal government fixed the rate at which all articles could be sold. Written promissory notes were forbidden. The quality of flour was rigidly prescribed. No cow, ewe, or breeding sow might be killed; and weekly returns had to be furnished of all slaughtered stock. Meanwhile the colony was slowly developing. Eighteen years after its foundation there were between six and seven hundred landholders, of whom about four hundred were ex-servicemen. About 80,000 acres were under cultivation, and over 144,000 under pasture.

The military situation seemed to demand a military Governor as Bligh's successor; and Major-General Nightingale was intended for the post. The Third Regiment under Colonel Macquarie was detached for service in the colony; and Macquarie was to act as Lieutenant-Governor during the absence of the Governor. Nightingale, however, never took up the appointment; and Macquarie was made Governor. The long period of his government, which lasted till 1821, embodied in crude suggestion the theory which was to yield to new influences. Macquarie believed in Australia as a country for convicts and emigrants, and resented the presence in their midst of free settlers. Thus, he thought, as unwelcome intruders, had no cause for complaint if he refused to treat them as freemen. Macquarie placed on record his deliberate opinion that he was justified in flagging "profligate men, though at

the time free, without any trial or examination before a Court." This flagging occurred in 1818, and the justification was written four years afterwards. How from such beginnings Australia gradually developed, until now it is perhaps the most democratic community upon the face of the earth, will be told later.

In spite of the wide terms of his commission, New South Wales, as known to Philip, included only the present county of Cumberland; it stretched from Broken Bay to the north to Botany Bay to the south. The exploration of the Hawkesbury and Nepean rivers in 1789 opened up a large stretch of fertile country on their banks; and the crossing of the Blue Mountains in 1813 enabled the rich district of Bathurst to be thrown open to settlement. In 1787 the mouth of the Hunter river was discovered; and a branch depot for convicts was afterwards started there. So little was known of the coast of Australia that it was not till 1790 that Bass, sailing in an open boat, proved Van Diemen's Land to be a separate island. In 1801-3 Flinders first made a survey of the coast of southern Australia. Port Philip was discovered in January, 1803; and it was decided to form a settlement there as well as in Van Diemen's Land. But the Lieutenant-Governor, Collins, who arrived in October, 1803, formed a most unfavourable opinion of the site, and he was allowed to remove to Van Diemen's Land, where he founded the settlement of Hobart. A settlement was also started at Port Phillip on the north coast of the island.

If the early history of New South Wales crudely illustrates the temper of the times with regard to colonization, in Canada a very different problem was worrying the minds of British statesmen and Governors. The history of Canada down to the British conquest has been described in a previous volume. At first the new province was placed under military rule; but the disposition of the British Government, both at home and in Canada, was very conciliatory, and the system was well adapted to the simple character of the population. There was distress, owing to the delay of the French Government in admitting liability on the paper-money; but, upon the whole, the people seemed fairly content with their new rulers. The problem how to recognize the position of the Roman Catholic Church, while preventing it from becoming a nucleus for French intrigues, was solved by tacitly allowing claims which could not be openly admitted.

It was the singular good fortune of Great Britain that, when war broke out with France in 1793, it came in such a fashion as to alienate the natural sympathies of the Canadian people. The British Governors were under no illusion as to their temper; there was acquiescence in British rule, but the patriotism and prejudices of generations could not be uprooted in a day. The British officers, to whom the care of the new colony was entrusted, regarded with special favour the simple and

pious inhabitants, and drew comparisons between them and the restless and restless "settlers and traders," as they called the New England commercial immigrants. Nevertheless the British rulers, in their efforts to civilize their new subjects, had no easy task. The deep-seated British prejudice against Roman Catholicism proved a serious hindrance. The royal instructions, which forbade holy orders being conferred "without a license first had and obtained from the Crown," were, however, quietly ignored; and, in spite of occasional friction, the relations between the authorities and the Roman Catholic hierarchy were on the whole friendly. The feudal system, which had survived in Canada, was a very different thing from that swept away by the Revolution in France. "By degrees," the Lieutenant-Governor, Milnes, wrote in 1800, "the Canadian gentry have become nearly extinct: and few of them, on their own territory, have the means of living in a more affluent and imposing style than the simple habitants, who feel themselves in every respect as independent as the seigneur himself, with whom they have no farther connexion than the obligation of having their own ground at his will, paying their toll of a fourteenth bushel, which they consider more as a burdensome tax than as a return to him for the land conceded by his family to their ancestors for ever, upon no harder condition than the obligation above mentioned, a trifling rent, and that of paying a twelfth to the seigneur upon any transfer of the lands."

In this state of things it was obvious that the seed of social revolution would fall on stony ground, though reports of French republican designs on Canada fill a large part of the state-papers of the time. The habitants, it is true, displayed great reluctance to serve in the militia, and, on the first day they were called out, "broke into a mob and refused to be rallied for." But this was attributed to long disease of military service rather than to active disloyalty. Here and there a French patriot might lament that Canada had not been "re-demonstrated" at the Peace of Amiens; but, on the other hand, French Canadians, especially the religious institutions and the clergy, contributed substantially to the cost of the war. In any case, the risk of attack from France was never serious. Napoleon, who, conscious of his lack of seapower, abandoned Louisiana to the United States, was never in a position to invade Canada with success.

If political conditions thus favoured the beginnings of British Canada, she was also fortunate in her early rulers. Compared with the average of mediocre place-hunters who had presided over the destinies of the American colonies, the first Governors of Canada stand out conspicuously. Murray (1763-6) was an upright soldier, and a person agreeable to the Canadian population; Haldimand (1778-85) was a hard-working and conscientious Swiss, whose reputation has been vindicated from the aspersions of earlier writers by the publication of the records in



the Canadian archives. But above all, one name must always be associated with the making of British Canada—that of Sir Guy Carleton. As Lieutenant-Governor or Governor of Québec from 1763 to 1773 and again, from 1786 to 1796, as Governor of Québec and subsequent Governor-General of the British North American possessions after the passing of the Constitutional Act, he had unobscured views of judgment of the character of the new colony; and no one could have used his knowledge to better purpose.

Even Carleton, however, was unable to check one of the worst abuses of the old British colonial system. In indignant language he called attention to the abuse of the system of *farm and perpetuity to judges, officials, and others*. He denounced a system "which alienates the interest of the Crown from whoever administers the King's government. This policy I consider as cruel with His Majesty's governments in New America, and the cause of their destruction. As its object was a public but private advantage, as this principle has been pursued with diligence, extending itself unceasing, till all authority and influence-government on this continent was overborne, and the Governor reduced almost to a mere corresponding agent, unable to resist the pecuniary speculations of gentlemen in office, or to consist their connections or associations of any security whatever. It was not therefore surprising that this phantom of an executive power should be swept away at the first onset of a political storm. . . . Whatever tends to subvert the executive power on this continent tends to sever it for ever from the Crown: Great Britain." It was in fact the weakness rather than the tyranny, the executive which was the chief evil of the old system of government and it is this weakness for which responsible government has provided the remedy. But in Carleton's time responsible government was distant; and a dreary waste had to be passed, wherein the weakness of the executive, the private interests of the Council, and the irrepressible dissensions of the Assembly were destined gradually to bring about it final impasse, relief from which was found in a peaceful revolution.

Under the proclamation of October 7, 1793, regular Courts to administer English law were to be created; and the promise of a General Assembly was held out. The situation had been complicated by the arrival of some two hundred immigrants from the American colonies. These regarded with dislike and contempt the ignorant populists which surrounded them, and resented strongly the delay in granting popular Assembly, in which they alone, as Protestants, would have taken part. To such the role of a Protestant minority over Roman Catholics seemed in the nature of things. The English settlers were mostly traders or disbanded soldiers; and the *frontiers* of the Province were largely recruited from the ranks of those who had failed in business. For men "sought to repair their broken fortunes at the expense of the people." Grave scandals occurred in the administration of the law. I

consequence, an ordinance was passed in 1770 limiting the power of the *Assemblée*. At the same time more drastic measures were recognized to be necessary. In the special circumstances of the colony, a popular Assembly seemed impossible; but there was no reason why a French people should not enjoy the benefit of French customs and laws.

These views were embodied in the Quebec Act, 1774. Under it, a Council, to consist of not more than twenty-three nor less than seventeen members, was created. The power conferred on it to pass ordinances did not include the right to levy general taxes or duties. The French Canadian law was to prevail in questions "relative to property and civil rights"; but the English criminal law was to remain in force on the ground of its "certainty and lenity." The wisdom of the Quebec Act was within a short time justified, when the Canadians, generally speaking, declared to join the rebellious American colonies; but there was no good reason for retaining within the limits of the Roman Catholic colony the territory to the west of the Alleghany Mountains, which was the natural heritage of the American provinces. While, however, the policy of conciliation towards the inhabitants of French extraction was wise in its day—and it is idle to imagine that the French nationality could have been peacefully destroyed—the consequences of the American War of Independence greatly altered the situation.

Many American settlers, refusing to make terms with the new Republic, sought a new home in Nova Scotia and the western districts of Quebec, where they became known as "United Empire Loyalists." The presence of this new element rendered necessary some modification of the Quebec Act. That the Constitutional Act of 1791 was not proposed without anxious forethought is clear to every student of the records. Sir Guy Carleton, while at home on leave, had assisted in framing the Quebec Act. In 1786 he became Governor-General, with the title of Lord Dorchester. The following year we find him confessing himself at "a loss for a plan." He recognized the objection to separate assemblies, and hankered after a "more general government" than was provided by the mere existence of a "Governor-General." In the same spirit, Chief Justice Smith, an American loyalist, speaking with the bitterness of past experience, protested against the establishment of democracy implied by the creation of separate petty legislatures. There was, however, much force in Grenville's objection that the presence in the same assembly of representatives of rival nations, with rival interests, who had served so apprehensively in the give and take of political life, would be a dangerous experiment. Dorchester deprecated haste. He considered that economic reforms were more urgent than political, that some tenure should be introduced in new grants of land, and that the amount of a single grant should be limited to 1000 acres. Still it was clearly desirable that English freemen should enjoy popular government; and loyalty to their pledged word forbade that the British Government

should refuse to the French of Lower Canada what they were granting to the English in Upper Canada.

Under the Constitutional Act, 1791, the province was divided, and separate legislatures were established in the two new provinces. French law and customs could thus be retained in Lower Canada, while the English population of Upper Canada obtained the benefit of English law. The English inhabitants of Quebec were the chief sufferers under the Act. Under the electoral arrangements made by the acting-governor, Sir Alured Clarke, the proportion of representatives in the Assembly was fixed according to the existing population of the different districts. At this time, the agricultural population was almost entirely comprised in the French settlements; and, the number of members of the Assembly remaining the same, the English townships, as they developed, did not receive adequate representation. Looking back, we may regret that no attempt was made to strengthen the government by adding to the efficiency of the Executive Council. There was in it no division into departments, no individual responsibility, and no individual superintendence. The claim of Deschamps to select councillors to form an inner cabinet was not approved by the home authorities; and the Executive Council was a mere Privy Council, wherein men of wholly different views might sit side by side. Deschamps's successor, Prescott, who arrived at Quebec in 1793, became involved, from the outset, in a hopeless struggle with his Council over the question of land grants, and, while continuing to receive his salary as Governor, spent most of his term of office in England. His successor in the government, Milnes, also found himself thwarted and opposed by Chief Justice Osgood. It need not have passed the wit of man to find a remedy for this unfortunate state of things.

With regard to the Legislative Council, one provision of the Act has excited much discussion. Pitt proposed that power should be given to the Crown to give hereditary titles to the members of the Canadian Upper House. Colonial conditions were hardly such as to render advisable the creation of such titles; nevertheless, the object of the Government in proposing it was undeniably wise. In Grenville's words it was, "To give to the upper branch of the Legislature a greater degree of weight and consequence than was possessed by the council in the old colonial governments, and to establish in the province a body of men having that motive of attachment to the existing form of government which arises from the possession of personal or hereditary distinction." In Canada, no less than in the old American colonies, the root of political difficulties lay in the fact that a democratic Legislature was confronted with a Governor autocratic in theory, aristocratic by traditions and associations. We are familiar with the various forms of "influence" which, in England, bridged the gulf between the old system of government and the new. The want of a genuine aristocracy had

born son came of the American Revolution; and British statesmen were certainly not wrong in aiming at supplementing this defect in Canada. It was, however, easier to will than to accomplish. Deshautes, from the first, advised that the measure should be attacked in every possible way to the British Government. Unfortunately they were, for the most part, poor; and the feudal system of tenure, without the military obligations connected with it, afforded few points of contact between the lords and the vassals, who to all intents and purposes resembled English copyhold tenants. A real source of grievance to the Canadians was the purchase of these estates by Englishmen, and the more rigid enforcement of legal rights. The sudden disbandment of the Canadian regiment, raised for the Indian war in 1768, left behind it a feeling of bitterness, which the well-meant efforts of the British Government were not able altogether to remove. Moreover, considerable grants of land to the impoverished veterans would have been necessary to make them any real check to the progress of democracy.

In this state of things the Assembly fell more and more under the domination of professional men, who had sprung from the class of habitants. Although the general level of elementary education was lamentably low, opportunities were not wanting for the more clever members of a family to receive an advanced education. Such as one inspired a blind belief in his kinsfolk and neighbours, who themselves might not be able to read or write. The qualification of electors had been left to the Canadian authorities; and, though the suffrage might appear extensive according to English standards, any restriction of it would probably have kept out the habitants, whom it was the object of the Act to enfranchise. But, though the result may have been inevitable, it was none the less unpleasant to the British Governors. One after another, they record the same experience. So early as 1800, some years before the publication of a French newspaper (which is sometimes spoken of as the date from which troubles began for the British Government), we find the Lieutenant-Governor, Milnes, writing "Very few of the *seigneurs* have sufficient interest to secure their own election or the election of anyone to whom they give their support.....and the uneducated habitant has even a better chance of being nominated than the first officer under the Crown." On the whole, however, the relations between the Governor and the Assembly were satisfactory until the time of Craig. In 1818, according to that official, the Assembly consisted of six petty shopkeepers, a blacksmith, a miller, fifteen ignorant peasants, a doctor or apothecary, and twelve Canadian *seigneurs* and notaries, besides "four or five respectable people that at least they do not keep shops." Two Englishmen completed the list. "There is not one person coming under the description of a Canadian gentleman among them."

Not was it only in Lower Canada that indignant Governors replied the

seven half of demersey. Upper Canada had been peopled by British soldiers and American loyalists, a race that might have been expected to stand by the mixed system of government to which they were accustomed. Yet from Upper Canada the active Lieutenant-Governor, Simcoe, reported that the general spirit of the country was against the election to the Assembly of half-pay officers, and in favour of men who dined in common with their servants. The rulers of the Assembly were active and restless for particular measures which were soon shown to be "improper or futile."

Dorchester resigned in 1795 on the ground that he did not agree with the policy of the Government "to divide and subdivide and to form independent governments instead of consolidating, as is done in the United States." Separate governments had been carved out of Nova Scotia for New Brunswick and for Cape Breton in 1784; and Prince Edward Island also had a separate Lieutenant-Governor. Dorchester resented the practice of the lower authorities in holding direct communications with Simcoe. No subsequent Governor could speak with the authority of Dorchester; and henceforth the affairs of the two provinces ran in recognized separate channels. In Lower Canada the difficulties in the way of government came to a head during Sir James Craig's term of office, which lasted from 1800 to 1811. Craig was an honest but obstinate soldier, slowly sinking under an insupportable salary. No man was less fitted to the rôle of constitutional governor. He sought to cut the knot which he was powerless to untie. George Ryland was sent on a secret mission to England to obtain, if possible, the abolition of the Assembly. Ryland most unreservedly found the English ministers, Liverpool and Peel, "weak, very weak," and failed in his main object; though he obtained more sympathy for his proposal to curb the independence of the Roman Catholic Church. To long-suffering English politicians Craig's demand for a distinct recognition of the principle that Canada was not to be governed by the House of Assembly seemed very indiscreet. Moreover, the imminence at this time of war with the United States dictated a policy of conciliation with regard to the Canadians. The new Governor (1811), Sir George Prevost, was in every way the opposite of Craig; and the manner in which the Canadians contributed their share to the defence of the Empire in the American War caused a temporary improvement in the relations between the Government and the people. One cause of future friction between the Assembly and the British Government was fortunately as yet lacking. It was not until 1808 that the offer of the Canadian Assembly to undertake the full discharge of the civil service was accepted. Down to that time, the revenues from the land customs duties and the sale of the public lands had been largely supplemented by grants from the Imperial exchequer. This dependence on the mother-country was no doubt a source of security to the British

authorities. It was clear that the right of regulation and control would necessarily follow upon adequate self-taxation.

Throughout this period a continual waste of soil was the mother and natural alienation of the public lands. Land speculation obtained vast tracts, but made no attempt to promote settlement. Well-meant efforts to benefit individuals, such as the grants made to the children of United Empire Loyalists, failed in their object, through the land being, in most cases, sold for a trifling price; and the rules framed against the excessive size of land grants were in practice successfully evaded. The existence of great blocks of "dead reserves" was a further hindrance to cultivation.

Nevertheless, in spite of economic failure and the wrangling of politicians, the material development of both provinces went slowly on. The population of Lower Canada, about 65,000 at the date of the conquest, had increased to about 130,000 in 1818, of whom some 55,000 to 60,000 were British or American. This British population was, for the most part, confined to the towns of Quebec and Montreal, and even in these remained a minority of about one to three. Upper Canada, which was positively uncolonized by Europeans before the American War, had in 1818 a population of some 70,000. The need for extensive emigration from England had not yet arisen; but in 1805 some Roman Catholics from the Scottish Highlands emigrated to Upper Canada. The attempt of Lord Selkirk, in 1812, to establish settlements in the Red River valley should be noted as the first invasion of the closed reserves of the great trading companies. The Hudson Bay Company and the North-West Company were actively carrying on the fur trade, but they only held isolated posts. In Lower Canada, Governor Haldimand started the modest beginnings of the system of roads which was to play a great part in Canadian development.

The period was, however, emphatically the age of small things. Throughout we observe the note of dependency. Carleton saw that North America required a population fifty times as large as it then possessed, but that he expected little development seems clear from the view he expressed in 1767 with regard to Quebec. The severe climate (he wrote) and the poverty of the country discouraged all but the natives; and any new stock transplanted would be totally hid and imperceptible amongst them except in the towns of Quebec and Montreal. The view current in England is probably expressed in a paper written some years after the close of this period by "A Military Man." "The possession of this dreary corner of the world is productive of nothing to Great Britain but expense. . . . Nevertheless, it pleases the people of England to keep it, much for the same reason that it pleases a mad-dog or a bull-dog to keep possession of a bare and unwarlike bone, towards which he sees the eye of another dog directed. And a fruitless bone of contention has it proved and will it prove between Great Britain and

the United States before Canada is merged in one of the divisions of that Empire—as exact, however, which will not happen until blood and treasure have been profusely lavished in the attempt to defend what is indispensable and to retain what is not worth having." The affairs of Canada were to pass through many and evil days before it found political safety under responsible government and economic safety in the development of its enormous natural resources.

Throughout the whole period in question, Canada was, for practical purposes, confined to what was now its eastern portion. The task of providing a population for Ontario and adding to that of the eastern provinces was enough, without encroaching the untrodden regions of the west. Great Britain, however, maintained a lien upon the promise of the future; and when, in 1780, Spain claimed, by right of previous discovery, the northern Pacific coast up to the Russian possessions, and seized British ships trading on this coast, the demand was promptly repudiated. Happily, the action of the French Assembly in refusing to support Spanish pretensions averted war; and the voyage of Vancouver (1790-5) served to call further attention to future possibilities. In 1808 Sir Alexander Mackenzie, who had crossed the continent from the east in 1781, proposed, on behalf of the North-West Company (founded in 1784), to form a supreme civil and military establishment on the Island of North at King George's Sound, with two subordinate posts on the river Columbia and in the Otter Harbour. A trading settlement had been founded at Neches Sound in 1788; and there were scattered settlements north of the Columbia belonging to the Hudson Bay Company; but the time for regular colonization was not yet. Mackenzie might reasonably protest against the claim of the Hudson Bay Company to bar the way to the opening of the West; but it was not till much later that the grievance became serious.

While continents in the west and in the southern seas were reluctantly travelling with the birth-throes of new English nations, the page of history was occupied by events of a more stormy character. On February 1, 1793, the French Republic declared war against Great Britain; and thenceforth the colonial possessions of the rival Powers became the prize of whoever should obtain the mastery at sea. The West Indian Islands have always possessed strategic importance; but at this time the sugar colonies were valued mainly for their commerce, and as being among the chief sources of maritime power and national wealth within the Empire. The old historian of the West Indies compared with pride the extent of the West Indian and the East Indian trade, and showed that the capital employed in the former exceeded by almost four to one the capital employed in the latter, and that the duties paid to the Government stood in the proportion of over two to one. Tobago, which the peace of 1763 had returned to France, was captured

in 1793, as well as the French islands of St Pierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland. In the following year Martinique was taken without the loss of a single life. The possession of the best harbour in the eastern Caribbean Sea rendered this island a position of special importance. St Lucia and Guadeloupe also surrendered in 1794. The attempt, however, to combine with these undertakings the complete occupation of Hayti led to the loss of both the former islands. A French expedition under Victor Hugues recaptured Guadeloupe at the close of 1794, and St Lucia in the following June. Insurrections were at the same time stirred up in the British islands of Dominica, St Vincent, and Grenada, which, in the case of the two latter, were not quelled till the arrival of a British force under Sir Ralph Abercromby. St Lucia surrendered on May 22, 1796, after hard fighting, the result being mainly due to the energy and capacity of Brigadier-General Mowat.

Meanwhile the absorption of Holland by the French Republic had given new impetus to Britain and the British East. The Batavian Republic, established in 1795, was in fact a mere appendage of France; and the Dutch colonial empire became open to English attack. Cape Colony was of importance as the halfway house to the East Indies: and an expedition was despatched under Admiral Kitchenaugh and General Craig "to protect the colony against an invasion of the French." The Dutch Governor was in a difficult position. The Prince of Orange, the hereditary Stadtholder, wrote from England bidding him to submit to the English; but there were no signs of a French invasion, and he preferred to remain faithful to the *de facto* government in Holland. Nevertheless, the resistance was not very formidable; and, on the arrival of British reinforcements under Sir Alured Clarke, terms of capitulation were arranged on September 12, 1795. At the time of this conquest, there were already in existence the existing districts of Stellenbosch, Swellendam, and Graaff-Reinet. These districts had been occupied in spite of the general policy of the Dutch East India Company; and their existence rendered more difficult the task of the British authorities. At first they seemed inclined not to acquiesce in the surrender; but Stellenbosch and Swellendam soon accepted the British terms, and the Boers of Graaff-Reinet submitted after an abortive attempt at resistance.

At first great stress was laid on the temporary nature of the occupation; but, whatever the ulterior designs of the British Government, the appointment of Lord Macartney, who arrived at the Cape as Governor in 1797, and the system of government introduced, suggested a permanent retention of the colony. Lord Macartney's rule, though according to later notions despotic, was just and honest. The economic condition of the people was improved by the English occupation; and the "free trade" promised to the colonists, though very different from free trade as we now understand it, was certainly an improvement upon the rigid monopoly of the Dutch East India Company. The main difficulty in



the way of the British authorities was the same in Cape Colony as in America. An intensely aristocratic social system found itself confronted with a community which, whatever had been its political condition, was intensely democratic. Englishmen of the type of the governing classes of the eighteenth century found it difficult to associate with the traditions and firmness of Cape Colony, although feminine tact might sometimes bridge the chasm. Macartney's stay in the colony was brief, and unhappily Sir George Yonge, who succeeded him at the end of 1793, after General Dumas had acted as Lieutenant-Governor for about a year, laid himself open to gross charges of corruption. Upon investigation at home, he was acquitted of personal bribery; but the state of things revealed at the enquiry was discreditable to his government.

The story of the reduction of the Dutch possessions in India and of Ceylon is dealt with elsewhere. In the farther East, Malacca was taken in 1795, and Amboyna and the Banda Islands in the following year. The year 1796 also witnessed the reduction in South America of Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice; Surinam and the island of Curaçoa were not taken till three or four years later. The alliance of Spain with France cost the former country in 1797 the island of Trinidad, the accidental burning of the Spanish fleet preventing any resistance. In Hayti since the British attempts met with failure; and they were abandoned in 1798. Subsequent events in the island, and the fate of its able negro ruler, Toussaint L'Ouverture, have been described in a previous chapter. Sweden and Denmark lost their West Indian Islands in 1800. The French alliance proved a costly occasion for countries with over-sea possessions.

In the West Indies throughout this period there existed a variety of forms of government. So long as the negro was deemed a mere chattel, so-called popular government was possible in these islands in a degree which has become impossible in later times. Thus we find Lord Castlereagh writing in 1800 of Jamaica, "The pretensions of the Assembly to all the rights and privileges of the House of Commons is quite absurd; they have no other privileges than those naturally arising out of and connected with the colonial and limited purposes for which, by the act of the Crown, they have been created. The control of the army does not belong to them." Side by side with the constitutional rigour of Jamaica and Barbados were the purely military governments of the islands conquered during the war. Thomas Moore was the governor of St Lucia before its restitution to the French, and Thomas Picton of Trinidad. The case of Picton in Trinidad is especially noteworthy. His instructions were, for the present, to administer Spanish law in both civil and criminal cases. Under the Spanish law torture was permissible; and it was proved that in the case of a Spanish girl a slight form of torture had been employed. Public opinion in England was lashed into a frenzy against the "blood-stained tyrant", and Picton became the subject of a criminal indictment.

He was at first found guilty on the charge of applying torture illegally; the counsel for the prosecution having misrepresented the Spanish law; but upon a new trial he was acquitted, while his character was at the same time vindicated by the result of a minute enquiry before the Privy Council. There can be no question as to the honesty and uprightness of Vician, and he proved both an efficient and a popular governor, the fault really lay with the framers of his instructions.

Final mention may be made of the colony established by the Sierra Leone Company in 1786, with the philanthropic object of introducing civilization into the West Coast of Africa, and thereby striking a blow at the slave-trade. Negroes introduced from Nova Scotia proved a valuable addition to the colony. It must be confessed that Sierra Leone failed to realize the hopes of its founders. "Many of the settlers," we are told, "and even some of those who went out in the Company's employment, embarked in the service of the slave factories or continued the trade upon their own account." The new movement, which recognized the brotherhood of man, found more active opposition than in the foundation of Sierra Leone. The Act for the Abolition of the Slave-trade, passed in 1807, should be noted as closely connected with colonial history. The slave-trade had been regarded as one of the mainstays of the old colonial system; and many believed that its abolition would prove fatal to the colonial interests of Great Britain. This view was vigorously expressed by Lord St Vincent in the House of Lords; but, though the measure was, from an economic point of view, "a leap in the dark," the conscience of the nation could no longer endure the existence of this plague-spot in its midst.

It was due to the sea-power of Great Britain that Napoleon, who fully recognised the importance of colonial empire, found his best-held place working for the aggrandisement of his chief adversary. In 1798 it seemed as though the splendid vision of an Eastern Empire might be realised. The retirement of the British fleet from the Mediterranean left to the French its temporary control. Under the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797) the Ionian Islands had become a French possession; and Malta was seized by Napoleon in June, 1798, on his way to Egypt. Nelson's pursuit of the French fleet and its destruction in Aboukir Bay are described in a previous volume; but the Battle of the Nile marks a turning-point in colonial history, because among its results is to be placed the permanent British occupation of Malta, which, according to Moore, was in 1800, even after years of neglect, "the strongest place in Europe." The Maltese rose against the French in August, 1800, the garrison taking refuge in the fortress of La Violette. After a two years' blockade by land and sea, they finally surrendered in September, 1800. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Amiens stipulated that Malta should be restored to the Knights of St John; and in the same yielding spirit

Great Britain restored to France and her allies all conquests except Trinidad and the Dutch possessions in Ceylon. The retention of Trinidad was perhaps due more to Napoleon's anger with Spain than to the persistence of English statesmen. It was abundantly manifest that Great Britain had not waged war with the view of enlarging her colonial empire.

The Peace of Amiens was a mere truce; and, had not Napoleon's retention of Holland and the breakdown of the settlement with regard to Malta given cause, some other reason would have been found for a renewal of hostilities. The provisions with regard to Malta proved incapable of execution; and the publication of General Sebastiani's report on his tour of observation in Egypt and the Levant justified the contention of those who recognised the importance of Malta as the key to Egypt and the East. In 1805 war was resumed. St. Lucia, Tobago, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice were quickly retaken; and in the following year Surinam surrendered. Curaçoa and the Dutch islands of St. Thomas and St. Croix were taken in 1807. In 1809 Martinique was captured, and finally Guadeloupe in the following year became British; so that no European flag except the English and the Spanish waved in the West Indies.

Under the Peace of Amiens the Cape of Good Hope had been ceded to the Batavian Republic; the right being reserved for British ships to use Cape Town for the purchase of supplies without the payment of duties beyond those payable by Dutch ships. The new system of government was very different from that of the East India Company. A council of four members was to assist the Governor. The judicial authority was made independent of the executive and the legislative. Moderate custom duties replaced the monopoly of the old Company. The Commissioners, de Mist, and the Governor, General Janssens, proved worthy exponents of the new system. Unhappily their ideas of compensation and toleration were beyond the understanding of the Dutch farmers with whom they were brought in contact. The Dutch government was hardly established when Great Britain and France were again at war; and in 1805 an expedition was despatched under Admiral Popham and General Baird against Cape Colony. It arrived at Cape Town in January, 1806; and, after a gallant attempt at resistance, General Janssens was obliged to yield to superior numbers.

Before following the fortunes of Cape Colony, brief mention should be made of a somewhat shameful passage in British history. The home Government had for some time cherished vague schemes of obtaining in South America a position favourable to British trade, through cooperation with the Spanish colonial insurgents. These schemes had, however, been abandoned out of deference to Russia. Nevertheless, early in 1806, Sir Isaac Popham, without orders, and on the strength of exaggerated rumours of dissension in La Plata, left Cape Colony,

and sailed against Buenos Ayres. That place surrendered on June 27, 1806, to a small body of troops under General Boscawen. The capture, however, had been in the nature of a surprise; and in August the British garrison was in turn compelled to surrender to a joint force of Spanish troops from Montevideo and natives of Buenos Ayres. The British fleet blockaded the river; and reinforcements from the Cape were arranged on the sea-coast. Meanwhile the British Government had not the resolution to abandon a conquest of which it had disapproved. Before the news of the loss of Buenos Ayres had reached them, an expedition under Admiral Murray and General Crauford was arranged for the reduction of Chile. British rule was to be substituted for Spanish; but, on the crucial question whether Great Britain would stand by the interests of the inhabitants in the event of peace, all that the Ministry could express was "an anxious wish...to regulate the conditions of any future peace as to leave them no cause for apprehension." In this state of things it was perhaps fortunate that the loss of Buenos Ayres compelled the expedition to be directed to its reduction. General Whitelocke was dispatched from England, with additional forces, to assume the supreme command. In spite of a partial success gained by Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the attack upon Buenos Ayres ended in failure; and in return for the liberation of English prisoners, General Whitelocke retired from La Plata. Tried by court-martial, he was found guilty and cashiered; but in fact other things, besides the reputation of an incompetent general, were on his trial in these proceedings.

After the second conquest of Cape Colony, British rule was restored on the old lines. Throughout the period the government was in form a despotism, though the Governors Lord Caledon (1807-11) and Sir John Cockburn (1811-8) were well disposed towards the Dutch colonists; and the government was carried on, so far as possible, through Dutch instruments. A cloud, however, was cast on the horizon, which was to cast a shadow over the future relations of the Dutch with the British authorities. The London Missionary Society was founded in 1794, and a few years later began its work in Cape Colony. It is impossible in a brief summary to enter into the disputes which arose between the missionaries and the Dutch colonists upon the question of the treatment of the natives. Doubtless there were faults on both sides. If the Dutch were often harsh in this respect, as men who live on the borders of civilisation are wont to be, the missionaries were not always gifted with common sense. The full results of these misunderstandings belong to a later date; but, so early as 1818, we find the interference of the home authorities at the bidding of the missionaries causing the so-called "black circuit," which, according to Dutch sympathisers, left behind it a maddening sense of wrong. At the close of the great war, Holland recognised the permanence of the British occupation of Cape Colony, as well as that of Denmark, Prussia, and Russia, receiving

in return various payments amounting to the sum of \$6,000,000; but whether that occupation would in fact be permanent still remained in doubt. British migration to Cape Colony did not begin till 1818; and for many years political symptoms portended storms. But for the men of that generation the task of confronting Napoleon was a sufficient burden; the problem of combining authority with freedom in a colonial empire had to wait for its solution till a later day.

In the Far East, the removal of Napoleon's schemes of aggrandizement rendered necessary the reduction by the English of Bourbon, the Ile de France (Mauritius), and Java. The two former were taken in 1810; and in Java the Dutch general Janssens surrendered on September 18 of the following year, after an ineffectual resistance. The British occupation, though it continued only five years, was memorable for the reforms initiated by the Governor, Stamford Raffles. The original intention of the East India Company had been that the island when taken should be handed over to its native inhabitants. The Governor-General of India, Lord Minto, who accompanied the expedition, at once saw the impossibility of this course; and an interim British government was set on foot. That, in this provisional state of things and with so little time in which to work, much of Raffles' system of reform remained on paper, is not surprising; the wonder is that so much was carried out.

The Dutch East India Company had come to an end in 1795; but the substitution of the Batavian Republic for the Company led to no real change of system. The appointment of Daendels as Governor in 1807 was followed by a reorganization of the system of government; but the lot of the natives, weighed down by the payment of "contingents" and by forced labour, was in no way improved. To them the substitution of a rigorous and militant central authority for the malversation of petty officials meant merely an increase of burdens; and Daendels' successor, Janssens, again and again reported the extreme unpopularity of the government. Raffles set himself to remove the causes of this unpopularity. It is true that the ideas to which he sought to give practical embodiment were not in themselves new. A Dutch ex-official, Dirk van Hogendorp, had some years earlier proposed the abolition of all forced services and the transference of the land to the common people, along with the introduction of a general tax in kind on the land, and a poll-tax on persons. The difficulty lay in the application of these theories. In his own words Raffles proposed: "1st. The entire abolition of all forced delivery of produce at inadequate rates, and of all feudal services, with the establishment of a perfect freedom in cultivation and trade. 2nd. The assumption, on the part of the Government, of the improved expenditure of the lands, with the services and rights thereof, without the intervention of the regents whose office shall in future be confined to public duties. 3rd. The renting out of the lands so secured in large

or small estates, according to local circumstances, on leases for a moderate term."

After a tentative employment of the agency of intermediate houses, it was finally decided that the Government should enter into direct contact with individual peasant proprietors. In the nature of things it was impossible that Raffles' system should at once come into full working order. It required, as a condition for success, a survey of the native lands and a body of trained European civil servants. Moreover, financial exigencies forbade the immediate abolition of all forced deliveries; and the same cause prevented the native agents from receiving such allowances as alone would have rendered possible a complete change of system. The truth with regard to Raffles' reforms is by no means easy to arrive at; for, while his sanguine temperament was apt to confuse intention with accomplishment, the Dutch officials, after the restoration of the island, would naturally be inclined to depreciate the work of the daring English innovator. Granting that his work must be measured rather by its promise than by its actual fulfilment, we shall admit that enough was effected to establish Raffles' title to rank among the greatest of English colonial governors. In the prevailing temper of the time regarding colonies it was not without an ironic appropriateness that such a man's labours should have been expended on a colony destined not to remain British.

By the first Treaty of Paris (May, 1814) Malta was recognised as British; but all the French colonies conquered by England were restored, with the exception of Tobago, St Lucia, and Mauritius, with its dependencies Rodriguez and Seychelles. By the London Convention of August, 1814, Great Britain agreed to restore all the Dutch colonies except the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice. The islands of Banda were given up to the Dutch in exchange for Cebu and its dependencies on the coast of Malabar. The result of the great war was not so much to add to the size of the British Empire, though the gain of Cape Colony led in time to a great extension of territory, as, by the assertion of sea-power, to secure to the scattered portions of that Empire their peaceful development under British supremacy.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

## ST HELENA.

THE abdication of Napoleon, his retirement from Paris to Malmaison, and his flight to Rochefort, have been related in a previous chapter. When Napoleon arrived at that port (July 3, 1815), he found the coast narrowly watched by British sail, and hemmed upon every side. For ten days he waited to balance chances, conscious of a certain loss of elasticity in himself, listening to the counsels of others, himself indolent. A clandestine escape, an ignominious capture in the bosom of a Dutch ship or in an open war-vessel, would have been inconsistent with an impressive close; and, after some hesitation, he rejected all desperate expedients and determined to throw himself on the generosity of the English people. On July 13 he wrote to the Prince Regent that he had terminated his political career, and that he came, like Theodosius, to seek himself at the breast of the British nation and to claim the protection of her laws. Two days later he gave himself into the charge of Captain Maitland of the *Hibernia*. He knew well that he could expect little mercy from the restored Government of France, and that the Prussians would shoot him like a dog. But England was the refuge of the homeless and the asylum of the exile. She had sheltered Paul, the friend of his youth; she had sheltered the Bourbons, the rivals of his manhood. Out of magnanimity she might shelter him.

But the man whose ambition had wrought such disasters could not expect to be treated with leniency; and the British Government determined that Napoleon was no guest, but a prisoner of war. It was a case of policy, not of precedents; and, even if Lord Liverpool's Cabinet had been accessible to quiescent impulses, it would have been their plain duty to suppress them in the interests of European peace. The Congress of Vienna had declared Napoleon to be an outlaw, and, in virtue of a Convention struck on August 2, 1815, the four Great Powers agreed to regard him as their common prisoner. The turn of events had devolved upon Great Britain the ungracious office of the gaoler; but Austria, Russia, and Prussia were consenting parties; and all four Powers promised to name commissioners to assure themselves

of Napoleon's presence in the place of his captivity. Meanwhile, on July 28, the British Government had decided to send their captive to St Helena. In that lonely island of the Atlantic, with its precipitous coast, its sandy harbours, its sparse population, the great prisoner of state might be securely guarded, the more so as the East India Company, to whom the island belonged, had recently erected upon it a complete system of sentinels. The climate was reported to be salubrious; and in St Helena Napoleon might enjoy a larger measure of liberty than any government would then have been prepared to concede to him in Europe. It was a hard fate, but brighter than an Arabian fetters, and gentler than the doom of Mount and of Negy.

On August 7 he was removed to H.M.S. *Northampton*, which, under the command of Admiral Sir George Cockburn, was instructed to convey him to his destination. His suite consisted of twenty-five persons, including Count Montholon and General Gourgaud, who had served as adjutants in the last campaign; General Bertrand, who had controlled his household in Elbe; Count de Las Cases, once a royal *intendant*, now one of the most attached of his adherents; and Dr Barry O'Meara, the surgeon of the *Bellerophon*, who, at Napoleon's request and with the consent of the British Government, was allowed to act as his medical attendant. Montholon and Bertrand were accompanied by their wives, Las Cases by his son. On October 17, at the hour of eight in the evening, after a passage of sixty-five days, Napoleon landed at Jamestown. As the house destined for his reception was not yet ready, he took up his residence at the Briars, a villa belonging to a merchant named Balaam, where he spent some weeks in pleasant and familiar intercourse with the family of his host. In December the exile moved into Longwood, a low wooden building on the wind-swept plateau, far above the prying curiosity of the port. It was here that the last scene in Napoleon's life-drama was enacted.

For the general history of Europe the captivity at St Helena possesses a double interest. Not only did it invest the career of the fallen hero with an atmosphere of martyrdom and pathos which gave to it a new and distinct appeal, but it enabled him to arrange a page before the altar of history, to soften away all that had been aggressive and hard and violent, and to draw in firm and authoritative outline a picture of his splendid achievements and liberal designs. The Napoleonic legend has been a force in the politics of Europe; and the legend owes much to the wisdom of the exile. The great captain, hero of adventures wonderful as the Arabian Nights, passes over the mysterious ocean to his lonely island and emerges transfigured as in some smouldering mirage. He shows the agonies of Prometheus, benefactor of humanity, chained to his solitary rock; his spirit is with Moses ascending, moving in the same orbit of loneliness and beneficent wisdom. The seed sown from St Helena fell upon fruitful soil and was tended by desert hands.



Carriv, the great Liberal journalist of the July monarchy, claims Napoleon, on the ground of the Longwood conversations, as the friend of the Republic which he overthrew. Quinet says of him as of some vague and romantic embodiment of the democratic spirit:

*"J'ai couronné le peuple en France, en Allemagne;  
Je l'ai fait gentleman partout par l'éducation;  
J'ai donné des idées à la France sans rien;  
Une nation pauvre s'est levée en révolt."*

The heir of the Napoleonic House, Louis Bonaparte, son of the ex-king of Holland, knew well how to exploit the democratic elements in his uncle's career. In 1831 he was secretly negotiating with Republican leaders in Paris; in 1838 he published a statement in his *Mémoires politiques* that his principles were "entirely republican." In 1839 a slender volume came from the same pen, entitled *After Napoleon*, which contained the whole essence of the exile literature and the whole programme of the Liberal Empire. The *Siècle*, a Bonapartist organ, spoke in 1840 of "the sublime agony of St Helena, longer than the agony of Christ, and no less resigned," and in the face of evidence even lost sight of the elementary facts of Napoleon's career. "The thought of Napoleon at St Helena," say the editors of the official *Correspondance* (vol. xix), "is a thought of emancipation for humanity, of democratic progress, of the application of the great principles of the Revolution"; and this was the pretext and apology for the Second Empire, the Government which, beginning with a cannonade in the Bouchards, ended with the capitulation of Sedan and the loss of Alsace and Lorraine.

Exile is in itself a form of martyrdom; and the walls of Longwood ate their bread in generic sorrow. As Las Cases remarked, "The details of St Helena are unimportant; to be there at all is the great grievance." A little company of French gentlemen and ladies, accustomed to the stirring life of a brilliant capital, found itself pitched on a desolate island, far from friends and home and all the great movement of the world. The attendants of Napoleon were not cast in the staid mould; and, even if considerations of policy had not been involved, transportation would have inclined them to exaggerate minor discomforts, to strain against the restrictions of the governors, to shudder at the rocks and waves, to condemn the rain when it was dry, the sun when it was rainy, and the wind when it was windy, to compare the sparse gun-train of the Longwood plateau with the ample shades of Mardy and St Cloud, and the rough accommodation of the Longwood house with the comforts of a well-appointed Parisian hotel. To a man like Napoleon, whose whole soul was in politics, isolation was a kind of torture. He had no administrative occupations to absorb his energies as had been the case in Elba; and "thus," to quote his own bitter phrase, was now "his only

superfluous." To quicken all the tedious hours was a task too heavy even for his busy genius. He learnt a little English, he dictated memoirs, he played chess, he read books and newspapers, he set Geometrical mathematical problems, and in the later half of 1810 and the earlier half of 1811 he found some solace in gardening. In the first two years of his captivity his spirits were sometimes high and even exuberant; and in the exercise of his splendid intellect he must have found some genuine enjoyment. But at heart he was miserable, spitting himself like a cross child, and allowing petty insults to fester within him. Now he was calm, proud, and grand, now irritable and wayward. Even the approach of death could not purge his soul of its evil humours, and he left a legacy to Castillon as a reward for attempting to accommodate the Duke of Wellington.

The colony of Longwood had a political object in magnifying the hardships of its position; and it has left a large literature of complaint. "Our situation here," said Napoleon, as reported by Las Cases, "may even have its attractions. The universe is looking at us. We remain the martyrs of an immortal cause. Millions of men weep for us; our country sighs; and glory is in mourning. Adversity was wanting to my career. If I had died on the throne amid the clouds of my omnipotence I should have remained a problem to many men; to-day, thanks to my misfortune, they can judge of me ruled as I am." Nor was this the only advantage that might be reaped from the policy of complaint. Compassionate Whigs in England, learning the tale of hardships, the bad food, the damp house, the intercepted letters, the ostentatious orders of arrest, would rise and denounce the Government in Parliament. At the voice of Lord Holland the heart of the country would be stirred; and Napoleon would be summoned back to Europe on the crest of the Whig reaction. Even if this hope failed, still it would be wise to disparage the good name of England. The Bourbons owed everything to Great Britain; but the rivalry between France and England was older than the Bourbons; and the story of petty indignities heaped upon her greatest captain by a British Government would be accepted in France as a token that he too had suffered for the old cause, and that his dynasty would never forget it.

Holding the general conviction that Napoleon was far too dangerous to be allowed abroad, and having some reason to believe that plots were on foot to effect his rescue, Lord Liverpool's Cabinet properly determined to keep a close watch on St Helena. Their precautions may have been excessive—and excessive the Duke of Wellington thought them—their suspicions over-done, their regulations too minute and harassing. Often the Government undoubtedly was, but it was as humane and considerate as its sense of duty would permit. The prisoner received a yearly allowance of £10,000, subsequently raised to £12,000, inhabited the second-best house in the island, was permitted to retain a numerous wife and to move freely without an escort within a district of twelve miles. He might

gustly his taste for books and newspapers and music, and he might ride or walk outside the walls with a British officer in attendance.

There are not the provisions of an Indian Government; and the man who was sent out to administer them was not Indian. Sir Hudson Lowe, who assumed sole charge of the island on April 14, 1818, was an officer with a respectable record, though not one which would be likely to commend him to Napoleon. He had led a regiment of Camiseros, participated in the siege of Toulon, and brought the news of Napoleon's abdication to London. In five stormy interviews, all held within the first four months of Lowe's arrival, Napoleon poured out the rish of his wrath upon the harsh governor, whose chief crimes consisted in his refusal to extend the twelve miles' limit or to forward a letter of complaint to the Prince Regent save through the ordinary ministerial channels. After this, Napoleon never suffered the "Gallician thief-taker" to approach him, or attempted to revive his first and hasty estimate. It may be conceded that Lowe was a martinet, that he was deficient in graciousness and tact, and that he ultimately came to suffer from a morbid suspicion. To be a good regimental officer is one thing, to discharge a delicate political mission is another. Lowe was full of loyal pusillity. The home Government, with almost incredible perversity, had insisted that Napoleon should be released the Imperial title and known only by the designation of General Bonaparte. A wise governor would have taken good care to minimize the effect of so stupid a regulation as soon as he had ascertained that it was violently objected to. Lowe on the other hand administered the rule with military exactitude. He interpreted a book from Europe because it was directed to "the Emperor," and recommended the officers of the 89th regiment to decline a copy of *Cato's Life of Marlborough* presented to them by Napoleon during his last illness because it contained the Imperial name on the title-page. So monstrous an exhibition of obtuse literalism has rarely been afforded. But there was no inhumanity in Lowe. He was genuinely solicitous for the creature comforts of the exiles.

It was, however, part of the policy of Longwood to court martyrdom and to advertise woe. When Napoleon failed to obtain a relaxation of the twelve miles' limit, he declared that he would not ride out at all; when he was reminded of the need of economy, he ordered his plate to be broken up, as if the wicked gauler had driven him to starvation's brink. On October 9, 1818, some new and more stringent regulations arrived from England, which had probably been suggested by intelligence received in London in the previous August, to the effect that three hundred men had set sail from Baltimore to attempt a rescue. The limit was contracted to eight miles, and the sentinels were drawn in close to the house at sunset, so that the exiles were deprived of the full enjoyment of the sunset and most delicious hours of the day. The new restrictions (which were subsequently relaxed) were certainly

unpleasant; and it is not surprising that they should have provoked a protest.

In 1817 a thin volume was published in London entitled *Letters from the Cape of Good Hope in reply to Mr. Fawcett*. The letters, which purported to be written by an Englishman, were in reality translated from the French; and the original draft was secretly dictated by Napoleon to Las Cases. They were designed to impress the British public with the sufferings of the exiles, and to furnish a defence for those episodes in Napoleon's career which had proved most repugnant to British opinion—the execution of the Duc d'Angoulême, the death of Captain Wright, the treatment of the Spanish Bourbons, and the retreats from Elba. It was represented that the new code of rules was worthy of Botany Bay; that Napoleon could not go out into his garden without being spied on by a redoubt; that he was not allowed even to exchange a word with a native; that the climate of St. Helena was fatal to health, and the food noxious; that for many months Napoleon had not left his four ill-built, unwholesome little rooms; and that the British Government was incurring a cost of £200,000 a year to keep a prisoner within four walls under a tropical sun. It was a skillful demonstration, but the Tory garrison showed no signs of distress, and the Quarterly blew its loudest note of defiance. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (November 21, 1818) the representatives of Russia, Austria, and Prussia formally testified their approval of the new regulations.

The Emperor's autobiography had been commenced at the Tuileries and St. Cloud, where he had dictated accounts of several of his Italian battles to General Bertrand and given orders that plans and maps should be drawn to illustrate his Italian and Egyptian campaigns. The work was resumed at St. Helena with such materials as the Emperor was able to gather round him; and the story of Brumaire and the Provisional Consulate, of the early exploits in Italy, Egypt, and Syria, of the retreats from Elba and the Hundred Days, was written in a connected form at Napoleon's dictation, together with a critical account of the Montenapoleons and Waterloo campaigns. Chapters were added upon the rights of neutrality, the battle of Copenhagen, and the assassination of Paul I. Four notes were dictated on Las Cases's *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de Saint-Domingue*, and six notes on *le Peuple à la Quatrième Coordonnée*; but, with the single exception of Waterloo, no military campaigns were recorded, and the account of Waterloo was not a record but an apology. For a moment, in 1817, Napoleon seems to have contemplated a narrative of the Russian expedition; but the plan was soon dropped for lack of materials, and a projected history of the Revolutionary Convention shared the same fate. The choice of episodes was not fortuitous. The *Mémoires* were designed to exhibit Napoleon as the soldier of the Republic, and to clear his military reputation from the stain of his last repudiating defeat.

Edoúard-Berni, the finest of critics, has recognised the literary quality of the St Helena writings, the prompt imperious brevity, the exquisite clearness, the occasional beauties of sentiment and eloquence. It is natural to compare the record of the Egyptian and Syrian campaigns, where Napoleon depicts himself at once as soldier, statesman, and diarist, with another splendid fragment of military autobiography, the *Commentaries of the Gallic War*. The two stories have the same lucidity, the same gift of perspective, the same command of professional technique, the same wide scope of observation, the same close adherence to detail. Caesar has more formal eloquence; Napoleon has more romance, more passion, more education. But, while each wrote to defend his policy and his military reputation, Caesar had no interest in concealing or confusing the truth.

Yet the formal memoirs, however strongly conceived and masterfully executed, are the least interesting portions of the St Helena retrospect. Napoleon was a notable talker; and, when the long tedium of his political career was relaxed, his restless mind peered itself out upon all the incidents of his wonderful life. It is true that he desired a certain reading of his career to be accepted, and that he more than once prompted his faithful followers to record his remarks; but he was far too unable to maintain a steady pose. He was not a dilly man sitting down to fixify a dull life, but a child of nature, frank, passionate, impetuous, full of sudden turns and ruses which carried him far beyond the boundaries of his set apology. The scholar's mind, constant to its old habit, schemes for the past, as it had formerly schemeed for the future; and we cannot tell whether the plans which he attributes to himself had actually been in his mind. A man of such a temperament could talk neither sober autobiography nor sustained dream. And so, side by side with the official legend, the *Mémorial de paix*, deferential to a moral judgment whose power it usually apprehends but never understands, we have the fragments of spontaneous talk, sometimes dazed and lively, sometimes grand and eloquent, sometimes brutal, sometimes kindly, always and through every mood vivid and unmistakable.

Napoleon slowly saw that the flames of reaction were spreading over Europe, and that the yoke of the Bourbons would soon become intolerable to France. Some day the King of Rome would have his chance. In the sombre gloom of clericalism and privilege and military impotence, men would point back to the bright vision of a Liberal Empire, which had been based on social equality and religious tolerance, which had made France the arbiter of Europe, and Paris the centre of European civilisation. Then France would turn to her great, calm, and benevolent Prometheus, would gather his lightest words and dream his true intention. She would learn that he alone had understood and advised her; that he loved peace, but was driven by wicked foreigners into needless war; that, although he had showered golden gifts upon her, his

anarchy was still full of the manifold blessings of prosperity and constitutional rule which he intended to bestow upon Europe after the conclusion of a general peace. She would read his own authentic account of campaigns which he had fought as the soldier of the Republic, and, perusing his story of Waterloo, would never sink in his supreme mastery of war.

"The system of government," said Napoleon once to O'Meara, "must be adapted to the national temperament and to circumstances. In the first place France required a strong government. While I was at the head of it, I may say that France was in the same condition as Rome when a dictator was declared necessary for the salvation of the Republic. A series of collisions against her existence was formed by four great amongst all the powerful nations of Europe. To resist successfully, it was necessary that all the energies of the country should be at the disposal of the chief. I never supposed taken in my own defence. Europe never ceased to make war upon France and her principles. We had to strike down others or to be ourselves struck down. Between the parties that so long agitated France I was like a rider seated on an unruly horse, who always wanted to swerve either to the right or to the left; and to make him keep a straight course I was obliged to let him feel the bridle occasionally. In quarter times my dictatorship would have finished, and I should have commenced my constitutional reign. Even as it was, with a coalition always opposing me, either secret or public, avowed or denied, there was more equality in France than in any other country in Europe. One of my grand objects was to render education accessible to everybody. I caused every institution to be directed upon a plan which offered instruction to the public either gratis or at a rate as moderate as not to be beyond the means of the peasant. The museums were thrown open to the people. My consule would have become the best educated of the world. All my exertions were directed to illuminating the mass of the nation instead of breasting them by ignorance and superstition... There never was a king who was more the sovereign of the people than I was. I always prided myself upon being the man of the people... Those English who are lovers of liberty will one day lament with tears having gained the battle of Waterloo. It was as fatal to the liberties of Europe as that of Philippi was to those of Rome."

Such was the general scheme of apology. The conquests were forced upon him, but they made for the well-being of the conquered; and the whole foreign policy was part of the great battle for light against darkness, which had been waged by Voltaire and continued by the men of the Revolution. The "grand objects" were to re-establish the Kingdom of Poland as a barrier against "the barbarians of the north," and to endow Spain with a constitution, which would have crushed privilege and superstition and opened a full career to talent. He admits that the Spanish War destroyed him; but the "Partisards could not have been left to the

machinations of the English, to the intrigues, the hopes, the pretensions of the Bourbons." The interview of Bayonne was not an ambush but "an immense coup d'état." He had never mingled in the intrigues of the Spanish Court, had never broken engagements with the Spanish princes, and had used no duplicity to draw them to Bayonne. "When I saw them at my feet and could judge by myself of their incapacity, I pitied the lot of a great people, and seized the unique occasion which fortune presented me to regenerate Spain, to rescue her from England, and to unite her entirely to France." Again, if he had been successful in moving the Chamber, he would have founded independent republics in England and Ireland. "I would have destroyed the House of Hanover, abolished the nobility, proclaimed liberty, fraternity, equality.... Your nobles would have been on my side, knowing that I am a man of the people and that I spring from the people myself." His designs in Italy were equally liberal. "I gazed, when I had a second son, as I had reason to hope, to make him King of Italy, with Rome for his capital, uniting all Italy, Naples, and Sicily into one kingdom." The three great obstacles to Italian unity had been the foreign dynasty, the spirit of locality, and the weakness of the Pope at Rome. In the short space of fifteen years all had been removed, "broken by the great movement of the French Republic." The Pope was at Fieschiabona; and, but for the Russian campaign, the head-quarters of the Catholic religion would have been permanently transferred to Paris. All had been prepared for the proclamation of Italian independence upon the birth of the second son. It was settled that Prince Eugene should act as Viceroy during the minority.

It was true that mistakes had been made in Germany. The King of Prussia should have been deprived of his kingdom after Jena. "After Friedland I should have taken Sillesia and given it to Saxony. Had I done this, given a free constitution, and delivered the peasants from feudal anarchy, they would have been contented." He thought that he should have declared Hungary independent, that he should have subdivided Austria, that he should at least have "devoured" Prussia before starting on his Moscow campaign. Still, the Confederation of the Rhine and the kingdoms of Westphalia, the grand-duchy of Warsaw and the crippled state of the Hohenzollerns, were sufficient evidence of French preponderance beyond the Rhine.

The problems of the Balkan Peninsula, of Asia, Africa, and America had not been solved; and here it was necessary to acknowledge some failures and errors of judgment. The idea of the policy, however, was large, magnificent, and liberal. Egypt was the key to the East; and France, once mistress of Egypt, would have been able to unlock the treasures of India. She would have played the balance of Asia, and, in alliance with Russia, Persia, and the Mahometans, broken the British power in the East. "Egypt once in possession of the French, secured

*India to the English.*" The possession of Egypt was also designed to secure a further advantage. The Ottoman Empire was corrupt to the core, and though, on its inevitable dissolution, part of the spoil would go to Russia, the remainder would fall to France, the mistress of Egypt. During the negotiations subsequent to the Peace of Tilsit, the partition of Turkey had been frequently discussed between Napoleon and Alexander. But, though at first Napoleon was pleased with the Russian proposals because he thought "it would enlighten the world to drive these brutes the Turks out of Europe," mature reflection convinced him that the plan would endanger the equilibrium and the peace of Europe. "I considered that the barbarians of the North were already too strong, and probably in the course of time would overwhelm all Europe, as I now think they will." Accordingly it became his object to bridle the Muscovite barbarism in the interests of European civilization. On the one hand, he would lure them far into the East; on the other hand he would erect strong barriers in the west and south, a national kingdom of Poland, a group of German States under French suzerainty, a French Italy, a French Egypt, possibly also a French Constantinople. These he would have accomplished a work analogous to that of Leo I and Charles Martel, of Charlemagne and Otto I, who saved the fabric of Greek and Latin civilization from destruction at barbarian hands.

The great design had failed, and Europe would live to regret it; but the failure had been the result of the incapacity of subordinate, of irredeemable accident, of the porous policy of England, and was in no way inherent in the design itself. An administrative had lost the battle of the Nile; the chance stroke of an assassin had destroyed the general who could have preserved Egypt for France. And what benefits might not fifty years of French rule have secured to Egypt? A thousand dykes would have distributed the waters of the Nile; sugar and cotton, rice and indigo, would have been cultivated; and the commerce of the Indies would have resumed its ancient route. "After fifty years of possession, civilization would have spread into the interior of Africa by the Senegal, Abyssinia, Darfour, and the Fouta; several great nations would be called to enjoy the benefits of the arts, the sciences, the religion of the true God, for it is from Egypt that the people of central Africa must receive light and happiness." An elaborate argument was designed to show that the French army could have maintained itself in the country without help from home.

In the West Indies Napoleon had to contend to the disadvantage of his plans. He told O'Meara that he should have declared San Domingo free, and that he should have acknowledged the black government; for, if this had been done, England would have lost her West Indian colonies. However, in the notes appended to Lacroix's memoirs, he takes a precisely opposite line and defends the policy of the expedition, ascribing its failure to the mistakes of Le Clerc, the intrigues of the English, and the



revenge of yellow fever. He had found it necessary to permit the slave-trade and to maintain the institution of slavery in Martinique and the Ile de France, but these decisions had not disturbed the course of events in San Domingo. Slavery was founded upon antipathy of colour; and antipathy of colour could only be overcome by polygamy. He had therefore held several consultations with theologians with the view of preparing a measure to authorize polygamy in the French colonies, "containing the number of wives in two, one white, one black." This was the solution which the legislator would be bound to adopt, whenever it should be thought desirable to enfranchise the blacks in the French colonies. The experiment was never made, for the naval war stripped France of her islands; yet in the Continental System a compensation was provided, which in time would have made Europe independent of colonial imports. In two or three years best-quality sugar would have been sold as cheaply in the French market as the cane-sugar of the tropics.

Nor was this the only preparation for the temporary bondage of war. Napoleon had made France the centre of a federal empire; and it was his intention that Paris should be the capital of Europe, "unique, incomparable," adorned with all the treasures of art and science, the seat of the Papacy and of the College of Cardinals, the centre of the foreign missions, the home of the University of France, the sanctuary of all the ideas and thoughts which were to sway the course of European civilization. In order "to facilitate the fusion and uniformity of the federal parts of the Empire" he had designed, in the Institute of Medicine, a school in which all the princes of the Imperial House would have received a common education. Each prince would bring with him "ten or twelve children more or less of his own age and belonging to the best families of his country," with results which might easily be predicted. French principles would take root in all the dependencies; Italy, Spain, Germany, and Holland would attach themselves more closely to the French connection; foreign sovereigns would clamour for the admission of their sons; and, looking back upon the friendships of early youth, the rulers of Europe would be more likely to keep the peace.

Great as had been his ambition, his course was untainted by crime or corruption. Scrubbing the past from St Helena he declares that he is ashamed at his moderation. After one or two preliminary volleys, he ordered the guns of Val-de-Aulnois to be charged with black cartridge. Nothing would have been easier for him than to have procured the death of the French and Spanish Bourbons; yet the temptation was rejected. He would probably have purchased the Duc d'Angoulême, if Talleyrand had not interrupted a letter in which the Duke offered his services to the new Government of France. "My secret thought," he said on one occasion, "was to give him the Constable's sword so as to be quit of the dagger." He had never taken a bribe; he had never bought a vote or a party by

promise of place or power: he had found great dissipation, he had left administrative purity. Council of State, Tribunals, Senate, all were pure and irreproachable. As for himself he had never cared to amass wealth. "*J'ai eu le goût de la fondation et non celui de la propriété. Ma propriété à moi doit être la gloire et la célébrité.*"

As to the nobility of his great social experiment, the creation of the nobility, he was under no illusions. In a singularly penetrating way he explained one day to Las Cases that the French Revolution had destroyed the social charism of the home, and the ease, luxury, and wealth which form the basis of cultivated enjoyment. In consequence of this, society took its pleasure in public entertainments. The throne had also ceased to be a lordship, a signoria, and had become an office; and the whole tone of a modern Court differed from that of the Courts of the ancien régime. The modern Court had less social influence, for the influence of Courts was only penetrate the nation through the medium of an aristocracy. He had to be cautious about introducing men of the ancien régime to the Court: "for every time I touched this cord there was a trembling of spirit, as with a horse when the reins are pulled in too tight. I have made princes and dukes, but I could not make real nobles." In twenty years, however, all would have been well, for he had intended to intermarry the new blood with the old.

He returned to this subject at St Helena, saying that the creation of the nobility was one of his greatest, his most complete, his most happy ideas. He had three objects in view, all of which would in time have been attained—to reconcile France with Europe, to amalgamate the new France with the old, and to annihilate the feudal nobility. He desired that his national title would have re-established that equality which the feudal nobility had proscribed: "for parchment I substituted the action," forgetting apparently that the actions are not transmitted from father to son. It was done, however, that he had not succeeded in winning the Parobourg St Germain. "*J'ai fait trop, ou trop peu,*" he said one day to Las Cases—enough to discontent the democrats and not enough to attract the royalists. "If on the return of the *Empire* I had attached them to myself, the aristocracy would readily have adored me." He goes on to speculate upon all that he would have done to kind the ancient nobility to his throne. His first thought, "his true inclination," when seeking for a second wife, was to marry a daughter of one of the old French Houses. He would have adopted the daughters of the Montmorencys, the Stiles, the Clugnes, and married them to foreign sovereigns. "For the good and the magic of aristocracy consists in antiquity and in time, the sole things which I was unable to create." Talleyrand, his usual scapegoat, prevented admission to the *Empire*, and his councilors persuaded him to the Austrian marriage: so the Parobourg St Germain was never conceded. We must remember that on this occasion he was talking to a royalist.

The Imperial system might be accused of having stifled liberty and injured education. To such allegations Napoleon replies that his work was a *work*, not a *statue*. The extreme centralisation of the prefectural system was essentially transitional, "a weapon of war," and would in time have given way to "our peace establishment, our local institutions"; and have he sketched out a system of local government by unpaid magistrates somewhat after the English plan. Again, the conscription, far from harming education, was designed to benefit it. "Conscription is the eternal riot of a nation: it purifies morality and trains habits"; and the virtues engendered by the military life would in time have been fertilised by the instruction given in the regimental schools which the Emperor had planned in order that the conscripts might continue their studies. He had also devised a scheme for the improvement of clerical education. The elements of agriculture, medicine, and law were to be added to the theological course provided for those intending to take Orders. Rages and controversy would inevitably have become rarer in the pulpit; and, while the *curé* would preach "pure morality" to church, he would be in a position to give useful counsel to his parishioners on practical affairs.

He denied that the Senate was useless; he asserted that the Tribunal was useless and expensive, and that its suppression was mentioned by the public voice. "*J'ai toujours marché avec l'opinion de tous les sages d'Europe.*" There could be no doubt as to the solidity and excellence of his finances. "Never," he said to Gergaud, "has anyone brought more order and more light into financial accounts than I." In part my good measures are due to my knowledge of mathematics, to my clear ideas on everything." At another time he spoke of his Code as the "work of salvation," as his "title to the benedictions of posterity." These were legitimate wants; and the noblest monument to his memory, as he once told Montholon, would not be a catalogue of the exploits of "the most valiant soldier in the history of war," but a collection of the thoughts which he uttered in the Council of State, and the instructions which he issued to his ministers, and a list of the public works which were undertaken during the period of his rule.

There were moments in which bravado and apology were out of place, and he saw himself and the world truly. "Never but myself ever did me any harm," he said once to O'Meara, "I was my only enemy"; and again to Montholon, "I stretched the cord too much. I could not wait to dole the Spanish business before I crossed the Niemen." But of contention for bloodshed and treasure spent and lives broken there is no trace. He broods over his failure and tries to explain how he should have averted it, now saying that he should have shot Bonaparte after Waterloo and sent twenty deputies to the scaffold, now that with a man like Turmenne to help him he would have made himself master of the world. In unguarded words he shows how little he cared for the principles

of the Liberal Empire. Had he conquered at Waterloo, he would have sent the Chambers packing. If he were back again in France, he would close the University and entrust the education of the country to the priests. "I too have suffered from the mania for propagating the sciences, but my experience has corrected it. We want cultivators, workers, manufacturers, not philosophers."

But a reconciliation of his inconsistencies is not to be attempted. As the record shows him he could be brutal, cynical, chicanerist, and who can keep the chart of his moods and thoughts? There is not a noble sentiment which he will not pitch overboard when the scolding storm is on him; there is hardly a proposition which stands unscathed in the confused effluence of his contradictory apologies. At one moment he loudly proclaims his beneficence, and then suddenly the notes of the sithing anthem are stopped, and we hear the despairing cry of the baffled seaman laying the blame of failure on his confederates. On the whole he met his hour of trial with a certain noble courage, clearing his dependent and inevitable companions, and himself setting an example of resolute work. But, as hope after hope went out and disease gained on his constitution, his giant energy flagged. At the opening of 1821 it was clear that he had not long to live; and after the end of March he scarcely rose save to change his bed. The disease which slew him was the same which had slain his father, cancer in the stomach; but he bore the pain with patient fortitude and full knowledge. When Bertrand asked him what conduct his friends should pursue and what end they should aim at, he answered with fine magnanimity, "The interests of France and the glory of the Fatherland. I am an old man." The last faint sounds caught from his lips as he expired on May 5, 1821, are said to have been, "*France, amis, les Français, Antoine*"; and so in the midst of the great hurricane he passed out of life, charging at the head of his ghostly legions. De Toussard has written his epitaph—"He, you as great as a man can be without virtue."

Men of a conservative temper who were spectators of the downfall of the Empire were apt to see little in Napoleon's career but a superb and malignant explosion of human energy, the devastations of which it would be the duty of subsequent generations to repair. To them he was merely the last and the greatest of the Jacobins, the upstart captain of the revolutionary and military democracy which had overturned the settled institutions of France and thrown its insolent challenge at the old order of Europe. Others, taking longer views of history, have been principally concerned with the fact that Napoleon was a powerful disabser of medieval barbarism. They think of the wars of the Empire, not merely as a great effusion of Frankish chivalry, inextinguishable as the Crusades themselves, in valour and pathetic extravagance, but also as one of the decisive episodes in the secular duel between the Latin and the

Teutonic nations. For the conquests of France involved the acceptance of the political system which had been fashioned in the fire of revolution; the obliteration of ancient boundaries; the destruction of the social groupings of the feudal age, noble cast, trade guild, religious order; the extension of a system of private law, as hostile to the Teutonic principle of free association as it was favourable to the Roman principle of State compulsion. To others, again, the true significance of Napoleon lies in the fact that he made possible the national movements of the nineteenth century. He is the herald of Italian unity; and, also by reason of the things which he destroyed and by reason of the efforts which he provoked, he takes rank as one of the makers of Germany. For the old aristocratic federations of the Dutch he substituted the principles which govern the modern kingdom of Holland. It was one of his many policies to excite the national and inextinguishable aspirations of the Poles; and calves of hope spread even to Serbia, Roumania, and Greece, communicated by the mighty movements of so many men, and the sudden catastrophes of such ancient things. If South-American democracies value their independent status of the men who destroyed the prestige of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies might be raised, without an excessive strain on historical propriety, in the square of Valparaiso or Buenos Ayres.

This, however, is not the aspect which chiefly impressed Englishmen. That despised and despotic generation, who never cried craven and never drew breath, viewed Napoleon, not with complete justification, but also not without justification, as the tyrant who respected no pledge, stopped short of no ambition, and flinched before no crime. They thought of him not as the creator of nationalities (for he created none in his lifetime), but as the destroyer of peoples and the enemy of constitutional freedom all over the world. As the men of the fifteenth century regarded Attila the Hun, so, with few exceptions, did the contemporaries of Pitt and Liverpool regard Napoleon. The thunder of the storm has now long died away; and we see that some precious seeds were borne upon the hurricane. Nor did they fall upon the continent of Europe alone. The maritime and colonial power of England was fortified by a war which gave us Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope, promoted the occupation of Australia, and led to the destruction of the Mahometan power in India. The sea-power of France, broken by the disorders of the Revolution, was finally shattered by the wars of the Empire. So impressive was the apprehension of England beyond the seas that some writers have regarded the supremacy of the British Empire as the most important result of Napoleon's career.

What was his legacy to France? To the extravagance of his later projects France owes the loss of the Rhine frontier, which had been the ancient conquest of the revolutionary arms, and the humiliated position of French diplomacy. That he terminated the progress of the Revolution, that he founded a government above party, that he founded the school of

the Church, and reconciled the principles of social equality and political order—all this is acknowledged even by his enemies. To his concrete enemy France were the rapid completion and the wide application of her Code; nor has any great modern community of men received so much from a single human mind. His economic legislation is open to criticism, even granting his own assumptions. Was it wise for a government resting upon the support of the peasantry to promote the growth of towns by giving high protection to manufactures? Was it statesman-like to exclude the manufactures of Italy and Germany from the French market? Was it not chimerical to suppose that Europe could be made independent of tropical produce? Socialism had been the pest which, in the eyes of the middle classes, had justified the Consulate, and socialists can find little comfort in the Civil Code. Napoleon declared in the name of private property; and it was left for the Second Empire to legislate trade-unions. His religious policy had issues widely different from those which he intended; for a Church, plucked, polled, and belled by the State, was inevitably thrown back upon the support of the Papacy. If the Revolution, by confiscating the Church lands, destroyed the qualifications beloved by St Louis and Bonnet, Napoleon promoted that modern form of Ultramontanism which wages a lifeless war against the very fundamentalism of the democratic State. The Revolution broke with religion and sowed the seeds of martyrdom. Napoleon exploited it and promoted at once clerical opportunism and Ultramontanism and. The idea of a vast community, organised on a rigid plan and trained to a definite end, will always continue to fascinate much impatient of the free and uncoordinated movements of human activity. In attempting to control all the sources of spiritual and intellectual influence in France, Napoleon assumed a task beyond the compass of any man or any government. The freedom of liberty and authority must necessarily shrink from age to age and from occasion to occasion. When Napoleon grasped the helm of State, France needed a spell of strong government. This he gave her, and more besides. He gave her a scheme of education framed to meet the needs of a military despotism. He restored the administrative centralisation of the ancien régime, with those improvements which the Revolution had rendered possible—a centralisation scientific, cultural, all-pervading, disseminated by the press or legislative acts, or correspondence; and even trained in the Napoleonic school have worked the machine of French government ever since.



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*See also under Napoleon (Napoleon, Vaudé) for Alexander I and Napoleon.*

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## TURKEY, GREECE, AND THE LEVANT.

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*See also Bibliography to Chapter XLII.*

## MANUSCRIPT SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE, EXISTING AT PARIS.

By CHARLES SOMMER, *Archiviste* at the *Archives Nationales*.

### (1) *Archives Nationales*.

The documents of most importance for the domestic history of the Consulate and the Empire are preserved at the *Archives Nationales*, where they may be inspected on request addressed to M. le Directeur des *Archives Nationales*, Paris, 21, 23 rue des Francs-Bourgeois.

This is not the place to indicate all the series in which documents bearing on the period may be found: one can only refer the student to the publications which, under each category, give sufficient information as to the documents it contains. The first place must be given to the *Statistique par série* des documents conservés aux *Archives Nationales* (Paris, Delagrave, 1904, 1 vol.). See especially the series B (*Quintons and votes*), C (*Procès-verbaux of the Assemblies, and documents connected*), CC (*the Conservatoire National and the Imperial Chambre des Pairs*), F (*general administration*), H (*plans and maps*), CP (*Ministère de l'Empire*), EII (*official papers*), AD (*an important collection of printed matter*), AP<sup>1</sup> (*the State Secretariat*). The *Statistique* should be supplemented by the *List des Consulate des Archives Nationales* (Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1899; not published, but to be found in the larger libraries), a work due to M. G. Savois, former Director of the Archives.

For the Consulate and the Empire, the most important series is that marked AP<sup>1</sup>, in which are preserved the papers of the office of the Imperial Secretary of State. There are to be found, in particular, the ministerial reports, and the minutes (*procès-verbaux* by Napoleon) of the *conseils* passed from the year VIII (1799) to 1815. The series AP<sup>1</sup>, in which are also some important diplomatic documents, represents, in fact, what is essential in the administrative activity of the period: the Secretariat of State is the central organ on which depended and to which was transmitted all public business of first-rate importance.

The following publications, by M. Chas. Schmidt, may also be consulted: (1) *Le Musée des Archives Nationales* (published, Mar. 14, 1906, by *Les Archives Françaises*) describes the facilities offered to students visiting the Archives, and indicates the inventories open to them. (2) *Les Sources de l'Histoire d'un département aux Archives Nationales* (published, Mar. 14, 1905, by *Les Archives Françaises*) contains an estimate of the importance, for students of contemporary history, of the papers contained in series F (*general administration*). (3) *Les sources de l'Histoire contemporaine: le fonds de la Police générale aux Archives Nationales* (published in the *Revue d'Hist. cont. et contempor.* 1908-9) should be consulted for the purpose of research in the abundant papers of the Ministry of Police (series P<sup>1</sup>, *affaires politiques, étrangères, &c.*).

(2) *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.*

Documents anterior to 1870 are concentrated on application to M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Paris. There are two principal series: (1) *Correspondance politique-diplomatique* of ambassadors, and correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with French agents abroad, classified by country, and in each country by chronological order; (2) *Mémoires et Documents* divided into two groups, France and foreign countries; an inventory-summary has been issued; since the publication of *Les Archives de l'Ministère de France*, by MM. Langlois and Béhic, vol. i of the *Correspondance politique* (Germany, England, Argentine Republic, Austria) has appeared (Paris, 1902).

(3) *Archives du Ministère de la Guerre.*

Documents anterior to 1870 are concentrated on application to M. le Ministre de la Guerre, Paris. There are two principal series, forming in reality two distinct collections of Archives, for access to each of which special authorizations is required. These are: (1) *Les Archives historiques*, where one may consult, in particular, the *Correspondance des Armées*, a primary source for military history; (2) *Les Archives administratives*, where one kept the personal records (dossiers) of military officers.

(4) *Archives du Ministère des Colonies.*

In these archives, which, though of much importance, are still imperfectly known, the documents are arranged in three principal séries: (1) *personnel des Colonies*; (2) *correspondance politique*; (3) *papers historiques*. They are open to inspection on application to M. le Ministre des Colonies, Paris.

(5) *Archives du Ministère de la Marine.*

Since 1870 the papers of this Ministry anterior to the Revolution, and a portion of those of later date, have been deposited at the *Archives Nationales*. For the period of the Consulate and the Empire, one should consult the *Archives*, the *correspondance générale* (classified under ports), the *campagnes*, the *armements*. Special authorizations from the Ministry of Marine is required in order to consult these documents.

(6) *Libraries.*

The documents preserved in the great libraries are of so varied a character that it is impossible to give even a summary account of them. In the National Library open acquisitions of the *fonds français* are to be found interesting and ; a catalogue of which is in preparation. Others will be found in the library of the Arsenal (acquired by M. Malet), and in the library of the Institute (catalogue by F. Buisson), and other libraries. But what is essential for the domestic library of France is to be found in the different Archives.

The further details—except for such modifications as have been made since 1870—the student should consult the book by MM. Ch.-V. Langlois and H. Béhic, entitled *Les Archives de l'Ministère de France* (Paris, Pion, 1907). He will find there, in particular, indications respecting Archives at present hardly explored, such as the *Archives des Colonies*, etc., also respecting such as have been destroyed, e.g. those of the *Comité d'État* and of the *Ministère des Finances*, which were burnt in 1871. Many private libraries have preserved documents relative to the Napoleonic period, but access to these is generally difficult.

## CHAPTERS I, V.

## FRANCE UNDER THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE.

## I. LAWS, REGULATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS, ETC.

- Annuaire national* (yearly imprint), published by Texts. Paris. One vol. yearly.  
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*Bulletin des Lois. Table chron.* (in viii-xx viii. 3 vols., and supplement). Fourth series (in xii-1814. 20 vols.). Index by Bonobonius (1789-1814). 4 vols. Paris. 1816.  
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*Julien, M. A. Extraits politiques sur la situation actuelle de la France et sur les plans de secours gouvernementaux.* Paris. 1800.  
*Martini, J. P. Bonaparte, Comte de. Exposé de la situation de l'Empire présenté au Corps législatif le 22 février 1812, avec 22 tableaux statistiques.* Paris. 1812.  
*Ponsard, J. Essai d'une statistique générale de la France.* Paris. 1802.  
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*Roquemin, E. L'État de la France au 14 brumaire.* Paris. 1874.

## II. GENERAL WORKS.

For works on the general history of France during this period (by Deland, Guérard, Desnoyelles de Beaumont, Lacretelle, Talon, Thévenaz, Thiers, etc.), and the works on Napoleon (by Fauriol, Lantier, Peyre, Ratt, Sadiet, Varadé, etc.) see General Bibliography.

## III. MEMOIRS AND CORRESPONDENCE.

## 1. OF FRENCH ORIGIN.

## (a) Of primary authority.

[No thoroughly critical study of Memoirs belonging to the history of this period has yet been made, and many of them mentioned in the present section might perhaps be said to have a place in the next group.]

Abricourt, Louis-Jean, *voir* Perron. *Discours de Mémoires et Souvenirs historiques*. 10 vols. Paris. 1840-4. Engl. transl. 9 vols. London. 1855. 2 vols. London. 1855.

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André, L. M. A. F., *Contes de Mémoires*. 2 vols. Paris. 1890-1.

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 Maréchal, C. F., Baron de. *Napoleon et Marie-Louise*. *Strenuous intimacies*. 2 vols. Paris. 1872-3. New edition, entitled *Mémoires*. 2 vols. Paris. 1894. Engl. transl. 2 vols. London. 1894, 1895.  
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(3) *Of inferior authority.*

[Among these, we will be aware they are not by the authors to whom they are attributed, or because their authors were distinguished or display bias, bias, or inconsistency, the following may be mentioned.]

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— *Mémoires biographiques.* Ed. Mademoiselle M. A. Lacroix. 2 vols. Paris. 1816. Engl. transl. Philadelphia. 1846. London. 1856.

*Mari, M. B., Duc de Beaune, Souvenirs intimes sur.* Ed. Charlotte de la Couronne d'Orléans, née Desormaux. 2 vols. Paris. 1845. Cf. *Baron de A. de la Cour d'Orléans.* Paris. 1828.

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*Saint-Amand (F. Richard, dit). Mémoires.* Edited by F. Hérissant de Strasbourg. Paris. 1837.

*Saint-Etienne, Ida. Mémoires d'une contemporaine.* Arranged by A. Mémoires, Ch. Waller, A. Fehst, and C. M. de Villeneuve. 6 vols. Paris. 1837-9.

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*Boisdeley, M. Notes on a Journey through France.* London. 1823.

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*Cort, Sir John. The Stranger in France.* London. 1808.

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*Fuchs, J. Letters from France (1803-5).* 2 vols. London. 1805.

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*Hess, C. R. Briefe.* Leipzig. 1804.

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*(Hollman, J. C.) The substance of some Letters.* 2 vols. London. 1804.

*Knapton, M. Travels.* 2 vols. London. 1816.

- Knieffow, A. von. *Erinnerungen aus Paris im Jahre 1814*. Berlin, 1894.
- Leveson, R. *Narrative of a captivity in France from 1809 to 1814*. 2 vols. London, 1822.
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- Madison, G. *An excursion in France*. London, 1809.
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- Nassau, A. H. *Beschreibungen (1807)*. Halle, 1810.
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- Pickerton, J. *Recollections (1807-9)*. 2 vols. London, 1809.
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## IV. SPECIAL WORKS.

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- Bingham, D. A. *The Marriages of the Bonapartes*. 2 vols. London, 1891.
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 Pezay, L. Froudey, poète de la reine. Paris. 1902.  
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F<sup>o</sup> 581-584.

F<sup>o</sup> 6-8, 22-28, 304-318, 324.

F<sup>o</sup> 305-400<sup>4</sup>, 484-500, 618-626, 700-716.

AB<sup>o</sup> 1516-1568, 1617, 1618-1619, 1650-1661.

AB<sup>o</sup> 386-391.

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## CHAPTER VIII.

## THE COMMAND OF THE SEA.

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273-282. Despatches of Admirals commanding on East India station.

313-326. Despatches of Admirals commanding on Persian station.

334-336. Despatches of Admirals commanding on Levant station.

367-371. Despatches of Admirals commanding on Lisbon station.

387-421. Despatches of Admirals commanding on Mediterranean.

523-526. Despatches of Admirals commanding on North America.

534-579. Despatches of Admirals commanding on North Sea station.

636-651. Correspondence of Admirals commanding at Chatham.

736-775. Correspondence of Admirals commanding at the Devonport.

1171-1187. Correspondence of Admirals commanding at Plymouth.

1211-1220. Correspondence of Admirals commanding at Portsmouth.

1221-1221, 2698, 7. Intelligence.

1221-1222. Letters from Lloyds.

1221-1224, 4279. Letters from the Secretary of State.

1221-1226. Letters from the War Office.

1221-1227. Secret Letters to the Admiralty.

1221-1228. Petitions.

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## CHAPTER XI

## TILSIT AND ERFURT.

## I. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.

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A small part only of the diplomatic correspondence contained in the archives of the *Grand Mazarin*, relating to the period subsequent to the Treaty of Tilsit, has yet been systematically published. The work of Hans Ruland, "*Preussen und Frankreich*," has not been carried on beyond the year 1807. The despatches of the French Foreign Office during the reigns of Clugny, then de Callevet, are not fully known; but the gaps in our information have been to a large extent filled by the work of M. Vissel, "*Napoleon et Alexandre I*" (1845-18, 4 vols., Paris, 1868). Light has also been thrown on Russian policy during this period by the *Cauchyville Correspondence*, the *Weymssch Archives*, and the works of MM. Tatischeff and Tatischevski, which are regarded as documentary evidence. Similarly the *Hardenberg Memoirs*, edited by Leopold von Ranke, Leuchard's "*Historische jenseits der Elbe*" (1852, 1856, 1857), Dr A. Sturz's "*Abhandlungen und Mittheilungen aus Geschichte der preussischen Reformen*," and collections of the *Internationale*, present fairly complete materials respecting the foreign and domestic history of Prussia in this period. With Russian affairs this Chapter does not deal, except in relation to the policy which led up to the interview at Erfurt. The *Memoirs of Metternich* gives some of the State papers relating to this.

The British Foreign Office Records for this period have been published only in the most fragmentary manner. The following are the volumes that deal chiefly with the events described in this Chapter: Denmark, Nos. 32; Portugal, No. 32; Prussia, Nos. 74 et seq.; Russia, Nos. 33-34; Sweden, Nos. 3-37 (new series); Holland, Nos. 33-35 (new series); Silesy, Nos. 37-38 (new series); Turkey, Nos. 35-36 (new series).

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## CHAPTER XII

## THE WAR OF 1859.

## 1. DOCUMENTS.

No systematic and extensive publication of the documents relating to the political history of the year 1859 has as yet been made. The statement holds good of all the States concerned. Even Switzerland's comprehensive work, *Histoire des événements de l'Europe pendant le règne de l'empire*, is in this respect incomplete. The Austrian archives have been used by Beer, so far as regards any concern, in his *Die Jahre österreichischer Politik*, 1881-82, which treats very thoroughly of the policy of the Minister Count Stadion. Westermann's *Österreichs Österreich und Europa im ersten Jahrzehnt des letzten Jahrhunderts*, vol. 11, is based on documentary evidence.

The National Archives of France still contain much unpublished material relating to 1859; but the most important part has been published in the *Correspondance de Napoleon I.* by the *Archives de l'Empire*, in the *Œuvres complètes de Napoleon*, and in the *Revue de Champagne*. The same may be said of the English archives, as the principal source is to be found in "George Curzon's *Official Correspondence*," and the "Cambridge MSS."

As regards the military events of 1859, the *K. K. Kriegsarchive* in Vienna contain stores of valuable material, which has been extensively used by Baron von Ruster-Kriegshelm, in his *Denkschrift*, 1865, also in his *Aspekte*, which is still in process of publication. On the other hand, these archives contain many documents, which, being "secret," may not be published; as that, as yet, we cannot be said to possess an absolutely complete history of 1859, written from the Austrian point of view, and based upon official reports.

The French General Staff, on the other hand, is busily engaged in writing the actions of the *Départ de la guerre*, for the history of the War of 1859, in an admirable work by Col. Sauty, *Campagne de 1859 en Allemagne et en Autriche*, of which three vols. have already appeared. It is based exclusively on documents.

There remain the Prussian archives of Breslau, Munich, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, and Darmstadt, which contain various unpublished official reports relating to the part taken in the war by the Confederation of the Rhine.

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## CHAPTER XVIII.

## THE FIRST RESTORATION.

## I. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL.

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## CHAPTERS XIX and XX.

## THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

The main part of the manuscript material for a history of the Congress of Vienna, and of the First and the Second Phase of Peace, as well as for the general diplomatic history of the year 1814, is to be found in the dispatches and other papers deposited in the Archives of the various departments of the several European Governments. Most of this material, but not as yet all, is accessible to the student. The papers dating from this period in the Foreign Office at Paris, which include the official correspondence of the French embassy at Vienna, are open to students, on permission of a commissary; those in the K. K. Staatsarchiv at Vienna are open to applicants, and those in the K. K. Ministerien on permission of the Minister of the Interior; those in the Geh. Staatsarchiv and the K. Ministerien at Berlin on application to the Director; the State Records at Brussels and at the Hague are freely opened, but special permission is required for the use of the papers of this period in the Imperial Archives at St. Petersburg and in our own Foreign Office. In addition, some of the smaller Archives contain papers of interest, more especially the Royal Archives at Dresden—for instance the *Memoirs* of September 26, 1814, with regard to the management of the Russian question at the Congress.

It would seem as if no private correspondence remained unpublished which is likely to equal in interest that which has already been given to the world; although important Russian sources are only gradually being made accessible to Western readers.

For a complete list of the principal publications of the Congress, see Köhler, *Adressen*, Vol. vi, pp. 568 seq. He cites as a (protective) contemporary but the "*Guide des Reueues à Vienne pendant le Congrès*," published at Vienna in Jan. 1815 by "Jean Tugghien, coarrier de S. A. R. le Duc Albert de Saxe-Teschen."

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# CHAPTER XXIII.

## THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

### I.—INDIA AND CEYLON, 1768—1818.

#### UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL.

Besides a number of mss. belonging to Protected States, there is a mass of documents, relating both to the office of Native Commissioners and to those of the East India Company, in the office of the different Departments at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. Some of these have been collated (see below), some are in process of examination. Besides these there is much in England in private as well as in public custody, namely—

Letters and Diaries of Warren Hastings, belonging to John Mitford, of Winton Hall, Shropshire (now, or shortly to be, transferred to the Victoria Hall, Calcutta). Letters and Diaries of Sir George A. Barlow, in the possession of Major Sir H. W. W. Barker, Bart., R.A.

(1) In the India Office:

The Court Minutes of the East India Company, their Despatches to India, and the Replies. In vols. of *Wellesley Papers*, *Parker Papers*, *Messenden Records*, and other collections, some only collated in mss.; vol. III of the *Messenden Records* is especially noteworthy.

(2) In the British Museum:

A great mass of documents relating to the administration of Wellesley, including accounts of Native Service money, private and official correspondence, Minutes on the Minutes. A number of letters and papers on the period 1809-11.

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# CHAPTER XXIV.

## ST HELENA.

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# CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

## OF THE

### PRINCIPAL EVENTS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME.

1774. *The Quebec Act.*  
Treaty of Katchick-Katandji.
1780. First Annual Meeting.
1784. Separation of New Brunswick and Cape Breton from Nova Scotia.  
Foundation of the North-West Company.
1788. Supplementary [East India] Act.
1789. Foundation of a colony at Sydney (N.S.W.) by Captain Phillip.  
Trading settlement formed on Norfolk Island.  
Trial of Warren Hastings opens.
1792. Assassination of Salim III.  
Explosion of the Humberbury and Vespera rivers.
1793. Peace of Wenda (Russia and Germany).
- 1793-4. Voyage of Vancouver.
1794. Russo-Turkish Treaty at Sitova.  
The Constitutional Act for Canada.  
Treaty of Broomfield.
1795. Assassination of Gustavus III.  
Foundation of the Colony of Sierra Leone.  
Russo-Turkish Treaty of Jass.
- Sir John Shore appointed Governor General of India.
- 1795-6. British embassy to Ulan.
1796. Convention between Great Britain and Russia.  
Parliament of New South Wales.  
The Permanent Settlement of Bengal.
1796. Jan.-Feb. Earl FitzWilliam Visits in Ireland.  
February. Surrender of Caylee by the Dutch to Great Britain.  
April. Assailed of Warren Hastings.  
September. First British occupation of Cape Colony.  
The French Institute established.
1798. November. Death of the Empress Catherine II and accession of Paul I.  
British conquest of Demosera, Kascoffia and Berlin.
1797. February. Treaty of commerce between Great Britain and Russia.  
October. Peace of Campo Formio (France and Austria).
1798. April. Earl of Mornington appointed Governor General of India.  
June. Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt. Surrender of Malta to the French.  
.. Irish Intervention.

- 1798 August. Battle of the Nile. Landing of a French force in Sicilian Bay.  
November. Capitulation of Arcis.  
Ben captures Van Damme's Land.
- 1799 April. Defeat and death of Tipu Sultan at Mysore.  
October. Surrender of the Duke of York at Alkmaar.  
November. Overthrow of the Directory (28 Brumaire).  
Nov.-Dec. The French-Louis Capulet.  
December. Constitution of the year viii. Bonaparte's First Consul.  
Conquest of the Ionian Islands by the Russians and Turks.
- 1800 March. Election of Pope Pius VII.  
May. Bonaparte crosses the St. Bernard.  
June. Battle of Marengo.  
" French victory at Horstveldt.  
August. Union of England and Ireland.  
September. Surrender of Malta to England.  
November. Renewal of hostilities in Germany and Italy.  
December. Battle of Hohenlinden.  
The Second Armed Neutrality.
- 1800-1. Transient U-Overtures to the San Domingo.
- 1801 January. Annulations of Russia in Georgia.  
February. Treaty of Lunéville (France, Austria, and Germany).  
March. Proclamation of 1791.  
" Murder of Paul I. Accession of Alexander I.  
" Treaty of Florence.  
April. Battle of Copenhagen.  
May. The Constitution of Malacca.  
June. Maritime convention between Great Britain and Russia.  
" Treaty of Bucharest.  
" Treaty of St. Petersburg between Russia and Great Britain.  
July. The Concordat signed.  
August. Battle of Alexandria. Cairo taken.  
September. Reorganisation of the Russian Republic.  
Bonaparte leaves his death in the Channel.  
Defeat of Traugott's Armies.
- 1801-2 Sept.-Jan. Capitulation of the Chelysian Republic.
- 1802 March. The Peace of Amiens (Great Britain, France, Spain, etc.).  
April. Proclamation of the Concordat. The British Republic joined.  
May. Napoleon Bonaparte's Council for Life.  
" Creation of the Legion of Honour.  
August. Constitution of the year x.  
September. Incorporation of Piedmont, etc., with France.  
October. Treaty of Russia (East India Company and the British).  
First English Factory Act.  
Chambersland's In Great de Christianism.  
Rise in East's Service.  
Foundation of the Edinburgh Review.
- 1803 February. The Act of Mediation (Switzerland).  
May. Declaration of war between Great Britain and France.  
August. Outbreak of the Spanish War.  
The Russian Revolution in Germany.  
The Italian Concordat.  
Russia's Rebellion in Ireland.  
The British take Gambia, Sierra Leone, Tobago, and Demerara.  
Sale of Louisiana to the United States.

- 1804 March. The French Civil Code.  
 " Calvead's plan. Evacuation of the Duc d'Angoulême.  
 April. Pitt's return to office.  
 May. Franco-Dutch Treaty.  
 " Napoleon becomes Emperor of the French.  
 December. Spain declares war against Great Britain.  
 " Continuation of Napoleon.  
 Capture of Malta and Melina by the Whiskies.  
 Death of General Foch.  
 Defeat of Colonel Mowbray in Northern India.
- 1805 April. Treaty of St Petersburg between Great Britain and Russia.  
 May. Napoleon becomes King of Italy.  
 June. Code Napoleon extended to Italy.  
 July. Accession of Austria to the Treaty between Great Britain and Russia.  
 " Battle of Cape Finisera.  
 October. Battle of Trafalgar. Captivity of Ugo.  
 November. Convention between France and the Allies.  
 " Napoleon occupies Vienna.  
 December. Battle of Austerlitz.  
 " Treaty of Vienna between France and Russia.  
 Chamberlain's Act.  
 French occupation of Genoa.
- 1806 January. Second and final British occupation of Cape Colony.  
 " Peace of Friendship between France and Austria.  
 " Death of Pitt. Fox becomes Prime Minister.  
 February. The Treaty of Paris (France and Prussia).  
 March. Formation of the Grand Duchy of Berg.  
 " Joseph Bonaparte becomes King of Naples and Sicily.  
 June. Louis Bonaparte becomes King of Holland.  
 June-July. The Constitution of the Rhine confederated.  
 July. Battle of Wagram.  
 August. France II abdicates the Empire and becomes Francis I, Emperor of Austria. End of the Holy Roman Empire.  
 September. Death of Fox. Ministry of All the Talents.  
 October. War between France and Prussia.  
 " Battle of Jena and Auerstedt.  
 " French occupation of Prussian and other territories.  
 November. Napoleon's Berlin Decree.  
 December. War between Russia and Turkey.  
 French occupation of Dalmatia and Ragusa.  
 Venice added to the Italian Kingdom.  
 British expedition to Buenos Ayres.  
 Russian revolt.  
 Treaty with Rasht Singh.
- 1807 Jan. and Nov. British "Orders in Council."  
 February. Battle of Eylau.  
 " British expeditions to Turkey and Egypt.  
 March. The Portland Ministry formed. Canning becomes Foreign Secretary.  
 April. Convention of Bucharest between Russia, Prussia, and Sweden.  
 May. Death of the Sultan Selim III.  
 June. Great Britain accedes to the Convention of Bucharest.  
 " Battle of Friedland.  
 July. Lord Minto becomes Governor in India. Meeting at Valparaiso.  
 " Treaty of Tilsit between France and Russia.

- 1807 July. Treaty of Tilsit between France and Prussia. Occupation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Abolition of the United Kingdom of the Rhine.  
 September. British seizure of Dutch fleet at Copenhagen.  
 October. Marie becomes Minister of Home Affairs in Prussia.  
 " Prussian Edict of Emancipation. Schwarzenberg's military reforms.  
 " Franco-Spanish Treaty at Fontenablon.  
 Oct.-Nov. French invasion of Portugal. Flight of the Portuguese royal family. Navarino declares war on Great Britain.  
 November. The Milan Decree.  
 " Fichte's *Address to the German Nation*.  
 French Commercial Code.  
 Abolition of slavery in the British colonies.  
 Completion of the Simplon road connecting France with Italy.  
 Sir John Malcolm's first mission to Persia.
- 1808 Jan.-Oct. French Code of Criminal Procedure.  
 February. Seizure of Spanish fortresses by French troops.  
 Feb.-March. Russian invasion of Poland. The Act of Commerce renounces the liberties of the Grand Duchy.  
 March. Constitution of the Imperial University of France.  
 " Revolution of Aranjuez. Abdication of Charles IV.  
 May. The Dos Egos at Madrid. Abdication of Ferdinand at Bayona.  
 " Treaty entered into France.  
 " Joseph Bonaparte becomes King of Spain.  
 " The Papadunas formed at Kinsburgh.  
 May-June. General insurrection in Spain.  
 July. Accession of William II.  
 " Capitulation of Bayona at Bayona.  
 August. Arrival of the Arthur Wellesley in Spain. Battle of Vitoria.  
 Convention of Girona.  
 September. The Convention of Paris.  
 October. Congress and Convention of Erfurt.  
 December. Napoleon invades Spain and occupies Madrid.  
 The March of Aragon and the Duchies of Valencia, Murcia and Canton, incorporated in the Italian Kingdom.  
 Joachim Murat marches to the Kingdom of Naples.  
 Spain's political reforms.
- 1808-9 Sir John Moore's campaign.
- 1809 January. Battle of Corunna. Death of Moore.  
 " Treaty of the Danubius (England and Turkey).  
 March. Battle in Tyrol. Outbreak of war between France and Austria.  
 " French invasion of Portugal.  
 " Battle of Medellin.  
 " Revolution in Sweden and Abdication of Gustavus IV.  
 " Accession of Charles XIII.  
 April. Battles of Alcenburg and Eckmühl.  
 May. Accession of the Regal States by Napoleon.  
 " Napoleon enters Vienna.  
 " Battle of Aspern.  
 July. Wellesley expels Gauth from Portugal. Battle of Talavera.  
 " Battle of Wagram.  
 July-Nov. The Walcheren expedition.  
 September. Treaty of Frederichsberg (Russia and Sweden).  
 October. Treaty of Schiedersheim (France and Austria).  
 November. Battle of Grita.



- 1823 Renewal of the Charter of the East India Company for twenty years.  
*Crowning of the Blue Mountains and opening up of Northern Australia.*
- 1824 January. Peace of Kadz (between Jura and Denmark).  
 " First VII returns to Rome.  
 February. Conference of Châtillon-la-Palme.  
 March. Treaty of Commerce. Battle of Lützen.  
 " The Allies enter Paris and establish a Provisional Government.  
 April. Abdication of Napoleon. Louis XVIII returns to Paris.  
 " Battle of Toulouse. The French Constitutional Charter.  
 May. First Peace of Paris.  
 August. "Family Peace" of Berlin.  
 September. The Congress of Vienna meets.  
 November. Election of Charles XIII of Sweden to the throne of Norway.  
 Renewal treaty with Persia. Opening of the trade with India.
- 1825 January. Defensive Triple Alliance of Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia.  
 March. Declaration of the Congress of Vienna against the Slave Trade.  
 " Return of Napoleon. Flight of Louis XVIII.  
 " Treaty between Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Persia against  
 Disputes.  
 March-June. The Hundred Days.  
 June. Adoption of the Federal Act at the Congress of Vienna.  
 " Adoption of the Final Act by the Congress of Vienna.  
 " Battle of Ligny and Quatre Bras.  
 " Battle of Waterloo.  
 " Second abdication of Napoleon.  
 July. Second French Restoration. Return of Louis XVIII.  
 October. Napoleon lands on St Helena.  
 November. Second Peace of Paris.
- 1826 May. Death of Napoleon.









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- Benicia, George Francisco, Marquis de,** 189.
- Beilford, John Russell, sixth Duke of,** the second Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, 762.
- Bera, Marquis's address at,** 632.
- Betham, Richard's victory at,** 426.
- Bizka, Duke of Portuguese royal family from,** 324.
- Bolton, Secretary of United Provinces at,** 594; relations of, 435; property of, 529.
- Belgium, united to France, 85; French troops in, 528; proposed to unite with Holland, 129; Napoleon restores 200 to 201, 149; French drives 211 of, 569; campaign in, 222 seq.; the overthrow of, 223; 224; incorporated with Holland, 524; 525, 529.**
- Bologna, institutions at,** 507.
- Bol, Dr Andrew, and election of,** 523.
- Bolognese, Marshal, Duke de (1704-18),** 52; 541, 542.
- Bombay, Council, created (July 18, 1818),** 525; rights of, 525.
- Bombay, Moore up the road to,** 545.
- Boyd, John the French at,** 5.
- Breconshire, declared to belong to the Crown, 129; granted to Talbotville, 214; 215; no longer held by Talbotville, 224.**
- Bugal, river in, 71, seq.; 104, 545, 547; South River of, 547, 548, 549.**
- Burgundy, Louis Auguste Philippe, Duke de, created, 200; 201, 211, 212, 213, 214; complete victory, 215-16; reconnaissance of, 199; taken to Strasbourg, 199; at Colmar, 200; Austria gives, 202; at Tilsit, 197; and the creation of, 202, 203 seq.; in Cologne, 211; 212, 207; at Leipzig, 204.**
- Burgundy, Prince, Francis de, Legation, 215; and Parliamentary reform, 200.**
- Burgundy, Lord William Cavendish, British ambassador in Italy, 220; letters to master of House of Commons, 224; correspondence, 225; in India, 702.**
- Buss, Earl of, brother of, 712, 708.**
- Buxton, occupation of, 145, 152.**
- Buxton, John, Bishop of, 529-30.**
- Buxton, William, General, proposed, 200; to join the Portuguese army, 200; 201; 202; 203; 204; 205; 206; 207; 208; 209; 210; 211; 212; 213; 214; 215; 216; 217; 218; 219; 220; 221; 222; 223; 224; 225; 226; 227; 228; 229; 230; 231; 232; 233; 234; 235; 236; 237; 238; 239; 240; 241; 242; 243; 244; 245; 246; 247; 248; 249; 250; 251; 252; 253; 254; 255; 256; 257; 258; 259; 260; 261; 262; 263; 264; 265; 266; 267; 268; 269; 270; 271; 272; 273; 274; 275; 276; 277; 278; 279; 280; 281; 282; 283; 284; 285; 286; 287; 288; 289; 290; 291; 292; 293; 294; 295; 296; 297; 298; 299; 300; 301; 302; 303; 304; 305; 306; 307; 308; 309; 310; 311; 312; 313; 314; 315; 316; 317; 318; 319; 320; 321; 322; 323; 324; 325; 326; 327; 328; 329; 330; 331; 332; 333; 334; 335; 336; 337; 338; 339; 340; 341; 342; 343; 344; 345; 346; 347; 348; 349; 350; 351; 352; 353; 354; 355; 356; 357; 358; 359; 360; 361; 362; 363; 364; 365; 366; 367; 368; 369; 370; 371; 372; 373; 374; 375; 376; 377; 378; 379; 380; 381; 382; 383; 384; 385; 386; 387; 388; 389; 390; 391; 392; 393; 394; 395; 396; 397; 398; 399; 400; 401; 402; 403; 404; 405; 406; 407; 408; 409; 410; 411; 412; 413; 414; 415; 416; 417; 418; 419; 420; 421; 422; 423; 424; 425; 426; 427; 428; 429; 430; 431; 432; 433; 434; 435; 436; 437; 438; 439; 440; 441; 442; 443; 444; 445; 446; 447; 448; 449; 450; 451; 452; 453; 454; 455; 456; 457; 458; 459; 460; 461; 462; 463; 464; 465; 466; 467; 468; 469; 470; 471; 472; 473; 474; 475; 476; 477; 478; 479; 480; 481; 482; 483; 484; 485; 486; 487; 488; 489; 490; 491; 492; 493; 494; 495; 496; 497; 498; 499; 500; 501; 502; 503; 504; 505; 506; 507; 508; 509; 510; 511; 512; 513; 514; 515; 516; 517; 518; 519; 520; 521; 522; 523; 524; 525; 526; 527; 528; 529; 530; 531; 532; 533; 534; 535; 536; 537; 538; 539; 540; 541; 542; 543; 544; 545; 546; 547; 548; 549; 550; 551; 552; 553; 554; 555; 556; 557; 558; 559; 560; 561; 562; 563; 564; 565; 566; 567; 568; 569; 570; 571; 572; 573; 574; 575; 576; 577; 578; 579; 580; 581; 582; 583; 584; 585; 586; 587; 588; 589; 590; 591; 592; 593; 594; 595; 596; 597; 598; 599; 600; 601; 602; 603; 604; 605; 606; 607; 608; 609; 610; 611; 612; 613; 614; 615; 616; 617; 618; 619; 620; 621; 622; 623; 624; 625; 626; 627; 628; 629; 630; 631; 632; 633; 634; 635; 636; 637; 638; 639; 640; 641; 642; 643; 644; 645; 646; 647; 648; 649; 650; 651; 652; 653; 654; 655; 656; 657; 658; 659; 660; 661; 662; 663; 664; 665; 666; 667; 668; 669; 670; 671; 672; 673; 674; 675; 676; 677; 678; 679; 680; 681; 682; 683; 684; 685; 686; 687; 688; 689; 690; 691; 692; 693; 694; 695; 696; 697; 698; 699; 700; 701; 702; 703; 704; 705; 706; 707; 708; 709; 710; 711; 712; 713; 714; 715; 716; 717; 718; 719; 720; 721; 722; 723; 724; 725; 726; 727; 728; 729; 730; 731; 732; 733; 734; 735; 736; 737; 738; 739; 740; 741; 742; 743; 744; 745; 746; 747; 748; 749; 750; 751; 752; 753; 754; 755; 756; 757; 758; 759; 760; 761; 762; 763; 764; 765; 766; 767; 768; 769; 770; 771; 772; 773; 774; 775; 776; 777; 778; 779; 780; 781; 782; 783; 784; 785; 786; 787; 788; 789; 790; 791; 792; 793; 794; 795; 796; 797; 798; 799; 800; 801; 802; 803; 804; 805; 806; 807; 808; 809; 810; 811; 812; 813; 814; 815; 816; 817; 818; 819; 820; 821; 822; 823; 824; 825; 826; 827; 828; 829; 830; 831; 832; 833; 834; 835; 836; 837; 838; 839; 840; 841; 842; 843; 844; 845; 846; 847; 848; 849; 850; 851; 852; 853; 854; 855; 856; 857; 858; 859; 860; 861; 862; 863; 864; 865; 866; 867; 868; 869; 870; 871; 872; 873; 874; 875; 876; 877; 878; 879; 880; 881; 882; 883; 884; 885; 886; 887; 888; 889; 890; 891; 892; 893; 894; 895; 896; 897; 898; 899; 900; 901; 902; 903; 904; 905; 906; 907; 908; 909; 910; 911; 912; 913; 914; 915; 916; 917; 918; 919; 920; 921; 922; 923; 924; 925; 926; 927; 928; 929; 930; 931; 932; 933; 934; 935; 936; 937; 938; 939; 940; 941; 942; 943; 944; 945; 946; 947; 948; 949; 950; 951; 952; 953; 954; 955; 956; 957; 958; 959; 960; 961; 962; 963; 964; 965; 966; 967; 968; 969; 970; 971; 972; 973; 974; 975; 976; 977; 978; 979; 980; 981; 982; 983; 984; 985; 986; 987; 988; 989; 990; 991; 992; 993; 994; 995; 996; 997; 998; 999; 1000.**
- Buxton, William, General, proposed, 200; to join the Portuguese army, 200; 201; 202; 203; 204; 205; 206; 207; 208; 209; 210; 211; 212; 213; 214; 215; 216; 217; 218; 219; 220; 221; 222; 223; 224; 225; 226; 227; 228; 229; 230; 231; 232; 233; 234; 235; 236; 237; 238; 239; 240; 241; 242; 243; 244; 245; 246; 247; 248; 249; 250; 251; 252; 253; 254; 255; 256; 257; 258; 259; 260; 261; 262; 263; 264; 265; 266; 267; 268; 269; 270; 271; 272; 273; 274; 275; 276; 277; 278; 279; 280; 281; 282; 283; 284; 285; 286; 287; 288; 289; 290; 291; 292; 293; 294; 295; 296; 297; 298; 299; 300; 301; 302; 303; 304; 305; 306; 307; 308; 309; 310; 311; 312; 313; 314; 315; 316; 317; 318; 319; 320; 321; 322; 323; 324; 325; 326; 327; 328; 329; 330; 331; 332; 333; 334; 335; 336; 337; 338; 339; 340; 341; 342; 343; 344; 345; 346; 347; 348; 349; 350; 351; 352; 353; 354; 355; 356; 357; 358; 359; 360; 361; 362; 363; 364; 365; 366; 367; 368; 369; 370; 371; 372; 373; 374; 375; 376; 377; 378; 379; 380; 381; 382; 383; 384; 385; 386; 387; 388; 389; 390; 391; 392; 393; 394; 395; 396; 397; 398; 399; 400; 401; 402; 403; 404; 405; 406; 407; 408; 409; 410; 411; 412; 413; 414; 415; 416; 417; 418; 419; 420; 421; 422; 423; 424; 425; 426; 427; 428; 429; 430; 431; 432; 433; 434; 435; 436; 437; 438; 439; 440; 441; 442; 443; 444; 445; 446; 447; 448; 449; 450; 451; 452; 453; 454; 455; 456; 457; 458; 459; 460; 461; 462; 463; 464; 465; 466; 467; 468; 469; 470; 471; 472; 473; 474; 475; 476; 477; 478; 479; 480; 481; 482; 483; 484; 485; 486; 487; 488; 489; 490; 491; 492; 493; 494; 495; 496; 497; 498; 499; 500; 501; 502; 503; 504; 505; 506; 507; 508; 509; 510; 511; 512; 513; 514; 515; 516; 517; 518; 519; 520; 521; 522; 523; 524; 525; 526; 527; 528; 529; 530; 531; 532; 533; 534; 535; 536; 537; 538; 539; 540; 541; 542; 543; 544; 545; 546; 547; 548; 549; 550; 551; 552; 553; 554; 555; 556; 557; 558; 559; 560; 561; 562; 563; 564; 565; 566; 567; 568; 569; 570; 571; 572; 573; 574; 575; 576; 577; 578; 579; 580; 581; 582; 583; 584; 585; 586; 587; 588; 589; 590; 591; 592; 593; 594; 595; 596; 597; 598; 599; 600; 601; 602; 603; 604; 605; 606; 607; 608; 609; 610; 611; 612; 613; 614; 615; 616; 617; 618; 619; 620; 621; 622; 623; 624; 625; 626; 627; 628; 629; 630; 631; 632; 633; 634; 635; 636; 637; 638; 639; 640; 641; 642; 643; 644; 645; 646; 647; 648; 649; 650; 651; 652; 653; 654; 655; 656; 657; 658; 659; 660; 661; 662; 663; 664; 665; 666; 667; 668; 669; 670; 671; 672; 673; 674; 675; 676; 677; 678; 679; 680; 681; 682; 683; 684; 685; 686; 687; 688; 689; 690; 691; 692; 693; 694; 695; 696; 697; 698; 699; 700; 701; 702; 703; 704; 705; 706; 707; 708; 709; 710; 711; 712; 713; 714; 715; 716; 717; 718; 719; 720; 721; 722; 723; 724; 725; 726; 727; 728; 729; 730; 731; 732; 733; 734; 735; 736; 737; 738; 739; 740; 741; 742; 743; 744; 745; 746; 747; 748; 749; 750; 751; 752; 753; 754; 755; 756; 757; 758; 759; 760; 761; 762; 763; 764; 765; 766; 767; 768; 769; 770; 771; 772; 773; 774; 775; 776; 777; 778; 779; 780; 781; 782; 783; 784; 785; 786; 787; 788; 789; 790; 791; 792; 793; 794; 795; 796; 797; 798; 799; 800; 801; 802; 803; 804; 805; 806; 807; 808; 809; 810; 811; 812; 813; 814; 815; 816; 817; 818; 819; 820; 821; 822; 823; 824; 825; 826; 827; 828; 829; 830; 831; 832; 833; 834; 835; 836; 837; 838; 839; 840; 841; 842; 843; 844; 845; 846; 847; 848; 849; 850; 851; 852; 853; 854; 855; 856; 857; 858; 859; 860; 861; 862; 863; 864; 865; 866; 867; 868; 869; 870; 871; 872; 873; 874; 875; 876; 877; 878; 879; 880; 881; 882; 883; 884; 885; 886; 887; 888; 889; 890; 891; 892; 893; 894; 895; 896; 897; 898; 899; 900; 901; 902; 903; 904; 905; 906; 907; 908; 909; 910; 911; 912; 913; 914; 915; 916; 917; 918; 919; 920; 921; 922; 923; 924; 925; 926; 927; 928; 929; 930; 931; 932; 933; 934; 935; 936; 937; 938; 939; 940; 941; 942; 943; 944; 945; 946; 947; 948; 949; 950; 951; 952; 953; 954; 955; 956; 957; 958; 959; 960; 961; 962; 963; 964; 965; 966; 967; 968; 969; 970; 971; 972; 973; 974; 975; 976; 977; 978; 979; 980; 981; 982; 983; 984; 985; 986; 987; 988; 989; 990; 991; 992; 993; 994; 995; 996; 997; 998; 999; 1000.**
- Buxton, William, General, proposed, 200; to join the Portuguese army, 200; 201; 202; 203; 204; 205; 206; 207; 208; 209; 210; 211; 212; 213; 214; 215; 216; 217; 218; 219; 220; 221; 222; 223; 224; 225; 226; 227; 228; 229; 230; 231; 232; 233; 234; 235; 236; 237; 238; 239; 240; 241; 242; 243; 244; 245; 246; 247; 248; 249; 250; 251; 252; 253; 254; 255; 256; 257; 258; 259; 260; 261; 262; 263; 264; 265; 266; 267; 268; 269; 270; 271; 272; 273; 274; 275; 276; 277; 278; 279; 280; 281; 282; 283; 284; 285; 286; 287; 288; 289; 290; 291; 292; 293; 294; 295; 296; 297; 298; 299; 300; 301; 302; 303; 304; 305; 306; 307; 308; 309; 310; 311; 312; 313; 314; 315; 316; 317; 318; 319; 320; 321; 322; 323; 324; 325; 326; 327; 328; 329; 330; 331; 332; 333; 334; 335; 336; 337; 338; 339; 340; 341; 342; 343; 344; 345; 346; 347; 348; 349; 350; 351; 352; 353; 354; 355; 356; 357; 358; 359; 360; 361; 362; 363; 364; 365; 366; 367; 368; 369; 370; 371; 372; 373; 374; 375; 376; 377; 378; 379; 380; 381; 382; 383; 384; 385; 386; 387; 388; 389; 390; 391; 392; 393; 394; 395; 396; 397; 398; 399; 400; 401; 402; 403; 404; 405; 406; 407; 408; 409; 410; 411; 412; 413; 414; 415; 416; 417; 418; 419; 420; 421; 422; 423; 424; 425; 426; 427; 428; 429; 430; 431; 432; 433; 434; 435; 436; 437; 438; 439; 440; 441; 442; 443; 444; 445; 446; 447; 448; 449; 450; 451; 452; 453; 454; 455; 456; 457; 458; 459; 460; 461; 462; 463; 464; 465; 466; 467; 468; 469; 470; 471; 472; 473; 474; 475; 476; 477; 478; 479; 480; 481; 482; 483; 484; 485; 486; 487; 488; 489; 490; 491; 492; 493; 494; 495; 496; 497; 498; 499; 500; 501; 502; 503; 504; 505; 506; 507; 508; 509; 510; 511; 512; 513; 514; 515; 516; 517; 518; 519; 520; 521; 522; 523; 524; 525; 526; 527; 528; 529; 530; 531; 532; 533; 534; 535; 536; 537; 538; 539; 540; 541; 542; 543; 544; 545; 546; 547; 548; 549; 550; 551; 552; 553; 554; 555; 556; 557; 558; 559; 560; 561; 562; 563; 564; 565; 566; 567; 568; 569; 570; 571; 572; 573; 574; 575; 576; 577; 578; 579; 580; 581; 582; 583; 584; 585; 586; 587; 588; 589; 590; 591; 592; 593; 594; 595; 596; 597; 598; 599; 600; 601; 602; 603; 604; 605; 606; 607; 608; 609; 610; 611; 612; 613; 614; 615; 616; 617; 618; 619; 620; 621; 622; 623; 624; 625; 626; 627; 628; 629; 630; 631; 632; 633; 634; 635; 636; 637; 638; 639; 640; 641; 642; 643; 644; 645; 646; 647; 648; 649; 650; 651; 652; 653; 654; 655; 656; 657; 658; 659; 660; 661; 662; 663; 664; 665; 666; 667; 668; 669; 670; 671; 672; 673; 674; 675; 676; 677; 678; 679; 680; 681; 682; 683; 684; 685; 686; 687; 688; 689; 690; 691; 692; 693; 694; 695; 696; 697; 698; 699; 700; 701; 702; 703; 704; 705; 706; 707; 708; 709; 710; 711; 712; 713; 714; 715; 716; 717; 718; 719; 720; 721; 722; 723; 724; 725; 726; 727; 728; 729; 730; 731; 732; 733; 734; 735; 736; 737; 738; 739; 740; 741; 742; 743; 744; 745; 746; 747; 748; 749; 750; 751; 752; 753; 754; 755; 756; 757; 758; 759; 760; 761; 762; 763; 764; 765; 766; 767; 768; 769; 770; 771; 772; 773; 774; 775; 776; 777; 778; 779; 780; 781; 782; 783; 784; 785; 786; 787; 788; 789; 790; 791; 792; 793; 794; 795; 796; 797; 798; 799; 800; 801; 802; 803; 804; 805; 806; 807; 808; 809; 810; 811; 812; 813; 814; 815; 816; 817; 818; 819; 820; 821; 822; 823; 824; 825; 826; 827; 828; 829; 830; 831; 832; 833; 834; 835; 836; 837; 838; 839; 840; 841; 842; 843; 844; 845; 846; 847; 848; 849; 850; 851; 852; 853; 854; 855; 856; 857; 858; 859; 860; 861; 862; 863; 864; 865; 866; 867; 868; 869;**





















Pinada, Infante of Spain, arrest of, 483.  
Pinocchio, and the Congress of Vienna, 386.

Pius VIII., list of, 298. Napoleon's exiles, capture of, 375; 376; attempt to convey again to, 377; threatened by Napoleon, in case of English completely and completely, 403; French Embassy of, 414; 415; Eugene at, 412; Alliance at, 403; Italian intervention in Spanish War, 387; Coalition and French at Congress of Vienna, 390; Term of, 400; from city of, 413; from Allied Forces at, 403.

Prussian on the Rhine, University of, 317.  
Prussia, Alexander George, General, against First Russia, 446.

Prussia, General, at Elg, 336.

Protestant League, Duke of York and Albany, 447; against Queen Caroline, 379; and Catholic Consecration, 330; against the Anglican as approached, 341; re-organization, 341; relations of with George III., 340.

Protestant League, J. King of France, 374-7; 375; relations of with France, 380; 381-2, and the Congress of Vienna, 379; 380-1; peace in Treaty of peace (May, 1814), 387.

Protestant League, King of Württemberg, at the Congress of Vienna, 341; marriage of, 341; 342.

Protestant League, and the French Reg., 41; Napoleon at the time of, 381; 382.

Protestant League, King of Prussia, 41; 42, 43, 44; and French policy of, 40; after of Napoleon to, 41; French policy to, 41; 42, 43; relations of with France, 380; with Russia, 41; French to become Emperor, 376; under Napoleon to Napoleon, 376; relations to Napoleon, 377; peace proposed to, 378; capture of, 378; capture of, with Russia, 379, at Moscow, 379; 380, peace offered to, 381; captured by Alexander, 381; 382; and Alexander, 381; Napoleon's demands upon, 387; 388; capture of, in regard to 381, 387; capture of, 382; military reform of, 380; 381; relations of to Russia, 380; 381; offered to Napoleon, 380; 381; 382-3, in the war of 1803, 382; 383; 384; 385; Napoleon's 381; relations of, 380; Napoleon, 387; 388-9; and the Allied Council of War, 387; at Leipzig, 388; 389, 390; relations of with Austria, 389; under Paris, 389; 390; at Vienna, 389-91; and the Federal Act, 391; under Vienna, 391; and the Holy Alliance, 391.

Protestant League, Duke of Brunswick-Lüne, on Brunswick-Lüne, Duke of.

Protestant League, King of Denmark, at the Congress of Vienna, 380.

Protestant League, Treaty of (1803), 382; 387.

Protestant League, Treaty of (July, 1805),

387; capture of, under the old constitution (1811), 382.

Pope, Innocent, his death, 41.

Pope, John, Archbishop, and the Quarterly Review, 387.

Pope, General, Spanish general at San Sebastian, 450; as Valencia, 450.

Pope, Louis, General, French general at Andorra, 381; captures Andorra at the battle of Andorra, 380.

Pope, Louis, Duke of (1805), 380, 381.

Pope, Louis, King of Germany at, 380.

Pope, General, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; restoration of, to France, 381.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.

Pope, Louis, French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380; French claims to, 380.





- [illegible]



- [illegible]

- agitation in, 309; 311, 320, 326; pro-  
cesses of, 309; British Empire in, 705-65  
Jahres, Money notes, 717  
Jahrbuch, Duke of, tried and acquitted,  
429  
Jahrbuch, Myraa between, 60; commander  
of 61; Grand Army crosses Danube into,  
356  
Jahre, San-Augusta-Friedrichs, 126  
Jah, camp in the 32; 33; American troops  
near the 326, 334  
Jahrbuch, Duke of, 333; accompanied  
by Austria, 338  
Jahre, Austria, conquest of, 41; independ-  
ence of, recognized, 14; refused (1809)  
by the British, 349; relinquished by  
Alexander, 359; ruled in France, 360;  
British prisoners in the, 363  
Jahre, French designs upon, 35; suggested  
French plan at, 35; Napoleon's plans  
for attacking, 35; 36; and the Emperor,  
36; destruction by, 363; rebellion in,  
36; part of France with, 702 esp.;  
conquest of, 702  
Jahre, French ruler, 135  
Jahre, battle in the, 363-4  
Jahre, and the "General administration  
of conquered territories," 347  
Jahre, Austrian emperor, 346  
Jahre, at Prussia (1807), 319  
Jahre, industrial experiments of, 377  
Jah, Austrian empire II, 38 esp.; French  
process at, 41; relations of, with the  
French, 310; 311; rule of Napoleon in,  
37; spirit of, 377; Royal Legation  
opened to, 38; Napoleon II, 387;  
issue of the British blockade (concerned  
in, 388; French events in, 389; Napoleon  
called to the throne of 394; kingdom of,  
397-7; Austrian empire II, 379, and the  
Congress of Vienna, 397 esp.; Napoleon's  
designs in regard to, 394  
Jahre in 1809; 3. Lorenz, Eugene,  
Spanish agent, 397-8  
Jahre, British Minister at Rome, 394  
Jahre, France France, sent to 397, 399  
Jahre, French agent in England and  
Ireland, Superintendent of, 397  
Jahre-Krieg, French war, Prussian 180-  
Napoleon, 397, at the Congress of Vienna,  
399  
Jahrbuch, Joseph-Maria, inventor of linen,  
126  
Jahrbuch, Jean-Jacques, 127  
Jahre, the, to be closed in English trade,  
379  
Jahre, Pacific Single, 315 of, and 316, 316,  
317  
Jahre, announced to, 702  
Jahrbuch, landing of Napoleon at, 707  
Jahrbuch, Order of the, 316-7  
Jahre, San Augustin, Duke general,  
successor of Cape Town by, 712; suc-  
cessor of Java by, 714  
Jahre, Treaty of, 365  
Jahre, captured (1811, 1812) occupation of,  
702; returned to Holland, 702; Holland  
billion in, 714  
Jahre, Prussia, editor of the *Abendblatt*  
Gazette, 367  
Jahrbuch von Berlin, Baron Konrad von,  
Austrian general, 360; commander of, in  
Germany, 360; 367  
Jahre, Prussian army near, 376; blockade  
at, 376; battle of (1806), 379 esp.; 380,  
380, 382, 418, 397; battle at the  
University of, 383  
Jahre, German Federation, 37  
Jahre, Daily, influence of, 373  
Jahre, Royal North, blockade of, 712  
Jahre, blockade of Austria, 316-7; 368;  
conquered the army of Louis XVIII,  
368-7; 368-7; domain covered of war,  
368; 369  
Jahre, Day, of Berlin, Prussia Report of  
Foreign, demands the withdrawal of  
troops, 368  
Jahre, battle, in New South Wales, 730  
Jahre, Henry, Baron, Russian general, at  
the Congress of Vienna, 367  
Jahrbuch, Treaty of (1806), 369  
Jahre, Vienna, 36  
Jahre, 1. 2. war, at the Congress of  
Vienna, 369  
Jahre, King of Spain, see Bonaparte,  
Joseph  
Jahre II, Emperor of Austria, and Turkey,  
36; recent history policy of, 414  
Jahrbuch, Emperor of the French, 70-6,  
71, 377, 378, 379-80  
Jahre, Jean-Augustin, Marshal of France,  
71; 121; at Vienna, 407; director of  
King Joseph's army, 407; at Russia,  
407; strongholds garrison of Napoleon,  
409  
Jahre des Etrangers, 387; 397  
Jahre de Calcutta, 389  
Jahre de Paris, 389  
Jahre, Austria, Duc d'Angoulême, French  
general, ordered to 389, 389-4; French  
in Portugal surrounded by, 389; Italian  
processes which resulted by (1808), 389;  
attack 389, 400; in possession of  
Portugal, 409 esp.; 414-5; and the cam-  
paigns of 1808, 408; proposals to the  
British, 407-1; 408; at Russia, 411; and  
the Russian campaign, 409 esp.  
Jahre, British mercenaries to 389, 408  
Jahre, Austria general, 61  
Jahrbuch, Myraa, France, Janine  
helped by, 400  
Jahre, Napoleon war, 373  
Jahrbuch, Friedrich Schlegel, Count of,  
Prussian Marshal, Governor of Berlin,  
387; 397, 397  
Jahre, General at, 316-8; occupation  
of (1810, 318; 379, 379, 387; part of,  
called to France, 380-4

- [illegible]



- [illegible]





- 1804; on the Council of War, 362, et. seq. to the Burghes, 373
- Maurice, doctor of, incorporated in the Italian Republic, 498
- Maximilian-Léopold, Charles, Prince of Saxe-general, 145; commander of 3000 Swiss army, 341; advice of, to the Emperor, 333; repatriation at Viter, 444-5
- Meisner, British diplomatic agent at Tientsin, 387-8
- Meisner, de Alenbourg, and Oursel, 1-15
- Meisner, William James, and the United Kingdom, 333 seq.
- Meisner, Anton, in India, 391 seq.
- Meisner, August, Major-General, Governor of Free State, 336
- Meisner, French colonial expedition to, 34
- Meisner, Sir, French-Alexis de, 333, 335
- Meisner, Richard, over in Britain, 337
- Meisner, Lord Mervyn at, 333; Lord Mervyn and, 333; return to, 333, 335
- Meisner, Treaty of (1804), 33, 333; Godey and, 405; Ferdinand and, 405, 432; introduction of, 403; Meisner at, 405; spirit of, 405; French return to, 405; King Joseph's return, 405-6, 411; the public, return to, 442 seq.; France and, 405; Verges and, 403; Wellington and, 405; Verges, 405; Austria and, 405; Wellington again, 411; promulgated by the French, 411; arranged, 411-4
- Meisner, Charles IV's manifesto in the, 405
- Meisner, French agent at, 371; and, 371-2; 373-5; 382, 385; return to, 385, 387; 400; return of Verges to, 411; new corps formed at, 412; standing of, 400-4, 415
- Meisner de Godey, Charles-François, French General, called to aid for West India, 335
- Meisner G. Baron of Turing, 345
- Meisner, Treaty of (1786), 335
- Meisner, English colony at (1805), 375; Sir John Mervyn at, 383
- Meisner, French Commissioner at, 30; territory of, 34; returned to position of a religious war, 335; Lutheran missionary at, 334; magazine formed at, 337; Meisner at, 375; Meisner at, 335; attempt to carry position to, 377; French army at, 345; Mervyn's design on, 375; introduction of, 375; Meisner's return to, 335
- Meisner, Friedrich Karl, Meisner at, 34; on the Turing
- Meisner, French de, 335
- Meisner, Jean-Léopold Sir Friedrich Louis, commander of expedition to, 34; 34; Meisner, Sir, and Verges, 335
- Meisner, Sir Ferguson, General, at West India, 385-6
- Meisner, English at, 345
- Meisner, copy of, 345-6; 347
- Meisner, General, and Verges, 344
- Meisner, Sir John, in India, 391, 393; mission of, to Paris, 393
- Meisner, Sir Charles Meisner, writing at Paris, 393
- Meisner, Charles-François, de, French general, commander at, 371, 403, 404
- Meisner, August, Meisner de, 335, 337
- Meisner, Meisner's military expedition to, 335
- Meisner, Meisner's at, 33, 343, 345, 346-347; 347, 348-2
- Meisner, Sir John Mervyn, Sir Karl at, 41; and the West India, 403 seq.
- Meisner, Meisner, 345-6, 403
- Meisner, English's U. S. position, 345, 346; mission of, to the French, 346; mission of, to the French, 411; mission of, 411-4; called by Verges to Meisner, 405; mission to the English of Meisner, 345; 346; mission of, 345; Meisner and, 344-5, 345; a course of English campaign, 345; the English return from, this course of, 345; Meisner, 344; Meisner's at, 345, 346
- Meisner, Sir, rise of, 345; led of, 347
- Meisner, Treaty of, 345; French and, 345
- Meisner, Charles-François, Comte, French general, mission of, in India, 405
- Meisner, Thomas, 345; French Meisner, Commander of England, 371
- Meisner, called to India, 34, 345; 345
- Meisner, called to France, 405; Austria's return to (1786) 34, 345, 346; mission return from, 345
- Meisner, war of, 345; against the, 345, 346, 347; military power of the, 345; and Meisner, 345; on war with the Meisner, 345; Meisner and the, 345, 346
- Meisner, Meisner John at, 345; 405
- Meisner, Jean-Léopold, Comte, French general, master Col. Verges and Meisner, 405
- Meisner, Meisner's in the, 345
- Meisner, Meisner of, 34-5, 34, 35, 36 seq., 350, 352
- Meisner, Meisner, 34
- Meisner, August-François, Duc de Meisner, 34; Meisner's Meisner of Meisner, 341, 342; Meisner's at, 345; Meisner's Meisner of Meisner, 345
- Meisner, August-François, Meisner at, 345
- Meisner, Meisner, Meisner of Meisner and Meisner, 341; 342; Meisner and Meisner led the power, 345; Meisner of, 344; Meisner of, 345
- Meisner, Meisner, Meisner, 34; Meisner's Meisner of Meisner, 345; and Meisner, 345





- More, Thomas, lieutenant of, on the River, 375; 376
- Morre, Thomas, Governor of St. Louis, 380
- Morrell, Charles-Antoine-Louis-Jacques, Comte, French general, defeated at Chancellorsburg, 333
- Morrell, battle of (1805), 334
- Moravia, destroyed in, 31; Napoleon in, 335
- Moravia, Jean-Yves, French general, 313; 32, 33, 33-3, 34, 35, 35-3, 37; death of, 337
- Moravia, de St. Mary, Marquis-Louis-Elie, Administrator of Parma, 335; (1805), 336
- Moravia, Don Juan, Spanish revolutionary, 34
- Moravia, Austria general, 35
- Moravia, Richard Volpe Walling, Earl of, Governor-General of India, 331 app.
- Morrell, Lord, English politician, 332
- Morrell, R. A. G. J., Duke of Devon, Marquis of Devon, marquis the Duke of Devon, 313; defeated by Cornwall, 337; as Thomas, 338; at Mainz, 334; captured on march on Canal, 335; failed (Baltimore), 337; became British, 338; at Chancellorsburg, 338; march of, 339; 339, 340; left to Russia, 339; joined Napoleon, 337; as Russian general, 340; General Foch, 341
- Morrell, George A., on Russian-Austrian War, continuation of War in, 35; 37; Napoleon in, 335; 336; campaigns of, 336; march of Grand Army in, 337 app.; French army into, 338; evacuation of, 338; Napoleon in, 339
- Morrell, de St., Spanish battle in, 338
- Morrell, Joseph, 340
- Morrell, Frederick Ferdinand Earl, Baron von, Count of, 341
- Morrell, Johann von, 339; 339; acceptance the History of Peter Frederick, 337
- Morrell, French revolution in, 35; Napoleon of, 35; Prussian (October 15, 1805)
- Morrell, E. J. H., Count von, Hungarian campaign, at the Congress of Vienna, 339; 339 app.; 339 app.
- Morrell, Count of, 339; threatened to march in, 341; wedding of Russian-Bavarian in, 341; Treaty of (1815), 341
- Morrell, and the last rebellion, 339
- Morrell, Charles Marie, joint King, 339; 339
- Morrell, Justice, King of Naples, French general, 34, 34-3, 35, 35; capture Gera and Reg, 337; Napoleon's letters in, 340; continuation of French march, 338; under the Duke, 338; John Day at Stuttgart, 34; Joseph Austria army, 338; 337; joint Napoleon, 338; at 338; march, 338; under the Grand Army of Reg, 337; as the East of the Spanish Confederation, 338; claims Reg, 338; and Reg, 338; at Reg, 338 app.; under Napoleon, 334; advances on Kingsberg, 337; controls Joseph Napoleon in Naples, 338; and the Duke of Naples, 337; in Reg, 338; captures the Duke, 338-9; position during at Naples to East of Portugal, 338-9; and the Grand Army of Reg, 338 app.; at Reg, 338; at Madrid, 338 app.; return to France, 338; in Reg, 338; and the French revolution, 338 app.; at Reg, 338-9, 339; as Leipzig, 338 app.; and General Napoleon, 337; in Italy, 339; 338-9; battle of, 338; march to Turin, 338; continuation of war against, 338
- Morrell, George of Stuttgart in, 338
- Morrell, John, and the Duke of Naples, 338
- Morrell, James, General, Governor of Canada, 341
- Morrell, John, and the Quarterly Review, 337
- Morrell, Sir John, General, battle of Chancellorsburg, 338; with Sir Chancellorsburg, 338; and the war with Russia, 338
- Morrell, Admiral, expedition of, to Cuba, 338
- Morrell, Count of Aragon in, 332
- Morrell, J. P., Duke of York, 338
- Morrell, British officer in Austria, 337
- Morrell, campaign in, 338, 339
- Morrell, position of, 338
- Morrell, and the Spanish war, 338; campaign of, with Naples, 338 app.; death of, 339
- Morrell, Count of Aragon in, 332
- Morrell, Count von, 337
- Morrell, the Year First and, 33; 33; are created by the French, 33; condition of, 33; ministry of, 338; created by Napoleon, 338; Russian invasion in, 338; Napoleon and the Grand of 338-9; French troops enter (1805), 337; invasion of Austria in, 338; completed to create French campaign, 338; Battle of Chancellorsburg, 338; 338; French invasion in, 337; Pope during campaign over, 338; battle against, 338; French then and, 338; destruction of it, 338; saved by Joseph, 338; march of French into in, 338-9; French invasion over in, 338; invasion of, 338; Russian troops in, 338
- Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, and the Congress, Chap. I, pages, 37, 38, 39; campaign to replace the Year First I (see England, 37 app.; 37, 38, 39 app.; 38; from his battle in the Channel, 38; was policy of 38-39; plans of Campaign (1805), 38 app.; plans against England, 38 app.; and the peace of Amiens, 38 app.; and the Victory of Austerlitz, 38-39, and Brunswick, 38.



























- Takewitsch, Russian general, and Nagai-  
lov, 487; crosses the Oder, 114; at  
Lützen, 332
- Takhtschoff, Paul Tschirch, Russian  
admiral and general, commands army  
of the Danube, 481; before Hermann-  
burg, 484; marches to the Rur, 484  
supp.; John Wingenbach, 111; at  
Breslau, 110
- Taktsching, Russian Cossack, at, 419
- Takuma, French officer sent to, 109;  
French ambassador at, 111
- Tallin, Russian attack on, 440
- Tallin, Louis Bonaparte at, 271; general  
at allies in, 437; Treaty of (1812), 439
- Tambor, France at, 28; 34
- Tamir, the, and Congress of Vienna, 489
- Tamshere, Russian general, crosses the  
Oder, 114; enters Hamburg, 113
- Tanaka Okei, Grand Master of the, 16
- Tanz, great town of the, 119
- Tarkenton, American-Germ, Count, 151-2
- Tarkenton, J. A., Congress and the English  
cavalry, 89; at Waterloo, 104-105
- Tarot, Bay and Archipelago of, the, French  
fleet at, 171; Archipelago (Tahiti) and,  
184; capture of, 111; ceded to France,  
104; 107
- Tarot, Francis-Henri, Baron von, Aus-  
trian minister, 19; 40; Foreign  
Minister, 100; 111, 101
- Tassey, Mary to, 10
- Tatler, Edmund, Lord Batton, and the  
Libel Bill, 679
- Tatary-Scots, battle operations, 474; 481
- Tatt, release of Napoleon from, 437;  
Russian army crosses Russian at, 101;  
conferences at, 100; Treaty of, 295, 295,  
295, 294, 294, 294, 297, 296, 296, 296;  
secret articles of, 297; 296, 296, 296,  
297, 296, 296, 297, 296, 296, 296, 296;  
Treaty of, in part of Alexander I, 179;  
296, 296, 296
- Tatt, Baron of Russia, 101; relations of,  
with the British, 710; 710 supp.; with  
Russia, 710; power of, 710 supp.; death  
of, 710
- Tatt, released (1804), 100; released by  
England, 104; ceded to Great Britain,  
100; 704, 704
- Tatt, an English
- Tatt, recognized by Russia, 474; cross-  
ing, 474; 474
- Tatt, Treaty of (1797), 100; battle of  
(1797), 101
- Tatt, General von, officer of, 440; 487, 480
- Tatt, Count, Russian ambassador, 100-101;  
101, 101
- Tatt, an German-German
- Tatt, with, pamphlet of, 104; 497;  
death of, 704
- Tatt, Maria, member of the Old Guard, 101
- Tatt, remainder of, 101; ceded to France  
in, 104
- Tattschoff, Russian general, commands  
army (1812), 481; at Lütz., 489;  
commands main army, 487; 101 supp.
- Tattschoff, Russian army at the, 489
- Tattschoff, Louis at, 484; 489; Man-  
stein at, 100
- Tattschoff, French attack upon, 484-5
- Tattschoff, Russian expedition (1812) sent to,  
48; French fleet at, 10; 210, 210;  
British blockade of, 101; 214, 214;  
Russia and, 111; English ships at, 210;  
Alexander and, 107; English at, 104-104;  
Russia crosses to, 107; Louis at, 104
- Tattschoff, battle of, 489
- Tattschoff, Russian expedition at, 104
- Tattschoff, Antonio-Louis-Guido, Count,  
Count to, 107
- Tattschoff, battle of (1809), 100; 140,  
140 supp.; capitulation of, 140
- Tattschoff, the Russian, Imperial-ordered in  
Portuguese army, crosses Galicia, 487
- Tattschoff, Wellington sends troops  
to, 489
- Tattschoff, attacked by Tipton, 704; 117
- Tattschoff, battle of, 100
- Tattschoff, Jean-Baptiste, Count, 100 supp.
- Tattschoff, French army at, 48; Russian  
remains (1809) of, 48; Council of,  
100; Bishop of, captured, 101; captured  
by Austria, 107
- Tattschoff, arrives at (1812), 48
- Tattschoff, the Treaty of (August 4, 1812),  
110; 101; Napoleon at, 111; Louis  
XVIII at, 111
- Tattschoff, ceded to France by, 487
- Tattschoff, captured by Austria, 101; part of,  
48; captured by Austria, 100
- Tattschoff, captured by Great Britain, 70;  
10; Nelson serves in, 110; capture of,  
101; 101
- Tattschoff, count of, 48
- Tattschoff, Francis-Henri, 100
- Tattschoff, Papinian-Guido, under Mel-  
ville, 100
- Tattschoff, Napoleon at, 100
- Tattschoff, General-Jean-François, Count,  
French admiral, in command of French  
expedition, 100; dissolved, 100
- Tattschoff, member of the French Committee  
on Civil Procedure (1804), 101
- Tattschoff, the, Year at, 10
- Tattschoff, Spanish defeat at, 440-4
- Tattschoff, the, 100
- Tattschoff, the, meetings at, 9, new count  
found at, 10; marriage of Napoleon at,  
101; welcome to Louis XVIII at, 100;  
preparations in, 100; wedding banquet  
in, 100; Napoleon at, 110; Louis XVIII  
returns to, 100
- Tattschoff, Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne,  
Viscount de, officer of, 10
- Tattschoff, Maria released to march on, 10;  
to be political, 100
- Tattschoff, Treaty of (August and 77), French  
army 100, 10; French ships at,  
100; relations of, with Russia, 101, 100.





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Tarwater, Kayfish Lake at, 31; Goshute mts. from, 32

Tarwater, Lord, see Barthol, Francis (Japan); Germany, several Maxims of mounted; also; Pyrowich, Russia general, at Novoross, 219; attacks French, 220

Togo, Mr George, in Cape Colony, 758

Tok, Frederik, Duke of, see Frederick Augustus, Duke of York and Albany

Ton, von Wurzburg, Baron David Ludwig, Count, Prussian field-marshal, 225; commander the expedition at Shingoen, 225; commander of Prussian corps, 1/2 reg.; German-General of Staff and 51st Corps, 224; marches on Wladiberg, 224; at Nauman, 224; relations of, with Ruker, 224; at Minkow, 227; at Leipzig, 228; loses French column, 229; at Chikow, 227; at Lein, 230

Town, Arthur, and Mr English and myself, 227; and the Irish, 228, 770

Travels, Prince Alexander, 244; marches of, with a Russian L, 244

Travels, Prussian's school at, 222; 227

Travels, India, India of the Afghans, 714

Travels, expedition of, by Portugal, 715

Travels, observed by Follenius (July 15, 1805), 224

Travels, England at, 228

Travels, General, 221-2, 227, 228

Travels, results of 224; British operations in, 224-225

Travels, French army at, 228

Travels, observations at, 228

Travels, people of (Pentecost), stark school in Leipzig, 228

Travels, India at, 228

Travels, expedition to the British (July 21, 1805), 228

Travels, E. E. E., Great war, General, march of, 225-6; 221; at Warsaw, 221, 222

Travels, retreat of Russian to, 227; fighting at July 25-26, 1805, 227; marches of, 224; 225-6

Travels, South of, 228

Travels, Johann Heinrich, 227

Travels, Nicholas, 22, 25, 50

Travels, Peter, 222, 22-23

Travels, Department of the, 227

Travels, Russian's marches at, 22, 228. See at, 224, 224; March at, 222; the expedition in, 228; manuscripts of 228; Society of Public Utility founded at, 227; and the Congress of Vienna, 228

Travels, German Society of the Congress of Vienna, 228

Travels, Congress, President of Magistrate Federal Commission, 228

